TERRORISM 2.0 IN EURASIA

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ABSTRACT: *"New" terrorist organisations, characteristic of the post-Cold War period, sharply contrast with their more traditional ("old") predesessors in Europe and Russia. These latter European terrorist groups (termed here as Terrorism 1.0) were mostly: sovereignty/ideology-driven, geographically limited, and distinguished their targets from victims. However, at the end of the 20th century such "old" groups were replaced, in Europe, by "new," civilisational, organisations which deploy political violence for somewhat cosmic objectives (termed here as Terrorism 2.0). This work is based on exploring terrorism´s (r)evolution into the 21st century.*

Introduction

Terrorism in Eurasia is not a product of the end of the Cold War and neither is it symptomatic of the global war on terror which commenced after the tragedy of 11 September 2001 (9/11). Indeed, European states, including Russia, have faced radical groups seeking influence over the governments' decision-making processes by staging political acts of violence for centuries. With the notable exception of millenarian movements, the bulk of such terrorists were largely driven by the desire to obtain enhanced political and/or economic rights for the groups they acted on behalf of. Yet, these more traditional European terrorist organisations and individuals, at the cusp of the 21st century, have been succeeded by new, global terrorist networks waging "civilisational" war.[1] Due to the Iron Curtain – and the crushing of internal dessent – Soviet Russia managed to prevent acts of terrorism against its populace, however the collapse of the USSR opened a pandora's box of internal violence, which continues in localised forms in the North Caucasus with sporadic terrorist activity spilling over to population centres such as Moscow and St. Petersburg.

"New" terrorist organisations, characteristic of the post-Cold War period, sharply contrast with their more traditional ("old") predesessors in Europe and Russia. These latter European terrorist groups (termed here as Terrorism 1.0) were mostly: sovereignty/ideology-driven, geographically limited, and distinguished their targets from victims. However, at the end of the 20th century such "old" groups were replaced, in Europe, by "new," civilisational, organisations which deploy political violence for somewhat cosmic objectives (termed here as Terrorism 2.0). In Russia however, the shift to "new" terrorism is occurring haphazardly and at a slower pace. This is termed as Terrorism ½ since the groups operating in Russia maintain a limited territorial scope and are driven by sovereignty-like logic, though they primarily target civilians.

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The main differences between the terrorisms in Europe and Russia are best explained by the fundamentally diverse governmental responses they elicit. Whereas the EU focuses on *exclusionary-protective* measures, Russian counter-terrorism is *inclusionary-preventive*. In Europe, counter-terrorism programmes seek to prevent entry and the proliferation of insecurities from outside, Russia's efforts are preventive and inclusionary: it lives with these insecurities.

"New" Terrorism's "Old" Beginning

The recent explosion of research on terrorism produced remarkable debates on what actually constitutes the subject of research, the intellectual boundaries of terrorism. With the proliferation of definitions of terrorism, scholars and practitioners alike stumble upon a clear definitional gap.[2] Some view terrorism generally, as 'an extreme, violent response to a failed political process,'[3] while others consider more detailed descriptions such as:

> the use, or threat of use, of violence by an individual or group ... acting for or in opposition to established authority, when such action is designed to create extreme anxiety and/or fear-inducing effects in a target group larger than the immediate victims with the purpose of coercing that group into acceding to the political demands of the perpetrators.[4]

For some terrorism is 'an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby – in contrast to assassination – the direct targets of violence are not the main targets'[5] while others employ very succinct wording and determine it to be 'a tactic for the political objective of domination.'[6]

Terrorism – due to its amorphous character – presents a definitional quagmire and the problem with multiple definitions of terrorism is threefold. Methodologically, infinite definitions generate the problem of non-falsifiability[7] as it becomes very difficult to separate the "core" of terrorism from its various "mid-range" forms and sub-types. Ontologically, if *any* threat to national security is considered terrorism, then we are faced with the gloom of living in a state of constant terror. Finally, if everything is terrorism then there is no terrorism: the constant state of fear blurs the borders between what terrorism is and what it is not, making the fight against it futile.

