DEFINING AN INDIVIDUAL SECURITY COMMUNITY: THE EU AND ASEAN IN CONTRAST

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ABSTRACT: *This work seeks to reveal differences in the understanding of the concept of security between the EU and the Association of South East Asian States (ASEAN) and to adequately account for such differences. This work considers that ASEAN qualifies as a nascent security community confirming that the comparison to the EU is legitimate. The EU is presented as a community of states which puts heavy significance on human security, whereas security referent object in case of ASEAN is the state. As a result of the need to conceptually comprehend those differences, this work introduces a new category of security communities: the individual security community and fits it to the current typology of security communities.*

INTRODUCTION

Both the European Union (EU) and the Association of South East Asian states (ASEAN)[1] are projects which have made war among their members very unlikely or unthinkable, and have contributed to the security of the region. The aim of the present paper is to find any differences in the understanding of the concept of security between the two and explain the reasons for those differences. By doing so, this paper will test the following hypothesis: Unlike ASEAN, the EU represents a security community where not only war among members is unthinkable, but also conditions for the maximalisation of individual security are present. In addition to that, this paper will argue that the current typology of security communities is not sufficient to capture the differences among the analysed subjects. As a result of the need to conceptually comprehend those differences, this paper introduces a new category of security communities: the *individual security community.* This definition is very important for a

better conceptualisation of security communities in general and in understanding the process of European integration from a security perspective. The case of the EU will therefore serve as an example in which the meaning of the term *individual security community* will be explained.

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If the hypothesis is correct, to what factors can be accounted the fact that the EU has developed a closer security community (SC)? Which variable explains the fact that the EU is concerned with individual security? Is it because of values, the level of state development, systematic reasons or a different variable? Can ASEAN potentially replicate the EU?

The structure of the present paper is as follows. In the first chapter, the term security community (SC) and various understandings of the concept are defined. This will allow us to proceed with further analysis, in which this paper will seek to answer the question whether ASEAN qualifies as any kind of SC, using the methodology developed in the first chapter.[2] A positive answer to the above mentioned question will allow us to proceed with further comparison between ASEAN and the EU in understanding the concept of security.

The case selection was motivated by two reasons. Firstly, both cases are useful examples for the argumentation of the paper. And secondly, both the EU and ASEAN are in the process of formation of new security structures in their respective regions.

The Concept of a Security Community

The concept of a security community received its first full theoretical attention from Karl Deutsch and associates in 1957.[3] According to them, an SC is defined as a group of people which has become "integrated" to the point that members of the community have come to agreement 'that common social problems must, and can be resolved by the process of peaceful change' without using physical force.[4] According to Deutsch, there are two types of security communities distinguished by the way they are created: amalgamated, which means 'the former merger of two or more previously independent units into a single larger unit, with some type of common government', and pluralistic, which 'retains the legal independence of separate governments'.[5] According to Deutsch, the United States

is an example of an amalgamated SC. Members of pluralistic SC possess a compatibility of core values derived from common institutions, mutual identity and loyalty and are integrated to the point that "a dependable expectation of peaceful change" is present.[6]

Based on Deutsch's work, Raimo Väyrynen[7] and Andrej Tusicisny[8] further widened the typology of security communities and based the difference not on how the security communities were created, but on what qualitative difference they convey. Väyrynen and Tusicisny differentiated between interstate security communities and comprehensive security communities. The first term describes a community of states where war between states is unlikely and the latter describes the situation where both interstate conflicts as well as civil war are unlikely. Both of them would qualify as either a *pluralistic* or *amalgamated* SC. For them, therefore, Western Europe, let alone the EU, is a classic example of a comprehensive SC, while ASEAN would be interstate.

The fact that the above mentioned scholars reduced their "impossibility of war" to a societal level is very important and provides a good starting point for further analysis. Using the same logic, this paper argues that such methodology for distinguishing between security communities fails to be receptive to some features security communities might have. For this reason, this paper suggests that in order to fully understand the phenomenon, we have to focus our analysis not only on the state and group level but on the individual level as well. The need for such a step will become apparent further into the paper.

The field and the concept of human security had its renaissance in the UN Development Programme´s (UNDP) 1994 Human Development Report[9] which operated with the definition of human security as "the vital core of all human life in ways that enhance human freedoms and fulfillment".[10] From that time, many definitions of human security have evolved. For the purposes of this paper, human security is defined as "freedom from fear" and "freedom from want".[11] This holistic definition can hardly provide sufficient grounds for the formulation of policy, but for the needs of this paper, it is clear and sufficient.

