Global Dynamics

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Conscription and European Security

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In the 25 year process of European reintegration, military conscription – as a feature of the European political scene – has largely vanished. The evaporation of sizeable, conscripted militaries reflects the widespread belief that conscription is a political, economic and military anachronism reminiscent of times of great continental insecurity and international militarism which are no longer considered valid sources of European identity. Instead, security identities in post-Cold War Europe are increasingly forged by cosmopolitan values such as democratic internationalism, human rights protection, legal-secularism, political transparency (including the democratisation of foreign policy) and the social market economic system.

It seems that Europe is ready to bury and forget Cold War reminders as the EU boldly (if cautiously) extends and deepens its regional and international commitments. However, as this work argues, some Cold War conceptions are better served public and polished. Conscription is one such conception. EU interests – its ability to fulfil its new-found international responsibilities – would be greatly enhanced by recycling and reshaping, rather than abandoning conscription to suit the changing international political environment.

In popular historical and political discourses, conscription and war are intractably connected. This is because, with few exceptions, conscription was based on war-fighting, often enacted to prepare a population for military service on an active front. Commonly, narratives of conscription have been subordinated to narratives of war. This work abandons such a causal view of conscription and offers normative insights into the developing linkages between extensive peace-time conscription efforts and the emergence of international society with responsible international citizens. This work argues that conscription – in democratic states – must be extended and deepened (reintroduced

where it has been abolished) to prepare democratic societies for dealing with the 21ˢᵗ century international security agenda through a mixture of moral, legal and technical education, specialised training and experience. Two main hypotheses are explored at length.

Hypothesis 1:

Peace-time conscription extended to include moral, legal and technical education decreases state level aggression and helps to 'humanitise' soldiering.

Hypothesis 2:

Mature democratic states extending mandatory education are better prepared socially, economically, militarily and morally to deal with changing international security conditions of the 21ˢᵗ century.

This work is meant to add to the growing literature focussing on developing responsible international society. By providing an alternative view of conscription and how it may be utilised for inducing the emergence of an international society characterised by cosmopolitan values and governed by a reasonably agreed upon morality which places the sanctity of human life above all else, it is hoped that this work inspires other academics, students of politics and those interested in the future of international society to join the increasingly public demands that democratic states, which pride themselves as the vanguard defenders and proliferators of democratic values, make international contributions to those ends.

As non-conventional, asymmetrical security threats increase in frequency and ferocity, there is growing concern within democratic societies that traditional military provisions are not adequate to defend the rights and values inherent to democratic citizens. To allay such concerns, democratic states must drastically reassess their policy measures regarding poverty, unemployment, crime and violence prevention and failed states within regional and international contexts. Further education and advanced, widened and deepened peace-time conscription is an appropriate vehicle towards the achievement of two key goals:

1 Advancing a cosmopolitan perspective in the political landscape of a state's citizenry and increase his/her attachment to wider international society

2 Promoting democratic responsibility – among citizens – to lead by example, through the utilisation of citizens' educational period towards realising a more prepared and humane international society

This work concludes by making specific recommendations – directed at democratic governments – regarding the actualisation of the varieties and direction of progressive peace-time conscription programmes. These are intended to contribute to continuing debates over the future of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) which depends on normative regional defence to ensure that Europe's democratic values are not bartered away for intangible security against intangible threats. It is my firm belief that an extensive programme of peace-time conscription, widened to include many nonmilitary programmes, and deepened to give substance to such programmes, will invariably contribute to the long-term safety, security and international influence of the EU.

(Re)Defining Conscription for the 21st Century

There are suspiciously few definitions of conscription in international relations literature. Most discussions, essays and books which deal with conscription simply avoid academically defining it and tend to rely on popular dictionary definitions. Some international relations theorists simply discuss the phenomenon without defining it at all, in the hope that a reasonable understanding may naturally emerge. In all, most intellectual examinations of conscription lack a robust definition and instead simply declare it mandatory (or forced) military obligations,[1] call-up, or in American political jargon, 'the draft.'

Christopher Jehn and Zachary Selden's work entitled, "The End of Conscription in Europe?"[2] serves as a strong example of this. These authors immerse readers into a political and economic narrative of conscription, which while very insightful, spends too much time evaluating shifts in European perceptions of conscription without fully explaining what conscription really entails. They are hardly alone. A level of subject reification is present in nearly all surveys and theoretical articles focussed on conscription.[3]

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(Re)Defining conscription is essential. Theories of peace- and war-time conscription may help paint a more vivid picture of international society and the division of responsibility within it. Thus, on the theoretical side, (re)defining conscription narrows inquiries and allows the degree of focus required to explore the murky and nuanced implications. On the practical side, this paper advocates the wide-scale reintroduction of conscription programmes throughout the members of the European Union. Such a position will, hopefully, spark a much needed debate over international society and Europe's ability to carve out a niche of 'civilian power.' (Re)Defining conscription will, it is hoped, assuage critics of peace-time conscription by clearly and unambiguously projecting the scope and boundaries of such programmes.

Peace-time conscription is understood as a system of advanced practical education focussing on challenges to local, regional and international society. Such conscription programmes parallel programmes of higher education in that they are mandatory to all citizens of a state not attending college, university, or equivalent degree or certificate programmes. Peace-time conscription is meant to increase citizens' sense of responsibility towards society (local, regional, and international); increase awareness of challenges to those societies and brings 'civilian power' to the foreground of overcoming such challenges.

Crucially, the parameters of such a practical education within a peace-time conscription programme are deeply reliant on recognising current security challenges, implying a direct correspondence between security and education. This requires a great deal of flexibility. The European Union, long thought of as a slow and reactive institution, can revitalise its image through proffering flexibility to its budding foreign policy and defence culture in its extended EU boundaries. Flexibility – in recognising potential challenges to international society; in the deployment of political and economic resources; of sociological preparation, and in times of crises; of military force – is central to the maintenance and further development of civil society (on all levels) and may act as a guidepost for developing democracies around the world.

This linkage between conscription as advanced practical education and a recognised security environment reaches back in history. However, until the late 20th and early 21st centuries, advanced education

manifest in conscription was rooted in militarism, and the skills developed during conscription were meant to prepare a state's youth for active military service. This has been the tragedy of conscription since its widespread introduction in Napoleonic times – that preparatory education of a state's youth implied war-training.

From such tragic beginnings, peace-time conscription – to fill normative objectives within international society – may be launched.

'Civilian Power' and Peace-Time Conscription

Before delving into the main arguments of this work, a brief discussion of motivation is required. Simply, why would the EU be interested in advancing programmes of conscription given a general aversion to military force among EU members? To answer this question, a review of the EU's security identity is required. Although it is difficult to precisely attribute the EU a single source of security identification, there is growing reliance on 'civilian power' as a point of reference, guiding EU foreign policy priorities. 'Civilian power' generally maintains military force as a residual rather than a primary tool of policy actualisation. However, military force is an important ingredient in the budding EU security culture gravitating around 'civilian power.' The peacetime conscription model advanced in this work is meant to instil a sense of responsibility in international society, to conscripted forces. If 'civilian power' is to determine the foreign policy priorities of the EU, then the military force held as a residual tool must be drawn from the broad base of European societies and not left to professional soldiers, whose motivations for enlisting into a military structure are often rooted in socio-economic imperatives and military fascination rather then advancing the 'civilian power' goals of the EU. Before bridging 'civilian power' to peace-time conscription, a brief account of 'civilian power' is required.

Similar to conscription, the concept of 'civilian power' was popularised during the Cold War. It is commonly attributed to François Duchêne who, writing in 1972 said that

> Europe would be the first major area of the Old World where the age-old processes of war and indirect violence could be translated into something more in tune with the twentieth-century citizen's notion of civilised politics.[4]

According to Richard Whitman, "Duchêne's conception of a European civilian power rested upon the inconceivability of a nuclear armed European federation and the banishment of war from Western Europe."[5] Duchêne's convictions, that the possibility of nuclear war in Europe forced political and popular reflections which concluded that its utility had run its course, proved with hindsight to be extremely accurate. Duchêne explored techniques for *domesticating* European politics, arguing that through institutions, which could arbitrate tensions and conflicts, a common sense of responsibility could be nurtured. In short, Duchêne argued that the development of a common sense of responsibility would help states (in a European context) recognise their shared interests. For Europe, those interests meant avoiding nuclear war in which there would be no winner. The notion of recognising common interests in avoiding war (nuclear and other WMD) act as a bedrock of European 'civilian power.'

While Duchêne's thoughts offer a wealth of ideas to students interested in current international society, they have been eclipsed by other, more contemporary authors who spearheaded a renaissance in casting European 'civilian power.' Hanns Maull[6] and Christopher Hill[7] have both contributed to more current, understandings of 'civilian power' which are useful for comprehending the need for establishing representative militaries, conscripted from societies which define themselves as 'civilian powers.' Both Maull and Hill have faced numerous criticisms, however, as the EU continues to construct its security identity, their original hypotheses have been reintroduced as guideposts. Bridging the conceptions of 'civilian power' introduced by these two theorists will help paint a more vivid picture of current 'civilian power' and how peace-time conscription may assist the EU in achieving its 'civilian power' tasks.

Hanns Maull, in his work entitled, "Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers," identifies three essential conditions for a state to be considered a 'civilian power.' These are

1 the acceptance of the necessity of cooperation with others in the pursuit of international objectives
2 concentration on non-military, primarily economic, means to secure national goals, with military power left as a residual instrument serving essentially to safeguard other means of international interaction

3 a willingness to develop supranational structures to address critical issues of international management[8]

In other words, states' 'civilian power' rests on cooperation to achieve international objectives, the deployment of non-military instruments of policy (with military power left in reserve) and fostering states' willingness to construct international agents which – through cooperation – can tackle international challenges. Although Maull refers to Japanese and German foreign policy priorities, the EU has made considerable steps towards constructing its own Common Foreign and Security Policies oriented to the achievement of these 'civilian power' goals.[9]

The EU is a cooperative union whose ultimate power rests on its ability to agree – although reaching agreement can be an arduous task – on issues pertaining to regional and international security. The EU regards the deployment of military force as a residual and not primary tool of diplomacy and tends to deploy alternative power resources (primarily economic) as a means of asserting international influence. Finally, the development of the CFSP is evidence of the EU drive towards coordinating member foreign policy priorities under a supranational umbrella.

Christopher Hill bases his notion of 'civilian power' on six functions regarding the (then) EC. These are:

1 a replacement for the (then) USSR in the global balance of power
2 regional pacifier
3 global intervener
4 mediator of conflicts
5 bridge between rich and poor
6 joint supervisor of the world economy[10]

Hill's first function may be omitted. The EU is not motivated towards balancing (even softly) the US.[10] In fact, through NATO and other transatlantic forums, the EU and the US are bound tightly together in their mutual quest to maintain a human rights based international society. This does not indicate confluence over the means deployed to reinforce international society and there have been numerous transatlantic disputes including, over the International Criminal Court (ICC), Guantanamo Bay prisoners, Operation Iraqi Freedom (etc.). However, it is apparent that Europe is not attempting to replace the USSR as a balancer in international society.

Hill's remaining five functions may be used to depict post-Cold War EU 'civilian power.' The EU's 'security through integration' programme has contributed significantly to the Euro zone of peace by offering economic incentives for structural changes and developments in fostering civil and democratic societies among both new and old members. Together with NATO, the UN and increasingly in coalitions of the willing, the EU has begun to shed its reluctance to intervene in ensuing international conflicts or in areas of potential violence in both preemptive and preventive roles. Finally, the EU recognises the connection between poverty, crime, terrorism and other forms of political violence, and has taken important steps to bridge the international wealth gap. Economic security is a powerful incentive for domesticating international relations as it provides a conduit for citizen ownership of their political state

Together, Maull and Hill's depictions capture EU 'civilian power.' Military power is present but held in reserve, while other forms of power are deployed in a cooperative manner (as opposed to unilateralism) to help civilise political interactions (domestic and international).

'Civilian power' is presently a defining feature of EU security culture.

However, it is only a theoretical fixture, governing policy identification and prioritisation but not actualisation. The 'Headline Goals;' the European Rapid Reaction Force envisioned in Helsinki (1999) has not yet been realised. It is therefore difficult to attach significance to the 'civilian power' model of the EU, as its members have not contributed the resources needed to fulfil its 'civilian power' goals.[11]

As an amendment to the 'civilian power' project, peace-time conscription may be an indispensable tool. It has the potential to realise the normative goals of the EU by educating and training EU youth towards the defence of an international society defined by the cosmopolitan values listed on page 28 above.

As discussed below, professional soldiers will not suffice for constructing and defending EU values. Only by raising and reshaping the mandatory period of education (theoretical and practical) can the EU hope to positively infuse international society with 'civilian power' as a standard of international exchange. 20th century militarism, genocide and imposed ideological movements have left their mark on European consciousness. At present, the EU must not sit on the fringes of international society when conflicts and crises, which run counter to

progressive EU thinking, threaten the viability of cosmopolitan international society. Peace-time conscription can assist the EU in its ambitious 'civilian power' project.

In his work entitled "Conscription and Its Alternatives," Bjørn Møller iden- tifies four reasons why "states may abstain from fielding armed forces …"[12] These are:

1 They do not perceive any threats to their sovereignty or territorial integrity
2 They are so small that defence is obviously futile
3 They rely on external protection
4 They rely on a non-military form of defence[15]

For the European Union (and its members) these criteria for military abstention have not been met. While direct conventional threats to the EU (and its members) are remote, they have not entirely vanished. The terrorist attacks perpetrated against Spain (2004), the UK (2005) and most recently in Paris (2015) are stark reminders of the insecurities open societies face from within, and the (not so distant) breakup of the former Yugoslav Republic, which resulted in mass murder, ethnic cleansing and mass displacement, prompt EU memories of the horrors of war and its potential contagion. Threats continue to define the EU's security identity; even if the source of threat has changed according to international realities and the implosion of a belligerent external adversary, the USSR.

As challenges change so must the tactics for dealing with them. It would be both foolish and irresponsible for the EU to abandon a capable military altogether. Instead, the EU should reformulate its priorities and how to effectively deal with current security challenges. By increasingly defining itself as a 'civilian power,' the EU has tacitly abandoned a pacifist or neutral foreign policy orientation. A 'civilian power' point of reference, where military power is present but held in reserve, helps to overcome the taboo of using military force, for force can be deployed in a responsible manner, consistent with the values of the EU.

The question must no longer revolve around whether the EU should raise and maintain military forces? Given the types and intensity of international conflicts, the question should be, 'what type of military instruments should be developed to maintain the values of European society, promote international peace, security and justice and generally defend the EU's territory, people and international interests?'

Peace-Time Conscription and 'Humanitising' Soldiering

War-time conscription – understood here as forced military labour or forced financial contributions to a war-machine – prepares a state's youth for war fighting, even if defensively oriented. With few exceptions, state-level war-time conscription seeks to create obedience among its youth with an expressed prerogative of deference to orders. Such conscription programmes may be necessary under certain geopolitical and security conditions, which will not be further discussed here. Instead, it is important to look beyond wartime preparations and gauge how peace-time conscription programmes in states not facing dire conventional military threats can effect state behaviour and encourage normative internationalism and the promotion of cosmopolitan values.

In contrast to reactive war-time conscription, peace-time conscription is proactive. It is designed to expand the political horizon of a state's youth – rather than narrowing it while creating obedient war-fighters – and provide a structured vehicle towards the development of a societal level consciousness in which social and democratic responsibility (locally, regionally and internationally) may be propagated. Peace-time conscription also helps habilitate military structures by infusing them with citizen values. In essence, peace-time conscription can help 'humanitise' soldiering. This may be achieved through the advancement of two main goals:

1 Reducing reliance on professional soldiers
2 Fusing military structures with citizens of diverse economic, social, political and ethnic backgrounds

It is beneficial to explore these goals to provide deeper understanding of the positive outcomes the promotion of a comprehensive peace-time conscription programme may produce for the EU and international society at large.

Reducing Reliance on Professional Soldiers

Professional soldiering is incompatible with the general value system of the EU and its 'civilian power' policy prioritisation. Utilising specialised combat forces for defence, peace-keeping and peace-making missions may be economically feasible; however, they are not in sync with the demands of democratic societies. This incompatibility

is related primarily to recruitment and not necessarily the functions professional forces later serve. However, if the EU is to shoulder more international responsibility while defending itself (conventionally and exceptionally) and maintaining its core values, it must shift away from a 'special forces' focus, directing its military affairs.

Professional armies typically recruit the bulk of their personnel from two main categories of citizens, the economically disadvantaged and those fascinated with military weapons, conduct and structure.

Those who are economically disadvantaged often join the military to receive free or discounted education, financial security for their families and tax support from their state. While this does not pose a direct challenge to fulfilling the 'civilian power' objectives of the EU, it does not contribute to citizen ownership of the military or infuse the values of a democratic population into the military structure of a state. In fact, filling the rank and file positions in a professional military with the economically disadvantaged often reinforces negative ethnic and class stereotypes. In this, Møller rightly asserts that "As national and racial minorities almost everywhere have a below-average level of employment; it is reasonable to expect all-volunteer armed forces to be able to recruit a higher percentage of these."[13] Møller goes on to explain that "minorities are overrepresented in ... armies ..."[14]

There are a number of internal and international problems associated with such an overrepresentation of minority groups in the professional militaries in the states of the EU. Firstly, such recruitment imbalances may result in charges of racism by the minority community, and internationally. It is difficult to convince international society of positive intents and designs with such a high level of economic disparity (and ethnicity) between policy makers (and beneficiaries) and policy enforcers. Only through disseminating policy enforcement responsibilities to all social spheres within European society, can the EU convincingly present its normative internationalist agenda. Parity needs to be established between how the EU views itself, and how international society views the EU. Secondly, is the issue of recruit motivation. If recruits are drawn primarily from minority groups and in the present military structure of EU states this implies specialisation operations (for civil defence), international peace-keeping, peace-making and war-fighting, the question of troop morale and motivation is raised. Recruits which participate in military operations though feel detached from their state do not perform as well on the battle-field as multi-

national recruits which feel as though they have a stake in a conflicts' outcome. When infusing EU military culture with 'civilian power' it is imperative to provide ownership of military matters to recruits themselves. This again requires the abandonment of professional soldiers, for if drawn primarily from the economically disadvantaged and ethnic minorities, there is little hope of convincing recruits of their moral as well as military function. Such groups tend to view their military 'tours' as employment and not as a normative contribution to the state or international society. Peace-time conscription can alleviate this situation and increase the morale and motivation of recruits to fulfil normative objectives because with mass participation comes ownership of the political process and its regional and international tasks.

More dangerous than recruits drawn from the economically disadvantaged or an overrepresentation of ethnic minorities, are those fascinated with military structures and machinery. Professional militaries necessarily attract those people who willingly join a military to, crassly, shoot guns, drive tanks, fly fighter jets. Realising 'civilian power' goals will remain an elusive task if reliance on professional soldiers, who join military structures due to military fascination, remains in place. The irony of introducing a peace-time conscription programme is that recruits should maintain their revulsion to combat and warfare, though participate as a matter of civic responsibility. For this reason, peace-time conscription should be oriented towards many non-military functions, as well as the more traditional tasks of a military structure (see pages 40-48 below).

Fusing Military and Civilian Values

As the EU attempts to create a viable military to ensure its, and international security, its reliance on professional soldiers – particularly those fascinated by military machines and structure – needs to be reduced. Only through the fusion of military and civilian values can there be a 'humanitising' process among soldiers and other recruits. Such a fusion cannot take root in militaries dominated by professional soldiers; it can only be imported from civilians themselves. Thus, peace-time conscription is necessary to infuse the values of society into military structures.

When conscripts are involved in international operations (military, humanitarian or relief work) civilians in their home country show

great intolerance at callous deployments, dangerous missions, abuses (against the conscripts or indigenous population), and excesses of force. This intolerance at putting conscripts in harms way has led to much political upheaval in states deploying them. Both France (during the Algerian conflict) and the US (during the Vietnam conflict) utilising conscripts alongside professional soldiers, were confronted by immense anti-war protests and movements directly related to rising death tolls and horror stories of abuse reported by conscripts. Breaking the military 'code of silence' and loathing abuses and human rights violations are part of 'humanitising' soldiering. Infusing civilian values into a military structure can result in increased awareness of military abuses and force democratic states to take actions to create a greater level of transparency in a military.

Using the case of France in the Algerian war, George Q. Flynn remarked that

> … conscripts in Algeria proved to be a two-edged sword. While fulfilling their military obligations, they also criticised torture and channelled unrest back to metropolitan France.[15]

Bringing the values of metropolitan France with them, conscripts proved to lack a distinctive military culture and alerted loved ones back in France as to the systemic abuse of Algerians at the hands of French forces. They preformed under the pressures of a professional Officers Corp, however this was a war of occupation, not reconcilable with civilian values.

Similarly, Bjørn Møller asserts that

> … as the United States experienced during the Vietnam War, there are limits to what the public will accept in terms of casualties among conscripts, as well as limits to the treatment that conscripted soldiers from all walks of life will endure.[16]

Conscripts in Algeria and Vietnam had not chosen to participate in military operations. Under the war-time conscription programmes popular in the immediate post-WWII era, civilians were forced into military structures. However, these conscripts did not abandon their civilian values and very bravely fulfilled their duty while openly questioning the logic of such operations.

Democratic citizens must collectively remember the horrors of war-time conscription – despite its infusion of civilian values – and avoid its return. At the same time, there must be increased awareness that professional soldiers lack civilian values because they generally lack

contact with civilians. To solve this problem there must be a wide-scale reintroduction of conscription, carried out however, during peace-time, with legal and democratic full-transparency and guided by 'civilian power' objectives. No longer should militaries be operated solely by professional soldiers. An influx of civilians into a military structure, which is expanded to include military and non-military roles, will assist in defending (without themselves violating) the core values of a state. In short, civilians can 'humanitise' soldiering and increase the accountability of those wishing to deploy force (or other means).

Introducing peace-time conscription programmes in democratic states requires a new 'social contract;' one which stresses the importance of the citizen's responsibility towards the collective and its defence. Since in EU security culture, defence has widened to include a particularly non-military element, the new 'social contract' must include the EU's pledge to govern the deployment of conscripted forces reasonably and in line with the general will of EU civil society. The idea of a 'social contract' was first developed by Jean Jacques Rousseau who wrote of men "aggregating a sum of forces that could gain the upper hand (over nature) ... so that their forces are directed by means of a single moving power and made to act in concert."[17]

Peace-time conscription is based on a similar approach. There must be an aggregation of people's forces which could gain the upper hand – over violations to international and European society – however these must not be solely based on war-fighting, but rather on the collective skills and progressive, human rights based identity which European citizens have been developing for several hundreds of years, and intensely since the horrors of the Holocaust and WWII emerged as public discourse. While Rousseau spoke of a social contract for men bartering their freedom (in the state of nature) for security (in the state of society), the new 'social contract' governing the actions and deployments of peace-time conscription units must be designed to translate European historic learning, professional expertise and responsibilities, into international realities that reinforce international society.

Peace-time conscription invariably challenges war culture where the distinction between 'civilians' (citizens) and 'combatants' (soldiers) forms the foundation of the laws of war. Peace-time conscription intractably merges the 'civilian' with the 'soldier' and forces the latter to be subordinate to the former, as the rank and file members of the variety of conscription programmes are not military minded personnel;

they are the equal citizens of democratic states, young men and women who must help shoulder the regional and international responsibilities which will help advance a more human rights based and equitable international society.

A Programme of Peace-time Conscription

After exploring some theoretical aspects of how peace-time conscription may assist in reinforcing current international society which is increasingly defined by cosmopolitan values, it is necessary to offer some suggestions of what such conscription programmes should include and how they can translate into fulfilling the 'civilian power' goals of the EU. The following is a prototype of a comprehensive peace-time conscription programme. Attention is paid to identifying areas the EU should focus its attention on, and not how these programmes may be realised. There are numerous and hefty questions which must still be answered regarding the economic, legal and social costs and benefits to peace-time conscription. These, unfortunately fall outside of the scope of this work, which is to identify a new perspective over what needs to be done in the EU for dealing with the 21st century security agenda. It should be noted however, that in keeping with the 'civilian power' goals of the EU, the mandate to deploy peace-time conscription forces should be bound by EU and international law unless such laws constrict assistance to beleaguered peoples or states. In such circumstances, the EU must reserve the right to intervene (deploying peace-time conscription forces) into a civil or international conflict with a stated goal of preventing or reducing the loss of life to a civilian population. When reviewing some of the more brutal late 20th century conflicts, one may ask whether the EU did enough to end violence, mass murder or genocide. The answer is that it did not. Introducing a peacetime conscription programme may also provide the EU with enough political, humanitarian and military clout – deployable in a timely manner – to see its progressive cosmopolitan values become entrenched in societies afflicted by strife or conflict.

Peace-time conscription programmes must run parallel to higher education institutes. Citizens opting to attend traditional higher educational institutes must be exempt from conscription, for they serve civilian tasks through their education. All other citizens, (with exception given to mentally and physically incapable persons and teenaged

parents) would be required to select – in a timely manner – the conscription programme that best suits their expertise, interests and future career ambitions. Peace-time conscription programmes should be made applicable to persons (male and female) between the ages of 19-25 and vary in duration from 12-20 months, including (if applicable) an international deployment period.

Peace-time conscription within the current international political environment should comprise the following 3 broad areas, termed here as units:

1 Specialised Medical Unit (SMU)
2 Local and International Policing Unit (LIPU)
3 Civic and Localised Defence Unit (CLDU)

The following discussion highlights specific aims and attributes of each of the three units. This section is meant as preliminary recommendations of what each unit should aim to achieve.

Specialised Medical Unit (SMU)

Some of the most pressing international challenges are related to medicine distribution, the spread of infectious disease, bio- and chemical terrorism and post-disaster hygiene. As such, it is imperative for developed democracies, for theirs and international security, to have a solid base of medical support which is both regionally and internationally deployable in an organised and timely manner. To that end, the SMU would be responsible for training and preparing conscripts to deal with the variety of challenges related to the field of medicine. Such training is indispensable for the long-term security of the EU and provides many benefits to international society including; increased life-expectancy and higher work-force efficiency, which may result in greater wealth generation and thus a general reduction in wealth disparity, prompting more demands for civilian ownership over the political state and ultimately assists in democratic promotion abroad.

To help achieve medical and health related goals, regionally and internationally, the SMU may be further divided into 2 subsections:

1 Civic Medical Aid
2 International Medical Aid

While both the Civic and International Medical Aid groups would be designed to prevent, contain and combat infectious diseases and viruses, reduce mortality rates in combat and post-combat areas and

states affected by natural disasters and train medical staff in developing countries in modern medicinal techniques, their areas of operation would be different.

Conscripts enrolled in Civic Medical Aid would be trained in the local conditions of Europe. This requires a multinational dimension as language, cultural and sociological barriers are still present in the EU despite the removal of political boundaries. If conducted on a supranational level, much could be gained by mixing conscripts from among the different members of the EU. A Civic Medical Aid group of conscription recruits which operates from Ireland to Cyprus and Spain to Finland requires great coordination at both the intergovernmental and societal levels. This coordination can be utilised to deepen medical relations between different states, increase cooperation in medical research and development, increase the sharing of information and ultimately constructing a network of qualified medical staff which, after their conscription period concludes, will have greater employment mobility, through their qualifications, which would be equally accepted Europe-wide.

