

Czechoslovak– Latin American Relations 1945–1989

The Broader Context

Josef Opatrný

After 1945, Czechoslovakia resumed its diplomatic and economic relations with Latin American countries; disrupted during the occupation of the Second World War. At that time, Czechoslovakia had the most diplomatic offices in the region of the entire Soviet bloc. Communication between Prague and Moscow showed that the Soviet desires' to use the Czechoslovak position in Latin America to its benefit. Accordingly, those Latin American regimes that sought opportunities to establish contact with the Soviet Union in the early 1950s, such as Bolivia or Guatemala, did so through Czechoslovakia. According to the documents of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs from the years 1954, 1956 and 1957, relations with Brazil, Argentina and Mexico were considered as the most important by the Czechoslovak authorities. Hence, they also continued to be among the priorities of Czechoslovak foreign policy in Latin America until 1989. Czechoslovak relations to Latin America were predominantly determined by political and economic factors. Politically, Czechoslovakia focused on country's relations with to us and on its political orientation; economically, the opportunities for Czechoslovak exports of machinery products, respectively of entire investment units and the import of raw materials and agricultural products were essential. Over time, Czechoslovak authorities increasingly emphasised the economic side of relations to Cuba, whose debt to Czechoslovakia was constantly growing. By the end of the 1980s, Czechoslovakia was either maintaining diplomatic relations with all countries in the region, or considering their recovery



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with the exception of small island states in the Caribbean, which had recently gained independence.

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Introduction

The history of Czechoslovak-Latin American relations began long before 1945. Despite the relatively limited interests of most Central European countries – such as today’s Czech Republic – when compared to the major European colonial and mercantilist empires, later eclipsed by the US, the first signs of contact between the two regions originates in the 16th century; a point reflected in Czechoslovak documentation which illustrates the First Republic’s attempts at establishing diplomatic and trade relations to Latin American countries following Czechoslovak independence in 1918. In fact, economic ties in the form of trade with Czech glass and linen firms date back at least until the 18th century. The popularity of Czech glass in Latin America is evident from a 1720 letter of a Jesuit missionary and the existence of representation of the glass company Hecke, Zinke, Rautenstrauch in New Spain and later on in independent Mexico at the end of the 18th and beginning of the 19th century.¹

In the 19th century, the first groups of emigrants from Czech lands headed to Latin America. These migrants established communities that, even before WWI, maintained contacts with local political and economic elites as well as to the ‘old homeland.’² Hence, in the early 1920s, Czech professionals, especially brewers and experts in the sugar industry, sought employment in local breweries and sugar refineries. The facilities were equipped with Czech engineering plants and supplied with the necessary ingredients for beer production – malt and hops – by exporters in Czech lands.

Following the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the creation of an independent Czechoslovakia, the political representation of the new state tried to improve its position on the international scene by establishing diplomatic relations with countries around the world, including Latin America. In order to expand its economic circles, new markets were sought for the products of Czechoslovak in-

dustry – those lost in former parts of the monarchy. Trade with Czechoslovak machines and guns led to the establishment of new customs and border protection.³ On the other side, Czechoslovak importers in Latin America found tropical agriculture products like coffee, cocoa, tobacco, copra, vanilla, cotton, rubber, precious wood, leather, tannin, plant wax and oil, tropical medicinal plants, and raw materials in the form of nitrate, manganese, copper, lead, oil, etc.

Initially, the trade was limited due to problems with intermediaries, who retained a stronger position in the region than Czechoslovak importers. Greater success was ultimately achieved via Czechoslovak diplomacy, which was active in establishing contacts from the early 1920s with key countries in the region such as: Brazil, Argentina, Mexico and Peru (among others) and founded its representational offices in major cities of the continent. There were several skilled Czechoslovak diplomats deployed to Latin America, among whom Jan Havlasa (born Jan Klecanda) and Vlastimil Kybal excelled. Havlasa served as the first Czechoslovak Ambassador to Brazil and later on in Chile during the war. Kybal succeeded Havlasa in Rio de Janeiro (he also represented Czechoslovakia in Argentina at that time) and from 1935 he worked as ambassador to Mexico, having the accreditation for other countries in this part of the continent as well.

Kybal's vision is particularly interesting since he identified the further strengthening of Czechoslovak-Latin American relations as a chief objective. In 1935, he published *Po československých stopách v Latinské Americe (Following Czechoslovak trails in Latin America)*, where he discussed why Czechoslovakia should develop stronger relations with the Latin American region. He wrote then that

At first glance, this issue might seem to be exotic, given the vast distance of that continent from our homeland, and maybe even blank or less important, regarding our rather sporadic, more or less random and totally incoherent existing contacts. I admit this objection as long as it concerns the past, though my interpretation is to show that even the world so distant and different, such as South and Central America, did not remain entirely politically foreign to the unfree Czech man between the 17th and the 20th century; yet I do not accept the objection about subordination or even futility of our relations with Spanish and Portuguese speaking America, that is with

continent with European civilization, which occupies 20 separate states of 19.4 million square kilometres with 111 million inhabitants.⁴

Kybal based his arguments on the knowledge of the importance of Latin America to the world economy in the 20th century, personal experience with the leading countries of the region – where he served as ambassador – and admiration of Latin culture underpinned by a marriage with a significant Mexican painter Ana Sáenz. Before joining the diplomatic service (1919), he worked at Charles University, where, besides examining the intellectual world of Czech society in the Middle Ages, he also studied the history of Roman countries in the 17th century and their relations to Central Europe. While working in the Roman archives, he met Sáenz, who as a young painter studied Italian art and, later on, became Kybal's interpreter of both the art of the Hispanic area and the art her own lifestyle. After the independence of Czechoslovakia, Kybal offered his services to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and served as a diplomat in Italy, Brazil, Spain, and finally in Mexico. Even as Ambassador, he persisted in his publishing activities, although he was no more writing for professionals but rather for a wider readership, providing basic information about the history of the countries, in which he served.

Well aware of the significance of personal contacts in the region for the development of bilateral relations, particularly in Mexico, Kybal attempted to attract influential personalities of the political and cultural elite, to support his efforts and inspired the creation of the Association of Friends of Czechoslovakia. Moreover, he strove to deepen the Czechoslovak-Mexican relations in the field of culture, lectured at Mexican universities, spoke on local radio stations, and contributed to the organisation of Czechoslovak fine art exhibitions. There is little doubt that Kybal's activities, together with the interest of (then) Mexican President Lázaro Cárdenas, who aimed to diversify international relations of his country, created appropriate conditions for Mexico's support of Eduard Beneš' government in exile based in London during the Second World War.

