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TURKEY'S ROLE IN EUROPEAN SECURITY GOVERNANCE

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Abstract: *This article evaluates Turkey's position in European security governance. In the post-Cold War period, the administration, coordination and regulation of security has been, largely, performed through such an approach which itself is based on three assumptions. Firstly, the meaning of security was altered in terms of its conceptual and political indications. Secondly, there emerged a need to define this change and the dynamics thereof. Thirdly, states and international organisations (such as the UN, NATO, EU, and OSCE) wherein they participated came to be dominant security actors. The functioning of the network of international institutions, and its norms, is of utmost importance to Turkish foreign policy. As in case the Bosnian, Kosovar and Macedonian crises, Turkey has been included in European security governance. Turkey, as an actor centrally located in the instable Balkans-Caucasus-Middle East region, and experiencing negative impacts of regional crises, is compelled to encounter security issues and threats that increased and became more diverse in the post-Cold War period. This article proposes that Turkey should adopt a strategy that is geared toward influencing the network's functioning to the greatest extent possible instead of situating itself outside of it.*

Keywords: Turkey, Security Governance, EU, NATO, UN, Bosnian-Kosovar-Macedonian Crisis

Introduction

This work evaluates Turkish foreign policy within the framework of security governance in Europe. For that purpose, the extent Turkey is included (or excluded) in European security governance is examined vis-à-vis the Bosnian, Kosovar and Macedonian crises. This examination is made by adopting a deductive method. In the first part, security governance is defined. In the second part, the role of Turkey is discussed in the light of essential elements of security governance. Finally, Turkey's role in the security governance system

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in Europe in the near future is set out.

The discourses of democracy, pluralism, human rights and security communities hint at the political transformations that took place in the international arena following the Cold War. The political order that emerged as a result of these changes is different from the conventional sovereign nation-state conception to such an extent that the dichotomy between anarchy and hierarchy in International Relations (IR) loses its meaning.[1] The said dichotomy guided a perspective that for years distinguished between the realms of politics; domestic and international. It also came to dominate the perspectives and approaches adopted by security efforts as well as international works. On the contrary, complex and mutual dependence considerably determines international relations in today's world. In this context, analysing post-Cold War security relations is rendered more difficult due to this complex mutual dependency as well as the blurring of the anarchy-hierarchy dichotomy.

After 1990, while the implications of the concept of security became wider, its administration too was conducted within a larger context. Yet another distinct attribute of this period was the maintaining of security by public and private actors including international organisations, non-governmental organisations and private companies. In this context, the question is whether or not the governance perspective may be employed to explain the interactions between security actors in security studies. Given the governance perspective's common use in other areas of scholarship, it is surprising that it is only rarely utilised with regard to security. The main challenge here stems from the conceptual ambiguity that is rooted in the past use of governance perspective in multiple subject areas. Therefore, in order to grasp security governance, it is first necessary to determine what is to be understood from the terms "security" and "governance."

The term "Security Governance"

There is scant agreement over a reference point regarding the understanding of security in international relations. Consequently, the thing(s) implied by IR theories' notions of security demonstrate great variation. Therefore, the priority item here is to determine what is meant by security, what constitutes a threat to security,

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and whom these threaten. Security, generally speaking, is a concept that refers to a situation wherein social life proceeds under an uninterrupted legal order that ensures individuals' living without fear. In international relations, the concept of security is considered as the security of various levels including the international system, regions, the state, the society, subgroups under a society, and individuals. According to Weaver, while the threat against a state targets its sovereignty, for a society the threat is identity-based. Societal security is the continuity of traditional linguistic, cultural and communal structures, religious and national identities and customs under changing conditions.[2] On the other hand, Kolodziej surpasses previous analyses at state level by claiming that security policy represents a political domain adopted by groups and states in order to influence and define the international security system's structure in part or whole.[3] Strange, pushing even further, argues that the reference point should be individual security.[4] This notion considers all misfortunes including hunger, plague, injury, bankruptcy and unemployment to be serious threats. Similarly, Booth states that liberating individuals and groups by eliminating the physical and human obstacles before their free participation in activities would produce true security.[5] Truly, it is observed that national, societal, religious and individual security – as well as state security – falls within IRs' area of study. In this sense, Buzan maintains that security at an individual level is related to the security of states and the international system, and that security cannot be isolated at a given level at the expense of others.[6]

The domain of security encompasses all threats to human groups' existence. In this context, these threats may be not only military but also political, economic, social or environmental in their nature. What needs to be emphasised here is that threats, first and foremost, ought to be seen as a social phenomenon. Discourses play a significant role in the emergence of threats, and their meanings are essentially a cultural matter. In this sense, although threats are inclusive of objective facts, they must be evaluated in conjunction with social and cultural elements. Also, the discourses of relatively stronger actors are more easily accepted by the international community.[7]

Three global developments had considerable influence over the change in security notions of states after the Cold War. The first is

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the erosion of the notion of Westphalian national sovereignty due non-governmental actors' increasing influence in the international political arena. The usefulness of state-centred security approaches decreased in the face of more complex interactions between local and international developments and the increased importance of supra-national networks, as well as the aforementioned powers of mutual dependency, integration, and disintegration that eroded state sovereignty from above and below.