Is ASEAN a Security Community?

The fact that the members of ASEAN have managed to settle their disputes without the use of violence for more than four decades since the 1963–1966 *Konfrontasi* between Indonesia and Malaysia,[12] and the fact that member states enjoy high levels of interaction has encouraged various scholars to proclaim it an SC. ASEAN states also managed to establish a nuclear free zone by the year 2001 when the Philippines ratified the Bangkok Treaty signed in 1995.[13] In November 2003, ten national leaders of ASEAN countries also announced their plan to establish an ASEAN SC by 2020.[14]

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However, there are many arguments which support the view that ASEAN can not be considered as an SC. Therefore, for further analysis, it is crucial to ascertain whether ASEAN is an SC. If that were not the case, further comparison with the EU would lose ground.

ASEAN member states, especially Malaysia, continue to have territorial disputes with other members. Military expenditures are high as a result of the large-scale acquisition of offensive weapons.[15] ASEAN has also been incompetent in solving all kinds of problems or in overcoming them all. There is a certain observable phenomenon in that the level of coherence within ASEAN culminates in a crisis situation. That means that although in times of economic prosperity and political stability, ASEAN did not show weakness, in e.g. the financial crisis of 1997, Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia were heavily affected and the association was unable, at the regional level, to deal effectively and quickly with the crisis, and to coordinate strategies to combat it. Policies of states were instead dominated by national interests and in accordance with national strategies.[16] Such behaviour reveals a low level of economic and political coherence within the community as well as a low level of solidarity which is a fundamental condition for an SC to exist. This can be contrasted sharply with the current Eurozone crisis and the general high level of solidarity among members.

The low level of solidarity and political coherence within ASEAN also became apparent in finding a common stance toward the bloodshed in East Timor in order to prevent conflict, or at least to mediate between the conflicting parties. Thailand and Malaysia were fighting so long over the question of who should take the lead of an ASEAN peacekeeping mission until Australia took over the management of an international peacekeeping force.[17]

In addition, individual states increasingly draw their diplomatic efforts off the regional association on bilateral relations. During the economic crisis in Laos in 1999, and the steep fall of the Lao currency, the country took its request for help not to ASEAN, but to the People's Republic of China – which granted generous interest-free loans.[18]

However, other cases serve as an example of solidarity among members. For example, in 1979, ASEAN was able to agree on a quota of Vietnamese refugees in order to alleviate the situation of the worst affected countries: Thailand and Malaysia. ASEAN also succeeded, by joint diplomatic efforts, in preventing the international recognition of the Vietnam-loyal government in Cambodia, also in 1979.[19] These successes in regional coordination and cooperation had become possible only because the individual nation-states were willing to subordinate their interests to the regional consensus. In that regard, the motto of ASEAN: "One Vision, One Identity, One Community" or

"10 countries, 1 identity" might be true in reality or might at least represent the common goal of the association. Still consultations and solidarity are not necessarily a feature of common identity. They can be also a result of the commitment of ASEAN leaders not to interfere in the internal affairs of other states which will be a significant fact in further analysis.

Some authors also raise the criterion of democracy as an important determinant in whether a region can be considered as a security community and claim that the level of trust will be low in the case of authoritarian regimes. However, this paper represents the standpoint that ASEAN is an example of states where the level of trust is relatively high precisely because the majority of states are not democratic and do not interfere in the internal affairs of other states in areas such as human rights and good governance. This paper therefore suggests that it is not fundamentally important what the nature of regimes is in creating a security community; it is rather coherence which plays the vital role.

Summing up: what has been written about ASEAN without doubt shows a certain level of solidarity among its members, but it is apparently still in the formation process and is nowhere close to the EU. Therefore, ASEAN may be assessed as a region in transformation from a security regime to an SC. Further, in academic liter-

ature we can witness a growing consensus that ASEAN is an SC,[20] or at least, that firm foundations are being laid down for ASEAN to become one.[21]

In Deutsch's terminology, ASEAN may therefore be considered at least as a nascent pluralistic SC. Its members have a common identity which stresses non-confrontation as a way of solving conflicts. Moreover, there is a growing sense of ASEAN self-awareness which represents a potential source of collective "identity"[22] which is also present in civil society in member states and which calls for a supranational form of cooperation.