In the 1920s and 1930s, Czechoslovakia maintained diplomatic relations with most countries of Latin America⁵ and Czechoslovak exporters and importers traded either regularly or occasionally with

partners in all countries of the region, where they supplied traditional glass in its various forms (luxurious handcut glass, commercial glass, laboratory glass, sheet glass and glass jewellery), textiles, footwear, machines and machinery equipment, locomotives, railway material, paper, chemical products, electro-technical material, ceramics, including sanitary ceramics, weapons, ammunition, etc.⁶ In some cases, Czechoslovak goods acquired a positive reputation that, after the interruption of contacts during WWII, Latin American customers turned to their Czechoslovak suppliers requesting renewed cooperation after 1945.

One of the most commonly cited examples is the case of Czechoslovak tanks. Since they were apparently cherished by the Peruvian army, Peru sought to continue the contract after 1945. The contract was, however, discussed in a different political situation when Czechoslovakia and Latin America found themselves on the opposite sides of the ideological line that was increasingly dividing the world. Weapons, as well as strategic raw materials, such as ferrous metals and their concentrates, became subject to strict control of state institutions. In the case of Czechoslovak tanks, not only was a new contract not concluded, but Peru also banned the export of raw materials to Czechoslovakia and even suspended diplomatic relations with Prague.

Jacob Arbenz' government in Guatemala was relying on the interwar Czechoslovak-Guatemalan trade relations as well. Thanks to Kybal's activities in the second half of the 1930s, Kybal was accredited not only in Mexico, but also in Honduras and Guatemala, where trade with Czechoslovakia was successfully developing. The main trading activity was based in exports of Guatemalan coffee and the importation of Czechoslovak weaponry. Nevertheless, when Arbenz' government tried to revive this trading tradition in the 1950s, the supply of Czechoslovak weapons served as the pretext for overthrowing his regime in 1954.⁷

Relations during WWII

The period just prior to WWII, the months after Munich and the weeks after the declaration of the protectorate brought substantial transformation to Czechoslovak-Latin American relations. While Paraguay and Ecuador offered visas to Czechoslovak refugees within their immigration programmes; Czechoslovak embassies were to be ceded to Nazi

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Germany, which ended the contacts with Czechoslovak representation in exile in London that called for legal continuity with pre-Munich Czechoslovakia. Not all Latin American countries remained neutral when Nazi representatives were taking over Czechoslovak diplomatic missions however. Mexico, whose relations to Hitler's Germany and Mussolini's Italy were shaped by its diametrically different approach to the Spanish Civil War, signalled to Czechoslovak diplomats that it would support the Czechoslovak position and not intervene in favour of Germany in case Czechoslovakia refused to pass its diplomatic mission to Germany. However, when Kybal's mission formally ended, and a new head of the embassy was yet to be appointed, Kybal's deputy passed the embassy to Germans anyways – as other Czechoslovak diplomats serving in Latin American states did. Actually, there were certain reductions going on already immediately after the Munich Agreement since the forthcoming delegation in Havana never opened the office and recently established offices in Caracas and Lima were closed.

Over the subsequent months, Beneš' government in London sought to approach the great powers to stabilise its international status. For that reason, Beneš' government did not pay much attention to Latin America. In the meantime, each Latin American country formulated its own policy towards the occupying as well as occupied European countries. These policies varied throughout the region; while Mexico provided asylum to European anti-fascists and refugees, Argentina's policies were raising concerns and criticism among the Allies since they seemed to support the axis powers. Thus, in Mexico, Egon Ervín Kisch and Lenka Reinerová collaborated with the German antifascist resistance. In Argentina, former Czechoslovak diplomats and representatives of expatriate communities, which cooperated on joint projects

with other representatives of migrants of Nazi-occupied states, tried to arrest the influence of pro-Nazi immigrant associations. Czechoslovak exiles strove to work with representatives of other exiled groups to garnish support for the restoration of sovereignty.

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In 1941, discussions were held between representatives of the Beneš government and Mexican diplomats in London. On this occasion, the Czechoslovak side expressed interest in the reestablishment of the diplomatic relations that had been interrupted. Mexico approached this request with considerable understanding and, remarkably, at the Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of American States in Rio de Janeiro in January 1942, it was the Mexican and Uruguayan delegations, which were vigorously promoting the adoption of a resolution, which was recommending to the governments of the countries in the region to continue diplomatic relations with countries that were fighting for independence. Despite strong Argentinian opposition, the resolution was adopted and in the following weeks the Czechoslovak exile diplomacy made a great effort in order to fulfil the resolution in the individual countries of the region.⁸ At the end of March 1942, a joint Mexican–Czechoslovak declaration of resumption of diplomatic relations was already signed. Less than a month later a similar document was agreed between Uruguay and Czechoslovakia, which led to further developments in relations between Beneš' government and other Latin American countries. Hence, in the capital cities of Mexico, Brazil, Peru, Uruguay, Colombia (etc), Czechoslovak diplomats officially served. During the war, an embassy was opened in Havana where, prior to 1938, Czechoslovakia was represented only by its ambassador in Washington. Considering Argentinian policies during WWII, it is hardly surprising that diplomatic relations between the Beneš government and Buenos Aires were not restored before 18 April 1945.

Relations between 1945 and 1948

In 1945, Czechoslovakia operated eight embassies in Latin American. Prague was represented by following diplomats: the pre-war ambassador František Kadeřábek in Argentina (succeeded by Alexander Kúnoši in 1947), chargé d'affaires Vladimír Nosek in Brazil (succeeded by Jan Reisser in 1946), Vratislav Trčka in Colombia (succeeded by Victor Jansa in 1947, who was also accredited to Ecuador as well as Trčka), chargé

d'affaires Eduard Kühnel in Cuba (the office was closed in 1947 and the Czechoslovak ambassador in Washington Juraj Slávik got accredited to Havana), Václav Hyka in Mexico (succeeded by Václav Láska in 1946), Vladimír Smetana in Peru (succeeded by Václav Kresta in 1946 and by Eduard Kühnel as chargé d'affaires in 1947), František Kadeřábek in Uruguay (succeeded by Miroslav Rašín in 1947), and Vratislav Trčka in Venezuela (acting from Colombia, succeeded by Vladimír Khek in 1947 as Khek already had an office in Caracas). Since 1946, Czechoslovak statisticians have also registered the results of trade with Latin American countries, where both exports and imports were dominated by Brazil and followed by Argentina. These countries maintained their position within the Czechoslovak trade over the following years. Their strong position in trade relations determined their regional significance that was attributed to them not only by the Ministry of Foreign Trade, but also by the MFA.