The end of the Cold War, aggravated by 9/11, gave rise to new methods of warfare and terrorism followed closely the "old"–"new" wars discourse first introduced by Kaldor's seminal work entitled: 'New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era' in which the transformation of warfare was depicted. For Kaldor, new wars arise in the context of the erosion of autonomy and, in some extreme cases, the disintegration of the state. In particular, they parallel the erosion of the monopoly of legitimate, organised violence by the state.[8] The Weberian definition of a state having a monopoly over legitimate organised violence was replaced by the autonomy of illegitimate disorganised violence.

Similarly, 9/11 effected traditional terrorism, turning it from "old" (territorially-confined and politically-driven) to "new" (cosmic and all-pervasive). In defining the qualities of "new" terrorism Kegley identified ten key elements: the global targeting of civilians, using novel methods, waged by civilians, using hi-technology, organised by transnational non-state organisations, pursued by fanatical extremists, immoral and illegal, predicated on realpolitik principles and driven by hatred.[9] These benchmarks assist in capturing differences between terrorisms 1.0 and 2.0 into the combined categories of existential rationales, cognitive frames of reference, goals and objectives, popular support and geographic areas, and selection patters of targets and victims.

Differences in the *existential rationales* of "old" and "new" terrorisms stipulate diverse goals and objectives based on opposing moral considerations. "Old" terrorists are driven by existing social injustice between the subordinate (themselves) and the dominating (others) societal groups, and the desire to change the current (economic) system of wealth allocation. The forces fueling "old" terrorism are similar to the existential rationales of the dominating societies: independence, sovereignty and control over economic and political resources. In this respect they are fighting postional conflicts against their dominating societies where the key differences are in the visions these groups have on the political settings in their countries.

These goals are equally shared by "old(er)" European terrorist organisations such as: Euscadia ta Askatasuna (ETA – Basques nationalists), the Real/Irish Republican Army (R/IRA), the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASLALA) and the Red Brigades. These organisations represented specific ethnic or ideological groups (Basques, Irish Catholics, Italians, Armenians and Communists) and strove to achieve benefits for these groups alone. In the case of ETA and (R)IRA the goal was sovereignty for Basques and Irish Catholics from Spain and the UK. ASALA sought historical retributions and to serve justice to the perpetrators of the Armenian Genocide (1915) while Marxist-Leninists worked to construct 'a revolutionary state through armed struggle and to separate Italy from the Western Alliance.'[10]

The raison d'être of "new" terrorism is fundamentally different it is global and cosmic in nature. The flagship of terrorism 2.0 in Europe, al Qaeda, advocates the creation of a global Caliphate governed by Sharia law. The multitude of Chechen terrorist organisations operating in Russia (the Supreme Military Majlisul Shura of the United Mujahidin Forces of the Caucasus; Congress of the Peoples of Ichkeria and Dagestan; Caucasus Front of the Military Forces of Chechen Republic Ichkeria) maintain similar aspirations in their promotion of a Caucasian Imarat; an all-Muslim political entity in the Caucasian region. This implies a de- and reformulation of the region and the redrawing of the map by eliminating the Christian Republics of Georgia and Armenia.

The variance in the existential rationale between Terrorisms 1.0 and 2.0 is visible in corresponding *cognitive frames of reference*.

The difference between "new" and "old" terrorism may be viewed through the of actions on strategic and individual levels. "Old" terrorism seems inherently rational when it comes to actions aimed at achieving expected utilities. In other words, by choosing specific paths, rational actors aim to be better off than they were before making their choices.

Strategically, the tactics of asymmetric warfare is the imposition of insurmountable human and economic costs on a dominating side, rendering future confrontations too (rationally) costly to embark on.[11] Guerilla tactics and acts of public violence of "old" terrorists aimed to bring political, military, economic and moral attrition to their opponents. Kissinger's insights, made on the Viet Nam war, capture the message well. He remarked that,

> We fought a military war; our opponents fought a political one. We sought physical attrition; our opponents aimed for our psychological exhaustion. In the process we lost sight of one of the cardinal maxims of guerrilla war: the guerrilla wins if he does not lose. The conventional army loses if it does not win.[12]

This sentiment is equally applicable to "old" terrorism: the imposition of rational constraints on the dominating societies to achieve clearly defined political objectives.

