Regimes of Cooperation

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Stonewalling al Wefaq in Bahrain

Mitchell Belfer

Introduction

On 16 June 2015, Ali Salman, leader of Bahrain's al Wefaq bloc, was sentenced to four years in prison for inciting violence and encouraging an attempted coup d'état during the 2011 uprising. The verdict brought the Arab Spring in Bahrain to an end; a fact reflected in the muted response on Bahrain's streets. Yet, many in the international press were swift to pour scorn on Bahrain's government while glossing over the years of political unrest and the projection of Iranian interests though Ali Salman and the party he represents. This brief analysis traces al Wefaq and reveals similarities between the bloc and the gangs of Ayatollah Khomeini's men at the cusp of the 1979 revolution, between the fiery rhetoric of the Shia clergy in both countries and, most importantly, between the lofty goals they share in relation to establishing and maintaining a theocratic state. Ayatollah Khomeini dreamed of the Islamic Republic of Iran just as Ali Salman and his spiritual leader, Isa Qassim, dream of the birth of the Islamic Republic of Bahrain.

So what is al Wefaq and what does it want?

History of the Bloc

In November 2001 members of the Islamic Da'awa Party of Bahrain founded the Islamic al Wefaq bloc as a strategic decision by Ayatollah Isa Qassim who recognised that a new avenue to consolidate power in

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Bahrain had opened up with the National Action Charter, which had significantly reformed the Kingdom and provided increased political freedom for all its citizens.[1] Profiting on new-found political freedoms, al Wefaq initially sold themselves as a moderate Shia bloc that sought to redress issues facing Bahrain's Shia community. Bahrain's government responded positively and al Wefaq 'was pampered by the government by receiving more and more political power – for fear of domination of extremists and the spread of violence again on the streets.'[2]

This was – as seen since 2011 – only a ploy. Al Wefaq was 'pretending to be moderate and pÂdent.'[3] Since its goals were, explicitly, linked to those of Da'awa (re: valayat-el-Faqih) and the Da'awa's goals were based on overthrowing the al Khalifa government, it stands to reason that al Wefaq's ambitions are the same, whether attempting to do so through the deployment of violence or politics. This is not novel. Much of Khomeini's success in late-1970's Iran is reducible to two deceptive political manoeuvres: *khode* and *takiya*. Khode means 'to trick someone into misjudging his position' while takiya is a form of psychological warfare based on dis- and misinformation.[4]

Ali Salman used the fanfare generated by Tunisia's and Egypt's political revolutions to attempt to capturing power and enacted a plan that was well prepared.[5] Consider Salman's firebrand speeches in FebÂary 2011 at the GCC Roundabout; he was stoking the crowds with inflammatory speeches, from his ready-made podium, under the 'banner that read: "Until the Fall of the Government."'[6] This was a hefty goal for a political organisation without experience in governance or a realistic set of goals that could be used to initiate national dialogue. Al Wefaq is an organisation without a clear plan; another similarity with revolutionary Iran and the leadership of Khomeini who always deferred to the sentence that 'Islam is the answer.' For Ali Salman it is not Islam that has the answers, but Iran.

Ali Salman may have fashioned himself as a political leader but the revolution he is trying to organise is neither popular nor politically oriented—it is religious-by-nature and has identified geopolitical goals that would empower the Islamic Republic in the region for the purpose of instituting an Iranian-styled theocracy. In that case, Ali Salman and Qassim would become the main authorities of a Bahrain that would be nothing more than an Iranian vassal.

While al Wefaq has not been able to assume any real power in Bahrain, it uses lofty rhetoric across savvy platforms to capture the imagi-

nations of its constituents, promising them religiously sanctified lives, pure Islam (according to their interpretations) and Shia empowerment. And these goals have been used to rally people to their cause even though they have based their entire careers working for the establishment of an Iranian-styled theocratic system. It is therefore hardly surprising that despite the multitude of claims issued by the bloc, there is not a single page devoted to the policy formulation, preferences and objectives of al Wefaq. It remains an elusive bloc with a clandestine inner core and more silent paramilitary forces ready to achieve in violence what cannot be won in politics.

That is why al Wefaq had groomed, and later deployed, a paramilitary group (the Youth of 14 FebÂary (Y14F)—one of the main pillars of indictable offences that Ali Salman stood trial for. The Y14F closely resembles the asymmetric forces (notably the Basij) developed under Ayatollah Khomeini in his rise to power in Iran. To be sure, Hezbollah and Sacred Defence Bahrain are also effective asymmetric forces, with highly trained operatives and advanced command and communications systems which, when compared to Y14F seem professional and capable. However, the latter is a reflection of a paramilitary group connected to a political society which is attempting to assume power through similar techniques as the Ayatollah in Iran did.

Precursors to an Islamic Revolution in Bahrain?
al Wefaq and Iran

In practical terms, Iran's Islamic Republic has essentially transformed from a religious dictatorship to an arbitrary dictatorship, a pseudo-fascist state that uses coercion and torture as its main political currency. It is likely that al Wefaq would use similar methods of governance if it were to install itself as the political power in Bahrain. Such a similar disposition is not a matter of guesswork; it is an assumption based on the reflection of how al Wefaq positions itself in the country and the manner in which it mimics the Islamic revolution in its own policies.

There are, essentially, four points that could be usefully presented and compared to reveal the depths of mimicry of Bahrain's attempted revolution when compared to Iran's 1979 Islamic Revolution. *Firstly*, the unfolding revolution in Bahrain is, in fact, a cover for an intended coup d'état. *Secondly*, the leaders responsible for the political side of the attempted revolution, Ali Salman and Isa Qassim (from al Wefaq),

adhere to the velayat-e-faqih principles of the Islamic Republic and support the development of national institutions based on guardianship principles with them as Rahbar (leaders). *Thirdly*, there has been a clear politicisation of rights – especially human rights – as a means of legitimising al Wefaq (like revolutionary Iran before it) and generating international support for its cause. *Finally,* the practical side to the revolution entails false consensus building and the development of paramilitary stÂctures (which were constÂcted previously but remained as sleepers) that target non-religious allies as soon as the spoils of success need to be split.

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Power by Coup d'état

Ayatollah Khomeini rose to power on the backs of two coups d'état; the first against the Shah and the second against his nationalist and secularist coalition partners, which prodded 'members of the Green Movement for Freedom to [refer to] the Iranian regime as the "coup d'état government."'[7] It is interesting to delve into what is implied with such an approach to political power assumption and then apply the example to the case of Bahrain; the political and paramilitary groups that attack Bahrain's government and civil society in a bid to sow the seeds of national chaos and crisis and then move to take over the state. In short, it is becoming clear that members of the al Wefaq bloc seek a general breakdown in public order – brought about by their paramilitary partners – and were readying themselves to come to power by coup.

  With so many in the international community already very sceptical as to Iranian regional intentions, it is surprising that so few connect the situation in Bahrain as a microcosm – albeit late – of what happened in Iran more than three decades ago. Indeed, the Green Movement's depiction of the Iranian regime as a 'coup d'état government'[8] should be applied to its allies among the Shia communities throughout Arabia and Asia. In other words, if Ayatollah Khomeini managed to come to power on the tides of revolution, a revolution that was, and continues to be spread beyond his death, and has prioritised revolutionary proliferation among the Shia, does it not stand to reason that each group affiliated to Iran – no matter the rhetoric they invoke – are fundamentally committed to follow in the Ayatollah's footsteps and also come to power via coup d'état?

Qassim and Ali Salman certainly agree with the zeal of the Iranian revolutionary system and the transformative power it unleashed throughout Shia communities around the world. Indeed, reviewing some of the more potent statements that have been uttered by Qassim and Ali Salman provides important clues to the way they see revolution and coups d'état.[9] These two men are intent on a revolution in Bahrain but it will not be a democratic revolution in the full sense of the term; Qassim and Ali Salman seek to invigorate the Shia community at the expense of Bahrain's civil society, to come to power via Shia revolution enframed as a democratic revolution to keep the international community polarised and then declare a theocratic state based on the principles of the Islamic revolution in Iran. In other words, Qassim and Ali Salman plotted a coup d'état misnamed democratic revolution, a claim supported by the characteristics of their approaches to political life in Bahrain. Consider, for instance, their leadership style when compared to Iran's, especially in the period immediately preceding the Iranian revolution.

The Leadership Pyramid

Among the most obvious characteristics of the Islamic Republic is its deliberate, but effective, misnomer; its manipulative use of the word "republic" in the name of the country. This is done to espouse the image of a state in which citizenship has political meaning, enhancing civil society and defending the rights and responsibilities of individuals are the sole priority of the country's leadership. However, the reality of Iran reveals it to be the exact opposite of a republic; it is a religious dictatorship whose leaders came to power as part of a wide coalition and then used infiltration, violence and suppression to ravage former coalition partners (notably the secularists and nationalists) and assumed control of national institutions. A quick look at the political conditions facing post-revolutionary Iran will help set the tone for understanding the manner in which al Wefaq approach political life in Bahrain; as a reflection of what Qassim was taught in Iran and what Qassim has taught Ali Salman.

In contrast to the values of republics, Iran's system is based on the marriage between the spiritual leader (the Grand Ayatollah), a council of his disciples (the Guardians Council) and national institutions. Murat Tezcür accurately notes that in Iran

Ultimate power is concentrated in the hands of a single individual, the supreme leader, who is not popularly elected, practically has life tenure, and controls a loyal security apparatus with a mission to repress internal dissent. Citizens who want to Ân in the elections for parliament and presidency need their political credentials to be approved by an institution (the Guardians Council) whose members are not popularly accountable. The same institution can also strike down any parliamentary legislation or presidential bill on the grounds that it violates the constitution or Islam [...][10]

With more than decade of unchallenged political leadership of al Wefaq, with not a single internal election, grand council, or party gathering, it is clear that Ali Salman's tenure is life-long. Together with Isa Qassim – who fashions himself as a spiritual leader, but who is, in fact an Ayatollah – they are the Rahbars of the Shia community, whether that community wants them or not. In this way, Ali Salman and Qassim already assumed a form of direct control and suppression; they formed a political bloc which they are determined to use to wrestle power away from the current national leadership of Bahrain and force adherents from an otherwise apolitical (wider) Shia community in Bahrain.

If the al Wefaq bloc manages to wield political power nationally in Bahrain, it would most certainly do so according to the same principles as the Islamic Republic. This hypothesis is verifiable based on three lines of examination:

Firstly, whether or not one agrees with the message being delivered by Ali Salman and Isa Qassim, it is clear that they were not hoisted to the top of the Shia political spectÂm in Bahrain via elections or as part of a consensus-building project to get the entire Shia community to speak with one voice as to community interests. Instead, their assumed leadership – besides the fact that they are not representative leaders – is a reflection of their standing in the larger Shia pyramid based on the Twelver ideological tenet of valayat-el-faqih and their self-recognition (and Iran's recognition) as Rahbars. Much like the legitimacy of the Ayatollah system dominant in the Islamic Republic, Ali Salman and Qassim are only legitimate because the Iranian Ayatollahs granted them legitimacy. This is deeply problematic since they do not reflect the interests of Bahrain but rather of Iran and the latter's revolution should act as a stark reminder of what may result from dubious

legitimacy, for the sake of regime change, in the hands of illiberal individuals. This has raised significant suspicions in Bahrain since Rahbars demand adherence under the Shia Âles of marja'iyya (religious leadership) which essentially maintains a pyramidal stÂcture of Rahbars and Ayatollahs; a stÂcture which insists on complete obedience by lower Ayatollahs to higher Ayatollahs. Such a system is counter-intuitive to democratisation and provides a snapshot of the form of political discourses which would follow any assumption of power by people – like Qassim and Ali Salman – who base their authority on foreign sources of law, jurispÂdence and power.

The second point, as highlighted above, is based on the level of internal (intra-party) mobility within al Wafaq in that there is a decidedly lack of intra-party mobility. Qassim is the spiritual leader and will remain so until his death or incapacitation, Ali Salman is the political leader and will remain so until his death or incapacitation. This form of political organisation does not leave space for people to withdraw and change their political affinities; you are aligned for life and those that do leave – as many did in response to al Wefaq's 2014 elections boycott – aare ostracised. This may work – though dysfunctionally – for opposition movements but could never be superimposed onto an actual political system without establishing a dictatorship. The lack of internal party politics suggests what would lie on the horizon if al Wefaq gained more power. It is not a reform minded party—it is deeply conservative and would not yield to a single demand for greater transparency and competitiveness since it has already prevented such values from determining its present character.

Finally, Ali Salman and Qassim, as Rahbars, have already demonstrated that they are comfortable with the use of violence in pursuance of their political and religious ambitions. Such violence is not only directed at the Bahraini state, the Sunni community, police or the majority expatriate community; it is also focused on those members of the Shia community that disagree with their style of governance and their ideological persuasion. There have been, for instance, numerous cases of arson, physical violence and even murder directed against those that refuse to participate in some of the episodes of disorder in the Shia villages. Of course neither Ali Salman or Qassim directly use force; it is left up to their adherents. Just as there have been specific units constÂcted for the collection of intelligence, building explosives, leading riots and ambushes, so too has there been the constÂction of crack

teams of fighters that intimidate and abuse internal dissenters – men and women, girls and boys – for the sake of showing unity to the outside world. Perhaps this is why the international community has regurgitated the false argument that Bahrain is split into two communities, a Shia and a Sunni, and not the multi-faceted, multi-dimensional and multi-faith society that actually exists a society being held hostage by false images of human rights being promoted by agents of theocracy.

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The Politicisation of Human Rights

The use of the language of universal human rights by al Wefaq and their international agents is propaganda intended to dupe the local, regional and international communities into believing that al Wefaq is genuinely interested in the proliferation of individual rights and freedoms and only represents people in their quest for democracy. This contrasts with the reality of a bloc more interested in promoting a sectarian agenda and constÂcting a theocratic state in Bahrain in which peoples fundamental human rights are systematically abused.

Again, this line of argumentation has been tried and tested – successfully – in the past; in the lead-up to and execution of the Islamic revolution in Iran. Consider Osanloo's exposure of the politicisation of rights during Iran's revolution:

> What ultimately became the Islamic Republic was the result of a compromise whose effects continue today. Among those effects was the politicisation of "rights talk." In March of 1979, activists by the tens of thousands flooded urban centres to protest the suspension of a Shah-era law, the Family Protection Law, which had given women some rights in marriage dissolution and child custody, and the issuance of directives, including mandatory veiling, which did happen, and revocation of suffrage, which did not. The protestors, who held up signs favouring "equality" and "women's rights," were dubbed Western puppets and attacked. The attacks showed the early fissures within the popular stÂggle to remove a monarch.[11]

There were however, other rights which were accepted by the Ayatollah as means of legitimating the Islamic revolution within and beyond revolutionary Iran. Women, for instance, are considered 'autonomous subjects'[12] under Iran's legal system and they retain a wide variety of "rights" that provide a useful democratic sheath for an au-

thoritarian regime. Speaking the language of democracy, Iran has been able to project a more democratic image for a primarily Western audience that shows a sophisticated bargain of individual freedoms and religious authority. However, scratch the surface and it becomes clear that such legal precepts are based on the levels of adherence of women to the roles allotted to them under the religious authority of the Ayatollah. In other word – for instance – woman are 'autonomous subject […] as long as they were properly attired in *hejab* […][13]

And in Bahrain? A simple glance at one of al Wefaq's famous demonstrations, its internal configuration, a listening to the Friday sermons of Qassim and the political dialogue it maintains for *its* listeners as opposed to the dialogue it uses for others reveals the same patterns as in Iran. Bahrain's opposition figures have adopted the language of human rights in order to reach the Western audience and gain attention for an otherwise irrelevant stÂggle since the Shia community in Bahrain is not discriminated against as a community. For nearly a decade, members of the Shia establishment – notably Qassim, which do not favour extending even basic rights to women or the expatriate community in Bahrain – have spoken in two languages, one aimed at their own constituents and the second aimed at the international community. In the first case, the language adopted by Qassim and Ali Salman – and their many supporters – smacks of total religious subservience in the spirit of valayat-e-Faqih where the "guardians" of the community make decisions and such decisions are final. Take the rejection of Bahrain's new family law as an example. It was rejected for the Shia community because Qassim deemed it to give *too* much personal autonomy to women over their own bodies and decisions (such as divorce).

Simultaneously, other members of the al Wefaq bloc such as the al Khawaja family and Nabeel Rajab, have learned to speak in the language of human rights to great effect in the West with major international bodies now calling for the release of Rajab from prison and providing Maryam al Khawaja an audience at the United Nations. In both cases (and many more) the international community has been duped by its own goodwill and the mainstream discourses related to universal human rights. Neither the al Khawaja family nor Rajab are tÂly human rights defenders; they seek Iranian intervention in Bahrain and politicise human rights as a means of legitimising such an intervention. At the same time, many human rights organisations around the world have accepted, at face value, the claims of al Wefaq and its

supporters instead of adequately researching claims of abuse. This is a deeply troubling development in the latest round of political violence to hit Bahrain since it risks fully alienating the country from its Western allies and the international community more broadly based on selective information, half-tÂths and manipulation. It would be wrong to suggest the Bahrain's human rights record is flawless; it is not. However, it should not be judged by a different standard than other states.

For instance, in the lead-up to the 2013 G8 meeting in London, more than 400 people were pre-emptively arrested for their plan to disÂpt the talks.[14] Such pre-emption certainly goes against the standard forms of policing but was deemed acceptable since the costs of not pre-empting would be higher (it was thought) in terms of public safety. Neither the political opposition in the UK, nor the EU or any other major international actor condemned such policing tactics. If Bahrain were to do the same, based on the same logic, it would face an avalanche of criticism and have many around the country and the world mobilised against Bahrain's security precautions. This imbalance is due to the manner in which Bahrain's opposition has managed to manipulate human rights discourses and penetrate major human rights organisations, likely with the financial and political assistance of Iran.[15]

Al Wefaq, Qassim and Ali Salman are using human rights in order to achieve their ultimate objectives which are tantamount to regime change and the establishment of a theocratic state in the image of revolutionary Iran. So, not only does the bloc maintain close relations to Iran and is (largely) based on the same personalities and principles, but it has also politicised human rights in a bid to dupe the international community for the purpose of achieving such ambitions. In other words, al Wefaq is nothing more than the organ best placed to replicate the Iranian revolution in Bahrain.

From Consensus to Tyranny

Most disturbing however is al Wefaq's mimicry of the Islamic Republic's consensus building strategy which, essentially, is based on speaking a language which other political groups can relate to and support, using that support to appear to represent a major percentage of the country – for the sake of domestic and international legitimacy – but to retain violent designs on allies to be deployed following the collective success.

In Iran, consensus was needed between '(d)isparate factions, including nationalist and secularists' who sought a multi-party, power-sharing arrangement with more religious groups including the *ulema*.[16] The Ayatollah may have been the centre point in the anti-Shah coalition, but he – and his loyalists – were not the only source of power or the only group capable of mobilising segments of society against the Shah. Through the use of *khode* and *takiya* (noted above) Khomeini and his selected council – which included Qassim and current Iranian president Hassan Rowhani – secularists, unionists, nationalists and communists were duped into overthrowing the Shah; on the promise of a multi-party system.

Now enter the al Wefaq party with Qassim and Ali Salman at its helm. They are attempting to mobilise different segments of society against al Khalifa governance and they are using the false promise of compromise; they are also deploying the tactics of *khode* and *takiya*. Until now, these attempts have come to naught since the majority of Bahrainis see through them and the wide majority of people from both main sects – Sunni and Shia – as well as the different political and religious denominations in the country. However, the process is on-going and the manipulation of the national dialogue reveals the extent to which al Wefaq is willing to go to show Bahrainis that they intend to establish a consensus. This would not become a reality however. Qassim and Ali Salman intend to follow the footsteps of the Islamic Revolution in Iran and if they ever establish a consensus between the various segments of society against the current leadership of the country, it would be used to undermine the existing political process and multi-ethnic and open state of affairs and replace it with a theocracy.

Any understanding of al Wefaq's behaviour needs to recall these points since, much like the bloc's Iranian parent, they are the likely outcomes of the empowerment of a political society that has prioritised regime change as its main raison d'être.

But, at the time of this writing, al Wefaq has had its wings clipped by three fundamental changes to the political landscape in Bahrain:

1 al Wefaq's boycott of the November 2014 Parliamentary Elections was seen by the majority of its constituents as a betrayal since elections and power enhancements (for Parliamentarians) was one of the main goals of al Wefaq's programme after 2011. A num-

ber of al Wefaq representatives left the bloc – in protest at the boycott – and ran (and remain) as independents.

2 The arrest, trial and sentencing of Ali Salman for crimes committed during the violence at the GCC roundabout further revealed his political impotency—a point reflected in the mild reaction to his incarceration from within his former strongholds. Simply, Ali Salman is no longer regarded as the spokesperson of al Wefaq and certainly not of the Shia community more generally. The trial showed diligence and the transparency needed to assuage fears of political motivations driving Ali Salman's sentencing. Ultimately, Ali Salman has been relegated to a footnote in Bahrain's current political landscape.

3 ISIS's anti-Shia campaign in the Gulf region is increasing a shared threat perception among all Bahrainis. This has meant that those attempting to polarise Bahraini society via allegations of sectarianism are increasingly ostracised as the nation stands in unity against prevailing challenges. This has transformed into effective community police efforts that have brought members of the Shia communities to work closely with regular police units in order to keep the peace and ensure that Bahrain remains safe and secure. There is also much optimism that this initiative will be extended to other areas on the continuing quest to strengthen the country's civil society—which will also deny Iran (Bahrain's enduring rival) the entry points it has relied on to sow the seeds of disharmony in Bahrain.

Eventually, the tÂe nature of Ali Salman, and his al Wefaq bloc, will be exposed in glaring clarity. And on that day, the man and movement will have to answer some very uncomfortable questions; questions that tie him to Iran and cast him as the spoiler of Bahrain's political life for the sake of establishing the Islamic Republic of Bahrain. So, Bahrain is a better place without Ali Salman on the revolutionary prowl.

Notes

1 Much of the subsequent text first appeared in: Mitchell Belfer (2014), *Small State: Dangerous Region: A Strategic Assessment of Bahrain*, Peter Lang Publishers, Frankfurt, Germany.

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3   Ibid.

4   Ronen Bergman (2011), *The Secret War with Iran*, One World Publishers: Oxford, p. 12.

5   This assertion is based on discussions with a former member of al Wefaq who had suggested that Ali Salman was seeking to launch his bid for power in 2015 but 'sped things up' in order to profit from the turmoil in North Africa. The interviewee has asked to remain anonymous.

6   Raed al Jowder (2011), 'Al Wefaq: Its Birth and Origins,' *Bahrain Views*, 09 September 2011.

7   Arzoo Osanloo (2013), 'Contesting Governance: Authority, Protest, and Rights Talk in Postrepublican Iran,' in Steven Heydemann and Reinoud Leenders (2013), *Middle East Authoritarianism: Governance, Contestation and Regime Resilience in Syria and Iran*, Stanford UP, p. 127.

8   Ibid, p. 127.

9   For examples of Isa Qassim's firebrand views on revolution see: Isa Qassim (2012a), 'Martyrs: Flashlight of the Revolution,' Deraz, Bahrain, 28 FebÂary 2012. This speech is viewable at: <www.youtube.com/watch?v=-JPastN9UxCg> (accessed 19 May 2013). See also, Isa Qassim (2012b), 'Friday Speech,' Deraz, Bahrain, 12 October 2012. This speech is viewable at: <www.youtube.com/watch?v=s-fJdıKlsmU> (accessed 20 May 2013). For examples of Ali Salman's approach to revolution in Bahrain see: Ali Salman (2012a), 'The Gains of Bahrain's Revolution,' 13 April 2012, available at: <www.youtube.com/watch?v=mYmudneS65l> (accessed 20 May 2013) and Ali Salman (2013a), 'Strike and Civil Disobedience,' 21 January 2013, available at: <www.youtube.com/watch?v=D43fiovvsQE> (accessed 20 May 2013). See also: Jane Kinninmont (2012), 'Bahrain: Beyond the Impasse,' *Chatham House*, London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, p. 12.

10 Günes Murat Tezcür (2013), 'Democratic StÂggles and Authoritarian Responses in Iran in Comparative Perspective,' in Heydemann and Leenders (2013), p. 200.

11 Osanloo (2013), p. 136.

12 Osanloo (2013), p. 135.

13 Osanloo (2013), p. 135.

14 See, for instance, Mike Sergeant (2013), 'Riot Police Storm Soho G8 Protest Squat,' *BBC News*, 11 June 2013, available at: <www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-22859168> (accessed 10 July 2013).

15 Consider the Bahrain Centre for Human Rights (BCHR), an outlawed organisation that claims to be self-funded. On its homepage the BCHR writes that 'Because the BCHR has been outlawed by the government, it is unable to solicit funds, open a bank account, or hire independent financial auditors. As a result, the Centre exists on a very meagre budget, funded mostly by the BCHR workers themselves.' Given the extensive activities of the BCHR it is unlikely to have such a meagre budget or be self-financed. Also, it has only been outlawed in Bahrain, not in the UK or Denmark where its main personalities live. It therefore stands to reason that the BCHR is deliberately shrouding its funding. See: <http://www.bahrainrights.org/en/faq> (accessed 12 August 2013).

16 Osanloo (2013), p. 130.

Research Articles

Incremental Escalation as a Cost-Avoidance Instrument in International Conflicts

Michael Becker

How do states involved in international conflict decide on the quality and quantity of force to use? Traditional understandings of military threats and force in international relations emphasise its quality as an instÂment for achieving victory in a dyadic dispute. However, changes in the international system in recent decades have attached heavy penalties to overt offensive action, obliging states to disguise their use of force. One common – but under-studied – way of doing so is the tactic of incremental escalation, whereby states increase the level and scope of force over time within a conflict, but in a gradual manner. Examining the cases of North Korea's nuclear program and the Russia-Ukraine conflict (2014-present), this article investigates the use of this tactic in international disputes, demonstrating that it is a widespread and effective way for offensive-minded states to avoid the costs associated with aggressive behaviour.

Keywords: incremental escalation, conflict studies, dyadic disputes, North Korea, Russia-Ukraine conflict, Crimea

Introduction

How do states involved in international conflict decide on the quality and quantity of force to use? Traditional understandings of military threats and force in international relations emphasise its quality as an instÂment for achieving victory in a dyadic dispute.[1] In other words, according to the majority of scholarly analyses, state-initiated violence or the threat of violence is used to intimidate or subdue rival states in order to achieve material goals—acquiring resources, assuring regional security, and expanding territorial holdings. These goals, no doubt,

do in fact drive states' decisions to initiate hostilities. However, what it less clear is the extent to which they influence choices regarding the *quantity and quality* of force to use. This article argues that these decisions, at least in part, are determined by a series of intermediate concerns, which, broadly speaking, entail avoiding and minimising the costs associated with being labelled the aggressor in a given conflict. These intermediate goals have been largely neglected by scholars despite the fact that they shape in major ways how conflict is conducted in the modern era.

Many international alliances, much of international law, and the vast majority of security policies have as their *raison d'être* the deterrence and prevention of aggressive behaviour by offensive-minded states. The result of this pervasive tendency in international stÂctures is that there are major costs – reputational, economic, and military – associated with initiating hostilities or acting provocatively. These costs have all but eliminated the overt use of offensive military force but, instead of doing away with it entirely, have simply transformed its form.[2] When achieving their goals requires the use of offensive military force, states do not typically announce their belligerent intentions, or escalate to full-fledged hostilities in the space of a day. Instead, most states rely on complex tactics of blame and cost avoidance, including misinformation as well as surgical uses of force. These tactics serve to disguise offensive states' intentions, justify offensive action, and avoid the local and international costs associated with being labelled the "aggressor" in a given conflict. To take one example, Russian military interventions in the 2000s and 2010s in Georgia and Ukraine made use of obfuscation and calculated use of covert and sub-state violence to provide a basis for Russia to plausibly deny direct involvement in the crises.[3]

In general, these cost-avoidance tactics range from the obvious – denying direct involvement in a given conflict, claiming to have been provoked by another state – to the more subtle—modulating the use of force to give the appearance of proportionality and to mask the offensive state's tÂe goals. One type of modulated force in particular, the tactic of incremental escalation, has characterised offensive behaviour by multiple belligerent states involved in recent conflicts, both "hot" wars and "cold" disputes. This tactic is defined as gradual, successive amplifications in the frequency, intensity and scope of military action on the part of an offensive state over an extended period of time. In-

dependent of its utility *within* a dyadic conflict, this article argues that incremental escalation – combined with tactical reductions in the use of force – has become a necessary instÂment for offensive-minded states as a means to avoid, or at least minimise, the significant, internationally-imposed costs related to being perceived as the instigator of a conflict.

This article examines the particular benefits a tactic of incremental escalation provides to offensive-minded states, as a first step toward understanding how international conflict has adapted to an era in which aggressive state action is heavily stigmatised. The import of this topic is obvious: without an awareness of the gambits and devices states use to avoid blame for aggressive behaviour, it will be impossible to identify definitively many instances of aggression, given that no state will openly claim responsibility for its offensive intentions or actions. The article proceeds as follows. The first section defines escalation in more detail and develops the concept and logic of incremental escalation in international conflict. The next section develops a theory of incremental escalation by considering the specific advantages the use of incremental escalation provides to offensive states, the better to predict when the tactic will be likely to be used. It argues that multiple benefits accÂe to states that use gradual, marginal escalatory tactics, including avoiding international opprobrium, extracting concessions, and averting defender states' retaliation. In the following section, the theoretical discussion is substantiated using qualitative data from the Russia-Ukraine conflict that began in early 2014 and from the ongoing dispute over Iran's nuclear program. Finally, new research directions are identified in light of this work's findings.

Escalation in International Conflict

Escalation in the context of international conflict can be defined as successive, visible, and significant increases over time in the vertical, horizontal, and political dimensions of a dispute.[4] Vertical dimensions refer to the intensity of tactics used in a conflict, horizontal to the geographic or temporal scope of a conflict, and political to more nebulous characteristics like the objectives of a conflict or the Âles of engagement.[5] Escalation, in general, can be defined either broadly or narrowly. A more narrow definition might be restricted to vertical and horizontal dimensions—the additional commitment of offensive

military resources and manpower to an ever more intense conflict. Alternatively, escalation considered broadly might include political dimensions: increases in belligerent rhetoric and threats, greater use of economic statecraft, or the severing of diplomatic relations. This article adopts the broader definition of escalation, as it offers a more complete picture of possible offensive actions used by states to intimidate and coerce concessions from their rivals.

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The logic of escalation in general, as an instÂment of warfare, is well developed in the international security literature, yet the tactic of incremental escalation specifically remains under-studied. Many studies have examined when and why states escalate, but few have sought to investigate how they do so. According to the prevailing views on escalation, by advertising a nation's willingness to devote more and more resources and manpower to a conflict, it communicates resolve to challenger states that, themselves, are constantly weighing the costs and benefits of continuing to fight.[6] Furthermore, it signals to challenger states a certain willingness to appear reckless—to be willing to permit large consequences, including loss of life, in pursuit of certain goals, be they territorial, economic, or other objectives. This willingness to appear almost irrationally fixated on achieving these objectives, so the thinking goes, deters potentially antagonistic challenger states from engaging in conflict. This line of thought is related to the so-called "Madman theory" of military strategy that is frequently attributed to us President Richard Nixon during the Cold War, and it is also present in the writings of Niccolò Machiavelli.[7]

Why, then, would a state use incremental escalation against another state, instead of relying on more dramatic manoeuvres to signal their commitment to the conflict? The logic of incremental escalation's use was first elucidated in a chapter in one of the seminal texts on international security, *Arms and Influence*.[8] In it, Schelling discusses how states make commitments to defend their territorial integrity and how other, hostile states seek to undo or circumvent those commitments. One way of doing so Schelling calls "salami tactics." In essence, a challenger state attempts an offensive manoeuvre against a defender state, but one so minor that retaliation would be absurd[9]—an "accidental" flyover of protected airspace, for example. The utility of doing so for the challenger state lies in breaking the sanctity of the defender state's commitment; the latter can no longer claim not to tolerate *any* violations of its territory. Once the defender state's commitment to de-

fend its territory is revealed not to be absolute, the challenger state is free further to "erode" it. In holding to a reasonable standard of retaliation, then, the defender state leaves itself vulnerable to subsequent aggressions—other "slices" of salami. By ensuring that each slice remains small, the challenger state avoids 'invoking the [defender state's] commitment, [while] simultaneously making the commitment appear porous and infirm.'

Schelling's arguments are characteristically insightful, but the international system has changed since the publication of his work. Today, states that initiate conflict, or that overtly seek offensive military capabilities,[10] not only Ân the risk of retaliation by the defender state, but also may incur economic, military, and reputational costs imposed by tertiary states and international bodies.[11] As a result, challenger states make use of a wide variety of tactics to avoid being blamed for their aggression, and, where blame is unavoidable, to avert the penalties associated with it. In the contemporary international system, the utility of incremental escalation largely lies in manipulating third-party and international bodies' reactions to escalatory behaviour. The concept and operation of incremental escalation as presented in this article are similar to what Schelling meant by the phrase "salami tactics," but differ in two important ways. First, the principal actors in Schelling's discussion are the parties to a dyadic conflict, and a specific kind of dyadic conflict: a face-off between nuclear-armed powers of comparable capability. This was an eminently reasonable choice for Schelling, given the book's time of writing. Yet the stÂcture of the international system has since changed, requiring an updated understanding of the nature of incremental escalation. This article, consequently, examines the dynamics between a pair of hostile states, but also takes account of the role played by tertiary actors like other states and international organisations.

Second, in Schelling's schema, states use incremental escalation in a simple two-player game. Their goal is to impose territorial costs on the enemy without triggering a military response—in other words, to perform offensive manoeuvres only to the extent that they are either deniable or excusable. In Schelling's schema, states sought to undo each other's territorial commitments using incremental escalation, but it is not clear to what end. Schelling does not quite call it a zero-sum game, but implies that each acts in the hope of eventually eliminating the

other. This article, by contrast, argues that states use incremental escalation to achieve much more limited objectives, including, *inter alia*, regional hegemony, access to natural resources, and political or economic concessions. Therefore, incremental escalation in this article is understood as an instÂment used for purposes at times peripheral to the actual conflict. It can be used to avoid costs and extract benefits from other states, and may only have an incidental relation to the conflict within which it takes place.

A Theory of Incremental Escalation

Under what circumstances can states be expected to use incremental escalation as a tactic in an international conflict? In order to answer this question, it is necessary to understand the benefits such a tactic provides to offensive-minded states. This section considers these benefits, including those identified by Schelling in his work, as well as those that have developed more recently following changes in the international system.

The Threshold of Reaction and the Paradox of Increments

Incremental escalation manoeuvres present a special dilemma to defender states and, hence, are useful for offensive states. By definition, each constituent part of an incremental campaign is minor. This implies that each instance of belligerence, on its own, very likely fails to cross the defender state's 'threshold of reaction,' meaning the level of aggression that would necessarily merit a military or diplomatic retaliation.[12] Furthermore, even in cases where minor violations of a defender's sovereignty do in fact meet or exceed the threshold, they are still likely too minor to justify retaliation. This is, in part, because there is a well-documented norm in international conflict concerned with proportionate retaliation—an accidental shooting ought not to be parried with a nuclear attack, say.[13] Such disproportionality would violate widely held fundamentals of fairness and restraint in conflict that many states have found it useful to adopt. Thus, in cases where a state's sovereignty is violated, but only to a minor extent, they are hamstÂng by the doctrine of proportional retaliation. How to respond to a violation of its airspace—by an equal violation of the offender's airspace?

Such a manoeuvre smacks of pettiness, and also leaves little room for excusing honest mistakes. Do nothing, then? Doing nothing potentially invites ever more intÂsive violations.[14]

In a conflict where incremental escalation has been used, it becomes clear to the defender state at a certain point that minor violations of its sovereignty have accumulated to a point where they cannot possibly be accidental. Even then, defender states face a bind on how to react. A full-scale retaliatory manoeuvre is risky – the defender may then wind up being labelled the aggressor – and a proportional response to each individual violation, as discussed above, is not an ideal choice, though it may be optimal in light of the alternatives. Thus the tactic of incremental escalation provides a significant within-conflict benefit to challenger states. Specifically, it constrains the reactive options of defender states by avoiding any excessively aggressive manoeuvres that meet the defender's threshold of reaction, and it permits a discrediting of the defender state's commitment to self-defence, thereby clearing the way for further aggression.

Third-Party Observers and the Reputational Costs of Conflict

As noted, engaging in conflict, especially in the role of the aggressor, is accompanied by serious reputational and material costs imposed by powerful third-party states and international institutions. The increasing significance of these costs in recent decades has rendered overtly offensive conduct all but obsolete.[15] Incremental escalation, when used appropriately, has the potential to allow states to circumvent the costs of aggression.

This is due to several reasons. First, in cases of an incremental escalation, the initial manoeuvres are so minor that it is often difficult to apportion blame, at least beyond a reasonable doubt. If the defender state retaliates, it too can be blamed by international observers unaware of the initial provocation by the offensive state. Furthermore, because the initial stages of an escalatory manoeuvre often appear either accidental, or at least not provocative, their aggressive character can be denied by offensive states. The stÂcture of a conflict that escalates incrementally also favours the offensive state because of the suboptimal range of options faced by defender states. As discussed above, the defender state can respond to an escalatory manoeuvre by doing nothing, by responding proportionately, or by escalating further

themselves. These options, besides being suboptimal military possibilities, are also not ideal for defender states in terms of the optics of a conflict. Doing nothing is often not a viable option, as domestic audiences demand retaliation. And, even in cases where doing nothing is possible it may play into offensive states' hands, as they can claim that there is no conflict to speak of; avoiding the international censure that they might otherwise receive. Responding proportionately is equally suboptimal for defender states, especially given the often innocuous nature of the offensive state's early manoeuvres, as it risks muddying the water regarding who is responsible in the eyes of the UN and other important observers. Further escalation, though a reasonable tactical choice, and perhaps even defensible on normative grounds, risks being seen by third parties as unproductive, aggressive, and confrontational.

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Finally, incremental escalation benefits offensive states because it frequently attaches to disputes a "low-intensity," or "frozen" status, inuring media, state, and international observers to the conflict. Media demonstrate a well-known bias toward novel issues, and away from entrenched, intractable problems.[16] Consequently, conflicts of low intensity, even when geopolitically important, receive less media coverage, limiting tertiary states' ability to follow the conflict and to recognise offensive behaviour. Even when offensive behaviour is obvious, the conflict can acquire an "inevitable" image, which undermines condemnation of belligerent conduct.

Modulated Conflict and the Extraction of Concessions

A final advantage associated with the tactic of incremental escalation has to do with the manipulation and extraction of concessions from third-party states. It has frequently been remarked that pariah states such as Iran and North Korea 'game' the international system by periodically engaging in belligerent behaviour, and then backing down in order to extract concessions from states intent on insuring peace. What is less often noticed is that it is their use of incremental escalation and de-escalation that makes this strategy workable. These states carefully modulate their escalatory and de-escalatory manoeuvres, avoiding exceeding a level that could lead to military retaliation (though they do frequently incur economic sanctions and rhetorical condemnation), and never de-escalating to the point where an eventual reprise in belligerence would be too remarkable. This aspect of incremental escala-

tion, as well as its other utilitarian aspects, are illustrated in the next section, which addresses incremental escalation in practice.

Incremental Escalation in International Conflict

This section is devoted to illustrating the practical application of the tactic of incremental escalation. It compares two cases—the Russia-Ukraine conflict of 2014, and the ongoing dispute between Iran and Western powers over nuclear issues, regional stability and human rights concerns. The cases were selected with the intention not of providing a representative sample of all inter-state conflicts, but rather with the aim of demonstrating the widespread use of incremental escalation, and comparing its evolution in varying contexts. The three cases vary along multiple dimensions: intensity of the conflict, its duration, historical context, motivations, participants, outcomes, etc. The cases elucidate not only how the tactic of incremental escalation has become the standard for offensive states, but also how many diverse purposes it serves for those states.

The West-North Korea Dispute

Numerous observers of international affairs have remarked that the conflict between the West and North Korea has taken on something of a cyclical character: North Korea acts provocatively, the West threatens retaliation, eventually tensions calm, and in exchange for its relative docility, North Korea achieves concessions like the lifting of certain economic sanctions.

As Table 1 illustrates, this recurring pattern of escalation and de-escalation is not a new phenomenon. And, given the benefits it yields to North Korea, it is unlikely accidental. On the contrary, many observers of North Korea have contend that its leaders carefully calibrate the timing and extent of their escalatory manoeuvres to maximise the likelihood of extracting concessions from other states and minimise the chances of a military intervention. As Snyder suggests, 'North Korea has routinely used crisis diplomacy, brinkmanship, and delay to play for time in unfavourable circumstances.'[17]

Several goals animate North Korean leaders' conduct in the international system, which are important to understand if one wishes to explain their behaviour. First, Kim Jong-un and the other leaders of

North Korea seek to maintain the political status quo and their hold on power.[18] Given the economic backwardness, pariah status and relative resource poverty of the country, this goal necessitates the extraction of aid from both sympathetic and adversarial states. Yet, under normal circumstances, neither group of states has much of an incentive to do so. Allies of North Korea (re: China) view it as something of a nuisance, tarnishing China's international image and contributing to volatility in the region. On the other hand, rivals, such as the US, do not wish to support what they view as an unethical, aggressive and unstable regime.

How, then, does North Korea induce other states to provide aid and limit or lift sanctions previously applied against it? One possible way of doing so would be a permanent liberalisation of the state, but this would likely dislodge the Âling class from power as widespread international and local opposition to their Âle made itself felt. Therefore, the North Korean state extracts aid using the timing and nature of its military escalations. As the timeline above demonstrates, provocative action on the part of North Korea is predictably periodic. This action can range from missile tests, to the expulsion of international inspectors, to the prosecution of Western citizens, among other tactics. It is worth noting however, that rarely if ever do these actions reach the threshold of a *casus belli*. Missile tests indicate North Korea's ability to strike Japan, but Japan is not, in the end, stÂck. Westerners are sentenced to hard labour, but the sentence is ultimately commuted.

Incendiary action and rhetoric on the part of the North Korean state, therefore, frequently seem to skirt the edges of out-and-out conflict, but without ever actually reaching it. Doing so, besides stimulating internal nationalist sentiment among the North Korean people, also prepares the stage for an eventual de-escalation, which the North Korean state can tie to positive incentives like increased aid or decreased sanctions. If the provocations were too large, the option of a military retaliation would perhaps become too tempting for North Korea's adversaries. On the other hand, if the provocations were too small, the eventual de-escalation would not be noticed – or welcomed – to the same degree. A sizeable initial escalation also serves another goal that observers of North Korean politics point to: the Âling class's concern with saving face on the international stage.[19] It is the initial escalation that later gives North Korea the latitude to back down later without losing much face or appearing weak.

This pattern of behaviour has resulted in significant, tangible benefits for the North Korean regime, if not for its people. As Byman and Lind observe

> [s]ince the late 1990s, North Korea's 'nuclear extortion' has generated more than $6 billion in aid from not only South Korea but also the United States, China, and Japan. These countries gave hundreds of thousands of tons of food (explained to the North Korean people as 'tribute' to Kim Jong-il). The regime has also extracted outright cash payments (e.g., Kim Dae-jung's government paid Kim Jong-il to attend their much-heralded 2000 summit; Washington paid a fee to inspect one of North Korea's suspected nuclear facilities; a 2008 deal was accompanied by an announcement of 500,000 tons of U.S. food aid, along with the claim that the two were unrelated). Beyond outright aid, economic initiatives associated with South Korea's sunshine policy, such as the Kaesong Industrial Complex and the Hyundai resort at Mount Kumgang, have provided Pyongyang with a significant revenue stream.[20]

Thus, the North Korean regime's policy of incremental escalation has garnered it material gains from tertiary states concerned about the maintenance of peace on the Korean peninsula. It is the incremental character of the escalation and de-escalation that has permitted the regime to avoid the two extremes of, on the one hand, failing to attract other states to the negotiating table, and on the other hand, incurring a military retaliation.

The Russia-Ukraine Dispute

While the previous case highlighted the use of incremental escalation in an asymmetric conflict in which overt hostilities have not broken out in decades, this section discusses a more typical, territory-based dispute between contiguous states – Russia and Ukraine – which engaged in a low-intensity conflict beginning in early 2014. While the conflict has dimmed in intensity in recent months, an examination of its historical unfolding is instÂctive, as it illustrates the extent to which threats, brinkmanship, and, especially, surgical escalation were used by Russia to enhance its position both tactically and reputationally.

As tension over Ukraine's growing ties with Europe began to mount in early 2014, clashes between Ukraine and Russia, over a customs un-

ion, territory in eastern Ukraine, and other issues, became more and more animated. Yet while conflict between the two states was in some sense obvious, in another important sense it was, at any given point in the crisis, difficult to determine exactly who was fighting whom, in what ways, and with what goals in mind. There was no declaration of war, no mass engagement of conventional forces, and only rarely did leaders of Russia even acknowledge the existence of a conflict in which they were taking part.[21]

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This unusual "quasi-war" is difficult to evaluate in part because sub-state militias, with varying political sympathies and agendas of their own, are among the main participants in the conflict. They were not, however, alone, raising the question of why direct Russian and Ukrainian involvement in the conflict over Crimea and Eastern Ukraine has passed with so little discussion in the media and diplomatic circles. In significant measure, this question can be answered by understanding the timing and nature of the crisis's escalation. Measured along any of the three dimensions: vertical, horizontal and political, – that acts as an instance of escalation – this particular crisis has intensified slowly.

As Table 2 demonstrates well, Russia's offensive action in Ukraine, and in particular in the Crimea, proceeded incrementally, beginning with the Russian parliament's approval of the use of force in Crimea, a gradual build-up of forces on the Russian-Ukrainian border, initial clashes, and finally victory and annexation. This escalation of force was accompanied by Russia's rhetoric of denial until the moment it was no longer plausible. It was also justified by a claimed deterioration in security for ethnic Russians and Russian speakers in Ukraine.[22] Tactically, as well, the intervention was well disguised: the initial massing of forces that preceded the Crimea incursion was depicted as a series of training exercises, and only gradually did Russian regular forces move to annex Crimea.[23]

Through a concerted campaign of denials and diversions, but mostly through an incremental build-up of forces and engagement, Russia was able to disguise, to a large extent, its involvement in the conflict in Ukraine. Consequently, it was able to limit the backlash and negative repercussions that normally accompany offensive action. Under normal conditions, annexation, brinkmanship, and aggression of the sort practiced by Russia in 2014 would probably have led to significant economic sanctions, broad-based rhetorical condemnation, and potential military retaliation. In point of fact, there was significant condemnation of Russia's actions, but also calls for both sides to cease

hostilities; there were economic sanctions imposed, but many of them were symbolic and targeted toward the Russian leadership; and there was no serious consideration of military retaliation on the part of the only regional power capable of credibly initiating action, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).