Czechoslovak-Latin American Relations

Czechoslovak exports in thousands of Czech crowns⁹

	1946	1947	1948	1949	1950
<i>Argentina</i>	15022	84583	76850	61329	69797
<i>Brazil</i>	53862	38949	64951	73193	61877
<i>Mexico</i>	6829	13995	9461	6026	10390
<i>Venezuela</i>	2532	16195	10526	9554	12653
<i>LA Total</i>	85903	188974	207143	175177	198159

	1946	1947	1948	1949	1950
<i>Argentina</i>	20001	39470	111071	122136	62996
<i>Brazil</i>	15521	116336	80470	35437	55828
<i>Mexico</i>	1981	2528	3969	12854	1731
<i>Venezuela</i>	–	5594	4189	–	646
<i>LA Total</i>	40825	169973	214098	182874	134833

Czechoslovak-Latin American relations were then affected by changes to the international political arena, where Czechoslovakia and Latin America found themselves on different sides of an increasingly divided world. Yet Czechoslovakia's political elite, especially those representing Czechoslovak foreign policy, maintained the illusion of preserving an exclusive position of Czechoslovakia in Central and Eastern Europe

Czechoslovak imports in thousands of Czech crowns¹⁰

– as a bridge – which fell under the Soviet zone of influence following the Yalta and Potsdam agreements. Churchill's famous 1947 speech ended such an illusion.

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Negotiations over Czechoslovak participation in the Marshall plan, which was initially approved by the Czechoslovak government though rejected after talks in Moscow, acted as another factor that caused disillusionment.¹¹ Indeed, the February 1948 events acted as a mere confirmation of post-war developments and confirmed post-war ideological and power distributions. At the MFA, Jan Masaryk's death marked the definitive end of an unrealistic dream,¹² even though Masaryk was succeeded by (then) Secretary of State, Vlado Clementis, who soon fell victim to power struggles within the communist regime. Dejmek's conclusion refers to the decline in the importance of the ministry in the structure of the state power and he suggested that the 'position of the ministry in the state power structure changed very quickly and significantly; now, the centre of gravity of the state power structure moved to the peak of the Communist Party apparatus.'¹³ Czechoslovak foreign policy was no longer decided independently by the Central Committee of the Communist Party. Instead, it was formulated in Moscow.

The situation in February 1948 immediately impacted the personnel of Czechoslovak embassies throughout Latin America. Dejmek found that three quarters of the eight heads of embassies left their offices:

Many of them not only resigned (which in several cases led to another suspension of diplomatic relations with Prague), but also tried to keep the real estates of the delegations (apparently following the model of second resistance), such as ambassador Victor Jansa in Bogota or later on Miroslav Rašín in Montevideo.¹⁴

While events during the late 1940s and early 1950s – which were defined by the political and economic subjugation of Czechoslovakia and other Eastern European countries – confirmed Soviet domination in this part of the world, it is important to recall that some Western countries actively attempted to disrupt the Soviets' position in *its* sphere of influence. In other words, some Western states tried to limit Soviet power projects abroad. Despite the rhetoric of some countries' representatives, Latin America was, until the end of the 1940s, part of that political and economic bloc, which was created in the 19th century and fully constituted itself after WWI. Even the USSR respected such power

boundaries during the interwar period and this was unchanged by the rising Soviet ambitions to penetrate Latin America through COMINTERN. The position of the USSR in the region was visibly weaker than that of Czechoslovakia after WWII because Czechoslovakia benefited from its inter-war engagements. Hence, in the 1950s and 1960s, Moscow purposefully tried to take advantage of the Czechoslovak position in order to strengthen its regional influence.¹⁵ Due to the subordination of Czechoslovak diplomacy to the diplomacy of the USSR,¹⁶ Czechoslovakia willingly fulfilled that role in Latin America.

Still, the MFA viewed Czechoslovak activities in Latin America in the late 1940s and early 1950s with a certain amount of criticism. The national archives are revealing in this regard; they note that:

Due to a series of objective difficulties after 1948, the monitoring of issues in Latin America was superficial and non-systematic in this period. The analyses of the situation suffered from excessive generalization; the development in Latin America was paralleled to developments in Africa, Asia, without taking into account the particularities of historical, class and economic developments in Latin America [...] It was a period of certain disorientation regarding the countries of Latin America, which was perceived as a particularly hostile and dangerous area of pro-imperialist governments. This period ends just before the 20th Congress of the CPSU.¹⁷

Relations during the 1950s

These criticisms were not, however, applicable throughout the whole region. As mentioned, in the early 1950s, there were new voices calling for weakening of the dominant position of the US in the region. In several Latin American states, influential groups emerged. Their programmes called for reduction of social disparities through social reforms, inclusion of marginalised groups in society, land reforms, industrialisation, and counted on the increased role of the state in the economy and in social and cultural spheres. In the early 1950s, these groups only came to the power very rarely through coups organised by young nationalist officers, who would manage to overthrow the traditional ruling group or dictatorship. Relatively moderate reformist governments in Bolivia and Guatemala opened the way for radical

groups. Subsequently, Bolivian and Guatemalan revolution in the early 1950s along with Peron's regime in Argentina alarmed the US during the Korean War. The reaction of the US to reforms and nationalisation efforts led to the deterioration of relations with the US and the desire for closer economic and political contacts to the USSR and its Eastern European satellites.¹⁸ During the deteriorating economic situation in Argentina, Peron tried to use an anti-American rhetoric to strengthen his position. In Bolivia and Guatemala, nationalist regimes searched for a way to increase sales of their products and reduce dependence on customers from the US through economic cooperation with the countries in the Soviet bloc. During the process that took place after the unsuccessful attacks on the Moncada Barracks, Fidel Castro introduced in his enriching speech "History Will Absolve Me," a programme concerning the Youth Movement of the Century, which demanded the reduction of US influence in Cuba.