The Civic Medical Aid group would be divided into three focuses. First, a general medical assistance focus, which would provide additional support to hospitals and other medical centres for their day-to-day operations. Second, an emergency medical assistance focus, which prepares contingency plans of 'life-saving' following medical disasters such as a biological, chemical or conventional weapons attack, the outbreak of an infectious disease or natural disasters. Finally, a hygiene, heath and illness-prevention focus, which helps educate people towards healthy living.

While these focuses are broad, they are very important. Civic Medical Aid can act as a reserve 'human resource' of highly trained and easily mobilised medical staff which can reduce the loss of life caused by political violence, natural disasters or an outbreak of an infectious disease. Although this would be a branch of a peace-time conscription unit, and hence, its recruits would only be trained and mobilised temporarily (and with a high turnover rate), nevertheless, the skills these recruits develop during their training and mobilisation period would (hopefully) remain part of their knowledge base even after their conscription period ends. Thus, in times of conflict or natural devastations, these former recruits will still be able to positively assist in medical care-giving.

Alternatively, the International Medical Aid group should be divided according to specialisation, not geography. To deal with pressing international challenges where medical training is an asset, the International Medical Aid group should be designed as a reinforcement to the NGO, Doctors Without Borders, which is a "medical humanitarian organization that delivers emergency aid to people affected by armed conflict, epidemics, natural or manmade disasters, or exclusion from health care."[18]

The International Medical Aid group would fulfil its support missions through an intensive training course (in Europe) and a period of international deployment to places in desperate need of medical assistance. Areas of speciality covered by the International Medical Aid group should include, conflict and post-conflict medical aid, field hospital construction, organisation and administration, social and psychological counselling, education, infectious disease containment and prevention. Such a peace-time conscription focus has the potential to assist states and peoples facing extreme health risks and reduce the number of casualties from natural and human-made disasters. The International Medical Aid group would be fundamentally committed to 'life-saving' and help provide health care to peoples and regions which lack adequate medical resources. The International Medical Aid group may also help train medical care-givers in developing countries in modern techniques and approaches, to be able to cope without outside assistance in the long-term.

Ultimately, the establishment of a peace-time conscription unit focussing on medical issues will assist the long-term security of the EU and act as a progressive and 'life-saving' force in international society. Recruits would be trained to deal with a variety of regional and international challenges through theoretical and practical knowledge involving medical techniques. The SMU would be readily deployable throughout the EU and international society.

Local and International Policing Unit (LIPU)

The material security of the EU is increasingly tied to international stability, peace and the promotion of good governance abroad. Many international conflicts and tensions have the potential for contagion, particularly if aggrieved parties do not attract the attention of the UN or the great powers which could mediate disputes. Additionally, states

and other political communities which have emerged from conflicts, man-made or natural disasters, often lack the resources to maintain order and political stability due to pressures on local institutions. Areas which lack political order are breeding grounds for criminality, as people attempt to provide their own security if the state cannot (or will not) provide it for them. These two challenges, preventing the initiation of political violence between states (and other political communities) and assisting in restoring or maintaining political stability and order in post-conflict and post-disaster communities, should be a policy priority in EU foreign affairs.

At present, the EU is not facing significant international threats – freeing it from concentrating solely on its own territorial security – and is commonly regarded as a well-balanced international actor, guided in its policy prioritisation by cosmopolitan values and actualisation increasingly through 'civilian power.' The EU could use the present surge of international goodwill to further promote its interests of conflict prevention, and reinforce a cosmopolitan value system as a standard of international exchanges. Utilising a peace-time conscription unit, designed as a cosmopolitan policing force, would greatly enhance the EU capability to achieve such goals. This brief account of a Local and International Policing Unit (LIPU), is meant to describe some areas the EU should focus on, in its quest to establish and protect an international society increasingly characterised by cosmopolitan values. LIPU would direct its efforts to achieving three main tasks:

1 Post-conflict and disaster policing with the aim of peacekeeping, preventing or reducing criminality, constructing or upholding civil society, local police training and providing a secure platform for humanitarian assistance to be delivered

2 Wartime/conflict/crises policing with the aim of peacemaking, separating actual (or potential) combatants, and preventing the callous loss of life among a civilian population

3 Investigation and reconciliation with the aim of investigating alleged criminal activities (including 'crimes against humanity'), bringing (to regional or international courts, such as the ICC) those who are implicated in such criminality, and assisting in reconciliation (where applicable) between conflicting political communities by acting as a neutral arbiter

Policing is an essential element in constructing civil society. The EU should recruit and train peace-time conscripts to assist those parts of

international society where law and order have, or potentially will, collapse. Such deployments would (in most situations) require the acquiescence of the parties facing such a law-and-order breakdown, however, in extreme situations, where civilians face severe perils, LIPU should not await permission but rather be ready to deploy its police units to enforce, or reinforce civil society.

This is perhaps the most controversial peace-time conscription unit identified in this work, as it casts the EU as a purely normative international actor, even as it would assume responsibility for intervening into sovereign territories without the permission of local authorities, if there is a grave threat to a civilian population. To be sure, the EU has its own set of interests and priorities which go beyond bolstering international society. However, policing for the protection of civilians world-wide, to assist in governing post-disaster areas and preventing hostilities from erupting, is an intersection of international and EU security interests. For example, the EU has an interest in sustainable development and the promotion of democracy to encourage civilian ownership and responsible governments abroad. This interest is not purely normative, but also designed to reduce the attraction of Europe for asylum seekers and economic migrants. Ending hostilities and bringing order to post-disaster political communities may act as a catalyst towards these goals because establishing political order and protecting civilians is a first step towards economic rejuvenation, political stability, peace and good governance.

Civic and Localised Defence Unit (CLDU)

In keeping with the EU's 'civilian power' approach to international society, it must not completely abandon traditional military capabilities. The deployment of military force may be – under certain circumstances – a necessary evil, and the EU must be prepared to assume complete responsibility for its territorial, material and political security. Currently, NATO provides the most formidable security guarantee for the EU. However, the expectation that such an arrangement will reach into the indefinite future is misguided. The EU – together with NATO, while such an arrangement lasts – must assert strategic independence from the US. An integrated (politically, economically and militarily) EU must certainly remain in alliance with the US; however such an alignment must be confirmed between two equal partners, which is presently not

the case. The EU is a junior partner which relies too heavily on the US and NATO for its security.

Also, NATO is a limiting defence alliance based on Article 5 of the Treaty of Washington (1949) which stipulates that an attack on one member is tantamount to an attack on all.[19] While Article 5 was first invoked following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, there is no reason to believe that terrorism constitutes an 'attack' which would rally NATO states together for collective action, despite terrorism being ranked among the most formidable threats facing EU states. The Madrid (2004) and London (2005) bombings, are stark reminders that the EU must face many security challenges without NATO and US assistance; there were no calls for a similar invocation of Article 5 following those attacks. In fact, upon hearing the news of the London bombings, George Bush Jr. spoke of international resolve to overcome an "ideology of hate,"[20] his response was to "instruct them (homeland security) to be in touch with local and state officials about the facts of what took place here and in London, and to be extra vigilant, as our folks start heading to work."[24]

While the scale of death and carnage from the 11 September 2001 attacks was greater than that produced by the Madrid or London bombings, the latter were very important milestones in the so-called 'war on terror' and played an important psychological and sociological role in casting European security identification. That the US and NATO did not attempt to further support Spain or the UK indicates a degree of abandonment. Although terrorism does not pose a direct challenge to the viability of a western democratic state, its eradication (by force, special operations or 'hearts and minds') remains a key security aim.

Such neglect will become more commonplace as the EU and US part ways over key foreign policy priorities and approaches. It is therefore imperative that the EU construct its own independent military structure, comprised of peace-time conscripts who infuse such structures with civilian values, and hence, maintain equilibrium between EU society and values and its defence provisions. To that end, the EU should develop a Civic and Localised Defence Unit which would be trained and operationally capable to deal with security challenges to the EU.

The CLDU should blend more traditional territorial defence initiatives with those oriented to the emergence of new threats and challenges and would be organised to achieve three directives:

1 To increase the traditional military defence capacity of the EU in a manner synchronised with the demands of EU society and values

2 Provide a robust civic counterterrorism initiative to identify and prevent incidents of terrorism, (including its financing, recruitment and operational deployment) within EU borders

3 To further develop an EU wide civic rapid reaction and disaster relief to deal with a multitude of disaster and post-disaster missions

The first directive, with its emphasis on traditional military defence, would need to identify potential territorial threats and challenges and then develop appropriate and innovative methods for dealing with them. There are several areas of concern to the EU, which although not currently posing a direct challenge, could do so in the foreseeable future. Russia, the Middle East (including Iran) and Northern Africa may directly challenge – in both symmetrical and asymmetrical manners – EU territorial security.

At the time of this writing, only Russia has overtly threatened EU members. The Czech Republic and Poland have become the centre of a growing international crisis over their plans to assist the US missile defence system. Without opening debate over the wisdom for supporting the US in such a project, the EU must take Russian threats seriously and retain a capacity for deterring Russian interference in EU countries. With Latvia, Estonia and Finland directly bordering Russia, it would be a grave miscalculation to allow external bodies (NATO, UN or the US) to continue to be the principal security providers for the EU. While a more traditional military force is required to increase deterrence against Russia, utilising peace-time conscription will allow such a force to be consistent with the 'civilian power' objectives of the EU and ensure that civilian values are maintained within such a force.

The second directive, the establishment of a civic counterterrorism initiative, is an equally important task for the EU; one which may be bolstered by peace-time conscription. This directive would not entail mass recruitment, as counterterrorism is similar to policing in its

demand for intelligence and very limited police actions to arrest potential terrorists, interrogate suspects, and use information to avoid future attacks. Conscripts enrolled in this programme would essentially assist professional civil authorities in dealing with terrorism and related challenges.

There are several areas where peace-time conscription recruits would assist the EU deal with the scourge of terrorism. These include: intelligence gathering (including internet monitoring), assessing and utilisation, code-breaking, search and rescue in the aftermath of an attack, trauma counselling for those affected by terrorist attacks and criminal investigation to find those responsible for attacks.

Peace-time conscription is appropriate for counterterrorism because it would be a multinational effort, utilising recruits with different backgrounds (national, linguistic, religious) united by their civilian values and citizenship in the EU. Sharing intelligence; making sure that conduits of information remain open is a key to reducing (or completely eradicating) terrorism. Constructing an EU-wide conscription unit, which deals exclusively with counterterrorism, may help reassure EU publics as there would be a trained and visible EU body of citizen-recruits (working alongside professional counterterrorism police units). Terrorism and counterterrorism rely on clandestine operations. There is growing fear that EU freedoms are under-attack by both terrorist groups and those charged with pursuing them. By bringing conscripts with citizen's values into the 'war on terror' it is reasonable to assume that they can positively contribute to its success. At the very least, multinational conscripts involved in counterterrorism will demonstrate that all communities which comprise the EU share the burden of this challenge equally.

The final directive, to further develop an EU wide civic rapid reaction and disaster relief to deal with a multitude of disaster and post-disaster missions is vital to regional EU security and reducing the loss of life during crises. Rapid reaction – getting to the scene of a disaster in haste – within the EU, is indispensable for life-saving. To that end, peace-time conscripts dealing with this directive should be trained in a variety of tasks including: search and rescue operations in rural and urban areas, techniques of aid distribution, communication of impending disasters (such as violent storms or flooding) to civil populations and preparation for wide-scale evacuations of civilian populations

in times of crises. With predictions of environmental disasters (due to global warming), mounting, and unpredictable localised disasters, such as earthquakes and floods, occurring with increasingly frequency, it is important to train peace-time conscripts for dealing with them and associated problems.

If a prime goal of the EU is to protect the lives of EU citizens, it must be prepared for natural and man-made disasters alike. In this, as indicated throughout this work, professional soldiers will not suffice. Conscripted forces, trained and operationally accessible in a timely manner, may be the key to reducing the victims of disasters. The skills acquired by conscripts enrolled in the rapid reaction and disaster relief unit, as in other proposed parts of a peacetime conscription programme, would maintain their expertise even after their conscription period concludes. Therefore, the EU would preserve an extremely useful 'human resource' which may assist their fellow EU citizens fo

Conclusion

Security questions continue to define much of the EU's 21ˢᵗ century identity. This work sought to reshape an old idea, conscription, to act as a progressive element in the budding EU security culture and how it approaches international society at large. It is no longer permissible for the EU to entrust its value system and security to exogenous security providers. As a union of democratic states, the EU must be prepared to defend itself, and the cosmopolitan values it, and international society are increasingly defined by.

This work opened with a definitional section to try and reach an understanding of what conscription is and how it can be rehashed to provide r years into the projected future. civilian ownership over the political state, making the state more reflective of civilian values, and civilians more responsible for their state's wellbeing. The second part introduced the 'civilian power' approach to international relations, which is increasingly defining the EU's policy priorities and implementation with the help of peace-time conscription. The third part focussed entirely on theoretically assessing peace-time conscription and how such programmes may help 'humanitise' soldiering by reducing reliance on professional soldiers and infusing military structures with civilian values. This section concluded with a brief discussion of

the new 'social contract' which would be necessary before committing civilians to fulfilling foreign policy goals of the EU. The final section of this work presented three peace-time conscription units which may be indispensable for the long-term security of the EU. These were a Specialised Medical Unit; a Local and International Policing Unit and; a Civic and Local Defence Unit. These units, as part of a large peace-time conscription programme, were meant as policy recommendations. They were conceived idealistically as there are many other considerations which need to be assessed before any reasonable steps could be taken to introduce peace-time conscription on the EU level. However, it is hoped that this work will inspire critiques and comments so that the conceptions raised here can lead to debate over how the EU could advance independence over its security without threatening the cosmopolitan values its has been fostering since the end of WWII and now has the window of opportunity to promote throughout international society.

Notes

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Research articles

Constraining or Encouraging?

US and EU Responses to China's Rise in East Asia

Elena Atanassova-Cornelis

China's consolidation of power in East Asia has been reshaping regional security dynamics. This has challenged US regional leadership and confronted Asian states with a new strategic dilemma of major power rivalry. Similarly, China's rise has presented the EU with challenges to its strategy in East Asia, especially since Europe has high stakes in maintaining the security of the maritime commons for pursuing its trade interests in the region. This article examines China's rise in East Asia and evaluates the US and EU responses. The article argues that the diverging perceptions concerning China's rise – namely the threat versus opportunity dichotomy – largely define the respective responses of Washington and Brussels. The US both engages and hedges against China, which serves as a check on Beijing's regional ambitions and leads to a certain moderation in Chinese security behaviour in Asia. In contrast, the EU's uni-dimensional engagement strategy encourages Beijing to assert its regional interests and behave more like a typical rising power seeking dominance in East Asia. Ultimately, the competitive dynamics in US-China relations are reinforced by the EU's passivity on issues of core interest to Beijing, which makes the outcome of China's rise more, rather than less, uncertain.

Keywords: China, US, EU, security, East Asia, competition

Introduction

The rise of China has been reshaping regional security dynamics in East Asia. Since the late 1990s the People's Republic of China (PRC) has

been very active in regional diplomacy, has strengthened its military posture, and of equal importance, has become the driving force of East Asia's economic dynamism. China's rise has challenged US leadership in the region, which for more than half a century was sustained by the "hub-and-spoke" security system of bilateral military alliances between the US and some regional states, including Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea) in Northeast Asia, and the Philippines and Thailand in Southeast Asia. While Washington has sought to preserve its regional leadership by reinforcing its economic, security and diplomatic engagement in East Asia – what became under Obama a 're-balancing' to Asia strategy – the fact that the PRC since the 2000s has replaced the US as the largest trading partner of all its major Asian allies has made the American response to China's rise less than straightforward. For many Asian states – which are increasingly pulled into China's economic orbit, but remain wary of Beijing's long-term strategic goals in the region – the question of how to address the changing balance of power and maintain stability in East Asia is certainly most salient.

Similarly to the US and countries in East Asia, China's rise has presented the European Union (EU) with new challenges to its regional strategy. Although, geographically Europe is located far from the region, Brussels does have direct stakes in East Asian stability. This stems primarily from the EU's trade interests and especially, in maintaining the security of the maritime commons. Indeed, the PRC, Japan and the ROK are the EU's 2nd, 7th and 8th largest trading partners respectively. A more pronounced US-China power competition in the region, or a major escalation of the maritime territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas, would adversely affect international trade and jeopardise the safety of Asia's shipping lanes, which are critical for European exports and imports. The EU has increased its attention to East Asia by recognising not only the region's growing economic weight, but also its strategic importance. Brussels has focused on deepening Europe's economic ties with the region's major powers and forged several strategic partnerships. European policy-makers have further stressed the need to enhance the EU's contribution to East Asian stability by recognising that regional tensions, such as maritime disputes, directly impact on European interests.

Against the above background, this article examines China's rise in East Asia from, primarily, a security perspective, and the responses to it

by the US and the EU in the framework of their respective East Asia policies. The article first explores China's Asia strategy by focusing on its regional objectives and policies, including its policy towards America. Discussion then turns to the US's China policy and strategy in East Asia under Obama and with reference to Asian states' reactions to China's growing security role. This is followed by an examination of the EU's objectives and policies in the region, including its relations with the PRC and role in East Asia's security hot spots. Finally, this article elaborates on the areas of convergence and divergence between Washington and Brussels in their respective responses to China's rise, and discusses the implications of these responses for Chinese security behaviour in East Asia.

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China's Regional Strategy in East Asia

Main Objectives and Concerns

China's strategy in the wider Asian region in general, and East Asia in particular, reflects Beijing's primary foreign policy objective of seeking a peaceful external environment. Thisis driven by internal motivations. With the dissolution of the USSR and the decreased appeal of the communist ideology, the legitimacy of the one-party rule of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) came under threat. To ensure the survival of the political regime, the top priority for the leadership became sustaining high levels of economic growth. The main objectives were to alleviate poverty, raise the standard of living in the country and ultimately maintain public support for the CCP. As defined by Chinese State Councillor Dai Bingguo during the 2009 Sino-US Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED), the PRC's three core interests in order of priority included, first and foremost, the survival of China's 'fundamental system' and national security, secondly, the protection of China's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and thirdly, continued stable economic growth and social development.[1] In the East Asian region, the second core interest has included seeking reunification with Taiwan, and arguably pressing its sovereignty claims in the East and South China Seas.[2]

Relative power considerations have also underpinned the PRC's post-Cold War strategy in East Asia. The US, with its deep security and economic involvement in the region, has come to be perceived as *the* pow-

er that could pose the greatest threat to Chinese interests and regional ambitions. Obama's policy of rebalancing to Asia (announced in early 2012) raised concerns in the PRC about American containment, which sought to prevent the rise of a potential challenger to US leadership in the region.[3] Cementing the American alliances in Northeast Asia, especially with Japan, while enhancing the US involvement in Southeast Asia – notably in the South China Sea disputes – have been perceived by many Chinese observers in this light. As stated in a commentary in People's Daily, 'the US verbally denies it is containing China's rise, but while establishing a new security array across the Asia-Pacific, it has invariably made China its target.'[4]

Beijing's unresolved maritime territorial disputes in East Asia further intensify its regional security concerns. For China, it is the American rebalance to Asia that is increasing tensions in the East and South China Seas, as some of the PRC's neighbours (notably Japan and the Philippines) are understood to be taking advantage of the US involvement in order to press their territorial claims. The disputed Senkaku/ Diaoyu islands remain under Japanese administrative control, while the escalation of Sino-Japanese tensions since 2012 has provided yet another reason for Japan to reinforce its military ties with the US. The latter is interpreted by Chinese observers as a direct response to China's growing military strength and as the alliance's attempt to constrain Chinese power in Asia. For their part, the increased tensions in the South China Sea appear to have reversed the positive impact of the PRC's "good neighbourhood policy" of the 2000s on its ties with Southeast Asia. As stressed by a renowned Chinese observer, while 'China's diplomatic influence and effectiveness have shrunk considerably,' the US under Obama has 'scored a dazzling series of diplomatic, military, and economic victories.'[5]

Regional Policies in East Asia

China's embrace of multilateralism, beginning in the late 1990s, emerged as a major aspect of its East Asia strategy, as well as of its hedging against perceived US dominance. Beijing became active in the ASEAN+3 (APT) process, strengthened its presence in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and promoted the Six-Party Talks (SPT) for resolving the DPRK's nuclear issue. The PRC also demonstrated its commitment to ASEAN's principles of peaceful resolution of disputes and non-interfer-

ence in domestic affairs by becoming in 2003 the first non-ASEAN state to sign ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC). At the same time, by promoting 'Asian-only' fora and advocating the idea of an East Asian Community centred on the APT, Beijing has sought to limit US influence and even exclude America from regional institutions.6

In addition to supporting regional multilateralism, the deepening of economic ties with neighbours has been an important aspect of China's US hedge. Indeed, China's geopolitical concerns are to a certain extent eased by the growing dependence of East Asian countries on the Chinese market, especially as the PRC in the 2000s replaced the US as the largest trading partner of all its major allies. China, for example, has been Japan's top trading partner since 2007 when Sino-Japanese trade exceeded US-Japan trade levels. China in the past decade has also become very active in proposing and concluding preferential and free trade agreements (FTAS) with a number of trade partners in East Asia (and beyond), including ASEAN, Singapore, Taiwan and the ROK.

At the same time, the growing since the 1990s "China threat" perception in the region has made CCP leaders worry that a hostile external environment could jeopardise the country's main goal of economic development. Responding to the apprehension in East Asia regarding the PRC's rising (military) power, Beijing in the 2000s sought to promote a defensive image of a China that 'will never go for expansion, nor will it ever seek hegemony.'7 The Hu Jintao administration further articulated a 'peaceful rise/peaceful development' discourse, seeking to project the image of a 'responsible great power.' The main message was to reassure Asian states about China's benign intentions, as well as to demonstrate the benefits for the region of an economically stronger China.

Under Xi Jinping, however, the reference to the 'peaceful development' principle in official discourse has been reduced and the long-standing principle of 'maintaining a low profile' in foreign policy has disappeared, while 'the great resurgence of the Chinese nation' slogan has come to occupy a prominent place.[8] The renewed in recent years regional suspicion of the PRC's strategic intentions is, of course, not only due to the changing political discourse in China. It has been driven primarily by the perceived Chinese hardening of its position towards territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas. All in all, it seems that Beijing's strategy in East Asia, while not abandoning reassurance altogether, has started to emphasise more explicitly the

protection and assertion of the PRC's interests (with a greater willingness to bear the diplomatic and other costs this may entail). Similar change is also seen in China's US strategy.

Policy towards the US

For many Chinese analysts, America's regional strategy in East Asia is simply seeking to preserve and consolidate the US hegemonic order: the US is seen to engage the PRC in order to foster a political change towards democracy, and to contain it by hindering China's reunification with Taiwan and strengthening its alliance with Japan.[9] Indeed, successive US administrations have reinforced Washington's security commitments in Asia, most recently in the framework of Obama's re-balance policy. What has exacerbated Beijing's fears of a US-led containment of China is that America's continuing regional presence has been welcomed, and even sought, by a number of Asian states. These include major US allies such as Japan, and other partners in Southeast Asia (re: Philippines, Singapore, Indonesia, and Vietnam). While China has focused on maintaining positive relations and cooperating with the US on issues of common concern, for example on the DPRK's denuclearisation, it has also tried to reduce the risk of containment by America and its East Asian friends. As detailed above, Beijing has hedged by embracing regional multilateralism and by deepening the PRC's regional economic relations.

Another component of China's US hedge has been the PRC's military modernisation, made possible by the double digit growth of its defence spending. Most observers still maintain that, in the near-term, the primary goal for the People's Liberation Army (PLA) is to prepare for Taiwan contingencies. At the same time, as the PRC's missiles aimed at Taiwan are multifunctional, and hence could target Japan and some of the main US military bases in the region, or be used in the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute, the PLA's modernisation is now perceived to target responses to potential 'contingencies other than Taiwan,' namely in the East and South China Seas.[10] Beijing's establishment in the fall of 2013 of an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea, which included the disputed islands with Japan, only intensified such concerns in Washington, Tokyo and other Asian capitals.

The competitive side of China's US strategy was accentuated in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. The perception among Chinese

leaders of the PRC's rapidly increasing relative power and of the corresponding American decline, together with China's growing military capabilities and expansion of its maritime interests to protect vital trade routes, have led to Beijing's more assertive posture on the South China Sea disputes.[11] A China that once shied away from openly confronting America in East Asia has now become more vocal in objecting, for example, to US military exercises with allies and to US intelligence-gathering activities in the PRC's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). At the May 2014 Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA) President Xi Jinping even presented an alternative vision (to the US-led security system) for Asia's security order, one in which, as Xi stressed, 'Asia's security should rely on Asians.' This was an unequivocal message to Washington not to meddle in Asian affairs and an indicator of a growing competition with the US for influence in East Asia.

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US China Policy and Strategy in East Asia

Aspects of US China Policy

US China policy has been devised in the framework of Washington's broad post-Cold War strategy in East Asia—a strategy that has sought to preserve America's regional leadership, which was established in the early post-war years. While emphasising common interests and cooperation with Beijing, Washington has simultaneously focused on contingency planning in case of deterioration of ties in what has been defined by some observers as a policy of 'hedged engagement.'[12] The contours of the cooperative (engagement) and competitive (hedging) aspects of US China policy emerged during the Clinton administration. The policy crystallised under George W. Bush.

The cooperative aspect was reflected in the Bush administration's recognition of China as a "responsible stakeholder" in the international system and a crucial partner to America in tackling terrorism and in dealing with the North Korean nuclear issue. US strategic focus on the "war on terror" meant that Washington could not afford a confrontation with Beijing, and sought cooperation with the PRC as the optimum choice for maintaining and strengthening its leadership role in East Asia, as well as for preserving its regional and global interests.[13] Furthermore, the transformation of China's regional strategy and po-

sition in Asia, especially the PRC's increasing role as a locomotive of regional economic growth, was a new geopolitical reality that America had to recognise.

At the same time, China's growing military and diplomatic clout in East Asia, and the challenges these developments appear to pose to US primacy in the region and, by extension, globally, have contributed to the "China threat" perception in America. Uncertainties concerning Beijing's strategic goals have led to worries in Washington that as China is becoming stronger it may seek to contest US leadership and interests in Asia. [14] China's assertive behaviour in dealing with regional maritime territorial disputes over the past five years has become a primary challenge for the US,[15] arguably testifying to the perception of a rising Asian contender. For its part, the limited transparency in the PRC's defence policy has continued to feed US suspicion that the objective of China's military modernisation extends far beyond Beijing's core interest of reunifying with Taiwan.