A second global transformation that helped alter the states' notions of security in the post-Cold War era was the increased intensity, and complexity, of mutual dependency. This assertion led to the conclusion that threat perceptions and armament would cause imbalances in the international system and result in a loss of security for all states. This way, one state's individual security was associated with the sustainability of the international system. As part of this understanding, a given state's security came to depend on political- and economic assessments of international actors. It was in this framework that Yugoslavia's disintegration process was shaped by domestic developments and the assessments of internationally active actors alike.

The increase in mutual dependency in the 1990s was considered globalisation, which forms the third global change that triggered an alteration of individual states' notions of security. Globalization was understood to be a constant source of change and ambiguity in post-Cold War security studies.[8] Rosenau pointed to the duality embodied by the mutual existence of a state-centred (Westphalian) system and a multi-focal system that was developing as part of the process of globalisation.[9] The re-establishment of domains of authority alongside the globalisation process and an increase in the activity of international terrorist groups and organised criminal groups resulted in the adoption of multi-actor options (i.e. state and non-state actors: international organisations, multinational corporations, civil society institutions, etc.) in security-oriented efforts.[10]

These phenomena brought the cooperation-based security perspective to the forefront. Here, cooperation-based security describes the establishment of cooperation between interested parties with regard to security policies. In other words, it included measures that decreased other states' aggressive power.[11] This concept – spoken about since the 1970s – was developed as a counter-option

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to balance of power policies. According to this notion, strengthening inter-state cooperation served individual states' long-term interests. The multilateral nature of the cooperative security regime emphasises the element of partnership by developing a culture of dialogue and compromise among its members. Over time, this assists the development of a collective identity.

These changes had two very crucial implications for security perceptions. First, the role of military power came to be increasingly scrutinised. Furthermore, there emerged a need to revisit the concept of security, as a result whereof it was defined anew again and again.[12] Although security studies and applications were led exclusively with an emphasis on the "continuity of state" perspective, the idea of security was analysed with the help of more complex interpretations starting from the 1990s. In this context, Buzan proposed a security vision with military as well as political, economic, social and environmental dimensions, and posed important questions regarding the compatibility of national- and international security perceptions, as well as whether or not states were capable of greater inclination toward cooperation.[13] Baldwin claimed that this mostly stemmed from nation-states' need to redefine their political agendas in light of their assessments based on the influence exerted on them of the new international security conditions and not so much related to the notion of security itself.[14]

Official texts throughout the 1990s and the 2000s confirm that the international community adopted this extended security agenda.[15] Truly, states and international organisations adopted attitudes in line with the new security agenda. States, in addition to their traditional security concerns regarding military threats, prioritised a variety of issues including irregular cross-border migration, terrorism, arms proliferation, organized crime, conflict prevention and management, human rights, economy, environment, drug smuggling, and epidemics.

Consequently, a holistic approach was developed to address the notion of security as a multi-dimensional matter with its military, economic, social, individual and environmental aspects. Understood as such, the problem of security proved challenging to the nation-state's capabilities and allowed some room for international non-state actors such international organisations, non-governmental institutions alongside them in accordance with the cooperative

security perspective. The concept of mutual dependency, becoming more complicated through globalisation, necessitated the management, coordination, and regulation of security issues for international actors. This need paved the way for a new approach to security policies.

The concept of governance refers to a structure and/or order established through the common efforts of all interested actors in a social-political system. In this context, it is necessary to distinguish governance from government. While government connotes centralisation and integration, governance describes falling apart and differentiation. Disintegration may occur in three ways:

downward – towards local actors,
upward – towards the global level, and
sideways – towards individual and voluntary actors.[16]

Differentiation, on the other hand, refers to accepting heterogeneity and the conflicting nature of interests. Government stands for a centralised system of political control within the state, while governance indicates a fragmented policy-making process inclusive of state as well as non-state players at sub-national, national, and international levels.[17]

Governance came to be one of the concepts that are benefited from in a number of ways. In the European Union and local governments, as well as at a local level in the context of social, welfare, economic and other public policies, a multitude of academic studies are conducted in the conceptual framework of governance.[18] Such studies revealed the importance of multi-actor and multi-level approaches to policy-making processes. In a global sense, governance indicates state governments' willingness to enter into multi-party cooperation in order to achieve shared goals.[19] Even though state actors continue to be the main players in global governance; international organisations, non-governmental organisations, and multi-national corporations become increasingly more involved in formulation, application, monitoring, and regulation.[20] In conclusion, the notion of governance is inclusive of specific activities' management, coordination and regulation by multiple authorities. These three distinguishing attributes, depending on the subject area, are geared toward formal and informal arrangements, norms,

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discourses and certain political results.