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Based on the discussion above, it may be concluded that ASEAN qualifies as a nascent SC, which makes interstate conflict very, very unlikely, though not unimaginable. However, internal violence continues to be present in many of its members with the most striking examples being Burma, the Philippines, and Thailand, where the states themselves are a source of insecurity to some part of the society and to individuals, and where major social unrest occurs. The striking reality is that regardless of the fact that ASEAN is formally an SC, it is inadequate to deliver security to its citizens. Therefore, the answer to the principal question of this part of the paper has just a few implications for the lives of the people of ASEAN member states. It is important merely from an academic point of view. This point will be important for further analysis.

Genesis of the EU and Asean

ASEAN was founded in 1967 by Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. In its founding document, the Bangkok Declaration, member states committed to cooperate in economic, political and cultural fields.[23] Just as the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), founded by Treaty of Rome in 1957, sought to make war between Germany and France less likely, if not impossible, so ASEAN played an important security function in preventing the conflict between Malaysia and Indonesia from escalating into open military confrontation. In that respect, we can not find much difference among our analysed communities. Both of them have sought security and stability both through and for, economic development, and both communities have been successful

in that respect. Both communities also share similarities in the part played by external factors during the time of their early creation. Both in the 1950s for the EC, and in the 1960s for ASEAN, external factors played important and very similar roles. The project of a unified Europe might not have come in to existence if the international setting had been different. Western Europe was motivated to form a more close cooperation when faced with the reality of the Cold War confrontation, in order to better face the perceived threat from the USSR. For similar reasons, ASEAN was formed to limit the influence of both China and Japan. Material constraints thus played a considerable role in the creation of both organisations.

Members of both organisations may be regarded as strong states with respect to the strength of state institutions' penetration of society and their ability to deliver most essential public goods.[24] If that had not been the case, an SC would most probably not have been created because, as Buzan[25] argues, weak states export their domestic instabilities to each other.

Both the EU and ASEAN may be labelled as pluralistic security communities. In the case of both organisations, their institutions represent certain values that translate into norms which in turn shape the preferences of the players. However, when it comes to the instruments by which these communities seek their goals, together with the implications for their citizens as members of one or another community, major differences may be found. This implies that although both communities fit into the same category, according to existing terminology, they are, nevertheless, qualitatively very different. This will be illustrated in the following lines.

EU/ASEAN: Level of Supranationality and the Concept of Security

Whereas the European countries created a High Authority, a supranational body already in existence by 1957, in the case of ASEAN, there is no institution with the same role. Not only was such institution not created by the ASEAN Declaration, but, to date, it has not been created by any other document. More importantly, in the case of the EU, by every single new European treaty, we can see a gradual, and more or less continual transmission of particular policies on to the supranational level, along with the strengthening of the role

of supranational institutions such as the European Commission[26] (EC) and the European Parliament (EP). The process of ever deepening integration in the case of the EU goes hand in hand with the enhancing of human security of EU citizens. In the case of ASEAN, we can observe neither the same spill over effect, nor the enhancing of human security. In this respect, the only development in ASEAN is the change of discourse, wherein some member states have called for the abandonment of the principle of "non-interference" and the introduction of unanimous voting, which has not, however, been reflected in any way in the institutional setting of ASEAN.[27] What are the implications of the level of supranationalism for the security of our analysed cases?

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The ASEAN model places a heavy weight on the national sovereignty of the member states and the security autonomy of the region as a whole.[28] These principles are manifested in the stress on non-interference in internal affairs which serves the common interests of member states in the security regime, and containment of domestic opposition movements, sometimes through repression.[29] The principle of non-interference may be the result of various factors. It may indicate that the level of trust and common identity within ASEAN is at a low level. Furthermore, the internal context within which ASEAN was founded differs from that of the EU. As Feske[30] argues, it was important to the young nation-states in the first place that economic development could best be achieved in their opinion, on the basis of national and regional stability. The idea of "regional resilience" on the basis of "national resilience" continues to shape the understanding of security in the region to date. Unlike the EU, where society is mainly founded on cosmopolitan values, the societies of ASEAN members are based on communitarian ones. The relationship between state and citizens therefore, differs considerably.