Czechoslovakia consulted Guatemalan attempts to establish economic contacts with Soviet diplomacy and, despite lengthy negotiations, met the request for arms supplies. Negotiations regarding the normalisation of diplomatic relations took place in Bolivia as well. Although the period of the early 1950s produced a clear Czech diplomatic loss in terms of the disruption of relations to Venezuela, the Czechoslovak activities in the region in 1954 led the MFA to draw up a document that dealt with the Czechoslovak-Latin American relations as a whole. The document *Otázky vztahů mezi čsr a zeměmi Latinské Ameriky s ohledem na hospodářské styky*¹⁹ (*Relations between Czechoslovakia and Latin American countries with respect to their economic contacts*) brought a relatively comprehensive overview of the continent's mineral wealth and agricultural commodities offered on the world marketplace. While the commentary explicitly mentioned the disinterest of most Latin American states in economic relations with the countries of the Soviet bloc, it also expressed some long-term optimism:

In other Latin American countries – with the exception of Chile, Bolivia, Mexico and Paraguay – the interest in building trade relations with us and other countries of the peace camp did not develop to the same extent as in Argentina, Guatemala, Brazil and Uruguay. However, it is gradually rising.²⁰

Between 1956 and 1957, two other documents discussing the relations of Czechoslovakia and Latin America were created in the department of the MFA that, besides the US, also dealt with Latin America.

The first document was prepared for the board of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in October 1956 under the title *Přehled současného vývoje vztahů mezi ČSR a zeměmi Latinské Ameriky a návrhy na další postup*²¹ (*The overview of the development of relations between Czechoslovakia and Latin American countries, suggestions for further action*). The document not only reviewed relations between Czechoslovakia and Latin American countries, but also suggested approaches to take in states deemed by the MFA as important for Czechoslovak policies. In this context, especially Brazil, Argentina and Mexico were examined. The author of the text and a former ambassador to Argentina, Richard Ježek, wrote in the introduction:

In 1956, there was a further deepening and expansion of relations between the Czechoslovak Republic and the countries of Latin America. The position of Czechoslovakia, which has the most extensive diplomatic and economic relations of the socialist camp with these countries, got further strengthened.²²

After listing the countries, where Czechoslovakia had embassies, the list continued with countries that held negotiation with the MFA about ‘the establishment, respectively re-establishment’ of Czechoslovak embassies or consulates:

Czechoslovakia has embassies in Mexico, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil, and in April 1956 an embassy in Colombia, which also set up an embassy in Prague, was established. In June, Bolivia accredited a head of Bolivian embassy to Czechoslovak government. Furthermore, there are negotiations about the establishment, respectively reestablishment of embassies of Uruguay, Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, and Chile in Czechoslovakia and of Czechoslovak consulates in Chile, Paraguay and Cuba.²³

In autumn 1957, the board of the Minister of Foreign Affairs discussed the document *Výhledový plán vztahů mezi ČSR a státy Latinské Ameriky* (*The prospective plan of the relations between Czechoslovakia and Latin American countries*). The document was submitted ‘due to the need for a long-term concept of relations between the Czechoslovak Republic and Latin American countries.’²⁴ It described Latin America as a region politically and economically dependent on the US and characterised its economies ‘as based on the existence of *latifundia* with feudal subordination of agricultural labourers to landowners, which was the case in most of the countries. Consider that

Another feature of this development is the one-sided orientation of each country's economy according to the interests of the monopolies. This is especially characteristic for example for Brazil and Colombia, whose prosperity depends on the production and sales opportunities of coffee, then for Chile, Bolivia and Peru, which rely on the extraction and sale of copper and tin, and for Venezuela, whose economy stands or falls with sales of oil.²⁵

The position of the us in the economic and political life stoked – according to the author of the document – rising resistance of national bourgeoisies, which became the temporary and volatile ally

of the working class in the broad democratic anti-imperialist and anti-feudal front.' An example of resistance and national democratic forces against North American imperialism are the government changes that took place in Uruguay (1955), Brazil, Peru, Honduras, Ecuador and Panama (1956), as well as the increasing instability of the governments in Cuba, Venezuela, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Colombia and Paraguay, the removal of Nicaraguan dictator Somoza and the increasing pressure put on the governments that aims to enforce the implementation of autonomous domestic and foreign policy.²⁶

In short chapters, the author of the document dealt with individual countries, respectively groups of states, and in the conclusion underlined the importance of the Czechoslovak-Latin American relations for the entire "socialist camp." In Latin America, Czechoslovakia had the strongest diplomatic representation and the most extensive business contacts from all the countries of the Soviet bloc. Given the growing 'international-political and economic importance of Latin America, it was therefore desirable to further strengthen, deepen and widen Czechoslovak diplomatic, economic and cultural relations with Latin American countries.²⁷

Particularly the importance of expanding business contacts was emphasised:

The coordination of our business in Latin America with other countries of the socialist camp will be essential to achieve this goal. It will be necessary to make a good use of consumption and export potential of those countries in the socialist camp, which for certain reasons are still unable to economically enter to the various countries of Latin America.²⁸

The author(s) of the plan recommended focusing on a few major countries, which were traditionally the strongest in terms of trade relations such as Brazil, Argentina and Mexico. Attention was also paid to relations in the cultural and scientific spheres and the document stressed that

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'In most Latin American countries, the Czechoslovak Republic has reputation of not only economically and industrially advanced country, but also a country with an old cultural tradition and high level of science and art. It will be needed to support the contact of our scientific, artistic and other cultural institutions with similar organisations in the various countries of Latin America, organise the exchange of materials between institutions and mutual visits of scientists and artists in those cases, where the maximum effect is guaranteed. It will be also needed to make a better use of access to Czechoslovak scholarships by students from Latin America and possibly expand their amount.²⁹

In Latin America, Czechoslovak diplomacy was to identify realistic goals and implement them in cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Trade and with other Soviet bloc countries. The last sentence, which signals the knowledge of the region's traditions, is particularly significant since '(i)ncreased care will be given to purposeful social contacts (not only at the embassies, but also in Prague), as well as to the careful selection and training of diplomatic personnel.³⁰

Documents realistically assessed Czechoslovak opportunities in Latin America, where the second half of the 1950s was a period when Czechoslovakia suffered the suspension of diplomatic relations from the Peru and Ecuador. Additionally, the differentiation process continued in Latin America with societies experiencing the growing strength of political reform groups and the radicalisation of views of young members of the middle class, who demanded, often with reference to Marxism, a revolutionary twist as the programmes of reform leaders were not enough for them. Communist parties were often forced to work underground, where their leaders living abroad sometimes managed to build organisational structures with the help of the USSR and its satellites. Later on, when legalisation took place, the parties took the advantage of these existing structures not only for fast entry into the country's political life, but also to strengthen its ties to Moscow,

Prague, and East Berlin. Thus, as soon as Pérez Jiménez's dictatorship in Venezuela was overthrown, Venezuelan communists sought out Prague as a potential weapons supplier. The end of the dictatorship in Caracas in early 1958 foreshadowed more significant changes such as the victory of Castro's guerrilla fighters in Cuba which influenced Czechoslovak policies in Latin America and the development of the region as a whole.