Rational vs. Irrational Actors

Some scholars highlight the role rationality plays in the overall philosophy of the terrorist leadership. In their study, Neumayer and Plumper claim that 'the leaders of terrorist groups are predominantly rational and act strategically to reach their goal of increasing political influence in their home country.'[13] Here within lies the rationality paradox of "new" terrorism: engagement in irrational actions for the rationally affecting changes on the policy levels. A clear example of this effect was the withdrawal of Spain from the multinational force in Iraq within a month of the 2004 Madrid attacks. Even on individual level the terrorists were fully rational suicidal bombing tactics were not deployed. This was due to the desire of the terrorists to live through their struggle and to see the results of their actions. "New" terrorism lacks rationality on the strategic level with its costs imposed on the target governments being

exponentially lower than conventional or guerrilla actors. With its staged shows of violence, terrorism, as a crime, is far less lethal than any other types of warfare: according to Charkavorti, 'terrorism alone does not anywhere match the range of destruction caused by regular war, guerilla war and communal riots.'[14] The findings of the study conducted by Mueller and Stewart support this claim,

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> annual terrorism fatality risks... are less than one in one million and therefore generally lie within the range regulators deem safe or acceptable, requiring no further regulations, particularly those likely to be expensive... As a hazard, terrorism, at least outside of war zones, does not inflict enough damage to justify substantially increasing expenditures to deal with it.[15]

This factor makes both generations of terrorism less efficient than a standard asymmetric warfare.

The assumed irrationality of terrorism 2.0 continues to spread over the individual level to the terrorists' self-sacrificial actions: suicide attacks in the level of individual selfish rationality. Unlike the "old" terrorists who wanted to live to see the results of their actions, the suicide bombers decide to voluntarily exit the struggle. Selfish rationality proclaiming the supremacy of the human life fails in martyrdom. Since rationality promotes the quest for increased post-action utility, there is no way of pragmatically assessing the utility value change after successful suicidal attacks. Simply, no one ever returned from the other world with the message that the life after death is actually better. This means that actors have no point of post-action reference to evaluate their individual expected utility. Collectively, the situation is slightly different since the outcomes of the suicide attacks are meant for the greater benefit of the constituents. However, even here it is quite difficult to evaluate the effects of each individual act of terror within the larger picture of a supped cosmic war.

The rational choice component of the "old"–"new" terrorism dichotomy extends beyond the cognitive frameworks of the actors to their *goals and objective* arguing that once the demands of the actors are fulfilled (in some way or another) or they consider that they can no longer continue their struggle, the existential need to continue their actions will cease. In most cases, the "old" terrorist organisations in Europe had specific goals and tangible objectives,

were sovereignty-driven and followed concrete and limited agendas. The important thing is that their fulfillment will not cause the systemic destruction: these terrorist groups did not, typically, aim to make systemic changes and significant transformations in their target countries. In fact, they would prefer to live under the same political frameworks but with a greater utility for their groups.

Most "old" terrorists were part of a clearly defined ethnic-based political entity. The (R)IRA was 'subordinated to political control by a party,'[16] the Sin Fein. As a group closely related to Sin Fein, the (R)IRA had tangible, attainable and territorially-limited goals: self-determination, sovereignty and independence of Ireland from the UK. In Spain, self-determination was at the heart of the political and quassi-military struggle of ETA. Until recently ETA was a part of the Basque nationalist movement advocating the regional privileges and ultimate separation of the Land of the Basques, or Pais Vasco, from Spain and creating an independent own state. The existential causes of ASALA and other less "virulent" Armenian terrorist organisations[17] were rooted in the history of Armenian relations to Turkey. Its goals are also nationalistic-drive: to force Turkey to acknowledge the mass murder of the Armenian population of Turkey in 1915 as Genocide, to make Turkey pay reparations, 'to establish an independent and fully sovereign Armenian state comprising of the Armenian Soviet Republic and Turkish Armenia.'[18]

These "old" groups did not threaten the viability of the EC/EU and neither did any particular group have the capacity, or will (for that matter), to pose an existential challenge to any particular country (re: Spain and the UK). The ASALA, for its part, was pressing for the acknowledgement of the Armenian Genocide, which can, in principle, be achieved: there was no point on its agenda calling for the destruction of the Turkish state. The Red Brigades and Chechen terrorists stand somewhat, apart in this respect. In the first instance the resistance was caused largely by the Cold War rivalry (the Red Brigades wanted to remove Italy from NATO and to establish the communist state) while in the second case the primary aim is independence and sovereignty tinted though affiliation al Qaeda.