The implications of the PLA's growing 'anti-access/area-denial' (A2/AD) capabilities for the broader US interests in the region appear to have become especially worrisome for Washington. China's A2/AD focus is believed to be to 'counter third-party intervention, particularly by the US' in the western Pacific[16] and its military modernisation is said to 'threaten America's primary means of projecting power and helping allies in the Pacific.'[17] The political discourse of the US being 'a Pacific power' and the renewed American commitment to the Asia-Pacific based on Obama's rebalance to Asia policy constitute Washington's reassurance strategy for its allies and partners in the region. At the same time, the three components of the rebalance – military-strategic, diplomatic and economic – namely tightening US security partnerships, pursuing multilateral diplomacy, especially by supporting ASEAN-led institutions, and promoting the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) initiative, serve as a hedge for the US against a potentially threatening China. While America officially denies the existence of such a hedging strategy, the explicit concern that 'there remains uncertainty about how China will use its growing capabilities'[18] is no doubt a major driving force of Obama's regional policies in Asia.

The competitive, or "realpolitik", aspect of US China policy has included the reinforcement of US security partnerships across East Asia. The alliance with Japan, in particular, has been a main pillar of Washington's continuing regional involvement. The shared concerns about

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the rise of Chinese military power and, especially, its perceived asser-
tiveness in dealing with the territorial disputes in East Asia have be-
come a main driver for Washington and Tokyo to deepen their military
ties since the late 2000s. The Obama administration's reaffirmation
that 'our [US] treaty commitment to Japan's security is absolute, and
Article 5 covers all territories under Japan's administration, including
the Senkaku islands'[19] may be interpreted as a manifestation of this
US-Japan convergence on the common "China threat." The US has also
strongly supported Tokyo's sweeping security initiatives in the past
few years. Largely in response to the escalation of the territorial dis-
pute with the PRC in the East China Sea, Japan has enhanced its secu-
rity roles and defence capabilities, especially in the maritime security
domain. Supporting Japan has meant for Washington strengthening
the Japan hedge against China.

Obama's China Policy, and the
Strategic Response in Southeast Asia

The two aspects of engagement and hedging have defined Obama's
China policy. In particular, the first year of the administration ap-
peared to emphasise engagement of Beijing when the established in
2009 high-level S&ED sought to elevate Sino-US relations to the level of
a global partnership. The US administration reassured the PRC that it
was not seeking to contain China and focused on expanding bilateral
areas of cooperation. The message from Beijing contained a similar
focus on engagement.

Beginning in 2010 more competitive and tense bilateral securi-
ty relations have been observed, reflecting the strategic divergences
and mistrust between the two powers. Sino-US strategic divergenc-
es were accentuated by means of displaying military power and bal-
ance-of-power behaviour, together with a tougher political rhetoric on
both sides. The bilateral relations became strained over the Obama
administration's arms sales to Taiwan (in 2010 and in 2011) and follow-
ing North Korea's alleged sinking in 2010 of a South Korean naval ship,
the Cheonan.

However, Sino-US tensions particularly increased when the South
China Sea issue was added to the list of bilateral problems beginning in
2010. Washington has increasingly come to perceive the South China
Sea as an area of growing concern. Underscoring US national inter-

est in freedom of navigation in the area, the Obama administration's senior officials have expressed worries over what they see as China's 'destabilizing, unilateral actions asserting its claims' in the South China Sea.[20] This referred to the PRC's tensions in 2014 with The Philippines over the Second Thomas Shoal and with Vietnam over a Chinese oil rig that was placed near the disputed Paracel islands between May and July. As discussed earlier, the Sino-Japanese dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, too, has seen a greater US involvement in the past couple of years with America's reaffirmation of its commitments to Japan under the US-Japan Security Treaty.

In Southeast Asia, the US response to China's perceived assertiveness has included enhancing Washington's security ties with partners such as Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines, as well as with Australia. These have included conducting joint military drills and port calls, and engaging in high-level defence talks. Part of the US rebalance is the deployment of new littoral combat ships in Singapore and the stationing of 2.500 US Marines at Darwin military base in Australia on a rotational basis. In April 2014, Washington signed a new defence pact with Manila. It gives America increased access to military bases in the Philippines.

Obama has further accorded more priority to multilateral diplomacy in Asia and, in particular, to US relations with ASEAN as an organisation. This is known as the diplomatic aspect of the rebalance: in 2009, the US signed the TAC and held its first ever summit with ASEAN, and in 2011 it became a member of the East Asia Summit (EAS). Southeast Asian states have, since the Bush era, welcomed enhanced military ties with Washington, as well as resisted Chinese efforts for a leadership role and exclusive membership in the EAS.[21] America's participation in the EAS since 2011, strongly supported by some ASEAN members and Japan, has had an impact on the summit's agenda. Indeed, the US has brought more international attention to the South China Sea disputes – a multilateralisation of the issue that the PRC has opposed, insisting on a bilateral resolution of the disputes by the concerned parties. While ASEAN has been wary of antagonising China and jeopardising the bilateral trade ties, the organisation has started to openly express its concerns over the increased tensions in the South China Sea.

Beijing's response to what it sees as US-led containment has centred on displaying China's growing naval power, for example, by publicising military drills by the PLA, such as the October 2013 drill in the

Philippine Sea, which was the largest PLA Navy open-ocean exercise ever. The PRC has also stepped up the dispatch of patrolling vessels to disputed waters in the East and South China Seas. China's maritime surveillance is planned to expand in the next five years with a focus on both quality, i.e. improvement of law enforcement capacity through new military equipment, and quantity. Finally, in line with the double-digit growth of its defence budget over the past 20 years, the PRC in March 2015 announced an increase by 10 percent for the coming year. The focus will be on the development of more high-tech weapons, as well as on enhancing the PLA's coastal and air defences.

It is unsurprising, therefore, that wariness of Chinese strategic aspirations persists throughout East Asia. To be sure, most regional states recognise the growing importance of the PRC in economic and political terms, and seek cooperative relations with Beijing. At the same time, China's perceived assertiveness since 2010 in pursuing its maritime territorial claims in East Asia, backed up by strengthened military power, has led to regional demands for a greater US involvement.[22] US friends and allies in Asia have welcomed Obama's policies, seeing the American regional presence as a check on Chinese ambitions.

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The EU's Security Strategy in East Asia

Main Regional Objectives and Obstacles for a Security Role

The EU's involvement in the Asian region, in contrast to the US, is more recent. Europe's interest stems primarily from Asia's rising economic weight in the post-Cold War period. Since the early 1990s, Europe has sought to enhance its political and economic ties with Asian partners, as well as to make a positive contribution to regional security.

The EU's willingness for a security engagement with Asia was underscored in the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS). The ESS proposed that the EU develop strategic partnerships with Japan and China (among others) in the framework of the Union's expanded international cooperation.[23] It also explicitly recognised that regional conflicts, such as those on the Korean Peninsula, 'impact on European interests directly and indirectly,' and hence 'distant threats,' including the DPRK's nuclear activities, 'are all of concern to Europe.'[24] The updated in 2012 *Guidelines on the EU's Foreign and Security Policy in East Asia* empha-

sise again the diversity of threats to regional security, ranging from the North Korean nuclear issue to the South China Sea tensions.[25] The document argues that the EU should expand its contribution to East Asian stability, including notably through non-military security cooperation, support for regional integration and promotion of democratic values. The focus is on soft power and economic tools – an approach rather different from the one pursued by the US in Asia.

From the perspective of its foreign policy, the core objectives of the EU in the region are the consolidation of democracy, adherence to the rule of law and respect for human rights. Europe's preference for soft power tools has been reflected in policies that tackle development issues and seek to reduce poverty, contribute to peace building and civilian crisis management (e.g., in East Timor and in Aceh), and address environmental problems. As the largest development and humanitarian aid donor in Asia, the Union has extended assistance to a number of East Asian countries, including Cambodia, Thailand and North Korea. An important policy objective for Brussels is also the support for regional institution building, for this is regarded as a means to enhance peace and stability both in Asia and globally. In this regard, Europe has sought enhanced dialogue with East Asia in the framework of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) and the ARF, as well as with ASEAN.[26]

At present, Europe's security engagement in East Asia remains rather limited. In the first place, this region is not a main geographical area of Brussels' foreign policy. In comparison with the EU's policy towards, for example, the Balkans or Africa, where Europe has tackled conflicts, and sought to shape the political and socio-economic structures of countries, the Union's Asia approach has prioritised expanding trade relations and promoting inter-regionalism through ASEM.[27] Secondly, Europe's hard power remains largely confined to NATO and it has no permanent troop deployments in Asia, while the focus of the EU's security interests and missions is Europe's immediate neighbourhood, as the Ukraine crisis illustrates. The EU's limited hard power capabilities mean that the Union is unable to play a substantial role in Asia's security "hot spots," for example, on the Korean Peninsula or in the South China Sea – theatres of geostrategic importance for both Europe and America, in which only the US is at present deeply involved. Indeed, similarly to the US, Europe has a stake in maritime security in Asia, for

European trade is dependent on the safety of the shipping lanes passing through the South China Sea.

Finally, the particular structural limitations on the part of the EU, notably its inability to "speak with one voice" on major foreign policy issues, often dampen the expectations in East Asian capitals for forging meaningful international initiatives with the Union, and strengthen the preferences of Asian elites for dealing bilaterally with the individual EU member states.

Constraining or Encouraging?

The EU's relations with Japan – the Union's 7th largest trading partner – illustrates the limitations that Brussels faces in forging a security role in East Asia. By all accounts, this is the most institutionalised bilateral link in Europe's relations with East Asia. The Euro-Japanese partnership reflects the shared values of freedom, democracy and the rule of law. The bilateral cooperation has focused, in particular, on non-traditional security challenges, including climate change and energy, foreign aid, economic development, and conflict prevention and peace building.[28] Brussels and Tokyo are currently negotiating a comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) and a Strategic Partnership Agreement to further deepen their ties.

However, the potential for EU-Japan cooperation still exceeds the achievements so far. The Union's rather narrow approach towards East Asia primarily from a trade perspective (with China) – driven by the "China opportunity" perception – hinders Europe's relevance for Japan as a strategic partner; indeed, despite the shared democratic values between the two. From the viewpoint of Japan, for which the East Asian region occupies a central place in its foreign policy and China is a security concern, especially in the context of the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute, the EU is not 'an actor actively involved in the resolution' of pressing security issues.[29] In contrast, it is the military alliance with the US that remains a top priority for Japanese foreign policy, for it is seen as a deterring force against a potentially hostile China.

In 2004-2005, the debate about the possible lifting of the EU's arms embargo on the PRC was a clear illustration of the EU and US-Japan divergence on China. The "China threat" perception largely defined the strong objection by Washington and Tokyo to such a move by Brussels due to concerns that the lifting of the embargo might boost the PRC's military modernisation efforts and upset the military balance in East

Asia. Appearing to prioritise its economic interests, the EU came to be perceived in Japan as lacking an understanding of the region's geopolitical dynamics.

Similar limitations may be observed in the EU's 'strategic partnership' with the ROK, which, alongside Japan, is identified as a 'natural' and a 'like-minded' partner for Europe in Asia.[30] South Korea, the Union's 8th largest trading partner, was added to the list of the EU's strategic partners following the signature in 2010 of two major documents: the EU-ROK Framework Agreement (FA) and the EU-ROK FTA. Trade, investment and economic cooperation are a priority for Brussels and Seoul. Although the FA seeks to intensify the bilateral political relations in areas such as non-proliferation, climate change and energy security, these ties remain primarily confined to declaratory statements. Furthermore, Europe's limited, at best, security role on the Korean Peninsula raises the question for the ROK of whether its partnership with the EU can indeed be strategically relevant.

EU's China Policy and Role in East Asia's Security Hot Spots

The EU's China policy reflects Europe's growing economic interests both regionally and globally. The PRC is the EU's second largest trading partner after the US. The EU's trade with China dramatically increased in the second half of the 2000s, reaching between 2009 and 2013 an impressive average annual growth rate of 11 percent. Paralleling the deepening of economic ties was the rapid growth of sectoral cooperation in more than 50 areas, which led to a willingness on both sides to seek and upgrade their partnership to that of a strategic one.

The mutual recognition as strategic partners was first emphasised at the 2003 EU-China Summit and was subsequently echoed in the ESS published the same year. Europe perceives China to be a rising global power whose foreign policy choices are said to be of strategic importance to the EU. European leaders often underscore the shared number of international, politico-security interests with the PRC, ranging from maritime security and environmental protection to nuclear non-proliferation and promotion of multilateralism. Many observers have concluded, however, that there is a significant gap between the official rhetoric of a strategic partnership, and the reality of Europe and China actually defining and implementing common objectives.[31] The focus of

the relations remains predominantly an economic and a trade-oriented one, but also bilateral in nature, while international politico-security issues, such as North Korea, although being recognised (on paper) as a joint priority, are not followed by joint actions that could provide the evidence of an existing strategic partnership.[32]

Official EU statements and documents continue to stress that developing a strategic partnership with Beijing is one of the Union's top foreign policy priorities, while Brussels is continuing to support China's transition towards a more open society and its emergence as a 'fully engaged member of the international community.'[33] Indeed, an important aspect of the EU's China policy is assisting China's domestic transformation and its sustainable development, i.e. focusing on China's 'internal scene.'[34] In other words, Europe's engagement policy towards the PRC encourages the latter to open up its society, conduct political reforms and democratise[35], thus in essence seeking to "Europeanise" China. This does not necessarily resonate with China's own vision of its future development, for, as discussed earlier, the survival of the one-party authoritarian system remains a core objective for the PRC's leadership. CCP leaders continue to prioritise sovereign rights over individual rights, and attach utmost importance to territorial integrity and non-interference in domestic affairs, which are at odds with core European values.[36]

The EU's limited role in East Asia's critical security theatres undermines the Union's relevance as a player able to shape China's regional environment and Beijing's security behaviour. In contrast to the US, Europe is not involved in the Taiwan issue and is not a participant in the multilateral efforts aimed at denuclearising the DPRK. Nor is Brussels involved in any substantial way in encouraging a peaceful settlement of the territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas.[37]

With regard to Taiwan, the Union adheres to the 'one-China' principle and supports a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue. If 'stability and peaceful dialogue are threatened' Europe sees this as a direct concern for 'its own interests.'[38] Some observers[39] have criticised Brussels for its unwillingness to have a more 'outspoken' position on the growing number of missiles along the Chinese coast facing Taiwan[40]. This criticism appears to be even more relevant since 2008, for the rapid improvement of cross-Strait relations has not led to a (corresponding) reduction of the PRC's missiles opposite the island or to security assur-

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ances provided by Beijing to Taipei. In contrast to the US, which sells weapons to Taiwan in order to maintain the military balance across the Taiwan Strait, as well as deter China's potential use of force to re-unify with the island, the EU appears to ignore this geopolitical reality.

With regard to the DPRK, Brussels does recognise North Korea's nuclear and missile programmes as a concern for Europe, and a threat to East Asian security. In particular, Pyongyang's policies on 'non-proliferation and human rights' are said to be 'detrimental to regional and global stability.'[41] However, here too, Europe's role is limited to declaratory statements, such as 'encouraging' dialogue to achieve denuclearisation, 'calling' on the DRPK to fulfil its international obligations and alike.[42] Admittedly, Europe still remains out of the range of the DPRK's missiles and hence may not feel directly threatened by the North. At the same time, Pyongyang's policies not only destabilise Northeast Asia, but the DPRK's potential proliferation of nuclear materials to rogue states and terrorist groups may also have direct security implications for Europe's own neighbourhood.

With the increased regional maritime tensions in the past couple of years the EU has sought to somewhat enhance its political involvement in East Asia. This has included issuing statements to express the EU's concern about regional stability, for example, in 2012 during the East China Sea dispute escalation and in 2013 in the wake of China's establishment of ADIZ. With regard to the latter, Brussels stressed that this development 'heightened the risk of escalation and contributed to raising tensions in the region.'[43] This rather strong language regarding Beijing's policies was unusual for the EU, which typically preferred to avoid antagonising China. Political rhetoric was followed by some action, which sought to increase the EU's diplomatic visibility in East Asia. In 2012 High Representative Catherine Ashton signed on behalf of the EU ASEAN's TAC and in 2013 she attended the Shangri-La Dialogue, which was the first EU presence at this major Asian security forum. Ashton delivered a speech that underscored 'the real interest of the EU in and commitment to Asian security issues,' however 'not as an Asian power, but an Asian partner.'[44] This reflected a different (from the US) security role that Brussels was crafting for the EU in Asia – one that was focused on comprehensive approaches to tackling new security challenges with an emphasis on soft power.

The above discussion indicates that the ongoing geopolitical changes in East Asia detailed earlier in this article have stimulated the EU's

willingness recently to increase its regional security engagement in order to protect its (primarily) economic and maritime security interests. However, this EU involvement remains largely restricted to official statements, and many Asian observers continue to share the perception that fears of negative implications for European business interests in China are the actual driver of Brussels' reluctance to adopt a more outspoken position on Asian maritime territorial disputes.[45] For Beijing, the EU's limited strategic engagement in the region means that Europe is perceived as a great power only on issues, in which China does not have a direct stake, and hence unrelated to hard security concerns.[46] Since China's core security interests are in East Asia – a geographical area of the utmost strategic importance to the PRC – Europe is largely unable to shape Chinese security behaviour in the region or to steer the desired course of China's rise.

Constraining or Encouraging?

US and EU Convergence and Divergence on China and the Implications for Chinese Security Behaviour in East Asia

The structural differences between the EU and the US – with the former relying primarily on soft power foreign policy tools, while the latter opting for hard power instruments – are well known and often said to be the major factors accounting for their differing approaches to the evolving security environment in East Asia. At the same time, Brussels and Washington do converge on their broad objectives for the East Asian region, such as maintaining peace and stability, and freedom of navigation, as well as supporting regional economic development, security multilateralism and peaceful resolution of disputes. However, it is the diverging perceptions concerning China's rise – namely the "threat" versus the "opportunity" dichotomy – that largely define the respective responses of the US and the EU.

East Asia is *the* region where the PRC's rise has had (and will have) the most profound strategic impact than anywhere in the world. It is also a main geographical area of Chinese foreign policy. Beijing's policies and strategic choices in East Asia are, therefore, of the utmost importance for Asian and, by extension, global stability. Europe generally convergences with the US engagement strategy of binding China and enmeshing it in international institutions, in order to ensure the PRC's emergence as a responsible and "status quo" power.[47] However, it is

China's growing hard power that remains 'the principal prism through which most US analysts view China's rise'[48] and that defines Washington's responses. As detailed earlier, the US approach of engagement and hedging seeks to combine cooperation with China on issues of common interest with preparations for a potential deterioration in the bilateral relations; the latter aspect is conspicuously absent from EU's China policies. The Obama administration's rebalance is, to a large extent, a response to Chinese behaviour in East Asia that is seen to adversely affect either American (security) interests, or the interests of its allies and partners in the region. Wariness of Chinese maritime aspirations and concerns about the PRC's long-term strategic objectives in East Asia are shared by the US and many Asian states, but arguably not by the EU.

In contrast to the US and Asian countries, Europe remains a non-player in terms of seeking to shape China's regional environment and Beijing's foreign policy choices, pursuing instead a one-dimensional policy of engagement towards the PRC.[49] Led primarily by "an (economic) opportunity" perception, the EU appears to be much less interested in (or worried about) China's growing military power and its security behaviour in East Asia. While Brussels' reluctance to anger China, including on Asian territorial disputes, may be welcomed in Beijing, it does not bode well for Europe's aspiration to be seen as a credible strategic actor in Asia.[50]

So what are then the implications of these divergent strategies of the US and the EU for Chinese security behaviour in East Asia? On the one hand, Washington encourages Beijing to act as a responsible player in the region, for example, by seeking China's role in the denuclearisation of the DPRK. At the same time, the US presence also restrains Chinese attempts to dominate Asia. As the "China threat" perception grows in the region, thereby inviting greater attention by Washington, it becomes necessary for PRC leaders to moderate China's behaviour. In this way they seek to prevent the emergence of a potential US-led containing coalition that would be detrimental to China's economic development and domestic political stability, and may lead to a deterioration in Beijing's geopolitical position.

US involvement, for example, has led to a multilateralisation of the South China Sea issue, which, in turn, has put pressure on China to

de-escalate tensions. Indeed, since the second half of 2014 Beijing has embarked on a number of confidence-building measures, including softening its diplomatic rhetoric in various multilateral (ASEAN-centred) settings and showing a willingness to discuss with ASEAN a binding Code of Conduct in the South China Sea. While the Southeast Asian states have generally preferred to resolve their outstanding issues with the PRC within a more narrow regional framework, it appears now that Washington is becoming an important player in the dispute management process – an unwelcome development for China.

On the other hand, as the PRC perceives the US rebalance as a containment policy aimed at curtailing China's rise, it responds by placing more emphasis on military modernisation and, especially, naval expansion to safeguard its growing maritime interests. China's defence budget increase suggests that CCP leaders are taking very seriously the protection of the country's maritime interests and hence are not likely to change the PRC's position on the territorial disputes. Beijing also increasingly seeks to challenge Washington's leadership position in Asia. Placing an oil rig in the South China Sea and being more assertive in the dispute with Japan may be seen as examples of Chinese attempts to "test the waters," namely US regional security commitments. Should America fail to respond, regional confidence in the US would wane and Beijing would succeed in eroding Washington's security dominance in East Asia.

The EU's response to Asia's changing security environment, which is primarily defined by political rhetoric without a coherent strategy, appears only to encourage China to assert its regional interests. The emphasis placed by EU policy-makers on enhancing Sino-European ties, and thereby according the PRC a privileged position in the Union's foreign policy, is welcomed by CCP leaders, as they seek to balance US influence globally. At the regional level in East Asia Europe's reluctance to anger China on core security issues, such as Taiwan and maritime territorial disputes, questions Europe's ability to defend important (and shared with the US) values and interests. This makes it easier for China to exploit the Union's weakness. As Beijing's geopolitical aspirations in East Asia are only kept in check by the US, Chinese leaders leverage the PRC's economic importance for the EU by seeking to keep Brussels "out" of China's core security interests. The EU's inability and/

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or unwillingness to lift the arms embargo, and to grant China a market economy status, further stimulate the perception in Beijing of Europe as a strategically marginalised power.

The diverging approaches by the US and the EU may not be sending the right signals to Beijing. As architects of a liberal and rule-based international order, Europe and America are expected to defend the core principles on which it is based. Their diverging strategies only reinforce China's perception of the "decline" of the West and stimulate Beijing's responses that might seek to challenge it. While this challenge is still not pronounced at the international level, it is at the regional level in East Asia where China in recent years is starting to behave more like a typical rising power seeking dominance. At the end, the competitive dynamics in US-China relations appear only to be reinforced by the EU's passivity on issues of core interest to the PRC, which makes the outcome of China's rise more, rather than less, uncertain, an outcome neither the US nor the EU desires.

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The European Union as an Actor in Energy Relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran

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The final phase of the nuclear negotiations with Iran has coincided with a profound crisis in the EU-Russia relations. Due to the crisis in Ukraine, the uncertainty about European energy security has increased significantly. Against this background, Iran, with its vast natural gas resources, might become a new supplier to the European gas market. Consequently, the relations between the EU and Iran are becoming increasingly important. The main aim of this article is to analyse the relations between the EU and Iran in the energy sector through the concept of actorness.

Keywords: European Union; actorness; Iran; energy; oil; natural gas; Russian Federation

Introduction

The current crisis between the West and Russia and the military conflict in Ukraine have rendered the West's future relations with Russia uncertain. Also, since Ukraine is a main transit country for Russian oil and gas, the conflict in Ukraine might threaten European energy security. Questions about the security of energy supplies loom large against the background of the two previous gas crises between Russia and Ukraine, which, in 2006 and 2009, led to cutbacks of gas supplies to the members of the European Union (EU). On the other hand, the current crisis, which provided an additional impetus to the EU in its diversification efforts, creates new opportunities for potential new suppliers. In this context, officials from the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI), a

country which sits on the largest natural gas reserves, have repeatedly declared that Iran is able and willing to supply large quantities of its gas to Europe.

Since the early 1990s the EU-IRI relations have gone through various stages that have been characteriSed by phases of cooperation as well as phases of confrontation. While the period between the 1990s and the early 2000s was characterised by the EU's attempts to engage Iran in a constructive dialogue on a number of issues, including energy, in the second half of the first decade of the 21st century we can clearly see a decline of the EU-IRI relations. However, today, the EU is again trying to improve its relations with Iran.

The objective of this article is to identify and specify the main criteria for the EU's actorness in its energy policy (primary in the area of natural gas) and to analyse the external dimension of this policy towards the IRI. These objectives are attained through answering two questions: (1) how do the criteria of the EU actorness relate to the external dimension of the energy policy towards Iran? (2) Can the EU be considered as an actor of the energy relations with Iran and if yes, what is the extent of this actorness?

In order to achieve the stated objective and answer the research questions, it is necessary to analyse the internal dimension of the EU energy policy and its external dimension *vis-à-vis* Iran. As will be explained the degree of actorness depends on the delegation of competences to the European Union institutions, primary to the European Commission (EC) and on the format of the negotiations with third parties. In different policy areas the degree of actorness can vary.

Thus the extent of the independence of the EU institutions in the area of the internal energy market will influence the degree of actorness in the relations with Iran. Also, external environment can influence the degree of actorness. If policy issues related to the area of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) supersede the energy agenda we can expect a low level of actorness since the extent of delegation in the CFSP is rather limited.

The basic assumption of this article is that the actorness of the EU in the area of the energy relations with Iran is not only drawn from the aspects of the internal and external energy policy, but is also based on the Common Foreign and Security Policy. At the same time, this article assumes that the actorness of the European Union depends on

the ability of the European Commission to formulate a debate about the interactions with external actors, yet in the case of the external dimension of the EU energy policy towards Iran this actorness is rather limited.

In its theoretical dimension the present article is based on a combination of the agency theory, social constructivism1 and their relation to the European Union actorness. According to constructivist theoreticians, the EU actorness must be understood as a social construct between stakeholders2 based on the principle of the shared understanding of the European Union as the actor that has its own role to play.3

The structure of the present article is as follows. The first part presents concept actorness and its relation to agency theory. The second part analyses the internal dimension of the EU energy policy. Next section determines the extent of actorness in that field. The final part of the article analyses dimensions of actorness in the external energy relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Actorness of the EU and Concept of Agency

In contemporary literature on the topic, there are several concepts revolving around the actorness of the European Union in the international context. Some scholars prefer to combine the issue of actorness with agency theory.[4] Actorness relates to the ability of the EU 'to behave actively and deliberately in relation to other actors in the international system'.[5] On the other hand, agency theory refers to the situation 'when one party, the principal, enters into a contractual agreement with a second party, the agent, and delegates to the latter responsibility for carrying out function or set of tasks on the principal's behalf.'[6] Though these concepts are distinct, they are also interrelated since member states, as principals, delegate competences usually to the Commission to pursue certain common policy goal.[7]

In a classic principal-agency research based in economic theory, scholars tend to focus on a problem of asymmetric information and agency costs that result from the situation when agents and principals pursue divergent objectives.[8] In contrast, in the literature on international organisations, such as the EU, researchers focus their attention on the positive outcomes of delegation, mostly related to the reduction of decision-making costs, the enhancement of 'the credibility of policy commitments',[9] as well as to the stimulation of 'strategic behaviour in

international negotiations' and enjoy 'the advantages of speaking with a single voice'.[10] The latter rationale for delegation directly relates to the concept of actorness.