The Case of Cuba

Czechoslovakia's relations to Cuba went through specific developments after 1959, which produced a number of factors that defined their relations until 1989. Already during the First Republic, Cuba enjoyed exceptionally good relations with Czechoslovakia, especially due to the common interests of major sugar exporters and the fact that the world sugar cartel resided in Prague. Although diplomatic relations between Czechoslovakia and Cuba were not fulfilled after 1947, they were not suspended during Batista's dictatorship either. Czechoslovakia's press reported on the guerrilla war in Cuba. Due to the sharply anti-us attitude of Czechoslovakia, which was following the Soviet line, the article evaluated the events as a manifestation of Cuban patriots' negative attitudes towards the us approach to Cuba. Given the tense relations between Castro and the Cuban Communists at that time, the article maintained an aloof attitude towards the 26th of July Movement.

After the fall of Batista's dictatorship, a number of factors signalled a convergence between Cuba and the USSR. Czechoslovakia was the country supplying the weapons that were purchased within the framework of loans given by Moscow to Cuba.³¹ In 1960, the frequency of visits by Cuban delegations to Czechoslovakia and by Czechoslovak delegations to Cuba spiked and Cuba's image in Czechoslovakia's media changed to express appreciation for the Cuban revolution and for Castro. In April 1961, when Castro publicly announced that his regime was committed to building socialism, a new era of Czechoslovakia-Cuba relations began. Despite twists and turns, these relations remained exceptional in the region. Anti-us rhetoric and the successful defence of Cuba against attempts by the us to overthrow Castro's regime, contributed to rising popularity of Cuba and of Castro himself in a large part of Latin America. In Moscow and Eastern Europe, this raised hopes for further decline of the us influence in the region.

Such hopes had already been reflected in the concept of Czechoslovakia's 1959 approach towards Latin America. Accordingly, Cuba was recognised as a country that would be treated in a special way. Later, Czechoslovakia's government understood this concept as the beginning of a new approach of Czechoslovakia towards Latin America in general. The significance of this concept was confirmed when the MFA's 1962 documents evaluated the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s as follows:

In this period, our foreign policy action was based on the first conception of Czechoslovak relations with Latin America, which was approved on June 23, 1959. This concept, based on the analysis of the situation in 1959, formed the basis of our foreign policy in Latin America and established its basic tasks.³²

Policy-makers divided the region into two parts; Latin America without Cuba and Cuba.

In the introduction to the first section, the authors assumed that 'in the context of the national liberation struggle of colonial and dependent peoples, a struggle led by Latin American countries against us imperialism enters a new historical stage.'³³ The new situation offered Czechoslovakia, and other Eastern bloc countries, new opportunities and, after a recap of the actual state of relations in the political and economic sphere, ten tasks. These were to:

1. implement a proactive policy in the region and take advantage of cooperation with the USSR and other 'countries of the socialist camp' [...] to improve the status of the entire socialist camp in Latin America,
2. create conditions for the expansion of trade and economic relations, especially in 'significant states of the region,' in cooperation with the USSR and other 'countries of the socialist camp,'
3. cooperate with the Ministry of Foreign Trade in the field of commercial policy and remove defects,
4. improve conditions for foreign trade and diplomatic activities through the establishment of consulates in the industrial centres (Monterrey and Sao Paulo),
5. initiate invitations to official visits of government officials, parliamentary delegations (Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, Bolivia),
6. pursue the promotion of existing embassies and the expansion of their networks,
7. normalise relations at the embassy level in those countries where relations were either unfulfilled or interrupted,

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8. foster the expansion of cultural cooperation through cultural agreements, promotion of Czechoslovakia and cultural events 'of all kinds,'
10. make use of companies and friendship institutions that have ties with Czechoslovakia to promote the Republic,
11. take action in Brazil, which significantly influences other Latin American countries, in order to weaken the us anti-Soviet activity in Argentina and Mexico.

Accordingly, high Czechoslovak honours were to be granted to three Brazilian politicians, first and foremost to President Kubitschek, in whose case it was desirable to find an opportunity for his visit to Czechoslovakia.

The task of fostering stronger contacts within the region gained momentum in the late 1960s due to the spread of information about the onset of anti-American nationalist military regimes in Peru and Bolivia, and the victory of Salvador Allende in Chile's presidential elections. News about the successes of the leftist guerrillas FARC in Colombia, Sandinistas in Nicaragua and civil wars in other Central American countries also contributed. Subsequently, the media in the Soviet Union and other countries of Central and Eastern Europe welcomed any information about the victorious return of Peronism in Argentina and about urban guerrilla activities in Uruguay.

The Caribbean crisis contributed to the deterioration of relations between Havana and Moscow, which naturally affected the relations between Havana and Prague.