These priority interests, which can be largely explained by the colonial past of the ASEAN member states, influenced both the shape of the organisation and the regional cooperation principles applicable to the present day. Thus, ASEAN is weakly institutionalised: The governing body has, regularly since 1995, held summit meetings, and, previously only sporadically. It was only in 1976 that the Central Secretariat in Jakarta was established and even up to this day, it has no independent powers, exercising only true coordi-

nation functions. The States were not prepared to give up elements of sovereignty to a superior body and surrender consensus voting.[31]

The previously mentioned non-interference mechanism is one of the factors which helps leaders to continue their non-democratic rule within their countries without any pressure from neighboring states. Therefore, as Väyrynen argues, in reality "solidarity" has meant the mutual acceptance of the primacy of regime security in the region.[32] For this reason, it can be argued that "common identity" in the case of ASEAN states, serves different purposes than that in the EU; it enables leaders to increase regime security and, therefore, ASEAN has failed to create a "liberal cognitive region".

Owing to the fact that the EU has created an autonomous supranational structure, in the shape of the European Commission (EC) and European Court of Justice, which also holds the EC under scrutiny, EU member states have given up the principle of non-interference and have delegated powers to supranational bodies in areas including human rights. Other areas, such as consumer protection, transport, energy, the area of freedom, security and justice, public health etc. are within shared competences, which means that states can not exercise competences in any area where the EC has already done so. Although these areas are not supranational, such EC initiated legislation has been, with the consent of the Council of Ministers,[33] incorporated into the legal systems of member states. Narrowed down for the illustrative reasons of this paper, these are, for example: health and safety at work, employment and social rights, safety standards in general, consumer protection and rights, pollution limits for industry and car emissions, vehicle and industrial products safety standards, norms for children's playgrounds, the EU policy on environmental noise etc. Developments in the sphere of justice and home affairs, in another spectrum of activities, are intended to increase the security of citizens of the EU by measures taken in those sectors. These include: European Arrest Warrants, the European Police College, Europol, the Schengen Information System, etc. As such, these considered "intergovernmental" policies have deepened the cooperation of member states in those areas where it has been necessary since the creation of the common market[34] and the Schengen Area.[35] As a result of the overall development of the understanding of security within the European integration project, the EU has addressed security in some areas

which are, by other regions or states, not seen as a security threat, eg. immigration.[36] The EU, therefore, is not only deepening the meaning of security, by perceiving an individual as a referent object of security, but is also widening security by the securitization of an ever broader spectrum of areas. The stress the EU puts on human security is clearly articulated in the European Security Strategy:[37] '*It* (the EU, author´s note) *places the individual at the heart of its activities, by establishing citizenship of the Union and by creating an area of freedom, security and justice.*'

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In this respect, the EU is qualitatively different from ASEAN. The EC, as a supranational body, has no equivalent in ASEAN and keeps national governments under scrutiny including in areas linked to the state-citizen relationship. However, the EC was not always such a powerful body. The Commision, over time, has increased its importance in the European integration process as states have willingly transferred some of their functions to the supranational level by adopting new treaties.[38] This process has gone so far, that the supranational bodies now represent one of the poles of power in the EU with the capacity to initiate policies, which certain members might dislike, together with having the capacity to oversee their fulfillment.[39] It can be argued that the EC, when it first came into existence in the form of this High Authority, reflected the will and values of members states and nowadays, reflects not only the values of member states, but the values of the EU as an institution, shaping it further, which is a phenomenon known as the agent structure problem. The structure of ASEAN reflects the nature of its member states and probably shapes their preferences but can not be regarded as an engine of integration having the capacity to shape the meaning of the security of members.

The EU's meaning of security is also reflected in the "foreign policy" of the EU, regardless of the fact that common foreign and security policy remains purely on an intergovernmental level. The EU Security Strategy claims that 'The quality of international society depends on the quality of the governments that are its foundation. The best protection of our security is a world of well-governed democratic states.'[40] We have worked to build human security, by ... promoting good governance and human rights...[41]

The greatest strength of the EU in exporting its values is the process of enlargement. 'Frank Shimmelfennig, Stefan Enger and

Heiko Knobel have explored democratic conditionality based on neofunctionalist logic as the main mechanism through which international organisations such as the EU induce non-member state to comply with their conditions.'[42] Therefore, the Report on Implementation of the EU Security Strategy[43] is right when stating that 'enlargement has spread democracy and prosperity across our continent, and the Balkans are changing for the better'. After all, it is the EC as supranational organ that sets accession criteria for potential members. Neofunctionalist theory is therefore embedded in EU security strategy. Additionally, the EU´s understanding of humanitarian intervention is a testament to the human security approach of the EU.