In their definitions of actorness, most authors focus on its external attributes.[11] According to Jupille and Caporaso the EU's ability to act as an actor in global governance is based on four dimensions: authority, autonomy, recognition and coherence.[12] In order to determine the extent of the actorness we have to conceptualise and operationalise these categories:[13]

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1. Authority: the EU's 'authority to act on behalf of the collective'. The degree of authority depends on the 'extent of the delegated competences from the member states to the EU'.[14] The full delegation is in the area of the exclusive competences of the EU, while the area of shared competences suggests partial delegation, and competences to coordinate and support presume only limited delegation.

2. Autonomy: the institutional uniqueness and independence of the EU institutions in relation to other actors, in particular its member states. This reflects agency theory's relationship between principals and agents. Member states as principals delegate certain competences on the agent(s) to act on their behalf. The level of the EU's autonomy will depend on who actually represents the Union in the international negotiations: Commission, some member states, the presidency, or some combination of the three (the 'hybrid model' of negotiations).

3. Recognition: formal or informal recognition of the EU by other actors.

4. Coherence: ability to generate an internally consistent system of political preferences. The level of coherence is 'the degree to which the group comes up with a single message and manages to present that message with a single voice, without members of the group breaking away and undermining the collective message.'[15]

One of the most often quoted and applied theories in regard to this subject is Bretherton's and Vogler's theory of actorness, which is based on the constructivist approach and three interrelated concepts: opportunity (i.e. the factors given by the external environment that weaken or strengthen the actorness), presence (i.e. the EU's ability to influence its external environment by its mere existence) and capability (i.e. the internal organisation and functioning of EU external policies). As re-

gards the last concept, the authors distinguish four basic criteria of actorness, which are 1) shared values, 2) the legitimacy of the external policy (in particular the decision-making process and priorities), 3) the ability to prioritise and formulate coherent policies, and 4) the availability of tools for external policy and the ability to use them effectively.[16]

The extent actorness can range from none to minimal, moderate and high. Hence, in different policy areas EU can demonstrate different degrees of actorness.[17] This will depend on the extent of delegation of the competences to the Commission as a main agent and on the form of the Union representation in international negotiations. In this respect, Thomas seeks to take into account the increasing role of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in his approach.[18] Thomas defines actorness as the ability of the EU to unify the preferences of the member states and EU institutions, create a sufficiently clear common policy and ensure its implementation in the EU's relations with other states, non-state actors and international institutions.[19] This is the responsibility of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who has at her disposal the External Action Service as a bureaucratic body and the diplomatic personnel.[20] The Treaty of Lisbon merged this position with the European Commissioner for External Relations, which shall make the EU foreign policy more coherent and create a single authority that will represent the EU at the international level.

Similarly Dryburgh, who examines the EU's actorness in its relations with the IRI, highlights the importance and role of the EU as a global actor. In his view, alongside its external policy/relations, the EU's actorness is also rooted in the CFSP, whose development after the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty has added a new dimension to the EU. At the same time, while factoring in those criteria that focus on the external attributes of EU actorness – i.e. acting vis-à-vis third-country actors – Dryburgh also takes account of additional criteria of actorness. These include, for instance, the recognition of the EU as an actor in a certain area, both by member states and by external actors. If the external and internal actors share the same perception of the EU's role as an actor, this perception is crucial for the social construct of the actorness of the EU and thus for its evaluation.[21]

Nevertheless, since decision making in the Foreign Affairs Council is based on unanimity, we do not expect the High Representative to act

independently of the member states' interests. The High Representative realises the policy, which was agreed in the Council. Thus the level of delegation is by definition low. Hence, based on Dryburgh analysis of the EU's actorness in its relations with Iran in the area of CFSP the authors will use the following criteria of actorness in the area of the external energy relations with IRI: 1) the articulation of the actorness, 2) the consistency and specificity of the given policy, 3) the diplomatic apparatus and political tools, and 4) the perception of the EU actorness by third parties.[22]

In sum, the authors of the present article build on Jupille and Caporaso's criteria when examining the degree of actorness in the energy field, and on Dryburgh's criteria when examining EU's energy relations with Iran. As will be explained, EU's energy policy and external policy are interrelated. Thus Dryburgh's and Jupille and Caporaso's criteria are not mutually exclusive but they are rather complementary.

Internal Dimensions of the EU's Energy Policy

After China and the US the EU is the third largest energy consumer.[23] Although its overall energy consumption is decreasing, its depletion of inland domestic resources makes the EU Member States dependent on imports of natural resources. According to the European Commission, 53% of the EU consumption depends on imports.[24] Crude oil and petroleum products still dominate the primary energy consumption of the EU with a share of 33.8%, followed by natural gas (23.4%), solid fuels (17.5%), nuclear energy (13.5%), and renewable energy resources (11%). At the same time, the EU's import dependency on oil and petroleum is about 90%, its import dependency on natural gas is up to 66%, that on solid fuels is 42% and that on nuclear fuel is 40%.[25] Under present initiatives in the energy field, the EU tries to decrease the energy sensitivity of its economy and shift towards clean energy, which shall also help to decrease its import dependency.[26]

A positive sign is that between 2010 and 2012 the EU's primary energy consumption declined by 4% and the share of oil and petroleum products in it declined from 35.1% to 33.8% (but we should also remember that it was partly an outcome of the sluggish economic growth).[27] Nevertheless, during the same period of time the production of crude oil and petroleum fell by 21%, and since 1995 the overall oil and petroleum production fell by 56%.[28]

Although natural gas is considered to be a relatively clean source of energy, between 2010 and 2012 its consumption in the EU decreased by 11%, and its share in the total amount of energy in the EU declined from 25.1% to 23.4%. These declines were primarily due to weak economic growth and low electricity demand, but also partially due to the growing share of solid fuels and renewables in the power generation sector.[29] At the same time the overall gas production continued in its decline, and since 1995 it fell by 56%. In 2012, the EU imported about 287.5 bcm of gas.[30] According to the Commission during the next decade the EU's gas imports shall not exceed 340-350 bcm.[31]

Russia is the EU's main energy supplier. In 2012 the Russian share in the overall import of both oil and natural gas was over 30%. Meanwhile, Norway's share in the overall import of natural gas alone was about 30%. Between 2008 and 2011 liquefied natural gas (LNG) primarily from Qatar was seen as a major competitor to the pipeline gas. However, its market share in overall natural gas imports, after reaching its peak in 2010 at about 20%, went down to 15% in 2012, and during the next two years it continued in its rapid fall. This is primarily due to the much larger prices in the growing Asian market, to which LNG producers diverted their exports.[32]

Hence, Russia remains the most important exporter to the European market. However, the 2014 European Energy Security Strategy states that '[t]he most pressing energy security of supply issue is the strong dependence [on] a single supplier.' What is meant here by the term 'single supplier' is obviously the Russian Federation.[33] Thus, '[t]he European Union must reduce its external dependency on particular suppliers [...].'[34] This dependency issue is strongly articulated in the gas sector, and according to the Commission energy security can be achieved by the creation of an internal gas market through a shifting of the regulatory authority to the European Union (i.e. the Commission) level and by developing the common voice in the external energy policy. Recently the process of the creation of the EU's actorness through the regulatory state activism became visible in the EU's energy sector, as the Commission is trying to create an internal energy market.[35]

The gas markets in the EU have always been isolated, monopolised and segmented by leading energy companies.[36] This situation has led to 'divergences over internal energy policy [which] have undermined [the] external energy strategy.'[37] Moreover, since 30% of the EU's gas

supplies come from the Russian Federation, the Russian company Gazprom has been able to regulate the gas trade with its consumers and ensured its dominant position on the market. Hence, the 'European market' is disintegrated, and the 'European voice' is mute. This, by definition, has precluded any form of the EU actorness in the European gas industry, since there was virtually no delegation of authority to the European Union level and to the Commission as an agent.

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In order to change the situation, the Commission is trying to build an internal gas market by de-monopolisation, liberalisation and promotion of the spot market principle, which should, in theory, empower the consumers' position and their energy security.[38] For this reason the Commission came up with the third energy package, which, after a vigorous political debate, was finally adopted in September 2009—a few months before the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force. One of the key provisions is the principle of mandatory ownership unbundling, which should ensure third party access to the pipeline infrastructure and, by this, encourage gas-to-gas competition. Exemption to this provision can be provided by the Commission.[39]

But it was only after the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon that the provision on energy security was introduced into the primary law, which gave the Commission a legal basis for its regulatory powers. According to Article 4(2) of the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) energy is part of the shared competences, which means that the member states exercise their competences in a scope in which the EU does not exercise or stopped exercising its own competences.[40] Here, according to Article 5(3, 4) of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU), the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity are applied, which means that 'the Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed actions cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States […]', and its actions 'shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties.'[41]

In this respect the scope of the EU actions might be considerably broad, since according to Article 194(1) of TFEU the goals of the energy policy include the creation of the internal energy market, securing the energy supply, interconnection of energy networks, and promotion of energy efficiency and renewable energy sources. The member states might often not be able to achieve these goals alone. The legal basis gives the Commission a considerable space for its activity. Yet, as far

as the European market is still dominated by Gazprom, it must compete with the Russian monopoly over the nature of the European gas market. Consequently, it is in the Commission's interest to find an alternative supplier.

Although the recent definition of the Commission's role in the energy sector came with the Treaty of Lisbon, the process of regulation of the energy sector and framing of the issue dates to the beginning of the 1990s.[42] The Treaty of Lisbon only reflects the processes which have been going on for a longer period of time and are a result of the successful framing of the issue by the Commission. At the same time, the Commission perceives that the creation of the internal gas market will have a spill-over effect on the EU's external policy.

With respect to the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the Treaty of Lisbon merged the posts of the High Representative for the CFSP and the European Commissioner for External Relations and created the post of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The High Representative of the Union has at his or her disposal the External Action Service as a bureaucratic body and the diplomatic personnel.[43] These innovations represent an attempt to make the EU foreign policy more coherent and create a single authority that will represent the EU at international level. The merger of the energy policy and the EU external policy is considered to be very important. One underpins the other. At the same time the Commission perceives that the creation of the internal gas market will have a spill-over effect on the EU's external policy. This is understandable; since conclusion of contracts between energy companies is usually preceded by the intergovernmental agreements. Thus in one of its Communications the EC states that '[t]he EU external energy policy is crucial to complete the internal energy market.'[44] Another related document states that 'the successful and efficient functioning of the internal market with the gas and electricity will promote and underpin the development of an effective external dimension of the Union's energy policy.'[45]

The creation of the new position of the Vice President of the European Commission in charge of the Energy Union in November 2014 shows the clear ambitions of the European Commission to engage in the process of negotiations with suppliers. In this regard Framework Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union suggests that the Commission should be not only 'informed about the negotiation of intergovern-

mental agreements' with suppliers but also should 'participat[e] in such negotiations.' This will 'ensure that the EU speaks with one voice in negotiations'.[46] Nevertheless, it is still only a bid for future competences.[47]

Degree of the EU Actorness in the Energy Area

In terms of actorness, Article 194 of the TFEU and the third energy package provide partial delegation to the European Commission. Consequently, we can see a progress from the no explicit authority to a moderate authority, which presumes that the member states as principals keep certain control over their agent (Commission) but have to comply with the new rules of the third energy package. The autonomy of the Commission is on the other hand very limited, since the member states and their energy companies are still main actors who negotiate contracts with suppliers. As shown in the case of Iran, which has the largest gas reserves in the world (33.8 trillion cubic meters, which is 18.2% of all world gas reserves) and the fourth largest oil reserves in the world (150 billion barrels, which is 9.3% of all global oil reserves)[48], the Commission can participate in the intergovernmental negotiations related to the energy issues, but decision making is in hands of the member states. Thus 'a hybrid negotiating format has been put in place' where the High Representative for CFSP, Commissioner for Energy/Energy Union, president of the Council of the EU and various member states engage in talks with the third countries.[49]

In terms of recognition, the EU established cooperation with main suppliers and other countries including China, Russia and the United States, which suggest their recognition of the EU as a partner for negotiations.[50] In terms of coherence, the European Commission actively promoted a common approach to energy security issues since the early 1990s primary through a non-binding soft law. It was able to introduce three energy packages that gradually liberalised gas market. In 2015 it introduced the concept of energy union and appointed a respective Vice President of the Commission. The energy union is, however, still a distant perspective. Nevertheless, the Commission successfully framed the issue of negative consequences of dependency on Russian gas. In this regard, it clearly sent a signal that its aim is to find an alternative supplier. Particularly, the recent overtures towards

Iran,[51] which has the largest gas reserves in the world,[52] clearly suggest that the Commission seeks to establish close cooperation in energy field with this country.

We can conclude that the degree of actorness in the energy area is moderate. Energy relations with Iran were forestalled by the Iranian nuclear programme that got priority over energy cooperation. Recent nuclear deal, however, gives a new impetus for establishing energy relationship particularly in the gas sector. Yet, so long as the Commission does not have enough power to present a single voice in the energy field and conclude binding agreements with the third parties, rapprochement with Iran and building the new energy relations will be a responsibility for the CFSP. On the other hand, as it was explained, the EU's energy policy and external policy are mutually constitutive. Alternative gas supplies from Iran can break Russia's dominant position in the energy sector and enable the EU to finish its market integration that will further empower the Commission.

The Actorness of the EU in Its External Energy Relations with Iran

The limited autonomy of the Commissioner for Energy/ Vice President for the Energy Union in negotiations with the third parties and the predominance of the nuclear issue in relations with Iran necessitate using different criteria to assess the level of the EU actorness *vis-à-vis* Iran than were used in the analysis of the Union policy in the energy sector. In this section, the work deploys Dryburgh's criteria of actorness: the articulation of the actorness, the consistency and specificity of the given policy, the diplomatic apparatus and political tools, and the perception of the EU actorness by third parties.[53]

Articulation of Actorness

The first criterion focuses on examining the existence and development of various areas of cooperation in the context of the process of shaping and forming the basic framework of the mutual relations. Analysis of the first criterion is also important for determining the existential framework of EU actorness *vis-à-vis* the IRI, from which the specific features of actorness will subsequently be derived. In other words, in analysing the first criterion, the authors will focus on the

main issues of the cooperation and the development of the relations of the EU *vis-à-vis* Iran. Iran has acquired a significant importance for the European Communities and subsequently for the EU in the last few decades. The European Communities began to formulate its positions and interests towards the IRI already during the 1980s.

Since 1992, the EU has followed the so-called Policy of Constructive Engagement towards Iran, which was embedded in its CFSP. The overall aim of this policy was for the EU to maintain contact with Iran and have some measure of influence on its regime while pursuing its interests in various areas. At the summit of the European Council in Edinburgh on 11 and 12 December 1992, the sustained emphasis on political dialogue led to the launch of the so-called Critical Dialogue of the EU with the IRI. The EU was convinced that the only way to approach Iran while complying with international norms was through direct contact and dialogue. However, very soon it became clear that the economic and energy dimension of the critical dialogue was more effective than debates about nuclear proliferation, the peace process in the Middle East and human rights. At the end of President Akbar Rafsanjani's term in office, the share of European companies in Iran's economy as well as the prospects for deepening trade relations represented an important factor influencing the involvement of the EU and its member states in Iran. However, when on 10 April, 1997, a German court found that the highest political authorities of the IRI were responsible for the killing of several members of the Kurdish opposition in Berlin, the critical dialogue was interrupted.[54]

It was not until the election of Mohammed Khatami to president of Iran in August 1997 and the promise of a new moderate rhetoric in Iranian foreign policy calling for a dialogue between civilizations that Europe could be convinced to resurrect its relations with Iran in the form of the so-called Comprehensive Dialogue, which reaffirmed previous demands as well as fears, but sought public cooperation much more than before. The Comprehensive Dialogue and the preceding Critical Dialogue represented tools of a constructive engagement policy that was implemented through the CFSP in order to bring about change in Iran's behaviour and ensure its reintegration into the international community. For both parties, it was meant to usher in a responsible and constructive cooperation. Compared with the Critical Dialogue, the Comprehensive Dialogue represented a more structured framework covering a wider range of issues at a global level (for exam-

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ple, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and combating terrorism), a regional level (for example, the peace process in the Middle East) and a bilateral level (for example, the topics of energy, drugs, human rights and refugees).[55]

Despite this success, relations between the EU and the IRI began to restrict by the end of the second term of President Khatami, in particular with respect to developments around Iran's nuclear programme. By the end of 2003, the Comprehensive Dialogue elapsed and the same year also saw the suspension of the negotiations on the EU-Iran Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) which had begun in 2001. A significant worsening of relations occurred after the presidential election victory of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2005. The reasons for the deteriorating relations between the EU and the IRI included Iran's human rights abuses and repression of freedom of expression, but the most important reason was the danger of nuclear weapons production as a result of Iran's developing nuclear programme. The negotiations on the nuclear programme continued during the two presidential terms of Ahmadinejad, but no substantial progress was achieved.[56]

In contrast, after Hassan Rouhani was elected president in June 2013, a new round of negotiations between Iran and the E3/EU+3, i.e. the EU and six other powers (Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia, the USA and China), proved successful. After a year (+) of negotiations, on 14 July 2015 in Vienna, the E3/EU+3 and Iran finally reached a deal that resolved the lasting standoff over the Iranian nuclear programme. Under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Iran will, among other things, allow for extensive inspections of its nuclear facilities and also reduce its enrichment capacity. In return, the economic sanctions, including the EU sanctions on imports of Iranian oil and gas to EU countries, will be lifted. [57] This will open up its energy sector and stimulate EU-IRI cooperation on oil and gas projects.

Consistent and Concrete Policies

The second criterion of actorness is the consistency and specificity of the EU policy towards a third-party actor. In this case, it rests on an analysis of the external dimension of the EU energy policy towards the IRI. In this context, the consistency of the EU's energy policy in relation

to Iran is determined by the interest of the EU in energy cooperation, which, of course, changes due to the development of the IRI's nuclear programme.

The issue of energy has, for a long time, dominated the bilateral relations between Iran and individual European states.[58] The EU became more involved in this field with the EU-Iran Working Group for Energy and Transport, which was established in May 1999 in Tehran. This body became the basis of the EU-Iran energy-policy dialogue. The working group met once a year, either in Tehran or in Brussels. Iran also became an observer in the Commission's funding programme INOGATEI (Inter-State Oil and Gas Transport to Europe) with the possibility of becoming a full member.[59]

Despite the sanctions that had been introduced against the Islamic Republic of Iran by the US, Europe was one of the few places providing Iran with FDI, high-tech and know-how, which were much needed for developing its vast oil and gas reserves. The early 2000s also saw the signing of several major contracts between Iran and European energy companies, including, for example, the 2001 deal with the Italian company AJIB to develop the Darkhovin oil field with a total investment of 540 million USD. Also, in January 2004, the Austrian company OMV and the Iranian state company National Iranian Gas Export Co. (NIGEC) concluded an agreement on the possible construction of the Nabucco pipeline to Austria.[60]

The Nabucco pipeline was a project of the EU that aimed to reduce the EU's dependence on Russian gas in the future. The project was launched in 2002, when five energy companies (OMV of Austria, MOL of Hungary, Bulgargaz of Bulgaria, Transgaz SA of Romania and Botas of Turkey) signed a protocol of intent to build a pipeline called Nabucco. Besides Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, Iran was also considered to be one possible source of gas supply for the Southern Energy Corridor project in the early days, as one branch of the pipeline was supposed to begin at the Iranian-Turkish border. However, after the US and the EU introduced economic sanctions against Iran because of its nuclear programme, the import of Iranian gas to Europe ceased to be viable. Henceforth, the Nabucco pipeline was supposed to be sourced from the Caspian and Middle Eastern gas deposits and run via Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary to Baumgarten in Austria, supplying

Central Europe with approx. 31 bcm of gas annually without having to cross Russian territory.[61] As of the time of this writing, however, the Nabucco project is effectively dead after going through a series of set-backs, and not even the shortened version of it, the "Nabucco West," may be realistically expected, as it failed to win a tender for the supply of 10 bcm of gas from Azerbaijan's Shah Deniz field in June 2013.

An alternative to Nabucco is the 3000 km long so-called Persian Gas Pipeline, which was introduced in 2008. It should consist of two main parts: the first part in Iran, called the Iran Gas Trunkline 9 (Igate-9), should originate in Assaluyeh, where it will be fed with gas from the giant South Pars gas field, which it will then ship to the town of Ba-zargan, situated on the border with Turkey; the second, European part of the pipeline, which will pass through Turkey, Greece and Italy, will follow two routes: the northern branch of the pipeline should lead to Switzerland, Austria and Germany, while the southern trunk will supply gas to France and Spain.[62] The Persian gas pipeline, which is supposed to circumvent Russian territory, would have a capacity of around 37-40 bcm of gas per year, of which approx. 25 to 30 bcm is to be imported to the EU.[63]

Negotiations on further energy cooperation between European and Iranian companies continued despite the crisis in EU-Iranian relations. For example, in April 2007, the Austrian OMV concluded an agreement with the IRI providing for 23 billion EUR in investments into the South Pars gas field in exchange for supplies of LNG.[64] Additionally, in early 2008, the Italian energy company Edison signed an agreement with the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) worth 107 million USD to bring on line the Dayyer oil and gas field in the Persian Gulf.[65] Final-ly, in March 2008, the Swiss company EGL signed a contract in the amount of 42 billion USD with the Iranian NIGEC, under which Iranian gas exports to Europe would reach a volume of 5.5 bcm annually for a period of twenty-five years. The gas supplies were supposed to begin by 2010/2011, and according to the deal, the gas was supposed to flow through Turkey, Greece, Albania and Italy via the planned new gas pipeline along the bottom of the Adriatic Sea.[66]

However, with the further development of Iran's nuclear pro-gramme and the unsuccessful attempts of the EU and the United States to stop it, European energy companies were gradually winding down their business operations in Iran after 2010. At the same time, the EU

decided to join the US sanctions, and on 1 July 2012, it agreed to the harshest action in this respect so far, as the action focused primarily on the Iranian energy sector as an important source of revenue for the Iranian government, since the revenue was used to fund its nuclear programme. The EU, among other things, imposed an embargo on the supply of Iranian oil, banned European investments in the Iranian petrochemical industry and placed a ban on the supply of technologies for the Iranian oil and gas industry and the provision of insurance for oil tankers. In addition, Iran was cut off from the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT), which is primarily used for international payments.[67]

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An important step towards improving the EU-Iranian energy relations was the adoption of a declaration by the EU Council on 20 January 2014. This declaration said that if Iran commits to meeting its obligations in the nuclear programme, the restrictive measures that had been imposed by the EU may be lifted for a period of up to six months. The measures in question concerned the ban on the import, purchase or transport of Iranian petrochemical products and the ban on providing related services. The declaration also provided for the possibility of making available funds that are necessary for the execution of contracts for the import or purchase of Iranian petrochemical products. In the end of November 2014, the suspension of these restrictions was extended until 30 June 2015.[68]

Despite the imposed and subsequently lifted sanctions against Iran, it remains obvious that once the major issues related to Iran's nuclear programme will be resolved, the EU will have a strong interest in cooperating with the IRI in the field of energy. This was confirmed, for example, by a study of the European Parliament of November 2014 which emphasises that 'Iran seems to be a credible alternative to Russian gas', and the European Union 'in the longer term envisages importing Iranian gas [...].'[69]

A Diplomatic Apparatus and Policy Instruments

The third criterion of actorness focuses on the diplomatic apparatus and the political tools with the aim of analysing the key leaders and policies representing the European Union in external relations and identifying the main tools of implementation of this policy. In this

context, the authors focus on the role and importance of the member states and the European Commission as the main actors responsible for the external dimension of EU energy policy before and after the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon. At the same time, the authors identify the specific instruments of the EU's energy policy and the related political and diplomatic measures.

Before the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force, the issue of energy and security policy largely rested in the hands of the member states, which were occupied primarily with their own energy interests in the context of their bilateral relations with major suppliers. In other words, the external dimension of the EU energy policy towards Iran was articulated indirectly through regular meetings of the representatives of the member states with representatives of the IRI. In addition, the energy cooperation between the EU and Iran took place within the framework of the Critical and, later, the Comprehensive Dialogue, which provided the diplomatic and administrative apparatus by means of the CFSP. In this framework, meetings on energy-related topics between the representatives of the EU and Iran were held at least once during each presidency of a member state. This regular diplomatic dialogue allowed the EU to develop working groups on issues of common interest, such as, for example, the Working Group on Energy. Finally, the EU was engaged in policy towards Iran by using the position of its High Representative for the CFSP, who had become the key representative of the EU in the negotiations on Iran's nuclear programme.[70]

After the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, energy policy became an area of shared competence of the European Union and the member states. In addition, the Treaty of Lisbon has expanded the external dimension of EU energy policy, as it introduced provisions on the conclusion of international agreements relating, for instance, to energy projects of European interest.[71] The development of a legislative framework for the internal and external dimension of EU energy policy has, in turn, influenced the attitudes of the relevant EU and member state institutions.

The member states' positions on EU energy policy are affected by the mechanism of negotiations, but also by their specific domestic conditions. The activity of the member states within the EU is also determined by their energy priorities, which they seek to promote in line with their national interests. Finally, some member states still prefer bilateral relations with third-party countries over the negotiations

within the EU. For example, in April 2015, the energy issue became one of the main topics on the agenda of a meeting of the Bulgarian ambassador with the Iranian President in Tehran. On this occasion, the ambassador portrayed Bulgaria as an important bridge between the EU and the IRI in the supply of natural gas. The topic of energy would reappear in the beginning of May 2015, when future energy cooperation and the supply of crude oil and gas became an important topic on the agenda of the Polish delegation to Tehran, but also a topic of the talks held between the Iranian Oil Minister Bijan Namdar Zanganeh and his German counterpart, Energy Minister Sigmar Gabriel, during a visit in Berlin.[72] In addition, during the World Economic Forum in Davos on 23 January 2014, the leaders of several major European energy companies—for example, BP, Eni, Royal Dutch Shell and Total, expressed their interest in participating in the Iranian energy sector. Although these examples illustrate that member states remain important players in the energy field, their room for manoeuvre has been steadily declining in recent years. In contrast, the importance of the EU – which recently acquired legal personality – has been on the rise.