Essential elements of security governance: heterarchy, istitutionalisation and a shared goal

In the International Relations framework, security governance refers to the shared use of administrative-, economic- and political authority for the purpose of continued peace and stability in the international arena. The presence of a shared outlook ought to be added to this definition. Security governance necessitates both intellectual and institutional foundations. In other words, security governance has to rely on proximity of discourse as much as an agreement over material components.[21]

Security governance has three elements. Primarily, it rests on a notion of heterarchical relationship defined by increasing interaction among multiple actors. Furthermore, it involves institutionalisation with its material- (organizational structure) and intellectual components. Thirdly, notwithstanding the presence of different interests, it requires a shared goal.

Security governance was caused by elements that affected the emergence of new threats and actors as well as the development of heterarchical relations among them. States, first and foremost as a result of budgetary restrictions, were forced to acquire external security resources and to transfer or privatize security services in order to increase the efficiency of their own operations.[22] The second factor was the realisation that new global security threats such as supranational crime, terrorism, and immigration could only be coped with through international cooperation.[23]

The distinct and mutually overlapping relationship networks between various state and non-state actors with regard to security can be apprehended with reference to governance. Even though nation-states continue to be the primary actors in international relations, other players including multinational corporations, international organisations and non-governmental organisations increasingly ought to be accounted for in analyses. Non-state actors, to an increasing extent, complement states in security mechanisms. As such, while non-state actors at once emerge as a fundamental source of insecurity, they also start to play an important role in the struggle against such threats.[24]

The extended contents attributed to the notion of security helped strengthen the role of non-state actors in newly emerging security domains since national governments are in possession of limited expertise and resources therein. Non-state actors such as associations, foundations, human rights and environmental organisation acquired considerable roles in making, enforcing, and monitoring non-traditional policies in security.[25] The costs of security policies whose focus broadened to include refugees and environmental pollution came to be met by specialised non-state actors.[26]

Upon the end of the Cold War, while novel networks (i.e. non-governmental institutions, multinational corporations, etc.) emerged, older networks such as international organisations adapted to new circumstances. In this sense, NATO transformed its collective defence organisation functions into collective security operations. The organisation both became functional in peacekeeping operations aside from military defence (*adaptability*) and expanded eastward to include new members (*inclusivity*). During the interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo NATO established civilian-military relations with non-governmental organisation and other non-state actors (*informal relations*). At this time, new networks emerged between state and non-state actors to coordinate military security, minesweeping, humanitarian aid and post-conflict reconstruction.[27] The said network could surpass national boundaries and therefore sovereignty. In this way, it became possible to more effectively struggle against supranational security threats such as terrorism, WMD, and environmental pollution.

The transferring of security operations from states to regional (i.e. NATO and the EU), global (i.e. the UN) or supranational legal entities (i.e. non-governmental institutions and private security companies) manifests itself as governance.[28] In peacekeeping operations that are conducted as part of security governance, subject-level cooperation follows. For instance, while the UN and NATO provided security in former Yugoslavia, humanitarian aid and logistic support were, respectively, offered by non-governmental institutions as well as private security companies.

It is often seen that states unite their capabilities in order to resist another's power or to acquire benefits that they would be unable to attain by them. Inter-state cooperation may occur in the context of individual states' crucial interests.[29] When states mutually ben-

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efit from cooperation, they facilitate and perpetuate it by forming institutions. In this sense, activities by a number of international organisations contribute to governance's increase in international relations. The term "institution" here refers to not only organisations, but also accepted and repeated behaviour. Institutions are defined as a set of formal- and informal rules that determine codes of behaviour, limits of activity, and expectations.[30] This understanding rests on the assumption that institutions are voluntary formations.

Establishing and maintaining cooperation helps overcome two important obstacles necessitated by the anarchy that plays a significant role in the realist perspective.[31] While one of these relates to the states' concerns over being betrayed, the other is related to relative gains from cheating. In case of cooperation, concerns over deception apply to that particular arrangement. However, in security, this concern remains always valid. For changes in weaponry enable shifts in the balance of power. When a state renounces a security-based cooperation, it may choose to deceive the state(s) with whom it is in cooperation for the sake of military superiority. For this reason, states need to be alert about breaches in cooperation, and put in place necessary precautions.[32] This limits inter-state cooperation. Precisely at this point, institutions reduce concerns over deception in a number of ways. Institutions increase the states' information about one another by facilitating intelligence between the parties. As this situation makes it possible for potential cheaters to be identifies, it also allows measures to be taken by states that would be hurt by such an act of deception. Aside from this, rules entail a rise in the number of interactions. Institutionalized renewal renders deception a high-cost option, since states are deprived of future gains. Repeated transactions also allow the deceiver to be punished: while the fraudulent state is excluded from the cooperation mechanisms, those that honour their agreements and evoke trust can easily find a place for themselves within these mechanisms to increase their individual gains. Institutionalized rules, by allowing a variety of transactions to take place between the states, increase mutual dependency. A state that cheats in one area is likely to be punished in other setting wherein they participate. Although unable to stop states from cheating entirely, this stops deception from being an attractive option by pointing out the costs. Institutions may also lower transaction costs and render unnecessary the

time and efforts devoted to individual arrangements. In this sense, they lower the costs and increase profitability.[33]