Arising from our previous discussion, we can now identify, that human security is a concern for the EU for three reasons: moral, legal and enlightened self interest.[44]

These findings are an important point of division between the EU and ASEAN. In the case of the EU, the common identity puts more pressure on member governments, increases scrutiny over them and puts citizen first; in the case of ASEAN, the outcome is the opposite. ASEAN, as already mentioned, has rather helped to keep repressive regimes in power. The puzzle which needs to be solved now is to find reasons for this difference between the EU and ASEAN. This will be the goal of the next part of the paper.

Explaining the Reasons in Differences Between the EU and ASEAN

In order to discern the differences between our analysed cases further, I will apply the model developed by Cantory and Spiegel.[45] These authors identify variables which should be considered when defining any given area as a region. Such analysis is fully applicable in this given case and will, therefore, provide further explanations for the differences between the EU and ASEAN.

The box which follows illustrates the criteria proposed by the authors and indicates whether the analysed cases fulfill them.

Box: 1

Criteria	EU	ASEAN
Geographic proximity	YES	YES
Intense interaction	YES	YES
Social cohesion	YES	NO
Political cohesion	YES	NO
Economic complementarity of recourses	YES	Partial
Autonomy from the international system	YES	Partial
Internal and external recognition	YES	YES

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According to this table, the deeper integration of the EU can be explained by the fact that it shares all the variables which were identified by Cantori and Spiegel, for a group of states to become a region. A more coherent region has much higher prospects of deep integration and identification of its own values. This is not the case with ASEAN which does not fulfill the criteria of social and political cohesion and only partially fulfills the criteria of economic complementarity and autonomy from the international system.

ASEAN is actually a very divergent body. The annual per capita incomes in Cambodia (1,913 U.S. dollars), Vietnam (2,957 U.S. dollars) or Laos (2,259 U.S. dollars) are much lower than those of Singapore (50,705 U.S. dollars), Thailand (8,004 U.S. dollars) and Malaysia (13,985 U.S. dollars).[46] Economically divergent states with diverse economic systems can hardly find common ground in economic matters. The above mentioned principle is even illustrated in the current "EURO" crisis and the difficulties the EU is having in attempting to deal with the problem in a region which is economically on a different level of coherence compared to that of ASEAN. The economic systems of ASEAN members are not compatible and supranational economic integration, which might potentially spill

to other areas, cannot exist, and from an economic perspective, is even not desirable.

Apart from these economic disparities, social, political and ideological differences are other impediments for deepening integration. Political differences are particularly evident as ASEAN consists of members ranging from an absolute monarchy (Brunei) to semi-democratic or democratising societies (Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia) to authoritarian military regimes (Burma) and socialist dictatorships (Laos, Vietnam).[47] Such political differences are a major factor which results in ASEAN adopting a soft standpoint in the human rights sphere.

Social disparities are also evident in various other indicators. For example: the proportion of rural dwellers in the total population ranges from 0 percent in Singapore and Brunei to 85 percent in Laos; the average life expectancy of 74 years in Singapore to 51 years in Laos, and the adult literacy rate of 92 percent in Vietnam to 35 percent in Cambodia.[48]

The above mentioned differences are significant from the security perspective as well. Given the limited resources that any organization may have to operate with, it has to decide on their allocation given the high number of possible threats. EU members are rich enough to allocate their security resources to a wider number of subjects/threats, which are often co-identified throughout the EU as an institution, compared to ASEAN. This factor also plays a major role in the way the EU and ASEAN understand security. Based on this, it is possible to develop a thesis that the allocation of resources is derived not only from the structure of the system and the values of SC, but is connected to the level of the resources as well. The difference here between the EU and ASEAN is a good example of that.

Building on the above points, it can be argued that not only domestic but structural factors too can give a birth to the SC; however its nature will remain determined by the nature of its members and the level of their coherence. In the EU, society is mainly based on cosmopolitan values whereas those of ASEAN are communitarian. The fact that ASEAN is an incoherent group of relatively young states precludes the creation of a supranational body which would be an engine of cooperation. Even if that were the case, the individual would probably not be a referent object of security in the case

of ASEAN, because as particular members are in different stages of state formation, compared to those of the EU, the concept of state or even regime security therefore prevails.