Alongside the member states, the main actor in the energy relations between the EU and Iran, which are still rather limited despite the recent improvement, is primarily the European Commission. The Commission is involved in the external dimension of EU energy policy in two ways: Firstly, it is indirectly involved in the external dimension through the High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy. Given that the issue of energy goes beyond its purely economic dimension and significantly impacts the framework of the CFSP, energy policy occupies a high shelf on the agenda of the EU High Representative, who – as the Vice-President of the European Commission – represents the EU in CFSP matters and in political (energy) dialogue with third parties. Currently, the High Representative is the main EU negotiator with the representatives of Iran on its nuclear programme. In addition, the High Representative negotiates on behalf of the EU with the political leaders of the IRI on a series of political, economic, and energy issues. This was, for instance, the case on 8 March, 2014 during a meeting of the former High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton, with Iranian President Rouhani in Tehran.[73]

Secondly, the Commission is involved in the external dimension by its utilisation of the Vice-President of the European Commission, who is in charge of the energy union, and the Commissioner for Cli-

mate Action and Energy (formerly the Commissioner for Energy). The Vice-President of the European Commission for the Energy Union is a key actor responsible for the execution of the internal and external dimension of EU energy policy. Together with the Directorate General for Energy, he promotes the integration process of the common policy, giving major impetuses in implementing various energy policy objectives and proposing additional legislative measures. At the same time, the Vice-President for the Energy Union represents the EU in external energy relations with third-party countries, including Iran.[74] Similarly, the European Commissioner for Climate Action and Energy negotiates with the representatives of third-party countries, including the IRI, as well.

In addition, as regards its external energy relations, the European Union has at its disposal two kinds of key instruments, which are of a bilateral and a multilateral character, respectively.

The bilateral instruments include a variety of energy dialogues with selected countries or regions. In the case of the energy relations with Iran, the relevant dialogue was mainly the Iran-EU energy policy dialogue, and the working group on energy and transportation between Iran and the EU, which would meet once a year, became its foundation. The third meeting of this working group, which was held on 19 October 2002 in Tehran, was particularly important for the strengthening of the energy cooperation between the EU and Iran. At this meeting, the representatives of the EU and Iran signed two memoranda of understanding on energy issues and on the possibility of expanding the scope of the EU-Iran bilateral relations. However, further meetings of the working group were suspended after 2005 due to the continuing development of Iran's nuclear programme.[75]

Besides bilateral instruments, the EU also employs multilateral contractual and diplomatic platforms for solving problems connected to energy security. The motivation for many of these initiatives is to set – if possible – uniform legislative rules governing the trading of raw materials and energy, or even to extend the current legislative framework in the field of energy trade beyond the EU. The Energy Community Treaty, to which Iran is not a signatory, is based on such a scenario. So is the European Energy Charter (EEC), which – according to the EU – Iran should join.[76]

Finally, the political-diplomatic instruments include, in particular, economic sanctions that the EU decided to impose on Iran. It is obvi-

ous that EU trade with the IRI is subject to certain restrictions stemming from the sanctions imposed by the UN SC on Iran. At the same time, the EU through the European Council obliged its member states not to conclude any new contracts with Iran.

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Third-Party Perceptions of EU 'Actorness'

The last criterion is the perception of the EU as an international actor. It is based on the recognition of the EU as an international actor from both outside of the EU (in various regional organisations, third-party countries or international organisations) and within the EU itself (in the member states themselves). Thus the authors will examine if the EU is perceived as an actor in its external relations in the area of energy by Iran, third-party actors and the member states.

With the establishment of the Critical and, later, the Comprehensive Dialogue, where energy security was one of the main themes of the co-operation between the political representatives of the EU and Iran, the member states agreed with the representation of their interests by EU bodies, in particular the European Commission and the High Representative for the CFSP. In this way, they accepted the actorness of the EU in the external energy relations with the IRI. Likewise, the member states recognised the EU as an actor in the sense that it promoted its interests in the external energy relations towards Iran when they agreed with the establishment of the Iran-EU energy-political dialogue and the Working Group on Energy and Transport.[77]

With the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon, the member states furthermore agreed to delegate some of their powers in the field of energy to the EU institutions, especially the EC, which acts on behalf of the European Union in the external energy relations towards third-party actors, including Iran. Likewise, the member states have accepted the role of the EU, first its role in the capacity of the High Representative for the CFSP, and later its role in the capacity of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, for the E3/EU + 3 negotiations with the IRI with the aim to stop its nuclear programme.

The internal recognition of EU actorness is further supplemented by the external recognition process on the part of a third party. Iran, as well as the EU member states, accepted the EU as an actor of external (energy) relations. This was done by the political leaders of the IRI participating in the Working Group on Trade and Investment in

2001, but in particular it was done because of Iran's accession to the negotiations on the EU-Iran Trade and Cooperation Agreement, which was associated with the negotiations on the Agreement on Political Dialogue, and which was supposed to contribute to the further development of the economic potential of Iran and lead to an improvement of the investment climate and trade with the EU.[78] At the same time, Iran acknowledged the importance of the EU, and during the on-going crisis in Ukraine, which strained the relations between the EU and Russia, Iran has repeatedly offered its resources to Europe. For example, in the beginning of May 2014, Iranian Oil Minister Zanganeh emphasised that 'Iran is capable of delivering large quantities of gas and is always willing to participate in the European market.'[79] In a similar vein, Iran's President Rouhani, during talks with his Austrian counterpart Heinz Fischer in New York in late September 2014, stated that 'Iran may become a safe and reliable energy supplier for Europe.'[80] Finally, in early May 2008, the Iranian Deputy Oil Minister for International Affairs and Trade, Ali Majedi, said that 'only Iranian natural gas is a potential competitor to Russia in export to Europe.' He further added that the 'export of gas from Iran to Europe will be a win-win solution for both parties.'[81] Majedi also suggested three possible routes of supply of natural gas from Iran to Europe. He said that 'Iran can deliver gas to Europe through Turkish pipelines, which is considered the most rational route, or through the pipeline via Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, and the third way is through Armenia, Georgia and the Black Sea'[82] The Islamic Republic of Iran basically has two ways how to supply natural gas to Europe.

Firstly, it may be in the form of LNG. The Iranian natural gas would first have to be transported via a pipeline to the LNG hub in Oman and from there in the form of LNG with tankers to European ports in the Mediterranean.[83] Secondly, through a system of pipelines. Although there is currently no gas pipeline linking the IRI to the EU, the country is already connected to Turkey via the Tabriz-Ankara pipeline, which transports natural gas from the South Pars gas field into the town of Bazargan on the border of Turkey. Iran has several possibilities to use pipelines to send gas to the EU. Firstly, by using the above-mentioned Persian pipeline. Secondly, through the 5000 km long planned gas pipeline connecting Iran with Turkey and Europe (ITE), which has a capacity of around 35 bcm of gas annually. The ITE pipeline is supposed to begin at the border of Turkey and Iran and would lead to the city of

Ipsala at the border of Greece and Turkey. The gas would subsequently be piped through Greece and Italy, where the pipeline would split into two legs: the northern leg, leading to Germany, Austria and Switzerland, and the southern leg, leading to France and Spain. Thirdly, it could extend the existing gas interconnector linking Turkey with Greece (ITGI) to Italy by adding a subsea portion of the IGI Poseidon (linking Greece and Italy). The annual capacity of ITGI is planned at 12 bcm of natural gas.[84] Fourthly, via the future TANAP gas pipeline (Trans-Anatolian pipeline), which is supposed to start at the Georgian-Turkish border, where it connects with the existing Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) pipeline, thus feeding the pipeline with Azeri natural gas from the Caspian Shah Deniz II field and terminating at the Turkish-Greek border. The actual construction of this pipeline started in March 2015. In four years, the TANAP pipeline should transport to Europe natural gas in the volume of 16 bcm and in 2026 it is supposed to reach the capacity of 31 bcm of natural gas per year. The TANAP is supposed to be followed by the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), which leads from the Greek city of Thessaloniki through Albania and across the Adriatic Sea to Italy and to Europe, with a total capacity of around 10 bcm of gas per year. Natural gas from the TAP would then be transported into Southeast Europe by the Ionian-Adriatic Pipeline (IAP) running along the Adriatic coast, with a capacity of 5 bcm of natural gas per year. Along the route, the pipeline should pass Albania via Montenegro, Macedonia and Croatia, or could link Greece and Bulgaria (GBI) via an interconnector.[85]

For the moment being, however, it is not clear whether Iran will be able to secure a substantial volume of gas for the Southern energy corridor. Firstly of all, even if the European Commission ensured 50% of the capacity of the TAP pipeline for third party access, TAP's and TANAP's capacity is already 100% covered by 25-year long-term contracts to Azerbaijani gas. Thus, while the gas from Azerbaijan has already found its way to its customers, Iran so far failed to safeguard its potential customers' needs of gas. Furthermore, the legal framework for the supply of gas to Europe is so far lacking. Secondly, Iran's joining of the TANAP consortium does not mean that Iran will supply Europe through this pipeline. This is due to the fact that Iran's participation in the Shah Deniz consortium through the NIOC Company allows Iran to participate in the supply of Azerbaijani gas only for the initial capacity of TANAP, as well as TAP. Thirdly, even if Iran planned to deliver a large volume of gas to Europe through a capacity expansion of TANAP and TAP, its

potential consumers will need to build the appropriate interconnectors for an adequate volume of gas. From this point of view, Iran could attempt a resuscitation of the Nabucco-West Project, which should lead from the Turkish-Bulgarian border to Baumgarten in Austria, and whose original annual capacity was planned at 20 bcm of natural gas. Fourthly, due to the damage to the Iranian energy industry inflicted by Western sanctions, which among other things led to considerable delays in the development of gas fields in the Persian Gulf and to problems of supply to the domestic market, Iran will need at least five to six years to arrange the export of gas to Europe, building new pipelines and developing new fields.[86]

Furthermore, the export of Iranian gas via Turkey to the countries of Southeastern Europe may face the Russian-sponsored Turkish Stream project and its potential market impact. In terms of volume and diversification, the IRI and the RF are bound to be strong competitors in Europe after the sanctions against the regime in Iran will be discontinued. Iran's participation in the South Energy Corridor will, however, mean a weakening of the dominance of Russia in Southeast Europe and in the European market. Gazprom certainly does not like to see the emergence of another large supplier.[87]

Besides the acceptance of the EU and its member states as energy partners for Iran, it was equally critical for the EU to be recognised by the IRI in the diplomatic negotiations about the nuclear programme. Although the actors involved are still unable to reach a final solution, the simple fact that Iranian authorities continue to meet with EU representatives suggests that the IRI has recognised the EU as an actor in the nuclear programme. Furthermore, Iran is not the only actor who has recognised the role of the EU in dealing with the nuclear programme. In the negotiations with the IRI, the EU also received support from the US, Russia and China, which, in the last few months, has brought at least partial results and concessions from the side of the IRI.[88]

On one hand, it is obvious that the EU is generally considered to be an important actor in its relations with the IRI. This is recognised by both the member states themselves and third parties, including Iran. On the other hand, it is more appropriate to talk about a limited actorness on the part of the EU in its energy relations with Iran, which are still limited by Iran's nuclear programme. This was encapsulated in a statement by Iranian President Rouhani, in which he stressed that

Iran 'will not sign any contract unless all sanctions will be lifted. We want a win-win solution for all parties involved in the nuclear talks'.[89] However, the EU is well aware of the immense potential of Iran, whose gas may represent one of the main sources for the tapping of the full capacity of the Southern Energy Corridor in the future, which, for example, was confirmed in April 2015 by the European Commissioner for Climate Action and Energy, Miguel Arias Cañete, who said that 'if a final agreement is reached in June 2015 with Iran, it will open new possibilities for the future. The Southern Corridor will be able to supply natural gas not only from Azerbaijan, but also from Iran in the future'.[90]

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Conclusion

The main aim of the presented article was to define the main criteria of EU actorness and use them for drawing up an analysis of the internal dimension of the EU energy policy and its external dimension in relation to Iran. It was stated that the concept of actorness is related to the concept of agency. More independent the agent is the higher degree of actorness the EU demonstrates. In various policy areas the EU demonstrates different degree of actorness. In the case of the internal dimension of the energy policy, following four criteria were used to determine this degree: authority, autonomy, recognition, and coherence.

Judging by the extent of delegation of the competences to the Commission and form of the Union representation in international negotiations, it can be argued that the EU has a moderate degree of actorness in the internal dimension of the EU energy policy. The considerable progress was made in terms of the gas market integration, which led to the rise of the Commission's competences. Yet it is still dominated by Gazprom. Thus to challenge Russian market position it is necessary to diversify supplies, and Iran with its vast natural gas resources is a potential alternative supplier. Yet a 'hybrid model of negotiation format' in regards to the external energy relations, in which are involved not only the EU institutions but also separate energy companies backed by their respective governments, as well as the issue of Iranian nuclear programme necessitate the analysis of the EU-IRI relations through a prism of CFSP. In this policy area, the level of delegation is low by definition, since the High Representative is dependent on the unanimous decision making in the European Council and Foreign Affairs Council.

To analyse the level of actorness in the external dimension of the EU energy policy in relation to Iran the following criteria were used: an articulation of its actorness, consistent and specific policies, a diplomatic apparatus and political tools, and the perception of the EU actorness by third parties.

The analysis shows that the EU is able to employ its diplomatic apparatus in the energy relationship with Iran by using a blend of EU and member state activities and the development of a comprehensive framework. Alongside the member states, the main actor in the EU's external energy relations towards Iran is, in particular, the European Commission, which carries out its activities in this area through the High Representative of the EU, the Vice-President of the European Commission and the EU Commissioner for Climate Action and Energy. In its relations with the IRI, the EU has a wide range of positive and negative energy and diplomatic tools at its disposal to ensure the improvement of the relations. Although the EU is generally considered to be an important actor *vis-à-vis* Iran that is recognised by both the member states and third-party countries, including the IRI itself, the EU's actorness in its energy relations with Iran was still limited by the Iranian nuclear programme. The EU, however, is very well aware of the importance of the IRI for enhancing its energy security.

But until the genuine energy union is developed, when the member states as principals delegate the competences to the Vice President for the Energy Union to lead the negotiations with Iran and directly participate in intergovernmental agreements, we can talk only about the limited level of actorness in the external dimension of the EU energy policy *vis-à-vis* Iran.

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Notes

1   At the same time, this article combines weak constructivism with weak rationalism, as the EU, as a normatively rational actor, tries to use its influence in terms of norms and values in an attempt to get certain benefits, pursue its interests and change the behaviour of its partners, who accept the EU's norms and values, but who also try to manipulate these norms for their own benefit. See Petr Kratochvíl and Elsa Tulmets (2010), *Constructivism and Rationalism in EU External Relations*, Baden-Baden: Nomos.

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Criminal Governance and Insurgency

The Rio de Janeiro Experience

Jan Daniel

The issue of governance by non-state armed groups has been gaining increasing attention from a range of social scientists. This study considers the territorial governance and authority of armed gangs in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro, applying a notion of insurgency as competition for the support of the population, as proposed by David Kilcullen. According to this theory, insurgents establish a resilient system of control through which they subsequently gain legitimacy. Although organised crime groups in the favelas are not ideologically motivated to oppose the state in the way that other insurgent groups are, their engagement in illegal activities and control of the population based on "their" territory makes them armed opponents of the state and de facto insurgents. I argue that the authority of these groups among favela citizens can be traced to the inability of Brazilian state institutions to ensure security and social order, which is a crucial aspect of state "output legitimacy," (making this de facto state failure). Criminal groups, on the other hand, are viewed by many favela inhabitants as more capable of fulfilling at least the most basic community needs. They are therefore able to "outgovern" the state, presenting an effective and, in some sense, legitimate alternative to its institutions.

Keywords: Insurgency, organised crime, non-state armed actors, counter-insurgency, drug trade, Brazil, Rio de Janeiro

Introduction

The phenomena of advanced organised crime groups and so-called criminal insurgency have recently gained attention in a number of scholarly publications.[1] From the still escalating conflict between var-

ious narco-cartels and the state in Mexico through to Jamaican posses, Central American street gangs and the infamous Colombian cartels, we can identify the emergence of a new kind of challenge, empowered by a transnational illicit market, to the traditional understanding of organised crime, its nature and its relationship to national security.[2] These "criminal insurgents" are able to hold territory and defend it against state police or military forces. In some cases, they have even managed to establish themselves as the main authorities in "their" territories and to impose their own rules on local communities. The result is the emergence of so-called criminal enclaves, ungoverned spaces and no-go areas, which, according to some experts, accounted for about 25% of the area of the most important urban agglomerations in Latin America in 2009.[3]

The slums (*favelas*) of various Brazilian cities – especially Rio de Janeiro – are famous for this kind of criminal rule and, as such, have been in the spotlight for both Brazilian and international scholars for some time.[4] All these studies present a similarly unhappy picture of everyday violence and the failure of state authorities to fulfil citizens' basic needs. It is precisely this failure, particularly evident in the way that police and authorities view and treat the favelas and their inhabitants, which has cleared the way for the drug-dealing groups who have been able to gain a firm foothold in impoverished favela communities.

This study looks at this issue mainly by discussing the role of "criminal insurgency." It sets out to show how organised crime groups in Rio de Janeiro have evolved and been able to exploit the state's lack of authority and its unwillingness to govern the favelas. I argue that the contest between the Brazilian state and criminal gangs for effective territorial control can be seen as a competition for governance – defined as 'institutionalized modes of social coordination to produce and implement collectively binding rules, or to provide public goods and services'[5] – and for the trust of favela communities. Therefore, even though this criminal insurgency differs in many ways from traditionally understood ideological insurgency, a focus on the population is still crucial for the success of any campaign to regain state authority over these gang-ruled territories. At the same time, I aim to show that at least in the Brazilian case, criminal insurgency cannot be separated from the failure of state institutions.

In the sections that follow, I present the concept of criminal insurgency and apply it to the development of organised crime groups in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro. I then briefly review the historical context

of the Brazilian state's failure to establish legitimacy in these areas and show how this opened up a space for the rise of criminal insurgents. I also consider the governance practices of criminal groups and their relations with favela communities. The final part of this work comments briefly on the plan to reclaim some of the favelas through Pacifying Police Units (*Unidade de Policia Pacificadora*, UPP) and considers how this fits into the overall paradigm of criminal insurgency.

Criminal Insurgency, State Failure and Competing for Governance

Criminal Insurgency

The traditional understanding of insurgency owes a lot to experiences of anti-colonial struggles and wars with Maoist or Leninist guerrillas in "Third World" countries. As such, insurgency has mainly been understood as a political struggle between an incumbent (usually state) actor and a non-state entity that is ideologically motivated to oppose the state – in pursuit of either regime change or national liberation.[6] Generally, insurgents seek through various politico-military strategies (i.e. political violence and propaganda activities) to weaken the control and legitimacy of the government or other political authority within the population while increasing their own control.[7]

While the main driver of insurgents' actions has been perceived as ideological and therefore population-focused (given their effort to win support for their ideological cause), the actions of organised crime groups have traditionally been understood as economically motivated. The primary goal of organised crime is to secure profits (mostly gained from some sort of illegal business) and not to change the regime as such. For this reason, the focus is typically not on fighting state authorities overtly or trying to dominate particular territory. Rather, while they use violence selectively as a supplementary method, organised crime groups set out to infiltrate and undermine state authority by more covert means – such as corruption, blackmail and forceful intimidation – which do not draw attention to their actions.[8]

In his discussion of the nature of contemporary Mexican drug cartels, Richard Carter associates this view of organised crime groups with a 'modern' or 'realist' security paradigm, which mainly operates

with state-based and ideological challengers to national security.[9] According to this model, organised crime occurs "outside" the state sphere and in the illicit goods market, and it targets the state and state functions only insofar as they interfere with economic profits. Given the nature of this threat, the state should respond by enlisting law enforcement authorities and trying to reduce the crime rate to a manageable level.

In contrast, Bunker argues that the type of challenge posed by organised crime groups has changed, and thus, in some cases it is more accurate to speak about criminal insurgency than organised crime as it was once perceived. He connects this shift with the rising influence of various non-state actors, who are empowered by globalisation and access to worldwide networks; in the post-Cold War era, these entities are increasingly able to present direct threats to states and may even potentially create 'functional alternatives' in some environments.[10] On the other hand, various states are seen to be failing more and more to perform their basic roles and so enabling the emergence of "ungoverned spaces."

State failure is a notoriously ambiguous concept that is used by many authors in many different ways.[11] Following Jennifer Milliken and Keith Krause,[12] I identify three main broadly defined narratives about the state functions which are limited or completely missing in failing states[13]: these concern the provision of security, a legitimate government and representation of all citizens, and finally, public goods and services (such as infrastructure, healthcare, education etc.).[14] As the term "ungoverned spaces" suggests, state failure need not occur across all of a state's territory and may only affect some part of it. Brazil is by no means a failed state in the sense that Somalia is a failed state, but there are some areas where the state has failed in one or more of the above-mentioned dimensions of its functions.

The nature of criminal insurgency is closely related to the inability of states to effectively maintain security and the rule of law and provide basic public services and goods – functions which are bound up with state legitimacy – in these places. While the origins of criminal insurgent groups (like those of traditionally understood organised crime groups) lie in the illicit economy, they are also willing and able to control territory directly and, in some cases, to defend it against the state. According to some authors, this means that these criminal groups may be at a very rudimentary stage of the Tillyan war- and state-making

process.[15] Although these entities do not approach anywhere near the level of organisation of official authorities, they do create new networks of loyalties and new modes of controlling space.[16]

Enjoying direct control over a territory does not conflict with criminal insurgents' primary focus on profit. On the contrary, it enables them to carve out a space for their illegal business activities and operate free of state influence, which is necessary in the drug trade for safe storage and dealing. However, by challenging the state's domination of part of its territory and population and through their own political manoeuvering and governance of the territory, these insurgents become *de facto* politicised.[17]

It is important to note that while some criminal insurgent groups do occasionally try to advance ideological positions and present themselves as ideological opponents to the state – either as "social bandits" or as voices of egalitarian social movements – virtually none of them aims to create their own secessionist state and nor do they seek to significantly enlarge the area under their control beyond the territories important for their business.[18] It is also key to mention that even if we accept the notion of criminal insurgency, most affected states do not face a single "insurgency" because criminal insurgent groups usually have no united agenda or interests.[19]

Competition in State-building

State weakness and failure are important not only for the formation and growth of criminal insurgent groups, but also for their relations with the populations in their territories. When states fail to provide security for their citizens (or they are perceived as failing to do so), the affected communities are highly vulnerable to the violence and exploits of various non-state armed actors. In many of these cases, the rule of armed criminal groups brings at least some level of (albeit very selective) security and social order.[20] Some "advanced" criminal groups also take part (often for purely utilitarian reasons) in other governance activities – for example, they may provide money for some social and development projects which the state is not willing or able to run.[21] Additionally, in many places, organised crime groups are also important "employers" and players in the local economy, bringing jobs and revenue to places suffering from poverty and high unemployment.[22] For these reasons, in at least some communities, criminal groups may

in fact "deliver" more security and public goods than the official state government and therefore *de facto* "outgovern" the (failing) state. At the same time, they may be able to coerce other non-armed actors – such as NGOs or community organisations, which could perform some governance functions – into acknowledging their authority.[23]

The provision of public goods and ensuring of security (that is, the "governance" of these areas) are crucial parts of the "output legitimacy" of state institutions and of any other formal or informal authority.[24] As David Kilcullen puts it in his theory of competitive control, in the context of an irregular conflict (in this case, a conflict between a territorially-based criminal group and the state), 'the local armed actor that is by given population perceived as more capable to establish a normative system for control over violence, economic activity and human security is likely to prevail within that population's residential area.' [25] Given that "criminal insurgents" can control a territory and population in a similar manner to "ideological insurgents," this theory may well be extended to these groups; it might also explain their authority in the communities which they rule through the same combination of output legitimacy, personal trust[26] and direct and violent force.[27]

This also means that if the state wants to fight criminal insurgents, its representatives cannot do this in the same way that that they combat normal criminals. State authorities must instead engage in "state-building" and take back the areas affected by criminal insurgency where they previously failed.[28] In sum, the state must persuade the population that it represents a better alternative than the criminals. This is, however, complicated by the fact that the members of poor communities often have a deep mistrust of state authorities, whom they have long perceived as a source of insecurity rather than as fair and legitimate rulers.

The Uneasy Relations between the Favelas and the State

A Brief History of the Favelas in Rio de Janeiro

Favelas have existed as a form of illegal informal settlement in Rio de Janeiro since the last decade of the 19th century. The first favela was founded by freed slaves and war veterans for whom the state was not able to secure land and appropriate rent. In the first decades of the

20th century, the number of favela inhabitants slowly increased, owing mainly to the arrival of immigrants from rural communities. Even as the number of people living in these informal settlements rose, they continued to exist "outside" the Brazilian state, lacking state support, official access to public services and legal recognition. It is important to note that the state authorities took a largely negative view of the favelas and repeatedly tried to evict their populations.[29]

The provision of public goods and services and some other governance activities (like dispute resolution) fell, thus, to residents' associations (*Associaçoes de Moradores*, AM) and various community (often church-based) organisations. State and local politicians began to pay attention to the situation in the favelas in the late '1970s during the democratisation of the Brazilian regime. Nevertheless, various social and development projects were drastically cut during the severe recession of the mid-'1980s and they were not reinstated until the late '1990s.[30]

In 2010, when the last official census was conducted by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics, Rio contained 763 favelas and irregular communities, located mainly in the north, east and south parts of the city. In total, there were close to 1,400,000 people living in these neighbourhoods, which represented over 20% of Rio's overall population.[31] More recent data on the number of favelas, their area and the number of households they host, seem to be conflicting. Rio officials claim that there has been a 2.13% reduction in the area with favela housing since 2008, but researchers working in the favelas point to the rapid growth of both the occupied area and the number of inhabitants in many favelas .[32] In general, the favelas of Rio de Janeiro house primarily low-income communities, whose average monthly earnings ranged from 361 to 437 reais (approx. US$164 to US$198) according to the official census conducted in 2000. This was significantly lower than the average earnings in non-favela (*asfalto*) neighbourhoods in the same zones, which ranged from 153% of favela incomes in western areas to 566% of the favela amount in the southern areas of the city.[33]

The sizes of the favelas vary greatly – from neighbourhoods with just a few hundred residents to ones (such as Rocinha) where there are tens of thousands of inhabitants. The favelas also differ vastly in their social structure and geography,[34] which means that the statements in this study must be great generalisations in many instances. My goal

is not, however, to detail the situation in any specific neighbourhood, but rather to describe the wider phenomenon of the authority of drug gangs.[35]

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The Failure of State Authorities in the Favelas

If we accept the above definition of the main state functions, we can identify the failure of the Brazilian state in the favelas in at least two regards. First, most of the favelas were (and many, in fact, continue to be) built illegally on occupied land, which has determined the partly repressive and partly apathetic attitude of state authorities towards them.[36] The state was unable to provide security for the people in these settlements (since police only rarely patrolled these areas) and the public authorities themselves (mainly the *policia military,* the state police and the Special Police Operations Battalion, or BOPE) were frequently seen as sources of insecurity rather than as guarantors of law and order.