Concerns over relative gains are shaped by two factors: Primarily, the number of major players is influential. Relative gain becomes more important in settings with only two states' conflicting interests, making cooperation more difficult. However, in cases where there are multiple powers that are evenly matched, the presence of various coalitions for individual states to safeguard their interests renders relative gains less important for them. The second factor is military relations: With the possibility of using military power in conflict resolution low, individual states' relative gain assessments grow less important and cooperation may take please more easily.[34]

Institutions soften the obligations caused by anarchy. They help lower the transaction costs by providing information and thereby make states more reliable. Aside from these, they form a domain for cooperation to establish suitable coordination points, and contribute to inter-state reciprocity and multilateralism. Institutions' being active and persuasive in order to function in certain ways stems from behavioural expectations.[35]

As rationality (that is assumed to underlie actors' behaviour) cannot fully explain cooperation-oriented interactions, beliefs and opinions become increasingly important in accounting for actions.[36] For this reason, the governance approach also emphasizes the importance of discourses and identities. Discourses play a significant role in the emergence of threats. Their meaning is essentially a cultural phenomenon. In this sense, threats are social and cultural products as opposed to objective truths.[37] Threat perceptions do not emerge out of a supposedly objective international power structure. The discourses of relatively strong actors are also more easily accepted by the international community. In cases where objective threats are present, states choose to form alliances. With the threats gone, however, the harmony within the said alliance weakens. Therefore, the post-Soviet Union setting where it is impossible to replace the previous threat with a new one, NATO's importance had to erode. Alliances, once functional, are shaped by shared values. Faced with political change, the institution of these values demonstrates resistance, since it is easier to adapt an existing organization with a set of rules and a decision-making memory to new circumstances instead of forming new institutions.[38] Inter-

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national institutions may serve as primary representations of such values.

Finally, the security governance perspective is supported by common goals. Here, the term may be understood both as a structure and a set of results achieved at the end of the process. Structurally, governance is inclusive of institutions and these institutions dictate entry rules, codes of interaction, and behavioural restrictions to establish patterns of personal behaviour among participants. As a process, on the other hand, governance is interested in defining the results achieved by individual actors and the activities embraced to get these results. This envisages that goals in governance reflect a sum of individual actors' preferences. Such inclinations, although competitive at times, tend to be similar. Nevertheless, the results inevitably correspond to the preferences of a majority and not the entirety of actors.

Turkey´s role in European security governance

All political life rests on its components and therefore on understanding what/whom it includes and excludes. The governance perspective, taking into consideration its emphasis on the multiplicity of actors and bases of power, is indirectly inclusive. Inclusion is the quest for a conciliation of interests as well as consensus. Governance derives its legitimacy and necessity from inclusion, even though exclusion becomes inevitable at times.

Security governance foresees the presence of boundaries. Its inclusion of many actors as part of the heterarchical relations forces us to face which actors and included/excluded as part of governance's administration, coordination, and regulation. As an entity that requires common goals, governance entails an aspect that strengthens the concerns of the excluded and the sense that their interests are hurt. In this sense, a security-providing actor's inclusion in or exclusion from in institutionalisation processes and institutional structures of security administration emerges as a problem. In this context, the extent to which Turkey participates in the security governance system shall be evaluated with an eye on its membership in security organisations and its adaptation to security regimes.

Turkey, in the framework of the aforementioned security culture, found itself – in conjunction with international security pro-

viders- a position in the security governance in the Yugoslavian disintegration process. Turkey is not a full participant in this security governance due to its non-member status in the European Union. However, the inclusion/exclusion option already foreseen in the governance does not entirely exclude Turkey from this security governance. For instance, Turkey did cooperate with international organisations during the Bosnian, Kosovar and Macedonian crises.

As a power vacuum emerged in the post-Cold War Balkans, the instability entailed serious issues for Turkey. Turkey's transportation routes to Europe were negatively affected. The flow of immigrants to the country became stronger and, as a result thereof, economic costs became higher. Due to these reasons, Turkey both engaged in military activities via international organisations and also established military relations with certain regional powers. The sovereign-equality based foreign policy that Turkey maintained since its foundation minimises the Balkan states' tendency to perceive the country as a security threat. As a result of rising numbers in international crises from 1990 on, Turkey established a peace force battalion within its 4th army corps in order to participate in peace operations. The country, in this sense, strived to contribute to UN and UN-sanctioned NATO operations. Following the Gulf War, Turkey's desire – particularly in the Bosnian War's aftermath – to actively participate in international or multilateral military operations was realized in Operation Restore Hope of 1993 in Somali.