Relations with Cuba, however, went through a series of complex twists and turns after 1962. The Caribbean crisis contributed to the deterioration of relations between Havana and Moscow, which naturally affected the relations between Havana and Prague. The USSR however, did not initiate a single dispute between the Soviet Union, its satellites and Cuba; it was Havana that accused Moscow of retaining too

pragmatic of an attitude towards a potential armed struggle against the us. Cuba strongly supported the guerrilla movement in a number of Latin American countries, which had an impact on relations between Czechoslovakia and Cuba. From late 1962 to 1969, Cuba's secret service used Prague logistic capabilities to transport, to various Latin American countries, many thousands of Latin Americans who went through a physical or political training in Cuba. The Czechoslovak intelligence service also provided assistance to Operation Manuel,³⁴ although Czechoslovak authorities became increasingly hesitant in terms of their participation and contribution to the realisation of the Operation. They criticised the level of the action's preparation and its participants. Doubts concerning Czechoslovakia's participation were also fuelled as the position of Czechoslovakia in Latin America was threatened. Indeed, one document noted that

Operation Manuel is a complex and politically sensitive issue mainly because its implementation sometimes comes into conflict with the tendencies of communist parties in Latin America and puts Czechoslovakia into a position of a transfer station for sent revolutionaries. From time to time, articles discussing this topic appear in the foreign press. Our participation is aware of this danger and all efforts of the Czechoslovak intelligence service in Prague are always directed in such manner that the best interests of Czechoslovakia are protected.³⁵

In the context of leaked details about a transfer of one Venezuelan participant, who contacted Venezuelan security authorities, considerations about the possible consequences of other leaked events appeared in 1967. In the first report of the National Security Corps it was noted that

We can expect further arrests of participants, who either passed through in the past or at present, and it is likely that, as a result of this repression, the transit through Czechoslovakia and the assistance given at check-in will be revealed in many cases. This is related to the possibility of new accusations of Czechoslovakia of allowing it happen or of its direct support for such action.³⁶

During the 1960s, some political elites in Czechoslovakia began to realise that the expectations of the rapid spread and victory of leftist movements in Latin America failed to materialise and most likely would not do so in the near future:

Developments in Latin American countries show that reactions gained on importance while the revolutionary wave caused by the Cuban revolution started vanishing. Domestic interests are gradually merging with the U.S. interests. The volume of inter-American agreements between repressive organs (such as police and army) and their direct linkage with the equivalent organisations in the USA is merely an organisational expression of this unity of interests. These measures, together with reinforced anti-communist propaganda, show how U.S. imperialism as well as Latin American reactions learned a lesson from the Cuban revolution. It is an expression of their efforts to prevent emergence of a 'second Cuba' in Latin America. To maintain the current state, various forms, ranging from direct repression carried out by the military dictatorship to reformism, are being used.³⁷

Rationality in the assessment of the situation in Latin America was awoken by developments in several countries, where reformist regimes supported politically and economically by the US were gaining power, or by Washington's policies that aimed to decrease tensions with some governments in the region. The Dominican Republic and Panama serve as examples of these attempts. Furthermore, the economic costs taught a valuable lesson; the USSR and other countries in the bloc, principally Czechoslovakia, had to bear the costs stemming from the maintenance of Castro's regime in Cuba. In the period of economic problems that forced the Czechoslovak economists to seek unorthodox ways to restore stability, the funds spent on 'solidarity with the Cuban people' were a memento when considering the eventual socialist orientation of other countries in Latin America, particularly when taking into account the developments in Chile after 1970 and Nicaragua after 1980.

Economic efficiency of relations to Latin America were prioritised by the MFA and the Ministry of International Trade despite the 1969 developments, which put an end to the programme of economic reform in Czechoslovakia and to the attempts aiming for more independent foreign policy that emerged during the Prague Spring. Yet Latin America remained attractive for Czechoslovakia's diplomacy, which continued to emphasise the economic dimensions of relations since the region was an important market for Czechoslovak engineering products

and for investment units while Latin American countries supplied raw material for the Czechoslovak industry.³⁸ Even though official propaganda and political proclamations emphasised the importance of leftist movements in Latin America in the 1970s and Prague interrupted diplomatic relations with Santiago after some hesitation following the overthrow of Allende's government, the economic policy was much

Czechoslovak exports in millions of USD (excluding Cuba) in the second half of the 1970s³⁹

	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979
<i>Brazil</i>	31.1	24.7	69.2	42.4	22.5
<i>Argentina</i>	9.1	7.4	25.2	36.0	26.3
<i>Venezuela</i>	15.9	13.8	21.0	22.8	22.6
<i>Mexico</i>	9.5	9.8	7.3	11.5	18.9
<i>Ecuador</i>	2.3	2.2	4.8	7.6	9.1
<i>LA Total</i>	82.9	73.4	147.9	138.1	129.2

	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979
<i>Brazil</i>	59.6	102.8	127.0	131.4	144.6
<i>Argentina</i>	14.9	18.7	24.3	37.9	49.5
<i>Venezuela</i>	1.3	4.5	5.7	4.8	4.0
<i>Mexico</i>	2.2	8.5	7.8	7.2	6.9
<i>Peru</i>	19.7	23.1	32.7	22.0	26.5
<i>LA Total</i>	123.1	189.5	242.8	251.9	283.3

more pragmatic. Despite the reduction in trade volume between Chile and Czechoslovakia after 1973, economic relations sputtered on.

Czechoslovak imports in millions of USD (excluding Cuba) in the second half of the 1970s⁴⁰

Relations during the 1970s and 1980s

Diplomats serving in some of the countries where nationalist military regimes came to power in the late 1960s or early 1970s noted that the countries' economies, which are subject to strict state controls, did not reach the expected boom. This led to political changes; privatisation of some recently nationalised enterprises and to the decreasing interest in cooperation with countries of the Eastern bloc. Brazil, followed by Argentina, remained among the most important trade partners of Czechoslovakia, as Czechoslovak diplomacy and propaganda turned a

blind eye to the crimes of the military regime in Argentina that left thousands of dead and missing people. Yet Eastern Europe, including Czechoslovakia, was concerned about Pinochet's dictatorship in Chile, which was perceived as the product of US influence. Besides that, Czechoslovakia maintained proper trade, political and cultural relations with Mexico, had close relations to Cuba and, after the fall of Somoza's regime, also with Nicaragua.

The last extensive material devoted by the communist government of Czechoslovakia to Latin America, and adopted by the MFA in spring 1988, Latin America was to remain a subject of key interest. The document, entitled *Vývoj v Latinské Americe a nové zaměření čs. zahraniční politiky vůči zemím této oblasti*⁴¹ (Development in Latin America and the new focus of the Czechoslovak foreign policy towards the countries in the region) began with reference to the policy of the Soviet bloc countries:

In recent years, the countries forming the socialist community pay increasing attention to the elaboration of relations with Latin American countries. This attention is justified by the growing importance of Latin American countries in the international political and economic relations. In this context, it is necessary to rethink the position and role of Latin American countries in the contemporary world and especially in the Czechoslovak foreign policy.⁴²

The document suggested that Czechoslovakia had traditional economic and political links to the region; diplomatic relations were missing:

only with Chile (suspended in September 25, 1973), Belize and some small island countries in the Caribbean – Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Dominica, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, which gained independence at the end of the 1970th and early 1980s. Relations with Paraguay, Guatemala, El Salvador, Haiti, Grenada and the Dominican Republic are currently in a state of peace.⁴³

In the section on the economic relations, the authors regarded the traditional exchange of goods as the basis of contacts. Considering the exchange of goods, Czechoslovakia, however, registered a negative balance of about \$60 million (USD) in 1987 alone. Furthermore, when compared to 1986 and 1987, Czechoslovakia saw a significant drop in sales, from \$521.3 million (USD) to \$494.3 million (USD).