In the early years, the police were more often associated with forced evictions than with ongoing presence and provision of security, which was supplied mainly by local informal authorities and community militias. The violent practices of police and their indiscriminate approach to civilians and suspects grew even worse with heightened clashes between drug gangs and police in the late 1980s and during the 1990s.[37] In a study conducted by Janice Perlman, favela inhabitants perceived that the police were more violent towards the community than towards drug gangs.[38] While state policies on security and public order in the favelas have undergone some reforms since the early '80s and there have been a few attempts to turn them into somehow "softer" policing approaches, the overall image of the police has remained negative.[39]

Police have had a low level of credibility not only because of the high level of violence towards favela residents, but because of corrupt police practices, which have often brought them close to the drug gangs. For many people, it has therefore made no sense to ask police to resolve the crimes of gang members, and because of their perceived ineffectiveness and lack of professionalism, they have not been called to the scene of crimes in the favelas at all. This has not only applied to police, but also to some lower level courts and other state authorities which are viewed as ineffective and corrupt.[40] In sum, for a long time now,

people in the favelas have not seen state authorities as the primary actors who can guarantee security and order. On the contrary, these authorities have often been perceived as the source of insecurity and a possible threat.

As has already been hinted, these state institutions have also failed in the provision of public goods and services.[41] Both before and during the years of the Brazilian military regime, the favelas were more or less excluded from national public and social policies, and the main visible presence of the authorities in the favelas was during the mentioned brief police invasions. This situation changed during the '80s and particularly the '90s when the state launched large social projects aimed at improving the living conditions in the favelas, which were in many cases quite successful. (Examples include projects related to public electricity, healthcare, drinking water access and the building of other basic infrastructure.)[42]

On the other hand, Marcelo Lopez de Souza argues that the state continued to fail to perform its main functions and was therefore not able to tap into the potential to present itself as the residents' benefactor. In many places, this was because of the presence of criminal gangs who were only interested in promoting projects that might support their own position and status in the community. Any other projects and programmes were simply denied "permission" to launch or else they were sabotaged in various ways.[43] In other cases, state projects were carried out inefficiently and plagued by corruption and mismanagement, which greatly reduced their potentially positive impact.[44] The state was therefore not viewed as the dominant provider of public goods and services, and it had limited ability to improve the harsh living conditions in many of the favelas.

The question of whether the Brazilian state failed in the favelas when it came to its legitimacy and representation of citizens is more difficult to answer. The legitimacy of the idea of the Brazilian state remains quite strong among inhabitants (unlike the situation in some truly collapsed or failing states), however the legitimacy of some of its institutions (state police, judiciary, some local representatives) is weak. Especially in the case of the police, an almost universal distrust prevails. As a result of some vote-rigging incidents in the favelas, the representativeness of Brazilian state institutions may also be in doubt. There are known cases where local politicians cooperated with drug gangs or paramilitary militias during their campaigns.[45] However, it

remains the case that only the legitimacy of specific institutions and trust placed in particular individuals are called into question – and not the representativeness and legitimacy of the Brazilian state as such.

Rio's Criminal Insurgents

The Emergence and Rise of Criminal Insurgents

Wider networks of organised crime emerged in the favelas during the late 1950s with the rise of the cannabis trade and *jogo de bicho* (an illegal betting game). A fundamental shift came in the early 1980s with the arrival of the cocaine trade as Colombian producers searched for new markets and shipping routes. Brazil soon became an important point on the route from Colombia to the U.S. and Europe and subsequently also one of the biggest consumers of the drug.[46]

The cocaine trade brought a significant rise in drug groups' profits. They were able to obtain better weapons and secure their relations with local authorities through corrupt practices. Another important contributor to these criminal gangs' power was the improved organisation and strategy which came from an interesting fusion with the strategies of political insurgents inspired by the "urban guerrilla" theories of Carlos Marighella. During the early 1970s, the founders of *Comando Vermelho* ("The Red Command," known as CV) had been imprisoned together with militant opponents of the Brazilian authoritarian regime. As a result, these CV representatives had managed to pick up some of the militants' basic strategies and tactics. Incarceration also forged a specific sort of identity and high level of group loyalty (*o coletivo*) among CV members.[47]

During the late 1970s, CV members who had been released from prison spread out across the favelas (from which many of them had originated). Thanks to their superior arms and organisation, they were able to take over the emerging trade in cocaine, driving out their rivals from the most important dealing places. The rise of the CV in the favelas was made easier by the effects of the Brazilian economic recession. Organised crime groups and the drug trade, thus, became important sources of revenue for some favela residents and even for some AMs and their community programmes.[48]Through these means and using violent and coercive tactics (often targeting community leaders) in

many cases, the CV was able to incorporate or crush earlier informal authorities and become the dominant ruler of some favelas.[49] This authority was also strengthened by the fact that many gang members already had close (often familial) ties with people living in the favelas and were more trusted than the corrupt and violent police.[50] From the second half of the 1980s, we may, thus, speak of the rise of criminal insurgency as the CV managed by various means to keep the police out of its territory and control the main drug-dealing locations most of the time.

The CV's domination of the favelas did not last for long. In the early 1990s, the organised crime groups associated under the CV banner splintered into various smaller factions. By the mid-'90s, two new main factions had emerged – the Friends of Friends (*Amigos Dos Amigos*, ADA) and the Third Command (*Terceiro Comando*, TC) – along with a few smaller ones.[51] Numerous clashes over the most lucrative trading points brought more violence and weakened the main gangs. This resulted in the launch of the UPP programme in the late 2000s. However, there was also an earlier consequence: the emergence of a new type of non-state group – the paramilitary militia.

Militias – which often consist of retired policemen, firemen, soldiers and other off-duty public officers – originated in the western parts of city where they were able to drive criminal gangs out from some of the favelas and impose their own authority. These actors are, in fact, only a different manifestation of the failure of state institutions. They also serve as providers of security and "defenders" of the community in areas where the state is not able to perform its functions.[52] The number of favelas controlled by militias has been rising rapidly in recent years; by 2012, nearly half of them fell in this category.[53] However, because of their close ties with local politicians and police, these favelas are only seldom targeted in police actions, and it is, thus, difficult to characterise them as criminal insurgents in the same manner that this study seeks to portray the Rio drug gangs.

The Nature and Form of Criminal Gangs in Rio

While we may speak about the CV or ADA as some of the broader drug factions, it would be incorrect to depict them as anything like centralised organisations. The nature of Rio's drug gangs and criminal insurgency is strictly local (this is why, as I have noted above, it is more

correct to refer to multiple criminal insurgencies than to a single insurgency). They are each based in "their" favela and the whole faction functions only as a sort of a loose alliance or network of personal relationships, trade and cooperation. Each leader (*dono*) of the gang dominating the favela is therefore the *de facto* "supreme" authority over that territory.[54]

The structure of command in each favela is organised in the shape of a pyramid. Each *dono* has a deputy beneath him, while in the middle, there are various "managers" entrusted with tasks such as ensuring security and enabling drug deals. The lower levels are occupied by ordinary dealers and "soldiers," and in the lowest positions, we usually find children, who work as messengers, informants or scouts.[55] It is estimated that by the end of the 2000s, there were between 10,000 and 15,000 members of various gang factions in Rio de Janeiro.[56] As I have pointed out, these gangs are important players in the local economy; for young people especially (but also for many others members of the whole favela community), they serve as an important source of "easy" money and personal status.[57]

The territorial authority of a given favela is more or less recognised (even if it is contested at times) by all of the gangs. Each dono is responsible for "his" favela and its inhabitants' compliance with the rules of the favela (*lei de favela*) – a specific code of conduct that ensures the basic social order and authority of the criminal gang.[58] The creation and enforcement of these rules for the population in a given territory together with other governance activities may well be understood as political actions even though criminal gangs do not usually advocate for any explicit ideological vision.[59] However, these rules provide at least some means for resolving personal disputes and guaranteeing a level of security (though this is definitely not universal and depends on the position in the favela community).[60]

The authority and control of criminal insurgents over the favelas are the result first of all of their finances and arms, and thus, their ability to dominate the communities by material means. In many cases, these drug gangs are better armed than ordinary police, and they have better knowledge of the local situation. Combined with the hilly and dense urban terrain (and the effective support of the community), the gangs' arms – usually handguns, hand grenades and assault rifles, but sometimes even submachine guns and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) – generally ensure they are able to defend their territory effectively

against standard police, or at least retreat quickly and hide.[61] Nevertheless, the long-term sustainability of this kind of criminal insurgency depends heavily on population support (or at least compliance) and, as I have noted, an underlying context of the state's inability to focus its efforts on the favelas.

Criminal Governance and the Authority of Drug Gangs

The rise of criminal gangs in Rio has, thus, happened as a consequence of two main trends. On the one hand, we find the long-term failure of state institutions, which favela residents do not view as capable of providing them with security and/or other public goods, and, on the other hand, there is the ability of criminal gangs to exploit this security vacuum for their own goals and to gain trust and some sort of legitimacy among affected favela communities. Their authority, then, stems mainly from their material dominance and governance activities, which contribute greatly to their output legitimacy.[62]

Although there are many cases of drug gang violence towards the favela inhabitants, security and the regulation of violence remain the most important public goods which the gangs provide. The often brutal punishments dispensed (even for small-scale criminality), the nature of the close-knit community and the control gangs have over daily life in the favela usually deter potential offenders from perpetrating a crime in their own neighbourhood or offending the generally respected community "moral code."[63]

In the absence of public authorities' legitimacy and because of the readily available coercive power of gangs, they also often act as arbiters in various personal disputes. Although the available evidence suggests that gangs are often biased towards their members and residents of high social status, thanks to their long-term experience, they are still considered more reliable and effective than official public institutions.[64] At the same time, it is important to note that the communities themselves are not just passive recipients; they may, in fact, turn against an unjust dono and, for example, provide information about him to the police or other drug-dealing factions.[65] This shows the fragile equilibrium that exists between the gangs and civilians and also supports the thesis that criminal insurgency is a kind of competition of and over governance.

A second dimension of drug gangs' governance activities is the provision of material support for various development, public, social and more general welfare projects (for example, financing transportation to and from hospitals and clinics and providing resources for day care centres and recreational facilities). Drug gangs also often fund highly popular *baile funk* parties, which are one of the most important social and leisure events, at least for young people. Typically, the gangs do not provide all these activities by themselves but support diverse community organisations, or at least influence them through their control of the territory or *de facto* control of the AMS.[66] In sum, the drug gangs are deeply rooted in a network of governance in the favelas, which helps them to penetrate and control the community and also gain legitimacy through the positive public impact of some of their activities. In this way, they are able to "outgovern" the state in the areas where it fails to be present.

The penetration of communities occurs, however, not only through governance activities, but also simply through a close network of trust and personal ties. Gang members often originate from the same favela that they "rule" and tend to have family there. There is therefore a certain feeling of collective identity, which is only strengthened by the fact that some favelas have been ruled by drug gangs for nearly two decades and many young adults have virtually grown up with them. This also contributes to the higher level of trust in at least certain gang members and their authority.[67] On the other hand, it is important to note that the drug gangs have never really been seen as "normal" and "natural" rulers in the same manner as the state, whose (lack of) failure in Brazil has already been discussed from the standpoint of legitimacy.

Counterinsurgency and Reclaiming the State

Before I venture a conclusion, at least a few words must be said about the pacification programme which started in 2008 and marked a significant shift in the fight against drug gangs in Rio. To date (May 2015), there have been 41 UPP units operating within more than 60 favelas, including the biggest one, Rocinha. Hailed by many as a major success story, the UPPs have a very different policing style to the one previously utilised by state police.[68] The main goal of this strategy is not to arrest ordinary low-level gang members during brief crackdowns (the re-

sponse to "traditional" organised crime, as Robert Bunker has labelled it[69]), but to "reclaim" the favelas and so reduce the violence and impose a long-term state presence there.

The UPP model works in four stages: as a first step, special military and police units (usually from the BOPE) invade the favela and drive out armed gang members. During the second stage, the BOPE units stay for a longer time (days or weeks) and eliminate any remaining resistance. In the third stage, the BOPE units hand control of the favela over to the UPP, who try to impose law and order through a system of community policing. The final step should then be the integration of the favela into the normal life of the city through various social and economic development projects, and above all, the restoration of residents' trust in police and public authorities.[70] The similarity of this strategy to the "clear, hold, build" approach of modern U.S. counterinsurgency, as described in the now famous *Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24*, is obvious.[71]

A number of interesting developments may help us understand the nature of the Brazilian criminal insurgency. There have been only a few episodes of intense fighting between the drug gangs and the police; in most of the favelas, gang members have fled and hid in other, as yet unoccupied places lacking a strong police presence.[72] This was not exactly the situation during previous operations like those carried out in favela Complexo do Alemao in June and August 2007. One accepted explanation is that since the introduction of the pacification programme and UPPs, the police have not primarily pursued low-level members of drug gangs, who are prone to desertion; moreover, since police have declared their willingness to stay in the occupied favelas for a long time (which was not the case in 2007), gang members have decided to switch their strategy. In some occupied favelas, criminal insurgency has, thus, been replaced by a sort of "cold war" between police and gangs, who still have a degree of authority in the community.[73] This remains a radical change from the situation of overt conflict with the police, which is, at least to some degree, limited to neighbourhoods where police have turned to violent and militarised methods. In other places, the legitimacy of state institutions has at least partly been renewed, often through various community development projects conducted by the UPPs (or more precisely, through their UPP Social subdivision) although inequality and widespread poverty remain key issues.[74]

Concluding Remarks

In this study, I have tried to show how the failure of specific dimensions of Brazilian state functions in the favelas has cleared the way for the emergence of territorially-based organised crime groups. These groups have been able to exploit the security and governance gap for their own purposes and, thanks to their ability to cater to the specific needs of the community, they have also managed to establish themselves as dominant authorities in the favelas. Although these groups mostly lack an ideological agenda, they impose their own system of rules and regulations upon communities and are able to control a territory and defend it "against" state forces. Outside of cases of pure violent coercion and personal ties with the community, their authority, thus, derives mainly from their output legitimacy – that is, from the positive impact of their governance activities (provision of security and other public goods) on the affected communities.

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This fits well within the framework of criminal insurgency – where with the failure of a state authority, organised crime groups violently occupy the "space left by the state" and use it for their own purposes – whether this involves drug dealing, drug trafficking or the cultivation of coca, poppy seeds or something else. As can be seen in the case of Brazil and even more clearly in Mexico, when criminal insurgency reaches a much higher level, criminal insurgents are not limited to violent confrontations with the state, but use various corruption techniques (native to organised crime) to increase their profits and gain some freedom to manoeuvre. The experience with the pacification programme in Rio shows, then, that when a state proves itself willing and able to retake areas "ruled" by criminal insurgents, the latter can switch rapidly to other tactics and abandon the overt "insurgency," a fact that is usually not acknowledged by scholars utilising this concept. Criminal insurgency thus, becomes a reaction by organised crime groups to a specific environment and context rather than a significant change in the very nature of organised crime.

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Notes

1   See, for example, Max Manwaring (2005), *Street Gangs: The New Urban Insurgency*, Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, available at: <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/download.cfm?q=597> (accessed 20 May 2015); John P. Sullivan (2010), 'Criminal Insurgency in the Americas,'*Small Wars Journal*, 13 February 2010, available at: <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/364-sullivan.pdf> (accessed 20 May 2015); Robert Killebrew (2012),'Criminal Insurgency in the Americas and Beyond, '*PRISM* 2(3), pp. 33-52; Vanda Felbab-Brown (2013),'Crime-War Battlefields,' *Survival* 55(3), pp.147–166.

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The Gratuitous Suicide by the Sons of Pride

On Honour and Wrath in Terrorist Attacks

Denis Madore

Where there is coal, or oil, or water-power, therenew weapons can be forged against the heart of the Faustian Civilization
Oswald Spengler, Man and Technics

In that day, Yahweh with his hard and great and strong sword will punish leviathan, the fleeing serpent, and leviathan the twisted serpent; and he will kill the dragon that is in the sea.
Isaiah 27:01

In the Western philosophic and literary tradition to be without home or country is a fate that both demands our loathing and pity. As Aristotle characterized it, a man born without a city is either a "beast or a god". Such beings Aristotle maintains, since they cannot properly be called human, have a natural tendency towards war and violence. Aristotle sites Homer in describing such a being as clanless, lawless, and hearthless. "The man who is such by nature at once plunges into a passion for war; he is in the position of a solitary piece in a game of draughts."[2] Oswald Spengler addresses this issue of such wanderers by appealing to the image of Nietzsche's beasts of prey. "*The animal of prey is the highest form of mobile life.* It implies a maximum of freedom for self against others, of responsibility to self, of singleness to self, an extreme of necessity where the self can hold its own only by *fighting and winning and destroying*. It imparts a high dignity to Man, as a type, that he is a beast of prey."[3] The beast of prey that Spengler describes is

also much akin to Alexandre Kojève's conception of the japanized man, a being whom is capable of the highest spiritual undertakings – "the gratuitous suicide".

Both mythopoetic and philosophic accounts in the Western tradition attempt to give us an understanding of such men – they are naturally wed to the ways of war, but also hold no particular allegiance to community though they may invoke it in their march towards power. A great deal of effort in the classical Western cannon is spent rendering and making available a system of education and organization that permits the necessary tethering of such men, so as to not have them unleash their wrath inwards against their fellow citizens or plunge their respective communities into war with others. Such early mythopoetic and philosophic accounts of the warrior's nature also have modern equivalents which, it should, be noted, are not far removed from the classical examinations and judgements of Plato, Aristotle and St Augustine. Thomas Hobbes titled his *magnum opus* the Leviathan, from the book of Job, because Leviathan "... seeth every high thing below him; and is King of all the sons of pride".[4] This paper aims to survey several of the ancient and modern ontological accounts on the man of war as he relates to the regime. The hope is that such an analysis can bear fruit in showing a manner of understanding the global resurgence of dangerous individuals that can contest states directly by means of terrorism. I wish to stress however that for the most part I will be drawing upon such examples from the Western tradition of political philosophy, and leave it to more competent Islamic scholars to address such issues within Islamic traditions.[5]

Before we can attest that an act of violent suicide is a tactic of the power- less, or that religion offers a solace making it "reasonable", we must first take note of Achilles choice in Homer's Iliad: "Better a short life full of glory, than a long life." Behind liberal democratic thought lies a Christian heritage that often escapes the analysis of most secular interpreters. Augustine's theological and political philosophy is the first sustained argument on what became the Catholic Church's position on the injunction against suicide. The early Christian movements struggled with the relation between private and public as they related to piousness and civic duty – how were these often conflicting and unstable forces to be mediated in a polity that was heterogeneous in content? The Donatists and Circumcellions challenges to the Catholic

Church paved the way to what has become the communitarian heart of the Christian world view, but Augustine's doctrinal answer to Donatist and Circumcellion[6] challenges against Catholic authority spelled out how the magistrate[7] was to treat a being capable of a "gratuitous suicide".[8] Within this Catholic world view is born the injunction against pride that will haunt the thought of liberal democracy. It is this inability of liberal democracy to understand the ontological roots of the prideful, honour-seeking individual that is at the heart of our global predicament.[9] It is important to step back our analysis of such prideful men, to pre-Christian times since therein we find a very different and favourable understanding of the internal and external psychological forces that propel such men to action and sacrifice. And after two millennia of Christian secularism, our wits have become dull to what is perhaps most evident in world politics today – the return of the Gods, a return to myth as motive and means to establishing power.

Denis
Madore

A Mother's Council: Pride and Honour in the Timocrate

The ancient Greeks has two senses for the word pride – the positive type of pride was love of honour in the negative sense it was hubris. The positive noti- on of pride, if we transliterate, means philo-timai – by philo we recognize the friendship towards something, just as philoso-phia is friendship to wisdom, or better still the love of wisdom. Timai is a harder word to denote in its specific meaning, since it can mean a number of things – honour, avenging, that which is valued, precious or esteemed – the word is generally related to value and judgments of value. But this does not mean we can translate the meaning of philo-timai as a type of money-loving, rather it is linked with the love of judgement, the identification with judgement, of choosing between good and bad, or friend and enemy; it also is linked with the esteem associated with honours and privilege, reward and punishment. Yet pride is a complex psychological force which has a counterpart, its negative double; hubris as an overweening pride.

In book eight of Plato's *Republic* the account given by Socrates tells us that a Timocrate in youth will be with freemen "...tame and to rulers most obedient. He is a lover of ruling and of honor, not basing his claim to rule on speaking or anything of the sort, but on warlike deeds and everything connected with war; he is a lover of gymnastics

and the hunt."[10] Socrates goes on to describe how such a type would in youth deride the pursuit of wealth, however as he grew older the more he would associate with it and come to love it. Socrates' account demonstrates a type of individual who at their core loves both victory and honour (philoneikia, philotimai). Such a youth scoffs at those that talk too much, and prefers the man of action – it is both his ideal and ultimate aim. For those that talk too much veil their inadequacies in war by way of words, and ultimately they are sycophants and hypocrites that provide no emulative model either in educating one towards victory or the acquisition of honour. Such a youth has very high standards of respect, and those whom do not meet his criteria are not deserving of his respect. Socrates attributes this type of psychological complex to the education such a youth receives in the home, and for the main it is a consequence of motherly interventions to remedy the inadequacies of an introverted father. Socrates in the *Republic* stresses the importance of properly matching husband and wife, and when he describes Timocrate's malformed education; one gathers the importance he stresses with regard to the equality necessary in the coupling of husband and wife.[11]

The attitude adopted by the youthful Timocrate is not the free expression of an innate nature, rather it is the consequence of motherly education. The status an ancient Greek woman would hold in Greek society was largely determined by the standing and status of her husband.[12] If her husband was not well looked upon in public this would necessarily bleed into the private sphere of the household, and as primary guardian over the youth's education. Socrates explains how the child would come to learn through his mother and the slaves of the estate how they all lose honour as a result of the inactions in public of the father. Both mother and slaves would come to resent their current conditions, having no power or ability to change their fate they would continually remind the youth, that unlike his father, he should seek to gain the esteem of others. His father is constantly presented to him as inadequate, lacking in manliness *andreia*. This sends the youth into a search for surrogate educators as well as a life of austerity, he cannot become fully public having been educated primarily by non-freemen. This also means that his tethering to the public and, by consequence, the community is tentative. This loose association to the city is a consequence of the regime change that has cast his father into

private life for to undo such wrongs he must seek the help of those factions which would help him undertake the avenging of his kin. But this makes the family and private life more important than public responsibility and duty. The youthful Timocrate is marinated in an education that he must become manlier than his father.

Adeimantus and Socrates discuss the relation of the degeneration of regimes and how they affect the sons of a polity in flux;

> Then they will be stingy with money because they honor it and don't acquire it openly; but, pushed on by desire, they will love to spend other people's money; and they will harvest pleasures stealthily, running away from the law like boys from a father. This is because they weren't educated by persuasion but by force – the result of neglect of the true Muse accompanied by arguments and philosophy while giving more distinguished honor to gymnastics than music.
> You certainly speak of a regime, he said, which is a mixture of bad and good.
> Yes, it is mixed, I said, but due to the dominance of spiritedness one thing is most distinctive in it: love of victories and of honors.[13]

The sketch outlining this type of upbringing should concern us with regard to the rise of dangerous warlike individuals, and this is not simply of philosophic interest. As with Plato our inquiry is to investigate what types of individuals emerge and under what conditions, but unlike modern psychology we are not interested in this psychological make-up as an exception, as we trust as with Plato that it is important because it is a perennial lesson about politics.[14] The Greeks, being an honour culture themselves, have much to teach with regard to the revival of timocratic men in world politics.

The essential element in the account rendered by Socrates is the regime change that occurs in the polity, which is by and large what makes the Timocrate pursue his march towards war. But it is also why he does not have a genuine attachment to the community itself, after all, if his father became powerless it was a direct consequence of the regime's change, that though he seeks to take it over and renew it to avenge the injustice done by it, our young Timocrate in the end cares for it less than his task of becoming an important man of courage and honour. Because the father of the young Timocrate was unable to re-establish

his station in the renewed regime, like Friedrich Nietzsche writes in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Zarathustra seems to warn the young Timocrate, an "Aggrieved conceit, repressed envy – perhaps the conceit and envy of your fathers – erupt from you as a flame and as the frenzy of revenge. What was silent in the father speaks in the son; and often I found the son the unveiled secret of the father."[15]

Socrates' account raises some difficulties when we consider that no polity exists in a vacuum, and certainly the degeneration of polities that Plato describes in the Republic are not immune from contingencies and invasions. It is not coincidental that the degeneration of the polities of Plato's Republic seems to match the same development undergone by Athens in her rivalry with Sparta, but the outcomes in Athens were as much determined by internal forces as well as external pressures. It should be noted that the establishment of the Thirty Tyrants by Sparta would have lead to the conditions necessary for the arising of Timocrates. Those active in politics under new Spartan management would have been relegated to the private sphere.

The Timocrate finds his birth place between these borderlines, since his upbringing was always between the private and public realm. His father, having been pressured out from public life into private existence, is a man defeated – effectively his status is that of women, at worst he is a slave. His mother, meanwhile, along with the household slaves, goad him to take station in the public realm. In the Platonic tripartite soul it is not at all curious that the Thumotic part of the soul resides in the midsection of the torso, separating the head and bowels. It is this element of the thumotic, the in-between, that is the engine of the soul. It should not surprise us that modernity, and more often modern liberal democracy, has been described as populated by "men without chests".[16]

Socrates in the Republic gives us a philosophic account. Homer meanwhile, in the Iliad, gives us the mythopoetic account of this man of war in the personage of Achilles. Both are suggestive that it is due to unequal pairing in marriage that causes the unbalanced character we see in the young Timocrate's war-loving. Homer's account of Achilles is that he is a man divided, being a demi-god, son of Peleus, a mortal king and Thetis an immortal goddess. Unlike the Timocrate of the Republic, Achilles is not fathered by a defeated father, rather Peleus is a man denied access to the realm of the gods, being a mere mortal,

which means that he is incapable of holding any clout among the gods. For Thetis, this means a rather unhappy marriage to a man that cannot increase her standing. As Achilles recounts, his mother told him a prophetic choice regarding his future:

> For my mother Thetis the goddess of the silver feet tells me I carry two sorts of destiny toward the day of my death. Either, if I stay here and fight beside the city of the Trojans, my return home is gone, but my glory shall be everlasting; but if I return home to the beloved land of my father, the excellence of my glory is gone, but there will be a long life left for me, and my glory is gone, and my end in death will not come to me quickly.[17]

As in Plato's account, the mother exhorts the young Timocrate to take station within the public realm and fulfil the duty that his father was either unwilling, or incapable, of accomplishing. Though Thetis knows full well that her son Achilles cannot become a god, she can do her part to goad her son into a standing most like the gods – immortality. Achilles' immortality however resides within his glory that will be "everlasting". Yet Thetis is sure to remind her son that his glory will not be everlasting if he returns home to his father, this in part has to do with relative glory. Achilles will be denied the glory as judged by his mother's divine standard. Thetis however seems to be divided with regard to her son. At times she seems overly protective of him, and in Apollodorus' she dresses him up as woman to protect him from death. This dualist protect/goad treatment is best represented in an account that Thetis attempted to burn off Achilles mortality until his father Peleus took him to the apprenticeship of Chiron. Heracles and Dionysus, unlike Achilles, are examples of demi-gods that join the Olympian patheon because their father was Zeus, and being Zeus begotten they can by their father's station rise to the level of godhood, while Achilles is born to Thetis, she cannot dispense this privilege, being a goddess among gods. In Aeschylus' *Prometheus Bound*, Prometheus recounts a prophecy that Thetis will bear a child greater than his father, which quickly quelled Zeus' sexual interest given the catastrophic consequences.