Turkey, concerned about an emerging conflict, attempted to motivate the international community in order to prevent war in Bosnia. In this sense, the country took the matter to the UNSC as well as the OSCE. Presenting an action plan to the UN, the Turkish government demanded that military precautions be taken in addition to diplomatic pressure and humanitarian aid. Aside from these, it also strove to lift the arms embargo against Bosnians. One of Turkey's proposals to end the Bosnian War and to maintain BiH's territorial integrity was to engage in military interventions and operations against the Serbian forces under NATO leadership. The country also supported the bombardment of Serbian positions and airports.

On 08 December 1992, the Grand National Assembly mandated the government to send Turkish troops abroad to contribute to UNPROFOR as well as to participate in an international military

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intervention under UN supervision. Turkey devoted a total of 18 F-16 fighter jets to join the operation to monitor adherence to the UNSC's 31 March 1993 resolution to establish a no-fly zone. Furthermore, Turkish combat ships served in the Adriatic to enforce the embargo from sea.

On 16 April 1993, NATO invited Turkey to participate in the *Deny Flight* operation that worked to monitor the no-fly zone over Bosnia. Greece declared that it would not allow Turkish fighter jets to cross its airspace *en route* to Italy. Similarly, Greece strongly opposed Turkey's inclusion in the Bosnia-based multinational force with a land unit. Aside from these, Turkey's contribution to the peace mission in BiH was kept low profile since a Turkish military presence in the Balkans would heighten Serbian and Russian sensitivities toward the country.

Turkey's request to join UNPROFOR to establish safe zones and protection for the humanitarian aid campaign in BiH was approved by the UNSC on 22 March 1994. As such, the Turkish government commissioned a 1400-strong regiment that served under the UNPROFOR between 04 August 1993 and 20 December 1995.

Following NATO's assumption of the duty to enforce Dayton Peace Accords, the Turkish Peace Force serving under UNPROFOR was supplemented to reach the brigade level. As of 20 December 1995, this force was granted to IFOR, which was replaced by SFOR on 20 December 1996. The Turkish brigade was transferred to the new body. Later, size reductions decreased the Turkish military presence to the battalion level. The SFOR Mission was transferred to EUFOR, an EU force, as of 02 December 2004.

Turkey at first stood for Yugoslavia's territorial integrity when the crises emerged. During the disintegration process, the leaders of both Federal Yugoslavia and the individual republics visited Ankara to secure Turkey's favour. As a result of these talks, it was declared in April 1991 that Turkey supported the maintenance of Yugoslavia's integrity. Later, on 9 July 1991, Kiro Gligorov –then President of Macedonia – and Alija Izetbegovic – then President of Bosnia and Herzegovina- came to Ankara in order to demand the acknowledgement of their independence. However, it was only after the developments in Yugoslavia evolved into a crisis and the European Community (EC) acknowledged the Slovenian- and Croatian independence that disintegration emerged as the inevitable

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path. Keeping these changes in mind, Turkey acknowledged on 6 February 1992 the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and Slovenia.

In line with UNPROFOR and IFOR operations, the Turkish Naval Forces devoted a total of two frigates (one on duty and another in reserve), fuel ships, as well as Mine Countermeasures ships to Operation *Sharp Guard* performed by the STANAVFORMED. Between 13 July 1992 and 02 October 1996, a total of 18 frigates/destroyers, two submarines, four fuel ships, and approximately 5000 personnel served as part of the operation.[39]

Turkey's request to participate in UNPROFOR, to establish safe zones and protect the humanitarian aid campaign in BiH, was approved by the UNSC on 22 March 1994. Turkey served in the UNPROFOR with a regiment-level task force comprised of 1400 personnel between 04 August 1993 and 31 December 1995. Moreover, a Turkish officer served as military advisor as part of the UN BiH Mission Military Advisory Team in 2001–2002. Turkey also contributed 101 personnel to the UN International Police Force (IPTF) to enforce the Dayton Peace Accords and establish public order. IPTF transferred its duties to the EU Police Mission (EUPM) in January 2003. The Turkish government commissioned eight police officers and six gendarmerie members to this organisation.[40] SFOR was transformed into EUFOR as of 02 December 2004 and Turkish Forces remained engaged. Turkey was in close cooperation with international organisations during the Bosnian Crisis. It contributed to task forces established by the UN and NATO. In the aftermath of the war, Turkey continued to partake in international forces, and also offered help in the EU police force to become an important factor in BiH security governance, a position it maintains until the present.

As often happens in international relations, the conclusion of one problem leaves the residue that may produce a new as the Kosovo crisis unfolded, Turkish public opinion and media often pronounced the possibility that a new Bosnian tragedy was on the way. The Turkish government, on the other hand, strived to resolve the conflict through diplomatic channels. As such, Turkey proposed a number of suggestions including a 1974+ offer that would elevate Kosovo's status within the Yugoslavian Federal State as well as it

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being the third federal republic within Yugoslavia. After Serbian aggression against Kosovo, the country warmed up to an international intervention headed by NATO. Turkey actively participated in NATO's 1999 operations.