In part, the international community's failure to seriously deter or punish Russia for its offensive action stems from the latter's significant influence. Russia, as a massive, nuclear-armed military power, is a much less inviting military target than, say, Saddam Hussein's Iraq after it invaded Kuwait. Economically too, sanctions were less appealing in the case of Russia: much of Eastern Europe relies on Russian gas, oil and other goods, and depends on the Russian economy as a source of exports and imports.

Yet the role of incremental escalation in Russia's management of the crisis is not to be diminished. By taking Ukrainian territory in fits and starts, using rhetorical tools to deny involvement and deploying sub-state militias in addition to regular forces, Russia avoided triggering the West's "threshold of retaliation." This is tÂe despite the fact that in aggregate, the results of Russia's actions are the same as if it had taken Crimea in the space of a single day. While NATO, many observer states, and Ukraine itself would perhaps have liked to stop Russia's incursions, each incremental step that Russia undertook, on its own, was not worth risking a conflagration in the region. And, as Ukraine spoke out against Russia's actions, and used military force of its own, blame for the crisis began to be more difficult to apportion for many international observers. As it stands now, the international community has largely accepted the finality – if not the legitimacy – of Russia's possession of Crimea.

It is also worth noting that, by escalating slowly and deliberately, Russia was also able to avoid media attention to a large extent, as the conflict was overshadowed by other violence in the Middle East, and economic news. Admittedly, the conflict in Ukraine was not as bloody as, for example, the Syrian Civil War; yet media coverage, and the agendas of international bodies like the United Nations, focused on Ukraine to a surprisingly limited extent. Thus another benefit of incremental escalation in the Ukraine crisis for Russia has been that little energy has been devoted to understanding its causes, which party was at fault, and how best to exit the crisis.

Conclusion

This article highlighted the tactic of incremental escalation, demonstrated that it is widespread among offensive states, and argued that it provides numerous benefits to states willing to use it. It also contends that academic and policymakers' attention to the concept of escalation has largely focused on the *when* and *why* of state escalation, with little focus on an understanding of *how* they escalate. While traditional, massive, visible escalation may still be applicable in rare conflicts between states of equal capability that wish to demonstrate their resolve to fight, the contemporary international system heavily penalises overtly aggressive action, adjusting states' calculus about when, and how, to be belligerent.

As a result, many states that still wish to act aggressively must act more subtly, disguising their recourse to force through dissimulating rhetoric, non-traditional military tactics, and gradual, successive changes in the quality and quantity of force used—incremental escalation (and de-escalation). As it turns out, this pattern is far from being exclusively theoretical. It is a pattern observed in numerous conflicts, including, but certainly not limited to, those described in the above case studies. This article's illustration of the benefits that accÂe to offensive states that use incremental escalation suggests promising new research directions in the field of international security. For example, future research should attempt to locate in more detail the "threshold of retaliation." Where is it located? Does it depend on the nature of the parties to the conflict, the international environment, or other factors? Another current of research should investigate the effect of escalatory behaviour on the exact timing and nature of concessions offered by other states. What type of behaviour tends to maximise concessions? How can the international system use these lessons to disincentivise aggressive behaviour by pariah states? Future research in these areas – in addition to the findings of this article – contributes to a better understanding of what forms interstate aggression takes in the modern era, and provides insights as to what can be done to stop it.

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— 1994

North Korea and U.S. sign an agreement. North Korea pledges to freeze and eventually dismantle its nuclear weapons program in exchange for international aid to build two power-producing nuclear reactors.

— 1998

August 31 - North Korea fires a multistage rocket that flies over Japan and lands in the Pacific Ocean.

— 1999

FebÂary 27-March 16 - During a fourth round of talks, North Korea allows U.S. access to the site in exchange for U.S. aid in increasing North Korean potato yields.

December - A U.S.-led international consortium signs a $4.6 billion contract to build two nuclear reactors in North Korea.

— 2000

July - North Korea threatens to restart its nuclear program if the U.S. does not compensate it for the loss of electricity caused by delays in building nuclear power plants.

— 2002

October 4 - U.S. officials, in closed talks, confront North Korea with evidence that they are operating a nuclear weapons program in violation of the 1994 nuclear agreement. North Korea admits that is has been operating the facility in violation of the agreement.

December 31 - North Korea expels IAEA inspectors.

— 2003

January 10 - North Korea withdraws from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty.

April 23 - Declares it has nuclear weapons.

— 2004

August - North Korea offers to freeze its nuclear program in exchange for aid, easing of sanctions and being removed from the US's list of state sponsors of terrorism. The U.S. wants North Korea to disclose all nuclear activities and allow inspections.

— 2005

September 19 - North Korea agrees to give up its entire nuclear program, including weapons, a joint statement from six-party nuclear arms talks in Beijing said.

- In exchange, the U.S., China, Japan, Russian and South Korea have 'stated their willingness' to provide energy assistance to North Korea, as well as promote economic cooperation.
- North Korean officials later state that their country would begin dismantling its nuclear program only if the U.S. provides a light-water reactor for civilian power -- a demand that could threaten a day-old agreement among North Korea, its neighbours and the United States.

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— 2006

October 9 - North Korea claims to have successfully tested a nuclear weapon.

October 14 - The UN Security Council approves a resolution imposing sanctions against North Korea, restricting military and luxury good trade and requiring an end to nuclear and ballistic missile tests.

— 2007

FebÂary 13 - North Korea agrees to close its main nuclear reactor in exchange for an aid package worth $400 million.

March - During six-party talks, the U.S. agrees to release approximately $25 million of North Korean funds frozen at a Macao bank, a sticking point in the negotiations. T

September 2 - U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill announces that North Korea has agreed to fully declare and disable its nuclear programs by the end of 2007.

September 30 - At six-party talks in Beijing, North Korea signs an agreement stating it will begin disabling its nuclear weapons facilities. North Korea also agrees to include a U.S. team of technical experts in the disabling activities.

December 31 - North Korea misses a deadline to declare all its nuclear programs.

TABLE 2: Timeline of the 2014 Ukraine—Russia Conflict

— *Dec 17:* Russian President Vladimir Putin announces plans to buy $15bn in Ukrainian government bonds and a cut in cost of Russia's natural gas for Ukraine.

— *Feb 27:* Pro-Kremlin armed men seize government buildings in Crimea. Ukraine government vows to prevent a country break-up as Crime-

an parliament set May 25 as the date for referendum on region's status. Yanukovich is granted refuge in Russia.

— *March 1:* Russian upper house of the parliament approves a request by Putin to use military power in Ukraine.

— *March 2:* A convoy of hundreds of Russian troops heads towards the regional capital of Crimea.

— *March 3:* Russia's Black Sea Fleet tells Ukrainian navy in Sevastopol in Crimea to surrender or face a military assault.

— *March 4:* In his first public reaction to the crisis in Ukraine, Putin says his country reserves the right to use all means to protect its citizens in eastern Ukraine. Russian forces fire warning shots on unarmed Ukrainian soldiers marching towards an airbase in Sevastopol.

— *March 18:* Putin signs treaty absorbing Crimea into Russia.

— *March 31:* Russian troops partly withdraw from Ukrainian border in the south region of Rostov.

— *April 17:* Putin acknowledges that Russian forces were deployed in Crimea during the March referendum on joining Russia, but says he hopes not to have to use his 'right' to send Russian troops into Ukraine. Lavrov announces in Geneva a deal has been reached with Ukraine, the US and the EU to 'de-escalate' tensions in Ukraine.

— *April 24:* Putin says deployment of military in east Ukraine by the Kiev authorities is a crime that will 'have consequences. The Russian army starts new exercises at the border with Ukraine.

— *April 29:* Russia denies it has troops in eastern Ukraine.

— *May 7:* Putin endorses Ukraine's planned presidential election. He says Russian troops pulled back from border. The new overall toll from Ukrainian military operations stands at 14 servicemen dead.

— *May 8:* Russia conducts military exercises, test-fires several missiles, and says nuclear capabilities are on 'constant combat alert.' NATO says there is no sign of a Russian troop pullback.

— *May 19:* Putin orders troop withdrawals from the Ukraine border following the 'completion of spring military training programmes.'

— *June 9:* Russia and Ukraine reach a 'mutual understanding' regarding a 'de-escalation of tensions.'

— *June 19:* NATO says it has evidence of a renewed Russian military build up along the Ukraine border.

— *June 22:* Putin makes a public announcement supporting Poroshenko's plans for a ceasefire, calling for a 'substantial and detailed' dialogue between Ukraine and the pro-Russian groups.

- *July 13:* Russia accuses Kiev of killing a Russian civilian in an artillery attack, promising 'irreversible consequences.' Ukraine denies the charges.
- *July 17:* Malaysian Airlines flight MH17 is shot down of eastern Ukraine, killing all 298 people on board.
- *July 24:* The US accuses Russia of firing artillery across the border into Ukraine, but does not share its evidence. A Pentagon spokesman describes it as a 'military escalation.'
- *August 5:* Russia begins a build up of forces on the Ukrainian border, and continues a series of training exercises that have been held on and off since the start of the conflict.
- *August 12:* A Russian aid convoy of 280 tÂcks carrying 2,000 tons of food and supplies begins its long journey to the border to rising scepticism about the motives of the mission.
- *August 22:* Ukrainian authorities say about 90 tÂcks from a Russian aid convoy have crossed into Ukraine without permission, branding the act as 'direct invasion'.
- *September 20:* Participants in Ukrainian peace talks agree to create a buffer zone to separate government troops and pro-Russian fighters, as well as withdraw foreign fighters and heavy weapons from the area of conflict in the east.

Notes

1   For example, Lisa Carlson (1995), 'A Theory of Escalation and International Conflict,' Journal of Conflict Resolution, 39:3, pp. 511-534.
2   For a discussion of the effect of international law and alliances on states' propensity to declare war, see Tanisha M. Fazal (2012), 'Why States No Longer Declare War,' Security Studies, 21:4, pp. 557-593.
3   For an analysis of Russia's tactics in its 2014 conflict with Ukraine, see Michael Becker, Matthew Cohen, Sidita Kushi, and Ian McManus (2014), 'Reviving the Russian Empire: A Rationalist Model of State Intervention,' paper presented at the 2014 meeting of the Northeastern Political Science Association.
4   See Forrest E. Morgan, Karl P. Mueller, Evan S. Medeiros, Kevin L. Pollpeter, and Roger Cliff (2008), 'Dangerous Thresholds: Managing Escalation in the 21st Century,' Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, pp. 7-8, 18-19. For an analysis of the effect of the balance of power on the likelihood of a conflict's escalation, see Randolph Siverson and Tennefoss (1984), 'Power, Alliance, and the Escalation of International Conflicts,' American Political Science Review, 78:4, pp. 1057-1069.
5   Morgan (et al).

6   See Thomas Schelling (1960), The Strategy of Conflict, Harvard UP. See also James Fearon (1992), 'Threats to Use Force: Costly Signals and Bargaining in International Crises,' Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, James Fearon (1997), 'Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs,' Journal of Conflict Resolution, 41:1, pp. 68-90.

7   Scott D. Sagan and Jeremi Suri (2003), 'The Madman Nuclear Alert: Secrecy, Signaling, and Safety in October 1969,' International Security, 27:4, pp. 150-183; Niccolò Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy, Book III, Chapter II.

8   Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (1966), Yale UP.

9   This is especially tÂe because threats of overwhelming force seem less credible to deter minor aggressions.

10 Such as nuclear or chemical weapons.

11 Many states and international organisations explicitly disparage aggression between sovereign nations, the United Nations being one prominent example. Its charter references 'suppression of acts of aggression' in Article I, and devotes an entire chapter to provisions invoked when 'international peace' is threatened by inter-state aggression. See 'Charter of the United Nations,' available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/.

12 The precise nature of a threshold of reaction varies significantly from state to state and across time, and is therefore difficult to specify. For the purpose of this article, it is, however, important to note that it is less likely to be triggered by small, though repeated aggressions, than by ostentatious, visible maneuvers.

13 Proportionate response is a widely acknowledged norm in international conflict. For discussions of its applicability, see Randy W. Stone, 'Protecting Civilians during Operation Allied Force: The Enduring Importance of the Proportional Response and NATO's Use of Armed Force in Kosovo,' Catholic University Law Review, Vol. 50, No. 2 (2001), pp. 501-537; Judith Gail Gardam, 'Proportionality and Force in International Law,' The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 87, No. 3 (July 1993), pp. 391-413.

14 In Arms and Influence, Schelling identified several of these within-dyad benefits to aggressor states.

15 Tanisha Fazal, 'Why States No Longer Declare War.'

16 For evidence of this bias, see Herbert Gans, Deciding What's News: A Study of CBS Evening News, NBC Nightly News, Newsweek, and Time (New York: Pantheon, 1979); and Lee Wilkins and Philip Patterson, 'Risk Analysis and the ConstÂction of News,' Journal of Communication, Vol. 37, No. 3 (1987), pp. 80-92.

17 Scott Snyder, 'Negotiating on the Edge: Patterns in North Korea's Diplomatic Style,' World Affairs, Vol. 163, No. 1 (Summer 2000), pp. 3-17. Snyder's argument in this case drew significantly on the work of In Young Chung, 'North Korea's Negotiating Behavior Toward the United States,' Social Science and Policy Research, Vol. 17, No. 2 (1995), pp. 301-320.

18 Kim Do-tae, 'Change and Continuity in North Korea's Negotiating Behavior in the Post-Cold War Era,' Social Science and Policy Research, Vol. 17, No. 2 (1995), pp. 277-300.

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24 Adapted from 'North Korea Timeline Fast Facts,' CNN Library, March 31, 2014. Available at http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/29/world/asia/north-korea-nuclear-timeline---fast-facts/.

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Unpacking Bangladesh's 2014 Elections

A Clash of the "Warring Begums"

Pavlo Ignatiev

This work analyses events in the political life of Bangladesh after military Âle. It focuses on the rise of the leaders of two influential parties – the Awami League and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party – and the reasons for their animosity towards one another. I argue that both these political forces usually abide by a "winner-takes-all" principle and they are firmly against cooperation for the sake of the country. The polarisation of the political field, combined with natural calamities and a crisis in the textile industry, is propelling Bangladesh into an uncertain future.

Keywords: Bangladesh, India, political parties, elections, textile industry strikes

Introduction:
An Environmental and Economic Profile of Bangladesh

Bangladesh is a medium-sized country wedged between India and Myanmar within Asia's largest delta, the Ganges-Brahmaputra. More than 4095 km of Bangladesh's frontiers are shared with India and 350 km with Myanmar. Seven north-eastern Indian states – better known as the Seven Sisters – and their predominantly tribal and Christian populations of 42 million, can only access Bengal Bay through Myanmar or Bangladesh. Moreover, India controls 54 Bangladeshi rivers and uses their water for its own industrial and agricultural needs. The long and ill-protected border also provides ample opportunities for the smuggling of cows, food and consumer goods. In 2013, some 3.2 million Bangladeshi citizens resided in India on a permanent basis, sending home considerable remittances.[1] This, combined with the explosive

issue of the presence of illegal Bangladeshi immigrants in eastern and north-eastern Indian states, has made official relations with Delhi a topic of extraordinary political importance. Ties with neighbouring Myanmar are also under constant strain because of the unresolved question of Rohingya refugees—stateless people of Muslim faith who are persecuted in Buddhist Myanmar and have fled from the Rakhine state to eastern Bangladesh. Most political parties maintain that the half-million Rohinyas must either be ignored or deported because they are creating an economic and security crisis in the Cox Bazaar area.[2]

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Given the huge population of 156 million living in Bangladesh's 144,000 sq km, local resources and climatic conditions are not conducive to providing support. The Bangladeshi economy is highly dependent on several export commodities, with the textile industry playing a leading role on top of remittances. The export of ready-made garments brings in more than $25 billion (USD) annually and provides work for Âral women in 4,500 factories, many of which were constÂcted illegally without fulfilling essential security requirements. These cheap goods are supplied to huge department stores in Western countries, and Bangladesh occupies second place behind China as an exporter of garments. Historically, the eastern regions of Bengal depended on sugar cane and jute, the "golden fibre," but huge areas of land were occupied with rice plants since the country's numerous citizens placed it among the world's top consumers of this staple food. The population explosion led to the fragmenting of the land into tiny allotments, making an economy of scale impossible and paving the way for micro-credits to millions of needy households. The upshot is that 35 million people are borrowers of small amounts of money from banks for the poor.[3] In 1965, the country's workers began to dismantle huge ocean-going vessels on the beaches of Sitakunda near Chittagong. Today, more than 200 000 people are employed in this dangerous enterprise, and Bangladesh ranks second behind Pakistan in the annual number of dismantled ships. In 2012, 70 ship-breaking yards turned 260 ocean vessels weighing 3.1 million tonnes into scrap metal which was later supplied to the constÂction and metallurgy industries, meeting more than half of the country's steel requirements.[4]

The Bangladeshi land mass is criss-crossed by numerous rivers (of which the Ganges, the Brahmaputra and the Meghna are the most important) and predominantly flat except for the mountainous Sylhet district and Chittagong Hill tracts in the interior not far from the biggest port, Chittagong. The country is therefore extremely vulnerable

to typhoons and floods, and every year at least 20% of the area is submerged during the heavy monsoon rains. It is famous for its concrete shelters with wide roofs for rescue helicopters and lowered platforms for the cattle which dot the countryside, occupying fertile land in the coastal zone. Bangladesh also remains one of the main contributors to world ferry disasters, with a large number of these vessels colliding and capsizing during the rainy season. The overpopulated nation is highly dependent on river transportation, and these unfortunate events are connected with bad weather and the desire of ferry owners to boost earnings by offering room on boats to more people than they can carry. The country is also no stranger to black-outs due to its ill-developed electricity distribution network and natural calamities. In these conditions, remittances from Bangladeshi citizens in the Persian Gulf, India, Malaysia, the US and UK play an increasingly important role in economic development and substitute investments. In 2012-2013, Bangladeshi citizens received nearly $15 billion (USD) from relatives employed abroad mainly as cheap blue-collar workers.[5]

The Political Context

Bangladesh became independent in 1971 after a bloody war with Pakistan. During those events, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, one of the leaders of the historic Six-point movement attained the status of a national hero. He went on to Âle the country in different capacities until August 1975 when he was killed along with his wife, three sons, two daughters-in-law and servants in a coup organised by junior officers. After an epoch of revolts and military Âle from 1975 until 1990, the country finally embarked on democratic development. Two political groups which had successfully organised mass protests against the dictator Hussain Muhammad Ershad came to prominence: the Awami League (the People's League) and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). The leader of the first, Sheikh Hasina based her legitimacy on family connections (Sheikh Mujibur Rahman had been her father) and supported a policy of close relations with India along with the creation of a secular state. Zia Khaleda, the head of the BNP, was the widow of the charismatic general Zia Rahman, who had been a military hero in the independence movement and president of the country from 1977 to 1981; she defended the idea of an Islamic nation completely independent from India with close links to the Muslim world. Deep-seat-

ed and irreconcilable differences between these political programmes combined with personal animosities produced constant conflicts between the two influential political group leaders, whom people dubbed the "battling begums." Former president Hussain Muhammad Ershad, who Âled the country *de facto* or directly from 1982 to 1990, received a lengthy prison term in 1991, but his Jatiya Party (National Party) remained the third most influential force with a moderate programme based on Bangladesh's economic development.

Zia Khaleda became the country's first woman prime minister in 1991. She was among the individuals responsible for the passing of the 12th constitutional amendment of 06 August 1991, which brought in a parliamentary form of government instead of a presidential system. Unfortunately, the period of Zhaleda's Âle until 1996 was fraught with serious political scandals. While these years saw advances in education and the introduction of a nationwide tree-planting programme, Bangladeshi society was engulfed by a serious religious conflict.[6] In 1994, the popular writer Taslima Nasrin published her book *Shame*, which criticised the limited rights of women under Islam. She immediately faced death threats and was forced to leave the country. Periodic public riots also terrorised Hindu and Ahmadi religious minorities. In the same year, opposition parties boycotted parliament and began organising *hartals* (shutdowns) after unknown persons assaulted their activists with knives and batons. First staged by Mahatma Gandhi in historic Bengal, hartals can be defined as general strikes and shop closures intended to cripple the economy over a defined period—say for 24 or 72 hours. In Bangladesh, they are extremely violent and followed by the torching of tÂcks and buses, burnings of tyres on roads, erecting of stone barricades and street skirmishes. So-called soldiers of democracy are responsible for enforcing hartals with petrol bombs and ordinary weapons. Many local workers and schoolchildren stay home to avoid becoming the victims of this street violence.[7]

After another victory in the FebÂary 1996 elections, Zia Khaleda's government had its legitimacy undermined following accusations of widespread ballot-rigging. Under pressure from international donors and the Awami League, she agreed to hold new elections, introducing a 13th constitutional amendment to set up a neutral caretaker government in order to organise a free and fair national electoral process over a 90-day period. The Awami League leader, Sheikh Hasina, was suddenly thÂst into power as a result of this repeat campaign in June 1996.

After several days of incumbency, she agreed to free former president Ershad from prison on parole in exchange for his party's participation in a Âling coalition. Thanks to this political support and guidance, she introduced a foreign policy based on cooperation with regional neighbours.

In 1997, Bangladesh, became a co-founder of the Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, Myanmar and Thailand Economic Cooperation (BIMST-EC) regional group whose members were countries around the Bay of Bengal. The BIMST-EC Permanent Secretariat opened in Dhaka in 2014, and the organisation defined 14 areas of cooperation. Bangladesh became responsible for the issues of climate change, trade and investments.[8] During the same year, Sheikh Hasina also helped to create an important organisation composed of the biggest Muslim countries. Named the Developing-8 (D-8), the group encompassed 60% of the population of the Islamic world with Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan and Turkey as its members. Unfortunately, the participation of Bangladeshi leaders in D-8 activities was marred by scandals because of their strained relations with Pakistan and demands for unilateral duty-free access to the markets of member states.[9] On the other hand, the ties with India were mended due to a historic treaty on the sharing of Ganges water in 1996.

In 1999, Bangladesh became a signatory of the Kunming Initiative intended to rebuild the old Stilwell Road between north-eastern India and southern China, which had been heavily used during WWII as a lifeline for Chinese guerrillas. This motorway is positioned to handle 25% of the trade between China and India. Bangladesh, situated between the two countries, is likely to see investments in its road infrastÂcture and ports.[10] However, Hasina's government failed to pay significant attention to developments *within* Bangladesh. The exception was her signing of a peace accord with the representatives of the Chittagong area hill tribes in 1997. This accord envisaged broad autonomy for the region of five million people along with the resolution of land disputes between tribal people and Muslim settlers from the plains, withdrawal of some military bases and limits on the migration of impoverished Bangladeshis to Chittagong Hill tracts.[11]

Unfortunately, an atmosphere of lawlessness persisted within Bangladesh. In 2000, the Public Safety (Special Provisions) Act was adopted, stipulating that special tribunals be created to deal with violent street crimes. The legislature specified harsh penalties for felonies including

hijacking, extortion, damage to automobiles, road blockades, kidnapping and terrorism. Special one-member tribunals were established to conduct speedy trials of accused persons, many of whom had been arrested during street protests and nationwide hartals. Controversially, the Act also cancelled the bail procedure for accused persons.[12]

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However the events that would give Bangladesh its nickname of "the chaotic democracy" happened during the second term of Zia Khaleda and her Islamist partners after she won the general election of October 2001. Her son, Tarique Rahman, became the second most powerful person in the country and the heir to Khaleda's Bangladesh Nationalist Party. He also amassed a fortune very quickly with the help of several questionable deals. Immediately following Khaleda's party victory, the representatives of Hindu and Buddhist minorities were targeted in public violence; members of the Awami League also suffered frequent assaults at the hands of street gangs loyal to the government.

And, the cult of Osama bin Laden was visible on the streets. In 2002, Islamists torched several movie theatres as symbols of Western civilisation. The date 15 August was declared a national holiday ostensibly as the anniversary of Zia Khaleda's birth in 1945. This brought new friction to relations with the Opposition since Sheikh Mujibir Rahman, the father of Bangladesh's independence, had been killed without remorse on 15 August 1975, and the Opposition observed that date as a national day of mourning. In fact, Khaleda's birth certificate revealed that she was born on 05 September.[13] To add insult to injury, during an opposition rally in Dhaka on 21 August 2004, protesters against the assaults on Awami League workers in Sylhet were attacked by hand grenades, 13 of which exploded in the dense crowd. Some 24 demonstrators died and 500 were wounded, including Sheikh Hasina, who was left partially deaf.[14]

In 2004, the government unveiled an elite anti-crime and anti-terrorism Bangladeshi police unit consisting of 4525 personnel and known as the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB). The athletic squad members wore different types of weapons along with armour, black uniforms with RAB in gold lettering, bandanas and glasses; strikingly, their sniffer dogs were also black. Created to protect citizens against street crime, the squad soon became the main governmental force in the fight against opposition rallies; these officers did not hesitate to open fire or to kill indiscriminately.[15] Taking systemic corÂption into consideration, Zia Khaleda's government also introduced an independent Anti-corÂp-

tion Commission (ACC) in order to appease international donors by investigating document forgeries, the embezzlement of state subsidies and loans, money laundering crimes, illegally amassed wealth and tax evasion among the representatives of the political elite. This special body was supposed to be independent and neutral but in reality its stÂcture was defined by the government, which also financed the ACC's activities.[16]

The tense atmosphere inside the country was aggravated by the conflict with India, which had persistently accused Bangladesh of harbouring terrorists from the seven north-eastern states. Those accusations became more frequent after 2003 when the Indian and Bhutanese armies banished rebels from southern Bhutan during Operation All Clear and those rebels had to evacuate the remnants of their forces to neighbouring Bangladesh. In 1989, the Indian government began to constÂct a security fence close to the border and it intensified this work during Zia Khaleda's Âle. The government also went ahead with a policy of deporting illegal migrants originating from its eastern neighbour. Officials in Delhi claimed that the border barrier was needed to stop infiltration by terrorists and smugglers, but many Bangladeshis were outraged about the denial of opportunities to smuggle goods and cross the border in search of jobs. India's mass media also criticised Bangladesh's Islamist parties harshly for attempting to create an Islamic state; it discussed plans to divert water from the transboundary rivers. But the real outrage in Dhaka was due to the killing by Indian border guards of more than 1000 Bangladesh citizens and torture of another 1000 who had tried to cross the border between 2000 and 2014. The problem was exacerbated by the presence of 162 enclaves in India and Bangladesh where 51 000 people of questionable status resided.[17]

After clashes on the streets between activists from the two biggest parties in early 2007, the military temporarily took power into its own hands, and together with an interim government led by FakÂddin Ahmed, these generals initiated a policy known widely as Minus Two. Its aim was to remove the warring begums from politics and create a third alternative political force. As a result, both former prime ministers and 160 prominent politicians were detained along with thousands of activists. However, the representatives of military circles had no intention of becoming the new Âlers of the impoverished country facing dire economic problems. For one thing, they were afraid of los-

ing their lucrative jobs in UN peace-keeping forces: it is known that Bangladesh contributes more troops to peace-keeping missions than any other member state except for Pakistan. In 2013, for example, 1830 police officers and 6605 soldiers were Bangladeshi representatives.[18] As the country's main external donors, the EU, Japan and the US also put pressure on the military government to force the gradual restoration of democracy. Especially insistent on this plan was India, whose political elite feared that these events could facilitate the rise to power of radical Islamists.

The result was that the interim Âlers chose to prepare Bangladesh for exemplary parliamentary elections and then exit politics. The names of tens of millions of dead individuals along with duplicate entries and errors were removed from the electoral roll; military personnel digitally photographed 81 million voters for special electronic voter ID cards with fingerprints. They also introduced a new code of conduct for political parties which guaranteed the equality of all participants. On 17 December 2008, normal life was restored and the army finally returned to its barracks.[19]

This campaign, which culminated in general elections on 29 December 2008, was prepared for carefully by the Awami League. The party's activists unveiled their revolutionary Vision-2021, a programme intended to turn Bangladesh into a middle-income country by 2021 by encouraging investment, social equality, infrastÂcture development and the IT industry. In contrast, the BNP was in chaos after the suppression of thousands of its members by the interim government, which had successfully split this political force into two parts: one pro-military and the other pro-Hasina. The populace was also eager to see cÂcial changes after years of volatile Islamist Âle amid rampant corÂption and souring relations with neighbouring India. This was especially tÂe for new voters, who represented 31% of all participants in the elections. The news that 13 million deceased citizens had been listed on the electoral roll was a serious blow to the Âling party and Zia's allies. Citizens were also shocked by the gross violations of human rights committed by RAB personnel and demanded that those responsible be brought to justice. Ordinary Bangladeshis likened the RAB to a Latin American death squad in South Asia due to its growing impunity and infringements of human rights. Under BNP Âle, Bangladesh had also become one of the most corÂpt countries in the world. All of these factors influenced voting behaviour and brought a cÂshing defeat to

Zia Khaleda's party and her Islamist partners. In January 2009, Sheikh Hasina became the head of the government with overwhelming support from parliament where her party had gained a huge majority.[20]

Bangladesh under Awami League Rule

At first, the period of Awami League Âle from 2009 to 2014 brought some economic successes. These were largely due to the improved relations with Bangladesh's biggest neighbour, India, which surrounds the country on three sides. In 2009, the two countries agreed that the Seven Sisters should be provided with direct access to the Bay of Bengal, and in 2010, that agreement came into force. As a result, the travel distance from the north-east to Bengal's ports was theoretically reduced from 1750 to only 75 kilometres. But the out-dated Bangladeshi roads and railways were not suited to supporting the heavy traffic of Indian goods. To remedy the problem, these partners agreed in the same year that India would provide $US1 billion in credit to be used to develop rail infrastÂcture between the mentioned states and Bangladesh's border districts as well as to purchase locomotives and carriages, procure buses and execute dredging projects on trans-boundary rivers. In 2011, India removed duties on all Bangladeshi goods except for 25 alcohol and tobacco items with the goal of addressing the huge trade deficit caused by the diversified export of Indian enterprises and the need of the local textile industry to import massive volumes of cotton and silk. Sheikh Hasina's government also launched a campaign against terrorists from north-east India who were active in Bangladeshi territory. Consequently, the security situation improved dramatically in the region, and several high-ranking rebels from Assam were deported at the demand of Manmohan Singh.[21] In 2013, both sides signed an extradition treaty concerning persons implicated in serious crimes along with a more liberal visa agreement allowing for multiple-entry tourist and medical visas with validity of one year.[22]

The government also decided to introduce a programme called *Digital Bangladesh* drawing on relevant experience in southern India. In 2009, the company Telephone Shipla Sangsta launched its Doel laptop with a retail price of only $130 (USD) for distribution to state departments and schools. Electronic books were bought en masse for school children since the overpopulated country lacked forests and it was very expensive to print books in Bangladesh. Internet connections also be-

came available in Âral areas. Sheikh Hasina declared the IT sector an engine of growth and ordered the opening of computer training centres and Internet cafes in all districts while the import of computer hardware and software was simultaneously made duty-free. The country today has plans to capitalise on its young and low-cost workforce familiar with technical English in order to create an IT hub offering the cheapest services in the world.[23]

The government also tried to address the problem of frequent power outages. One response was the development of Bangladesh's first nuclear power plant, which will feature two 1,000 megawatt reactors and a high safety threshold and be built by Rosatom, a Russian nuclear energy corporation. The plant will be located in Rooppur (Pabna) 160 km to the north-west of Dhaka and should help to save money on expensive gas. The project, which was started in 2013, will be operational by the beginning of the next decade.[24] In 2012, new oil reserves were discovered in the northern region of Sylhnet, well-known for its tea gardens. Sheikh Hasina also agreed to buy electricity from India. To this end, a special transmission line will link India's eastern electrical grid to Bangladesh's western grid. Those measures are very important because 50% of the population does not have access to electricity and many textile factories rely mainly on costly power generators.[25]

On the other hand, this era of Awami League Âle was accompanied by gross human rights violations. On 25-26 FebÂary 2009, a group of border guards known as Bangladesh Rifles tried to stage a mutiny when they occupied their own headquarters and killed 57 high-ranking officers and scores of other innocent people. Their demands to the government were purely economic and job-related: an increase in their salaries and the length of vacations. Wanting to avoid large-scale bloodshed in Dhaka only months into her Âle, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina negotiated the surrender of these guards over 33 hours, promising the majority of them an amnesty. However, in 2013, 152 rebel soldiers were sentenced to death while hundreds of others faced life imprisonment. The Bangladesh Rifles were renamed the Border Guard of Bangladesh in a move to erase the memory of these deplorable events. The exceptional cÂelty of these sentences signalled to other violent offenders that they too would be punished mercilessly. It was also intended to appease the country's generals as the high-ranking personnel of the Bangladesh Rifles had traditionally been recÂited from among the ranks of army officers.[26]

Sheikh Hasina also decided that the time was ripe to destroy the most important ally of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party: Jamaat-e-Islami. In 2010, her government launched a process targeting collaborationists with Pakistan during the 1971 civil war and establishing the Bangladesh International Crimes Tribunal (ICT). The prime minister noted that three million civilians had died after the leaders of Jamaat-e-Islami and affiliated political forces created death squads of *razakars* (volunteers) to hunt down pro-independence journalists, university lecturers, political activists and members of the Hindu minority in eastern Pakistan. There was, however, a problem with this process: the civil war had taken place some 42 years ago earlier, and many key witnesses were already dead. The problem was aggravated by the fact that some of the accused were extremely old and for humanitarian reasons simply unable to stand trial.

These ICT proceedings continue to be very controversial. Islamists in Bangladesh have claimed that the process has nothing to do with the delivery of justice and is intended to destroy Jaamat-e-Islami and the opposition "compromise" movement in general. They have also threatened to take steps against judges and witnesses in these trials after their own return to power.[27]

The ICT has already sentenced eight well-known people to death. They include all prominent leaders of the main Islamist party and an influential member of parliament, who belongs to BNP ranks. At the same time, the ICT has outlawed Jamaat-e-Islami because of its destÂctive role in the civil war. This has led to increased violence on the streets and the radicalising of opponents who have sworn they will avenge their "martyrs."[28] Relations with Pakistan, which has accused Sheikh Hasina of Âbbing salt into historic wounds, have also deteriorated. Pakistani politicians do not understand why these dormant issues are being promoted so vigorously now – some 42 years later – by the Awami League. They also question the claim that there were three million victims of the civil war within Pakistan. In general, these trials have done a lot of damage to ties between the countries.[29]

In 2010, five military officers responsible for killing Mujibur Rahman during the "majors' revolt" of 1975, were hanged in Dhaka. Their trial had been initiated in 1996, but later, as prime minister, Zia Khaleda had done everything in her power to stop the hearings and let these individuals escape abroad. The independence hero had been assassinated along with his family and servants (some 14 people in total), except for

two of his daughters: Sheikh Hasina and her younger sister, Sheikh Rehana, who were in Germany at the time. Six other officers responsible for these assassinations were also hiding abroad, and Bangladesh asked Interpol and law-enforcement agencies to assist with their capture.[30]

Over the last few years, the country has also seen frequent "disappearances" of opposition party politicians. Since the beginning of 2010, more than 100 people have gone missing, many of them BNP members. Opposition leader Zia Khaleda has blamed RAB members for these atrocities, noting that following harsh international criticism, the number of street killings by this squad has gone down while "disappearances" are on the rise. Despite the negative publicity, Sheikh Hasina is not in any hurry to disband this notorious unit: on the contrary, she has decided to create a new military police branch to fight river pirates and contrabandists in coastal areas.[31]

Some of these measures have also targeted Zia Khaleda personally. In November 2010, the government confiscated the home on Shahid Mansuor Street in the capital where she lived for 38 years after receiving the property from the state as a presidential widow. Also in 2010, a decision was taken to rename Zia Rahman International Airport in honour of Sufi cleric Hazrat Shahjalal and to change the name of the University of Rahman in Barisal to Barisal University.[32] In the summer of 2011, a court imposed a lengthy prison sentence on Khaleda's son Arafat Rahman for illegally transferring money out of the country. As a result, he was forced into hiding in Bangkok and later fled to Malaysia.[33] Tarik Rahman, another of the begum's sons and the second most important politician in the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, is also facing a number of extortion charges in Bangladeshi courts. The authorities allowed him to fly to London in September 2008 after he agreed to leave his senior position as secretary-general of the BNP.[34] All in all, there have been so many cases brought against Khaleda and her family members that they spend all their time preparing for hearings.

Sheikh Hasina has also declared war on Muhammad Yunus, who won the Nobel prize in 2006 for his revolutionary work on microfinance and was the first citizen of Bangladesh and just the third person from the Bengal area to receive this distinction after the poet Rabindranath Tagore (the author of the Indian and Bangladeshi national anthems) and economist Amartya Kumar Sen. In 1974, this scientist formulated his theory of microcredit influenced by a visit to the countryside where he witnessed widespread poverty among Âral women.

With assistance from the state, in 1983, he created the Grameen Bank (*grameen* means "Âral" or "village" in the Bangla language) in order to distribute microcredits among these women. This financial institution is now an Asian leader in tÂst-based banking; it has 8.3 million borrowers of small amounts and enjoys high rate of credit return. After the military takeover, members of the interim government urged Yunus to create his own political party in 2007 as an alternative to the parties of two begums, but he refused.

Nonetheless, Sheikh Hasina viewed him as a potentially dangerous political rival who was popular among Âral women. During her earlier term, she had held out hopes that the Norwegian Nobel Peace Prize Committee would honour her for signing a peace treaty with Chittagong Hill tract tribes; in the final count, however, it was Yunus who took the prestigious prize. Under pressure from Hasina, the then 72-year-old scientist was forced to leave Grameen Bank in 2011. He has become a favourite target of governmental newspapers for his "exploiting" of poor people in the countryside.[35]

A Crisis in the Textile Industry

Despite the numerous trials and an atmosphere of persecution, Sheikh Hasina has remained relatively popular with the Bangladeshi people. Unfortunately for her government, however, the country's main hard currency earner, the textile industry has come under increased scÂtiny. This sphere of economic activity was created from scratch in 1978 when the Daewoo conglomerate agreed to invest money in a first clothing factory, Desh Garments. Daewoo also provided technical training to 130 Bangladeshi workers in response to the Multifibre Arrangement that limited the export of garments from South Korea to developed countries. Soon other factories followed.[36] Bangladesh was chosen as a location because it offered the cheapest labour force in the world composed of compliant Âral women workers whose calm behaviour contrasted with the trade-unionised violence of militant Korean workers. To satisfy growing demand, many factories were erected in haste with textile materials usually stored together with dyers on the premises. This caused many fires and also made it easier for sacked workers to commit arson.

The textile business was profitable due to the extremely low wages and large amount of overtime work performed by women workers.

This profit came, moreover, in spite of the need to import silk and cotton from China and India and buy sophisticated machinery in developed countries. Nevertheless, lax security led to many accidents. The government itself failed to pay attention to these events because elite political representatives were the owners of successful factories.

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In April 2013, the biggest of these catastrophes took place with the collapse of Rana Plaza, a building on the outskirts of Dhaka that had housed five garment-producing units; at least 1135 people were killed. In response, the US government suspended duty-free benefits for Bangladesh, triggering a major economic crisis in the country. With more than 317 million people, the US market is the top destination for Bangladeshi textile goods.[37] In spite of public criticism and calls to limit production orders of "bloodied" garments, European customers elected to inspect factories and pay for the enhancement of their security. To aggravate the situation, the workers decided to demand a rise in the minimum industry wage from $36 to $100 (USD) per month, and in September 2013, they organised nationwide strikes aiming to attract worldwide attention to their plight. The people with the lowest wages work at least 10 hours six days per week and may only rest on the premises of the 4500 factories where they are given very basic food such as a bowl of the cheapest rice and fish from polluted rivers. Even so, the government firmly rejects all calls for a wage rise above $68 (USD) per month (which would be a 77% hike) given that the competitive wage is the main draw of the chaotic industry.[38]

Preparations for the 2014 Elections

An amendment passed by pro-Awami League deputies in June 2011 removed the caretaker government which had been defended and lobbied for so strongly by the same party in 1996. In place of this respected institution, Sheikh Hasina established an interim state body composed of the leaders of loyalist parties and decided to appoint herself as its head. She argued that only politicians who had been elected as people's representatives had the right to Âle the country for the temporary period of the electoral campaign; nevertheless, she invited members of the Opposition to take up any other ministerial post they wanted, including as Minister of the Interior. To protest ballot-rigging during the election and capitalise on acute difficulties in the textile industry, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party organised a nationwide civil

disobedience campaign in the autumn and winter of 2013. This step was supported by BNP's electoral ally Jamaat-e-Islami, which had been banned from participating in the elections after the Supreme Court declared its registration illegal in August 2013. The party's activists hoped to stall the trials and executions of their leaders so that their former coalition partners could return to power and free them.[39]

A recent hartal by opposition parties was one of the most violent in Bangladeshi history. After activists began to torch tÂcks of textile goods travelling from Dhaka to the main port area of Chittagong, the majority of drivers decided not to go to work. The minibus and passenger bus sector suffered the same fate after people were burned alive because of petrol bombs. Railway links between the capital and Chittagong and north-eastern Sylhet were also cut off when opposition activists removed train tracks or placed rocks on top of them. During the 48 days of hartals in 2013, a total of 290 people were killed.[40] Many foreign investors incurred huge losses, including well-known Chinese and Korean entrepreneurs. Despite these circumstances, Sheikh Hasina decided to go ahead with general elections on 05 January 2014.

It was at this point that Hussain Muhammad Ershad, the head of the Jatiya Party, the Awami League's traditional and main coalition partner in government, abÂptly declared the atmosphere in the country non-conducive to elections and announced his political party would not take part. Only a few months earlier, many observers had believed that Jatiya would participate in the electoral process in order to ensure its legality (since Bangladesh Nationalist Party and Jamaat-e-Islami were both boycotting the elections) and later serve as the main "Opposition." In that "dual" capacity, the party could delegate its representatives to the government and simultaneously criticise the shortcomings of the Âling coalition.[41] But the abÂpt U-turn by the former dictator, Ershad, endangered this plan and made representatives of the Awami League furious. Ershad's decision came as a big surprise to Sheikh Hasina, and in December 2014, she sent in troops and RAB soldiers, who surrounded his house in the Baridhara neighbourhood of Dhaka and convoyed him to a military hospital for "treatment." By isolating Jatiya's 83-year old leader, the prime minister intended to force Jatiya into the election campaign, and she succeeded.[42] Ershad lost influence in his own political party because of his inconsistent position and constant shifting between sides; his party contributed three delegates as ministers to

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Sheikh Hasina's cabinet. Today the party leaders criticise the Awami League publicly while continuing to support it informally in parliament.[43]

On the other hand, the EU, the Commonwealth of Nations and the US did not provide representatives to monitor the elections, thereby signalling that they did not consider the process democratic or transparent. Against the background of a small voter turnout, the Awami League held 232 of the 300 elected seats and it formed a government on its own terms. Even so, a new wave of violence is expected and the country is in grave danger of international isolation.[44] Without political stability, it is impossible to raise the per capita income, which at $1190 (USD) is considered extremely modest.[45] If as a small and overpopulated country Bangladesh wants to be successful, it should open up free economic zones to lure foreign investors from India and China with a combination of cheap gas and abundant workforce. In 2013, the export of Bangladeshi commodities did not exceed $30.1 billion (USD) with ready-made garments providing 81% of this sum. Only an inclusive process of national reconciliation can change this grim picture.[46]

Conclusion

The democratisation of Bangladesh has not brought desirable results though the military regime, a common enemy of both influential political parties – the Awami League and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party – has disappeared. The relations between Zia Khaleda and Sheikh Hasina are fuelled by personal enmity and the two usually accuse each other of wrongdoings in public. To date, the side which has been victorious in elections has behaved according to the ancient principle of "winner takes all," using all law enforcement agencies to destroy its opponents. This has led to increased parliamentary fighting and the extensive use of hartal*s* designed to cripple the economy, which depends on the export of garments and uninterÂpted operation of ports. Bangladesh remains a country on the brink. This situation will not change unless the Âling elite and the Opposition, represented by two influential dynasties, learn to co-exist peacefully despite the cÂcial differences in their political programmes and their bitter history of confrontation.

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Afghanistan and the Privatisation of Security in the Czech Republic

Iveta Hlouchova

The Czech Republic has its own, specific experience with the privatisation of security. The Czech private security market and private security services available in the country have mainly been limited to the domestic arena. This study explores the potential of Czech private security market actors to operate abroad and possible implications for the development of the privatisation of security in the Czech Republic. Of these, one of the most significant is the gradual hybridisation of the market, with companies originally unrelated to the private security sector accepting private security roles on a growing scale. Afghanistan is analysed as a prospective export market that could help the Czech private security sector realise its full foreign export potential.

Keywords: Afghanistan, Czech, security, exports, hybridisation, private sector, private military and security companies, risk reduction

Introduction

Outside a few local academic publications, the privatisation of the security industry in the Czech Republic has not yet been the subject of an in-depth, comprehensive and complex research and examination.[1] From time to time, an article or other information about the activities of private security providers appears in local newspapers, other media or non-academic journals, but Czech public awareness of the topic is generally very limited. As such, the attention devoted to problems in the private security sector in the Czech Republic remains insufficient. It is both a cause and a consequence of this situation that the Czech private security market continues to be basically self-regulating.

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The Czech market in private security goods and services is still immature compared to foreign private security markets, but some specifics can be identified. There is quite a wide gap in the market, which is again both a cause and consequence of the security-related goods and services provided by private security actors in the Czech Republic. The market has yet to be consolidated, and a void remains that private security actors could fill when it comes to the provision of private security-related goods and services abroad. One of the most significant reasons for this unfulfilled potential is the shortage – or rather, utter absence – of demand (and thus, need) for Czech private security companies to provide and deliver private security goods and services abroad in a more organised manner.[2] Nonetheless, this potential clearly exists, especially for those seeking to boost and expand the reach of Czech exports. Various exploratory analyses have, thus, been conducted on behalf of either the Czech Ministry of Defence or Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the aim of identifying potential export markets for Czech goods and/or services.

Given the long historical relationship between the Czech Republic (Czechoslovakia) and Afghanistan, the existence of established trade and economic ties between them and the strong presence of past and on-going development and reconstÂction efforts in Afghanistan, Afghanistan represents a potential export market, albeit one that is controversial. The country has been identified as one of the few long-term priorities for Czech foreign (security and defence) policy. However, with conflict in Afghanistan still under way and gradually escalating, companies wanting to export and Ân their business in Afghanistan face many serious security risks. Regular armed forces cannot ensure the security of these commercial actors in Afghanistan (or any conflict zone more generally), and thus, an alternative needs to be found. Companies may either hire an established private military and security company to arrange their conflict zone security or develop their own security provision-related capabilities. The second option is becoming more and more common in the context of the global privatisation of security. This trend may be referred to as the "hybridisation" of security privatisation since corporate actors who previously did not provide security-related goods or services have started to perform various security-related roles and tasks on their own; the aim here is to use their own risk reduction capabilities to sufficiently secure their original activities, goods and services. Based on this logic, Czech companies

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interested in exports and/or finning their business in Afghanistan (or another conflict zone) may not be immune from this new trend. Given the lack of consolidation of the Czech private security market, this development, thus, could have significant implications for the business of privatising security in the Czech Republic.