A great deal of speculation can be had with regard to the ills of the patriarchal system in ancient Greece, most interesting is the equal pairing of husband and wife in Plato's warrior class – and it is most suggestive

that philosophers of the time conceded in part that such a system engendered overweening violent behaviour in youths. I am not suggesting that equality in marriage was presented out of notions of male/female equality, but rather there was an acknowledgment of the ills produced out of inequality in standing.[18]

Homer's account gives us a basis by which we can understand the actions of the Timocrate capable of a gratuitous suicide because of the relation between the profane and sacred realms, while the Platonic account gives shows how this is accomplished in our all too human considerations.

The Son of Pride's Ascetic Suicide:
The Exogamy of Imagined Cities

Homeric and Platonic views on the thumos, that element most related with striving towards warlike ambition, could not differ more starkly. In Homer's account the thumos is not something that is "housed" so to speak, within the soul. Rather it is like a spirit that advises the self in its undertakings, but this voice is not considered to be an inner voice of "conscience". As E.R Dodds, in *The Greeks and the Irrational*, argues

> This habit of (as we should say) "objectifying emotional drives," treating them as not-self, must have opened the door wide to the religious idea of psychic intervention, which is often said to operate, not directly on the man himself, but on his thumos or on its physical seat, his chest or midriff. We see the connection very clearly in Diomede's remark that Achilles will fight "when the *thumos* in his chest tells him to *and* a god rouses him.[19]

In Homer there is an explicit link between the thumos to a type of religious experience that divorces the individual from what we would call a "conscience" that chooses. Though the heroes in the Iliad may argue and rebel against their counselling thumos, it is a god through *ate* or *menos* that ultimately determines events. As Dodds argues, the ancient shame-based culture of the Homeric world over-determined events, and consequently sudden disasters or bursts of wild energy rousing the warrior to superhuman feats is ascribed to the gods which dispenses such events – for the Homeric consciousness events could not have been otherwise, and events that are beyond normal occurrence are attributable to the psychic intervention undertaken by a god.

Before elaborating on the dangerous mixture such divine attributions to events comes to signify within shame-based cultures, I wish to treat the manner in which the Platonic account makes note of the Timocratic penchant for an asceticism that fits into the hero complex, or as Joseph Campbell titled it the monomyth, an allure that is all to tempting for a youthful Timocrate.

In Campbell's loose schema, the hero hears a call to adventure, and follows a harrowing road of trials brought on by supernatural forces, during which he achieves the goal; the hero then returns to the ordinary world dispensing boons to the community.[20] Often the hero is first trained by an elder or wiseman of varying descriptions, but often such a figure lives on the outskirts of the community. In Achilles' case he is the immortal centaur Chiron who lives in a cave on Mount Pellion, a creature that is both identifiably animal but equally divine. As we saw with Aristotle, a being who can reside outside of the community is either a beast or a god, and ironically Nietzsche later retorted he must be both, a philosopher. This in-between station that the educator takes, being part profane (natural/bestial) and sacred (supernatural/divine), is mirrored in the philosophic[21] traditions as much as it is in the mythopoetic.

The symbolism is stark and rather suggestive. Chiron is also attributed with helping Peleus capture Thetis by order of the gods, a reward for his piousness. Chiron helps avert the potential cosmological regicide of Zeus that Prometheus longs to see so that he may be freed from his torments. The mythopoetic accounts of Achilles span far wider than the account provided by Homer's Iliad, but the Iliad is unique because of its scope, for it is a song sung by the Muses about the rage of Achilles – in fact it is quite something that the epic poem's opening word is mēnin (*rage* or wrath)! The complete Epic Cycle of the Trojan war is mostly fragmented accounts of the build-up and subsequent conclusion of the war, but the Iliad is the poem which testifies to the everlasting glory of Achilles – that glory is his wrath.

In the Republic Socrates mentions that the Timocrate will have a love for "gymnastics and the hunt,"[22] yet both activities in the Greek are related to the practice necessary to the attainment of honours. Such exercising of the youthful Timocrate is a preparation for war, just as the hero acquires an instructor that guides him to the excellence he will require in warfare. In part this is what Machiavelli tries to explain to Lorenzo de' Medici about having a mentor that is half-beast and

half-man. In mentioning Achilles' mentor Chiron, Machia- velli makes clear that politics, specifically the rule of others, is primarily about appearance. Machiavelli also mentions Achilles in the succession of imitation necessary for the ruler, citing the imitation that Alexander undertook of Achilles. Although Machiavelli invokes the study of history "for the light it sheds on the actions of eminent men,"[23] with waging war he begins his chain of men not in history but rather a mythical account. Though Alexander may have imitated Achilles, Achilles was trained by the mythical Chiron, and Chiron was trained by Homer. This type of training in military matters, which include hunting from the classical teachings, is capable of making hereditary rulers maintain their power, but also "enables men of private status to become rulers."[24] For this to happen however, such a man will have to follow what is asked of Lorenzo de' Medici, an education and mentoring by Machiavelli inserted into Chiron. The teaching is both of things profane and sacred. "Look how Italy beeches God to send someone to rescue her from the cruel and arrogant foreigners. Again, see how ready and willing she is to rally a standard, if only there is someone to lead the way."[25] Machiavelli, as with Homer, sees the need of believing in heroes.

But why is this teaching of specific importance to the young Timocrate, and why the appeal to the hero? The bestial teaching has to do with the practical aspects of war – it is for the most part a teaching about mere survival, but to exhort men to great deeds the bestial needs the compliment of the divine and eternal, so that a man can sacrifice himself to greater purposes. The invoking of myth and religion are the only means by which men can be swayed to sacrifice themselves, and choose the course chosen by Achilles. The ancient Greek cynics also practice this type of exhortation; they condemned men for their following of customs, and how they had become weakened as a consequence of such conventional moorings. They prescribed the emulation of animals and then the heroic demi-god Hercules. This mixture of profane and sacred was regarded as a short cut to virtue. They coined this process of toughening askesis, in the Greek exercise, which was also linked with the word *aksein* to shape as in art. One must transform oneself into something other.

We can see the utility of such exhortations by reading carefully Franz Fanon's *The Wretched of the Earth*, regarding the struggle for de-colonization. The appeal to myth, specifically local and historically rooted, is a powerful engine to action.

The atmosphere of myth and magic frightens me and so takes on an undoubted reality. By terrifying me, it integrates me in the traditions and the history of my district or of my tribe, and at the same time it reassures me, it gives me a status, as it were an identification paper. In underdeveloped countries the occult sphere is a sphere belonging to the community which is entirely under magical jurisdiction. By entangling myself in its inextricable network, where actions are repeated with crystalline inevitability, I find the everlasting world which belongs to me, and the perenniality which is thereby affirmed of the world belonging to us.[26]

José Ortega y Gasset, writing on the sportive origin of the state, concedes similar forces that unite under proto-political institutions;

For, surprisingly enough, these primitives associations of youths took on the character of secret societies with iron discipline, in which the members through severe training developed proficiency in war and hunting. That is to say, the primeval political association is the secret society; and while it serves the pleasures of feasting and drinking, it is at the same time the place where the first religious and athletic asceticism is practiced.[27]

He goes on to relate that

We must not forget that the literal translation of the word "asceticism" is "training and exercise". The monk took it over from the sport vocabulary of the Greek athletes. *Ascesis* was the regime of the life of an athlete, and it was crammed with exercises and privations. This we may well say that the club of the young is not only the first house and the first casino, but also the first barrack and the first monastery.[28]

Both Fanon and Ortega attend to the intimate link between the bestial and divine as a unity within the practice of warlike individuals. This mixture of beast and god is a frightful power; it is this cloak and garb that the warrior ascetic wears. In *On The Genealogy of Morals* Nietzsche makes the argument that the bending of men voluntarily to the ascetic ideal was a manner of inspiring fear in others. Self-mortification and privation from the common individuals is a manner of inspiring fear and awe from the community – every self-seeking vanguard, to use an anachronistic term, undertakes this development since it acts as the very proof that is different, but also superior, and attempting to

walk the path of heroes. By profunity we should understand the term for what Nietzsche claims it to really be, "a hardness out of deliberate pride" and not an altruism. As Nietzsche writes more succinctly in the *Gay Science*:

> *On the origin of religion* – The distinctive invention of the founders of religion is, first: to posit a particular kind of life and everyday customs that have the effect of a *disciplina voluntatis* and at the same time abolish boredom – and then: to bestow on this life style an *interpretation* that makes it appear to be illuminated by the highest value so that this life style becomes something for which one fights and under certain circumstances sacrifices one's own life.[29]

In closing this aphorism Nietzsche continues, "To become a founder of a religion one must be psychologically infallible in one's knowledge of certain types of souls who have not yet *recognized* that they belong together. It is he that brings them together. The founding of religion therefore always becomes a long festival of recognition."[30] It must be noted here that recognition is another form of expressing the honour-seeking of our young Timocrates. For Nietzsche this process is not unrelated to a transvaluation of values. That is to say, a shift in the manner that both individuals and society come to place their highest esteems. This is a necessary process for the young Timocrate if he is to rule one day, he must first undermine what is already established by an appeal to another unit of esteem, preferably those values which were held by his father. However, the young Timocrate is not above manipulating what his father held dear, because in the end his father was not a real man and gave into the corrupting influence of the newly established regime.

The Shield of Achilles or Secular Empire

Why are such phenomena of importance to understanding global events, specifically fundamentalist Islamic terrorists? And can our, up to now, very Western analysis serve to help us understand this global conflict?

Judaism and Christianity from the perspective of Sayyid Qutb's Islamism are corruptions of the primordial religion of Adam. What does this essentially theological tenet signify for Western civilization? Fundamentally it means that the Judeo-Christian world order is something

that will ultimately be overcome. Such beliefs by monotheistic religions that purport the sole and unique way towards salvation are nothing new, as the belief by many Christian millenarian sects can attest. But just as Christianity finds its root and germ in Abrahamic faith, it also must ultimately absorb or destroy it to fulfil its historical providence. Such providence is also present in Islam, the corruption in time is to be purified by the final prophet of God's teaching.[31] Alexandre Kojève expressed a similar idea from a secular Hegelian perspective; in principle history has ended, and the fact that nation-states were still in the main the predominant political unit, expressing mere nationalism, and not humanity, we could expect an intermediary state of organization to assist the labour of the negative to achieve a universal world order – this in-between state, larger than a nation but smaller than universal humanity would be the multi-national empire. As Kojève phrased it, "the period of *national* political realities is over. This epoch of *empires*, which is to say of *transnational* political unities, but formed by *affiliated* states."[32] Of course, such an empire would need to fracture and collect upon shared customs and traditions. Writing to Charles de Gaul on what should be France's foreign policy after the Second World War, Kojève put forth that Europe would be caught in the pinchers of two transnational affiliated states (the Anglo-American empire and the Slavo-Soviet empire). Obviously the Cold War did not quite work out in the manner Kojève might have anticipated. Nonetheless, Kojève expressed a very real development that from our present quarter reminds one of the 'discourse' of globalization, and understandably so, since Francis Fukuyama owes a great debt to his intellectual mentor in thinking that history had ended with liberal democracy. If one reads carefully Kojève's memo to the French government, it becomes exceedingly clear in retrospect how Fukuyama was little more than a pitch for Anglo-America preponderance, but fundamentally in agreement with Kojève. Perhaps it is important to review how such conglomeration of interests, customs and traditions would not be an easy, to use George Tenet's term, "slam dunk".

As Machiavelli had noted, it is far harder to make men follow a new prince, even in ideals alone, than what their prejudices and old grievances tell them. But given that the Westphalian order was partially the consequence of bridging bias of the imagination, it was possible to Kojève and others to replicate such labours for Empires, at least theoretically.[33] As the European Union can well attest, this process of forging

a loose union is fraught with difficulties, often technical in nature, but it seems it is always the issue of old national identities that most firmly impede the progress of unity – though it may be the most practical and rational of associations. Why?

As Kojève elaborates;

> This "kinship" between nations, which is currently becoming an important political factor, is undeniable concrete fact which has nothing to do with generally vague and unclear "racial" ideas. This "kinship" of nations is, above all, a kinship in language, of civilization, of general "mentality", or – as is sometimes also said – of "climate". And this spiritual kinship is also manifested, among other things, through the identity of religion.

This is very curious given Kojève's overt atheistic attitude which made him profess that he was a god-man, though not at all that curious if Kojève is following in the footsteps of Machiavelli. Essentially what Kojève harkens to is that mere racial (ie ethnic) differences can be subsumed beneath the common lineage of religion, but religion in its everyday practices forges within men a way of being that makes them characteristically alike in manners. Yet this is a very technological and rational manner of seeing religion. As Tom Wolfe wrote about in his essay, *Two Young Men Went West*, the old structures of Anglican hierarchy in the east gave the eastern seaboard industrial corporations their hierarchical structure imitating a mechanic great chain of being – but as protestant denominationalism worked its way westward further afield from its old dominations, it gave way to the lateral and associational basis of protestant conscience, and in doing so doing gave birth to the thinking needed for the microchip. We would do well to see how such Machinist realities were nothing more than the material reworking of the religious mind. For Hobbes could have dreamed of any number of mechanism, but he chose to build a mechanical God in the shape of a man. Oddly enough we can see that for Kojève history had ended, and that indeed Hegel had achieved what he set himself to do in the Phenomenology of Spirit; "To help bring philosophy closer to the form of Science, to the goal where it can lay aside the title '*love* of knowing' and be *actual* knowing – that is what I have set myself to do."[34] In so doing the realm of the slave whom had won the battle for dominion of the planet, set themselves to their highest virtues – work. As Alan Bloom noted, "If Kojève is wrong, if his world does not correspond to the real

one, we learn at least that either one must abandon reason – and this includes all science – or one must abandon historicism."[35]

It is important to keep in mind that the animating agent for Kojève is desire, and this desire is also pointed at the desire to have others desire us. This means that recognition is the central human relation which involves strife between individuals. After this battle, the slave chooses life over death and submits to the will of the master. The end of History then is the process by which the slave slowly emancipates himself and his self-worth until he is willing to forfeit his life for the sake of freedom. In effect, the slave becomes like the master, and in the ensuing order equality becomes the basis of their mutual recognition. Given all the world wars that have taken place since the French Revolution, the ultimate event in this process of mutual recognition, the principle achieved, all other conflicts would necessarily mimic this battle of recognition. For any group would seek to have the other recognize it. But Kojève was not blind to the fact that some could not be incorporated into this rational world order on the gathering horizon. What to do with them?

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> Well, these are *facts* that are brought in opposition to Hegel. And, obviously, he can make no answer. He can at best oppose the *fact* of the conscious Wise Man to the *facts* of unconscious "Wise Men". And if this fact did not exist....? In any case, by definition, Hegel cannot refute him, "convert" him, only with *speech*. Now, by beginning to *speak* or to listen to a *discourse*, this "Wise Man" already accepts the Hegelian ideal. If he truly is what he is – an unconscious "Wise Man" – he will refuse all *discussion*. And then one could refute him only as one "refutes" a fact, a thing, or a beast: by physically destroying him.[36]

Kojève has something rather specific in mind when he attends to this possibility, but I would like to compare this to a type of man that Kojève may have overlooked, or at any rate underestimated. Kojève keeps to a very Hegelian reading of asceticism, that is to say it is a retreat into subjectivity. Now Kojève concedes that this can be accomplished, as he states "Nietzsche seriously envisaged the possibility that the ideal that he called "Chinese" might become *universal*" (i.e. an unconscious Wise Man). But Kojève understands this possibility in Hegelian terms, and hence rationally. As such, its failing is both its unconsciousness, which is the same as saying mytho-poetic, for those under the mytho-poetic ideal cannot account for why they know what they know. Yet they

are not willing to be converted by rational speech or discourse, and consequently and fundamentally are irrational. This type of asceticism, though it may invoke the universal, cannot articulate it, nor do such individuals seek to. In effect they are the most stubborn of mules, they "have realized "moral perfection", since there have been men who took them as the model"[37]. If we consider the necessary steps in order to achieve Kojève's notion of empire, then we must understand what he means by affiliated states. Kojève is a thinker who chooses his terms rather carefully, and we will benefit in understanding the etymology of affiliated. Affiliate means "adopt, fix the paternity of", and is a compound word – the prefix af- means to assimilate, added to filius, which is latin for son. We have sufficient elements in order to paint a rather stark picture of the young Timocrate in a Hegelian world of Empire.

As we noted before with regard to the rational account rendered by Socrates of the young Timocrate, he will due to his rearing be "... a lover of ruling and honour, not basing his claim to rule on speaking or anything of the sort, but on warlike deeds and everything connected with war; he is a lover of gymnastics and the hunt."[38] Now, as Fukuyama has rightly pointed, out "the liberal democratic state did not constitute a synthesis of the morality of the master and the morality of the slave, as Hegel had said. For Nietzsche, it represented the unconditional victory of the slave."[39] Now Socrates mentions that the young Timocrate with slaves "would be brutal, not mere despising slaves as the educated man does."[40] Now the diplomatic chatter necessary to keep affiliated states together, all mutually respecting one another as equals, devoid and avoiding wars, means that a young Timocrate is hard pressed to find his model. This silent model does not profess or articulate its universal truth publicly, but teaches the sacred and profane arts of war. Where would such a young man seek his education? Further, what if such a man's father's standing was lessoned because his values, his esteems, his honour was not recognized in the manner it use to be? Such a basis has its origin in colonialism – which is to say the rational secular order that took hold in Egypt, a place where, as with the young Timocrate, women held no weight in the father's standard of honour.

The Battle for Planetary Rule: Seeking the Spear of Achilles

This is the most acceptable explanation of that galaxy of remarkable characters whose recollection Islamic history has preserved as it grew

through the ages. It is also the explanation of those events and occurrences which one would almost regard as legends created by some fertile imagination, were it not that the records of their happening have been accurately kept and preserved by history. History can scarcely record all the examples of spiritual purity and psychological courage, or moving sacrifice and of death for an ideal, all the flashes of spiritual and intellectual greatness, and the actual deeds of heroism in the various fields of life.[41]

We can see in the words of Sayyid Qutb[42] an appeal to similar forces invoked by Fanon in the *Wretched of the Earth*, that both appeals to traditional and local heritage that demand the renewal of myths, and by consequence a continuation of the lineage of heroes compelled to act. Let us trace the genealogy of Islamic terrorism as it relates to the change of regimes within the middle-east in order to see more clearly the young Timocrate.

The Egyptian Republic was declared on the 18th of June 1953, and by 1956 Gamal Abdel Nasser had implemented a fully independent, but more importantly secular, state. I do not wish to get into the specifics details of Egypt's historical development, rather I would like to draw comparisons to the mytho-poetic and philosophical accounts that were made previously. This will help us see how young Timocrates would have flourished under such conditions. By 1954, the alliance and support the Muslim Brotherhood had for the nationalist Free Officers Movement under Nasser quickly came to an end. It became evident that the newly established regime would not enforce strict Islamic law. The quick repression against the Muslim Brotherhood signalled what Qutb had already suspected in his book *Social Justice in Islam*. There he had seen foreign influence, only to come home from his studies in the US and realize it had taken root in Nasserism. During the Nasser crackdown against the Muslim Brotherhood, Qutb was arrested and released several times, only to have his work increase in radicalism while he cemented a network of plotted assassinations – he was sentenced to death by partisans of the Nasser regime, and it was Anwar Sadat himself that brought a message of clemency if only Qutb would appeal the sentence. A scene almost reminiscent of Plato's *Crito*, Qutb refused and followed through with his declaration before the trial that would take his life: "The time has come for a Muslim to give his head in order to proclaim the birth of the Islamic movement."[43] Qutb's youth was a time of great change in Egypt. Increasingly he would openly criticize King Farouk's complicity in British colonialism; this was also

mixed with astonishment on Qutb's part towards America's support for the founding of Israel, a battle that had humiliated the pride of Arabs across the Middle-East, more specifically their martial talents. President Truman's support for the transfer of a hundred thousand Jewish refugees into Palestine caused Qutb to proclaim, "I hate those Westerners and despise them! All of them, without any exception: the English, the French, the Dutch, and finally the Americans, who have been trusted by many."[44] It was the loss of honours that helped Qutb find the wrath necessary to found a mytho-poetic movement. Idealist through and through, it would in the end prove to be the necessary motive to seek out an ascetic warriors ethos and practice; its Mount Pellion would be the Lion's Den in Afghanistan and later al-Qaeda.

Eleven years after independence, Egypt, along with her allies, suffered a humiliating defeat at the hands of Israel. For three years Nasser fought the War of Attrition, until his death. Shortly upon taking over, Anwar Al Sadat instituted the Corrective Revolution as he slowly purged the regime of opponents to his rule, and over the long term implemented the realignment of Egypt domestic and foreign policies away from Soviet and towards American influences. This was a considerable step away from rule under Nasser, though Sadat temporarily supported the Muslim Brotherhood in order to help him purge the leftist elements from Egypt. Western secular colonialism in the middle-east was an instituting of the ideas of European Enlightenment, and in its advanced form was a "Godless" mechanism. By consequence its system of esteem, what it is to be considered of worth and value by society, faded the remnants of spiritual worth and value in favour of vulgar materialism. Like the young Timocrate in Plato's *Republic*, the standing of the father was reduced to nothing, and by and large his share of prestige faded into worthlessness as the new secular nationalism gripped nation after nation in the Arabian world. It was this seminal conflict that was brought to the fore in the Soviet Union's invasion of Afganistan; where before the young Timocrate's of the middle-east were displaced and lived in the in-between of secular states, unable to re-assert a new paradigm of value, in Afganistan they found a way of establishing the "immortal glory" sought by Achilles. But as the secular nation-states purged their populations of factional fundamentalists, it gave them the status which Aristotle warned, those that are "clanless, lawless, and heartless," and they plunged immediately into a passion for war.

The leader that would arise as the leading Qubt-inspired Timocrate was Ayman al-Zawahiri. Zawahiri was born to Dr. Mohammed Rabie al-Zawahiri, a clan which had under the newly secular governance of the British established a dynasty of medical professionals, nicely fitting into the new modernist standards established in Egypt. But the Zawahiri name was most identified with religion, specifically the Imam Mohammed al-Ahmadi al-Zawahiri, who as Wright notes, "enjoys a kind of papal status in the Muslim world."[45] Al- Zawahiri's mother, Umayma Azzam, however, was from a wealthier and more politically prominent clan. As Wright describes al-Zawahiri's father, he was "Obese, bald and slightly cross-eyed," and had a reputation of being eccentric and absentminded, though he was beloved by his students and neighbourhood children. As Socrates mentioned about Timocrate's father, he does not busy himself with seeking honours, as Dr. Mohammed Rabie al-Zawahiri was wont to do when he retired into his laboratory and medical clinic.

It was al-Zawahiri's uncle from the more political Azzam clan that introduced him to works of Sayyid Qutb. While not the sportive type, al-Zawahiri was known for his defiant temperament towards those he regarded as lesser, more notably secularists, while deferential to religious arguments and radical Imam notables. For al-Zawarhiri, the sacred realm became his milieu of esteem, and by consequence his prideful bouts of contest. More memorable were his exchanges in jail with rivals for leadership, such the blind Sheikh Omar Abdel-Rahman, whom is suspected of having issued the fatwa against Sadat, and now in American custody.

Osama bin Laden certainly draws parallel to what Socrates describes as the "love of hunting and gymnastics" the young Timocrate would pursue, far more of a physical type than al-Zawahiri. In fact Osama bin Laden very much matches the descriptions often rendered by the ancients about the honour-loving youth. As a young man Bin Laden enjoyed games of contest, but more conspicuously he liked horseback riding and big game hunting. As Wright documents when Jamal Khalifa recounts his friendship with Bin Laden, as young man, he had a penchant for adventure: "We were riding horses in the desert, and we were really going very fast. I saw fine sand in front of us, and told Osama this is dangerous, better stay away. He said no, and he continued. His horse turned over and he fell down. He got up and laughed. Another time, we were riding in a jeep. Whenever he saw a hill, he would drive free

fast and go over it, even though we didn't know what was on the other side. Really, he put us in danger many times."[46] Khalifa goes on to tell how he and Osama at the time were very much looking for a type of disciplining of the spirit: "Islam is different from any other religion; it's a way of life."[47] Both Jamal Khalifa and Osama Bin Laden were taught by the late Sayyid Qutb's younger brother, Mohammed Qutb, teaching them both the radical post-torture writings, *Milestones* and *In the Shade of the Quran*. Like the early Christian debates between St Augustine and the Donatists and Circumcillions, Osama Bin Laden would read the debates between Hasan Hudayi, who followed the Augustine-like conclusion in not questioning the faith of others in his book *Preachers Not Judges.* Though in early agreement with the more tolerant view, Osama would follow his Timocratic inclination towards the love of judgement and ultimately give into the notion of *Takfir*, the killing of apostates.[48]

Like Juilen Sorel in the *Red and the Black*, Osama's prospects for honour were limited in Saudi Arabia, as Wright relates:

> His brothers were being educated at the finest universities in the world, but the example that meant the most to him was that of his illiterate father. He spoke of him constantly and held him up as a paragon. He longed to achieve comparable distinction – and yet he lived in a culture where individuality was discouraged, or at least reserved for royalty. Like other members of the Saudi upper class, the Bin Ladens prospered on royal favors, which they were loathed to put at risk. Moreover, they were outsiders – still Yemenis, the eyes of clannish Saudis. There was no political system, no civil society, no obvious route to greatness. Bin Laden was untrained for the clergy, which was the sole alternative to royal power in the Kingdom.[49]

From its, origins fundamentalist Islamic success was marginal if we compare it to the superpowers of the Cold War and secularism. Its growth and power however remains with its ability to capitalize on spectacular mytho-poetic imagery much akin to that invoked in the Illiad. Whether this is a cynical or genuine belief is beside the point to a large extent, since it is capable of drawing out the most brazen and wrathful courage which lies within the Timocratic soul described by Socrates. Indeed, the Timocratic education is that of Chiron, half

beast and half divine, as invoked by Machiavelli. This certainly creates a new paradigm that no longer sees the state as something necessary to achieving its goals, and gives the means as promised and "enables men of private status to become rulers". In fact, one could argue that the experiences with national secularism has made the mujahedeen ascetic warrior all the more confident that his power relies purely in his ascetic ideal, unmediated by Imam or magistrate, using, as Spengler describes, the beast of prey's rebellion against technology. For "him it is a *spiritual* need, not on account of its *victories* – '*navigare necesse est, vivere non est necesse*' For the coloured races, on the contrary, it is but a weapon like a tree from the woods that one uses as house-timber, but discards as soon as it has served its purpose. This machine-technics will end the Faustian civilization and one will lie in fragments, *forgotten* – our railways and steamships as dead as the Roman roads and the Chinese wall, or giant cities and skyscrapers in ruins like old Memphis and Babylon."[50]

As George Tenet testified before the Congressional Joint Inquiry on 9/11 on October 17th, 2002, "While we often talk of two trends in terrorism – state- sponsored and independent – in Bin Ladin's case with the Taliban we had something completely new: a *terrorist* sponsoring a *state*."[51] This weapon forged against the Faustian civilization, that is to say, the secular global order of remaking the world, is like the spear of Achilles wedged within the neck of Hector. And this Western world certainly feels the besiegement that Troy once did. For the mytho-poetic imagery does not require understanding of mechanisms as Kojève would find necessary, it simply needs to know how to use the weapon. 9/11 was not achieved by a Manhatten project like technology, but rather the use of a religious asceticism and idealism which pronounced itself as powerful as any implementation of technology. The far enemy, as it is often called by radical Islamic Timocrats, is not a battle for any one state nor empire as it may have started out. It seeks the wrath of Achilles to strike at the very heart of Troy with a gratuitous suicide for immortal glory. This strategy should remind us of Ahab's vengeful wrath against Moby Dick, the leviathan;

The White Whale swam before him as the monomaniac incarnation of all those malicious agencies which some deep men feel eating in them, till they are left living on with half a heart and half a lung. That

intangible malignity which has been from the beginning; to whose dominion even the modern Christians ascribe one-half of the worlds; which the ancient Ophites of the east reverenced in their statue devil; Ahab did not fall down and worship it like them; but deliriously transferring its idea to the abhorred white whale, he pitted himself, all mutilated, against it. All that most maddens and torments; all that stirs up the lees of things; all truth with malice in it; all that cracks the sinews and cakes the brain; all the subtle demonisms of life and thought; all evil, to crazy Ahab, were visibly personified, and made practically assailable in Moby Dick. He piled upon the whale's white hump the sum of all the general rage and hate felt by his whole race from Adam down; and then, as if his chest had been a mortar, he burst his hot heart's shell upon it.[52]

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Notes

[2]   Barker, Ernest, trans. Aristotle, *Politics*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998. pp. 10,.