Turkey was under the impression that the Kosovo Crisis could potentially threaten its own security. The violence in Kosovo could spread to Albania and Macedonia. Albania was a country with which Turkey had close military- and political relations. The possibility of Macedonia's disintegration, on the other hand, triggered a Balkan War scenario that would include Turkey as well as Greece. Following the beginning of armed conflict in Kosovo in 1998, the Turkish government remained in contact with the UN Secretary General as well as the Albanian and Macedonian ministers of foreign affairs, and the Yugoslavian ambassador in Ankara. The Kosovo Crisis was discussed in the Board of Ministers that called for the autonomy of Kosovo. Ismail Cem, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, presented Yugoslavian president Slobodan Milosevic a three-phase plan. Accordingly, the Yugoslavian government was expected to cease violence immediately, execute the education treaty of 1996, grant the rights acknowledged in the 1974 Constitution, and return Kosovo's autonomy. However, Turkey failed to get any results from this initiative.[41]

Turkey navigated through the Kosovo Crisis in harmony with its Western counterparts. In this respect, the country abode by the economic measures against Yugoslavia and participated in air combat maneuvers in Albanian- and Macedonian airspaces. Article 92 of the 1982 Constitution states that the Grand National Assembly exercises the authority to send the Turkish Armed Forces abroad.[42] The Assembly's Resolution 596 dated October 8, 1998 is as follows: 'In the context of potential measures that may be taken by NATO with regard to the Kosovo Crisis, the Turkish Armed Forces have been mandated at the General Assembly's fourth session on October 8, 1998 to participate in the multilateral common force that may be formed by allied countries pending the government's discretion regarding the necessity, limits, extent and timing of such involvement.'[43]

The failure to resolve the Kosovo Crisis through political channels and the violent turn that the conflict took in February 1999 caused NATO to initiate an air operation on March 24, 1999. Turkey participated in the said operation with 10 F-16 planes stationed

in Ghedi, Italy. As the operation became more intense, NATO demanded additional aircraft and airports from the Turkish government. To this end, Turkey consigned eight F-16 planes as well as three tanker planes to be based in Bandirma and Incirlik, as well as allowed NATO to utilize airports in Balikesir, Bandirma, and Corlu. In addition to these, a frigate from the Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 and a minesweeper – part of the Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Group 2 – took part in the operations.[44]

The initiation of military operations triggered a mass flow of refugees into Macedonia and Albania, causing a humanitarian tragedy. Turkey joined AFOR with a field duty company between May 18-September 7, 1999 in order to help resolve the crisis and to heal the wounds that resulted from it. The said company assisted the civilian population in vital matters such as nutrition, bathing facilities, and laundry. During the operation, 18,000 refugees were accommodated in Turkey. Also 3,200 refugees each were hosted in two camps – Boyana, Macedonia and El Basan, Albania – that were made active in the process. The refugees returned following the peace treaty's signing. Three members of the Turkish Armed Forces were commissioned to work at the OSCE Kosovo Mission in May–September 1999. As the mission went on to assume the police duties as part of its common operations with the UNMIK (United Nations Mission in Kosovo) and the KFOR (Kosovo Force), the military personnel returned. A 15,500 strong multinational force from 34 countries continues to work under KFOR as part of five task forces. The Kosovo Turkish Battalion Task Force stationed in Prizren operates as part of the Multinational South Task Force formed by Germany, Turkey, Austria, and Switzerland.[45]

Aside from its military functions, Turkey also contributed to administrative mechanisms of the Kosovo security governance. As of March 2005, the country commissioned a total of 214 personnel (128 civilian police officers and 79 monitoring officers) to work with the UNMIK-CIVPOL. 207 civilian police officers from Turkey participated in the UNMIK. A civilian mission, EULEX, was stationed in the region by the European Union to replace the UNMIK that was rendered dysfunctional by the Kosovar independence. Turkey currently serves in EULEX with 37 police officers.[46] Turkey, thanks to centuries of historical and cultural ties to the region as well as the Turkish minority in Kosovo, followed the regional developments

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closely and contributed to Kosovar security and stability by offering soldiers, police officers, and experts to serve in KFOR, UNMIK, and the OSCE Mission.

Inter-ethnic tensions in Macedonia represented another test for the international community. The struggle between Albanians and the Slavs also negatively affected Macedonian Turks. From Macedonia's independence on, Turkey supported a multi-ethnic and multicultural unitary Macedonian state. The Slavic majority approved of constitutional and other legal changes thanks to European pressure (based on the expectation that monetary aid would be offered).

Operation *Essential Harvest* was initiated on August 27, 2001 under NATO leadership in an attempt to decommission militant groups in Macedonia. Turkey contributed to the multinational brigade that was formed for this purpose with a military team that was station in the Petrovac region between August 27–October 20, 2001. NATO launched Operation Amber Fox from September 2001 on in order to maintain its regional presence and assist international observers in Macedonia. Turkey participated in this operation with a mechanized infantry team and four personnel located at the headquarters. In Operation Allied Harmony that followed, the country offered three personnel members on duty at the headquarters. NATO's Operation Allied Harmony was taken over by the European Union from March 31, 2003 on. In Operation Corcordia that continued until December 15, 2003, Turkey contributed two light communication teams (2 officers, 2 non-commissioned officers, 4 privates), two officers at the EU headquarters, and one officer at NATO's headquarters in Skopje.