The situation was slightly different with the "old" Russian terrorist organisations, such as "Narodnaya Volya" ("People's Will") and the "Boyevaya Organizaciya Eserov" ("Military Organisation of the Social-Revolutionary Party"), which were on the forefront of violent

anti-governmental protests. These terrorist groups operated from within political parties (in fact, "Narodnaya Volya" was a party of its own) and represented ideological rivals to the obsolete Russian monarchy. However, their goals went beyond territorial control; these organisations had clearly-defined political demands directed at replacing the Russian ruling class with a populist order. According to Savenkov, a leader of the *Boyevaya Organizaciya Eserov*, this organisation was waging war against the current regime by eliminating its representatives.

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> By destroying them ... the Military Organisation... engages in an offensive action by brining in fear and disorder in the ruling cycles and aims at making the government comprehend the futility of keeping the current autocratic system.[19]

The goals and logic of "new" terrorism, in contrast, is irrational. Unlike their "older" counterparts, "new" terrorists wish not only to change the system: they want to destroy it completely. By posing existential threats to the western world al Qaeda is fighting a "civilisational," and not "positional" conflict. While uncompromisingly reject all the achievements of the civilisation they act against. Even if the US and its allies withdraw into isolation al Qaeda will persist.

The most paradoxical aspect of "new" terror is that it has no point of historical reference vis-à-vis the proposed end-states. In the case of al Qaeda's proposed Global Caliphate, starting from Rashidun, Umayyad, Abbasid and the Ottoman Caliphates, there is a steady desire of the Caliphate nations to create secular states. According to Arnason and Stauth,

> [t]he history of Islamic states appears as a long-drawn-out retreat from full exercise of religious authority. The early caliphate...was replaced by a monarchy which preserved some defining traits of its predecessor...but tended to replace the direct authority of religion with "group feeling and the sword"...; later... this transitory pattern declined into monarchy pure and simple, political at best and always in danger of regressing to the purely natural level.[20]

The aspirations of "new" terrorist organisations in Russia have the same problem of creating an entity that never before existed. There was no "Caucasian Imarat" in the Northern Caucasus even before it joined Russia; ethnic groups were ruled by their respective

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lords who were in constant conflict with each other. According to Khodarkovsky, the people of the North Caucasus represented a highly fragmented aggregation of Islamic societies organised on the basis of kinship, language, and common territory.[21] The nations populating the region – Dagestani, Kabarda, Circassians, Chechens, Ingushs, Circassians, Ossetians, etc. – were under strong Turkish and Persian influence and it took Russia 'three centuries of relentless effort to incorporate the whole region into the mother state, following the well-known pattern of conquest by war and the extension of protection.'[22]

Even the influence of Islam was not homogenous among the indigenous North Caucasian populations. Khodarkovsky further mentions that their adherence to Islam varied significantly – from the north-east Caucasus where Islam was deeply entrenched among the peoples of northern Dagestan and Chechnya, to the north-central Caucasus where Islam held a far more tenuous hold over Kabardinia... and Ossetia, and to the north-west Caucasus where Islam was often nominally accepted by the western Adyge people.[23]

On Contrasting Geo-Awareness

The patterns of gleaning support from constituencies as well as the geographic areas of operations differ significantly in terrorism 1.0 and 2.0. The "old" terrorist groups mainly recruited and received financial and human support from their corresponding ethnic constituencies. This was largely due to the specificity of their objectives: ethnicity-driven and territorially limited. Since most "old" terrorists advocated social justice for their respective group, their supporters would, naturally, come from these very communities.

The group-specific recruitment and location patterns extended to nearly all "old" terrorists. Even if some recruits came from other countries, their area of activities was limited. For instance, ETA was almost entirely composed of Basque nationals acting in Spain. Although, as Alexieva claims, the staffing patterns of ETA changed over time, with fewer recent recruits speaking the Basque language and having authentic Basque names,[24] ETA's personnel was limited to those who identify themselves as Basques. Similarly the (R)IRA recruit only Irish nationals – 'unpropertied unmarried, young men of middle classes, increasingly disproportionately dominated by

urban, skilled and socially mobile activists'[25] throughout the world. ASALA, also replenished its ranks from among young Armenians who joined the struggle against Turkey mainly in Europe. The Narodnaya Volya and the Esers, were composed of Russians and operated within the Russian empire. Although not quite impossible it is still difficult to imagine any Irishmen or Basque sharing the emotional stigma of the Armenian Genocide and joining ASALA to avenge the Turks.