The differences between our analysed cases also illustrate the fact that one theory of security cannot explain the development in both of them. For example, a neo-realist understanding of security, which places the state at the centre of the analysis and claims that whatever policy the state wishes to pursue, it will end up in securing itself, and not a different referent object anyway, which is the result of system constraint, would fail to explain the case of the EU. As the analysis suggests, the nature of EU member states influences the integration process and the understanding of security within the EU. On the other hand, neo-realism is fully equipped to explain the ASEAN case, where some states might prefer a different kind of integration but state security still prevails given the nature of the region and the nature of ASEAN states themselves. The EU case on the other hand can be better explained by the neo-liberal school which puts humans at the centre of security and claims that in some regions, it is possible to attain human security even in the anarchic world order.[49]

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In the previous part of this paper, we have indicated a number of differences between the EU and ASEAN and also found possible explanations for such differences. We have come to the conclusion that the existence of an SC increases security of the state but does not necessarily need to increase security of its citizens, let alone individual security. It is the nature of the SC members which determines the values and policy the SC can deliver to the citizens of its member states. Without any doubt, the ASEAN SC is a decisive factor in creating a peaceful South East Asian region, but as we cannot draw any parallels between the security of the state and the security of the people living on its territory, we can not claim that the existence of any SC will increase the internal stability and quality of life of its citizens. In the post modern understanding of security, ASEAN would not be perceived as an SC.

A number of significant differences exist between ASEAN and the EU; however, the current terminology on security communities

does not allow us to conceptualise such differences and to reflect them. For this reason, a new category of security communities, an individual security community, will be introduced in this chapter. By doing so, this paper will fill the gap in the classification of securi

ty communities, bring a new analytical tool in their conceptualisation and eventually help us to understand them better.

An individual security community is **a community of states which has created conditions for the maximalisation of human security within community of states where any kind of war is already unthinkable**.

The definition says, that in order to view any SC as an individual SC, more than one state is needed (community), which has already developed the initial stage of being an SC, be it amalgamated, pluralistic, or comprehensive (war is already unthinkable), and where the referent object of security is predominantly the individual (maximalisation of individual security). Security against some threats, such as preventable disease or poverty, can be maintained through institutions so individuals can benefit from a very high level of security in this case. For other threats, where cause and effect relations are obscure, such as cancer, unemployment, crime, etc., security measures can be chancy at best.[50] The security of both the individual and the state are therefore relative, and for that reason, the wording "created conditions for maximalisation..." has been chosen. The way in which states may create an individual SC has purposely not been mentioned in the definition. The USA and Canada would qualify as individual SCs, but their path towards this has not been similar to that of the EU. However, more research would be needed to evaluate that.

As individual represents the irreducible basic unit to which the concept of security can be applied;[51] an individual SC is therefore the highest, or better, the deepest form of SC it is possible to attain within a group of states. This is the situation where individuals may enjoy a high degree of individual security in the region and where both inter state, as well as civil wars, are highly unlikely, meaning that security referent objects at the higher level are already secure.

The following illustrative diagram, fits an individual SC into the existing typology of security communities, further enlarges it and suggests that the concept of an individual SC is methodologically compatible with the current typology of security communities de

veloped by Deutsch and further envisaged by other authors including Väyrynen and Tusicisny.

Box 2: Conceptualisation of an Individual SC

	Referent object/s		
Amalgamated or pluralistic SC	State	Group of people	Individual
Individual SC			
Comprehensive SC			
Interstate SC			

The EU, as an institution, has managed not only to deepen, but also to broaden the meaning of security which is a process that is not taking place within ASEAN. Consequently, the EU more resembles Galtung´s maximum approach to security where peace does not mean just absence of war but, in addition, the establishment of conditions for social justice.[52]

It is argued that shifting the security focus away from states towards individuals is not desirable nor even possible when structural and other fundamental threats exist. While these conditions persist, policies should be adopted to tackle those issues first. The argument is that those kinds of threats might potentially wipe out all other security concerns and measures.[53] These lines of argument again testify that without certain structural conditions, the development of an individual security community is very unlikely.