This study aims to explore the potential of Afghanistan as an export market and its probable effect on the future of the privatising of security in the Czech Republic.[3] The primary focus is on private security companies of Czech origin though multinational private security companies also perform various security-related roles and tasks in the Czech Republic and other countries. While the analysis may, thus, be affected by these multinational private security and military companies, my chief intent is to analyse potential developments for Czech private security companies and the possible trajectories of the privatisation of security in the Czech context more broadly.

The main data sources for this work come from relevant Czech and foreign academic publications and newspaper reports as well as interviews with selected owners and/or managers of Czech private security companies (cs Solutions and Čechyman) and two foreign companies (Securitas and GEO-SSL) that perform private security-related tasks in the Czech Republic.[4] I have elected to preserve the anonymity of respondents until appropriate triangulation of the data is conducted.

Privatising Security in the Czech Republic

To analyse the possible development of the issues at hand, we need first to introduce and understand the main features, challenges, opportunities and trends surrounding the privatisation of security in the Czech context. This rather general section, thus, seeks only to introduce key factors and attributes of the Czech private security environment and so provide a knowledge base for the analysis conducted to meet the goal of this research.

Private security actors have become an integral part of the Czech security architecture. Since the 1990s, the market in private security goods and services has been growing and developing gradually both in terms of the number of companies providing security-related goods and services[5] and the scope and character of the goods and services on offer. According to Bures, the number of private security companies registered in the Czech Republic exceeds 7,000 entities.[6] I was

not able to verify this figure as I could not find the data cited from the Czech Statistical Office. Nevertheless, it is apparent that the number of private security entities in the Czech Republic is higher than the count in other countries. At the same time, the number of Czech private security companies that actually perform security roles and tasks is widely believed to be much lower, with estimates putting it at no more than 10% of all registered private security companies in the Czech Republic. One major factor that, thus, needs to be taken into account in any analysis of the privatisation of Czech security is the very high number of companies established for a single purpose only (i.e. one contract, task or function). Such entities create a "black hole" in the Czech private security market, a phenomenon discussed below. In such an environment, there is virtually no space for so-called "healthy" competition among private security actors. On the other hand, none of these companies has a monopoly within the private security market though some have almost monopolised certain (sometimes geographically limited) sectors of private security goods and services.

There are various reasons behind this rather Czech-specific trend, some of which relate to other characteristics of the Czech privatisation of security. Such features are deeply interconnected and so influence and support as well as subvert one another.

First of all, for the last twenty years, there has been no separate legal framework that would set up clear regulatory and control mechanisms for private security actors. Commercial security-related businesses are still authorised and conducted under the terms and relevant provisions of the Trade Licensing Act.[7] There are several provisions in other regulations that help build up at least some kind of framework,[8] but – with just one or two exceptions – they do not address private security goods and services provision abroad. The fact that these provisions are scattered across different instÂments is not only problematic and somewhat confusing, but also works to create a grey area, or vacuum, in which Czech private security businesses self-regulate. This also leaves us with many provisions that are poorly defined and unclear, creating additional problems like the non-transparency of businesses in the field. Czech private security company personnel do not have any special or wider competencies, authorisations or powers. They are basically regular citizens authorised to use an appropriate level of force under the doctrine of necessary and appropriate (self-)defence. This fact may limit the due performance of private security provision roles

and tasks. In the absence of any specific framework of regulatory and control mechanisms, however, no special functions or powers should be assigned to a sector that practically (and functionally) regulates itself based on the trends, developments and internal and external influences on the private security goods and services market. Private security actors make Âles based on what suits *them* most.

On the other hand, the absence for more than twenty years of a separate statute dealing with problems, challenges and opportunities in sector – combined with a lack of clarification and rather broad requirements and low set-up costs for private security start-ups – have led to an environment where comparatively high numbers of private security actors and related players like politicians can barely agree on a compromise or concessions for potential negotiations. Even in this context, however, opportunistic and practical cooperation between private security entities is not rare and it can often be mutually beneficial.

Based on my exploration of relevant Czech and foreign literature and the answers of the private security-related respondents whom I interviewed, there are two main scenarios for cooperation between Czech private security entities: (1) the subcontracting of a locally established and consolidated company with local knowledge and appropriate capabilities to carry out a given contract and (2) the expansion of a company's influence and brand. The prevailing pattern of such cooperation involves two or potentially three private security actors, but no more than this. Given the predominance of such cooperation between and among private security entities in the Czech private security market environment, there appears to be great potential for manipulation, corÂption and tax evasion as well as personal enrichment and exploitation of the "weaker" party. A certain level of personal leverage in the Czech private security market and hence the critical role of personal ties cannot be overlooked or underestimated (see below).

Furthermore, what makes achieving compromise even harder is the existence of a staggering sixteen private security-related associations in the Czech Republic.[9] Several of these wield more real influence and power than others, however, none of the associations includes all of the relevant and most significant private security entities. Mutually beneficial alliances of private security actors are common. It is tougher, however, to predict the viability of these alliances, many of which are purely practical and based on pre-existing personal ties, a point that further complicates any potential research of the issue at hand. This

other dimension of the Czech private security market's fragmentation exacerbates the legal vacuum, which, however, works in favour of many Czech private security actors. Nevertheless, objectively speaking, such marked fragmentation underlines the lack – or inexistence – of any political will or commitment to finding effective means and mechanisms to regulate the market.

In my opinion, the privatisation of security in the Czech Republic is still in the process of consolidation, an assessment that may Ân counter to the opinions of other scholars and experts. Based on the stÂctural conditions that presented themselves in the Czech Republic after the fall of the Communist regime, the privatisation of security is developing according to the same patterns seen in other privatised sectors in the country—something that only compounds the nuances of this process.[10] It is important here to stress the legacy of Communism and the fact that there was no proper "decommunisation" in the Czech Republic. This left a void in the country's political and economic sectors that was filled by inadequate dynamics and mechanisms. The potential of the private security market has, thus, not (yet) been fully exploited. Since it is still under way, this privatisation process is open and sensitive to both internal and external influences, and there remain gaps that can be targeted. What is apparent, however, is that the Czech market is not the same as – or even similar to – the market in the US, the UK or any other country. For reasons that go beyond the existing legal vacuum, many dominant private security actors have begun providing a wide range of security-related goods and services that enhance domestic security, and the potential extension of their business abroad has not been appropriately explored.[11] A further factor for which the Czech Communist legacy can partly be blamed is the employment situation in the Czech private security market where company personnel are for the most part regular employees. This situation can, however, again be linked to the lack of exploration of the market's external potential.

One sign of the unexploited potential abroad (i.e. in geographically distant markets) is the current absence of any private military company in the Czech private security sector. This claim strongly depends, however, on what is understood to constitute a private military company and the services they provide. Singer, a father of private security studies, distinguishes three subcategories of private military companies: military provider firms, military consultancy firms and military

support firms.[12] Viewed through this lens, all private military companies provide security goods and services that were once dispensed by regular state armed forces/state military. This includes direct combat and combat support roles on the front line as well as assistance, advice, mentoring, training, education, consultancy and logistical support and related goods and services. In this context, the assumption that private military companies operate only within the borders of the country where they are registered is misleading and simplistic: after all, while armed forces in democratic states have a very limited role at home, they have significant domestic security functions and tasks in other countries. By this logic, there are some entities offering and delivering good and services on the Czech private security market who may meet the criteria for Singer's categories of military consultants and supporters. Such companies, however, do not only focus on these types of goods and services and they generally provide a wider range of goods and services at home compared with their offering abroad. Since some Czech private security entities provide close protection (or goods protection) both inside Czech territory and abroad, they may also be identified with some aspects of Singer's military provider category. However, the actual performance of these services abroad is generally quite problematic and challenging for these companies, particularly in conflict zones (given issues with the lack of Czech regulations as well as transport and logistics, local contacts, compliance with local legal frameworks, etc.).

In fact, none of these companies provides adequate complementary risk assessment, consultancy and intelligence services in foreign areas of interest. One of the main reasons for the absence of these services is the low level of demand: many potential customers do not know about the possibility of contracting private security services of this kind, or else they believe they do not – or actually do not – need them. Either they are not interested in Ânning business operations abroad, or else they have no interest in these services since they have started to establish their own specialist departments. The second scenario may be considered a sign of the hybridising of the privatisation of security as companies that were originally not security actors embrace their own security provision-related functions and tasks. The lack of an adequately qualified and skilled workforce with the required capacity is another factor behind the dearth of private security services. The majority of Czech private security companies also mis-target their PR

campaigns, primarily focusing on potential recÂits and underestimating the customer-seeking dimension.

Nonetheless, an environment missing a legal regulatory framework raises questions about why this is the case, that is, the reason for such a prolonged absence. Here, we may consider the lack of attention from responsible lawmakers resulting in a lack or non-existence of political will and commitment. According to the resources that I consulted, this deficit/ absence of will really matters, but its underlying cause lies in "irregular" links with the political establishment. In particular, former high-ranking private security executives have been appointed to (sometimes very important) political functions and roles, a trend which is quite the opposite of the pattern in other countries where former politicians move to the commercial sphere.

It should be noted that, in 2012, the Âling government attempted to reform the self-regulating private security market and introduced a bill on a purported compromise between private security providers on the one hand and the Ministry of the Interior on the other. However, private security representatives maintain that this bill was not in fact a compromise and its provisions had been set up to satisfy the interests of the Ministry first and foremost. One critical issue that must be addressed, then, is the clarification of the requirements, obligations and rights of Czech private security companies who provide their goods and services in foreign countries.

Interestingly, one private security representative whom I interviewed mentioned the possible growth in demand for what he called 'higher security services' (primarily close protection services). This potential demand is strongly connected with the potential of foreign markets. Among these higher security services, we can also include aerial capabilities (unmanned aerial vehicles) of private security actors.

Overview of Key Czech Export Data

I suggest an introduction to the basic features and timing of Czech exports is needed in order to put Afghanistan's potential as a significant Czech export market in a broader context. As such, this overview is not comprehensive. Moreover, since I lack an appropriate educational background in economics, I have deliberately refrained from analysing the economic issues at hand in the depth and thoroughness that they deserve. However, in general, the Czech economy can be classified as

small, open and export-driven. According to 2013 data from the Czech Offices of Statistics and Customs Authorities, the export of goods and services comprised some 81% of the annual Czech GDP.[13] In compliance with binding EU regulations, surveys of export data are regulated by the Customs Act, and since 01 May 2004, they have also come under a Czech Ministry of Finance decree on trade with third countries.[14] The data from Customs Authorities and presented by the Czech Statistical Office cover both trade with other EU member states and non-EU countries. These statistics show that recently exports have exceeded import figures. The increasing role of public-private partnerships in external trade is also identified.[15] Even outside the security sector, I believe that private companies are useful vehicles through which state representatives can trade certain goods and services abroad without needing the parliamentary authorisation that is required under Czech law.[16] This commonality is expected to prompt a trend once Czech political and corporate representatives decide to diversify Czech export markets. One of the main incentives for the long-term vision of finding new markets and new projects for the Czech economy within broader European economic diversification efforts, is a generally very strong dependence on Russia.[17] In light of the latest developments in Ukraine, Russian partners are understood to be increasingly unreliable, a condition that goes beyond the business and trade context though that is critical for to our purposes.

The potential advantages of this export diversification are self-evident and dominated by the generation of more revenue and boosting of the economy. There are, however, significant disadvantages as well including the re-opening of the debate on the schism between economic profit and human rights, especially in cases of the supply of potential weapons, ammunition and/or possible dual use technologies to countries with a record of human rights abuses. Afghanistan may be one such controversial export market since it is still a hot conflict zone. This discussion has the potential to challenge the Czech Republic's international prestige as a strong supporter and defender of human rights and freedoms. Related to this debate, there is a need to address the potential social responsibility and accountability of the Czech private security actors who intend to deliver their goods and services abroad.

According to the Czech Statistical Office's *Statistical Yearbook* for 2013, some export sectors may be considered "traditional."[18] In line

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with efforts to find new external trade markets, we can also highlight other non-traditional export sectors based on specific conditions and needs in selected countries.

A major portion of total Czech external trade consists of the export of machinery and transport equipment. This is followed by miscellaneous manufactured articles, mineral fuels and chemicals, manufactured goods, cÂde materials and food, beverages and fats.[19] These categories are general but sufficient for our purposes. The Czech Republic's main export partners are identified as Germany, Slovakia, Poland, France, the UK and Austria. This indicates the prevalence of Czech external trade/exports inside the EU.[20] There is some argument about whether this amounts to an advantage or a disadvantage given the potential impact of a future financial crisis both in the Eurozone and worldwide.

Overview of Czech Policy on Afghanistan

To understand why Afghanistan might potentially be another important export market for both the Czech state- (semi-) owned and private companies, it is useful to place these issues in the larger context of the Czech Republic's general policy towards Afghanistan. Again, I set out only basic characteristics and relevant factors since this study does not aim to address this topic in greater depth and scope.

The two countries have a relatively long history of bilateral relations that includes a strong mutual trade exchange element. The potential expansion of Czech exports to Afghanistan has solid roots even as unstable security continues to limit any more significant efforts by Czech corporate actors to re-establish trade and a presence in the country. The multilateral dimension of this relationship is also significant, especially considering the Czech Republic's reconstÂction and development activities in Afghanistan and its active participation in NATO's International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan, which is set to continue in a transformed state until 2016. However, while this multinational dimension is strong and cannot be underestimated, the primary focus of this study remains the bilateral dimension of the Czech-Afghan relationship.

Afghanistan is further identified as one of the five long-term priority countries for Czech foreign policy in the Czech Foreign Ministry's latest concept document, whose primary focus is the security and eco-

nomic dimension of the Czech-Afghan relationship at both bilateral and multilateral levels. In general, the Czech Republic has a strong strategic interest in the existence of a stable, democratic and developed Afghanistan, and up to now its development, humanitarian and reconstÂction aid and efforts on the ground have supported Afghanistan's socioeconomic development and progress. Alternative actions with the same aim (i.e. supporting (socio-)economic transformation and growth) could contribute to stabilising the country. Here, for example, Czech exports might provide further economic incentives or employment opportunities.

The Czech Foreign Ministry has also developed an unofficial roadmap document titled *Development Cooperation Programme for Afghanistan, 2013-2017*, which identifies economic stabilisation and the creation of grounds for lasting sustainable development in the country as critical priorities for Czech-Afghan relations at both bilateral and multinational levels.[21] Czech exports of non-security related goods and services—along with the potential supply of goods and services by Czech private security actors— could help with this effort. This approach might be mutually beneficial since it would create new job opportunities for both Czechs and Afghans. It could also find productive roles for skilled and qualified experts across relevant subject areas and support small business activities on both sides. Further, the transfer of technologies is explicitly identified as one of the priorities for future Czech policy towards Afghanistan. Even so, I believe that the absence of any unified common document of the Czech Foreign Ministry and Ministry of Defence regarding what the country wants to achieve in Afghanistan and how it should therefore proceed (i.e. in terms of strategies, capabilities, instÂments, etc.) complicates any corporate business (whether private security-related or not) and may potentially make it unproductive and ineffective.

Importantly, exports of private security and non-security business activities, goods and services to a conflict zone like Afghanistan could prove to be a double-edged sword. There may even be a severe backlash given the strong risks of lobbying, corÂption and bribery as well as the maintaining of bad practices/methods. The latter include both factors in Afghanistan (warlordism, personality-driven politics, ethnic/tribal rivalries, corÂption, poppy cultivation, organised crime, bad governance and ineffective provision of even the most basic services to the population, etc.) and the practices of Czech private security

companies (irregular connections with the political establishment, the creation of ad hoc, single-purpose private security companies, real influence over the political-economic "grey zone," and the general potential to cause damage to the Czech Republic's international reputation in Afghanistan and elsewhere, etc.). These drive the critical need for a legally binding regulatory framework at the Czech state level even though the conduct of private security actors in Afghanistan would fall under the strict Afghan regulatory and control framework. Cooperation and consultation with Afghanistan (and any other foreign states where Czech private security actors may be active) should be considered when drafting any legal instÂment on these issues. The regulatory and control framework in Afghanistan could even| introduce effective mechanisms to be integrated into a Czech counterpart since the presence and activities of Czech private security companies in the country would underline the urgency of such a framework in the Czech Republic. A situation in which private security companies continue to basically regulate themselves is no longer sustainable, and if their presence and activities are strengthened and expanded abroad – let alone into conflict zones – it will be increasingly indefensible at both domestic and international levels.

Czech-Afghan Bilateral Trade and Economic Relations

As shown, the economic dimension of Czech-Afghan relations is fundamental. This section aims to provide a fact-sheet of basic characteristic and trends in this area. My goal is, thus, to enhance this study's analysis, and not to provide a comprehensive and complex breakdown of Czech-Afghan trade and economic relations.

The information presented and analysed in this section – and the two parts that follow on Afghanistan's potential as a Czech trade and business export destination and the prospects for private security respectively – may also help explain why Afghanistan could (and, for some important reasons, should) become another market for the export of Czech goods and services. We can, thus, see why Czech political decision-makers could and should support these exports. This move can help to diversify Czech export markets, promote overall economic growth and develop a much needed regulatory framework given the state of the Czech private security business. Importantly, while such a framework may not be particularly in the interests of some significant

Czech politicians or corporate actors in general, I also do not expect it to be very restrictive, limiting or concrete and specific in the provisions and measures it establishes. Moreover, given the attention and domestic and international pressures that the extension of Czech private security across borders—let alone to conflict zones—would certainly generate, a legal document establishing a regulatory and control framework and tools and mechanisms amounts to a "must-have."

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As noted, the Czech Republic and Afghanistan have a good historical record of reciprocal trade relations. The first record of trade cooperation between the former Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan dates back to the 1920s, when Czechoslovakia established a sugar factory in Baghlan. The existence of very good relations at diplomatic level also supported and underscored the economic and trade dimension of these bilateral relations. After 1957, the first exports of machinery and equipment took place under the intergovernmental credit provision framework, with items being used for cement works in Jabal us-Siraji and Puli Chumri, coal mines in Karkar-Dudkas and a slaughterhouse in Kabul. After Afghanistan became a republic, its government and Czechoslovakia signed an economic agreement on 17 December 1973. The economic cooperation between Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan was strengthened further after April 1978, when a Communist puppet regime was established in Afghanistan. As a "brotherly" Communist state, Czechoslovakia (along with the Soviet Union and other Eastern bloc countries) became very active in creating and boosting Afghan economic potential. A Czechoslovak trade department was established in Kabul, and several bilateral agreements were signed between the two governments dealing with issues of trade and economic cooperation and cooperation in science and technology. The period of the 1980s, when Soviet troops occupied Afghanistan, was marked by several significant economic developments in bilateral Czechoslovak-Afghan relations; these included support for trolleybus transport in Kabul, on-going constÂction activities in the cement industry, power engineering and the mining industry. Furthermore, Czechoslovak specialists in geology, parasitology, medical geography, Oriental studies and other disciplines were sent to Afghanistan to educate and assist with local capacity-building efforts. The priority, however, remained goods and services related to mining, energy, transport and cement work for reconstÂction. After the signing of a bilateral postal agreement, various engineering products, freight vehicles, tÂcks, tyres,

tubes, building materials and other consumer goods were delivered to Afghanistan. In the opposite direction, commodities such as cotton, raisins and other dried fÂit, animal hide, skins and the like were imported to Czechoslovakia from Afghanistan. Significantly, all of the facilities and projects that Czechoslovakia implemented in Afghanistan were compromised or destroyed during the conflict in Afghanistan in the 1980s and 1990s. Therefore, there is virtually no groundwork that Czech companies could build on for their future reconstÂction projects in Afghanistan.

Interestingly, I was told by (former) Czech Ambassador to Afghanistan, Petr Pelz, during direct discussions with him, that Czechoslovak JAWA-brand motorbikes were very popular among irregular anti-Soviet *mujahedin* forces. He also noted that some current insurgent groupings continue to use these bikes both for transport and to stage their attacks (they serve as both a means of transport and as actual vehicles bearing improvised explosive devices).

Two chambers of commerce provide established platforms that may serve to increase the level and expand the scope of reciprocal trade relations.[22] First, the Czech-Middle Asian Mixed Chamber of Commerce provides general help with building and developing economic relations and trade cooperation between Czech companies and foreign business entities. Since these services have a wide reach geographically, there is a potential risk that they may not be provided with great awareness of the finest details of the Afghan economy and market.[23] On the other hand, by joining this network, companies and small businesspeople become part of a more established and consolidated business platform, which may serve as an assurance of their safe business practices. This chamber also cooperates closely with the Association of Afghan Businessmen. In October 2014, the two entities signed a memorandum of cooperation on a joint project, the Afghan Czech Business Centre.[24] This development could potentially make the Czech-Middle Asian Mixed Chamber of Commerce a more attractive and productive platform than the second chamber of commerce.[25] The latter, the Czech-Afghan Mixed Chamber of Commerce in the Czech Republic limits its focus to bilateral relations between the Czech Republic and Afghanistan. It was established in 2005 with the specific purpose of restoring the good name of Czech companies and products on the Afghan market. This chamber provides support through experienced consultants who are familiar with the Afghan economy and

have practical knowledge and experience; they counsel Czech inves-
tors, exporters and/or importers who are interested in expanding the
reach of their goods, products and services in Afghanistan. The cham-
ber's wide range of services are directed at facilitating entry into the
Afghan economy along with the start-up and consolidation of business
on the Afghan market and successful and effective commercial prac-
tice there.[26] Companies that are interested in Afghanistan as an export
market for their goods and services can, thus, join the chamber and
make use of its services.

However, it is difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of these two
chambers based on the success of Czech companies and small busi-
nesspeople on the Afghan market to date. For one thing, there are
many other variables that can significantly influence start-ups and
their consolidation on the market. Another factor that makes evalu-
ation hard is the general lack of any demand from Czech corporate
actors to enter Afghan markets.

The determinant that has been—and will continue to be—critical
when it comes to the drive of Czech corporate players to expand into
Afghan markets is the state of security in Afghanistan and general un-
certainty about the country's post-2014 future. Given the latest devel-
opments like US President Barack Obama's decision to issue guidelines
to US forces in Afghanistan after 2014 that endorse combat-enabling
support (and thus, basically allow the US to fight the Taliban and not
just the remnants of al-Qaeda, as was previously authorised), these
forces will provide ground and aerial combat support to Afghan na-
tional security forces and so retain some of their combat role. The
close attention of the international community to Afghanistan and its
continued presence and support in the country, may serve to increase
Czech corporate actors' demand and efforts to enter Afghanistan since
no single actor would want to take over responsibility and account-
ability for abandoning Afghanistan on its own. Another significant
variable is the potential of corporate actors to make use of private se-
curity goods and services already being offered or, as they case may be,
to develop their own security-related roles and capabilities. Consider-
ing the strong ties between politicians and entrepreneurs and those
among entrepreneurs themselves in the Czech environment, I believe
that Czech corporate actors would not be inclined to hire a foreign or
multinational private company providing security-related goods and
services despite their greater experience. Taking into account another

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rather typical Czech element—the quest for the lowest price for goods and services generally—it is also significant that some Czech private security actors would be cheaper to hire than any international competitor.

There is no agreed basis for reciprocal trade cooperation at a whole-of-government level between the Czech Republic and Afghanistan though particular official documents serve as the grounds for more in-depth and specific cooperation. In 2012, for example, the Afghan transport minister visited the Czech Republic and signed an intergovernmental agreement with his Czech counterpart. Its contents included the Czech constÂction industry's participation in the development of transport infrastÂcture in Afghanistan. In addition, as we have seen, the transfer of technologies is an explicit priority for future Czech policy on Afghanistan.[27] From a historical standpoint, although several agreements were signed by the governments of Afghanistan and Czechoslovakia, they did not give rise to successive Czech-Afghan agreements.

According to the data from the Czech Statistical Office, the balance of reciprocal Czech-Afghan trade shows a downward trend in recent years. This correlates with increasing instability in Afghanistan and the general worsening of the national security situation, again highlighting the underlying and determining effects of the security issue on considerations of whether to engage in the country. According to the Czech statistics, after the surge by US/NATO combat forces in Afghanistan in 2009, the volume and turnover of reciprocal trade between the Czech Republic and Afghanistan sank by 35.42% from the figure earlier that year (i.e. down from CZK 638 million to CZK 421 million).[28] Czech exports also fell by 36.61% over this period (i.e. from CZK 631 million in 2009 to CZK 400 million in 2010).[29] In contrast, correlating with the international community's increased efforts to stimulate Afghan economic growth and reduce dependence on international aid and investments, imports from Afghanistan soared by 71.43% in the same period (i.e. from CZK 7 million in 2009 to CZK 12 million in 2010).[30] This trend prevailed increasingly and began to consolidate in 2011, 2012 and 2013. Given the prolonged armed conflict, the overall demand for Czech goods and services is low in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the Czech Republic is seen very positively among Afghans, who appreciate the high quality of Czech products. On this basis, Czech actors who revive and

offer Czech products, goods and services on the Afghan market may enjoy a comparative advantage over other potential exporters.

Furthermore, the Czech Statistical Office data also helps us to identify three main spheres of Czech-Afghan trade partnership and economic cooperation: agriculture, infrastÂcture work and the mining industry. Notably, the major commodities exported from the Czech Republic to Afghanistan are vehicles, industrial machinery and equipment (especially pumps). On the other hand, the main imports to the Czech Republic from Afghanistan are fÂit, nuts, fragrances and medicinal plants.

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Exploring Afghanistan's Potential

Exports

Based on this intelligence about exports to Afghanistan, various actors have evaluated the needs and demands in the country in order to identify those which the Czech Republic could help meet with exported goods and services. A number of potential export commodities have been pinpointed. Some of these would basically succeed products once delivered to Afghanistan from Czechoslovakia while others would be first-time exports to the country. As a Âle, commodities exported from the Czech Republic to Afghanistan must not only meet Afghanistan's needs and be in its interests; they also need to fall within the overall framework of Czech policy towards Afghanistan, which they should support and complement. No Czech exporters may supply goods and services to Afghanistan that do not accord and are not consistent with broader Czech policy towards the country. This is because of the potential such exports have to affect the Czech Republic's international image and the democratic norms, values and principles being promoted in its bilateral and multilateral diplomatic agenda all over the world. Czech export activities should also support the particular development and reconstÂction projects being implemented on the ground by various Czech entities in Afghanistan. Cooperation between Czech actors and their Afghan counterparts need to be directed at enabling and enhancing the democratic transition process in Afghanistan with the aim of supporting stable economic growth and decreasing dependence on

international aid and investments. This means carrying missions out in ways that encourage local businesses and the local economy to grow sustainably.

As has been noted, however, the risk of corÂption and other bad financial practices increases alongside growing interest from foreign investors and exporters. The international finances being pumped into Afghanistan are generally perceived as sources of "quick, big money" based on experiences of the last few years when international aid was often ill-stÂctured, mismanaged and misused in Afghanistan. What Czech companies and small businesses considering doing any business in Afghanistan also need to take into account is the reality on the ground when it comes to the tÂe power brokers at local level. As Afghanistan is a highly heterogeneous society, a strong tribal element cannot be overlooked even in the context of potential exports to the country. Tribal rather than ethnic rivalries could potentially accompany any business deal at local level like the constÂction of facilities, geological exploration or waste processing projects, etc. In this regard, corporate actors interested in exporting their goods and services and/or starting up businesses in Afghanistan can either use local Afghan partners considered tÂstworthy and credible as proxies or intermediaries to make deals with tribes and clans, or they may try to reach an agreement with these entities on their own. Both approaches have their advantages and disadvantages, and it is not the aim of this study to analyse these problems in any depth. It is, however, important here to consider the organised crime dimension, which manifests predominantly around poppy cultivation.[31] Any foreign business operating in Afghanistan outside the capital Kabul will most likely encounter organised crime sooner or later. There is, hence, a need to include guidelines in their overall business and project implementation strategies on how to approach this activity when it starts to affect the business at hand. These guidelines should address issues like coping with potential racketeering imposed on the company's activities, as well as looting and attempted robbery. Such guidelines can give private security actors additional space to develop themselves and their operations.

Among the commodities which relevant actors suggest the Czech Republic can start exporting to Afghanistan in greater quantities are agricultural machinery, industrial machinery and equipment, geological exploration technologies and veterinary and agricultural technologies. Other potential exports include machinery for mining and quar-

rying along with professional training regarding mining and quarrying products, Czech crystal, waste processing technology, fire protection and shoes (especially military boots). All of these items require the constÂction and maintenance of infrastÂcture, including supplies for railway networks, the building of public roads and restoration of public transport. On the latter count, the re-establishment of the trolleybus network in Kabul is, according to former ambassador Pelz, one of the top topics on the current agenda of negotiations between Czech business entities and their Afghan counterparts.

I add three categories of items to the list of potential Czech export goods and services to Afghanistan: vehicles, dual-use technologies and weaponry and ammunition. These additions, of course, need to be weighed up before any decision is taken about actual supplies to Afghanistan.

Concerning the delivery of vehicles, there is a history of tÂck exports from the former Czechoslovakia to Afghanistan. This export segment may potentially be expanded with the supply of Czech family cars or multi-purpose vehicles. Such exports would, however, have to come after the building of public roads and other infrastÂcture and follow-up maintenance. This is, in fact, the prerequisite for the delivery of many potential Czech exports to Afghanistan.

Regarding dual-use technologies, I maintain that Afghanistan will not develop its weapons of mass destÂction programme in the future given the overall weakness of Afghan state stÂctures. However, what must again be thought through carefully is the widespread organised criminal activity across the country. Corporate entities delivering their goods and services to Afghanistan need to ensure that these technologies and/or maintenance services are protected and do not fall into the hands of non-state actors linked to organised crime or any other entities that could trade in or misuse these technologies.[32] These facts widen the scope for private security activity to include the protection of personnel, goods and related services on the ground.

The export of weaponry and ammunition presents an even more complex problem. Historically, the former Czechoslovakia supplied various kinds of weaponry and ammunition to Afghanistan. This arms trade was seen as part of a tradition. Czech exporters of this type could, thus, again enjoy a comparative advantage over other potential exporters. On the other hand, there are several factors that make Czech weaponry and ammunition exports problematic and potentially

unproductive. The first of these is the abundance of agreements between Afghanistan and other more influential arms-exporting states (the us first and foremost, but also Germany, India, Russia and others). Czech weaponry and ammunition may be comparatively cheaper, but given the strong political pressure surrounding this trade, any Czech arms export items would most likely be very specific and limited. One segment where Czech arms deliveries to the country might find support is the Afghan air force since the Czech Republic is one of the leading nations contributing to its build-up. Though these tasks were assigned entirely to Czech armed forces, Czech private players could supplement their efforts by providing technologies to the aviation industry along with maintenance services, education and other forms of Afghan capacity-building. Here, any gap in essential security provision could be filled with private security goods and services. In addition, there is a need to consider the risk of an emerging foreign policy dispute over the export of arms to conflict zones; a rift opens up when the pursuit of economic interests clashes with a policy of support for the protection of human rights and freedoms. Human rights concerns have been – and remain – an intrinsic part of Czech foreign policy. The Czech government and parliament have also adopted some regulations that prohibit arms exports to countries where there is clear potential for the items supplied to be used to violate human rights and freedoms. Afghanistan is obviously one of the target countries given the extended and on-going conflict that has recently been prone to escalate and intensify. In this regard, future developments in Afghanistan remain deeply uncertain and bound up with numerous factors: the future of the insurgency itself; the potential spread of instability from Iraq as the influence of isis-aligned entities increases; the future of the Afghan national security forces and of the real power-holders in the country; the related problem of re-establishing exclusive rights to the legitimate use of violence; the actions of neighbouring countries (especially Pakistan linked to the actions of India in Afghanistan, but also Iran); and many other determinants that are difficult to predict. All this means that the potential supply of Czech weaponry and ammunition to the country is also highly unpredictable. But just as the uncertainty about Afghanistan's future may create serious obstacles and challenges for Czech exports, so too could it prove beneficial in cases where specific demands arise and Czech exporters are able to meet them.

It should be stressed that the natural resources and mineral reserves of Afghanistan have the potential to meet the Czech Republic's energy needs and interests. This assumption is, of course, complex and subject to a variety of other important factors, and an analysis of these issues is not the purpose of this study. For our purposes, it is enough to note that Afghanistan's potential role in Czech energy policy may stimulate the Czech export of geological exploration and exploitation technologies and mining and quarrying machinery along with the deployment of experts on the ground in Afghanistan (and in the Czech Republic) to educate and train local professionals about mining and quarrying products. Furthermore, if the Czech Republic decides to participate in the exploration and exploitation of Afghan natural resources and mineral reserves, it may also provide technologies and experts for the reconstÂction of essential infrastÂcture across the country. The actual execution of these tasks on the ground in Afghanistan could expand the private security goods and services delivered and performed across the country. Importantly, Czech exports would not be limited to the delivery of items, but could also include constÂction, maintenance, servicing and an educational role in Afghanistan based on the International Security Assistance Force(ISAF)-promoted slogan *shona ba shona* (shoulder by shoulder) if interested actors decide to hire the local workforce.

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Private Security Goods and Services

As indicated in the previous section, the opportunity to export Czech goods and services to Afghanistan gives the Czech private security sector a way to use external markets to expand its activities abroad. This section therefore focuses on the potential (future) activities of private security companies in Afghanistan from a Czech perspective based on the capabilities, specificities and other circumstances of the privatising of security in the Czech Republic.

When considering any potential private security-related missions in Afghanistan, it is vital to note the specific framework recently established in the country which limits the activities of private security actors in Afghanistan. At the same time, this framework, if appropriately implemented and enforced, may offer lessons about introducing mechanisms and tools for the regulation and control of private security companies as well as ways to ensure their transparency and account-

ability and an adequate level of social responsibility in their activities. The main points of the regulatory framework for private security (and military) actors in Afghanistan can be summed up as follows: on 17 August 2010, then Afghan president Hamid Karzai issued Decree no. 62 whose articulated goal was an absolute ban on the activities of all private military and security companies in Afghanistan from 01 January 2011.[33]

Karzai justified this complete ban by reference to the uncontrolled flow of money, said to be creating a kind of dependency syndrome and obstÂcting the rise of the Afghan economy. He also cited the misdoings of contractors from some companies, including human rights abuses, espionage activities, collaboration with the insurgency and other misconduct subverting overall counter-insurgency and democratisation efforts. The bottom line here was an allegation that private operations were eroding the government of the Islamic Republic's exclusive right to the legitimate use of force as well as its legitimacy and credibility. A more pragmatic reason can, however, be identified as the driving force behind this decree: as Pelz confirmed to me during an interview, Karzai sought to distract international as well as domestic attention away from internal problems of pervasive corÂption. At the time, several political representatives and aides to the president himself were suspected of deep involvement in fraud and corÂption and they had been threatened with prosecution. According to the decree, the critical issue was whether a private security or military company already possessed a special authorisation and relevant licence that had been issued by the Afghan authorities. A ninety-day deadline was set for companies without the licence to wind up all their activities and leave the country. However, this deadline was subsequently extended. The debate about the ban on private security activities in Afghanistan has fallen silent since FebÂary 2011. Nevertheless, several important regulatory and control provisions were established in the decree: they include a limit on the number of contractors who can be hired for a specific task by a specific company for a specific period of time. This needs to be approved and authorised by relevant Afghan authorities and bodies, and there are Âles on issuing licences and the like. Under the decree, the Afghan private security and military organisations were required to transform themselves into a unified and thus more manageable entity called the Afghan Public Protection Force with the ISAF in an advisory role, or into so-called risk-management compa-

nies. These companies have, however, been subjected to further legal restrictions and obligations while the Afghan Public Protection Force has been assigned the tasks originally carried out by private military and security companies (especially when it comes to the protection of strategic assets, facilities owned and used by coalition forces and NATO supply convoys). In March 2013, the Afghan Ministry of Interior announced the Afghan Public Protection Force's integration into the stÂctures of the Afghan National Police. The main impetus for the decision to create this security section can be identified as the efforts of the Afghan government to control activities and money flow. Efforts to curb the profits of insurgents and criminals from the racketeering activities of Afghan private security actors also played a critical role. In my opinion, the reorganising of the Afghan national police stÂctures and integration of the Afghan Public Protection Force in fact increase the scope for foreign private security actors to increase their activities in Afghanistan. This opportunity is due to the challenges and problems of implementing such Afghan efforts in terms of the doubling of tasks, competencies, powers and authority and issues of (mis)management, commanding stÂctures and accountability and responsibility-sharing.

As I have argued, with the expansion of the private security goods and services provided by Czech entities into foreign/external arenas/markets, the potential for the hybridisation of private security providers rises exponentially. Certain tendencies are already evident in the Czech environment where corporate entities which originally provided non-security-related goods and services have started to develop their own private security provision-related capabilities. It is still not clear how the specific legal regulatory and control framework in place in Afghanistan would apply to these actors. Additional changes and amendments are required to adjust the legal provisions and requirements for these new hybrid types of private security providers. Given the absence of such an overall legal framework in the Czech environment, the case of these hybrids needs to be considered, with adequate and appropriate provisions approved and implemented to avoid the creation of potentially exploitable legal gaps.

Significantly, the Czech Republic is a signatory and supporter of the 2008 Montreux Document, an instÂment also signed and ratified by Afghanistan to add to the complexity of the topic at hand. [34] The Montreux Document is an agreement among a number of countries setting up obligations regarding the presence, functions and activities

of private military and security companies in conflict zones. This document lists some seventy recommendations for good state practices. These include verifying companies' track records; examining procedures used for the staff-vetting process; conducting correct criminal prosecutions after any violation of effective legal provisions; the existence of company insurance policies; and ensuring the compliance of companies' personnel training and conduct with the protection of human rights and freedoms and the norms of humanitarian law in general. Contracting states, home states and territorial states are reminded of their international legal obligations in the document as well as the various types of behaviour and conduct that are understood to be good practices during any interactions with corporate security businesses. The document applies international law to private security companies themselves. Although the contents of the document and the provisions it applies focus primarily on times of armed conflict, its scope goes beyond this and deals with relevant aspects of non-armed conflict contexts as well. I therefore consider this instÂment to be a good starting point and potential blueprint. Since, however it is a non-binding, non-legal document that neither creates nor alters legal obligations, but merely summarises and articulates existing requirements and provisions about private security roles and functions, there is a pressing need for additional action. It is vital that the measures introduced in the Montreux Document are integrated into some other legal framework that could be created in the Czech Republic (or elsewhere). In sum, Czech decision-makers and other relevant actors should build on the Montreux Document since it creates common ground for various entities and their interactions in the context of providing private security goods and services.

Generally speaking, along with the transformative role that NATO member states' armed forces are playing in Afghanistan under operation Resolute Support—a mission that involves advising, assisting, training and mentoring of Afghan national security forces with a scheduled start date of January 2015—there is space for private security actors who can supplement the official NATO support mission with their skills and capabilities. Of special interest to Czech private security actors could be the training of Afghan prison guard units, a segment overlooked and underestimated in the overall context of training missions by NATO forces. (The training of border police units might present another opportunity though this task is more likely to

be conducted by regular NATO forces given the general significance of border police.) Theoretically at least, private security companies could contribute to building the capacities of local units (such as Afghan local police or Pashto tribal militia *arbakai*), but such tasks are highly dependent on the future of security sector reform in Afghanistan and the potential integration of these units into the stÂctures of the national security system. Additionally, Czech private security companies could provide specialists, goods and services in the security engineering and design spheres to give a further boost to Afghan national security force capacities.

The potential export items and services which have been identified and analysed in this study would help Czech private security actors to enhance their close protection and static guarding skills and capabilities and to develop the skills and capabilities needed for effective goods and services protection. Furthermore, the protection of infrastÂcture and facilities, to be achieved through the export of the capabilities, skills and know-how commonly used for these types of tasks domestically, could be a significant component in the evolution of Czech private security. Since Czech exports could potentially include the training and education of Afghans as well as the presence of Czech experts on the ground, private security companies could come under fairly strong pressure to develop their capabilities for rescue/recovery and/or medical evacuation missions. Such private players would also need to strengthen their transport capabilities.

Afghanistan is clearly a very complex conflict zone where various positive as well as negative and subversive influences, supports and pressures can—at times critically—affect the delivery of goods and services on the ground as well as trade and business themselves. These characteristics would most definitely help to stimulate the risk analysis, risk management and other consultancy segments of the Czech private security industry that are connected to intelligence-gathering activity (entailing export intelligence, business intelligence, intelligence about the situation on the ground in the area of interest, etc.). The external activities of Czech private security companies might also spur the growth of the banking and financial services of relevant actors given pressures from both internal and external directions and the general attention bound to follow. In this regard, these activities would be very difficult to keep off the the radar from the public, international organisations and other potentially important entities.

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Moreover, in my opinion, Czech private security actors could supply goods and services to Afghanistan outside (or discontinuously with) the export of Czech products and services. Virtually any entity can hire a Czech private security company to undertake particular tasks. It was disclosed to me during the interviews for this research that Afghan entrepreneurs had hired a private security company (a part-Czech enterprise, with a British co-owner) to secure a newly built hotel in Kabul. I also believe that the private security services Ân by Czech companies could be retained by non-governmental or humanitarian organisations or travel agencies wishing to protect tourists travelling to regions where security was risky and unstable. Theoretically, a guard service for national parks or protected areas might also be viable.

All these potential uses of private security forces, goods and services in a foreign conflict zone – and Afghanistan specifically – would significantly affect the state and development of the privatisation of security in the Czech Republic. The potential implications for the privatisation of security in the Czech Republic – and the Czech private security market itself – are examined in this study's conclusion.

Conclusion: Contemplating the Potential Implications

I have decided not to categorise the potential implications uncovered in this work as either positive, neutral or negative. All of these implications may have further positive as well as negative effects, and the longer-term outlook may include a backlash. Moreover, this study has not aimed to offer any more concrete and specific recommendations or guidelines. I have sought rather to explore the potential for Czech exports to Afghanistan along with possible activities of Czech private security entities in the country and to identify where these prospects overlap. This overlap builds on the interests currently being pursued by Czech trade and private security actors with a common denominator of profit. My analysis points to the development trajectory that is most probable, but also ideal given favourable conditions on the ground in Afghanistan.

The potential hybridisation of Czech private security providers has been mentioned several times. Formerly non-security-related businesses in the Czech Republic may start to develop their own security-related capabilities, especially in terms of real risk assessment, risk management and business intelligence. Theoretically, these compa-

nies could also start to build their own private security provision capabilities as operatives handling protection and guarding tasks. These roles, however, require greater input costs and resources (especially for education and training) than simply hiring qualified analysts. Therefore, it would seem to be more logical and profitable to contract an actor which already has these capabilities at its disposal. There is, then, no prospect of absolute hybridisation of the sector. I would also assume that the two chambers of commerce that already serve as a base for business with and in Afghanistan would be (if they are not already) the initial focal points for exports of private security companies' services from the Czech Republic to Afghanistan. At the same time, these chambers have the greatest potential to develop their own private security-related capabilities.

The role and position of private security actors would be strengthened in the Czech security architecture if the private security market became more consolidated in the face of internal and external pressures. This increased power of corporate security entities and the private security market would most likely bring additional pressure, greater than ever before, to create a law establishing a regulatory and control framework along with instÂments and mechanisms for the private security goods and services market in the Czech environment. Again, I would not expect such a legal document to provide any more concrete and specific provisions or requirements, rights and obligations for private security provider entities. I do believe, however, that this legal regulatory and control framework would be very restrictive and potentially limit the performance of private security roles and functions; at the same time, it would need to stay very general since finding a compromise among so many interested actors remains very problematic amidst mounting pressures internally (from the public) and externally (from international partners and organisations especially at EU and NATO levels, etc.). Nevertheless, it is thanks to these pressures that the political will and commitment might be generated to come up with at least some minimal basis for regulating and controlling the business at hand. The competencies, authority and powers of private security actors would need to be clarified and well-defined in this framework. Given the specific security environments that these players would face in Afghanistan, their competencies would also need to be expanded beyond necessary and appropriate (self-)defence while remaining very moderate. The issue of private security operatives' tak-

ing of prisoners—before these persons are handed over to responsible law enforcement authorities, an imperative step—would have to be addressed with relevant provisions set out clearly. A related concern, the potential criminal prosecution of individual contractors would also need to be dealt with. It is clear that if deployed to Afghanistan, the operatives of security companies would fall under Afghan law. What needs to be considered and addressed in the relevant legal document, however, is the potential for the expulsion and deportation of those who are prosecuted in Afghanistan along with the additional issue of their serving sentences in the Czech Republic (in the case of Czech nationals first and foremost; a wider and more challenging debate is expected regarding non-Czech nationals working for Czech companies in a similar situation, and adequate legal provisions would need to address this issue as well). Significantly, any legal regulatory framework for the Czech private security market must be based on the principles of the Montreux Document, which the Czech Republic joined a year ago. With a clear legal framework in place, the businesses of private security entities would become more transparent in the Czech context. The performance of private security actors would become more socially and politically responsible and individual contractors as well as entire companies would be held accountable for their deeds.

The call for a legal framework reflects the need to establish the legality of Czech private security actors performing their business abroad, and in Afghanistan specifically. In this connection, the potential legitimacy of private security actors would be affected both domestically and in the country where tasks are being executed. (This is the ideal scenario.) Objective and unbiased media coverage of missions and tasks of Czech private security providers would raise general public awareness at the domestic level and help generate appropriate pressure on political leaders to adopt a Czech legal framework for the private security sector and market. Once such a framework is in place, private security actors could gain more public respect and legitimacy. In this regard, the "grey zone" of the Czech private security market should be limited through the legal regulatory and control mechanisms enacted for the sector. Increased public awareness and interest could also prompt additional pressures to transform the "irregular" connections between politicians and private security entrepreneurs into more "healthy," effective and productive ones. Nevertheless, the prospect that personal ties will just be pulled under the radar – off the grid and out of pub-

lic sight – remains relatively high. On the side of Czech state actors, procurement stÂctures may also be affected given the internal and external pressures generated by the export of Czech private security goods and services. The "Afghanistan factor" could disÂpt or dismantle relationships due to the entirely different private security business environment at international level. Achieving legitimacy in the eyes of the local Afghan population may also be a persistent problem in the wake of the overall historical experience.

Participation in the Afghanistan market would, thus, also increase the need for adequate, appropriate and credible local knowledge within the private security sector that provides employment opportunities for Afghans. (These individuals' background checks would need to be detailed, exhaustive and accurate.) As a specific feature of the Czech private security sector, employment relations would see changes, with the loosening of employer–employee ties and the increasing potential for a "Western" model of hiring contractors for specific tasks rather than actually employing them (due to potential insurance problems and other concerns).