[3]   Spengler, Oswald, *Man and Technics: A Contribution to the Philosophy of Life*, University Press of the Pacific, Honolulu, 2002. pp. 22.

[4]   Hobbes, Thomas, *Leviathan*, Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis, 1994. pp. 210.

[5]   As in the spirit of Joseph Campbell, "My hope is that a comparative elucidation may contri- bute to the perhaps not-quite disparate causes of those forces that are working in the present world for unification, not in the name of some ecclesiastical or political empire, but in the sense of human mutual understanding." Campbell, Joseph, *The Hero with a Thousand Faces: Third Edition*, Princeton University Press, Princeton. pp. VIII.

[6]   Catholic Encyclopaedia Dictionary, Cassel. London, 1931, "Agonistici (Agon = 'struggle')." One of the names given by the Donatists to those of their followers who went through cities and villages to disseminate the doctrine of Donatus. They first appeared about 317 (Tillemont, Mém., VI, 96), and claimed that they were champions of Christ, fighting with the sword of Israel. Their war-cry was Laudes Deo (Praises to God). They committed many barbarous acts and deeds of violence. Whether they called themselves "fighters" (Agonistic) because they fought the battles of the Lord, or because

they were forced to fight those who sought to protect their property against their invasions, is not clear. The Catholics styled the Agonistici, "Cir- cum-cellions," i.e. circum cellas euntes, because they roved about among the peasants, living on those they sought to indoctrinate." The Circumcellion attempted to reach martyrdom by forcing the hands of those they attack, or by taking their own lives.

7   I use the word magistrate to directly link this with the later thought of John Locke in the *Letter on Toleration* to emphasize the notion of religious and secular divide.

8   Dyson, R.W. ed. Augustine, *The City of God Against the Pagans*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 27, 32–33.

9   Of course I am not referring to those that have contemplated the problem of pride, such as Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes "vainglory", or Jean-Jacques Rousseau's "amour-propre", rather I am referring to more narrow views that have been expressed popularly with regard to liberal democracy.

10 Bloom, Alan, trans. Plato, *The Republic of Plato: 2nd Edition*, Basic Books, Chicago, 1991. pp. 226, 549a.

11 Walcot, Peter, "Plato's Mother and Other Terrible Women", *Greece & Rome*, 2nd Ser., Vol. 34, No. 1 (Apr., 1987), pp. 12–31.

12 Pomeroy, Sarah B. *Goddesses, Whores, Wives and Slaves: Women in Classical Antiquity*, Schocken Books, New York, 1995, pp. 25–29, 79–84.

13 Bloom, Alan, trans. Plato, *The Republic of Plato: 2nd Edition*, Basic Books, Chicago, 1991. pp. 225-226, 548b-c.

14 I am in agreement with H.E. Malden in The Sequence of Forms of Government in Plato's 'Republic' Compared with the Actual History of Greek Cities, *Transactions of the Royal History Society*, New Ser., Vol. 5. (1891), pp. 53–74, when he writes "Even, Plato, however, could hardly be serious in suggesting that the ethical decadence of individual character from generation to generation proceeds always by a fixed law, that the son of the perfect man is always or even generally ambitious, that the son of the ambitious man is always money- loving and so on."

15 Kaufmann, Walter, trans. Nietzsche, Friedrich, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for None and All*, Penguin books, New York, 1978, pp. 100. Plato also makes this a key feature of the youthful Timocrate, that he pursues what his father could not gain, namely wealth and standing.

16 See: Lewis, C.S. *The Abolition of Man*, Macmillan Publishing Co., New York, 1975 and also Fukuyama, Francis, *The End of History and the Last Man*, Harper-Collins Publishers, New York, 1992, specifically chapter 24 entitled "Men Without Chests".

17 Adler, Mortimer J. Ed. *Great Books of the Western World: Homer*, University of Chicago, Chicago, 1992, pp. 105 Iliad, book 9: 410.

18 Pomeroy, Sarah B. *Goddesses, Whores, Wives and Slaves: Women in Classical Antiquity*, Schocken Books, New York, 1995, pg. 19. Pomeroy makes an interesting comment regarding the relation between the warrior and the promised kingdom, and the relation of a Timocra- tic pattern of progeny. "In the matrilocal pattern it was often a roving warrior who married a princess and settled down in her kingdom. The husband was attracted by

the expectation of inheriting his bride's father's realm; hence the succession to the throne in his case was matrilineal. Sometimes fathers gave their daughters in marriage to notable warriors to obtain allies. Achilles boasted that he had his choice among the daughters of many Greek chieftains. Since the prize was the kingdom, the princess' father often held a contest for her hand, thereby assuring himself that he found the strongest or most clever son-in-law." Ortega y Gasset also makes similar observation in his *The Sportive Origins of the State* on the role of Exogamy in the formation of the warriors. Interesting parallels can probably be made with the fundamen- talist martyrs promise of virgins in the hereafter if he dies in the service of Allah.

19 Dodds E.R. *The Greeks and the Irrational*, University of California Press, Berkley, 1964. pg. 16. It is interesting to note that much of Sayyid Qutb and other radical Islamist theorists express a similar sentiment with regard to the over-determination of events, almost in abdica- tion of responsibility.

20 Campbell, Joseph, *The Hero with a Thousand Faces: Third Edition*, Princeton University Press, Princeton.

21 Often in the Platonic corpus Socrates is said to talk with young thumotic men outside of the city proper, under and olive grove, in the house of metic (non-citizen) etc...

22 Xenophon, *On Hunting*: "Moreover, the very attempt makes them better in many ways and wiser; and we will give the reason. Unless they abound in labours and inventions and pre- cautions, they cannot capture game. [14] For the forces contending with them, fighting for their life and in their own home, are in great strength; so that the huntsman's labours are in vain, unless by greater perseverance and by much intelligence he can overcome them." 13:13–14, and Peleus stirred a desire even in the gods to give him Thetis and to hymn their marriage in Cheiron's home. Bk 1:8–9, [16] Achilles, nursed in this schooling, bequeathed to posterity memorials so great and glorious that no man wearies of telling and hearing of him. Machiavelli also recommends that knowledge of hunting and horseback riding are essential for a knowledge of warfare and its associated virtues.

23 Skinner, Quentin and Price, Russel, ed. *Machiavelli: The Prince*, Cambridge University Press, pp. 53.

24 Ibid, pp. 52.

25 Ibid, pp. 88.

26 Fanon, Frantz, *The Wretched of the Earth*, Grove Press, New York, 1963. pg. 52.

27 José Ortega y Gasset, *History as a System and Other Essays Towards a Philosophy of History*, Norton Library, New York, 1961. pp. 29.

28 Ibid.

29 Kaufmann, Walter, trans. Nietzsche, Friedrich, *Gay Science,* Vintage Books, New York, 1974. pp. 296 section 353.

30 Ibid.

31 I am not arguing that Islam does not have a notion of tolerance, as this is certainly true with regard to other Abrahamic faiths. However, in principle if this were essentially the case, then there would be no need to follow Islam as a faith. Indeed without affirming the need to follow Islam, we

are stating essentially what any other faith will do as long as it is mono-the- istic, to say nothing of its practices. What I am attempting to show is that religions, more specifically Islam in our case requires boundaries and distinctions, otherwise they merely melt into permissive cosmopolitan-ism. This is how a Timocrate sees his religion, founded on an us and them, friend/enemy basis, which uses universalism as mere means to action. See also Schwab, George, trans. Schmitt, Carl, *The Concept of the Political*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1996.

32 Kojève, Alexandre, "Outline of a Doctrine of French Policy" pp. 7, Hoo-ver Institute, http:// www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/3436846. html.

33 From Kojève's tone in the "Outline of the Doctrine of French Foreign Pol-icy," one gathers that a conscious imitation of Machiavelli is undertaken. That is to say, just as Machiavelli is exhorting Lorenzo de Medici to under-take actions to unite Italy, Kojève is exhorting France's government officials to help create a Latin Empire.

34 Miller A.V. trans. *Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1977. pp. 3.

35 Bloom, Alan, *Giants and Dwarves: Essay's 1960–1990*, Touchstone, New York, 1990. pp. 272.

36 Bloom, Alan, ed. Kojève, Alexandre, *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel*, Cornell Universi- ty Press, 1969. pp. 84.

37 Ibid. Kojève already discounts this. Note the past tense of "took".

38 Bloom, Alan, trans. Plato, *The Republic of Plato: 2nd Edition*, Basic Books, Chicago, 1991. 549a.

39 Fukuyama, Francis, *The End of History and the Last Man*, HarperCollins Publishers, New York, 1992. pp. 301.

40 Plato, *The Republic of Plato,* 549a.

41 Sayyid Qutb, *Social Justice in Islam*, Octagon Books, New York, 1970. pg 140.

42 http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/07spring/eikmeier.htm.

43 Wright, Lawrence, *The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11*, Vin-tage Books, New York, 2007, pp. 26.

44 Ibid. pp. 11.

45 Ibid. pp. 40.

46 Ibid. pp. 91.

47 Ibid. pp. 91.

48 Ibid. pp. 91–92.

49 Ibid. pp. 95.

50 Spengler, Oswald, *Man and Technics: A Contribution to the Philosophy of Life*, University Press of the Pacific, Honolulu, 2002. pp. 103.

51 http://www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/creports/911.html.

52 Melville, Herman, *Moby-Dick or The White Whale*, Collector's Library, Lon-don, 2004, pp. 262.

Book Reviews

Managing the Undesirables

Refugee Camps and Humanitarian Government

Reviewed by Wendy Booth

According to a 2012 report by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 'an average of 3000 people per day became refugees in 2012, five times more than in 2010.' The number of refugees, worldwide, now stands at approximately 15.4 million. These figures are startling. Discovering effective ways to assist refugees, whatever the humanitarian crisis, is a matter of urgency. As the author of *Managing the Undesirables*, Agier's aim is to describe and create an understanding of humanitarian governance.

Agier is an anthropologist, and his work is essentially an ethnographic account of his visits to refugee camps, mainly in central and western Africa, during the period 2000 until 2007. It provides an account of people's lives in the camps, including a number of interviews, and the difficulties faced by the stateless, particularly in regards to the power exerted over their lives by the UNHCR and the NGOs which provide humanitarian assistance. Agier states that his main aim is to open up further paths for ethnographic inquiry 'in one of these new imagined spaces which a few decades ago no one would have imagined could figure among the legitimate terrains of anthropology' (p.134). His affiliation with Medecins Sans Frontieres (Doctors without Borders) enabled Agiers to access to the camps and closely examine the situation of the refugees located within their territory.

The work tackles the complexities associated with displaced persons and provides a raw account of the issues faced on the ground. It is particularly useful, from an anthropological perspective, including with regard to human rights. Problems that arise from the absence of recognition and lack of citizenship also make the book useful to those interested in the politics of identity and recognition. The book provides a straightforward account that brings the central problems to the fore in an easily understandable manner, with a focus on the day to day problems faced, such as the apathy that results from being dependent on humanitarian aid, with Agiers describing refugee camps as 'waiting rooms' (p. 72); a state that the majority of refugees find themselves in sometimes for months but more often for years.

The power that humanitarian organisations wield over displaced persons is clearly described, from the labelling that occurs on entering the camps, 'a hierarchy of misfortune' (p. 213), to decisions about who exactly should receive plastic sheeting, and the distribution of food packages. This information meets the objectives that Algiers set out to achieve at the start and provides interesting reading and a thorough insight. However, it does, at times, seem overly descriptive, as well as short on solutions and more in-depth theoretical arguments.

It is inevitable that the provision of aid and what form this should take will be contested and face criticism. One of the most poignant points that Agiers makes is regarding the politics within the camps, and perhaps more importantly outside the camps, by the UNHCR and NGOs, with the camps described as places of 'extra territoriality' (p. 71) and '(z)ones of exceptional rights and power, where everything seems possible for those in control' (p. 82). There is a striking contrast between the public perception of humanitarian aid and the impunity which organisations have, for example with regard to the forced return of displaced persons now urbanised after war and sometimes decades away from their homeland, yet expected to go back to their original lives as farmers (p. 120).

The book is essential in the context of the current debate on refugees. Perhaps the most worrying factor flagged up is 'the impunity of those in charge' (p. 155), and the way that privatisation is entering the field of humanitarism. Moreover, the post 9/11 era 'strangely resembles science fiction, but permits the effective global application of an imperial police force, with humanitarianism as its left hand' (p. 206). These issues are mentioned in the latter half of the book, and result

in a desire for further elaboration. While Algiers describes instances where refugees themselves have carried out protests or elected leaders from among themselves as representatives within the camp, it is ultimately these powerful exterior forces which will determine the future of refugee camps and the status of displaced persons; as Agiers coins it 'managing the undesirable' and controlling the fate of those who 'are viewed, simultaneously or alternatively, as vulnerable and undesirable, victims and dangerous' (p. 201). *Managing the Undesirables* provides a good starting point for these issues, which is the main objective of Agiers, yet the issues at play need to be delved into more deeply, for example the idea of integrating displaced persons into existing towns and cities, which is usually more cost effective; or indeed, deciding what to do when long term refugee camps evolve into townships—a point made in the book. In addition, further ethnographic research is required, as his research terminated in 2007 and is largely centered on Africa. In sum, the book is a highly commendable ethnographic account that is easy to follow and provides a significant contribution to the current crises of the humanitarian movement.

Rules for the World

International Organizations in Global Politics

Reviewed by Jelena Cupać

International relations scholars have rarely tackled the subject of inter-
national organizations outside of the paradigmatic question imposed
by the neo-neo debate about the nature and possibility of coopera-
tion among states. In this regard, Michael Barnett's and Martha Fin-
nemore's book *Rules for the World* may be viewed as an attempt to break
away from these preset research questions of the disciplinary debate.
The book successfully manages to unpack the black box of interna-
tional organisations by going beyond the input of states' interests and
attempting to offer a set of coherent theoretical accounts for analysis
of the behavioural autonomy of these organisations. The authors posit
that 'we can better understand what ios *do* if we better understand
what ios *are*' (p. 9). This reasoning leads them to suggest that ios are
nothing more than bureaucracies, like all other organisations. The rest
of their theorising is directed by this supposition, but before paying
more attention to it, it is important to highlight that this type of anal-
ysis is hardly novel; there exists a well-developed body of scholarship
in sociology, organisational theory and political science that examines
the role of bureaucracies and Barnett and Finnemore are not shy to
borrow heavily from it. Nonetheless, it would be a great injustice to re-
gard *Rules for the World* as lacking a valuable contribution. Accordingly,
this book represents one of the first theoretically developed attempts

to view IOs as polities whose behaviour is steered by bureaucracies.

Barnett and Finnemore reject explanations that regard the behaviour of IOs as a mere function of the member states' interests and make the case for their behavioural autonomy and authority in the international arena. As suggested, the concept of bureaucracy assumes central stage in their argument. Bureaucracy is regarded as a unique social form which develops a distinct organizational culture. Drawing considerably on Max Weber's explorations, the authors posit that the autonomy, authority and power of bureaucracy is derived from claims to rationality, or in other words, from their tendency to structure action in terms of means and ends (p.116). Furthermore, their autonomy is exercised through the production and diffusion of impersonal rules and norms that, in turn, frame the problems in particular way and as such play a significant part in constructing the reality of world politics. More importantly, bureaucracies construct the social world in such a manner as to make it amenable to their intervention.

From this short summary of Finnemore and Barnett's main arguments, it is clear that they largely subscribe to a constructivist theoretical paradigm. Even though, the labelling is hardly ever fruitful for the development of the theories and science in general, some minor weakness regarding this issue should be pointed out. Although the argument about the construction of social reality is *par excellence* a constructivist argument, Barnett and Finnemore conceive it in a highly instrumental manner. This is because they see particular ways of constructing reality as a process aimed at maintaining the authority and power of IOs in the realm of world politics and can almost be conceived of as the rational choice behaviour on the part of these organisations. In this regard, their accounts are better conceived of as a theoretical framework rather than a developed theory, which opens up possibilities for further theoretical specifications and development.

The third, fourth and fifth chapters of the book are dedicated to case studies of the developments in the International Monetary Fund, UNHCR and the UN Secretariat in the case of Rwanda's genocide. In a truly gripping manner Barnett and Finnemore depict the process of development and change of these organisations. They show how their organisational cultures and procedural routines affect the way they frame the problems they deal with which, determines the character of their actions. As an illustration, how the UN Secretariat's decision

to define conflicts in Rwanda as a reciprocal civil war due to the culture of 'institutional ideology of impartiality' (p. 123), rather than an on-going genocide prevented them from prompting fast, or for that matter, any substantial action. Similarly, they demonstrate how the emergence and the insistence on 'repatriation culture' (p. 74) led the UNHCR to put people in danger by returning them to their not yet safe homes. In general, however, these case studies should not be viewed as hypothesis testing. In the spirit of the interpretative method of those theorists that adopt a constructivist theoretical paradigm, Barnett and Finnemore prefer to provide a 'thick description' of the historical developments of these organisations. That said, even though this method is very useful in allowing the reader to track down the change, which was one of the aims of the authors, at certain moments if falls short of fully capturing the previously made arguments about autonomy, authority and power of the IOs.

In the concluding chapter, Barnett and Finnemore take up a normative question on the subject of legitimacy of an expanding global bureaucracy. They ask if we should regard an all-encompassing bureaucratic expansion as a generally good thing. Liberated from the normative pressure that liberal institutionalists have when demonstrating the usefulness of international organisations in encouraging cooperation among states, they offer as set of balanced normative propositions. Therefore, they acknowledge that these organisations are important international players that undertake useful tasks and goals that transform the character of global politics, but their cost and problem of legitimacy should by no means be overlooked.

Rules for the World is a short but indispensable book for all those studying international organisations and for those who wish to know more about global governance without adopting a dominant state-centric approach. In it Barnett and Finnemore open up space for reshaping and enlarging the research agenda for the study of these significant international relations' entities by managing to break away from the same old drama of the neo-neo debate. While the book tells us a few new things about bureaucracies *per se*, the deployment of this concept in the study of IOs sheds light on certain aspects of their behaviours which would otherwise be hard to spot. Also it is important to note that the authors manage to demonstrate that IOs are more than mere tools of their member states, but also that they are not simply servants for the global common good.

Gender and International Relations

Theory, Practice, Policy

Reviewed by Kateřina Krulišová

Gender and International Relations: "friends or foes"? The topic of gender is one of the most contested subjects in current IR studies and, when applied to IR's most hotly debated topics, there is no consensus among scholars, not least feminist scholars, about what gender actually is, how it should be applied and politicised/securitised. Undoubtedly, the literature on the topic is growing fast and may cause a great deal of confusion among students of IR, mainly for its incomprehensiveness.

The disagreement over what gender actually is or may be, and theoretical and practical discontent on how to apply gender when it comes to IR is reflected in Steans' book entitled: *Gender and International Relations: Theory, Practice, Policy*. Clearly, the author does not attempt to clarify the study of gender but rather provides a clear overview of the existing concepts and alternative thoughts on a wide spectrum of International Relations and Security Studies issues.

The two opening chapters provide a theoretical account of gender and Feminist International Relations in a clear, and simultaneously, a very comprehensive manner, with an essential literature guide for further reading, not only highlighting the core feminist academic publications, but also critiques of these by non-feminist scholars. For a student of International Relations, these two chapters are enough to paint a vivid picture as to what gender may mean at various times and

spaces of the blurred and disappearing lines between personal, political and international arenas.

After the theoretical introduction, special topics, such as the state, nations and citizenship; human rights and sexuality; peace and violence; peacekeeping and global governance are reviewed and explained. Undoubtedly, Steans succeeds in providing a clear and accessible gendered view on such topics, although these sometimes lack coherence and the reader might find her/himself lost in the divide between problem-solving and a critical theories as well as in the relevance of the empirical data provided.

The theoretical strength of the book is clearly visible in Chapter 7, called 'Telling Stories,' where the author introduces the concepts of critical theory, constructivism, and the method of deconstruction in a perfectly comprehensive, yet easily understandable manner; "friendly" even to students often previously confused about those theoretical concepts. Her account of gender archetypes, warrior heroes and monstrous tales, together with the politics of the visual, is truly eye-opening and force the reader to revisit everyday media and popular culture "discourse" on gender relations and realities.

Overall, Steans provides both students and scholars with a very helpful tool for understanding gender in the study field of International Relations. Not only is she able to easily explain the core concepts of the theoretical gender debate, she also provides case studies, some notoriously known, others quite novel, to demonstrate the importance of the study of the gender "problem" for students of IR. Also, she offers excellent reader`s guide and is surely welcomed by academics and students alike, new pedagogical tools and features in her suggestions of seminar activity provided at the end of each chapter. Despite that the book may at times seem too shallow for more advanced readers of gender, its accessibility and comprehensive coverage of the most basic concepts, and above all, theoretical clarity, should be regarded as its true value-added.

Liberal Terror

Reviewed by Lukáš Makovický

Given the number of recent, quality, poststructuralist accounts of the War on Terror (de Goede, Dillon and Reid, Elden, Graham), why should one pay attention to Brad Evans' new book, *Liberal Terror*? There is no short answer, but if one were to give such, it would include the expressions 'complex,' 'carefully thought out,' and 'setting new academic standards for nomad theorising.' To paraphrase one of the book's core intellectual influences, Gilles Deleuze, Evans takes the readers on a journey. Take into account the globally spread fear and insecurity, in spite of us living in, arguably, the most secure of times, the popularity of apocalyptic imaginary in an Age of Reason, or the increasing turn to pre-emptive security practices, whether speaking of drone strikes, military interventions and extra-legal politics in democracies committed to state sovereignty and the rule of law. To use a metaphor, for Evans, as others, all of this renders the prevailing imaginaries and explanations of the world suspicious and constitutes a 'desert of the Real,' to borrow from a well-known Slovenian theorist. Like a nomad, Evans takes the travellers across this desert, moves from theme to theme, from theory to theory and from example to example, oftentimes through seemingly bizarre movements from Enlightenment philosophy through speeches of Bush and Blair to discussing advances in counter-insurgency strategies in a single chapter. At the end of the book the reader-traveller is left with a superb knowledge of the desert and a feeling there is always something more to discover, more to contemplate, more to do, as the desert has a life of its own. Perhaps the most telling is chapter 4, titled 'On Divine Power,' which turns the thinker of liberal peace, Immanuel Kant on his head. In contrast with some recent works, Evans does not hesitate to contextualise and give

textual support to claims that Kant's project has a structure of a theodicy that seeks to answer why is there evil in the world. For Kant, while humans are born innocent, evil enters the world once humans take action and haunts the presence since universal reason is unattainable (p.119). So is peace. But, according to Kant, we still need to aspire towards such universalism of a society that forces progress upon its subjects. For Evans however, this is to say it is always from a conception of evil that a universal good is assembled, never the other way around, ironically exploring how it is the hunt for monsters that makes up the possibility for a *future* good order that casts doubt on contemporary world's very *present* reality: 'Humanity is realised only by the wars that are fought in its name' (p.105). It is against this horizon that the global ambitions of liberalism try to set up a secularised image of Providence, which has its own set of implications. Evans, for example, shows how, for Milton Friedman and others, the prospect of a free society and liberal virtues set aside egalitarianism, which was never a liberal virtue, nor more than a hopeful by-product (p.126). And, in chapter 3, for example, it is an exploration of the theories of network society and complexity, which, for Evans only complicates, but does not negate such a Kantian dictum – the imaginary of fear is distributed and naturalised inside society, so that the security-speak only intensifies practices of risk, insurance and resilience that force the society to return to "normal:" 'for the liberal subject everything changes, so that everything remains politically the same' (p.75), no matter how ridiculous it should be for a social scientist to think that terrorists and violence came from Mars. To give an example, a revision of four terrorist biographies in the UK shows that there have been histories in wealthy and poor families that some had education, some not, some were exposed to radical Islam, some not and some had criminal records, while others did not (p.93). The point is that the Kantian evil of choice got transformed into an impersonal mechanism of complex emergence: 'all randomness is potentially evil and all intentionality potentially disastrous' (p.174-175), neglecting the core ethical question of particularity. Hence, chapters 1 and 5 build on the linkages between resilience and environmental terror, in particular by highlighting how the liberal view that the state is obsolete now gets translated into the very fabric of security governance with implications for the political utility of catastrophe—suffering is now seen as an opportunity for resilient individuals to adapt, so

that the ever more pressing problems related to ecology, population growth or natural resources are decoupled from the social fabric of liberal governance, making the world's poor a threat to be pacified, if not eliminated, instead of cared for (p.18, p.140, p.174). Evans' book draws a bleak picture, but as many points scattered throughout the book and the last chapter argue, little is lost as post-structuralism, in its less vulgar versions, offers a different ethical promise – all of this is ever more an invitation to look for events that trigger alternative worlds, for a political philosophy that de-naturalises such a temporal structure that makes liberal terror possible and for a yet stronger call demanding the impossible, all this making Evans' work a deep well of ideas for twenty-first century security thinking.