Conclusion

Cuba and Nicaragua continued to be the countries favoured by Czechoslovakia throughout the 1980s. While Cuba was the first and the only truly socialist country on the continent – maintaining rich contacts in the political, economic, cultural, educational, scientific, sport and health spheres – Nicaragua was a state with interests in cooperation in all areas and, as Czechoslovak documents explain, mainly in ‘the international assistance, which was essential in order to overcome the consequences of the enduring armed aggression of the Somoza counterrevolution, which was supported and equipped by the USA.’

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The countries that kept-up their traditional relations to Czechoslovakia such as Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, were busy forming another group of states. According to the document from the late 1980s, Czechoslovakia was also supposed to maintain ‘stable, fair and friendly relations’ with Mexico; still, ‘significant imperfections in cooperation, especially in economic and commercial area’ existed. Other countries that Czechoslovakia paid attention to were Peru, Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia. Additionally, the document referred to Central America due to promising prospects resulting from the agreements signed in San José and to the Caribbean, where relations deteriorated as a consequence of the 1983 Grenada Crisis. The collapse of the dictatorial regime in Haiti was evaluated favourably by the document, although ‘the installed pro-American puppet regime retained its anti-popular and anti-democratic character.’⁴⁴ The authors anticipated the normalisation of relations with the Dominican Republic and, after Pinochet’s departure as president, also with Chile. A similar development was expected ‘after the fall of the regime of General Stroessner in Paraguay.’⁴⁵ In the economic area, as a response to the international wave of privatisation, emphasis was put on the expansion of cooperation with private companies and on the search for different forms of linkages that would contribute to raise Czechoslovakia’s imports to enhance exports.

The events of the following months then corresponded to the realistic evaluation of further developments in Chile and Paraguay presented by the document. Nicaragua, however, went through an anomalous development; the adoption of a new electoral law in 1988 heralded surprising defeat of the Sandinistas in 1990; in other words, at a time when events in the USSR and Eastern Europe were rapidly transform-

ing the region, the international political scene and, consequently, relations to Latin America. In the case of Czechoslovakia and later on in the case of the Czech Republic, the transformation, which begun in 1989, meant a gradual loss of interest in Latin America, both in political and in the economic sphere. Hence, the number of Czechoslovak embassies in the region declined, by 2011, to levels below 1945.

While this work drew on historical documentation to illustrate nearly a century of international engagements between Czechoslovakia and Latin American states, it is clear that the future is not going to be a repeat of history. Instead, with nearly 25 years separating the present times from the Cold War, there have been unleashed a series of energies that are acting to re-establish the long tradition of Czech relations to the vast continental and archipelago region of Latin America. This work did not seek to provide a historical narrative only however. Instead it worked at defining the manner in which such disparate regions and the countries in them have managed to forge relations despite immense distances at a time when globalisation had yet to enter the parlance of international relations. Now that such relations have been facilitated by new technologies and approaches, it seems natural that a new wave of diplomatic vigour will ensure.

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Notes

- 1 Bohumil Bađura (1964), 'Apuntes sobre los orígenes del comercio vidriero entre Bohemia y México (1787-1839),' in: *Historica IX*, pp. 69-134 and Klaus Weber (2004), *Deutsche Kaufleute im Atlantikhandel 1680-1830, Unternehmen und Familien in Hamburg, Cádiz und Bordeaux*, München, pp. 139-141.
- 2 See: Josef Poliřenský (1976), 'La emigración checoslovaca a América Latina 1640-1945: Problemas y fuentes,' in *Jahrbuch für Geschichte von Staat, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Lateinamerikas* 13, pp. 216-238; Josef Opatrňy (1994), 'Algunos problemas del estudio de la emigración checa a América

- Latina,' in *Estudios migratorios latinoamericanos* 27, pp. 381-399 and Ivo Barteček (1997), 'Emigración desde países checos y Checoslovaquia hacia la América Latina (Balance de los estudios latinoamericanos checos),' in *Ibero-Americana Pragensia* xxxi, pp. 227-241. The texts on this subject were also published in the supplements of the yearbook *Ibero-Americana Pragensia* under the titles *Emigración centroeuropa a América Latina*, I, *Iberoamericana Pragensia*, Supplementum 10, (Josef Opatrný ed), Praga 2000, *Emigración centroeuropa a América Latina*, II, *Iberoamericana Pragensia*, Supplementum 12, (Josef Opatrný ed), Praga 2002, *Emigración centroeuropa a América Latina*, III, *Iberoamericana Pragensia*, Supplementum 14, (Josef Opatrný ed), Praga 2004, and *Emigración centroeuropa a América Latina*, IV, *Iberoamericana Pragensia*, Supplementum 17, (Josef Opatrný ed), Praga 2006.
- 3 On the topic of exports of agricultural machines see: Jiří Novotný and Jiří Šouša (1989), 'Máquinas Agrícolas Checas para América del Sur,' in *Ibero-Americana Pragensia*, xxiii, pp. 79-98. On the topic of exports of Czechoslovak weapons see Jaroslav Bouček (1988), 'Negocios con Armamento Realizados por la Empresa Škoda en América Latina,' in *Ibero-Americana Pragensia*, xxii, pp. 85-190 and Novotný and Šouša (2004), 'La contribución checoslovaca para la modernización del Ejército peruano (La exportación a Perú de tanques de la fábrica Československá-Kolben-Daněk de Praga, a finales de los años treinta del siglo xx),' in *IAP*, xxxviii, pp. 151-174.
 - 4 Vlastimil Kybal (1935), *Po československých stopách v Latinské Americe*, in 'Sbírka přednášek České akademie věd a umění,' No. 5, Praha, p. 7.
 - 5 On the issues of Czechoslovak Latin-American diplomatic relations see: *Příručka o navázání diplomatických styků a diplomatické zastoupení Československa v cizině a cizích zemí v Československu 1918-1985*, FMZV (Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs) Archival documentation division, 1987.
 - 6 Czechoslovak trade with Latin America in the past twenty years was mainly examined by the authors Jiří Novotný and Jiří Šouša (1986, 1987), 'Los Bancos Checos y América Latina, 1919-1938,' Primera parte in: *Ibero-Americana Pragensia*, xx, 1986, pp. 107-140, Segunda parte in: *IAP*, xxi, 1987, 35-54.
 - 7 Lukáš Perutka, *Checoslovaquia, Guatemala y México en el período de la Revolución Guatemalteca*, in print.
 - 8 For the activities of the Czechoslovak diplomacy in Rio de Janeiro see Vladimír Nálečka (1973), *Československo a Latinská Amerika v letech druhé světové války*, Praha, Universita Karlova.
 - 9 Archive of the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs (AMFA), 'Meeting of the Collegium 1953-1989, Book 18, 'Zpráva o vztazích Československé republiky s Latinskou Amerikou,' 10 November 1955, pp. 17-18.
 - 10 *Ibid.*
 - 11 On the Marshall plan see: Karel Krátký (2010), *Marshallův plán. Příspěvek ke vzniku studené války*, Plzeň, Praha.
 - 12 Jindřich Dejmek refers to Masaryk's 'never fully explained death' as to 'a tragic and symbolic epilogue to the existence of the Czechoslovak democratic diplomacy.' See: Jindřich Dejmek (2012), *Diplomacie Československa I. Nástin dějin Ministerstva zahraničních věcí a diplomacie (1918-1992)*, Praha:

- Akademia, p. 140.
- 13 Dejmek (2012), p. 145.
- 14 Ibid, p. 136.
- 15 For an example of Guatemala during Arbenz's administration or Cuba in the late 1950s and early 1960s see Hana Bortlová (2011), *Československo a Kuba v letech 1959-1962*, Praha: Universita Karlova v Praze and Lukáš.
- 16 On the topic of Czechoslovak diplomacy after 1945, respectively after 1948, cf. particularly Dejmek (2012), pp. 119-229.
- 17 National Archive (NA), ÚV KSČ f. 1261/0/11 KSČ-ÚV-Antonín Novotný, Box 5, 'Zhodnocení dosavadní čs. zahraniční politiky v Latinské Americe,' in *Přílohy ke koncepci československé zahraniční politiky vůči zemím Latinské Ameriky*, Příloha III, November 27, 1962, p. 3.
- 18 A vast amount of literature was dedicated to Latin America in terms of US policy approaches. See, for example, Walter Lafeber (1994), *The American Age: United States' Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad since 1750*, W. W. Norton: New York and Thomas F. O'Brien (2007): *Making the Americas: The United States and Latin America from the Age of Revolutions to the Era of Globalisation*, University of New Mexico Press.
- 19 AMFA, Meetings of Collegium, 1953-1989, Book 6, 'Otázky vztahů mezi ČSR a zeměmi Latinské Ameriky s ohledem na hospodářské styky,' 19 June 1954.
- 20 Ibid, p. 13.
- 21 AMFA, Meetings of Collegium, 1953-1989, Book 22, 'Přehled současného vývoje vztahů mezi ČSR a zeměmi Latinské Ameriky a návrhy na další post-up,' 11 October 1956.
- 22 Ibid, p. 1.
- 23 Ibid, p. 1.
- 24 AMFA, Meetings of Collegium, 1953-1989, Book 29, 'Výhledový plán vztahů mezi ČSR a státy Latinské Ameriky,' Praha, 23 September 1957.
- 25 Ibid, p. 2.
- 26 Ibid, p. 3.
- 27 Ibid, p. 60.
- 28 Ibid, p. 60.
- 29 Ibid, p. 61.
- 30 Ibid, p. 63.
- 31 On the topic of Czechoslovak-Cuban relations see Hana Bortlová.
- 32 NA, A ÚV KSČ f. 1261/0/11 KSČ-ÚV-Antonín Novotný, box 5, cover 45, 'Zhodnocení dosavadní čs. zahraniční politiky v Latinské Americe,' *Přílohy ke koncepci československé zahraniční politiky vůči zemím Latinské Ameriky*, Příloha III, p. 5.
- 33 NA, A ÚV KSČ f. 1261/0/11 KSČ-ÚV-Antonín Novotný, box 5, 'Koncepce vztahů mezi ČSR a LA,' 1.
- 34 Prokop Tomek, 'Akce Manuel,' in: *Securitas Imperii 9. Sborník k problematice zahraničních vztahů čs. Komunistického režimu*, Praha, ÚDV 2002, pp. 326-333.
- 35 Archive of Security Service, Book 80723, Information on Operation Manuel, Praha 14 July 1969.
- 36 Archive of Security Service, Book 80723, Report 'Spolupráce československé

- a kubánské rozvědky,' 11 January 1967.
- 37 NA, ÚV KSČ, f. 1261/0/11 KSČ-ÚV-Antonín Novotný, Book 5, 'Nové jevy v národně osvobozeném hnutí v Latinské Americe,' 4 November 1966, p. 16.
- 38 In the 1970s, a series devoted to the economic situation of individual countries and groups of countries in Latin America, with a brief outline of their relations with Czechoslovakia, began publication thanks to the Institute of Foreign Trade and the publishing house Horizon (later ČTK-Pressfoto). See: Ján Garčár (et al) (1981), *Venezuela*, Institut zahraničného obchodu/ Horizont, Obchodně ekonomické sborníky, Řada LA, Praha, and Vlastislav Beneš (et al) (1981), *Laplatská skupina*, Institut zahraničního obchodu/ ČTK-Pressfoto, Obchodně ekonomické sborníky, Řada LA, Praha.
- 39 AMFA, f. DTO, Argentina, Book 42, Commercial Department in Buenos Aires, Report from the Second Half of 1981, March 1982.
- 40 *Ibid.*
- 41 AMFA, f. Meetings of Collegium 1953-1989, KM-12/88, 'Vývoj v Latinské Americe a nové zaměření čs. zahraniční politiky vůči zemím této oblasti,' Praha 2 May 1988.
- 42 *Ibid.*, p. 1.
- 43 *Ibid.*, p. 6.
- 44 *Ibid.*, p. 6.
- 45 *Ibid.*, p. 14.

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