Notably, the private security goods and services provided domestically in the Czech Republic would virtually be exported to a foreign country. The emergence of a Czech private military company – i.e. a company dedicated to what Singer classifies as the roles and functions of security provider, consultant and supporter, including developing logistical support services – is therefore highly likely in my opinion. This is in line with growing demands for such services coming from various Czech corporate actors who are not, however, security-related.

Alongside this "externalisation," another important implication is the "transnationalisation" of the Czech private security market based on the increasing tendency for cooperation with a wide range of state as well as non-state actors. There is a fundamental and critical need for the adopting of related legal provisions that address the challenges of externalisation and transnationalisation appropriately and adequately as both these processes include highly controversial, problematic and even dangerous interactions with outside players. Not only do these interactions have the potential to damage the international image and reputation of the Czech Republic, but the potential threats they pose to vital and strategic Czech interests cannot be underestimated. On the other hand, these two trends may also bring great benefits to the Czech market in private security goods and services, especially by in-

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troducing standards, methods and codes of conduct from more experienced foreign companies.

Together with other internal and external pressures, the externalising of Czech private security provision efforts—could also generate a more effective educational framework for private security and military company workers. And, the transformation of employment, better education (including various courses, workshops, study visits, etc.) could create a more qualified workforce, potentially attractive to foreign private security companies as well. Externalisation-related pressures and influences could change PR recÂitment as well as customer-seeking campaigns, making them more sophisticated and professional.

At the same time, I suggest that the potential for overloading the private security sector is relativelyhigh—and particularly so in the Czech context. We must therefore consider the potential for the implosion (or burn-out) of the Czech private security market as a result of the inability of relevant actors to meet demands in Afghanistan (and elsewhere).

In sum, in my opinion, the advantages of externalisation and transnationalisation of the Czech private security market potentially surpass their disadvantages. However, this is only tÂe so long as the market's self-regulating tendencies are halted and a strong political will and commitment generated and maintained to address the problems at hand. In the Czech Republic, this second variable remains a formidable challenge.

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Notes

1   Local academic publications on the topic include O. Bures (2012),'Private Actors in the Fight against Terrorist Financing: Efficiency versus Effectiveness,' *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 35 (10), pp. 712-732; O. Bures (2013),'Public-Private Partnerships in the Fight against Terrorism?' *Crime, Law, Social Change* 60(4), pp. 429-455; O. Bures (2014), 'Private Security Companies in the Czech Republic: Rearticulating the Security Field and Transforming Politics,' *Security Dialogue* 45 (1), pp. 81-98; O. Bures and V. Nedvedicka, (2011), *Privatizace bezpečnosti:* České *a zahraniční zkušenosti* [Privatisation

of Security: Czech and Foreign Experiences], Prague: Grada; O. Bures (ed.) (2013), *Privatizace bezpečnosti: České a zahraniční zkušenos*ti [Privatisation of Security: Czech and Foreign Experiences], Prague: Grada; T. Jurcik (2013), *Soukromé bezpečnostní firmy v bezpečnostním prostředí* České *republiky* [Private Security Companies in the Security Environment of the Czech Republic], Master's thesis, Masaryk University, available at: <http://is.muni.cz/th/237769/fss_m/>; J. Kamenik and F. Brabec (eds.) (2007), *Komerční bezpečnost: Soukromá bezpečnostní* činnost *deketivních kanceláří a bezpečnostních agentur* [Commercial Security: Private Security Activities of Detective Offices and Security Agencies], Prague: ASPI Wolters Kluwer; V. Lamr (2010), *Sociálně-právní a pedagogické aspekty* činnosti *soukromých bezpečnostních agentur* [Socio-legal and Pedagogical Aspects of Private Security Agency Activities], Master's thesis, University of Tomas Bata, Zlin, available at <http://theses.cz/id/d69isp/?lang=en;furl=%2Fid%2Fd69isp%2F>; P. Macek (ed.) (2008), *Bezpečnostní služby*, Praha: Police History, P. Macek and F.Novak (2005), *Privátní bezpečnostní služby*, Prague: Police History; and T. Smid (2012), 'Hrot kopí a české soukromé vojenské a bezpečnostní společnosti,' *Středoevropské politické studie* 4, vol. XIV, autumn 2012.

2 Czech nationals with adequate skills, experience and knowledge are, however, hired quite frequently by foreign (British, American, South African, etc.) private military and security companies and deployed to security-risk areas and conflict zones. They represent an important Czech component of the private security sector at the multinational, cross-border, non-domestic level.

3 For my purposes, the concept of "exports" reflects the aspirations of both state-owned and private companies to Ân their businesses on the ground in Afghanistan. References to exports, thus, denote not only the goods and services to be sold in the foreign country, but also an actual physical presence there. This is mostly to be achieved through personnel operations and export support services as well as assistance, advice and mentoring activities as part of the education and training of locals.

4 These interviews were conducted in 2013 and the first half of 2014.

5 Bures (ed.)(2013).

6 Ibid, pp. 162, 192.

7 Trade Licensing Act no. 455/1991.

8 Other Czech statutes relevant to private security include an amendment to the Trade Licensing Act (2007), Act no. 274/2008, on the police of the Czech Republic and Act no. 292/2009, on excises and a number of other amendments to various statutes.

9 Bures (2013), p. 192.

10 The private security market is also one of the few sectors open to former workers and collaborators in the Communist security apparatus: see Bures (2013), p.163. This situation, however, remains controversial: while it may help these individuals find a way to earn their living without meetingstigma and potentially discrimination, it also brings past modes and patterns of behaviour into a new and still evolving business market. This could eventually harm the market's development.

11 One interview respondent noted that in this situation 'the goods and services of many of the Czech private security companies are being stretched too far, complicating their business.'

12 Peter W. Singer (2008), *Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatised Military Industry. Updated Edition*, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.

13 Czech Statistical Office (2013), *Statistical Yearbook of the Czech Republic 2013*, available at: <http://csugeo.i-server.cz/csu/2013edicniplan.nsf/eng-publ/0001-13-eng_r_2013>

14 Ibid. This decree implements various Customs Act provisions and repeals several decrees on import duty exemptions and the non-preferential origin of goods.

15 Ibid.

16 For a recent example, consider the supply of Kurdish fighters in Iraq with Czech weapons and ammunition. In this case, the Czech Minister of Foreign Affairs made a public statement about using private corporate channels to avoid the potentially drawn-out process of obtaining parliamentary authorisation.

17 More specifically, Russia has highly interdependent relationships with both the European Union as a whole and individual member states. Both sides in these relationships need the other to prevent the dramatic deterioration of their respective economies that would result from an extended shortage of the goods and services imported/exported from the other side. This fact, however, does not prevent these breakdowns from happening, particularly when trade and business are hijacked as political tools to leverage policy changes on either side.

18 Czech Statistical Office (2013). For more information, see Ministry of Industry and Trade (2014), 'Traditional Export Sectors,'<http://www.czech-tradeoffices.com/about-czech-republic/export-sectors/> (accessed 15 November 2014).

19 Ibid.

20 See the more detailed and precise data from the Czech Statistical Office (2013), available at <http://www.czso.cz/csu/2013edicniplan.nsf/engt/0E002418FB/$File/000113.pdf> (accessed 16 November 2014) (now dead). For another very good source of Czech export and import data, see the Czech Republic profile in the *Observatory of Economic Complexity* available at <http://atlas.media.mit.edu/profile/country/cze/> (accessed 15 November 2014).

21 The Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2012), *Development Cooperation for Afghanistan, 2013 – 2017*. available at: <http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:UqxzCEWddzUJ:www.mzv.cz/file/1023376/PROGRAMME_CZ_AFG_2013_2017_FINAL.doc+&cd=2&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=cz>.

22 The primary emphasis here is on Czech export-Afghan import axis given the focus of this study.

23 This risk is, however, minimal considering this chamber's established presence in Afghanistan, including regional offices with permanent representatives in the country. For more information, see *Czech-Middle Asian Mixed Chamber of Commerce* (2014), <http://www.csok.cz/article/en> (accessed 21

November 2014).

24 The project is intended to be long-term. It aims to foster reciprocal trade cooperation and to support Czech exports.

25 Another strength of the Czech-Middle Asian Mixed Chamber of Commerce lies in its educational projects. These focus on training qualified industry and engineering sector specialists on both the Czech and partner (including Afghanistan) sides.

26 More information about the Czech-Afghan Mixed Chamber of Commerce in the Czech Republic is available at its website <http://www.obchodniko-mora.cz/index.html> (accessed 21 November 2014; text available in Czech only).

27 Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2012).

28 Based on currency exchange rates of US$1 to CZK 22.3 and €1 to CZK 27.67 (valid on 22 November 2014), reciprocal trade fell from US$28.6m to US$18.48m and from €23.1m to €15.2m respectively.

29 From US$28.3m (€22.8m) in 2009 to US$17.9m (€14.46m) in 2010.

30 From US$0.31m (€0.25m) in 2009 to US$0.54m (€0.49m) in 2010.

31 According to the latest UN report, such poppy cultivation reached record highs in 2014. See United Nations Office on DÂgs and Crime (2013), *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2013*, available at: <http://www.unodc.org/documents/cropmonitoring/Afghanistan/Afghan_report_Summary_Findings_2013.pdf>.

32 The risk of misuse/abuse of dual-use technologies does not necessarily relate to the manufacture of weapons of mass destÂction. These technologies may also, for example, help enable more sophisticated poppy processing etc.

33 President of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (2010), Decree about Dissolution of Private Security Companies no. 62, 17 August, available at: <http://psm.du.edu/media/documents/national_regulations/countries/asia_pacific/afghanistan/afghanistan_decree_number_52_dissolution_psc_2010-english.pdf>

34 See *International Committee of the Red Cross* (2014), 'The Montreux Document on Private Military and Security Companies,' <https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/publication/p0996.htm>. For the full text of the Montreux Document on Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States related to Operations of Private Military and Security Companies during Armed Conflict, see <https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc_002_0996.pdf> (accessed 22 November 2014). The Czech Republic joined the Montreux Document on 14 November 2013.

Environmental Cooperation and Conflict Transformation

Šárka Waisová

This work is concerned with the tactic of using environmental cooperation as a conflict transformation instÂment. This is an optimistic approach which suggests that environmental cooperation is an independent variable that may positively influence politics due to it retaining strong peacebuilding potentials. This article shows how ideas about the relationship between environment, ecology and conflicts has evolved and changed over time and discusses seven theoretical and methodological problems of the approach. The problems and weaknesses of the idea to use environmental cooperation as a conflict transformation instÂment, discussed in the text, moderate the optimism originally connected with the approach. It seems that the transformative peacebuilding potential of environmental cooperation remains, at least, unclear.

Introduction

As political issues, the environment and ecology have a short but rich history. Environmental issues entered the political agenda in the mid-1960s in a variety of ways. One of the newest approaches is based on the idea of using environmental cooperation as a tool for conflict transformation. This idea emerged in the 1990s in an attempt to find more effective instÂments to solve conflicts, and in the new millennium as part of the legacy of 9/11, it has gained attention from policymakers.[1] While the relationship between the environment and security has been researched for decades and is relatively well-analysed

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and described,[2] attitudes to the relationship between the environment and conflict have changed dynamically in recent years, and the current analysis and state of research are unsatisfactory.

This work is concerned with the evolution and difficulties of using environmental cooperation as a conflict transformation instÂment. The transformation of the idea into an institutionalised approach is observed and its weaknesses and problems are analysed. The motive for this research lies in the fact that despite growing interest in this concept among scholars as well as practitioners, there has been little relevant systematic and critical study of the literature on the use of environmental cooperation as a conflict transformation instÂment and no critical evaluation of the approach as such. The recent study by Maas, Carius and Wittich – the first project of its kind[3] – observes that there is no coherent school of thought within the literature on environmental cooperation as a conflict transformation instÂment, but rather several trends, which they concentrate on. Nevertheless, their study does not evaluate the literature or the approach *per se*.

This study revisits the academic literature. However, in the area of conflict resolution, which has a strong practical dimension, a substantial number of relevant publications have been produced outside academia—by international governmental organisations and agencies, non-governmental organisations, think-tanks and independent researchers. The scope of this present review, thus, goes beyond purely academic literature.

This article is divided into two parts: the first is stÂctured chronologically and shows how ideas about the relationship between the environment, ecology and conflicts have evolved and changed over time. The goal of this first part is not to replicate existing reviews, but to outline how the idea of environmental cooperation as a conflict transformation instÂment was born.[4] The second part is stÂctured thematically and discusses theoretical and methodological problems in the approach I term *environmental cooperation as a conflict transformation instÂment* along with the challenges facing contemporary research and applications using environmental cooperation in conflict transformation. This study does not, however, research the practice of environmental cooperation in conflict-affected areas; we still do not have enough empirical data for such an analysis.

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Using Environmental Cooperation to Transform Conflicts: The Framework

Environmental issues have been present in security studies since the 1950s, and they have been part of the international political agenda since the 1960s. Scholars (re: Brown) were concerned about the relationship between environmental change and security already in the 1950s, though they did not use this exact terminology.[5] The key text which articulated the connection between security and the environment, was Ullman's work titled 'Redefining Security.'[6] According to Ullman, non-military threats, such as a lack of resources or environmental disasters, are more devastating than military threats because environmental issues cannot be faced via military alliances or deterrents. Ullman's reflections were elaborated in the 1990s by scholars who analysed environmental threats and security.

This section introduces the way that environmental issues have penetrated the area of conflict resolution. Environmental issues became part of conflict resolution and peace studies in the mid-1990s, emerging from discussions in security studies about environmental scarcity, environmentally induced conflicts and conflict resources.[7] Environmental issues began to influence not only research into the causes of conflicts, but also the approach to conflict resolution.

Scholars of conflict resolution have determined a relationship between the environment, ecology and natural resources on one side and conflicts on the other, within a multidimensional complex framework in which four broad streams can be identified. Authors in the first stream worked further on the concept of environmental scarcity, enriching this concept with ideas about demographic growth, climate change and water wars, and arguing that environmental degradation and a lack of natural resources reduce the adaptive capacity of societies and support the outbreak of violence.[8] A second stream of authors believe that natural resources might serve to prolong conflicts since they bring money to conflicting parties (this idea was connected with research into economically induced conflicts[9] and the role of so-called blood diamonds in interstate conflicts in Africa).[10]

Representatives of the third stream argue that uneven access to resources, denial of resource access and insufficient compensation to the local communities whose resources are used, are all sources of grievances which can easily transform into a source of violence.[11] Critics of these three streams "joined forces" to create a fourth stream to

question the dominant narrative.[12] That story may be summed up as follows:

> high resource consumption → environmental degradation → deepening of resource scarcity → greater competition → a higher risk of the outbreak of violence.

The fourth stream argues that conflicts over resources may lead to the joint exploitation of resources and, consequently, the emergence of joint interests and joint resource management. Similarly, resource scarcity based on environmental degradation may be overcome by joint efforts to halt the degradation. Scholars in the fourth stream are inspired by the belief that environmental protection is vital and it is in the joint interest of all humankind that environmental issues are put above political borders and environmental protection is a non-political conflict-free issue. They hold that unilateralism produces no solutions and environmental issues have catalytic potential.[13] Recent studies have shown that there are at least four groups of reasons why governments and other actors are interested in trans-boundary environmental cooperation and management:[14] 1. ecological advantages (protection of biodiversity), 2. economic advantages (environmental cooperation may directly or indirectly bring economic development, for example, by advancing eco-tourism), 3. political advantages (environmental cooperation is connected with institutionalisation, regionalisation, democratisation and integration) and 4. catalytic advantages (environmental cooperation may spill over into political dialogue). Finally, these critics have been fundamentally influenced by the research of Wolf and his colleagues, who tested more than 1800 cases and evidenced that there have been hardly any "water wars" in human history.[15] Wolf showed that the riparian states sharing water resources are more inclined to cooperation than to conflict.

All these beliefs, ideas and research results have helped create the approach of environmental cooperation as an instÂment for conflict transformation. The building blocks of the approach are the assumptions that:

1. environmental issues ignore political boundaries and have the potential to inject a degree of objective and depoliticised discourse into the negotiations,
2. conflict and cooperation are not opposite poles on one spectÂm, but may coexist,
3. environmental cooperation has the potential to be an independ-

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ent variable positively influencing regional as well as world politics because it helps participants to internalise norms, form regional identities and interests, operationalise routine international communication and put aside the acceptability of using violence,

4. environmental cooperation has the potential to strengthen tÂst between conflicting communities; it can help teach peacebuilding habits, which may spill over into political dialogue and build a bridge between these communities.

The approach began to consolidate and spread early in the new millennium when in the fallout of 9/11, academics and policymakers started to look for new conflict resolution instÂments. At the time, several studies had presented the peacebuilding potential of environmental cooperation in conflict-affected areas and the idea had gained attention within international organisations such as UN Environment Programme (UNEP), NATO and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).[16] UNEP and NATO labelled it 'environmental peacebuilding'[17] and OSCE called it 'environmental confidence building.'[18]

Despite the rising popularity of the idea of using environmental cooperation as a tool for transforming conflicts in dispute-ridden areas, there are still not many studies which systematically research the peacebuilding potential of environmental cooperation, the forms it has taken in conflict-affected areas or its problems, weaknesses and negative effects.[19] Among existing academic and policy analyses, the prevailing literature either demonstrates that environmental cooperation exists in conflict-affected areas[20] or they are future-oriented and recommend the use of environmental cooperation as a transformative tool in particular conflicts.[21] These studies also suggest which model of environmental cooperation should apply to specific cases—critics working in this vein have, for example, recommended establishing a trans-boundary peace park at sites in Kashmir and the Korean Demilitarised Zone.

Theoretical Shortcomings, Methodological Weaknesses, Research Challenges

The following sections surveys three of the most pronounced theoretical and methodological problems affecting the use of environmental cooperation as an instÂment for conflict transformation:

1. a lack of clarity about what is meant by "environmental cooperation,"
2. overlooked variables and a vague account of causality and mechanisms,
3. the broadening of the approach.

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And, this work introduces four additional research challenges:

4. the great variety of forms and shapes of environmental cooperation, including different concepts of environmental peacebuilding,
5. different beliefs about the stage of a conflict when environmental cooperation should be used,
6. an absence of clear opinion about the type of conflict in which environmental cooperation is appropriate,
7. the lack of knowledge about the agents engaged in environmental cooperation in conflict- affected areas.

Theoretical Shortcomings: The Uncertain Definition of Environmental Cooperation

Though a number of scholars and institutions encourage us to use environmental cooperation as a bridge between conflicting communities, there is still significant uncertainty about what is meant by "environmental cooperation." Some have not thought through the term and assume that everyone must already know what "it" means or that the phrase is understandable on its own. The ambiguity surrounding environmental cooperation affects both its parts and the question of what is meant exactly by "environmental" and "cooperation" may be posed.

The term "environmental" is generally used in connection with issues about the environment and ecology. For those engaged in conflict resolution, environmental cooperation usually refers to cooperation in conservation and ecosystem protection where a key concern is the protection of natural resources. But this is still very general. As some scholars have shown, the ways that the term is defined – and in particular, attributes given to individual resources such as (non)renewability, (im)mobility, (il)legality, (non)tradability and (non)lootability – influence the results of analyses of the relationship among resources, environmental cooperation and conflicts.[22]

By analysing academic and policy documents about environmental cooperation as a conflict transformation instÂment, it is clear that ideas about the peacebuilding potential of environmental cooperation, in conflict-affected areas, are mainly based on a definition of natural resources as non-tradeable, non-lootable and immobile. Natural resources which fulfil these criteria show, for example, a high level of biodiversity of fauna and flora; natural, protective, historic, aesthetic, educational and research value in the landscape; protective, anti-erosive, hygienic and aesthetic functions in the vegetation zones of soil and water resources; regulatory functions in the vegetation, water and soil vis-à-vis the local area, the regional climate and pest incidence; and regulatory functions in the vegetation, water and soil for the bio-chemical cycles of the landscape. There is uncertainty about resources such as oil, diamonds, columbite-tantalite (coltan), water and tropical timber. Some authors do not understand these resources as part of an ecosystem and argue that though their looting may lead to financial problems, they do not represent environmental factors on their own, and thus, are not natural resources.[23] Others do consider them (or at least some of them, specifically water and tropical timber) to be natural resources.[24]

A second difficulty with proposing environmental cooperation as a conflict transformation tool lies in the issue of what "cooperation" implies since it is defined differently by political scientists, sociologists and economists (etc). Even when considering *only* political science and international relations interpretations and disregard other, valid, concepts of cooperation,[25] there is still evident ambiguity—cooperation is differently defined by those analysing governance, the problem of free riders, collective action and the tragedy of the commons.[26]

Part of the problem with the term cooperation relates to the issue of cooperating agents and at what level cooperation occurs. The quality of cooperation is influenced by whether it happens on a micro-level or a macro-level as well as by whether it is intergovernmental cooperation or cooperation of civil society groups or private actors or some form of hybrid cooperation. Environmental cooperation has been used as a conflict transformation instÂment on a micro-level[27] and between states.[28] Existing academic publications refer to various models of cooperation among states, but in cases where the participants in environmental cooperation are non-state actors or hybrid organisations (such as the International Union for the Conservation

of Nature), models of state cooperation can hardly be used. It is clear that the inclusion of non-state actors in environmental cooperation in conflict-affected areas demands a more interdisciplinary perspective.

Overlooked Variables and Vague Causality

One important weakness in the *environmental cooperation as a conflict transformation instÂment* approach is the overlooking of variables, notably political and economic factors along with vague thinking about causality. First, I illustrate the problem of variables, and then I highlight the problem of causality. Environmental cooperation is seldom (if ever) an independent variable. This means that other factors, specifically interceding variables, need to be identified and understood.

Scholars dealing with the peacebuilding potential of environmental cooperation do not usually pay much attention to questions such as what the cooperation is about, who the conflicting communities are (i.e. what their political systems or economic orientations are) or what stage the conflict is at and what it concerns. Contemporary studies of environmental cooperation in conflict-affected areas do not even consider technological developments or the influence of new technologies such as global positioning systems. If scholars research these issues, they usually note that there are many variables and these should be analysed.[29] Based on several studies, it is clear that factors such as a society's political system, value orientation, religion, economic orientation, strength and density of institutions and level of development can influence the effects of using environmental cooperation as a conflict transformation tool since they affect environmental behaviour or may absorb the upheaval from rapid environmental changes.[30] Thus, a more complex model of analysis which takes into account multi-causality, is needed.

Thinking further about causality, it is not clear how instÂmental environmental cooperation *is* exactly in transforming conflicts. Nor is it apparent how the spill-over of positive experiences from environmental cooperation into political dialogue works precisely (especially considering the multi-causality mentioned above); how environmental cooperation at a local level can influence political dialogue at the highest level or how environmental cooperation is instÂmentalised for political reasons. We do not even know anything about the relationship between the intensity of violence and the emergence of environmental

cooperation. There are, therefore, several key, open questions: Can environmental cooperation ease animosity and violence? Or is the easing of violence a prerequisite for environmental cooperation?

These problems are well demonstrated by Payne and Lafontaine who researched the cases of the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) and Environment and Security Initiative (ENVSEC) respectively.[31] Payne questioned GEF's ability to support environmental projects effectively in conflict-affected areas. He showed that the implementation of environmental projects at these sites is not only challenged by political barriers but is very expensive and usually complicated by questions of authority and sovereignty and the limits on the activities of non-state actors. According to Payne, GEF may be useful for both conflict prevention and conflict transformation but its direct contribution is limited and unclear. Lafontaine analysed ENVSEC – a joint initiative of OSCE, UN Development Programme (UNDP), UNEP, NATO and the UN Economic Commission for Europe and Regional Environmental Centre for Central and Eastern Europe – which was established in 2002 as a joint platform for environmental and security cooperation by Western organisations with post-Soviet countries.[32] He concluded that environmental institutions are unable to provide a spill-over effect; in other words, they cannot ensure that the positive experience from environmental cooperation will spill over into political dialogue. The peacebuilding potential of initiatives such as ENVSEC is limited to say the least.

The Problematic Widening of the Approach

A third problem with the approach of using environmental cooperation for conflict transformation is its widening to cover issues which relate to conflict resolution and environmental cooperation, but whose inclusion is questionable. As mentioned, environmental cooperation is promoted as a conflict transformation instÂment by very different groups of actors in very different areas. These actors bring new issues and practices to the debate, diluting our knowledge of environmental cooperation in conflict-affected areas. The most acute problem is probably the coupling of the peacebuilding potential of such environmental cooperation with the debate about protecting the environment against the effects of military conflicts. That issue is not new, having emerged in the 1970s in relation to the environmental ef-

fects of the Vietnam War and militarisation of the Korean Peninsula.[33] Today's debate concerns the impact of interstate conflicts, civil wars and fragile states on ecosystems, biodiversity and conservation system. The growing attention to environmental protection in conflict zones is connected with the finding that 81% of wars (defined in accordance with the PRIO dataset) under way between 1950 and 2000 happened in areas with a high level of biodiversity.[34] The place which has gained widespread attention in recent decades – and which, to a significant extent, has generated this debate – is the Great Lake region in Africa, an area on the borders of Rwanda, Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo where mountain gorilla and hippopotamus populations lived historically. Several conflicts which passed through the region (the Rwandan genocide, the First and Second Congo Wars) annihilated these gorilla and hippopotamus populations. Western researchers and conservationists launched an initiative to establish a nature park in the area in order to protect animals against guerrilla violence and hunting by refugees.[35] Initiatives aiming to protect the environment in conflict zones have also emerged in other countries such as Afghanistan[36] and Sudan[37] in fragile regions.

Based on the environmental degradation in conflict zones, the concept of "biodiversity hotspots" has also emerged. These are areas featuring an exceptional concentration of endemic species and experiencing an exceptional loss of habitat (as a consequence of military conflict among other reasons). Based on this development, conservationists have urged that environmental protection efforts concentrate on conflict zones and fragile states rather than on stable, peaceful and developed areas where the risk of losing the habitat is significantly lower.[38]

What the widening of the debate means in practice can be seen from the transformation visible within UNEP since 2008. Plans to use environmental cooperation as a conflict transformation instÂment have been institutionalised within a programme called 'Environmental Cooperation for Peacebuilding.' The programme aims to 'assist countries, regional organisations and the UN system to assess and transform potential sources of conflict over natural resources into an opportunity for cooperation and a platform for peacebuilding.'[39] This initiative has a set of goals which is wider than merely supporting environmental cooperation as a conflict transformation instÂment: it engages in environmental protection in fragile states and advocates for the greening

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of peace operations, the development of environmental law and the inclusion of environmental protection into Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programmes; all of this comes under the heading 'Environmental Cooperation for Peacebuilding.'

Research Challenges: The Many Faces of Environmental Cooperation and Peacebuilding

The first research challenge identified here is the lack of clarity about the forms and shapes which environmental cooperation can take. The literature on environmental cooperation between conflicting communities deploys phrases such as "environmental governance," "integrated management of resources" (formal, informal and customary management are mentioned) and "environmental peacebuilding."[40] Some authors do not distinguish between forms of environmental cooperation though do recognise various degrees of cooperation intensity.[41] Ideas about forms of environmental cooperation vary mainly based on the natural resources which scholars are analyse. For example, Böge and Luzi refer specifically to 'integrated water resource management' and 'customary water management' respectively.[42] This thinking about the forms of environmental cooperation is connected with the problem outlined above—that is, the ambiguous definition of "cooperation." Further complications then stem from other terminological confusion (such as uncertainty about the use and understanding of terms like "management," "governance" and "conflict"[43]) along with the broadening of the debate to include new issues like development and human security.[44]

The task of this work is not to research the issue of the forms of environmental cooperation in any detail, but rather to show how diverse the field is and the way that existing terms and concepts overlap. As noted, scholars working with environmental cooperation as a conflict transformation instÂment, use terms such as environmental governance, integrated resource management and environmental peacebuilding—this work now turns to exploring these.

Environmental governance has been defined generally as 'a social function centred on efforts to steer societies or human groups away from collectively undesirable outcomes and toward socially desirable outcomes.'[45] It has been described as 'the use of institutionalised power to shape environmental processes and outcomes.'[46] The role of en-

vironmental governance is 'to regulate use and consequently set the framework for interactions between resource users.'[47] It is applied at a global as well as a local level.[48] The Montreal and Kyoto Protocols are considered to be forms of environmental governance.

Resource management is understood as a process which includes physical and socio-economic approaches whose aim is to harmonise the supply and quality of natural resources with the demands of different users and the environment.[49] It is also explained as a process of collective understanding and action by which human communities and other social actors together manage natural resources and ecosystems, drawing from everyone´s unique strengths, vantage points and capacities.[50] Resource management includes, for example, international and trans-boundary environmental regimes, trans-boundary nature peace parks, joint river commissions and the organisation of river basins. Resource management can be formal or informal; it may be based on customary law or cooperation between traditional authorities.[51]

Environmental peacebuilding has emerged as the most recent term in this context. Its users presume that international relations are not only relations among states, but relations among societies as well. They also believe that environmental cooperation has a catalytic function which can open effective peacebuilding channels and opportunities for dialogue, transform uncertainties and help overcome political tensions by building tÂst and creating cooperative connections through societies; this can make it possible to overcome stereotypes and help create shared norms.[52] Environmental peacebuilding integrates resource management with the good governance of natural resources to enable conflict prevention, conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstÂction.[53]

What we find here are also different concepts of "environmental peacebuilding" itself. According to the first concept, the environment serves as one possible link between the conflicting parties in order to foster peace in an area of conflict. The alternative version presents the far more widely discussed idea that environmental conflicts can be resolved through the common management of natural resources. Distinction can be drawn by recalling that environmental conflict resolution is based on conflict theory, which holds that life in a society is characterised by conflict rather than consensus. Against this, the concept of environmental peacebuilding advances the liberal view that engaging in cooperation is the norm.

A comparison of these approaches is shown in this table:

Environmental conflict resolution	Environmental peacebuilding
Cause of conflict	
Scarcity or abundance of natural resources	Non-environmental
Idea	
Resolving environmental conflicts through the common management of natural resources	Resolving conflicts between adversaries through cooperation on environmental issues
Means	
Creating agreements on cooperative use and management of resources; changing existing laws on the use of resources and land.	Creating long-lasting bonds between communities; fostering tÂst and confidence through ongoing cooperation in common projects; developing shared knowledge about common environmental threats and possible solutions.

Table1:
Comparison of
environmental
conflict resolu-
tion (left) with
environmental
peacebuilding
(right).

As seen via examples, the forms of environmental cooperation over-lap. In many cases, they do not refer to technical instÂments, but to political issues which need to be contextualised within a particular setting.[54] Another problem stems from the fact that there are so many individual and case-specific types of environmental cooperation (e.g. peace parks, river commissions, organisations of river basins and plat-forms of NGOS and environmental experts) and they have been used in such very different conflict situations that we cannot draw general conclusions or glean information about the lessons learned.

The Conflict Stage When Environmental Cooperation is Used

The second research challenge lies in the uncertainty about the conflict stage when scholars and practitioners intend to apply this approach. Specifically, it is unclear whether environmental cooperation should be used when the conflict manifests and at an early stage of escalation in order to prevent violence from breaking out, or deployed later in the escalation to improve relationships damaged by violence. Alternatively, it could serve as a means of post-conflict reconstÂction and, at the same time, a way of preventing a return to the violence.

Environmental issues first emerged on the conflict resolution agenda in connection with post-conflict reconstÂction. An important role in the debate was played by UNEP, which concluded in the first half of the 1990s from the lessons learned in Bosnia and Liberia that environmental degradation caused by military conflicts is a serious barrier to reconstÂction and sustainable peacebuilding in post-conflict areas. This conclusion was reached by scholars and practitioners alike. The World Bank's pilot programme 'Global Environmental Facility' was established on the back of this wave. The goal of the GEF was to connect post-conflict reconstÂction and sustainable development programmes with environmental issues. The concept was employed, for example, in the Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations in the first half of the 1990s as well as in the peace negotiations between Ecuador and PeÂ in 1998, the peace accord between Israel and Jordan in 1994 and the peace negotiations between North and South CypÂs. The experience with GEF led to the idea that environmental cooperation and resource management could be used to prevent conflicts.[55] This idea was also influenced by experiences with conflict diamonds in West Africa and illegal coltan mining in the DRC, where funds from the (usually illegal) trade in resources were used to finance military actions. Experts argued that in order to end the violence, it was necessary to cut off the financial resources of rebel movements and thus, in other words, stem the flow of diamonds (coltan). (This was later the goal of the so-called Kimberley Process.) To build a sustainable post-conflict barrier stopping the violence from returning, it was also necessary to reform the management and governance of natural resources.[56]

The debate over using environmental cooperation as a tool for conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstÂction also occurred among the scholars of water wars—i.e. violent conflicts over water.[57] Water wars first emerged as a research issue in discussions about environmental scarcity, but it was only later, in connection with the resolution of water-induced conflicts, that attention was paid to water not as a cause of conflict but as a joint interest and catalytic agent.[58] The next step came with the UN's 2009 'Greening the Blue Helmets' programme, which sought to include environmental issues on the peacekeeping and peacebuilding operation agenda.[59] At the same time, several reports appeared that argued in favour of including environmental protection and conservation within post-conflict programmes of demilitarisation, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR).[60] A unique initiative of the

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last decade which is gaining more and more attention and popularity is the use of trans-boundary nature peace parks and reserves. Peace parks had been established in the past, but they were used as tools for post-conflict confidence-building and reconciliation between former adversaries (as in the cases of PeÂ and Ecuador, or Israel and Jordan, both referenced above) or for the protection of endangered species in areas of military conflict (see, for example, the details of the ViÂnga peace park on the borders between the DRC, Rwanda and Uganda[61]). Recent plans for peace parks see them as instÂments which should support cooperation and open the door to improvements in the re-lations between conflicting parties. Westing, for example, suggested establishing a peace park between North Korea and South Korea in the Demilitarised Zone;[62] conservationists and mountain-lovers have also recommended establishing a peace park on the Siachen Glacier in Kashmir, which is disputed territory between India and Pakistan.[63] Meanwhile the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) has supported the opening of trans-boundary peace parks in disput-ed border areas in Africa,[64] and researchers and conservationists have proposed creating a marine peace park in disputed territories in the South China Sea.[65]

As shown, there are at least three projections of how environmental cooperation can be used as a tool for conflict transformation: these shift from the point of conflict prevention to post-conflict reconstÂc-tion—that is, from applying environmental cooperation to prevent conflicts to its employment in post-conflict reconstÂction and to di-rectly improve relations between parties in a violent conflict. Because each stage of a conflict requires a different approach, we cannot draw any conclusions about environmental cooperation as a general tool for conflict transformation.

The Type of Conflict Where Environmental Cooperation is Used

Since the end of the 1980s, it has been clear that violent conflicts are predominantly of an interstate character. And, the latest research shows that violence often recurs with only a few countries tÂly in a "post-conflict" state. The rate of the onset of violence in countries with a history of conflict has been increasing since the 1960s and every civ-il war that began since 2003 occurred in a country where there had previously been a civil war.[66] In these recurring conflicts, causes usu-

ally accumulate. Scholars of environmental cooperation as a conflict transformation instÂment do not usually take these facts into consideration. In other words, most studies fail to distinguish between types of conflict. Many publications about the peacebuilding potential of environmental cooperation in conflict-affected areas concentrate on particular interstate or domestic conflicts, but do not deal with the cause of conflict—i.e. the issue of whether the cause, as an intervening variable, has any influence on the use and success of environmental cooperation as a conflict transformation instÂment.[67] For now, we do not know if there are any similarities or differences in environmental cooperation as a conflict transformation instÂment in interstate or intrastate disputes, or in religious, ethnic or environmentally-induced conflicts. It is also unclear if the cause of the conflict has any impact on the effects of using environmental cooperation as a conflict transformation instÂment.

The Agents of Environmental Cooperation in Conflict-Affected Areas

The last research challenge which this study is concerned with is the lack of knowledge about the agents engaged in environmental cooperation in conflict-affected areas. In real life, the actors engaged in environmental cooperation are very different and include development agencies, UN agencies and UN programmes, international and regional economic and development organisations, hybrid bodies, professional non-governmental organisations, non-governmental movements of environmental activists, foundations and individuals such as committed scholars and nature lovers.

Projects supporting trans-boundary environmental protection have been developed by IUCN and UNEP since the 1980s with the support of governmental and non-governmental organisations and environmental experts. Since the 1990s, these projects have concentrated on conflict-affected areas. In 1993, Westing prepared a UNEP publication in cooperation with IUCN called *Trans-frontier Reserves for Peace and Nature: A Contribution to Global Security*, which argued in favour of trans-boundary environmental protection in areas of conflicts. Between 1998 and 2000, IUCN drafted its 'State-of-the-art Review of Environment, Security and Development Cooperation' for OECD.[68] Since the beginning of the new millennium, terms such as "environ-

mental confidence building" and "environmental peacebuilding" have appeared in the documents of osce, nato and unep.[69] ngos (such as International Tropical Timber Organization, World Wildlife Fund, McArthur Foundation, Hans Seidl Stiftung, Heinrich Böll Stiftung and Friends of the Earth Middle East) have organised a number of environmental projects in conflict-affected areas with the goal of building local peace. During the annual iucn conference in 2008, a cooperative framework for establishing trans-boundary peace parks was created under the name of the Global Trans-boundary Conservation Network.[70]

iucn consequently established the World Commission for Environmental Law while unep set up the Expert Advisory Group on Conflict and Peacebuilding.[71] The penetration of the idea of environmental cooperation as a conflict transformation instÂment into the agenda of international organisations has significantly helped individual scholars such as Carius, Conca, Dabelko, Halle, Matthew and Westing, who have all collaborated with international organisations, prepared various reports and projects for international agencies and worked as advisors, managers and researchers in international environmental and development projects.[72]

As seen from this short introduction to the entities who are engaged in environmental cooperation and believe in its peacebuilding potential, there are a large number and variety of actors, which confuses and complicates all of the issues involved. We know only a little about how particular actors work, what influence they may have, what their motivations are and what the effects of their engagement are from a mid- or long-range perspective. Moreover, some studies have shown that some actors (for example, iucn) understand areas of protection to include not only places with a high level of biodiversity, but those rich in social interaction and social reproduction, and support for environmental cooperation and conservation is only one of many goals.[73]

Conclusion:
Lessons Learned, Key Questions and Next Steps

The approach I term *environmental cooperation as a conflict transformation instÂment* developed as a critical reaction to pessimistic visions of the relationship between the environment and conflict. Environmental cooperation, which has been embedded as a new method for

addressing and transforming conflicts in the post-9/11 period, is an optimistic approach based on the belief that environmental cooperation is an independent variable that positively influences politics due to its strong peacebuilding potential. For more than a decade, these ideas have been spreading among conflict resolution scholars and environmentalists as well as those working in conflict-affected areas, but despite the enthusiasm for this approach, it remains underdeveloped conceptually.

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The seven problems and weaknesses associated with environmental cooperation's use as a conflict transformation instÂment, as discussed above, temper the optimism originally connected with the approach. It seems that the transformative peacebuilding potential of environmental cooperation is unclear and that scholars and others cite events postulated in the future as empirical evidence. A number of studies demonstrate that environmental cooperation may exist between conflicting communities, but it is not clear how all this fits together—i.e. how the peacebuilding potential of environmental cooperation works, how this can be systematically verified, how particular agents of environmental cooperation work in conflict-affected areas, if there exists a relationship between the forms and shapes and intensity of environmental cooperation and its peacebuilding potential and if there are any negative effects of environmental cooperation in conflict-affected areas. In other words, existing studies in the field come up against fairly elementary problems in terms of theory constÂction, the methodology used and empirical testing.

My pessimism about the use of environmental cooperation as a conflict transformation instÂment is compounded by the fact that the peace parks and other environmental cooperation projects in conflict-affected areas are in many places rather theoretical. In many of the model cases often mentioned (for example, the Korean Peninsula, the Israeli-Palestinian cooperation over water and the Indo-Pakistani cooperation about the Siachen Glacier and in the Sir Creek wetlands), there is no clear and unequivocal evidence of the transformative peacebuilding impact of environmental cooperation.

Given the problems shown above, I would conclude that the approach of using environmental cooperation to transform conflicts may be a normative ideal and, as such, universally applicable. But it is clear that its application and success greatly depend on the specific case; generalisation is not possible – at least for the near future – and

proposing a single model of environmental cooperation as a conflict transformation instÂment would be too simplistic. In order to think further about this approach and move forward with its use, we need to see major improvements in the theory's constÂction and methodology as well as systematic data collection providing valid and reliable data and the analysis of empirical evidence.

Though it is necessary to combat all these theoretical and methodological problems, I perceive some of these issues as far more important than others. Key points are the impact of particular agents and of the type of conflict, the intensity of violence and other separate variables (notably political and economic factors) and the nature and functioning of any spill-over between environmental cooperation and political dialogue if this exists. Knowing more about all of these points may help to convert the normative ideal of environmental cooperation as a conflict transformation instÂment into a working system.

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The Europeanisation of Czech Parties' Election Manifestos

Reviewing the 2013 Chamber of Deputies Elections

Jan Kovář

This work contributes to the debate on the Europeanisation of political parties and particularly the Europeanisation of party election manifestos. This contribution investigates the extent of programmatic Europeanisation of relevant political parties before the 2013 Chamber of Deputies elections in the Czech Republic. A content analysis is conducted, within a comparative framework and using a bi-dimensional conceptualisation, of selected relevant Czech political parties' programmatic documents. The degree of Europeanisation of programmatic documents is then identified on the basis of content analysis. The results show that there is only a limited extent of Europeanisation of elections manifestos and that the degree of Europeanisation decreases over time since the Czech accession to the EU.

Keywords: Europeanisation, political parties, election manifestos, Czech Republic, Chamber of Deputies elections

Introduction

Europeanisation as a research agenda has become one of the most widely used theoretical approaches to study European integration and the impact and influence of it on the political and institutional development of EU's member states, its institutions, political actors and processes.[1] The research agenda on Europeanisation became a

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distinctive research field within the wider field of European Studies no longer than two decades ago but its effects are traceable since the start of European integration in the 1950s.[2] Broadly, Europeanisation is a term used to understand the effects of European integration on the politics, policies and polities of EU member states. In this respect, Europeanisation is an incremental process that redirects and reshapes politics to the sense where European integration and the EU become part of the organisational logic of national politics and policy-making.[3] On the other hand, Europeanisation is also a term used to understand the process how national (political) actors build and enhance European-level political institutions.[4]

In other words, the term Europeanisation encompasses both the top-down influence of European integration on domestic politics and the bottom-up impact of member states on the EU and its (political) institutions.[5] The top-down approach starts from the presence of European integration and then focuses on the presence or absence of change at the national level. In contrast, the bottom-up approach exogenises the EU level and hence it starts from the domestic level and only then goes up to the EU. The latter approach is interested in creation of supranational institutions and stÂctures and how this process is influence by domestic stÂctures.[6] Methodologically speaking, a third approach has been developed lately that refuses to threat Europeanisation as a one-way process and instead combines premises of both earlier mentioned approaches. The so-called bottom-up-down approach commonly starts at the domestic level and traces the process of formation of EU-level institutions and policies. Subsequently, it investigates pressures and effects of the EU-level on domestic politics and policies.[7]

While studies using the bottom-up research design were prevalent during the 1990s,[8] more recent development has seen an increase in scholarly analyses using the top-down research design.[9] According to Börzel and Risse,[10] Europeanisation as a research agenda may be applied to all three standard dimensions of political science research: *politics*,[11] *policy*,[12] and *polity*.[13] Of this wide range of approaches and dimension of political science research to which Europeanisation may be applied as research agenda, this article focuses more narrowly on the dimension of politics and more specifically the Europeanisation of political parties' programmatic documents. In doing so, it will adhere to and rely on the top-down approach to Europeanisation. In detail,

this paper analyses programmatic documents prepared by relevant Czech political parties for the recently held national parliamentary elections of October 2013. Thus, the main research question is: if and to what extent were the election programmes for the 2013 Chamber of Deputies election Europeanised? The stÂcture of the article is as follows: the next section reviews the literature on Europeanisation with particular focus on political parties. The third section discusses methodological concerns and issues, including the selection of relevant political parties for the analysis. The fourth section presents the results of the analysis, while the final section sets the results into the wider literature on Europeanisation of political parties and programmatic documents in particular.

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Europeanisation of Political Parties and Party Systems

From a theoretical perspective, there is considerable debate about how to define Europeanisation,[14] but the literature within the top-down approach generally uses the concept as shorthand for 'domestic impact of the EU' or 'influence of the EU'[15] and this also applies to Europeanisation of political parties and party systems.[16] As indicated earlier, probably the latest as well as the least-researched area is the Europeanisation of the *politics* dimension, that is, the Europeanisation of political actors, their interactions as well as processes of political contestation and interest aggregation.[17] More concretely, the Europeanisation of national political parties, party systems, and interest groups has emerged only recently as a separate research area.[18] This statement is particularly valid in relation to the new EU member states (MS) as well as the candidate countries in Eastern Europe and the Balkans, given their historical detachment from the European integration process.[19]

This may be surprising since at least from the evaporating of the 'permissive consensus,' public opinion and the role of political parties become increasingly important.[20] Political parties are the central actors in collective will formation process and this also applies to the EU-level as they are the 'principal gatekeepers within the European electoral arena'[21] and where the majority of politicians 'are party politicians', including those in the European Council, the European Commission, and the European Parliament.[22] This late emergence of a research field that combines Europeanisation with a focus on political parties and party systems is commonly attribute to the existence of

the permissive consensus and related low salience for general public as well as domestic politics in general[23] and to the broader turn in comparative politics toward incorporating European integration dynamics into explanations of domestic political change.[24]

In any case, a considerable amount of research on Europeanisation of political parties as been generated during a rather short period. Following the pioneering work of Ladrech,[25] most of the studies focus on one or more areas in which evidence of Europeanisation could be reflected: (1) programmatic change; (2) organisational change; (3) patterns of party competition; (4) party-government relations; and (5) relations beyond the national political system. To start with, according to Ladrech,[26] one of the most obvious and explicit areas in which the impact of European integration unfolded is that of (1) programmatic changes.[27] This form of Europeanisation may be evaluated as both qualitative and quantitative change of programmatic documents prepared for various types and orders of elections from European Parliament (EP) elections to local contests. Thus far, research on the Europeanisation of political parties' programmatic documents has reported ambiguous results in terms of qualitative and quantitative changes incurred by the European integration process. One strand of literature concludes that party programmes tend to embody only limited qualitative and quantitative EU-incurred changes,[28] while the other strand of literature reports much more intensive EU-related changes of political parties' programmes.[29] More precisely, studies dealing with the Europeanisation of parties' programmes for EP elections report more intensive changes incurred by the EU than research dealing with manifestos for national parliamentary and/or local elections.[30]

Moreover, the level of Europeanisation of programmatic documents differs across time, political parties, countries[31], as well as by policy sector.[32] On the one hand, Pennings documents a modest rise in the references to the EU in party manifestos.[33] But, on the other hand, these references are often general and vague and election manifestos rarely involve specific policy and/or institutional proposals.[34] Put differently, Europeanisation of party manifestos remains limited to the referential level with much less evidence for substantial changes.[35] Parties have often devoted a section dealing with their stance on their country's membership in the EU.[36] In sum, parties do not consider EU issues to be blankly unimportant. On the other hand, however, they do not regard EU issues as top priority issues but rather consider these issues as one

among multiple issues that they must deal with.[37] Above all, EU issues play secondary role at best in party manifestos that still remain a platform where stance on EU are of subsidiary importance and in which parties do not such much controversy over EU issues.[38]

As noted, there are important changes in the level of Europeanisation of party manifestos across time and parties. I restrict my focus to the case of the Czech Republic and illustrate this changing intensity political parties assign to EU issues in its programmatic documents. If during the early transformation era (1990-1996) issues related to the European integration were elaborated in highly succinct manner in party manifestos,[39] the pre-accession period (1998-2002) is characterised by a significant increase of both quantitative inclusion and qualitative elaboration of issue related to the European integration process.[40] Finally and compared to previous periods, the membership period (2006-2010) is not only characterised by most intense Europeanisation of election manifestos, but also by decline of Europeanisation between the 2006 and 2010 parliamentary election.[41] Overall, Europeanisation of election manifestos of Czech political parties is increasing with the approach of the Czech Republic's entry into the EU.