Turkey commissioned four gendarmerie personnel and an officer located at NATO HQ Skopje as part of the PROXIMA police force formed by the European Union on December 15, 2003. The police mission ended on December 15, 2005. Following this date, the EUPAT police consultation team took over for a six-month mandate. Turkey did not take part in this effort.[47] Turkey acted with its Western allies in crises that emerged out of the Yugoslavian disintegration process. The country's participation either was in the context of UN missions or stemmed from its NATO membership. By participating in UN, NATO, EU, and OSCE operations in Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo, Turkey contributed to efforts seeking to establish stability in the Balkans.

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Based on the fact that security governance not only rests on organisations but also a proximity of values an identities, to what extent is Turkey included in- or excluded from security governance? While the intellectual basis will be established with reference to Turkey's security perceptions, the functional basis shall take into consideration the roles that the country played in security governance applications. These analyses will be conducted on the basis of security governance's inclusion-exclusion problem.

The Turkish security culture was formed by geographical determinism, the *Realpolitik* tradition, and the Westernization process.[48] Geographical determinism was instrumental in Turkish politicians and military officials to account for security policies employed to resolve a variety of insecurities and interests.[49] In short, the country acknowledged its geopolitical position as a founding element of its security culture. From the perspective of the *Realpolitik* tradition that makes up part of Turkey's security culture, the dominant realist security approach fails to account for the country's changing security needs in line with the globalization processes.[50]

In the post-Cold War period when a number of international security elements were changing, NATO's significance as a fixed part of Turkey's foreign and security politics remained unaltered. Cooperation and common efforts emerged as the most efficient mechanisms in a new international environment that bore witness to escalating sensitivities toward global-level risks and threats. Turkey -a founding member of the UN as well as an actor in NATO and all other major European institutions, and a potential member of the European Union- pursued an active policy to develop friendship and cooperation in its region and elsewhere.

Evaluations of Turkey's post-Cold War international security perceptions were brought up in a variety of platforms by high-ranking personalities. Among such cases, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, in his analysis of the Middle East crisis spearheaded by Lebanon, demonstrated the need for multilateral cooperation in order to facilitate regional security by saying that his country would never be a by-stander to regional developments and that the international community, along with a peace-minded UN, ought to display solidarity in order to immediately ensure a ceasefire.[51] Egemen Bagis, former head of the Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Relation of NATO Parliamentary Assembly, maintained that the world's

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need for NATO increased since September 11, 2001. Underscoring the importance of cooperation and alliances between NATO members, Bagis argued: 'There are certain new dangers present in the world. Terrorism, Weapons of Mass Destruction, terrorist organisations, human-, drug- and arms trafficking are some of them. We need to struggle against these issues together. I cannot fail to mention this: the democratic values that bring us together under NATO are also the values that need to be sheltered.'[52] He touched upon the parliamentarians' need to better explain NATO activities to their constituencies in light of potential problems in the Middle East and the Caucasus, and stated that 'particularly in order to fight the problems of the 21st century, NATO's importance shall rise'.[53] As seen in this statement, Turkey shared the values emphasized by NATO (such as democracy) and perceived similar threats (terrorism, the proliferation of WMDs, etc.).

Turkey's membership in European security organisations and its role in European security entailed by its Westernization path were acknowledged as the country's "Western" identity. In the late 1990s, whenever this Western identity was scrutinized, "security relations" served as an anchor in European waters.[54] Liberalism and democracy have been other significant elements in Turkish security culture's Westernization process.[55] In this context, being a full member of institutions such as the EU, NATO and OSCE that accept liberalism and democracy as their core values bears considerable importance to Turkey. Similarly, the country perceived NATO- and EU expansion as a whole and claimed that a new security structure could not be erected in Eurasia without its contribution.

Conclusion

The coordination, administration and regulation of security were conducted through idiosyncratic instruments. The post-Cold War security governance view was based on three assumptions. Primarily, security changed its meaning in a conceptual- and political sense. Furthermore, the need arose to define this change and its dynamics. Thirdly, states and international organisations wherein they are active (UN, NATO, EU, OSCE) became dominant security actors. In light of these assumptions, it was shown that shared goals could be identified through an institutionalisation via het-

erarchically-related actors. The cooperation and coordination between these four institutions were influential in the perpetuation of security. Security threats were countered with diversified, *ad hoc* and operational responses with no clear drawn borders. A dynamic relationship between inclusion and exclusion accompanied these processes.