The logic that the security of individuals is inevitably connected to the state so,[54] the security of individuals is best attained through the security of the state does not hold in all cases. In other words "the security of the state is not necessarily synonymous to that of people who live within its physical boundaries.[55] Moreover, sometimes there is no harmony between individual and national securi-

ty. Being a citizen of a state within an interstate SC does not theoretically, and in some cases even practically imply an increase in the security of the citizen. It is only an individual SC which inevitably must have such an effect. This comparative study of ASEAN and the EU illustrates the meaning of these words in reality.

Does the fact that ASEAN states are at a different level of development imply that ASEAN may follow the European way in the future? This paper has provided some hints whether this can occur, but given the scope of the present paper, it will be left for further research. As of now, if ASEAN qualifies as a nascent SC then, the EU qualifies as a nascent individual SC.

Conclusion

The aim of present paper was to find differences in understanding of the concept of security between the EU and ASEAN and to test the following hypothesis: Unlike ASEAN, the EU represents a security community, where not only war among members is unthinkable, but also conditions for the maximalisation of individual security are present.

The method this paper has employed was a comparative analysis of the EU and ASEAN. Firstly, the puzzle as to whether ASEAN qualifies for any kind of security community has had to be solved in order to proceed with further analysis. The result is that ASEAN may be characterised as an organization which is moving away from being a security regime towards being a security community, which means that ASEAN is a nascent security community.

This implies that both the EU and ASEAN qualify as pluralistic security communities which shape the preference of players, so that interstate conflict is very unlikely if not unthinkable. However, such information does not tell us the whole picture because it does not include information about the meaning of the security concept for the members. As has been argued, whereas in the case of the EU, the individual is the predominant security referent object, in the case of ASEAN, it is the state or regime. In practice, this is an enormous difference between these communities with huge implications for individuals to be a member of one or the other community.

Therefore this paper has argued that the current typology of security communities is not equipped to grasp the difference between

the analysed subjects. This problem has been solved by introducing a new category of security community: *the individual security community,* which helps us to capture the different natures of the EU and ASEAN. This is also a step for the conceptualisation of security communities in general.

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According to the findings, although ASEAN plays a very positive role in the security of the region, it is nowhere close to the developments which have taken place in the EU. As has been illustrated, it is the European Commission which has been, and is, the engine of such development and which secures the values of the community, sometimes at the expense of some members. Therefore, the nonexistence of a similar body in ASEAN has considerable implications. Indeed, it will take some time for ASEAN to create a genuine interstate security community. The hypothesis of the paper therefore holds.

Further research needs to be done in order to fully explain the concept of an individual security community; this was not the aim of this paper though. However, I hope that this paper has at least helped us to better understand this phenomenon and has laid the ground for further research into it.

Notes to Pages

1   ASEAN comprises Burma, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos and Malaysia.
2   A great degree of consensus among scholars exists that the EU is an SC and for this reason, there is no need to do the same analysis again in the case of the EU.
3   Deutsch, Karl W. *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area.* (Princeton University Press, 1957).
4   Ibid. 117.
5   Ibid. 118.
6   Ibid. 122.
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24 Except for Burma which does not meet all criteria.

25 Buzan, Barry; Waever, Ole. Regions and Powers: the Structure of International Security. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

26 Successor of High Authority.

27 As a reaction to enlargement to include Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Burma, there is already debate within ASEAN on the possible use of „constructive intervention" and „flexible engagement" to reform the political system of Burma and Cambodia (Collins, 1999, Collins, A. Mitigating the Security Dilemma ASEAN Way. *Pacifica Review,* 11, no. 2, 1999).

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33   The Council of the EU, also known as the Council of Ministers, is an intergovernmental body of the EU consisting of ministers and heads of states, which meets twice a year on sectoral bases be it: industry and trade, foreign policy, education, environment etc.

34   In the shape of the Single European Act adopted in 1986, not the Treaty of Rome.

35   The Schengen Area is an area with no internal, but only external borders which consists of 25 member states.

36   For more elaboration on the issue see: Huysmans, Jeff. The European Union and the Securitisation of Migration. *Journalof Common Market Studies*, vol. 38, No. 5. (December 2000).

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38   All together, there have been seven treaties which have modified the initial Treaty of Rome of 1957, the 2009 Lisbon Treaty being the last one.

39   The EC has the right to impose financial sanction to member state if any state fails to comply with the regulations and directives of the EC or even to the European Court of Justice if state would not be willing to pay the sanctions.

40   European Security Strategy. Brussels, 12 December 2003.

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