There are, nonetheless, important differences among individual parties. The first difference relates to established parties with wide public support and parties failing to gain parliamentary representation during the modern era. Established parties – either as government or opposition parties – include EU issues in election manifestos than the latter group of parties.[42] There are also obviously differences in Europeanisation among individual parties, but also if we compare election manifestos one party prepares for subsequent elections. Moreover, there is not one clear pattern of divergence among individual parties, but it appears that election manifestos of the Greens and the Communists are less Europeanised than those of the Civic Democrats, the Social Democrats and the Christian Democrats.[43] At last, literature suggests that in the Czech Republic, similarly to other EU member states, election manifestos prepared for elections to the EP are more Europeanised than elections prepared national parliamentary elections and other elections held in the country.[44]

To sum up and conclude the previous discussion of the relevant literature, Europeanisation of political parries is generally understood as the effects of European integration on national party organisations and as the responses by national political parties to the impact of Euro-

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pean integration.[45] The progressing European integration process may not only have indirect effects: by changing the environment parties operate in, the EU may have an impact on internal features and behaviour of parties.[46] But, on the other hand, the EU may also have, albeit probably much fewer, direct effects in political parties and party systems in terms of formation of an EU dimension of political conflict, as new wholly separate dimension in party competition.[47]

Finally, the literature on Europeanisation of political parties generally highlights an important difference in terms of the magnitude of Europeanisation of parties in the pre-2004 EU Member States, on the one hand, and the Central and Eastern European countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 on the other.[48] So far, the research of the pre-2004 EU MSs[49] and the candidate countries from the Balkans[50] has shown no significant impact of European integration upon national political parties and party systems, while studies of the CEE countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 have reported a more significant impact of the EU—of course, with some notable exceptions.[51]

Among the most often cited reasons that explain the East-West divergence in the impact of Europeanisation on political parties are: (a) the specific starting conditions for European influence in the CEE countries – whereby the CEE countries had s strong desire to join the EU as soon as possible – which can be regarded as facilitating 'factors' of EU's influence,[52] in particular through its political conditionality;[53] (b) the resulting asymmetric relationship between the EU and the CEE candidate states;[54] and (c) the early establishment of stable party systems in most of the pre-2004 EU MS.[55] Notwithstanding these conclusions, it does not mean that there are not any differences between the individual CEE countries in terms of the depth of impact of Europeanisation on political parties. Indeed, scholars maintained that among the CEE countries the impact of the EU on political parties was most intense on the 'illiberal' states, while it was less intensive in relation to political parties in the other CEE (i.e. Bulgaria, Romania and/or Slovakia) countries.[56]

Methods and Data

To investigate the Europeanisation of party election manifestos and to answer to the main research question of this work, it is necessary to discuss a number of methodological issues. The first is the question of

what parties, movements, or individual candidates will be included in the analysis. Only political parties and their coalitions can be contents Chamber of Deputies election in the Czech Republic and hence the focus is on political parties and their potential coalition solely. Moreover, only relevant political parties are included in this study. To be included, a party had to have won seats in the 2013 Chamber of Deputies elections. Specifically, we will be analysing programmes of the ANO 2011 (ANO 2011), Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD), the Christian and Democratic Union – Czechoslovak People's Party (KDU-ČSL), the Civic Democratic Party (ODS), the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM), the Tomio Okamura's Dawn of Direct Democracy, and the 'Tradition Responsibility Prosperity 09' (TOP09).

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After selecting which political parties to include in the study, another concern relates to the use of the Europeanisation concept. For the purposes of analysis of party election manifestos and following the majority of scholars, Europeanisation, as a concept is employed in the paper as a process by which national political parties adapt to the institutional framework and logic of the EU or, in other words, the responses of political parties to the impact of European integration,[57] restricting our interest to the top-down approach to the Europeanisation of parties programmatic documents. Put differently, I understand the Europeanisation of election programmes as a process inspired by European integration - a process of reflection of European integration in one of the aspects of the national political discourse – leading to quantitative and/or qualitative changes in party election programmes.

The last question to be addressed before the analysis itself is the question of the method used to determine the extent of Europeanization of election manifestos of Czech political parties. The method I will use to achieve this goal will be content analysis of party election manifestos of earlier mentioned Czech political parties since content analysis is among the most frequently used techniques for the analysis of political parties' programmatic documents.[58] Building on the above-mentioned of Europeanization of political parties' programmes, and postulating that relevant changes incurred by the process of European integration may be observed in terms of qualitative and quantitative transformation,[59] we use the methodological approach developed by Havlík (et al)[60] in which the extent of the Europeanization of election programmes is examined on the basis of two interconnected dimensions: *quantitative* and *qualitative.*[61]

The quantitative dimension, on the one hand, reflects the space devoted to the theme of European integration, while the qualitative dimension, on the other, addresses the detailed elaboration of 'EU' themes in the analysed programmes.[62] Put differently, the quantitative dimension reflects the level of penetration of the EU as a theme in party manifestos given the assumption that the Europeanization of political party programmes may be expressed by the growing count of analyses of European integration done in these platforms.[63] Four levels of Europeanisation of party manifestos are distinguished for the quantitative dimension of: (0) Absence of EU issues – political party altogether leaves out European integration in its election programme, opinion of the party on European integration is absent from the manifesto; (1) Diffuse occurrence – European integration is mentioned across individual sections throughout the election programme, meaning that there is not a compact section of the text devoted to it; (2) Generally concentrated occurrence – European integration issues are integrated into a broader foreign-policy section, meaning that it represents a fundamental part if this section; and (3) Specifically concentrated occurrence – issues related to the European integration process are the subject of an independent section of the election programme.[64] For the quantitative dimension to assign issues into categories, it is necessary to come up with an operationalisation of issues.[65] I differentiate between A) national issues, B) European integration issues, and C) international, global, and other issues.[66]

On the other hand, the qualitative dimension of Europeanisation of election programmes reflects the degree of detailed elaboration of EU issues in election programmes.[67] In effect, the qualitative dimension may be described as 'encompassing attempts to make precise and concrete any references to European integration.'[68] With respect to the qualitative dimension of Europeanization of parties' programmes, Havlík's approach differentiates four levels of elaboration of EU issues: (0) Absence of issues—European integration issues are not elaborated on in the programme; (1) General mention of European integration—involving normative evaluation of the entire integration process, or general expression of party's preferred institutional setting of the EU; (2) Reaction to individual (long-term) aspects of European integration and agenda of the EU—involving EU policies and their reform, institutional stÂcture, and model of organisation; enlargement in general;

and (3) Reflection on current issues having to do with the European integration process—concerning heretofore unapproved or discussed aspects of European integration such as the Treaty reform, reform of the EU's institutional framework, enlargement in concrete terms, and others.[69]

The last methodological concern to be mentioned before the analysis itself is that analysing Europeanisation of the two individual dimensions requires distinctive approach. While the analysis of the quantitative dimension of Europeanisation of election programmes is degree-based, the analysis of the qualitative dimension is rather cumulative. When evaluating the quantitative dimension, the identification of the predominant degree of Europeanisation is decisive.[70] If, for example, the second level of Europeanisation on the quantitative dimension is identified in a given programme (i.e. EU issues are included within the broad foreign-policy section of the programme) and, at the same time, EU issues are mentioned cross-sectionally throughout the election manifesto, the predominant degree of Europeanisation is decisive for the final evaluation of Europeanisation of the given manifesto.[71] On the other hand, the degree-based approach is not suitable for the analysis of the qualitative dimension of Europeanisation of party manifestos and a different approach is required: a cumulative one. I do not attempt to postulate that identification of the third level of qualitative Europeanisation of election manifesto (i.e. reflection on current EU issues) indicates more Europeanisation that identification of the first level of qualitative Europeanisation of election manifesto (i.e. general mention of European integration).

I rather use the cumulative approach, whereby 'the greater the number of ways in which the European theme may be identified as having been worked into the election programme side-by-side, the more the extent to which the document in question may be seen as Europeanised.'[72]

Analysis of Election Programmes: The Results

A content analysis of eight political parties' election manifestos for the 2013 Chamber of Deputies elections was carried out in order to study the Europeanisation of the programmatic documents of Czech political parties.

Resort Programme was the title chosen by the ANO 2011 for the 2013 Chamber of Deputies election programme.[73] The manifesto was divided into fourteen sectorally defined parts and none of these is devoted to discussing EU issues. One of these sections, titled 'Foreign Policy,' includes an elaboration of EU issues; however they are not of a fundamental salience. The ANO2011 often uses the EU as a reference point in its manifesto.[74] Generally, the party maintains that 'our country has to become active, constÂctive, though even critical, but not, however, a capricious member of the Union' (n.p.). ANO2011 aimed to 'constÂctively demarcate ourselves from the nonsensical bureaucracy' in the EU (n.p.). In the area of economic policy, the party promotes establishment of the VAT 'reverse-charge' in the whole EU and it will also seek opportunities at the EU level to set-up zero-rated VAT on pharmaceuticals, books and prints.

In terms of agricultural policy where the party's elaboration of EU issues is perhaps the most elaborate, the ANO2011 purports to use direct subsidies for the 'livestock production and intensive commodities of the vegetable production at the most' (n.p.). The party will make all effort in a bid to straighten the condition in the field of national and regional subsidies to agriculturists as at the internal market it 'is not possible for our Western EU competitors to have multiple times higher national subsidies that our agriculturists and food industry' (n.p.). In a similar vein to other parties' manifestos, the ANO2011 several times mentions various means of EU funding and associated drawing of finances from this funding, for example to: create new employment vacancies, increase the effectiveness of EU funding for industrial projects, and improve transportation infrastÂcture in the country. The party will generally aim to ensure 'expedient adjustment of EU funds for the 2014-2020 period' (n.p.) and to 'ensure increased effectiveness of applications for EU funding with the help of managerial governance of their preparation' (n.p.).

The manifesto of the ANO2011 call for the EU to 'continue building of own defense capabilities in the spirit of the Common Security and Defence Policy' (n.p.). In the energy policy area, the party 'will contribute to the stabilization of European energy network' (n.p.) in order to minimize blackouts. Taken together, European integration issues occur diffusely across the ANO2011's election manifesto and no compact section of the programme is devoted to the EU. From a viewpoint

of qualitative elaboration of EU issues, the party provided general references to the process of European integration. Most frequently, the ANO2011 aimed at description of its preferences related to individual (long-term) aspects of European integration (CAP, CSDP, energy policy). On the other hand, among the current and heretofore unapproved provisions related to the European integration process the party mentioned establishment of VAT reverse-charge in the whole EU and VAT exemptions at the national level.

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The Civic Democratic Party (ODS)

The title of the ODS programme for the 2013 Chamber of Deputies elections was *#I_Vote_Right* and it was divided into the Preamble and fourteen sections defined around individual policy sectors.[75] One of these sections is titled 'Foreign Policy and European Union' and it contains a clearly delineated independent section of the election programme devoted to the EU. Discussion of EU issues is nevertheless not limited to this section and EU issues also occur, albeit to much less extent, diffusely across the programme. The Civic-Democrats often use the EU as a reference point.[76] Similar to other parties' manifestos, the ODS manifesto commonly refers to EU funds and associated drawing of finances from these funds for example to: (a) introduce English courses from the first grade of elementary school, (b) increase the attractiveness of technical education and vocation training, (c) create new employment vacancies in the country-side, and (d) support development of fish pond culture businesses.

The party is strictly against any form of 'European taxes' and refuses 'steps leading to the establishment of fiscal union that would lead to the harmonisation of taxes and further loss of member states' sovereignty' (p. 5). In the external affairs area, the Civic-Democrats call for the promotion and cultivation of the trans-Atlantic tie and the 'strengthening of the EU-US relations not only in the field of defence but also in economic cooperation' (p. 26). The party will also stand against any EU's proposal to 'restrict internet neutrality' (p. 7). The ODS acknowledges benefits European integration brings to the Czech Republic but it is necessary to ensure that id 'does not proceed et the expenses of some of its members' (p. 29). Towards this, the party sees the EU 'as an area of economic freedom and not as an area of European bureaucracy' (p. 29). Finally, in terms of the Czech membership in the

eurozone, the Civic-Democrats maintain the Czech Republic 'cannot currently afford euro, it would not be an asset' and insist on holding popular referendum about membership in the eurozone given that the 'obligations associated with acceptance of euro have changed rapidly since Czech accession to the EU' (p. 29).

Finally, the ODS stresses the importance of the common market for European integration and hence supports liberalization of services markets and establishment of free-trade zones with non-European countries, in particular with the US. Overall, European integration issues occur in a specifically concentrated manner – i.e. they are the subject of an independent section of the election programme – and, to significantly lesser extent, diffusely across the manifesto. From a qualitative viewpoint, the ODS provides general references to EU-related issues as well as description of preferences concerning individual (long-term) aspects of European integration (single market, eurozone). In addition, the party also provides discussion of current and heretofore unapproved matters related to the European integration process (fiscal union, EU-US TTIP).

The Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD)

The manifesto of the ČSSD for the 2013 Chamber of Deputies elections, *We will get through functional state: Election Manifesto of the ČSSD* [sic], is divided into five broadly defined sections.[77] None of these is devoted exclusively to the EU and the manifesto does not contain foreign policy section where EU issues may be discussed. References to European integration occur diffusely across the election manifesto, with some of them located in the 'Active Membership in the EU' subdivision, one of the many subdivisions of the wide section titled 'Society.' From the general point of view, the ČSSD declares that is has a 'positive approach to the deepening of European integration' (p. 15), look forward to active participation in the political debates about future direction of the EU in which it will 'pursue social and cultural dimension of European integration' (p. 33).

In accord with other parties, the Social-Democrats make a number of references to various EU funds which they intend to use, for instance, for heat-cladding of buildings, for 'measures improving the quality of water and air' (p. 9), for 'modernisation of schools and their equipment (p. 11), and to pursue active employment policy. Overall, drawing finan-

cial resources from the EU's stÂctural funds is one of the priorities of the party. In terms of the long term aspects of European integration, the party calls for non-discriminatory access for Czech farmers and food industry to the EU's financial resources within the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). In terms of tax policy, the Social-Democrats will initiate negotiations with the European Commission to introduce zero-rated VAT on pharmaceuticals and books and support introduction of EU-wide financial transaction tax, income of which shall become 'direct income of the EU' (p. 17). The country shall become prepared to the membership in the eurozone, accession to which shall happen when it is 'economically and socially favourable' (p .33).

In terms of defence policy, the party generally promotes the enhancement of EU capabilities to cope with and prevent crises and the strengthening of the trans-Atlantic security ties. Finally and with the field of domestic coordination of EU affairs, the ČSSD will set up a communication network of Czech citizens working in the EU's institutions in order to facilitate 'information transmission and exchange' in pursuance of Czech interests in the EU (p. 33). Taken together, European integration issues occur diffusely across the election manifesto and no compact section of the manifesto is devoted to the EU. From a qualitative viewpoint, the Social-Democrats provided general references to the European integration process. Most of the time, the party focused on description of preferences concerning individual (long-term) aspects of European integration (defence policy, CAP, single market). The ČCSD, nonetheless, also provided discussion of current and heretofore unapproved provisions related to the European integration process (EU financial transaction tax).

The Christian and Democratic Union – Czechoslovak People's Party (KDU-ČSL)

The manifesto for the 2013 Chamber of Deputies elections was entitled *Election Programme of the KDU-ČLS 2013-2017*.[78] The manifesto was divided into 14 sections, defined around individual sectors of society. One of these sections is devoted to the discussion of EU issues as well as foreign policy concerns, but EU issues occur also diffusely across the programme. Speaking about the foreign policy section, EU issues represent a fundamental part of it. The Christian-Democrats make a number of references to various EU funds which will be 'drawn from

and utilized duly' (p. 11). Specifically, EU funding will be directed to projects that 'create new employment opportunities' (p. 4) and 'develop the country side' (p. 11), into new transportation infrastÂcture, into professional development of school leavers, and into local and county projects that clearly improve 'infrastÂcture, development and quality of life' (p. 10). The KDU-ČSL intends to negotiate at the EU level to set up zero-rated VAT on child's nappies and infantile nutrition. In the section of the manifesto titled 'EU and Foreign Affairs,' the Christian-Democrats call for restriction of financial sector regulation, Czech accession to the eurozone only when the economy is prepared for it, and facilitation of 'Czech entrepreneurs to other member states' services market' (p. 11).

The KDU-ČSL will support further enlargement of the EU by other European countries, while maintain that for Turkey 'only privileged partnership' is admissible (p. 11). Among the long term aspects of European integration, the party also intends to pursue more restrictive immigration policy, while 'maintaining the openness to persecuted people' (p. 11). The Christian-Democrats will support the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor's Office aimed at 'investigating frauds with EU funding' (p. 11) as well as the creation of EU's common military capabilities. Overall, European integration issues occur in the generally concentrated manner, i.e. they are integrated into and represent of fundamental part of the foreign-policy section. From a qualitative viewpoint, the KDU-ČSL provided general references to the European integration as well as description of preferences concerning individual (long-term) aspects of European integration (single market, eurozone, stÂctural funds). Nevertheless, the party also provided discussion of current and heretofore unapproved provisions related to the European integration process (EPPO).

The Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM)

The manifesto KSČM put together for the 2013 Chamber of Deputies elections was entitled *Programme for the Future*.[79] It was divided into a Preamble and six broadly defined parts and does not include a coherent section devoted to the EU or European integration. Moreover, the Communists, for the most part, use the EU as a reference point,

for example, when it argues that incomes should be increased in the Czech Republic 'to the average level in the EU' (n.p.). Beyond these referential mentions of the EU, the party intends to ensure 'equal position of member states in the EU's political institutions' and to 'refuse extensive bureaucratisation and the persisting deficit of democracy in EU' decision-making' (n.p.).

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In the area of taxation, the KSČM also demands opening 'negotiation with the EU to establish zero-rated VAT on pharmaceuticals' (n.p.). The final reference to EU issues in the programme relates to party's intention to pursue in the EU and in the WTO the interest to abolish the exemption of international freight transport from taxes. The Communists do not provide any other references to European integration issues. In sum, European integration issues occur diffusely in the election manifesto and no compact section of the manifesto is devoted to the EU. Since European integration process is, in practice, reflected in few sentences, it appears that these issues are of secondary salience at best in the election programme for the 2013 Chamber of Deputies elections. From a qualitative viewpoint, the party provides general references to European integration issues and minimal discussion of long-term aspects of European integration (democratic deficit)

The Tomio Okamura's Dawn of Direct Democracy (Úsvit)

The programme of the Tomio Okamura's Dawn of Direct Democracy for the 2013 Chamber of Deputies elections, entitled simply *Programme of the Movement*, was divided into two main sections: the introductory part 'Ten principal programmatic issues of the Tomio Okamura's Dawn of Direct Democracy' followed by the 'Programme Itself.'[80] The introductory part of the manifesto revolved mostly around the chief aim of the party: introduction of direct democracy and personal, criminal, and material liability of politicians. One of the ten principal programmatic issues of the Úsvit is, however, focused directly on the EU. The party maintains the Czech Republic shall not become the 'EU's province' and will request holding a referendum 'on every transfer of state sovereignty to EU institutions' (n.p.). Moreover, the Dawn of Direct Democracy sees the EU as a 'free market of goods, services and labour' but not as a polity of 'non-systemic donations, allowances and

bureaucrats' (n.p.). Within this party, the party also call for restrictive immigration policy in the Czech Republic since 'we do not want inadaptable immigrants or the arrival of religious fanatics' (n.p.).

The second party of the programme – that is in fact the programme itself – is divided into seven sectorally defined sections. Only one of these sections, namely the section on 'Economic Policy', includes references to and discussion of EU issues. The discussion of EU issues is nonetheless quite brief, two sentences in fact. The Dawn of Direct Democracy is 'against rampant European bureaucracy' and the party approves accession to eurozone provided that 'it is unambiguously advantageous for the Czech Republic and its citizens, and strictly on the basis of holding plebiscite' (n.p.). Overall, European integration issues occur diffusely in the election manifesto, there is not a compact section of the text devoted to the EU. In fact, since European integration issues are practically reflected in few sentences, it may appear as if they were almost absent from the manifesto. From a qualitative content viewpoint, the party provided an overtly general description of its preferences concerning European integration and one specific position on the membership in the eurozone, a long-term aspect of European integration.

The Tradition Responsibility Prosperity 09 (TOP09)

TOP09 programme for the 2013 Chamber of Deputies elections, entitled *We Know where we are Going*, was divided into twelve sectorally defined parts.[81] None of these is devoted exclusively to European integration and not even in the 'Foreign and Defence Policy' section, do EU issues play a predominant role. On the other hand, plenty of references to the EU occur diffused across the election manifesto, with the majority of them located in the 'Economic Policy' and the 'Foreign and Defence Policy' section. Generally, TOP09 is convinced that Czech interests may be 'defended more efficiently in tight partnership at the 'common European table' rather than by policy diverging from common discussions and only includes criticism' (p. 24). Most of the time, the party presents its preferences concerning individual long-term aspects of European integration. For example, TOP09 aims to provide direct agricultural subsidies to 'those who tÂly farming the ground' (p. 18) and it generally 'supports the efforts of the Western Balkans countries to join the EU,' while maintaining that enlargement is only

conceivable if and when the given country 'fulfils without exception all accession conditions' (p. 24).

The party, moreover, sees EU's Common Energy Policy as a tool for bargaining diversification of sources of energy supply. Within the field of development policy, TOP09 aims at 'restricting protectionist barriers hindering import of goods from developing countries' (p. 25). Most of the party's discussion of European integration issues is related to economic aspects. TOP9 will support THE completion of the EU's common market a reduction of bureaucratic demands resulting from EU's economic regulation. Within the realms of the EU's common market, the party intends to increase consumer protection rights 'in coordination with European partners' by providing enough accurate and infallible information (p. 23). Finally, the TOP09 reflects on the current financial crises in the EU: it will aim to decrease the budget deficit by at least 0.5% yearly, as determined in the Stability and Growth Pact and it will make all effort so that the Czech Republic signs and ratifies the Fiscal Compact.

The party also believes that membership in the eurozone will bring more benefits than costs and that it will promote 'long-term stability and prosperity' (p. 21). According to TOP09, the optimal time for joining the eurozone is between the 2018-2020. Taken together, European integration issues occur diffusely across the election manifesto and no compact section of the manifesto is devoted to the EU. From a qualitative viewpoint, TOP09 provided general references to the European integration as well as description of preferences concerning individual (long-term) aspects of European integration (CAP, energy policy, enlargement, single market). The party, nonetheless, also provided discussion of current and heretofore unapproved provisions related to the European integration process (Fiscal Compact).

Results of the Analysis

The analysis of Czech parties' election manifestos prepared for the 2013 Chamber of Deputies elections shows that the analysed parties discuss and reflect on EU issues with varying levels of intensity in the programmatic documents. This finding underlines conclusions of previous studies conducted in the region.[82] In accordance with previously conducted research on Europeanisation of parties' programmatic documents, our results suggest that most election manifestos prepared for

the 2013 national parliamentary elections in the Czech Republic display only a low level of Europeanisation (see Table 1). In other words, EU issues are generally of secondary salience at best for parties in their programmatic documents. Some of the analysed party manifestos – particularly those of the Úsvit and KSČM – almost completely avoided (discussion of) EU issues and hence were almost completely non-Europeanised. Moreover, election manifestos of the ANO2011 also featured low Europeanisation in terms of quantity of EU issues discussed, while qualitatively providing reflection to the EU's long-term agenda. On the other hand, some of the analysed election manifestos – those of the TOP09, ODS, KDU-ČSL and to lesser extent the ČSSD – clearly displayed Europeanisation on both the quantitative and especially the qualitative dimension.

Looking solely at the qualitative dimension, which is more important for the overall extent to which party manifestos are Europeanised since it 'more precisely documents the importance the party attaches to European integration,'[83] the story is similar. The qualitative Europeanisation of election manifestos differs across parties as much as the quantitative. The most Europeanised is the programme of the KDU-ČSL as the party reflects on several so far unapproved issues related to the European integration. Election programmes of three other parties (ČSSD, TOP09, ODS) predominantly reflect on the EU's long-term agenda while including only slight reference to thus far unapproved issues related to the European integration. Finally, one parties' manifestos (ANO2011) reflected only on the EU's long-term agenda and other two parties' resorted in their programmes to mere general and normative references without much attempt to reflect on the concrete EU long-term agenda and actual problems and issues related to the EU.

In summary, the results show that when Czech parties put together an election manifesto for national parliamentary elections, in most cases the Euromanifesto do not display high level of Europeanisation but ether display only weak level of Europeanisation, according to presented conceptualisation. In term of the quantitative dimension, most of the election programmes occupy the lowest layer of our conceptualisation that is, EU issues occur in diffuse manner across these parties' manifestos. From the perspective of qualitative dimension, most of the election programmes occupy the middle layer of Europeanisation on our conceptualisation that is, the parties reflect on individual long-term aspects of European integration in their Euromanifestos.

Put differently, Czech parties' election programmes for national parliamentary elections display a low to medium level of Europeanisation on both the quantitative and qualitative dimensions, which corroborates previous results of prior studies of Europeanisation of manifestos prepared for national parliamentary election across EU member states.

Quantitative dimension				
		Diffuse occurrence	Generally concentrated occurrence	Specifically concentrated occurrence
Qualitative dimension	General and normative references to the EU	Úsvit KSČM↓		
	Reflection to the long-term agenda of the EU	ANO2011→ ČSSD↓	TOP09↓	ODS↓
	Reflection on current issues related to the EU		KDU-ČSL	

Finally, one other interesting finding stems from the analysis: Czech political parties often use the EU and Europe as a referential point/framework for domestic politics (e.g. unemployment in the Czech Republic among lowest/highest in the EU). Moreover, the parties often also mention opportunities of EU funding without further specifying the concrete use and as such opportunities to draw on EU funds becomes a common reference to the existence of the EU.[84] The Europeanisation of party manifestos is thus often limited to this referential level without many substantial changes in party programmes and it appears that EU issues may hardly 'produce influences other than those constituting a referential framework for domestic politics.'[85]

Table 1. Location of parties on the quantitative and qualitative dimension of Europeanisation.

Source: Authors on the basis of content analysis of election manifestos.

Conclusion

The aim of this contribution was to analyse the extent of Europeanisation of election programmes of selected Czech political parties prepared for the recently held 2013 Chamber of Deputies elections according to the conceptualisation presented in the methodological

section. The results show that the extent of Europeanisation on the quantitative dimension was in general similarly low as most of the analysed manifestos. Only for TOP09, Christian Democrats and Civic Democrats, did EU issues appeared within the generally and specifically concentrated occurrence. Interestingly, two of these parties are considered to be right-wing parties, while having substantially different positions on pro-/anti-EU conflict dimensions. Concerning the qualitative dimension, the greatest depth of discussion about European integration was identified in the programme of the KDU-ČSL which appeared within the third conceptual category and in the programmes of the ODS, TOP09 and the ČSSD that oscillated between the second and the third conceptual categories. The rest of the programmes exhibited only minimal Europeanisation in terms of depth and precision of elaboration of EU issues.

The question remains how do these results concerning Europeanisation of political parties' programmatic documents fit into the previous literature. First, the fact that the election manifestos prepared for the Czech national (first-order) parliamentary elections embody only low levels of Europeanisation fit well into the pattern identified by previous literature: studies on the Europeanisation of parties' programmes for EP elections report more intensive changes incurred by the EU than research dealing with manifestos for national parliamentary and/or local elections.[86]

Second, if compared to the prior literature on the Europeanisation of parties' programmatic documents in the Czech Republic (and its neighbourhood), results presented here support the trend of decreasing Europeanisation of programmatic documents ever since the country joined the EU. While the pre-accession period was characterized by increase of programmatic Europeanisation, the membership period–and in particular since the 2006 Chamber of Deputies elections–is characterised by decrease of programmatic Europeanisation.[87] The results on Europeanisation of Czech parties' election manifestos reported here dovetail well into this trend. In other words, Czech political parties are increasingly likely to downplay EU issues in election manifestos prepared for national parliamentary election at least since the 2006 Chamber of Deputies elections. Whether this trend will continue into the future or will spill-over to the sphere of election programmes prepared for EP elections should be the subject of future research.

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Notes

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4   Robert Ladrech (2002), "Europeanization and Political Parties: Towards a Framework for Analysis," *Party Politics* 8, no. 4; Kenneth Hanf and Ben Soetendorp, "Small states and the Europeanization of public policy," in *Adapting to European integration : small states and the European Union*, ed. Kenneth Hanf and Ben Soetendorp (London: Longman, 1998).

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17 cf. Ondřej Císař (2004), "Mezi Prahou a BÂselem: nevládní organizace, sociální hnutí a zájmové skupiny na cestě do EU," *Sociální studia* 1, no. 1; Petr Fiala et al. (2006), "Evropeizace politických stran a zájmových skupin: základní problémy a směry analýzy," *Politologický časopis* 13, no. 1; Ladrech, *Europeanization and National Politics*, 9.

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27 see also Haughton, *Party Politics in Central and Eastern Europe: Does EU Membership Matter?*

28 Vít Hloušek and Pavel Pšeja (2009), "Europeanization of Political Parties and the Party System in the Czech Republic," *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* 25, no. 4; Sylvia Kritzinger et al. (2004), "Continuity and change in party positions towards Europe in Italian parties: an examination of parties' manifestos," *Journal of European Public Policy* 11, no. 6; Paul Pennings (2006), "An Empirical Analysis of the Europeanization of National Party Manifestos, 1960-2003," *European Union Politics* 7, no. 2; Havlík and Vykoupilová, "Two dimensions of the Europeanization of election programs: The case of the Czech Republic; Robert Ladrech (2008), "Europeanization and the variable influence of the EU: national parties and party systems in Western and Eastern Europe," *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans Online* 10, no. 2.

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61 This approach to Europeanisation of party manifestos is particularly suitable given that it does not demand any area specification and it is neutral towards both political parties' positive or negative attitude to the EU and the degree of consolidation of the respective party system Smrčková

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64 Havlík and Vykoupilová, "Two dimensions of the Europeanization of election programs: The case of the Czech Republic."-16; Havlík, České politické strany a evropská integrace: Evropeizace, evropanství, euroskepticismus?, 32-33..

65 It is necessary here to briefly discuss the meaning of a 'chapter': we consider a chapter to be a passage of text headed by a title and formally delineated from other sections. In the case of multi-level stÂcturing of the election manifesto, the chapter may be located even at the lowest level of the stÂcturing (i.e. sub-chapter) Havlík, České politické strany a evropská integrace: Evropeizace, evropanství, euroskepticismus?.

66 Following other scholars, issues can be expressed in several ways in the programme: either in a form of short mention, sentence, and passage, or as a whole chapter. In other words, coded are not entire manifestos, or sections or chapters in it, but individual arguments, defined as verbal expression of a political idea or an issue. Most of the time, a sentence corresponds with an argument, but when a sentence comprises more than one argument, it is broken down in as many quasi-sentences as there are arguments, and these quasi-sentences are coded. The smallest unit that is categorised is a sentence or a quasi-sentence.

67 Havlík and Valterová, "Evropeizace českých politických stran: aplikace Ladrechova konceptu."

68 Havlík and Vykoupilová, "Two dimensions of the Europeanization of election programs: The case of the Czech Republic," 165.

69 Ibid; Kovář, "The Supply Side of Second-Order Elections in the Czech Republic: A Light at the End of the Tunnel?; Havlík, České politické strany a evropská integrace: Evropeizace, evropanství, euroskepticismus; Havlík, "Mluvit stříbro, mlčeti zlato - aneb několik poznámek k evropeizaci volební programatiky Komunistické strany Čech a Moravy.". In relation to the last level of qualitative dimension, Havlík points out that, while analysing concrete election manifestos, it is necessary to reflect the current state of European integration process, meaning that there will be different current issues related to European integration at different points in time.

70 If, for example, the second level of Europeanisation on the quantitative dimension is identified in a given program (i.e. EU issues are included within the broad foreign-policy section of the program) and, at the same time, EU issues are mentioned cross-sectionallly throughout the election manifesto, the predominant degree of Europeanisation is decisive for the final evaluation of Europeanisation of the given manifesto Havlík and Vykoupilová, "Two dimensions of the Europeanization of election programs: The case of the Czech Republic," 167..

71 Ibid.

72 Ibid., 168.

73 Resortní program, 2013. Election manifesto for the 2013 Chamber of Deputies election, Available at http://www.anobudelip.cz/cs/o-nas/program/resortni-program/, accessed on 20 October 2013.

74 For example, when they argue the Czech Republic has the highest share of people employed in industry in the whole EU.

75 #Volím_pravici. Volební program pro volby do Poslanecké sněmovny PČR 2013, *2013.* Election manifesto for the 2013 Chamber of Deputies election, Available at http://www.ods.cz/docs/programy/volebni-program-2013.pdf, accessed 20 October 2013.

76 For example, when the manifesto argues that the costs of labour in the Czech Republic are one of the highest in the EU, and in similar occasions.

77 These are: Human, Economy, Regions, Countryside, and Society.

78 Volební program KDU-ČSL 2013-2017, 2013. Election manifesto for the 2013 Chamber of Deputies election, Available at http://volby.kdu.cz/getmedia/0bb4631e-0fb2-478e-9d17-eaa3ffd840df/KDU-CSL---Volebni-program-2013-2017.pdf.aspx, accessed 20 October 2013.

79 Program pro budoucnost, 2013. Election manifesto for the 2013 Chamber of Deputies election, Available at http://www.kscm.cz/volby-a-akce/volebni-program, accessed 20 October 2013.

80 Program hnutí, 2013. Election manifesto for the 2013 Chamber of Deputies election, Available at http://www.hnutiusvit.cz/program-hnuti/, accessed 20 October 2013.

81 Víme, kam jdeme. Volební program TOP 09, 2013. Election manifesto for the 2013 Chamber of Deputies election, Available at http://www.top09.cz/proc-nas-volit/volebni-program/volebni-program-2013/, accessed on 20 October 2013.

82 Havlík, České politické strany a evropská integrace: Evropeizace, evropanství, euroskepticismus; Havlík and Vykoupilová, "Two dimensions of the Europeanization of election programs: The case of the Czech Republic; Kovář, "The Supply Side of Second-Order Elections in the Czech Republic: A Light at the End of the Tunnel?."

83 Havlík and Vykoupilová, "Two dimensions of the Europeanization of election programs: The case of the Czech Republic," 168.

84 Hloušek and Pšeja, "Europeanization of Political Parties and the Party System in the Czech Republic."

85 Ibid., 533.

86 e.g. Wüst and Schmitt, "Comparing the Views of Parties and Voters in the 1999 Election to the European Parliament; Kritzinger et al., "Continuity and change in party positions towards Europe in Italian parties: an examination of parties' manifestos; Kritzinger and Michalowitz, "Party Position Changes through EU membership? The (Non-)Europeanisation of Austrian, Finnish and Swedish Political Parties; Kovář, "The Supply Side of Second-Order Elections in the Czech Republic: A Light at the End of the Tunnel?."

87 Havlík, České politické strany a evropská integrace: Evropeizace, evropanství, euroskepticismus; Havlík and Vykoupilová, "Two dimensions of the Europeanization of election programs: The case of the Czech Repub-

lic; Havlík and Valterová, "Evropeizace českých politických stran: aplikace Ladrechova konceptu; Hloušek and Pšeja, "Europeanization of Political Parties and the Party System in the Czech Republic; Havlík, České politické strany a evropská integrace: Evropeizace, evropanství, euroskepticismus?

The Europe-anisation of Czech Parties' Election Manifestos

Transnational Threats and Reformulating Security in the UN

Dagmar Rychnovská

Over the past two decades, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has increasingly dealt with new thematic issues and, particularly, with so-called "transnational security challenges." What implications does this trend have? Focusing on conceptual dimensions, this article analyses whether, and how, the inclusion of transnational threats on the UNSC's agenda affects its understanding of security. This work approaches the dynamics of threat politics in the UNSC from the perspective of securitisation theory and argues that security is reformulated in the process of securitisation. Deploying the examples of the securitisation of terrorism and AIDS, this work assesses the dynamics of the (attempted) reinterpretation of security, highlights its effects, and discusses what further consequences and challenges this trend may produce.

Keywords: UN, UNSC, security, transnational threats, securitisation, terrorism, AIDS

Introduction

The UN was established towards the end of WWII as an international organisation whose mission was to prevent another destÂctive war—a goal that its predecessor, the League of Nations had not fulfilled. Given the changing nature of international politics and the UN's expanding membership, the organisation's priorities, tasks and competences have been transformed. However its core agenda – maintaining international peace and security – remains intact. Still, the very understanding of what constitutes international peace and security, what may threaten these lofty goals and how threats to them should be prevented has undergone significant evolution. Over the past two

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decades, two particular and not unrelated trends may be identified in this regard: the UN's attention shift from interstate to intrastate conflicts, and the new thematic issues that have been brought to the UNSC as a body responsible for UN security politics. These issues, which have been addressed according to the logic of security, include terrorism, piracy, organised crime, infectious diseases, environmental degradation and the security of marginalised groups.[1]

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Though more recent and less settled, the move to broaden the UNSC's agenda is thought to be significant since it affects both the UN's internal functioning and its cooperation with member states and other actors. By emphasising new threats that are often understood as transnational – i.e. as phenomena 'driven by non-state actors (e.g. terrorists), activities (e.g. global economic behaviour), or forces (e.g. microbial mutations, earthquakes)'[2] – the UNSC may better mobilise the international community and call for coordinated action. At the same time, since many new threats have a non-military character, this trend underscores the UNSC's changing perception of peace.[3] Here, peace is understood as not only the absence of armed conflict (negative peace), but also the achievement of broader stÂctural conditions enabling friendly relations among states and a conflict-free society (positive peace).[4] Consequently, the logic behind the UNSC actions is transformed from reactionary to more proactive, and it ceases to operate merely in emergency mode. By propounding long-term policies and prescribing new measures to be implemented by member states in national law, the UNSC also begins to act as a UN legislative power (rather than only in its traditional executive role) and, thus, to diminish the role of the General Assembly.[5] Since the UNSC is a *status quo* body, the move to reformulate security marks a dramatic shift from prior practice.

This work contends that the internal dynamics of these developments call for attention. Looking at issues through the lens of constÂctivist security studies, it asks whether, and how, the inclusion of transnational threats on the UNSC's agenda has challenged and transformed its understanding of security. Drawing on the securitisation theory developed by the Copenhagen School of Security Studies[6] and its recent advances,[7] I argue that "security" does not have any universal fixed meaning but rather is a concept which is constantly being reinterpreted as it is used in social interactions. The most significant changes to understandings of security may be observed in the process

of securitisation whereby a particular problem is brought within the security agenda and formulated as a threat. Securitisation is, then, a specific political action in which a securitising actor identifies that an issue or condition is a threat to a valued referent object and calls for the use of extraordinary means in order to tackle that threat. If this securitising move is accepted by the relevant audience, the issue shifts from normal politics to the realm of exceptional politics, enabling the use of extraordinary measures. As a consequence, successful securitisation not only changes the power and competences of securitising actors, but also reconstÂcts the meaning of the issue—that is, the way it is conceptualised, linked to other issues and embedded in dominant security narratives.[8]

All this suggests that if we want to uncover whether and how the meaning of security is evolving in the UNSC, it will be useful to analyse how the UNSC interprets international peace and security and threats to these goals in practice. This is particularly relevant when it comes to the introduction of new issues onto the UNSC agenda. A number of pressing questions arise: Are these new threats seen as compatible with the UNSC's understanding of threats to international peace and security? Why or why not? Does the UNSC explicitly discuss what "international peace and security" means? Is the new interpretation of security disputed within the UNSC?[9]

This research focuses empirically on two new transnational threats which were included on the UNSC's agenda: the issue of terrorism in 2001 (leading to UNSC Resolution 1373) and that of HIV/AIDS in 2000 (prompting UNSC Resolution 1308). These cases have been selected for analysis for several reasons. First, the era of the early 2000s was marked by the UNSC's increasing emphasis on transnational threats, resulting in the adoption of several non-traditional resolutions dealing with new thematic issues.[10] Second, both cases concluded with the adopting of a UNSC resolution that formulated a new understanding of the securitised issue; both might, thus, challenge the broader interpretation of international peace and security. Third, both securitisations were initiated and promoted by the same actor—the United States, which had the control and power of a securitising actor. Despite these similarities, however, the reinterpretation of security caused by each issue's inclusion on the UNSC agenda was very different. While the case of terrorism prompted a highly successful, unchallenged securitisation, the attempt to securitise AIDS was more problematic and dis-

puted. This work's comparative design, thus, allows us to study the different dynamics at work in the UNSC's reinterpretation of security through its deliberations on new security issues and their relevance to international peace and security.

This work proceeds as follows: first, the theoretical aspects of the UNSC's constÂction of security are discussed. Second, two case studies are set out, dealing respectively with the constÂction of terrorism and of HIV/AIDS as threats in the UNSC setting. Third, the findings are discussed and put in the broader context of UN security politics. Finally, I offer some concluding observations.

Constructing Security in the UN Security Council

According to the UN Charter, the UNSC's responsibilities are to identify 'the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression' and 'make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken,' even extending to the collective use of military force.[11] From the perspective of international law, these concepts are very open-ended and their interpretation, thus, depends on the UNSC itself. There are no specific definitions of these terms in the UN Charter, and turning to other sources of law, very little International Court of Justice jurispÂdence addresses these issues.[12] In fact, since the end of the Cold War – and especially since the UN engaged in the war on terror – the key concept "threat to peace" has been significantly reformulated. The UNSC's emphasis has shifted from international (interstate) to internal (intrastate) affairs, and more attention has been paid to threats that go beyond the topic of political violence.[13]

Rejecting the idea that the UNSC agenda is predetermined by a particular notion of what international peace and security mean – or should be – and, thus, which threats the UNSC should deal with, I would suggest that we look at how the security concept is reinterpreted through securitisation in empirical contexts. The Copenhagen School argues that any issue can become a security issue if it is presented as such by a securitising actor and accepted by a relevant audience.[14] At the same time, it may be contended that securitisation not only constÂcts the meaning of a concrete threat, but also profoundly affects the social context in which it is embedded. Successful securitisation can empower securitising actors – and possibly others as well – and improve their ability to influence how meaning is constÂcted in the

given socio-political setting. Alternatively, securitisation changes the socio-linguistic context, i.e. the system of meaning (i.e. security narratives, frameworks etc.) in which specific conceptions of threat and security are entrenched.[15] The concept of security may be thought of as one which is constantly being reconstÂcted as it evolves over time and reaches new actors and discursive contexts. Thus, it makes no sense to search for an ultimate or even universal logic of security in either specific empirical contexts or theoretical terms since the meaning of security is always contextual and changing, and as such, it must be understood in a process-oriented and empirically informed way.[16]

To analyse this process, we can focus on speaker-listener interactions in a specific empirical area and study them with the help of the securitisation framework; according to the latter, a securitising actor proposes a new concept of a threat and the relevant audience accepts or reject this move.[17] In the context of the UNSC, the interactions between the securitising actor and the audience are institutionalised through official Council deliberations initiated by UNSC members or other relevant UN actors.

The outcome of these debates takes the form of resolutions (or other official documents) which indicate whether, and how, the audience has accepted the securitising move and the resulting reinterpretation of threats and security. Once accepted by the UNSC, the new understanding of threats and security presumably affects further SC actions both in terms of the powers and competences gained by actors during the securitisation and the images of security issues constÂcted in these debates.[18]

This study analyses these dynamics is practice and looks at how the meaning of security is constÂcted and reconstÂcted through the securitisation of transnational threats in the UNSC. Concretely, the analysis focuses on the following concerns:

Securitisation context: What is the broader socio-political and socio-linguistic context of the securitisation? Which actors are involved in the securitisation, and how do they take part?

Securitisation process: How does the securitising actor present whatever constitutes the threat as well as the referent object? How does it depict what must be done about the threat, who must take action and the urgency and seriousness of the threat? How does the audience accept these moves?

Securitisation effects: What are the immediate as well as the more long-term effects of the securitisation in terms of policy change (i.e. security practices)? What are these effects in terms of discursive change (i.e. the concept of security)?

While the discussion proceeds according to this scheme, the main emphasis is on the third part— i.e. the issue of how UNSC members, as the securitisation audience, accept the concept of a threat and its relevance and appropriateness to the UNSC agenda. This securitisation process is, thus, traced over two case studies: the securitisation of transnational terrorism in 2001 and that of HIV/AIDS in 2000.[19]

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The Case of Transnational Terrorism: A Successful Extension of Security

Securitisation Context

The issue of terrorism has a long history in the UN: during the Cold War it was dealt with by the UNGA and seen as a specific crime whose roots and motives varied. In the 1990s, the UNSC increased its activities in this field and reinforced the perception of terrorism as a state-sponsored and state-based criminal activity. However, the failure to suppress terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda, which had become less dependent on state support, motivated the UNSC to adopt a more comprehensive approach to terrorism.[20]

The result of this change was Resolution 1269, which represented a substantial shift in the understanding of terrorism: it depicted terrorism as a general concern, condemned all terrorist acts regardless of their motivation and manifestation and highlighted the importance of the issue by recognising that some terrorist acts 'could threaten international peace and security.'[21] After the terrorist attacks of 9/11, American and other diplomats urged their governments to call for a resolute response.[22] Terrorist attacks and terrorism in general were discussed at the UNSC meeting on 12 September when the UNSC adopted Resolution 1368. The counterterrorism strategy was further specified in the comprehensive Resolution 1373, which was developed by the US, co-sponsored by the UK and adopted at a meeting on 28 September that year.