Security governance in the Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia crises was executed by, along with a number of actors, among international organisations that overly procured security. The said relations were neither in an anarchical stance nor a hierarchical order. UN, NATO, EU, and OSCE were in cooperation and coordination by themselves thanks to the notion of complementation. This was also manifest in non-members' admission to conduct security governance when necessary. Every individual organization signed up to perform the duties that they were believed to be capable of. This way, both material capabilities and intellectual roles guided the organisations. Finally, when faced with security threats stemming from intra-state violence, the organisations ensured a shared goal by constructing pace and stability over liberal norms.

Turkey adapted to the conceptual changes in security. In this sense, it has been in close cooperation with security-providing institutions and contributed to their changing functions. In general, Turkey was included in the institutional structure of security governance. However, there were also cases where the country was excluded due to its non-member status in the European Union. On the basis of this inclusion-exclusion problem, Turkey's relations particularly with the European Union came to the forefront. In security governance applications, however, the country's profile was at times like the Bosnian crisis kept low due to political and cultural reasons.

Considering the inclusion capacity of the security network that emerged out of the international organisations framework, staying out of the security governance concept would put Turkey in a bad situation. Serbia's resistance against this approach led to no success during the crises of the Balkan region. On the contrary, NATO, EU and OSCE ensured "desired" political outcomes by governing the Yugoslavian disintegration process. These results, quite naturally, are unsatisfactory for Serbia that was left out of the network. On the other hand, the states included in the network were successfully

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kept away from competing and conflicting on the basis of their individual national interests.

The function fulfilled by the network of international institutions and rules during the Yugoslavian disintegration process is rather important for Turkish foreign policy. The problems that Turkey, a NATO and OSCE member, encountered in its EU membership process gave rise to the public scrutiny regarding the security network's functioning. Developing relations between the EU and NATO, coupled with the Western European Union's loss of function, created a major concern for the country. Even though Turkey is not a full member of the European Union, remaining outside of the network while it continues to maintain its power would entail considerable risks and costs. Therefore, Turkey should adopt a strategy that will maximize its influence over the network's functioning instead of staying out of it. As an actor located at the heart of the unstable Balkans-Caucasus-Middle East region that experiences negative effects of regional crises, the country finds itself compelled to deal with an increasing number of diverse security issues and threats that emerged after the Cold War. As a result thereof, Turkey is bound to comprehend and take into consideration the security governance system.

Notes to Pages

1 „International Relations" is written with capital letters when referring to the discipline. For general implications, it is used as "international relations".

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18 See Beate Kohler-Koch and Rainer Eising, *The Transformation of Governance within the European Union* (London: Routledge, 1999); R.A.W. Rhodes, *Understanding Governance: Policy Networks, Governance, Reflexivity and Accountability* (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1997).

19 Elke Krahmann. Conceptualizing Security Governance. *Cooperation and Conflict* 38/1, 2003: 11–14.

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Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 172–173.

21 Mark Webber. Security governance and the excluded states of postcommunist Europe. In Derek Averre and Andrew Cottey (eds). *New Security Challenges in Postcommunist Europe.* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002), p. 44. Note that governance includes 'the coordination, management and regulation of issues by multiple and separate authorities, interventions by both public and private actors, formal and informal arrangements'. See Emil J. Kirchner and James Sperling (eds.) *Global Security Governance. Competing Perceptions of Security in the 21st Century.* London, Routledge, 2007, p. 3.

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24 See Elke Krahmann. Security: Collective Good or Commodity? *European Journal of International Relations* 14/3 (2008): 379–404.

25 Krahmann. Conceptualizing Security Governance, 9–16.

26 Elke Krahmann. 'From State to Non-State Actors: The Emergence of SecurityGovernance. In Elke Krahmann (ed.). *New Threats and New Actors in International Security.* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 13.

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28 Rosenau. Change, Complexity, and Governance in Globalizing Space. p. 169–200.

29 The extent of institutions' importance in international relations, as well as their functionality in decreasing the effects of the anarchical structure has been the object of competition between neorealism and neoliberalism.

30 Robert O. Keohane, 'Neoliberal Institutionalism: A Perspective on World Politics,' in *International Institutions and State Power, Essays in International Relations Theory*, ed. Robert O. Keohane (London: Westview Press, 1989) p. 3.

31 The anarchical international structure prevents cooperation due to the survival instinct present in individual states' nature. However, cooperation flourishes to the extent that institutions rectify the problem of anarchy. The term is used in International Relations to describe the lack of a central authority. It has, in this sense, neither a positive nor a negative connotation. Although anarchy is a concept that describes the lack of a central authority over individual states, it is also used to connote a non-existence of rules whilst ignoring shared principles, norms,

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rules and guidelines. However, states also act according to treaties and international organisations.

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42 The Constitution's section regarding declaration of war and the use of armed force is as follows: "The Turkish Grand National Assembly has the authority to allow a declaration of war in cases deemed legitimate by international law, as well as to send the Turkish Armed Forces abroad and to have foreign armed forces to be present in Turkey in cases other than those required by international treaties whereto Turkey is a party, or principles of international courtesy."

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44 Turkish Military Force. 'Turkey's participation in peace support operations'.
45 Ibid.
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