Securitisation Process

The securitising move was made in a very broad and abstract manner. In initiating the securitisation, the US representative did not elaborate on the nature of the referent object, but instead stressed that the terrorist attacks also affected other states. In his words, the attack 'was an assault not just on the United States, but on all of us who support peace and democracy and the values for which the United Nations stands.'[23]

The audience condemned the terrorist attacks and expressed their support for further actions by the Security Council. The attacks of 9/11 were said to target humanity, democracy, freedom and the values shared by the UN members, but some also presented them as a threat to the domestic order. When it came to interpreting the nature of the threat, most speakers depicted terrorism in a very general way and linked it discursively to other security issues. Terrorism was presented as an unjustifiable phenomenon; Ireland, for instance, suggested that 9/11 was an 'attack of barbarism and evil against innocent people.'[24] Even more importantly, 9/11 attacks were interpreted as an example of a new type of terrorism which was global in scale and could take any form. For instance, the Ukrainian representative noted that 'new definitions, terms and strategies have to be developed for the new realities'[25] while Russia described terror as a 'plague of the twenty-first century.'[26]

The US speaker did not present the suggested security measures in detail, but only demonstrated the clear determination of his country to 'win the war against terrorism,' while making 'no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbour them'[27] and calling on members to bring the perpetrators to justice. These suggestions were repeatedly approved though only briefly discussed by the audience. That audience expressed its solidarity with the US, and all speakers vocalised the support of their countries for any further UNSC action in this respect even if such support took a rather abstract form. Further, Russia and China raised the issue of existing international conventions against terrorism and argued for their full implementation. They also pointed out that these conventions should lead to not just the suppression, but also the prevention of terrorism. For Russia, the Council's action represented a 'resolve of Council members to do all they can to leave not one terrorist act unpunished and to increase efforts to prevent and end terrorism.'[28] China was more

circumspect in its wording about what should be done and instead proclaimed its support for 'the United Nations in strengthening its work in preventing and combating terrorism [... and in the] practical implementation of the relevant international conventions against terrorism.'[29]

As regards the perceived seriousness and urgency of the situation, the audience broadly accepted the view that the threat from terrorist attacks was exceptional. The French ambassador, for instance, described the situation as a 'time of trial'[30] while the Jamaican representative even noted that the attacks had 'plunged our entire world into an unprecedented period of peril, fear and uncertainty.'[31] Some speakers indicated that they saw terrorist attacks as comparable to acts of military aggression in the traditional sense: for instance, the Russian ambassador proclaimed them 'an unprecedented act of aggression of international terrorism,'[32] and the representative from Mauritius stressed that they had taken 'the lives of thousands of innocent victims, including women and children.'[33] Therefore, despite the many unknowns around the threat – or rather, the *potential* threat since the UNSC sought to address terrorism as a more general issue – the way that it was discussed by decision-makers showed that they were convinced of its relevance and the urgent need to formulate and implement collective countermeasures.

In general, this securitisation was very effective, appealing persuasively to all UNSC members. That audience accepted the extended conception of terrorism as a threat to the whole international community. They agreed that this complex threat must be responded to collectively through the prevention and suppression of terrorism. They also shared a sense of the urgency and seriousness of the threat.

Securitisation Effects

Adopted unanimously, without any abstentions, the two resolutions on terrorism generated a new understanding of terrorism as a threat to international peace and security. As such, they triggered an international counterterrorism regime. Interestingly, there was no formal discussion in the Council before the passing of the landmark Resolution 1373, and allegedly no significant background negotiations were held about the content of this resolution.[34] In terms of the language it used, the conceptual changes it made and the policies it designed, Res-

olution 1373 clearly deviated from the UNSC's prior security discourse. The resolution cited terrorism in general as a threat to international peace and security; it approved the use of self-defence against terrorist attacks and authorised several exceptional measures including the obligation of member states to incorporate a variety of new and extraordinary policies (e.g. the criminalisation of terrorism and its funding, targeting of suspected terrorists with economic sanctions and travel bans, obligatory extradition of terrorists, etc.) into their domestic law. It also established the Counter-Terrorism Committee, with a mandate to monitor and support the implementation of these measures at the level of the states. How long the measures should be in force and how they could be reviewed were not discussed in the resolution. Given both its quasi-legislative form and its unusual content, it was, thus, unprecedented and a landmark in the politics of the UNSC and the UN in general.

Turning to the long-term evolution of understandings of terrorism, Resolutions 1368 and 1373 attached a specific meaning to the concept – as a global, uncontrollable and increasingly dangerous phenomenon – which, in fact, fits well with the progressivist narrative about terrorism's changing nature and the international order that the UN represents.[35] The repeated classification of terrorists as extremists or fanatics who exploit the advantages of the modern world was also consistent with suggestions to "fight" the conditions which presumably enable the planning and organising of terrorist activities rather than considering other potential countermeasures, such as negotiations, deterrent acts or addressing the root causes of terrorism.[36] This approach contrasts with the earlier stance which dealt with terrorism on an ad hoc basis, focusing only on some of its aspects and mostly targeting its state sponsors.[37]

Seen more broadly, the UNSC's involvement in emerging international counterterrorism allowed it to gain new powers – particularly at the expense of the General Assembly – through the establishment, for example, of several expert bodies that maintained terrorist blacklists and decided on new counterterrorism measures. Terrorism, thus, became a very powerful buzzword in the UN, and many other issues (e.g. proliferation of weapons of mass destÂction, organised crime and dÂg trafficking) have since been securitised in the UNSC based on their links to terrorism.

The Case of AIDS:
An Unsuccessful Reformulation of Security

Securitisation Context

In 2000, the UNSC, for the first time, addressed an issue that had previously been linked instead to the politics of development and health: the HIV/AIDS pandemic. In contrast with the securitising of terrorism in 2001, this was the first appearance of the AIDS topic on the UNSC's agenda. The issue had already been politicised in the UN and dealt with by several of its agencies in 1990s, but without much success. At the end of that decade, Peter Piot, then head of the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), took over the agenda, seeking to gain political attention for the pandemic by connecting it with a new narrative in US policy circles about 'global emerging infectious diseases' as a national security threat.[38] The characterisation of AIDS as a threat to social and economic stability was accepted within the wider network of relevant UN agencies[39] though the representatives of states with the highest AIDS prevalence rates were more sceptical about this securitisation.[40]

The securitisation in the UNSC was initiated primarily by Richard Holbrooke, a US diplomat. He was later joined by Al Gore, the then US vice-president and presidential candidate as well as Kofi Annan, the then UN secretary-general, Peter Piot and other AIDS experts.[41] The UNSC debate on HIV/AIDS took place in January 2000 and was followed by a meeting in June 2000. It was at that meeting that the UNSC passed Resolution 1308 specifically addressing the topic.

Securitisation Process

The securitisation was promoted by a variety of securitising actors, who, in fact, offered two different takes on the issue. On the one hand, Holbrooke, then the US ambassador, sought to present HIV/AIDS as a threat to 'world security' under a 'new and extensive definition' of security.[42] In his view, "security" denoted not only security from 'loss of life and the ravages of war,' but also from 'constant fear and degradation, and from a loss of the quality of life and liberty of spirit that should belong to all.'[43] On the other hand, other securitising actors

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linked the threat of HIV/AIDS to security's traditional referent object—the state—through the supposedly negative effects of the pandemic on economic and social stability. This was in turn, assumed to endanger the political stability of African states, where the pandemic was most severe .In this vein, Al Gore argued that

> [f]or the nations of sub-Saharan Africa, AIDS is not just a humanitarian crisis. It is a security crisis, because it threatens not only individual citizens but the institutions that define and defend the character of a society.[44]

The representatives of some African countries also stressed this negative effect of HIV/AIDS on the social and economic stability of their states and highlighted the danger that the pandemic would hamper the progress that had been made so far. However, these arguments about the far-reaching consequences of the AIDS epidemic could not sway this audience. Most UNSC members did not support the re-conception of security suggested by Holbrooke, and some even questioned the empirical grounds for his argument.

In the ensuing debate, the securitising actors therefore narrowed down the referent object and adjusted descriptions of the threat so as to link the problem of HIV/AIDS more directly to the traditional concept of security.[45] Here, they pointed to the peacekeeping operations whose efficiency would diminish if soldiers began to suffer from the disease. The success of the new argument was, however, doubtful since most speakers continued to address the more complex consequences of the spread of the HIV/AIDS pandemic and not only its ties to peacekeeping. For instance, several representatives (from France, Jamaica, Namibia and Ukraine) highlighted the danger that the pandemic posed to the economic and social security of states, and some (from Bangladesh, Netherlands, Tunisia, UK and Zimbabwe) extended this argument to the allegedly negative consequences for the political stability of African states and their ability to resist violence. Canada reiterated its long-term support for a widening security agenda and a more human-centric understanding of security but also recognised the situation's destabilising effect on the stability and functioning of African societies. Argentina was more direct in its support for the draft resolution; it accepted that the spread of HIV/AIDS had a negative effect on African security by reducing the effectiveness of peacekeepers, and thus, their ability to stabilise conflict and post-conflict areas. At the same time, speakers from other states (Netherlands, Uganda and

Ukraine) challenged this argument, stressing that the roots of the AIDS pandemic were more complex and linking them to issues such as poverty, gender discrimination and modernisation.

As regards suggested measures, the speakers' opinions differed little. At the first UNSC meeting on HIV/AIDS, the securitising actors gave only a very vague picture of what should be done about the security issue. They emphasised the need to tackle AIDS domestically through education and awareness-raising among the population and illustrated the success of that approach with the example of some African states.[46] Later, as the focus shifted to the danger of AIDS for peacekeepers, their testing, education and training were the main policy initiatives suggested to solve the security problem. Faced with the concerns of some member states about the intervention in domestic affairs, Holbrooke had to reject a proposal for a compulsory database about peacekeepers;[47] he stressed that preventive measures should not infringe on the sovereignty of states.[48] There was relatively wide acceptance of the main argument about the need for a preventive training programme for peacekeepers to be coordinated by international bodies and other member states. Representatives from Canada, Jamaica and Ukraine also claimed that the UNSC might help suppress the spread of AIDS by preventing and stabilising violent conflicts—that is, in line with its traditional security politics and without expanding its competences. Many representatives (from Bangladesh, France, Mali, Namibia, Tunisia, Ukraine and Zimbabwe) also underscored the importance of better access to medical treatment and anti-AIDS dÂgs. Though these insights were not reflected in the final resolution, they showed this audience's interest in discussing and politicising the problem of AIDS more generally—and not only in relation to peacekeeping and security.

We can see, thus, that the audience was not really convinced that HIV/AIDS was a security problem. The securitising actors—and Holbrooke and Gore in particular—tried to liken the problem's relevance to that of traditional security issues by constÂcting the problem as a 'global challenge' and a threat to 'global security' and the 'world community' and calling for a 'war against AIDS.'[49] Nevertheless, this militarised language did not resonate with the audience and most speakers were quite cautious when describing the negative effects of the HIV/AIDS pandemic. The importance of the issue was demonstrated with many statistics about infection rates among the African population. However, while the audience expressed its concern about these neg-

ative trends, it did not accept arguments about the problem's urgency and global relevance or the need to apply any possible measures, including monitoring infection rates among international peacekeeping personnel.

Securitisation Effects

After several months of intensive diplomatic negotiations and the mobilising of other international and UN agencies, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1308, which recognised that 'the HIV/AIDS pandemic, if unchecked, may pose a risk to stability and security.'[50] The spread of the disease was described as a potential 'risk to stability and security' with 'a uniquely devastating impact on all sectors and levels of society' and a 'potential damaging impact [...] on the health of international peacekeeping personnel, including support personnel.'[51] Since the UNSC had agreed to support domestic policy measures to tackle the AIDS problem, the resolution encouraged member states to prevent the spread of the disease to military personnel by reducing the risk behaviour of peacekeepers (through education, training, voluntary testing, counselling and treatment) and incorporating similar measures in the preventive training of UN peacekeepers. Although Russia and China refused to take part in the discussion, the resolution was finally adopted unanimously without any abstentions.

The securitisation of AIDS had additional implications notwithstanding research findings that subsequent UN debates on AIDS were not dominated by the language of security but rather by that of development.[52] For one thing, tackling AIDS became an important policy area in the UN (see, e.g., the Millennium Development Goals), bringing more attention and resources to UNAIDS. Kofi Annan included the UNSC narrative on AIDS in several official reports. In the *In Larger Freedom* report, for instance, he asserted that AIDS was not only a public health problem, but also a cause of social and economic instability since it endangers economic development and 'weakens governance and security stÂctures, posing a further threat'; as such, he argued, it 'demands an exceptional response.'[53] It must be reiterated, however, that the credibility of this narrative has since been challenged, and the UNSC's perception of AIDS as a security issue has changed.[54]

Characteristics of the New Threats and the Reformulation of Security

While scholars and analysts broadly share a view of the changing conception of security in the UNSC, how is this evolution perceived by insiders? Do UNSC members—the entities who make concrete decisions about issues of international peace and security—see these decisions as contributing to the changing understanding of peace and security? Do they explicitly discuss whether and why changes are made? And do they reflect on those changes?

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In terms of the re-conception of security brought about by these two securitisations, our analysis shows that it was possible to expand the scope of threats on the UNSC's agenda so long as these threats were understood as credible and relevant for the UNSC. For instance, the effective securitisation of terrorism was justified based on the changing nature of transnational terrorism and the need to address this new type of threat in a more complex way. In contrast, AIDS was not perceived by this audience as a serious issue posing a direct and powerful threat to security.

At the same time, the UNSC continued to understand international peace and security, the ultimate referent object of security, in a predominantly negative way—as the absence of political violence. Attempts to explicitly reformulate the values that the UNSC should protect were rejected by the audience, as the AIDS example shows. The UNSC's deliberations demonstrate that AIDS was only taken seriously when securitising actors reformulated the issue pragmatically as a threat to the economic, social and consequently political security of states (rather than a threat to human security), thus accommodating the audience's understanding of security.

The securitisation of terrorism was different in the sense that the problem was understood in a very general and expansive way, allowing for speakers' different interpretations of the referent object. While some used highly militarised language, others linked the problem to other values that should be protected—domestic political and economic stability, freedom, democracy and so on. Arguably, while the reformulation of the referent object was rejected in the securitisation of AIDS, the broadening of this object became possible in the context of the threat of transnational terrorism.

The inclusion of the transnational security issue on the UNSC's agenda also represented a challenge to the type of politics which the UNSC typically engages in. Both the securitisation of terrorism and the less successful securitisation of AIDS led the UNSC to adopt certain long-term preventive policy measures which apply regardless of the seriousness ascribed to a particular threat. These policies give new powers and competences to transnational actors controlled by or collaborating with the UNSC. They, thus, transform the UNSC's traditional role in the UN as well as in international politics. Concretely, the AIDS case shows us that even where an issue is not identified as a threat to international peace and security, dealing with it within the UNSC under security logic can make a difference in several ways: on the one hand, it may empower new actors and make them more credible. On the other, it can highlight and legitimise a particular understanding of the issue, which may then be constÂcted as a more serious security threat. This can lay the ground for a future – and perhaps more effective – securitisation. Nevertheless, from the AIDS example, we can also see that where an issue is ascribed limited seriousness, this may cause the unconvinced audience and other relevant actors (other UN agencies, including the General Assembly and African states in the case of AIDS) to express concerns about the UNSC's expansion of its powers, assumption of the competences of other bodies and intervention in the domestic affairs of member states.[55]

Generally, UNSC debates focused on the nature of each particular threat, and thus, the question of countermeasures was not addressed in any complex way by either the securitising actor or the audience. In fact, there was no official UNSC debate at all before the adoption of the ground-breaking Resolution 1373, which introduced many revolutionary security measures. This raises serious questions about not just the role of backstage politics and "hidden" participants in the UNSC's policy-making, but also the legitimacy of these new policies and the UNSC's ability to reflect on the significance of the changes that it makes.

Conclusion: Implications for the Construction of New Threats in the Security Council

This study has highlighted the tensions between the established security logic of UNSC politics and attempts being made to address new problems in international politics effectively. The UNSC has been

granted extraordinary powers so that it can deal with extraordinary problems, but can it adjust to the logic of new threats and risks? The counter-terrorist policies adopted by the UNSC after 9/11 show that this body is, in fact, capable of reformulating the notion of security at least in order to accommodate potential threats to international peace and security; it is also able to reshape the portfolio of its countermeasures. In contrast, in the debate about AIDS, the audience explicitly expressed its desire to restrict the UNSC's focus to conflict management and not resort to any "standard measures" that could interfere with member states' domestic politics. Securitisation theory would explain these developments based on the principle that it is only when an audience accepts an issue as an existential threat that a securitising actor is allowed to resort to any necessary (let alone extraordinary) means. Since the UNSC has a mandate to act in times of emergency, it may be argued that its involvement in "normal" politics is in fact even more exceptional than its authorisation of the use of force. In other words, practices such as the use of force, which may be exceptional from the point of view of member states, need not constitute exceptional practices at an institutional level within the UN.

Can the UNSC, then, change its understanding of security so as to address issues that require prevention and control predominantly through standard measures rather than by responding with extraordinary measures? The case studies examined here show that while it is certainly possible to change the UNSC's conception of security through the securitisation of new issues, there are many barriers regarding what can be said in the UNSC context and how this may be achieved. Institutional language is one of these key obstacles. As has been suggested, the UNSC is vested with extraordinary powers in the realm of international politics and its scope of action is therefore restricted to issues of international peace and security. Its responsibility is to identify threats to international peace and security; in doing so, it may act under Chapter VII and resort to collective sanctions to tackle those threats. To include a new issue on the UNSC's agenda, a securitising actor must use institutional security language, or as some have termed it, 'the grammar of security' based on the UN Charter.[56]

Framing a topic as something other than a threat to international peace and security may raise serious doubts about its appropriateness for the agenda, and thus, about the legitimacy of the UNSC's politics. At the same time, this problem has a policy dimension. Since in the

UNSC's socio-linguistic context, the discourse of security also very directly signals the discourse of exceptional politics, recognising an issue as a threat to peace may cause the UNSC to gradually bring the proposed countermeasures into the realm of extraordinary measures and ultimately to authorise the use of force. While the language of "normal politics" may be seen as inappropriate in the UNSC context, using security language opens up the Pandora's Box of exceptional politics and may effectively escalate securitisation towards militarisation. This suggests that the UNSC is ill-equipped to act other than according to the logic of security on which it was founded and which is anchored in the UN Charter. The UNSC's expansion of its sphere of action through the securitisation of terrorism may, thus, be ascribed to its ability to bring together the established notion of an existential threat with new measures of a non-exceptional nature. The conditions for such radical conceptual changes do not emerge often, but this does not mean that they cannot occur at all.

This raises further questions about efficiency and legitimacy. By getting involved in the governing of new transnational threats, the UNSC is doing far more than authorising exceptional measures in international politics. It is also helping to establish a particular global security agenda, giving voice to new actors, legitimising new security practices and a new logic of security governance and significantly broadening the policy area for its interventions in the domestic politics of member states. Nevertheless, the UNSC continues to justify these steps by way of traditional security optics based on the established logic of threats and the language of security. Such narrow security-driven rhetoric may, however, be blocking a comprehensive discussion of effective solutions to new problems. By highlighting only their security dimension, the UNSC may reinforce a misleading highly simplistic approach to complex issues, which, in fact, require complex solutions. There is, thus, a need for more in-depth discussions about not only the understanding of new threats, but also their appropriate solutions and the UNSC's role in designing them. The second challenge refers to the legitimacy of the UNSC's political involvement in these issues. The UNSC's competences are traditionally in the sphere of conflict management, and this has expanded to internal conflicts. Given the UN principle of non-intervention, any broadening of UNSC competences is potentially controversial. Acting on issues which are not even considered to be threats to international peace and security and designing new policies

and new modes of involvement in member states' internal affairs may be illegitimate conduct in the eyes of some members in the long Ân. Therefore, unless the UNSC explicitly redefines the concept of international peace and security and its powers to maintain this sphere, it is unlikely to deal effectively with new issues that require new solutions.

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Notes

1   Thomas G. Weiss (2010), *The United Nations and Changing World Politics,* Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press. See chapter 6 for a discussion of these issues.
2   Peter Bergen and Laurie Garrett (2005), 'Report of the Working Group on State Security and Transnational Threats,' Princeton Project on National Security Papers, p.3, available at: <http://www.princeton.edu/~ppns/conferences/reports/fall/SSTT.pdf> (accessed 17 April 2014).
3   Erika De Wet (2004), *The Chapter VII Powers of the United Nations Security Council,* Portland: Hart Publishing, p. 139.
4   Johan Galtung (1969), 'Violence, Peace, and Peace Research,' *Journal of Peace Research,* 6: 3.
5   See, e.g., Stefan Talmon (2005), 'The Security Council as World Legislature,' *American Journal of International Law,* 99: 1; Paul C. Szasz (2002), 'The Security Council Starts Legislating,' *American Journal of International Law,* 96: 4; Eric Rosand (2004), 'The Security Council as "Global Legislator": *Ultra Vires* or Ultra Innovative,' *Fordham International Law Journal,* 28: 3.
6   Ole Wæver (2005), 'Securitization and Desecuritization,' in Ronnie D. Lipschutz (ed.), *On Security*, New York: Columbia University Press; Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde (1998), *Security: A New Framework for Analysis,* Boulder, Colo., London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
7   Holger Stritzel (2007), 'Towards a Theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and Beyond,' *European Journal of International Relations*, 13: 3; Holger Stritzel (2011), 'Security, the Translation,' *Security Dialogue* 42: 4-5.
8   Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998).
9   This study approaches these topics at a micro-level: it analyses the inter-

nal dynamics of changes in the meaning of "security" rather than stressing the broader socio-political context for these changes. Arguably, the explanatory power of that context is limited. For instance, the favourable post-Cold War international environment certainly helped "unblock" the sc and enabled more constÂctive international cooperation among the great powers; this did not, however, necessarily mean the reformulation and expansion of the Council's agenda. Though some contextualising of debates is needed, I would suggest that the broader international context is actually reflected in deliberations over the interpretation of security and transnational threats.

10   Peter Wallensteen and Patrik Johansson (2004), 'Security Council Decisions in Perspective,' in David M. Malone (ed.), *The un Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century*, Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, p. 29.

11   Charter of the United Nations, (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945), 1 unts xvi.

12   See, e.g., Nigel D. White (1997), *Keeping the Peace: The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security,* Manchester: Manchester University Press, pp. 33-52.

13   Malcolm N. Shaw (2008), *International Law*, New York: Cambridge University Press, p. 1237.

14   Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998).

15   Stritzel (2007).

16   Stritzel (2011).

17   Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998).

18   For an extended discussion of how to approach this process both conceptually and methodologically within constÂctivist security studies, see Dagmar Rychnovská, 'Securitisation and the Power of Threat Framing,' *Perspectives* (forthcoming).

19   The securitisation literature does not deal directly with the securitisation of terrorism in the un. For more theoretical discussions of the issue, see, e.g., Barry Buzan (2006), 'Will the "Global War on Terrorism" Be the New Cold War?' *International Affairs*, 82: 6; Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver (2009), 'Macrosecuritisation and Security Constellations: Reconsidering Scale in Securitisation Theory,' *Review of International Studies*, 35: 2. On the securitisation of aids in the un, see, e.g., Roxanna Sjöstedt (2011), 'Health Issues and Securitisation: The ConstÂction of hiv/ aids as a us National Security Threat,' in Thierry Balzacq (ed.), *Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve*, London and New York: Routledge; Colin McInnes and Simon Rushton (2013), 'hiv/aids and Securitisation Theory,' *European Journal of International Relations*, 19:1; Colin McInnes and Simon Rushton (2010), 'hiv, aids and Security: Where Are We Now?,' *International Affairs*, 86:1; Simon Rushton (2010), 'aids and International Security in the United Nations System,' *Health Policy and Planning*, 25: 6; Stefan Elbe, 'Risking Lives: aids, Security and Three Concepts of Risk,' *Security Dialogue*, 39: 2-3; Gwyn Prins (2004), 'aids and Global Security,' *International Affairs*, 80: 5; Marco A. Vieira (2007), 'The Securitization of the hiv/aids Epidemic as a Norm: A Contribution to ConstÂctivist Scholarship on the Emer-

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23 UNSC Verbatim Record (2001), UN Doc S/PV/4370, p. 7.

24 Ibid, p. 4.

25 Ibid, pp. 3-4.

26 Ibid, p. 5.

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34 Ilias Bantekas (2006), 'The International Law of Terrorist Financing,' *American Journal of International Law*, 97: 2, p. 326.

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41 McInnes and Rushton (2010), p. 227.

42 UNSC (2000), UN Doc S/PV/4087, p. 2.

43 Ibid, p.3.

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45 UN Doc S/PV/4172.
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Distant Shores?

Evaluating Spain's Immigration Policy

Traian Urban

Over the past few decades, Spain has been transformed from a net emigration country into a hub for international immigrants. In the last five years, the number of foreigners living in Spain has increased fourfold. This suggests a flow of some three million new residents streaming into Spain at a time of high unemployment and general economic paralysis. This study examines the history of Spain's immigration policy, highlighting issues such as governmental responsibility, pathways to social integration and the status of illegal immigrants.

Keywords: *Spain, immigration, economic crisis, unemployment, politics*

Introduction

In the global context of migration, Spain has shifted from a net emigration to a net immigration country over the last few decades. To attach a quick chronology to this transformation: 1973 marked the start of a period of demographic stability and a massive emigrant return to the country. Some have argued that this was triggered by the fact that much of the West had plunged into economic stagnation after the oil crisis—many in Spain's emigré community were economic refugees—however it was probably more connected with the dawn of a democratisation period that culminated in the late 1980s. Changes to Spain's domestic political system were reflected in a demographic balance between emigrants and immigrants that lasted until the mid-1990s.[1] Since then, there has been a noticeable shift, and Spain has emerged as a prime immigrant destination as a result of its economic growth, EU membership and participation in the Schengen Area. The country now ranks among the most popular immigrant destinations in the world with an intake rate four times higher than that of the US

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and eight times more than that of France.[2] In 2005, CypÂs and Andorra were the only countries in Europe that had more immigrants than Spain. Spain currently ranks 10th in the world in terms of the total number of immigrants behind countries such as the US, Russia, Germany, Ukraine, France, Canada and the UK. Over the past five years, the number of foreigners living in Spain has increased fourfold, which means there has been an influx of around three million new residents since 2010.

According to the 2011 census, 14.1% of Spain's residents were of foreign nationality. Migration flows declined slightly based on the impact of the economic crisis in 2010, 2011 and 2012; around 40,000 migrants who had been living in Spain left the country in 2011 and another 230,000 followed in 2012. These figures contrast with data from the mid-'90s when the number of registered immigrants was only one million or 2.5% of the Spanish population.[3] In the last decade, Spain's immigrant makeup has also diversified considerably. In January 1998, immigrants coming from the EU-15 formed 41.3% of residents who were not born in Spain. In January 2011, the same group made up less than 20% of all foreigners living in Spain. This period also saw the greatest increase in immigrants coming from countries in Eastern Europe. Between 1998 and 2011, this number rose from 6.6% to 21%.

If we look more closely at the nationality of immigrants in Spain,[4] we find that in 1998 the majority were as follows: Moroccan (190,497), French (143,023), German (115,395), British (87,808) and Argentinian (61,323). In 2011, the list had changed and these nationalities were noticeable: Romanian (809,409), Moroccan (766,187), Ecuadorian (478,894), British (392,577) and Colombian (372,541). There were 457,650 newly registered migrants in 2011. Immigrants to Spain tend to concentrate in areas with greater economic activity and more demand for labour. The areas with the highest immigrant numbers are therefore industrial and tourist centres such as Madrid and its surrounds, the Mediterranean coast and the islands. The most popular destinations for immigrants from within the EU are the Levante, Andalusia, the Balearic Islands and the Canary Islands. The main reasons that immigrants move to these places are the good climate and competitive prices compared to their home countries. On the other hand, the regions with the lowest immigrant numbers are Extremadura (2.3%), Asturias (2.5%), Galicia (2.5%), the Basque Country (3.4%), Castile and León (3.6%) and Cantabria (3.7%). Overall, 44.81% of all officially registered

immigrants in Spain live in three provinces (Madrid, Barcelona and Alicante). A 2009 population census indicated that the place in Spain with the largest immigrant settlement ws San Fulgencio (Alicante) where 77.58% of the 12,030 inhabitants were foreigners. The only cities with a population above 10,000 where foreigners outnumbered Spanish citizens were Rojales (where foreigners were 65.25% of the population), Teulada (60.37%), Calpe (58.61%), Jávea (51.22%) and Alfaz del Pi (50.89%); all are in the province of Alicante. Torrevieja, with more than 50,000 inhabitants, also had a high proportion of foreigners (47.65% of its 84,348 inhabitants); it is in Alicante province as well.[5] The geographic distribution of foreigners also greatly depends on their country of origin. In the autonomous areas of Madrid and Catalonia, Latin American and African people represent two-third of all immigrants. There are twice as many Africans as Latin Americans in Catalonia, and in Madrid it is the other way around. Moroccan citizens form the largest migrant colony in Catalonia and Andalusia while 75.51% of all Pakistani residents live in Catalonia. Most Ecuadorians in Spain live in Madrid (34% of the total number) followed by Barcelona and Murcia. Brits are mostly clustered in Alicante and Malaga, Germans on the Balearic and Canary Islands and more than half of Romanians in Spain reside in Madrid or Castellón.[6]

Immigrants' origins in Spain are, thus, very diverse and considerably influenced by cultural factors. The majority come from Latin American countries (36.21% of all immigrants according to 2006 National Statistics Institute data) followed by the EU (34.45%) and North Africa (14.83%). A minority are from European countries outside the EU (4.40%); Sub-Saharan Africa (4.12%); the Middle East (2.72%); India (1.67%); North America (0.66%) and the Philippines (0.48%). Only 0.5% of all immigrants are from the rest of Asia or Oceania.

Given the historical experience and the fact that during the Franco dictatorship many emigrated from Spain, Spanish people are quite open to immigrants. According to a Public Opinion Research Centre (*Centro de Investigaciones Sociologicas*) analysis, public opinion has changed along with other phenomena connected with increased migration.[7] Between 2000 and 2005, for example, Spaniards saw immigration as one of the most serious threats to Spanish society.[8] We can find reasons for this change at many levels: economic, political and security-related. Public opinion was influenced by the unfortunate events on the Ceuta-Melilla border as well as terrorist attacks in Ma-

drid in 2004, the announcement of regulations targeting illegal immigrants, growing illegal immigration from the African continent and the beginning of the economic crisis.

That crisis in Spain had an impact on immigrants and how they were generally seen. There were fewer attractive work positions available to foreigners without any high-level qualifications. On top of this, due to increased unemployment, Spaniards began to demand the positions whichhad mostly been performed by foreigners, for example, jobs at ports or in the agriculture or building industries. As a consequence, we find that unemployment among foreigners increased more than fortyfold in the period 2008-2009 compared to 2007. Total unemployment was also seven times greater than in 2007.[9] According to OECD estimates, 'the registered unemployment rate among immigrants [...] reached 8% more than the unemployment rate among the Spanish citizens.'[10] In 2012, this figure exceeded 12%.[11] Based on data from the third quarter of 2012, some 333,905 immigrants to Spain were officially registered at the Spanish employment office (SEPE)[12] and receiving some kind of unemployment benefit; 221,398 of them were from countries outside the EU. This was considerably lower than the figure in 2011 when there were 441,689 immigrants on unemployment benefits. On the other hand, it marked an increase from 2008 when 209,200 people were registered at the Spanish employment office.

Turning to the ethnic breakdown of unemployed people, we find that more than one hundred different nationalities were registered at the employment office. The most represented were Moroccan (70,253 or 21%) followed by Romanian (57,370, 17.18%), Ecuadorian (29,332, 8.79%), Colombian (19,477, 5.83%), Bolivian (9,610, 2.88%), Argentinian (7,353, 2.20%), Brazilian (4,042, 1.21%), UÂguayan (3,034, 0.91%) and Chilean (2,394, 0.72%). Only 41% of immigrants met all of the criteria to receive unemployment benefits from the central or regional employment office. The rest obtained a temporary unemployment benefit lasting only six months or they were not registered at the employment office. The fact that immigrants in Spain only receive a limited unemployment benefit (*Los Subsidios*) instead of the full benefit (*Las Prestaciones Contributivas*) is very important to those trying to save money from the state budget. In 2012, 41.3% of immigrants received full unemployment benefits while 46.7% were given limited unemployment benefits. The remaining 11% of unemployment benefits was paid to difficult-to-employ individuals (*La Renta Activa de Inserción (RAI)*) while

1.1% of a special unemployment benefit went to seasonal agricultural workers in Andalusia and Extremadura.[13] Thus, 58.7% of all registered immigrants in Spain were on a limited form of unemployment benefits (the less costly variety). In June 2012, the total cost of foreigners' unemployment benefits to the state budget was EUR 236.8 million. This was 7% lower than the costin 2011. Most unemployed foreigners were registered in Madrid (16.67%), Barcelona (16%), Valencia (5.69%), Alicante (4.40%) or Murcia (4.19%). Efforts to save state budget funds and impose stricter conditions have radically decreased the number of foreigners on unemployment benefits, with an overall fall of 26% in the last two years. Two years ago, 76% of all unemployed immigrants were receiving these benefits, but now the figure is only 40%.

Immigration Policy Authorities

Spain's immigration policy is based on Article 149.1.2 of the Spanish Constitution and the authority of the central government.[14] The social integration of immigrants was not mentioned in the first law on foreigners and it was left largely under the control of autonomous regions and their governments.[15] In the '90s, the central government's immigration policy focused especially on border control and immigrants who were already living in the country. This began to change slightly in 1991 when the Managing Directorate for Immigration (*Dirección General de Migraciones*) and the Office for Foreigners (*Oficinas de Extranjeros)* were established under the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs.[16] The self-governing regions took the initiative and started to make specific regional plans for integrating foreigners. These defined key questions about the conditions for involving immigrants in the labour market and options for using healthcare, education and housing as well as general integration in the local environment. Particular strategies were developed including measures respecting regional differences. The government set up the Support Fund for Reception and Integration (*Fondo de Apoyo a la Integración*) in 2005 so that autonomous governments could receive state budget funds to assist with foreigner integration. Other than the historic areas of Andalusia, Catalonia and the Basque Country, which have their own regional budget funds to support foreigner integration, these autonomous governments allocate money to regions and cities as needed. Therefore the state only regulates the statutory standards and defines strategic goals.

Act 2/2009 on the rights and freedoms of foreigners in Spain mentions social integration in its Article 2, which calls for public support for the integration of foreigners into society according to the Spanish Constitution.[17] The law sets out the state administration's goal, which is the integration of immigrants into the local community, and it also names different economic, social, cultural and political tools to achieve this end. Immigrants should be made familiar with both constitutional and local laws and the values of Spanish, regional and European civilisation. They should also be made aware of human rights, democracy and the principle of non-discrimination based on sexual or gender identity. Article 2 of Spain's immigration statute details the cooperation among the central government, autonomous regions and municipalities. All of the listed authorities should cooperate according to the law and coordinate their activities leading to the goals under the strategic plans.[18] The autonomous governments and their regional authorities are responsible for all integration activities. They should coordinate their information and counselling provision activities with the public administration, non-profit organisations and social partners.[19] This is how the law describes the main authorities responsible for making immigration policy.

Integration Plans

However there is not just one law that determines Spain's immigration policy. Instead the state has established integration plans for particular periods. The first Spanish Integration Plan (pisi - *Plan para la Integración Social de los Inmigrantes*) was adopted by the government in 1994. Soon after, an initiative started that established the FoÂm for the Social Integration of Immigrants (*El Foro para la Integración Social de los Inmigrantes*) and the Immigration Observatory (*El Observatorio Permanente de la Inmigración*). The FoÂm worked as a consultation and information body dealing with questions around the integration of immigrants[20] while the observatory was a statistics and information agency working on issues involving immigration, immigrants' residence in the country and international security.[21]

Another plan called the Global Programme to Regulate and Coordinate Foreign Residents' Affairs and Immigration in Spain (greco) (*Programa Global de Regularización y Coordinación de la Extranjería y la Inmigración*) was adopted for 2001-2004 with a budget of eur 120 million.

The ensuing Strategic Plan for Citizenship and Integration (*Plan Estratégico de Ciudadanía e Integración*), known as PECI,[22] was influenced by one of the four financial tools of the European Programme on Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows. The main aim was the integration of third country nationals in the EU. This plan was mostly financed by the Fund to Support Admission and Integration of Immigrants and to Strengthen Education (*Fondo de Apoyo a la Acogida y la Integración de los Inmigrantes y al Refuerzo Educativo*); it was approved in FebÂary 2007 for the period 2007-2010 with a budget of over EUR 2 milliard. The main goal was to accomplish social cohesion among local Spanish residents and immigrants. This was based on the principle of non-discrimination and the importance of equality of opportunities and rights (civil, social, political, cultural and economic) as well as guaranteed access to public services (education, employment, social services). The autonomous provinces, local authorities, non-profit organisations, immigrants' associations and the FoÂm for the Social Integration of Immigrants all helped to create this plan. One important part was the fight against racism and xenophobia with the aim of promoting adaptation by immigrants and their broader participation in society. In 2008, the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs was transformed into the Ministry of Labour and Immigration. Based on these priorities, the State Secretariat for Immigration and Emigration (*Secretaría de Estado de Inmigración y Emigración)* was established as the agency responsible for developing immigration policy, integrating immigrants and updating policies on Spanish citizens abroad.[23]

The most recent integration plan – for the period 2011-2014 – was the Strategic Plan for Citizenship and Integration. Its main focus was on strengthening social cohesion in the new migration context with the aim of reducing migration flows. Key goals were divided into priority areas in line with previous plans:

1 Integration into Society—The main goal was the educating of immigrants with the knowledge needed to ease their integration into society. This was based on the principle of equal access to the tools for gaining material goods and services along with all attached rights and duties. Emphasis was put on developing projects to support integration and the creation of a national network to promote immigrants' integration into society and their security.

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2 Education—Here the aim was assuring immigrants equal access to education during the compulsory schooling period.[24] At the same time, they should be guaranteed tuition of sufficient quality to help learn the official language of the country and the region.[25] Other aims were adapting the education system to the heterogeneous student base; supporting students to obtain intercultural knowledge; helping students by transforming schools into spaces for communication, coexistence and immigrant integration; and improving the approach to higher education and making academic title accreditation more effective.

3 Employment—The goals were updating the law on employment and social security to ensure equal rights and duties for immigrants; improving the management of migration flows and supporting migrants' professional growth; countering the black economy and the use of unofficial employment contracts with illegal immigrants; and fighting discrimination against immigrants on the labour market.

4 Housing—Priorities were increasing the role of state-protected dwellings and ensuring the accessibility of this accommodation to low-income immigrant groups as well; combatting discrimination against immigrants in the area of housing policy; and improving conditions for the coexistence of new arrivals and original inhabitants so as to avoid immigrant segregation.

5 Social Services—Goals were adapting the public system of social services to today's multicultural society and enabling the same approach to social programmes so that integration becomes more effective.

6 Health—The focus was on ensuring immigrants' rights to health protection and their equal access to healthcare.

7 Children and Youth—Here the purpose was to support the integration of children and adolescents into the programmes designed for them.

8 Equality—The aim was to fight discrimination based on race, ethnicity or other differences and to ensure equal opportunities for all. This also meant incorporating equal treatment into public policies.

9 Women—Objectives were to help immigrants through special tailored programmes and to support their participation in all areas

of civil life. A further goal was to support the social integration of immigrants in difficult life circumstances.

10 Participation—This area was concerned with creating associations to help immigrants participate in the day-to-day ordinary and political life of each autonomous region.

11 Improving the Picture—The priorities were to improve the image of immigrants in the community and to try to change negative attitutudes to immigration.

12 Coordinating Development—The focus was on identifying and supporting various possibilities for cooperation with immigrants' countries of origin. Another aim was to support immigrant integration within social development processes.

The overall budget for the plan was EUR 2 billion. Of the 12 listed areas, the main emphasis was on the first three: education (40% of the budget), immigrant integration into society (20%) and employment (11%). These plans did not have the same status as laws, and thus, the self-governing regions were not obliged to fulfil them.

Non-Profit Organisations

There are many non-profit organisations in Spain that aim to help immigrants. Illegal immigrants often turn to these organisations for help. Generally, they provide free legal, interpretation and translation services as well as help with dealing with authorities. They also offer information about options for legalising residence in Spain and employment vacancies, healthcare etc. There are over one thousand registered organisations with goals of this nature in Spain.[26] Some of the most important non-profit organisations are Cáritas Española,[27] ACCEM (Spanish Catholic Mission for Migration),[28] (Spanish Catholic Mission for Migration), CEAR (Spanish Commission to Help the Refugees)[29] and CÂz Roja (Spanish Red Cross).[30]

Spain's Immigration Policy

During Franco's dictatorship and until the mid-1980s, Spain's immigration policy was almost non-existent.[31] The law focused rather on foreigners as tourists. As we have seen, at the beginning of the 1980s, Spain transformed itself from a traditional emigration country into an

immigration country under the influence of many factors. As a consequence, in 1984, there appeared the first law regulating asylum rights,[32] and 1985 brought Immigration Act LO 7/1985 on the rights and freedoms of foreigners in Spain.[33] The aim of both these adopted standards was to align better with European standards at the time. Act LO 7/1985 was generally very restrictive towards foreigners and did not guarantee them all their rights.[34] It did not deal with the problem of illegal migration or the possibility of repatriation. In 1993, the Spanish government, aware of Spain's entry into the Schengen Area, quickly created a system for giving work permits to foreigners based on calculated quotas. The main goal was to ensure the filling of work vacancies in sectors of the economy where there was low demand. The Ministries of Labour and Immigration and the authorities of autonomous provinces were responsible for managing the quota system. The final agreements were discussed with the relevant economic and social partners or employment offices.[35] In the first year, quotas were set at almost 21,000 work permits for foreigners in economic sectors where there was little demand: agriculture (10,000), the building industry (2,000), domestic labour (5,000) and other services (4,000). However, because information about the situation was not spread effectively, these positions were not filled; there were only 5,000 applications for these vacancies.[36] Subsequently, from 1994 to 2005, quotas were reduced every year. There were 30,000 work vacancies for foreigners in 2006. In contrast, the number stood at over 70, 000 in 2007 based on a decision of the Socialist government of the time. Over 90% of work permits were given to foreigners employed in agriculture, a sector that was unattractive to local citizens.[37] To a certain extent, the aim of the quotas was also to increase the flexibility of the labour market and the economy. A foreigner coming to work in Spain had to confirm in writing that when their work contract terminated, they would return home and prove this within one month of their arrival by visiting a Spanish consulate in person.[38] Reforms came in 2004 in the form of a system managed by the Spanish employment office,[39] which began to publish a catalogue of hard-to-fill vacancies (*Catálo de Ocupaciones de Difícil Cobertura*).[40] This listed offers of both skilled and unskilled positions that employers were stÂggling to fill with local people. This catalogue is now updated quarterly. Because of the increasing economic crisis and the country's response to market demands in recent years, the number of vacan-

cies has fallen drastically. For example, in 2008, there were more than 200,000 vacancies in the catalogue while in the third quarter of 2012, there were only 28.

The reform of the Asylum Act[41] came as a result of the harmonising of Spanish standards with EU asylum laws as well as alignment with the Schengen Treaty and the Dublin Convention.[42] In 2000, the Spanish government passed the new Immigration Act t4/2000 on the rights and freedoms of foreigners in Spain and their social integration.[43] This law emerged as a compromise between the governing Popular Party and the Opposition, the Socialist Party. Its main feature was its openness; it did not discriminate against immigrants based on their legal status and it protected illegal immigrants from immediate deportation. The statute granted some new political and social rights to both legal and illegal immigrants and it gave them access to free healthcare and education. Before the passing of this law, the rghts of illegal immigrants had been very restricted rights. They were, for example, only able to obtain medical treatment in really urgent cases and young people in this group did not have access to education. In contrast, Act 4/2000 gave every foreigner free access to healthcare and education regardless of their legal status. This was subject only to one condition: the need to be listed in the Residents' Registry (*Padrón Municipal de Habitantes*), which provides data about all residents.[44] To this end, each foreigner was required to present a current valid passport and their lease contract to confirm their residence in the country. Where there was no such contract between an owner and tenant, they had to confirm their residence through a statutory declaration or a bank account in their name verifying their address. After registration, each immigrant was issued a registration certificate (*Certificado de Empadronamiento*). This certificate also made it possible for immigrants to obtain a healthcare card (*Tarjeta Sanitaria*)guaranteeing free access to medical treatment.[45] Illegal immigrants had access to emergency services only. The importance of being listed in the registry also came from the fact that the three-year residence period began on the date of registration; after it finished, the immigrant could apply for legal residence based on the conditions for social integration. The law also guaranteed underage foreigners access to education on the same terms as Spanish citizens.[46] Based on their documentation, they were assigned to the nearest school in their residential area.

The 2000 law also became the source of the government's Greco Plan—that is, the Global Programme to Regulate and Coordinate Foreign Residents' Affairs and Immigration in Spain (*Programa Global de Regulación y Coordinación de la Extranjería e Inmegración*) for 2002-2004. That programme was announced by the government in 2001 just a day before the third Spanish EU presidency[47]; it was the result of close cooperation with the EU Refugee Fund. The main aim was closer alignment with European asylum and immigration policy. The plan focused on the problems surrounding Spanish immigration with a stress on four key areas:[48]

1 Guidance, coordination and management of immigration in Spain
2 Integration of foreign residents and their relatives who contribute to Spain's positive growth
3 Management of migration flows to guarantee peaceful coexistence in Spanish society
4 The asylum system for refugees and displaced persons.

In addition to these activities, 2003 saw the publication of a resolution on the financing of asylum and immigration-related projects in harmony with Article 9 of the European Refugee Fund Âles.[49]

The government decided to reform the immigration law later in 2003. Following its win in the 2000 election, the Popular Party gained an absolute majority of votes in parliament and therefore did not need to seek support or make compromises with coalition partners when it came to immigration policy. The reform of Immigration Act LO 14/2003[50] reflected a conservative approach to immigration policy, with a central emphasis on reducing illegal immigration and supporting legal flows. It confirmed the rights of immigrants who had all required documents and put more stress on deporting illegal immigrants as part of the fight against unlawful migration. It also reduced the rights of illegal immigrants to unite, strike and demonstrate, made their deportation easier and imposed higher penalties on employers who employed them.

The 2003 Immigration Act included measures allowing police to look into registry notes; this served in practice to restrict the rights of immigrants who were afraid to be exposed. The law obliged international transport companies to report passengers who did not have return tickets, and it also defined and imposed sanctions on human smugglers and companies employing illegal workers. Immigrants were

obliged to update their entry in the registry every two years. Another important point was the initiating of a programme of voluntary return to the immigrant's home country.[51] Unemployed foreigners had the option to use the financial support which was part of the government's voluntary return plan. The aim was to give foreigners a financial incentive to return to their homeland; they would receive the first part of the support before they left and the authorities would pay the remainder on their arrival home. The programme was developed for immigrants living in Spain who had lost their jobs and decided to return to their home state. The government offered to pay out their unemployment benefit as a lump sum depending on how long they had worked in Spain[52] and to cover their return ticket as well.[53] Immigrants received these payouts on condition that they gave back their work permit and visa and agreed not to return to Spain for the next three years.

In response to increasing migration from Africa, the government adopted a directive concerning asylum policy; this set up a system of temporary protection in special cases involving the mass return of vulnerable persons.[54] Anxious about the high immigration rate, the public approved the government's restrictive measures, taking them to be essential for achieving the goals agreed in Tampere.[55] In 2004, the Spanish government asked its European partners to increase the Union's budget and the responsibility of other countries for the costs of migration mostly from Africa. The main priority was the protection of the European-Spanish naval border by the Andalusian coast and the Canary Islands.[56] We may understand this as the Europeanisation of the longstanding Spanish problem with African migration. In addition to fighting illegal migration from Africa, in the period 2004-2007, Spain signed bilateral agreements on mutual cooperation with 10 African countries: Morocco, Algeria, Mauritania, Senegal, Guinea-Bissau, Equatorial Guinea, Mali, Cape Verde, Ghana and Gambia.

In 2008, as a consequence of pressure from the EU in the form of the Procedural and Qualification Directive, the Family Reunion Directive and the Immigration and Asylum Pact, Spain was forced to amend its asylum law[57] along with its immigration law concerning foreigners.

The Qualification Directive was incorporated into the law through its Articles 6 to 966, which define the conditions of the right to asylum as well as Articles 10, 11, 12 and 36, which deal with the doctrine of supplementary protection.[58] The guideline mentions that supplementary protection can be given to an individual whose application has been

denied if their forced repatriation would create a serious risk of violating Articles 2 and 3 of the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms59 or it would cause serious danger in cases of ongoing conflict. Therefore the Qualification Directive also guarantees international protection to individuals who do not meet all the criteria under the 1951 Geneva Convention.

The implemention of the Qualification Directive into Spanish law improved on the phrasing of the previous asylum law which had guaranteed protection to people with a 'justified fear of persecution.' The Spanish law goes beyond the scope of the Directive and includes a complementary protection status identical to the status of refugee. Concerning illegal immigration, the system of sanctions is strengthened in line with the European directive. New penalties are introduced and the list of criminal offences extended. One problematic point was the Returns Directive regarding the return of illegal immigrants to their home countries. At issue, in particular, was the right to detain immigrants for 18 months and the options of banning additional entry to the EU for five years and detaining and returning unaccompanied young people.[60] Given Spain's foreign policy priorities, the country at first considered not implementing this directive,[61] but the final version of the adopted European standard allowed EU member states to use more moderate procedures.

The fourth amendment to Immigration Act LO 2/2009 gives immigrants the right to unite, strike and take part in commerce; they are also granted the right to a free education until the age of 18 and to no-cost legal advice.[62] Article 12 states that foreigners with official permanent residence have the right to receive medical treatment on the same terms as Spanish citizens. All foreigners have the right to access medical treatment in case of a serious illness or an accident. Article 6 also refers to the right of foreigners who are legal residents to vote in local elections in their place of permanent residence. On the other hand, the new law restricts family reunification. Only reunions of the closest kin are allowed. In particular, the Âles limit reunions with parents, which may only occur if the persons concerned are older than 65 years (except in humanitarian cases); the individual seeking the reunion must also prove that they have been a continuous resident of Spain for a minimum of five years. Against this, the law allows for the granting of work permits to reunited lineal descendants who are more than 16 years old. The reunion of de facto couples is also new. In

keeping with the European priorities, special protection is provided for women who lack official residence and have been the victims of domestic violence. The amendment makes it possible for them to obtain temporary work and residence permits.

Aside from this, the law sets out sanction mechanisms. Illegal immigrants have a 30-day period in which to leave the country and they are not allowed to re-enter it for the next five years; that period may be extended to a maximum of 10 years if the foreigner could pose a serious threat to public order or security.[63] The detention period is also increased from 40 to 60 days. The law creates a register in order to control the movement of foreigners as they enter and leave the country; it also defines and regulates the minimum standards for warning and sanctioning the employers of illegal immigrants from third countries.[64] Administrative sanctions may take the form of penalties to employers per individual illegal worker as well as other potential sanctions including, for example, closure of a place of business. The law also stipulates criminal penalties including the imprisonment of employers who support or help with people smuggling and the use of illegal workers. A penalty of up to EUR 750,000 may be imposed on a person who helps illegal immigrants to enter the country through a fake marriage, a false residence confirmation or a formal invitation etc. An important amendment affects foreigners who voluntarily return to their homelands. They may retain any employment rights they have gained in their full scope.[65]

The law also allows the autonomous regions to make agreements with states so as to control the movements of young persons who arrive in Spain without their parents. These regions may also enter into agreements with non-profit organisations, funds and other entities in order to protect youth and take care of their interests.

The requirements for entering Spanish territory are set out in the 1985 Immigration Act and Act L.4/2000, which also lists the specific criteria for meeting these requirements.[66] Since 1985, a system of two different entry controls has required foreigners to apply for a visa at Spanish consulates and then have their entry documents checked at border crossings.[67] In the past, foreigners from Latin America enjoyed simplified visa-free entry into Spain based on their shared culture and language. The situation was the same for foreigners from Morocco. Many immigrants took advantage of this easy access, coming to Spain as tourists and then staying on.[68] The government had a staggered re-

sponse to the arrival of these Moroccan, Ecuadorian and Bolivian "fake" tourists.[69] Spain imposed a visa requirement on Moroccans in 1991. In 2003, Ecuador was moved from the list of countries with simplified access to the third country list based on a decision of the European Council. As a result, Ecuadorian citizens had to have a visa in order to cross the EU's external borders.[70] The imposition of visa requirements on other Latin American countries reduced the flow of immigration. Nevertheless, these immigrants continued to come to Spain in 2004. And the number of illegal immigrants continued to grow.

The European Union's common visa policy mainly regulates short-term tourist visas, which are valid for three months. To enter Spain, individuals also require sufficient financial resources,[71] a return ticket and an invitation letter.[72] Eligibility to obtain a long-term visa is a matter which falls under the authority of the Spanish state. The Schengen regulations only harmonise the Âles about free movement with this kind of visa in the Schengen Area, the form in which it is issued and the format that it takes. Long-term visas are granted to citizens of countries outside the EU who wish to stay in Spanish territory for over 90 days, but no longer than 6 months.[73] Foreigners are able to obtain a residence visa that allows them to live in Spain, however this does not entitle them to work. A work visa is granted on the basis of an already secured work contract, a residence visa (which is issued to reunite families) or in exceptional cases, a visa to seek work (which allows individuals to enter Spain to find a job).[74] Spain has also begun to deal with illegal migration under pressure from the EU and its restrictive immigration policy. In 1995, the building of border barriers in Ceuta and Melilla began, and this was co-financed by the EU. Although these barriers were fitted with modern technologies including cameras, motion detectors, infrared rays and thermal sensors, they did not stop ongoing illegal migration.[75] Some new navy routes also proved very difficult to control. The situation grew more difficult in 2006 when nearly 30,000 refugees set sail to the Canary Island coast.[76] Spain reacted by introducing a modern radar system to detect the boats. Spanish diplomats also began to make agreements with countries of origin and countries of transit on the return of illegal immigrants. These agreements specified the conditions for handing over these countries' citizens along with third country nationals who had illegally crossed the borders of the contracting countries or were staying in their territory. The main aim of these international agreements was to simplify and speed up

the process of returning immigrants to the country from which they came (not necessarily their homeland though this might be the same). The first of these agreements on the politics of return were made with Morocco (1992), Nigeria (2001), Algeria (2002), Guinea-Bissau and Mauritania (2003).[77] Spain has gradually made agreements with many countries in Western Africa,[78] especially within the framework of the 2006-2008 Africa Plan,[79] which was formulated under the guidance of Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The main aims are mutual cooperation and the regulation of migration flows.

Illegal migration to Spain has repeatedly convinced the government to proceed with "regularisation" (*regularización*) processes–both *exceptional* and *permanent*. Such processes aim to reduce the number of illegal immigrants working in the country. The exceptional measures came in response to constant increases in the number of illegal immigrants residing and working in the country. So far there have been six rounds of extraordinary regularisation (in 1985, 1991, 1995, 2000, 2001 and 2005).[80] The main goals were pretty much the same in each case: to reduce the number of illegally working immigrants; to increase state returns through taxes and social security payments; and to facilitate the integration of these individuals into society. We should also not forget the fact that regularisation is an easy tool which governments can use to control immigration flows and a simple solution to work vacancies. The persons affected were mostly of working age and so made a significant contribution to the country. The first round of extraordinary regularisation of illegal immigrants came after the 1985 statute on the rights and freedoms of foreigners was adopted. Applicants had to produce a work permit and prove their residence in the country. The fourth round of regularisation was in 2000. The conditions were identical: the applicants had to evidence their place residence in the country until a certain date and have a work permit or an application for a work permit in process. Immigrants also had to show a residence permit valid for the last three years. The last and largest scale regularisation process was in 2005. The government changed the name from the 'regularisation' to the 'standardisation' of illegal foreigner workers.[81] The main intention was to motivate employers to have their illegal workers authorised. The chief requirement was confirmation of the immigrant's work performance in Spain for at least six months, or three months if they were working in the agriculture sector. The other prerequisites were a clean criminal record, registration with the local

authority before the appointed date and a signed employment contract. Employers also had to confirm that their payment of social insurance for their employees of foreign origin and observance of those employees' rights. The 2005 regularisation met with criticism not only from the the Popular Party but also from some EU member states, particularly Germany and the Netherlands, which feared the arrival of new immigrants and the deterioration of their own immigration situation.[82] These regulated processes, however, allowed illegal foreigners in Spain (almost 1.18 million people) to obtain a temporary work or residence permit which was renewable.

With the new law in 2000 came the possibility of permanent authorisation based on social integration (*arraigo social*) or incorporation in the workforce (*arraigo laboral*). In contrast with previous processes, immigrants can ask for this regularisation at any time. To be eligible for incorporation into the workforce, an immigrant must have enjoyed uninterÂpted residence in the country for at least two years and have a work permit that is valid for one year. The other requirement is the absence of a criminal record in both Spain and their country of origin.[83] Authorisation based on social integration can be granted to foreigners who prove their uninterÂpted residence for three years, as confirmed in the Residents' Registry. Close ties to legally resident relatives or other evidence that the immigrant is trying to integrate into the community can make this process easier.[84] Authorisation based on social integration is the most common way that illegal immigrants try to legalise their residence in the country. The result of both these methods is that the immigrant receives a residence permit for one year; this is renewable for the next two years provided that the applicant has worked and paid taxes for at least six months. An identical procedure applies after another two years has passed.[85] The full authorisation process takes five years and when it is complete, the immigrant receives permanent residence and a work permit (on the same terms as Spanish citizens). A permanent residence and work permit is not really permanent, however, since it must be renewed every five years. Any third country national who has had uninterÂpted legal residence in Spain for the last ten years may apply for citizenship. For asylum seekers and refugees, the period is five years. For citizens of Latin America, Andorra, the Philippines, Equatorial Guinea and Portugal, it is only two years. Citizens of Latin American countries who obtain Spanish citizenship do not need

to renounce their original citizenship since they are entitled to hold dual nationality for historical reasons. The residence requirement can be reduced to a period of one year in certain cases when the individual was born in Spain or has been in the care of a Spanish person or institution for the last two years. The same conditions apply to a person who is married to or the widow or widower of a Spanish citizen and to an individual born abroad who is the child or grandchild of a Spanish citizen.

Conclusion

Spain's immigration policy is subject to the authority of the Spanish government. After many years of development, responsibility for this policy has been divided between the central and regional governments. Based on an analysis of the data, we can say that the immigration policy goals set by different Spanish governments – that is, regulating and using migration flows according to the needs of the Spanish economy – have been shown to be unrealistic. The main cause is probably the inadequate use of methods and tools. The common view is that because of the regulation of migration flows with inadequate legislative tools that did not deal with illegal immigration, there were serious problems leading to an increase in illegal immigrants. Different governments tried to deal with the situation by implementing new policies and regularisation programmes for illegal immigrants.

As regards the integration of individuals in the community, the Spanish government, driven by the constitutional principle of decentralising and distributing of power, has done more than pass just one integration law. The process of immigrant integration follows the Strategic Plan for Citizenship and Integration, which is only a recommendation to regional governments.

The main feature of Spain's immigration policy is the delegation of a portion of state powers—especially in the area of foreign integration (education, employment, healthcare and social services)—to the autonomous regions. Every self-governing region makes its own policy decisions and plans in certain areas. These policies are often different from thepolicies of other autonomous regions and national policies.

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Notes

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4   el Instituto Nacional de Estadístict (National Institute of Statistics) (2015).

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6   el Instituto Nacional de Estadístict (National Institute of Statistics),'Flujo de inmigración procedente del extranjero por comunidad autónoma, sexo, generación y nacionalidad (agÂpación de países), available at: <http://www.ine.es/jaxi/tabla.do?type=pcaxis&path=/t20/p259/e01/l0/&file=02002.px>

7   CIS is an authority managed by the ministry responsible for state administration (Ministerio de la Presidencia). It is responsible for key studies on effective state administration and well-known for its public opinion research.

8   CIS, 'Indice Annual,' available at:<http://www.cis.es/cis/opencm/ES/2_bancodatos/estudios/anual.jsp>.

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12 Servicio Público de Empleo Estatal (SEPE) is an independent employment office affiliated to the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs.

13 See the data available at the Ministereo Empleo (Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs) website: <http://www.empleo.gob.es/estadisticas/BEL/PRD/indice.htm>.

14 See the La Moncloa (Spanish government) website, <http://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/NR/rdonlyres/79FF2885-8DFA-4348-8450   0461OA9267F0/0/constitucion_ES.pdf> (accessed 14 November 2014).

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17 Ley Orgánica 2/2009, sobre derechos y libertades de los extranjeros en España y su integración social.

18 Ibid, Article 2.

19 This relates to issues of employment, accommodation, language and general help with integration in the local community.

20 See Portal de Inmigración, <http://extranjeros.empleo.gob.es/es/ForoIntegracion/2006-2010/>

21 See Portal de Inmigración, 'Observatorio Permanente De La Inmigración,' <http://extranjeros.empleo.gob.es/es/observatoriopermanenteinmigracion>.

22 Portal de Inmigración, <http://extranjeros.empleo.gob.es/es/integracion-retorno/Plan_estrategico/pdf/PECIDEFI80407.pdf>

23 Ministereo Empleo (Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs), 'Prestaciones por Desempleo, Inicio,'<http://www.empleo.gob.es/es/sec_emi/index.htm>.

24 This means pupils aged six to 16 years according to Article 9 of Immigration Act 2/2009 Sobre derechos y libertades de los extranjeros en España y su integración social.

25 This refers not only to Spanish but also to Catalan, Mallorcan, Valencian, Basque or Galician depending on the residential area.

26 Guia Ongs, <http://www.guiaongs.org/directorio/inmigrantes-5-3-15>.

27 Caritas, <http://www.caritas.es/>.

28 Assem, <http://www.accem.es/refugiados/inmigrantes/>.

29 CEAR,<http://cear.es/>.

30 CÂz Roja, <http://www.cÂzroja.es/portada/>.

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42 R. Rein (1999), *Spain and the Mediterranean since 1898*, Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass, p. 222.

43 Ley Orgánica 4/2000, de 11 de enero, sobre derechos y libertades de los extranjeros en España y su integración social.

44 El Instituto Nacional de Estadística (National Institute of Statistics), 'Padrón. Población por municipios,' <http://www.ine.es/jaxi/menu.do?-type=pcaxis&path=/t20/e245/&file=inebase&L=0 >. This data includes residents' nationality, date of birth, sex, age and residential address in Spain.

45 Immigrants were eligible for this card regardless of their status. For more information about this healthcare card, see <http://www.tarjetasanitaria.net/>.

46 Underage persons are less than 18 years old.

47 'El Consejo de Ministros apÂeba el Plan GRECO con 37.776 millones de pesetas el primer año' (2001) *El Mundo* 30 March, <http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2001/03/30/espana/985961636.html>

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50 Ley Orgánica 14/2003, de 20 de noviembre, de Reforma de la Ley orgánica 4/2000, de 11 de enero, sobre derechos y libertades de los extranjeros en España y su integración social.

51 Gonzales and Spain (2007), p.322.

52 Forty percent of the amount should be paid out in Spain; the remainder should be provided in the country of origin.

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63 Directive 2008/115/ES of European Parliament and Council of 16 December
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64 Directive 2009/52/CE of European Parliament and the Council of18 June
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72 <http://www.maec.es/es/menuppal/consulares/serviciosconsulares/in-
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    daespaña.aspx>

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84 Such evidence includes certificates related to language and other educational courses offered by non-profit organisations as well as documents proving that the individual has a social life in the local society.

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Pirates of Aden

A Threat Beyond Somalia's Shores?

Natalia Piskunova

This study focuses on trends in maritime piracy in the Gulf of Aden in the period 2009-2012. My research examines core actors and their activities and the corresponding responses of local and international authorities. This work is based on analytical monitoring conducted over the same period. The point of this work is to illustrate the projection of Somali pirates from beyond their "traditional" waters and how this is impacting regional – and with it, international – security.

Keywords maritime, piracy, Gulf of Aden, Somalia, international intervention

Introduction

The problem of maritime piracy in the Gulf of Aden presents a new research area for regional and global studies. Academic interest gravitates around both theoretical and practical issues surrounding the problem of piracy. This work considers that the key scholarship-based tasks are based on: analysing the current situation, questioning the status of pirates as possible actors in the regional security system and examining new trends in maritime piracy in the region. This work aims to do just that. This is especially tÂe since there is an assumed relationship between *jihadis* and Gulf of Aden piracy. Given the current level of the problem, there is a need to prove – or refute – the thesis that maritime piracy is now a local rather than an international issue since such identification will assist decision-makers apply more appropriate policies for stemming such activities. The same clarity is required on the question of whether maritime piracy is linked to Somali state failure and whether there is a need for an international response. Global security threats that could arise from this situation also call for assessment.

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This study incorporates soft security issues into its analysis of current maritime piracy trends in the Gulf of Aden. In particular, it widens the spectÂm of issues understood to influence the regional security configuration to include internal political developments and state failure—an event that fosters favourable conditions for maritime piracy and kidnappings in the region.

Research Methods and Aims

A new research method is applied in this study; *analytical monitoring*, which is used to determine the situation in the Gulf of Aden during the 2009-2012 period. This approach facilitates the creation of a database of related events; widening the scope for long-term research on maritime piracy in the Gulf of Aden. The aim of this work is to analyse the problem of maritime piracy in the Gulf of Aden in the context of regional political processes. To accomplish this goal, three analytical tasks must be completed:

1 Assessing on-going trends in maritime piracy in the Gulf of Aden,
2 Evaluating the level of the international community's involvement in resolving the region's piracy issue,
3 Assessing the viability of pirates' status as actors in the regional system of international relations with all the rights such a status generates.

The object of this research is to depict the current configuration of maritime piracy in the Gulf of Aden. This research is divided into three key issues:

1 Current trends in maritime piracy in the Gulf of Aden,
2 Specific activities of pirate groups related to trade and private vessels whose routes traverse the Gulf,
3 Activities of the international counter-piracy coalition.

The *analytical monitoring* applied in this study presupposes a deeper, more data-based analysis of the timeline of events in the Somali region for an, overall, more in-depth analysis and greater harmony with theories of foreign policy and international relations. Analytical monitoring can also broaden the scope of the methods of situational and comparative analysis which have traditionally been used in similar cases. The analytical monitoring approach presumes the creation and prompt updating of a database of related events. In this database, all piracy-related events reported in the press are divided into relevant

groups: actions by pirates; actions by local government; and responses/actions of the world community. This enables a demonstration of major changes and trends in the development of maritime piracy problems in this region. Applying this method also provides for a more probing study of events, with actions categorised by actor and context. It is thus easier to visualise both qualitative and quantitative changes in the maritime piracy problem in this region. This, in its turn, allows researchers to account for both local and regional events.

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The data used in this research comes primarily from leading world news agencies with a focus on reports of piracy-related events in the Gulf of Aden. These include reports of kidnappings, shipwrecks and international operations to prevent or combat pirates. Reports of trials and prosecutions of pirates are also used to demonstrate political-legal trends concerning whether piracy is approached as a national or world security issue.

Major Trends in Maritime Piracy in the Gulf of Aden

Over 30000 vessels traverse the Gulf of Aden annually, making it an important transport hub in the Indian Ocean.[1] At the same time, international media features weekly reports of kidnappings and attacks in this area. Given the growing scale of this security issue, implementing analytical monitoring is a timely way to track major trends in pirate attacks in this area. The 2010-2011 period saw a surge in the level of attacks by pirates in the Gulf of Aden. This was visible from the widening of the geographical area marked out for potential attacks. To make the comparison: whereas in October-November 2009, the zone for possible attacks was limited to 165 nautical miles (287 km) from Somali shores, in April 2010, attacks were recorded some 1100 nautical miles (2037 km) from the Somali coast, which amounts to 500 nautical miles (926 km) from India's coast.[2] This means that the southern border of the attack zone shifted up to 250 nautical miles south of Madagascar.[3] In other words, the zone grew 10 times larger.

Assessing maritime piracy in the Gulf of Aden region in 2010-2012 showed that the geographical hubs from which the majority of aggressive actors set out were limited to specific areas of the collapsed Somali state. These hubs took the form of naval ports, illegal weapon arsenals and even unauthorised settlements of pirates from which organised pirate groups launched their criminal activities on the coast.

All wrecked vessels were transferred to the ports of Garader, Garakad or Hobio in the south-west part of Somalia's coastline.

Analytical monitoring of maritime piracy near Somali shores in 2009-2012 also highlighted the indiscriminate character of these pirate attacks. Pirates set out to capture any kind of ship which crossed their route; no special planning of concrete attacks was detected. The only exception was the destÂction of the *Maersk Alabama*, a vessel subjected to three attacks over the course of one year. The motivation here may be seen as a criminal vendetta: after each attack, the attacking pirates were sent abroad for trial while their accomplices still in Somalia stepped in to take revenge at sea. However, besides this exceptional case, attacks were aimed at any passing vessel, regardless of the type of cargo it carried or the number and nationality of those on board. The same was tÂe of the political implications of pirate attacks: there was no discrimination when it came to flag, nationality or type of vessel ownership.

Data from analytical monitoring of maritime piracy in the Gulf of Aden allows us to maintain that there is no organised or stÂctured group or network of pirates in this region. Attacks were carried out by dispersed groups of pirates—a fact complicating efforts to combat them. Additionally, there was no single common identity among all the pirates; none of the individuals on trial for maritime piracy associated themselves with any political or religious group globally.

Based on these facts, we cannot assume that pirates are actors in the contemporary system of international relations. These pirates did not constitute a common group since they did not identify or position themselves as a viable political or social association with global demands. Similarly, they did not associate themselves with any existing international criminal or non-criminal groups such as terrorist networks or other radical network stÂctures, and they never supported the manifestos of these groups. In terms of internal organisation, it was hard to make out any strict hierarchy or type of subordinate relations within the pirate groups. In the majority of cases, pirates gathered in small local crews to carry out a single attack at a concrete place and time. The list of members of a single pirate group was subject to change over a period as short as a month or even a week. Also evident from analytical monitoring was that the pirates did not put forward any political demands or demonstrate any political position. Generally, all their demands aimed to exact a ransom for the destroyed ship

and crew taken hostage. Any accusations about the Somali government (and/or unrecognised territorial and political units existing *de facto* in its territory) which pirates voiced at international trials were unsystematic and unrepresentative. The same was tÂe of random allegations about "Western" vessels polluting the waters of the Gulf of Aden or totally corÂpt local authorities stealing international aid and leaving the population to starve or become pirates.

In 2011, the number of attacks on private boats and yachts grew significantly. The problem was aggravated by the fact that negotiating over private vessels and crews is harder since they are not usually monitored by any international services or supported by any official authority. Beginning in June 2010, another trend was visible—the refusal of pirates to voice their ransom demands immediately after a ship was attacked. The "waiting" period before demands were presented to the crew stretched to two-to-three months. This was very different from the pattern in 2009-2010 when pirates issued their ransom demands directly after an attack. At the centre of this process, was a marked increase in the involvement of the Somali diaspora in Europe, and especially the UK, in liberating kidnapped crew and tourists. This trend was epitomised in the ransom negotiations conducted to free UK citizens caught by pirates on a private yacht on the open seas.[4]

Such trends occurred against the backdrop of significant improvements in the technical and military equipment deployed in pirate vessels. While pirates only used single vessel, with minimal fuel available to them, throughout 2010 and 2011, they had several groups of vessels at their disposal and good reserves of fuel, fresh water and food throughout 2010 and 2011. This enabled them to stay at sea for longer periods of time in order to lie in wait and follow heavily loaded transport vessels and pursue their victims without the need to return to Somali ports. The improved quality and assortment of military equipment was also seen in several cases of captured pirates in the Gulf of Aden area; they were equipped with AK-47s, small arms and cold weapons together with various types of modern arms and grenade cup dischargers.[5] These pirates had an ample supply of radio transmitters, mobile phones and special mobile and radio signal blockers that were used to prevent the crews' of seized ships from transmitting SOS signals or making contact with the outside world.

The cat-and-mouse tactics of some Somali pirate groups also changed. The number of attempted kidnappings carried out with the

help of "mother vessels" rose substantially. The strategy of using a mother ship is quite straightforward: it involves the hijacking of one ship while several pirate vessels stay close to the captured ship. The hijacked ship is then towed to Somali ports while the pirates seek out other victims who will be fooled by the non-Somali flag. The problem for rescuers is that these hijacked ships are mostly tankers loaded with large quantities of oil so that it is risky to fire at them when trying to free hostages. In a number of cases in the first half of 2011, pirates also forced these hostages to maintain their course and followed it in order to find and pursue other possible victims.[6] This complicated both the timely exposure of kidnappings at sea and the taking of measures to render the pirates harmless and ensure the safety of the ship and crew.

Analytical monitoring of piracy in the Gulf of Aden showed an increase, since May 2010, in the number of pirate attacks on vessels passing through the Gulf of Aden as well as on those heading to South Asian ports. Importantly, the geographic area of potential attacks widened beyond Somalia to include India. For example, the *Tai Yuan 227* fishing vessel, flagged by Taiwan, was hijacked by pirates in the Indian Ocean 700 nautical miles (1300 km) to the north-east of the Seychelles islands.[7] The ship had 28 crew members on board of unknown citizenship. It was towed by the pirates to the Somali coast.

The extent of the problem of piracy was made clear to influential world powers and oil producers when, on 05 May 2010, the Russian-owned tanker *Moscow University* was hijacked by pirates in the Gulf of Aden.[8] The tanker's crew had 23 members, all of them Russian citizens. It was loaded with oil valued at approximately $50 million (USD). A day later and Russian naval forces conducted military operations led by the ship *General Shaposhnikov*. As a result, the tanker was freed from the pirates and none of the crew was injured. At the same time, one pirate was killed and 10 more were detained.[9] A decision was then taken regarding whether to extradite the captured pirates to Russia for trial on charges of maritime piracy and armed robbery. Under Russian law, they faced up to 15 years in prison. Following the incident, an intensive debate eÂpted both online and offline in Russia. One sticking point was the issue of adequate measures to be taken by Russian military forces in counteracting piracy. There was great divergence of opinion about the need to use military means during operations to free hostage crews.

One stance held that it was not expedient to mount military operations to free captured crews and ships since this created conditions that were a direct threat to crew members' lives. Moreover, carrying out operations with firearms increased the risk to cargo, especially oil, and thus the chances of a vast ecological catastrophe in the region in the event of an oil spill caused by firing.

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Other advocates claimed that modern technical equipment – and the professional training of the Russian marine forces patrolling the Gulf of Aden – meant these liberation operations could be conducted without any harm to persons and/or cargo. Another view, that extending and enhancing the presence of naval forces in the Gulf of Aden could strengthen any country's status internationally and support its foreign policy, was also present in the debate. This step was also said to improve bilateral relations with all anti-piracy groups and promote better information and patrolling of the entire dangerous Gulf of Aden area.

International Community Responses to Somali Piracy in Aden

The period 2009-2012 saw a spike in international counter-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden. A number of successful rescue operations were conducted to free kidnapped crews and stolen cargo in the Aden area. Besides operations to rescue crews and cargo into the potential attack zone with special anti-piracy military vessels in the lead, the international community raised the issue of strengthening measures against hijackings in Aden. A set of practical strategies was established to protect crews and captains including manoeuvring, escaping pursuit in the open seas, issuing warning fire, etc. Some crews also took special EU NAVFOR courses on skills to counteract pirates in attempted hijackings.

It is noteworthy that information about hijackings and hijacking attempts in the Gulf of Aden is only available for ships registered with the EU NAVFOR, i.e. the EU Navigation Force Group that monitors ships and assists in cases of attempted hijacking. In fact, it is almost impossible to retrieve information about these matters for ships that are not registered with EU NAVFOR. This, in turn, prevents researchers from speaking with any accuracy about the actual numbers of ships that

successfully pass through the Gulf and those that are hijacked. This in-accuracy complicates the monitoring of the dynamics of both successful and unsuccessful attacks, and it hinders the analysis of potential trends and changes in the problem's development.

The current international stÂggle against maritime piracy is aggravated by the lack of a unified international database of laws and norms that would allow for conducting trials and criminal investigations anywhere in the world. Even in those countries where standard and criminal maritime laws do exist, it can be difficult to conduct trials since these laws are largely out-dated and do not reflect the existing reality. In Holland and the US state of Virginia, for example, trials of pirates caught kidnapping and terrorising crew at gunpoint in the Gulf of Aden, relied on 18th- and 19th-century laws. This is emblematic of the failure of modern international and national legal systems to revise their maritime laws in any way to address modern versions of piracy, a phenomenon which they believe to be strictly historical with no relevance to the times we live in.

Active piracy in the Gulf of Aden raises the question of the need for prompt updating of the database of international laws and agreements on fighting maritime piracy. Across different countries, the majority of those accused of maritime piracy have stood trial on charges of terrorism, kidnapping, attempted murder of crew and armed robbery. However, they have rarely been tried for classic maritime piracy. Thus, though the comprehensiveness of these charges has meant that all of those accused have received long-term prison sentences, including several life terms, there are grounds for reassessing and revising international maritime laws.

Between 2010 and 2011, the international community increased the use of military-type measures aimed at countering maritime piracy. The US and Russia especially assumed active roles in the fight against maritime piracy after their ships were came under attack in the Gulf of Aden. For example, on 01 April 2010, the *USS Nicholas* reported a pirate attack in the Seychelles region.[10] These pirates came under heavy fire and their vessel was pursued to the west of the Seychelles. As a result, six pirates were captured by the *USS Nicholas* and the pirate ship was confiscated and wrecked.[11] Aside from training crews in military approaches to combating pirates and capturing several groups of pirates

who were trying to abduct crew from US ships, US authorities have begun to develop more comprehensive measures as well. The *USS Nicholas* example is again a case in point: here all the pirates were extradited to the US for trial following the failure of their hijacking attempts and the crew's active countermeasures.

This case reflects yet another trend: the conducting of maritime piracy trials not at federal, but at the state level. The reason for these state-level piracy hearings is that in the absence of a unified national strategy on fighting maritime piracy from US authorities, the legal systems of several states allow for the holding of maritime piracy trials. For example, under Virginia state law, if a ship attacked by pirates is registered in any port in the state of Virginia and it was carrying the American flag, then the ship's captain may ask a court to launch a criminal investigation and trial. In this case, the Âle of law on fighting maritime piracy extends not just to crimes committed by pirates in US territorial waters, but to any place in the world where these events take place. This Âle allows for the on-the-spot detention of pirates caught attacking a ship and makes it possible to organise the pursuit of major and supporting pirate vessels.

This situation is illustrative of expanding efforts internationally to fight piracy. At the moment, it is the EU which has exhibited maximum efforts in this direction by creating the EU NAVFOR, which registers and patrols ships from any country that pass through the dangerous piracy zone. This appears to be logical since nearly 20% of EU trade comes from the Gulf of Aden and 95% of EU trade is maritime trade. Nevertheless, in France and Spain – two countries which have extensive experience combatting maritime piracy – both the criminal investigation and prosecution of those suspected of piracy are impeded. And, in April 2010, Kenya, which borders on the Somali territory hosting pirate hubs, officially refused to keep piracy suspects in Kenyan jails or to hold their trials at Kenyan expense even in cases where the piracy crimes in question occurred in Kenyan territorial waters.[12] Kenyan authorities repeated the statement later in October 2010 when the Kenya-EU agreement on cooperation against piracy in the Gulf of Aden expired.[13] Kenya's official explanation was that piracy proceedings had a negative impact on the country's tourist industry and there was an absence of the vast budget allocations needed to cover the expenses

of those accused of piracy and trial costs. The situation is not conducive to the coordination of international community actions aimed at fighting piracy and preventing pirate attacks.

Between 2009 and 2012, there was a widening debate in the international community on the need for non-state companies and organisations to patrol ships in the Gulf of Aden. A pressing issue was that private patrol companies need greater legal powers and broader authority to accompany ships that are passing through the Gulf of Aden and assuming the risk of pirate attack. Besides patrolling the area and accompanying ships, such contractors also offer private security services to ships. Their services are offered and performed by former military officers of various origins, who are hired by private companies to maintain ship security against pirate attacks.[14]

Opponents of this practice are against giving extensive rights and authority to non-state actors who patrol the area and assist with armed resistance to pirate attacks on ships in Aden. These critics believe that these contracts will increase ship insurance costs and create misunderstandings about the legal status of the armed groups accompanying crews and ships.[15] Stephen Askins, a lawyer from international shipping law firm Ince and Co, told the BBC that the majority of armed security contractors are from the UK while others come from the US, South Africa, Australia and New Zealand.[16]

Involving private contractors in the international stÂggle against maritime piracy may produce positive and negative consequences. On one hand, increasing the number of groups and organisations combating piracy will allow for the widening of the geographic scope of secured areas while also boosting the worldwide fight against piracy. Alternatively, there is a rise in ship insurance costs and a need to make higher payments to non-state armed guards. This will, in turn, increase the costs of transporting cargo and its price on the world market. It will also result in the development of fraudulent practices since there is now no strict procedure for vetting those contracting with companies to accompany their vessels and protect them from pirates.

In recent years, the international community has shown a propensity for action at an organisational level as well as the national level. The acute nature of the piracy problem was discussed at a UNSC meeting in April 2010, and various cases of pirate attacks and kidnappings in the Gulf of Aden area were examined. As a result, the UNSC passed a unanimous resolution calling for the international community and

regional organisations to widen the stÂggle against piracy and develop comprehensive measures aimed at the criminal prosecution of the culprits of pirate attacks. The UNSC also authorised the UN's Secretary General to prepare a special report on the piracy problem within three months for assessment at a UNSC meeting.[17] The Council praised the experience of the EU, NATO and other organisations that patrol the waters of the Gulf of Aden and called for these organisations to continue and expand their efforts to fight piracy.[18]

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Since the second half of 2010, the international community's efforts to fight maritime piracy in the Gulf of Aden have been sporadic. Here, it is interesting to look at one large-scale trial of pirates who were caught attempting to kidnap the crews of American ships. The trial was held in Norfolk, Virginia. In addition, Abduvali Muse, who was accused of attempting to kill the captain of the Maersk Alabama in 2009 as well as attempted kidnapping, stood trial in May 2010 in New York.[19] During the proceedings, he confirmed his guilt on both counts.[20] He also admitted to being the ringleader of a pirate group which had attempted to kidnap the crew of several ships passing through the Gulf of Aden. In his words, it was Somalia's government that was to blame for the piracy. He also claimed that he had failed to recognise the American flag on the vessel though admitting that he had held Captain Richard Phillips hostage for four days on a boat owned by the pirate group.[21] The court sentenced Muse to 34 years in prison.[22]

Conclusion

Several trends were seen in maritime piracy in the Gulf of Aden during and beyond the 2009-2012 period including changes in the geographic scale of the problem and its legal, economic and political dimensions. We can assume that the increase in legal proceedings and the intensification of prosecution processes are part of a positive trend in the recognition of the means to combat this issue worldwide. Politically, the existence of closer and more vigorous international cooperation in both preventing and fighting maritime piracy in the Gulf of Aden points to a positive trend in the elimination of the problem while also demonstrating the clear common interest of many world states. The united international response to this problem shows that maritime piracy in Aden has been acknowledged as both a regional and global issue that needs to be addressed unanimously.

The tendencies highlighted briefly in this study also reflect long-term debates about the possible means by which the international community can counteract piracy. A comprehensive stÂcture of systems for the prevention, criminal investigation and legal prosecution of maritime piracy may lead to positive results. At the moment, the primary problem in fighting maritime piracy in the Gulf of Aden is the lack of coordination of international community efforts to unify the legal measures to counteract piracy and curb crimes by pirates active not only in the Gulf of Aden but worldwide.

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Notes

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22 Ibid.

Small but Substantial

What Drives Ghana's Contributions to UN Peacekeeping Missions?

Jan Prouza and Jakub Horák

Ghana is among the largest military contributors to UN Peacekeeping Missions (PKM). Irrespective of Ghana's considerably smaller population size, armed forces capabilities and state budget than other contributing states such as India and Nigeria, Ghana has been substantially involved in most of UN PKM from the very beginning of its independent statehood. This article identifies some reasons for this participation. We apply a rational choice theory and public goods approach to frame three hypotheses. Subsequently, we test the hypotheses using data of the UN and Ghana Government, and also data from interviews with Ghana Army representatives. We conclude that there are at least two significant motivations for the Ghana's participation in PKM, namely: financial benefits and regional security concerns.

Keywords: UN, Ghana, peace-keeping mission, rational choice theory security

Introduction

The operation of troops in blue helmets is one of the most distinctive activities of the United Nations, which has set the maintenance of world peace as its primary target. In this study we focus on one of the largest providers of troops to this internationally operating organisation, which is the somewhat surprisingly relatively small (in terms of territory and population) West African state of Ghana. Despite the fact that in terms of its size and population it does not rank amongst large states such as Nigeria or India, it provides the international com-

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munity with considerable numbers of peacekeeping forces. The losses incurred within peacekeeping missions by the Ghanaian units, wearing a black star on their shoulders, are also high. What then guides Ghanaian politicians and representatives of the army to maintain this high level of representation in UN peacekeeping missions, which has furthermore been typical of Ghana for more than five decades?

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Providing an answer to this question is the primary aim of the presented study, which focuses on the period from 1960, when Ghana sent military and police units within the framework of the UN for the first time, up to the ongoing foreign intervention taking place under the current president J. D. Mahama.

History of Ghana's Military Interventions

Ghana gained independence in 1957, the first state in "black Africa" to do so. The first president of Ghana, Kwame NkÂmah, as one of the leading figures of the pan-African ideological movement, decided in 1960 to respond immediately to a catastrophic situation following the declaration of independence of the former Belgian Congo.[1] Ghana, together with Tunisia, responded within 48 hours to the call of the UN Security Council for the provision of troops for the UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC). The strength of the Ghanaian contingent was a respectable 8,800 soldiers and police out of a total number of 20,000 blue helmets.[2] This first mission immediately presented Ghana with a stern test, in which 43 Ghanaian troops and two British officers were killed in the 1961 massacre at Port-Franqui in the Kasai province by units of the ANC (Armée Nationale Congolaise), representing almost 20% of all UN losses in this operation.[3] This mission, however, represented the beginning of a distinguished history of Ghanaian foreign military interventions within the framework of the UN, which persists up to the present day, when Ghana has had no head of state during whose Âle troops were not sent on peacekeeping missions (PKM). Over 53 years of interventions, Ghana has provided over 130,000 troops for 39 missions in Africa, Europe and Asia[4], which places Ghana amongst the ten largest providers of troops for the UN. In these missions its armed forces have lost 131 men to date, ranking Ghana in fourth place in the number of deaths within the framework of PKM, after India, Nigeria and Pakistan.[5]

In addition to UN PKM, however, Ghana has also taken part in four ECOWAS regional peacekeeping operations, and continues to offer its troops for these missions to the present day—for example in the mission in Mali (AFISMA).

The Ghanaian Army and the Process of PKM Authorisation

At present almost one fifth of Ghana's army is within the services of the UN. The majority of these troops perform typical military activity in connection with PKM such as patrolling, mine clearance, monitoring of ceasefires, training of army and police, maintenance of calm and order. Some are authorised to lead missions or are appointed special representatives of the General Secretary of the UN for the given country.[4] Ghana also makes use of its several years of experience in order to provide training programmes for international specialists focusing on operation in these multi-dimensional operations, and participates through research in the increased effectiveness of activities in connection with the missions.

Table 1:
Ghanaian
Army and Cur-
rent PKM[7]

Number of active troops	Helicopters	Defence budget	Troops for UN PKM (January 2013)	Number of troops in individual missions (2013)	Troops in ECOWAS PKM
15,500 Army: 11,500 Navy 2,000 Air force 2,000 (World position in size of armed forces: 97)	Multi-purpose: 3 Transport: 5	2009: US$127m 2010: US$129m 2011: US$99m 2012: US$119m	2,809 (259 women) Ranking in UN: 10 (5th largest African provider of troops)	MINURSO: 11 MONUSCO: 485 UNAMID: 137 UNIFIL: 875 UNISFA: 6 UNMIL: 741 UNMISS: 36 UNOCI: 518	AFISMA: 120

From the data in Table 1 we see that Ghana certainly does not represent an international military superpower in terms of either its strength or its expenditures. Its army is relatively small and the number of its troops places it as low as 97th position in the world ranking. Additionally, total expenditures on defence in 2012 lag behind the international average, which was US$ 12,294 million, whereas the median[8] was US$ 924 million. Of the 138 observed countries in 2012 from which we have data available about military expenditures, Ghana is very low in this ranking, in 117th place with US$ 119 million.[9] Ghanaian military activities within the framework of the UN however demonstrate that despite the low expenditures on its small army, it is one of the most active contributors to PKM.

The sending of Ghanaian troops on missions, i.e. process of authorisation of PKM, can be divided into two phases, namely strategic and operational. In the strategic phase the potential deployment of units is discussed by the president, cabinet, parliament and the ministers of defence, interior and foreign affairs, the Ghana Armed Forces Council (GAFC), the Police Council, the chief of staff and the police chief inspector. Nevertheless, the final word in this process is within the jurisdiction of the president, who is the commander in chief of the Ghana Armed Forces (GAF). The other parties figure primarily in an advisory capacity. An exception is the minister of foreign affairs, who negotiates logistical and operational details of interventions with the UN. The parliament and in particular the Parliamentary Select Committee on Defence and Interior (PSCD&I) discuss and approve the budget for missions.[10]

Before a decision is taken on the provision of Ghanaian troops to the UN, the representatives of the armed forces and police must approve that the security situation within the country permits the state to spare the given number of troops and police potentially sent on the mission. After they have completed this evaluation of potential threats, the content of their report is delivered to the president, who decides whether Ghana shall provide troops. If this decision is positive, the operational phase is launched, in which a unit or specialists are selected and trained for the requirements of the future PKM. The resulting military unit then undergoes four to five-day training organised by Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC), which focuses on the specifics of the future deployment. Specifically this primarily concerns a detailed analysis of the mandate of the mis-

sion and the cultural environment of the country of the intervention, training in first aid or weapons handling and the technology assigned to the PKM.[11]

Theoretical Reflection on the Issue of Participation in PKM

The literature dealing with UN PKM is very extensive; however, the predominant part remains oriented towards practical issues in connection with the implementation of individual missions and an evaluation of their course. As a result, the majority of studies to date have evaluated the form, leadership and results of specific peacekeeping operations and a relatively small amount of attention has been devoted to an analysis of the actual conception of these operations[12] and the motivations of the states which took part in the missions. For the purposes of a theoretical anchoring of this study, we decided to start out from classic realist theory and its proponent Laura Neack who tried to identify the "real" motives of participating states. Latter, and for our purposes more useful, theoretical explanations could be find in theory of rational choice and public goods, which we shall present in brief.

Realist Theory

In general, realists stress the fundamental role of state, especially its power and interests,　　　supposing that all states pursue their own selfish interests. Therefore, realists reject the idealistic notion that the participation of states in any PKM would transcendent narrow (or even conflicting) national interests in order to keep international peace or to promote international norms and values. On the contrary, participation in PKM serves to preserve national interests in terms of the participant state's current or desired position in the international system.[13]

Despite that we can probably find some "idealistic statesmen" who profess to these values and have a genuine and unselfish wish to support the ideas of world peace,[14] Neack's work (1995) indicates the opposite. In her research, which focused on the period of the Cold War, she came to the conclusion that the interests pursued by means of a UN mission are the interests of Western states which benefit from the preservation of the status quo and those of a number of non-Western states which wish to stake their claim to prestige in international affairs by means of their active participation in UN missions.[15] The as-

sumption, although modified, that participation in PKM could serve as a source of international prestige will be tested in our third hypothesis stated bellow.

However, Neack dealt only with PKM which took place during the Cold War. The missions taking place since the end of the bipolar division of the world are different in many respects, not only for example in the increase in the number of PKM, but primarily with regard to the new providers of military units whose motivations are hardly explicable by her assumptions.[16] That's why we have decided to apply a contending theories of rational choice and public good.

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Theories of Rational Choice and Public Good

For the purposes of this study we can combine these two theories into a single one, since both are closely linked and together consists a solid basis for our hypotheses. Rational choice theory asserts that the individual players behave rationally and attempt to maximise their advantage in the economic sense of the word. Therefore, states tend to send their troops if the economic and political gains from the missions are high enough.

Public good theory was used by Sandler and Shimizu for an analysis of the uneven sharing of the burden and costs in PKM. According to Sandler and Shimizu, if conflicts (both intrastate and interstate) have negative impacts on other countries, then any efforts of PKM to end the conflicts pose a public good. If we view UN PKM as a public good, it is possible to state that an 'exploitation of the large by the small' occurs, i.e. that the states which provide the majority of the finances bear the burden on behalf of poorer states. However, the wealthy states do not act arbitrarily. On the contrary, there is a large assumption here that this is their rational choice, and that in exchange for the provision of these assets they advance their agenda in accordance with their own political preferences.[17]

This system of financing peacekeeping missions may however lead to humanitarian catastrophes, such as the Rwandan genocide in 1994. If the states which decide on the provision of finances and authorisation of PKM have no possible private economic or political gain from this operation, they may decide to block or refuse to support any action leading to the cessation of conflict and violence.[18] The production of public goods for UN missions is thus in large part dependent on the

subsequent private (or country-specific) gain of these states, namely (1) status enhancement for a contributing country; (2) greater stability for neighbouring countries; and (3) economic benefits from trading partners.[19] In the subsequent analysis we shall focus on the first and the second form which, as we suppose, play important role in a state's decision whether to participate in PKM.

Stipulating the Hypotheses

On the basis of the above-mentioned theories, we now present the hypotheses we shall test. After confirming or rejecting these hypotheses we shall subsequently attempt to formulate the reasons guiding Ghana and indeed other states to participate in PKM.

Hypothesis 1: Ghana's interest in participating in interventions increases with increasing profit from the system of financing UN missions.

Both aforementioned economic theories assume that the players act in such a manner as to maximise their gain and secure a supply of finances from the stipulated mission budget. Therefore, if Ghana's participation in a UN PKM is financially advantageous, this should be one of the important reasons for interventions for the political representatives of Ghana.[20] However, we need not view financial gain purely and merely as immediate profit, i.e. profit from the provision of Ghanaian troops to the UN and the subsequent receipt of a financial contribution of $ 1,028 per soldier per month[21], as well as further finances for military equipment and technology.[22] Another important factor in our opinion is the logistical problem of the transport of troops to PKM that take place far from the borders of Western Africa. The UN pays Ghana for the transport of its troops to the mission and back[23], but the sending of troops to remote areas does not bring any significant gain. If we take into account the fact that the UN is encountering financial difficulties and the reimbursement of costs is sometimes a very lengthy process, it would be a disadvantage for Ghana to pay for costly transports of its troops to remote areas and then wait for a long period for the return of this amount.[24]

Ghana should therefore concentrate on providing its soldiers within a distance as close as possible to its borders, or predominantly within the region of West Africa, which would be strategically and economically viable. In addition to these direct contributions, in the analytical

section we attempt to uncover further potential aspects of financial profiting from PKM, which could relate to Ghana and its armed forces.

Hypothesis 2: Ghana's willingness to intervene increases with the degree of threat to its own territory within the framework of the regional security complex.

As we noted in the previous section, greater stability in neighbouring countries could be important reason for participating in PKM. West Africa has traditionally been marked by instability and conflicts, which spill over beyond the borders of individual states. Most often it concerns a problem of refugees from the conflict zones, who are attempting to find a safe shelter and flee to the neighbouring states. The arrival of tens of thousands, sometimes hundreds of thousands of refugees, exposes the governments of the states to which these people flee to immense financial and security pressure. Another problem may be groups of insurgents who cross poorly guarded borders. Here they seek refuge from government armies, and also seek new recÂits and resources. In its final consequence, the conflict may spill over into further states, as occurred in the cases of Liberia or Sierra Leone. The further development of Ghana, the maintenance of stability and democracy is thus considerably dependent also upon the situation in the neighbouring states, which in our opinion is one of the reasons why Ghana is attempting, through its foreign policy implemented via active participation in military missions, to ensure the maximum possible stabilisation of its immediate surrounding area within the framework of the *regional security complex.*[25]

Hypothesis 3: Ghana's endeavour to participate in missions is greater if the president is not democratically elected.

In the 1960s and 1970s, armies in Africa turned with ever increasing frequency against civil regimes, which were in the great majority of cases depicted as incompetent and corÂpt. African armies, and especially their commanders, took advantage of their reputation, which had been maintained since the fall of the colonial governments.[26] Together with Latin America, it was in Africa that military coups became a symbol of politics. Since 1957, when Ghana gained independence, there have been more than seventy successful military coups on the continent.[27]

The third hypothesis is therefore partially constÂcted precisely on the basis of these events, and partially on the basis of the afore-mentioned notion that participation in PKM serves to enhance national

prestige. The assumption is that Ghanaian presidents attempt to avert coups by keeping the army occupied by activity more so than democratically elected presidents. If possible, they have sent a substantial part of their armies on interventions abroad in the form of participation in PKM. The plan was for the soldiers to earn above-standard wages on these missions, which would lead to greater satisfaction within the army. In addition, if they were engaged on missions, they would not have the time or capacities for planning coups.

Another reason may be the president's (un)popularity with foreign governments and the public. Military presidents in particular, who have come to power by means of a coup and conducted themselves in an authoritarian manner, have had the opportunity to attempt to improve their reputation abroad precisely through their participation in PKM and by playing an active role in the UN or OAU.

Methodology and Operationalisation

Our analysis focuses on 44 missions for which Ghana provided its troops between 1960 and 2013.[28] In addition to statistical data and scholarly literature; we also draw upon semi-stÂctured interviews with representatives of the Ghanaian armed forces, which we conducted in Accra in 2013. Although we are aware of a certain simplification, we decided for the purposes of this study in favour of the following operationalization of the examined variables.

Profit from system of financing PKM

In testing the first hypothesis we shall concentrate on the amount of money Ghana obtains from the provision of its troops for UN PKM. We shall also attempt to analyse and describe further possible financial gains and other advantages for the Ghanaian army as a whole and for the individual soldiers deployed on the mission. We shall also compare the distances from its borders at which Ghana intervenes militarily and the numbers of troops it sends to which parts of the world. We shall divide this into four zones, namely West Africa, the remaining Africa, Europe and the Middle East, and the rest of the world.

Threat to own territory and stability within the region

In testing the second hypothesis we shall determine (1) how many con-flicts have taken place in West Africa since Ghanaian independence; and (2) amount of conflicts which the international community decid-ed to respond to by deploying PKM, either under the heading of the UN, ECOWAS or AU. To do so, we use the UN data on PKM and data from the International Peace Institute and The Elliott School at George Wash-ington University[29]. Using the data, we shall subsequently reckon the percentage of these missions in which Ghana decided to participate and also determine the total number of Ghanaian missions that took place within the framework of West Africa and in other parts of the world.

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Democratically vs. undemocratically elected presidents and their willingness to intervene

In testing the third hypothesis we shall start out from the assumption that the military coups in Ghana and their undemocratically installed architects were viewed either negatively or with apprehension abroad. Therefore we shall first of all determine the method by which the Ghanaian president came to power. The method could be either dem-ocratic election or military coup. Then we shall determine how many UN PKM have been initiated under each president, and how many of them the individual heads of state decided to take part in.

Analysis

Hypothesis 1: The system which the UN uses for payment of compen-sation is markedly different in comparison with the majority of other international organisations. The UN pays $1,028 per month per soldier who takes part in a PKM. In addition, it pays states contributions for sending equipment, technology and other support services for military or police units, such as vehicles or field hospitals. In the great majority of cases, developing countries own outmoded technology and weapons which do not use complex and expensive modern technologies. How-ever, as we have described, it is precisely these states which provide the

backbone of forces to the UN, both in terms of troops and in terms of technology. This is no different in the case of Ghana. For example, the Ghanaian battalion which took part in the UNAMIR mission in 1994 had considerable logistical and technical problems from the beginning in comparison with the Belgians.[30] The result is that the costs for the deployment of these units and the technology of developing countries are lower than the subsequent financial compensation from the UN.

An example which demonstrates how Ghana profits from the UN compensation system is 2010. In that year Ghana provided more than 2,500 troops and other equipment for PKM. The financial contribution it obtained for its participation in peacekeeping operations was US$ 74,336,121. Expenditures on the operation of technology and for the equipment used, however, were only US$ 42,100,577. For the Ghanaian government this meant a profit of US$ 32,235,545.[31] Some of this money is subsequently used for the purchase of military or government technology, as happened between 1998 and 1999, when US$ 2,450,000 from the GAF account in New York was used for the purchase of the presidential plane.[32] Financial compensation is additionally paid in US dollars, and this currency is a sought-after article for Ghana.

However, Ghana profits financially not only as a state. The Ghanaian troops who take part in PKM obtain above-standard earnings thanks to their wage from the UN, which forms an additional income.[33] The direct economic gains thus provide Ghana with a large motivation to provide its troops. However, there are also indirect gains here. Due to the fact that the GAF share in UN missions, they gain valuable experience, which is significant both for the army as a whole and for individual soldiers. It improves their level of professional skills and increases their chances of career advancement.[34] International interaction, joint military manoeuvres and mutual support within the framework of the UN has its effect on the standard of the GAF, keeps the army better prepared and improves its operational capacities.[35] The private sector and national corporations also profit, obtaining orders from the UN for goods required for PKM, such as beef, packaged water and air transport.[36]

Graph 1 confirms the first hypothesis only in part. We see over 18,000 troops for UN PKM within the region of West Africa, and a further more than 8,000 Ghanaians in the rest of Africa. The largest number of unarmed observers is also deployed here. In the rest of the world, or in areas furthest from the borders of Ghana, less than 2,000 Ghanaian

troops and observers are deployed. A large exception is the third zone, the territory of Europe and the Middle East.

Graph 1: Provision of troops for UN missions.[37]

Upon a closer examination of the reasons why Ghanaians intervene so much in this region, we find that such a high number is due only to the single UNIFIL PKM in Lebanon. Ghana has been intervening in this PKM since 1979, and contributes with a contingent of an average strength of more than 800 troops annually. On their official website they even declare "ownership" of this PKM.[38] This is for the reason that one of the founders of this mission in 1978 was the Ghanaian diplomat and general Emmanuel Alexander Ato Erskine, who essentially built up this mission and secured support for it amongst the members of the UN, as well as securing the necessary facilities. Ghana led this mission again from 1999 to 2001. The operation of this PKM is therefore a prestigious matter for Ghana, and the GAF are suitably proud of their active and strong participation in the mission.[39] These factors thus explain the unusually high level of Ghana's participation in PKM in the region of Europe and the Middle East.

With the exception of the UNIFIL PKM, Ghana has provided only 178 unarmed observers for other missions in this part of the world. Despite the fact that the UN is known for its late payment of compensations for missions[40] and the complex enumeration of financial compensations for Ghana is not publicly available for consideration, from the available sources, interviews and data we can state that Ghana and its armed units genuinely profits financially and professionally from the UN system of compensation. And with only the sole example of the high level of military participation in the UNIFIL PKM in Lebanon, it provides troops primarily for missions in West Africa and the rest of Africa, which represents a financially more sound military investment.

*Table 2:
PKM within
the region of
West Africa[42, 43]*

** Ghana
present in
these countries
within the
framework
of ECOMOG
PKM.*

Name of mission/type	Organisation	Country	Year	Participation of Ghana
ECOMIL 1/PKM	ECOWAS	Liberia	1990-1998	YES
UNOMIL/Obs.	UN	Liberia	1993-1997	NO*
UNASOG/Obs.	UN	Chad/Libya	1994	YES
ECOMOG SL/PKM	ECOWAS	Sierra Leone	1998-1999	YES
UNOMSIL/Obs.	UN	Sierra Leone	1998-1999	NO*
ECOMOG GB/PKM	ECOWAS	Guinea-Bissau	1998-1999	NO
UNAMSIL/PKM	UN	Sierra Leone	1999-2005	YES
ECOMICI/PKM	ECOWAS	Cote d'Ivoire	2002-2004	YES
ECOMIL 2/PKM	ECOWAS	Liberia	2003	YES
UNMIL/PKM	UN	Liberia	2003- ongoing	YES
UNOCI/PKM	UN	Cote d'Ivoire	2004- ongoing	YES
MINURCAT/PKM	UN	Chad/CAR	2007-2010	YES
AFISMA/PKM	ECOWAS	Mali	2013	YES
MINUSMA/PKM	UN	Mali	2013- ongoing	YES

We can therefore confirm the first hypothesis that one of the reasons why Ghana provides its troops to the UN is to profit from its system of financing PKM. However, as the case of the Lebanese mission demonstrates, economic viability is not an entirely critical factor.

Hypothesis 2: Almost every country in West Africa, with the exception of Benin, has experienced conflicts of a greater or lesser intensity.[41] The most intense and thus also the bloodiest conflicts were the civil wars in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Nigeria. There have been and continue to be further conflict situations here, into which the international organisations the UN and ECOWAS have decided to intervene.

Four UN PKM and two observation missions have been sent to the territory of West Africa. Within the framework of its own PKM, ECOWAS has launched a total of six operations. Within the territory of the states neighbouring ECOWAS, one UN PKM and one observation mission has taken place.

This makes a total of twelve international PKM and three observation missions within the region of West Africa and the neighbouring countries. Ghana has taken part in eleven PKM and one observation mission, in which three of these missions are still ongoing at present. From the data in table 2 we see that Ghana is very active with regard to PKM within the region of West Africa, either under the leadership of the UN or ECOWAS. It has provided its troops for all UN PKM in this part of the continent. It was absent only in two UN observation missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone, which however took place simultaneously with ECOMOG operations in these countries, so its peacekeeping forces were present and armed, unlike the unarmed UN observers. We shall therefore not classify these two observation missions as non-participation. Ghana therefore did not participate in only one ECOMOG PKM in Guinea-Bissau. However, it is necessary to add that in the years 1998 – 1999, when the ECOMOG operation was taking place in Guinea-Bissau, Ghana was taking part in eleven other PKM and provided police for other peacekeeping operations (e.g. East Timor and Bosnia-Herzegovina).[44]

It is in the vital interest of the Ghanaian government to maintain security and stability in the country, and one of the key factors in this is also the stability of the whole of West Africa.[45] An example of a threat to stability which brings conflicts in West Africa is the civil war in Liberia. In 1992 Ghana had to receive 13,000 refugees. In 2004 there were

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more than 40,000 such refugees in Ghana, who could then begin to return voluntarily to their home country. In 2011 there were still 11,585 Liberian refugees within the territory of Ghana.[46] In addition to strategic, political and economic interests, Ghana is additionally bound to its region culturally and historically, and this bond certainly plays its role in the provision of troops to the conflict zones of West Africa.

Now we shall compare Ghanaian participation in PKM in individual continents, in particular within the region of West Africa. We shall start out from the total number of UN and ECOWAS PKM, which is 74. From this number we shall except seven police missions and two political-observation missions, since we are interested only in the provision of members of the GAF.[47]

Graph 2 shows the overall high level of participation in the provision of Ghanaian troops for PKM. Ghanaians have participated in more than 68% of all UN and ECOWAS military operations worldwide. More than one half of PKM take place in Africa. We can observe the highest participation, at the rate of 92%, in the region of West Africa. In other parts of the world, Ghana on average takes part in PKM in 61% of cases.

The maintenance of stability in West Africa is therefore one of the main motivating factors for Ghanaian participation in PKM, which confirms our second hypothesis – the willingness of Ghana to intervene increases together with the degree of threat within the framework of the regional security complex.

Hypothesis 3: As we mentioned in the section on authorisation, the last word and decision on whether Ghanaian troops are to be deployed on PKM is within the jurisdiction of the president. This authority provides Ghanaian presidents with the opportunity to influence both the internal and international view of their personality. Now we shall focus on the individual Ghanaian presidents and shall determine the method by which they came to power. We shall subsequently analyse the number of PKM that took place and the number of PKM that Ghana took part in under the Âle of each head of state.

Table 3: Ghanaian participation in PKM under individual Ghanaian presidents[50]

Head of state	In power	Assumption of power	Number of PKM	Partici-pation of Ghana
Kwame NkÂmah	1960 - 1966	Democratically elected	5	2
Joseph Ankrah	1966 - 1969	Military coup	0	0
Akwasi Afrifa	1969 - 1970	Military coup	0	0
Edward Akufo-Addo	1970 - 1972	Democratically elected	0	0
Ignatius K. Acheampong	1972 - 1978	Military coup	2	1
Fred Akuffo	1978 - 1979	Military coup	1	1
Jerry John Rawlings	1979	Military coup	0	0
Hilla Limann	1979 - 1981	Democratically elected	1	1
Jerry John Rawlings	1981 - 2001	Military coup/ Demo-cratically elected	39	24
John Kufour	2001 - 2009	Democratically elected	11	9
John Atta Mills	2009 - 2012	Democratically elected	3	3
John Dramani Mahama	From 2012	Democratically elected	2	2

The data in Table 3 shows that under the Âle of the democratically elected Ghanaian presidents, the international organisations UN and ECOWAS were engaged in 22 PKM, of which Ghana took part in 17 (78%). In comparison with this, under the Âle of those heads of state who came to power by force, 42 PKM were initiated, in which Ghana contributed to 26 (61%).

The most interesting personality with regard to Ghanaian participation in PKM is without doubt the longest Âling president, Jerry John Rawlings.[51] Under his twenty-year Âle, Ghana contributed to 24 PKM worldwide. Ghana's high level of participation under his Âle was possible also thanks to the fact that after the end of the Cold War there was an unblocking of the UN's capability to act, as well as a large increase in internal conflicts. Nevertheless, even despite the fact that the institutions of peacekeeping operations probably greatly benefited Rawlings in improving his own image abroad, from the data on the participation of Ghana in PKM we cannot confirm the hypothesis that authoritarian and internationally unpopular Ghanaian leaders took part in missions to a greater extent than democratically elected presidents. Democratically elected presidents also send Ghanaian troops to PKM very frequently. For example, President John Kufour (2000 – 2008) responded to the call for Ghanaian blue helmets nine times out of eleven cases. The last two presidents, John Atta-Mills and John Mahama have so far made use of every opportunity to provide their troops.

Conclusion

For over fifty years, since its first engagement in a UN PKM in 1960 up to the present day, Ghana has remained within the ten largest contributors to these missions. It is increasing its participation in international peacekeeping by providing troops also for ECOWAS PKM within the framework of the region of West Africa. Over the course of these five decades, Ghanaian troops have earned respect and proven themselves in arduous situations which they have encountered through participation in peacekeeping missions. The aim of this study was to confirm or reject three hypotheses relating to the reasons for Ghana's substantial participation in PKM.

We confirmed the first hypothesis on Ghanaian profits from the system of financing. The state, army and individual soldiers profit financially and professionally. The case of the PKM in Lebanon demonstrat-

ed that the distance of the mission from Ghana and thus also more economically viable logistics need not, however, be a critical factor.

We also confirmed the second hypothesis, relating to Ghana's interests in the security and stability of the region of West Africa. Ghana provided its troops for 12 of 13 UN and ECOWAS PKM in this region, which in percentage terms is one third higher than in the rest of the world. We thus observe Ghana's active endeavour to resolve conflicts and its interest in prevention against a deeper destabilisation of the entire region, which comes primarily with intensive long-term conflicts. If we connect the first and second hypotheses, it is possible to assume that the probability of Ghana's participation in PKM increases with the proximity of this mission to Ghanaian territory.

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We disproved the third hypothesis on the greater willingness of military presidents to intervene in PKM than their democratic counterparts. We did not observe any fundamental increase or reduction of Ghanaian participation in PKM under the Âle of the individual presidents.

We can therefore state that economic and security motives predominate over the personality and popularity of the president. For Ghanaian heads of state it is simply an advantage to maintain an active army. The prestige of Ghana and its presidents is promoted on the international stage, and at the same time its soldiers gain economically, which reduces the level of their dissatisfaction and the risk of a military coup.

A question arises with regard to Ghana's future role in international peacekeeping. The immediate future evidently will not bring any dramatic change in Ghanaian participation in PKM. In the long-term perspective, however, an identical prognosis is uncertain. In first place, the long unreformed UN system of financial compensation is constantly reducing the profits of the states which provide their troops. The UN endeavour to increase effectiveness and security standards on missions is also increasing the costs for providers of troops, which is felt especially by developing countries such as Ghana. If there is no reform of the system, which shall be highly arduous, since the UN already has problems with paying compensation, the factor of financial benefits for states shall become increasingly less attractive.

A second issue is Ghana's own ability to contribute to PKM to the same extent in the long term. Ghanaian military technology is outmoded, and the size of the armed and security forces is small. Approximately 25% of the Ghanaian army is more or less constantly deployed

on foreign missions, and the ratio of police to the number of citizens is 1:1,200.[52] Together with the rapidly growing Ghanaian population, the demands for maintenance of internal security shall increase. It is therefore unclear as to whether Ghana shall be capable in future of dealing with these factors, which jeopardise the long-term outlook for a further high degree of participation in PKM.

Otherwise, the entire long-term perspective of UN PKM seems highly uncertain, and the work of a "policeman of the world" may in future be taken on with ever increasing frequency by regional organisations such as the EU, ECOWAS or SADC. Even if it ceases to be financially viable to provide its troops for UN missions worldwide, the maintenance of the security of one's own borders will always be an important issue. It is therefore possible that the individual regions or sub-regions, not only in Africa, shall begin to rely increasingly on their own capacities in matters of the prevention and resolution of conflicts. We can observe this trend already in the building of sub-regional powers, such as the ad hoc created ECOMOG units (in ECOWAS) in the conflicts in West Africa, or the SADBRIG units (in SADC) in the Southern African region. In addition to this the units of the African Union are being built up, with its *African Standby Force* numbering 5,000 troops to be prepared by 2015.[53]

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Notes

1   Niyi Afolabi and Toyin Falola (2007), *Trans-Atlantic Migration: The Paradoxes of Exile*, New York: Taylor & Francis Group.

2 Festus Aboagye (2000), *Ghana: Four Decades of UN and Regional Peacekeeping*, Accra: Buck Press, p. 3.

3 Walter Dorn and David Bell (1995), 'Intelligence and Peacekeeping: The UN Operation in the Congo 1960 – 1964,' *International Peacekeeping* 1, pp. 11–33.

4 United Nations Peacekeeping Statistics, *Troop and police contributors,* United Nations, 2014, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml> (accessed 05 March 2014).

5 United Nations Peacekeeping Statistics, *Fatalities*, United Nations, 2014, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/fatalities/documents/stats_2.pdf> (accessed 06 March 2014).

6 RE: in December 2012, Major General Delali Johnson Sakyi was appointed commander of the UNMISS mission in South Sudan by the Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon.

7 According to Festus Aubyn and Kwesi Aning (2013), *Contributor Profile: Ghana*, Accra: Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre, p. 1.

8 We present the median because the average of state expenditures on PKM is heavily influenced by states such as the USA, China and Russia, whose expenditures far exceed the expenditures of other states. Nevertheless, Ghana is far below the values of the median.

9 In 2012, the average military expenditures of the 36 observed states in Africa from which we have data were US$ 915 million, and the median expenditures US$ 264 million. Ghana is in 13th place in the ranking of military expenditures; see Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *SIPRI Military Expenditures Database*, SIPRI, 2014, <www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database> (accessed 04 March 2014).

10 Aubyn and Aning (2013), p. 2.

11 Barimah Brako Owusu, (2013) interview by Jakub Horák, Accra, Ghana, 2013, Authorisation process and causes of Ghana's participation in a peacekeeping mission, type recording, available at Department of Politics, Philosophical Faculty, University of Hradec Krákové, Czech Republic. Lt. Col. Barimah Brako Owusu is commander of the 1st infantry battalion of GAF, previously the commander of the Ghanaian battalion (GHANBATT) in Lebanon.

12 Oldřich Bureš (2007), 'Hledání teorie mezinárodního peacekeepingu,' *Mezinárodní vztahy*, 4, p. 5.

13 Laura Neack (1995), 'UN Peace-Keeping: In the Interest of Community or Self?' *Journal of Peace Research*, 2, p. 184.

14 The idealist theory may be backed up by not only an "idealist"-minded statement but also by the "CNN effect". For more see Peter Jakobsen (1996), *National Interest, Humanitarianism or CNN: What Triggers UN Peace Enforcement after the Cold War?* Aarhus: University of Aarhus.

15 Neack, p. 194.

16 The ten main donors no longer comprise the Western powers. In the *post-Somali* intervention period, these are by contrast those states which are now becoming major powers (such as India, Nigeria, Pakistan and Ethiopia) or do not possess the potential to become significant powers (Bangladesh, Nepal, Ghana, UÂguay and currently also Rwanda).

17 Horofumi Shimizu and Todd Sandler (2002), 'Peacekeeping and Burden-Sharing, 1994 – 2000,' *Journal of Peace Research*, 6, p. 666.

18 Seven weeks after the outbreak of the Rwandan genocide, President Bill Clinton publicly declared that the USA would intervene in humanitarian crises and ethnic conflicts only if it was in the national interest. See William J. Clinton 'Remarks at the United States Naval Academy Commencement Ceremony in Annapolis, Maryland,' 25 May 1994. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. <www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=50236> (accessed 06 March 2014).

19 Shimizu and Sandler (2002), p. 656

20 In this hypothesis we are interested only in PKM organised by the UN and not ECOWAS, since ECOWAS uses a different system of financing. Its budget for PKM is considerably smaller and paid directly by the intervening states.

21 The amount of $ 1,028 was approved by the General Assembly in 2002. Since that time it has not been increased even despite the constant inflation of the US dollar, and this also is one of the reasons why PKM are not attractive for states with a modern army and higher wages. With the increasing standard of third world states, UN missions are increasingly less attractive for them from a financial perspective. Reform of this system in future is therefore evidently inevitable. See Alex Bellamy and Paul Williams (2013), *Providing Peacekeepers: The Politics, Challenges, and Future of United Nations Peacekeeping* Contributions, Oxford UP, p. 10.

22 Kumi Ansah-Koi (2013), interview by Jakub Horák, Accra, Ghana, Financial gains from UN peacekeeping missions, type recording, available at Department of Politics, Philosophical Faculty, University of Hradec Krákové, Czech Republic. Dr. Kumi Ansah-Koi is a professor at Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ghana.

23 United Nations, *Generic Guidelines for Troop Contributing Countries Deploying Military Units to The United Nations Peacekeeping Missions*, New York: United Nations, 2008, p. 15.

24 Bellamy and Williams (2013), p. 10.

25 The theory of regional security complexes is the brainchild of the main representatives of the Copenhagen school, Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver. In this work the authors delineate the regional security complex of West Africa as the "West African Proto-Complex", to which all ECOWAS state belong, together with Mauritania and Cameroon. These complexes are formed by a group of countries whose security is inseparably bound together. It represents another miniaturised anarchy within the framework of international relations, which has its own Âles. See Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver (2003), *Regions and Powers: The StÂcture of International Security*, Cambridge UP, 2003, p. 213.

26 Richard J. Reid (2009), *A History of Modern Africa*, Chichester & Malden: Wiley-Blackwell.

27 More than seventy successful coups in sub-Saharan Africa are listed by Richard Reid (Reid 2011). Patrick McGowan (2003) asserts that there have been eighty and Alex Thompson (2004) states as many as eighty six. In addition to the different time frame, the differences in the data may be

caused by the various (un)counted coups within the framework of an already governing army. For more see Patrick J. McGowan (2003), 'African Military Coups d'Etat, 1956-2001: Frequency, Trends and Distribution,' *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 3, pp. 339–70 and Alex Thompson, (2004), *Introduction to African Politics*, London: Routledge.

28 This study does not deal with UN PKM for which Ghana has provided only police or civil employees.

29 Providing for Peacekeeping, *Peacekeeping Data*, International Peace Institute and The Elliott School at George Washington University, <www.providingforpeacekeeping.org/contributions/> (accessed 08 March 2014).

30 Major General Henry Kwami Anyidoho describes how all the battalions, with the exception of the Belgian one, had outmoded weapons and technology. Worn out vehicles arrived without spare parts, and many important items of military equipment were stolen during transit from the home countries. For more see Henry K. Anyidoho (1996), *Guns Over Kigali*, Accra: Sub-Saharan Publishers, p. 8.

31 Aubyn and Aning (2013), p. 5.

32 Bellamy and Williams (2013), p. 276.

33 Documents on the drawing of financial compensation from the UN are unfortunately internal and unpublished, and as a result the authors did not succeed in obtaining further exact numbers. Nevertheless, from the interviews and further sources it is possible to judge clearly that this trend, in which Ghana profits from the financial system of PKM, is long-term. 'It's one of the key factors, big financial gain. We make a lot of money. It's our additional income.' See: Owusu (2013).

34 Kumi Ansah-Koi (2013).

35 Barimah Brako Owusu (2013).

36 Bellamy and Williams (2013), p. 19.

37 Authors according to United Nations Peacekeeping Statistics, *Troop and police contributors*.

38 As we find on the official website: 'Established on 19 March 1978 to deal with security problems between Lebanon and Israel, Ghana can rightly claim ownership of UNIFIL.' See Peacekeeping, *UNIFIL-Lebanon* (Ghana Armed Forces), <www.gaf.mil.gh/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=24&Itemid=6> (accessed 07 March 2014).

39 Barimah Brako Owusu (2013).

40 Bellamy and Williams (2013), p. 10.

41 UCDP Data, *UCDP Datasets* (Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala Universitet), <http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/> (accessed 08 March 2014).

42 United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, *Peacekeeping operations*, United Nations, 2014, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations> (accessed 07 March 2014).

43 William Agyapong (2005), *Military Intervention in Intrastate Conflicts in West Africa: Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group as a Case Study*, Kansas: Fort Leavenworth, p. 8.

44 Ibid, p. 8.

45 Barimah Brako Owusu (2013).

46 Bellamy and Williams (2013), p. 274.

47 We also except the UNOGIL observation mission in Lebanon which took place in 1958, in which Ghana could not yet participate.

48 United Nations Peacekeeping Operations.

49 Agyapong (2013), p. 8.

50 According to Jan Prouza (2010), *Ghana: Volby, politické strany a stranictví*, Olomouc: Periplum, 2010.

51 Despite the fact that he was elected president in elections in 1992, it remains a fact that he came to power via a military coup. Furthermore, the course of the first elections cannot be evaluated as democratic; hence we classified him rather amongst the non-democratic heads of state. For more see Prouza (2010).

52 Aubyn and Aning (2013), p. 288.

53 Aaron Maasho (2013), 'African Leaders Create Emergency Military Force,' *Reuters*, 27 May 2013, <http://in.reuters.com/article/2013/05/27/africa-military-force-idINDEE94Q07U20130527> (accessed 10 March 2014).

Book Reviews

Social Movements in Global Politics

Reviewed by Aliaksandr Novikau
(Northern Arizona University, USA)

The twenty-first century has, so far, been characterised by a crisis of institutional politics. Nation-state governments have become less and less capable of solving long-standing, potentially catastrophic problems such as global climate change, world population growth, global inequality and the loss of local cultures. As a result, many people are dissatisfied with politicians and politics in general. According to West, author of *Social Movements in Global Politics*, these flaws in policy-making are not unavoidable and could be solved through extra-institutional forms of politics such as social movements, which are defined as 'enduring patterns of collective activity that take place outside and often in opposition to official political institutions' (p. xv).

According to West, the role of social movements in politics has often been neglected – they have literally been 'hidden from history.' Yet social movements have always played a role in global politics. For instance, nationalist movements played a cÂcial role in the development of the modern nation-state. At the same time, social activists have continually fought for the political rights of all individuals, regardless of an individual's property status, gender, race, religion or ethnicity, which is the essence of the modern liberal democracy. Although economic rights are usually viewed as a private matter, extra-institutional activism has also raised questions about the poverty and economic disparity that led to the development of the contemporary welfare state.

One distinguishing feature of social movements is their ability to work towards – and often achieve – goals that are viewed by the wider

society as utopian at the time. Hence, the motto of the social movements of the 1960s – 'Be realistic, demand the impossible!' Unlike political parties, social movements attempt to not only achieve certain political changes but also to transform the entire political landscape and the cultural assumptions that are held regarding specific social issues. Hence, neglecting social movements also means neglecting a vital dimension of politics.

The author describes the phenomenon of the new social movements that appeared in the late 1960s around the world. At that time, many believed that most of the social problems have been solved. However, the new social movements politicised previously neglected social issues such as gender, sexuality, the environment and ethnicity. West selects two of the new types of movements to discuss in detail: the environmental and anti-globalism movements. He identifies two features that differentiate these movements from others: both are directly related to the economic sphere and are not really concerned with the politics of identity. In other words, unlike in other movements, the members of these are not associated with a certain social group that has been excluded from the sphere of politics.

As this growth of new social movements has inevitably affected the contemporary theories of social movements, the author discusses the evolution of several approaches to this phenomenon. The first of these is the *normative* approach, which discusses the role that social movements play in society. The theories that previously dominated usually viewed these movements as illegitimate, often destÂctive forces. However, since social movements are often more accessible to individuals than traditional political institutions such as parties and state agencies, social movements are often capable to raise important societal questions, and are therefore cÂial for democracy and democratisation.

According to West, there is also a shift in *empirical* approaches to social movements. Until the 1960s, mainstream theories viewed social movements mostly in terms of collective behaviour, explaining their emergence by social breakdowns, and the inability of the state to solve these breakdowns, resulting in a largely irrational collective outburst. Now, social movements are viewed more as rational collective actors that can achieve certain collective goals. The empirical analysis of social movements goes beyond debates about their rationality or

irrationality, however. New approaches emphasise the role of social identities, oppression, and consciousness; and therefore, the cultural creativity of social movements.

In sum, the book provides an excellent summary of the major theories of social movements – from mainstream to critical approaches. Moreover, it explains many of the fundamental concepts of political science; for example, the state, social power, international relations and democracy. Most importantly, the author has succeeded in delivering this information in a very simple, reader-friendly style, making Social Movements in Global Politics a good handbook for undergraduate students studying social movements and for members of the general public who are interested in this important social phenomenon.

Human Rights

An Interdisciplinary Approach

Reviewed by Teodora-Maria Daghie (University of Bucharest)

Human rights are considered universal, meaning that they should be applied regardless of any borders, ethnicity, skin colour, sex, language, religion, sexual orientation, political opinion or social status (etc). They also state that all people are born free and equal in dignity and have equal rights. At the global level we have achieved a Universal Declaration of Human Rights and various UN conventions, including those dealing with genocide, discrimination and gender rights. Freeman's work makes an all-inclusive presentation of the concept of human rights through time up to the 20th century, summarising the key concepts and institutions.

The book is divided into nine chapters, roundly guarded by an introduction and a conclusion; they are all very logically written, providing readers a steady flow of information and supporting the arguments in a solid way. Freeman states its purpose from the beginning: to link the fundamental philosophical concepts of human rights to the political sphere and look at their evolution in the context of a post 9/11 world. Furthermore, he examines contemporary concepts such as the implications of globalisation, development and poverty, putting great emphasis on the cultural barriers and trying to foresee its evolution in the 21st century.

He argues that so far the study of human rights was to a great extent done by lawyers, stressing the need to go beyond human rights law (p. 13). This is indeed a very accurate observation as a great extent of the key textbooks is solely dedicated to it. I agree with him that much more emphasis should be put on features such as the cultural element

beyond the universality of the human values and to increase the role of the social sciences in examining the phenomenon. The mechanisms and processes are very well developed and fostered by Freeman, being fully integrated in a smooth flow of arguments that successfully make a concise debate from introduction to conclusion.

As we might expect, introducing several contexts into the same framework has some significant effects that should not be understated. The study of globalisation and development from a human rights perspective should be read extensively in order to catch all of their features. Freeman has articulated most of the major evolutions that had occurred since the publication of the first edition, putting them in an elaborated and easily to be understood frame.

Focus is given to the role of the legal component, framing the origins of the human rights in the social disciplines and back in history as early as Roman law. It starts from the normative character of human rights and the positive rights, up to the 1970s and 1980s, stressing the 'legal form' of the academic debate of human rights, little being done in respect to other disciplines such as political philosophy. Despite the success of the European human rights regime, it did not have a great influence in the illiberal regimes outside the Western sphere of influence, but rather improved the human rights condition in countries with moderate respect of them (p. 92). Great consideration is given to the relationship between politics and law in what concerns a so-called conflict between the two, giving the examples of the international criminal tribunals of Yugoslavia and Rwanda, supporting Kenneth Rodman's view that they cannot deter a perpetrator if he has to cooperate in order to attain peace (p. 94). Others argue that though the law can protect the most basic human rights, there are problems that should be addressed politically, especially where law seems to have a limited success. Hybrid tribunals have been part of the recent history in war-torn countries; however they do not represent a long-term solution to further the cause of human rights. (p. 95).

The most important aspect of this book lies in its explanatory capacity and how it tries to have a solution-oriented approach. With a strong theoretical background and a comprehensive approach to the field, the book makes a good read for students, scholars and the general public. A great deal of information has been assembled and a number of studies are cited in a systematic and theoretical framework. Readers will certainly appreciate its writing style, layout and ease of navigation

through content in the effort of catching the essential debate on the human rights issue. To sum up, Freeman's book is an excellent and compulsory reading for students and anyone who wishes to get accustomed with the norms and concepts of human rights.

Book Reviews

Sexual Violence and Armed Conflict

Reviewed by Veronika Váchalová (Metropolitan University Prague)

Sexual violence has a history as long as the practise of war itself. It has been a part of the spoils of war that represent the gravest abuses of human rights. Nowadays, despite enormous humanitarian protests and efforts it is continuously used as a prevalent war tactic and a tool of war. Janie L. Leatherman looks at the causes and consequences of sexual violence in armed conflicts. Her book *Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict* is timely. She creates a link between global political economic stÂctures' involvement in armed conflicts and violent acts (gender-based violence, sexual violence and rape in particular) that come with it. Her main argument is that sexual violence is encouraged by patriarchal system of government and by view of hegemonic masculinity and dominance (not over women only).

Commonly, sexual assault is seen as an outrage to the husband or the whole family. Therefore, it is very hard to talk to the victims. Many victims of sexual assault do not concede it, which causes lack of testimonies and thus makes it extremely challenging to deal with perpetrator and possibly persecute them. Leatherman argues, that it has been historically difficult to prove rape because of women's low social standing in many cultures.

The book begins by emphasising the necessity of ending the silence of victims of sexual violence through conceptualizing sexual violence, explaining its occurrence in armed conflicts through various schools of theoretical approaches; up to the ending impunity and the problematic of consent and proving rape. This introductory subchapters offer explicit definition of sexual violence and the references to rape found in earlier documents of recorded history and early religious

texts where she, historically speaking, investigates sexual violence in armed conflicts as a taboo – impossible task of understanding it.

Leatherman provides a valuable overview of sexual violence used in armed conflicts, its impact on victims and their communities, posing question of why perpetrators do it. This all is supported by her examination of the dimensions of sexual violence in conflict. Despite this book provides focus on warfare, Leatherman did mention the domestic environment and domestic violence including sexual assault as well and virtually linked it to predispositions. By looking theoretically at feminism, Leatherman argues feminity is never discusses in universal way in contrast to masculinity. This universal tone accuses all men of being capable of sexual violence in wartime.

According to Leatherman, sexual violence is a 'Ânaway norm' because it leaves no sexual taboo untouched, as it is not only affecting women. Impact of sexual violence as a 'Ânaway norm', according to Leatherman, can be described via four thresholds (type of sexual violence, taboo targets, oppressed agency, loss of neutrality and safe space). Throughout the book, Leatherman uses many examples of armed conflicts where sexual violence has taken place, such as the DRC, Rwanda, and the rest of Africa, Asia and the Middle East. She uses Sierra Leone and the Congo as focal case studies describing in depth the consequences on societies. She completes the arguments by further war tactic of destroying safe spaces (churches and schools) and the apparent approval of the government in its support of hegemonic masculinity.

In the second part of this book, Leatherman focuses on the global political economy and its contribution to this issue. According to the author, propaganda, military authority and a sense of obedience are at the core of promotion of aggressiveness and hyper-masculinity. Soldiers have been forced to take part in the conflict and in return they gain power and control back through wartime rape.

The most valuable point of this book is that multinational corporations must be held responsible for their part in maintenance of sexual violence during armed conflicts. Rather, they take advantage by supporting repressive governments. In order to end this, Leatherman suggests countries must reduce the gender gap and give equal rights and access to multifaceted centres to women. Citizens of targeted countries should be educated about the consequences of sexual violence and humanitarian aid should be expanded.

The language used by the author is very clear and concise. Many testimonies are included in order to create the proper feeling of each individual reader – that is most often the anger. Frankly, this book uses many concrete cases that are hard to absorb but it must be considered as an advantage of reading this book because it is eye-opening and honest.

The book provides possible ways how to deal with sexual violence and how to improve conflict situations. However, they are largely hypothetical and their function in reality is in question. That is not to say the suggestions are not appropriate. The opposite is tÂe. Various organisations are already attempting to educate citizens of targeted countries but it has not shown any positive numbers in decrease of sexual violence. There clearly needs to be further measures taken.

This book is a welcomed source of knowledge about not only sexual violence in theory, but also about the debate behind this issue. It is honest and provocative at the same time. This book can be used as a textbook for students, but also as a research text for scholars, or even policy makers. I would strongly recommend this book to read before doing any further research because it is clear in giving information and it evokes proper feelings any scholar should have about this topic.

Is the EU doomed?

Reviewed by Daniela Lenčéš Chalániová
(Anglo-American University, Prague)

In recent years, Polity Press released a number of works which take issue with the current crisis of the EU and the possible futures that might follow from it. Consider, for instance, Simon Hix's *What's Wrong with the EU & How to Fix It* (2008), Jürgen Habermas' essay collection *The Crisis of the European Union: A Response* (2012) and Anthony Giddens' *Turbulent and Mighty Continent: What Future for Europe?* (2013).

Zielonka's book-long essay *Is the EU Doomed?* fits neatly into this body of futuristic literature, but unlike his colleagues, Zielonka is not optimistic about the chances of reforming the EU in a federal way as Giddens is, about politicisation of EU decision-making as a solution to its problems put forward by Hix or about turning the EU into a post-modern cosmopolitan community based on human rights (Habermas). Instead, Zielonka continues to explore his vision of a neo-medieval empire – a system of governance based on overlapping networks of competences without a clear systemic hierarchy rather than a centralised BÂssels authority – thoughts that he first explored in his critically acclaimed book *Europe as Empire* (2006). But before Zielonka introduces readers into his "polyphonic" cure, he first needs to "diagnose the patient," speculate about causes of his problems, the effects possible cures could have. To do so, Zielonka neatly divides the book into five comprehensive parts: Crisis, Disintegration, Reintegration, Vision and Practicing Polyphony.

The first chapter opens with the crisis of the EU which, in Zielonka's view, has its roots in the intertwined crises of cohesion, imagination and tÂst. Cohesion in his understanding is, however, not limited to the narrow fiscal definition of solidary redistribution of resources, but rather to a wider context of inequality: lack of cohesion between the

core and the periphery countries, but also between the "norm-makers" and the "norm-takers." Crisis of imagination leads to short-term solutions, literally patches to stop a leak instead of lasting general repairs, and finally, a crisis of tÂst underlines the above, depicting a European *status quo* in which people not only mistÂst the EU as such (as the declining EP election turnout suggests), but they mistÂst also their own politicians, and even the concepts of liberal democracy and capitalism themselves, as implied by the rising popularity of extremists, xenophobes and populists on both extremes of the political spectÂm. As Zielonka notes, 'from this rather depressing vantage point, it looks like the EU may well be doomed' (p. 19).

In the second chapter, Zielonka complains that while we EU scholars spend a lot of time researching integration, hardly anyone gives serious thought to disintegration! He promptly makes up for this shortcoming by sketching three scenarios of disintegration: in the first scenario, Europe's leaders lose control completely, in the second one, they try to address problems, but make the situation even worse, and in the third scenario, the elites take a benign approach 'with not so benign implications' (p. 23). All the while, the EU is being pushed to the brink of collapse by the "engines" of disintegration: by the power inequality among members, the failure of the euro to generate integration, by the lack of democracy, by the elites' disconnection from reality leading to the lowest common denominator decisions which fail to address substantial needs of the people and firms, by the EU's incapability as a foreign policy power, and finally, by the European project's failure to capture the imagination and loyalty of the people. For a long time, the EU has relied on output legitimacy epitomised by economic growth and efficiency, but even this has been lost. The EU today is failing economically, politically and institutionally.

In the third chapter, Reintegration, Zielonka ponders rational as well as irrational reasons to keep the EU, as well as two potential models for reform. Rationally, the EU's contribution to peace and prosperity cannot be neglected, also the EU as a global trading representative lets small states punch above their weight on the global market; irrational reasons suggest to keep the EU as an "alibi" for the national governments to drive unpopular reforms, or to keep the EU just for the sheer fear of the unknown: 'What could the demise of the EU bring about?' (p. 55).

Remaining models for reintegration leading either to a United States of Europe would demand further transfers of sovereignty (unfeasible), or radical integration could lead to formation of a *Bundesrepublik Europa* with power centralised in Berlin rather than BÂssels, with Germany being the tame "accidental" hegemon, however, this imperial model would require a serious domination on part of the Germans, which they do not seem to want, and greater resources which the Germans are unwilling to spend.

The gist of Zielonka's book lies in his chapter named Vision. For Zielonka, it is unlikely that a "doomed EU" will return to the pre-integration state of Westphalian sovereignty of nation states – to the dog-eat-dog state of war of everybody against everybody – Europe is too networked for that, and besides, other institutions (NATO) contribute to peace in Europe. Zielonka's vision is rather one of 'overlapping authorities, divided sovereignty and multiple identities;' he sees a Europe of fuzzy borders, with a 'redistribution based on different types of solidarity between various transnational networks,' a Europe of flexible arrangements, incentives and bargaining rather than strict hierarchy of Âles and penalties that we know from nation-states or the EU today (pp. 81-82).

This "polyphonic" arrangement of overlapping networks will be defined first, by a plethora of new actors including the regions, big cities, professional associations, NGOs and transnational integrative networks; second, it envisages integration along functional rather than territorial lines; third, the 'stÂcture of integrative schemes should be polycentric and not hierarchical. It should resemble numerous horizontal rings rather than a single vertical pyramid.' And lastly, governance of these networks would have to be flexible, "plurilateral" and diversified, because 'different policy fields require different types of membership, different modes of engagement and different mixtures of incentives and sanctions' (pp. 95-96).

Zielonka's vision, however, suffers from a rationality problem: while Zielonka is able to list rational and irrational reasons why the EU is about to fail, his treatment of the neo-medieval polyphonic Europe lacks the same consideration of irrationality. If rising populism, nationalism and xenophobia are in Zielonka's line of argumentation able to bring the EU down, these very forces should also be able to prevent a neo-medieval arrangement from emergence, because it is precisely

a retreat to the pre-integration nation-state conditions that they celebrate: closing of the borders and territorial exclusivity, ideas about downloading the power back to the national community often into the hands of a pragmatic leader who will show those crooks currently in power what it takes to Ân a state effectively.

Other than this, Zielonka's vision is very refreshing. Rather than trying to resuscitate the EU like the other authors do, he offers a completely different "fix" than Hix (2008) for example. The book is written in a very clear, approachable and engaging style suitable even for people who aren't really experts in EU governance. Zielonka consistently maintains a "dialogue" with his readers, always inquiring, always asking rhetorical questions, and it reads literally in one breath.

To conclude: we do not know what the future holds, but if indeed the EU slips into irrelevance, Zielonka's neo-medieval vision still keeps some hope that the future of Europe will not be so tragic after all.