Contrary to the staffing and operations of Terrorism 1.0, the human resources and logistics of Terrorism 2.0 makes it a truly global enterprise. In contrast to the recruits of the "old" terrorist organisations, in its 2.0 version ethnically limited patterns are rare. The recruiting and operational locales became internationalised: al Qaeda, (the Base), as the avant-garde of 2.0, does not have a 'single, uniform recruitment process for a group; rather, there are as many recruitment processes as there are distinct regions and nodes in which the group operates.'[26] This further complicates the tasks of law-enforcement agencies as it has become nearly impossible to identify current and future terrorists since they come from diverse background, ethnic groups, even have different sub-religious affiliations.

The globalised nature of the "new" terrorism, together with the following psychographic and state factors salient in recruiting were included as independent variables of the RAND study on terrorism: high level of current distress or dissatisfaction; cultural disillusionment; lack of an intrinsic religious belief system or value system; dysfunctional family and dependent personality tendencies.[27] Likewise, Sageman defined four parameters influencing appearance of the future terrorists that go beyond geographic limits: kinship, discipleship, worship and friendship, the last one being 'the only one type of social bound that might foster affiliation to the global jihad.'[28] Social conditions surpassing ethnic bonds, such 'as unemployment rates for young Muslims throughout Europe [that] are two to five times those of native Europeans'[29] were important factors in Vidino's study on terrorism recruiting in Europe. Neither of these variables is ethnically, geographically or linguistically-driven: any person from any set of values or ethnic belongings satisfying the basic recruitment criteria, can become a potential adept of the global terror. For example, the notorious Hamburg Cell responsible

for the 9/11 attacks was composed of a half-German and Moroccan and immigrants to Europe from Morocco, Indonesia, Yemen, Egypt, Lebanon and the United Arab Emirates.[30]

The only similarity between the new recruits to Terrorism 2.0 is that they pay no allegiance to their civic belongings, such as citizenship, but to more obscure causes. Al Qaeda is, essentially, 'composed of informal networks that mobilise people to resort to terrorism.'[31] Some "new" terrorists are not born Muslim but are Christian converts to Islam. According to Boukhars, most jihadists are captivated by ... anti-imperialist dimension of transnational jihadism, as is clearly shown by the converts to Islam... who came to find solace in an anti-system Islamist supportive milieu... challenging what they believe is a hegemonic Western system perceived as racist and discriminatory.[32] For example, in 2005 a Belgian convert blew herself up in Iraq in an unsuccessful suicide bombing against US soldiers. Another recent convert to Islam in the UK participated in the foiled bomb attack in 2006.

Like al Qaeda, the "new" terrorists in Russia attracted religious converts mostly from the Russian mainland. Hahn confirms the 'intensifying trend of a growing number of ethnic Russians, who have joined the Caucasus Emirate (CE). Many, if not all, of them have had ties to the CE mujahedin and have carried out some of the most egregious terrorist attacks in the past year or two.'[33] The most notorious was Pavel Kosolapov who exploded the Nevski Express train in 2007; Said Abu Saad Buryatskii-Tikhomirov, half-Buryat, a prominent Islamist ideologist, and suicide bombers Vitalii Rasdobud'ko and Marina Khorosheva.[34]

The transnational character of 2.0 further extends to the location of their attacks, re: global. Al Qaeda and its affiliated cells indiscriminately target the governments and civilians of the "infidel" countries all over the globe. According to the Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002 report by the US Department of State, prior to 9/11 al Qaeda had already attacked US troops in Yemen and Somalia and US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania; its members plotted assassinations of the Pope and (former) President Clinton; and attempted attacks against the Los Angeles International Airport. After 9/11 al Qaeda bombed a synagogue in Tunisia; attacked A French tanker in Yemen and US military personnel in Kuwait; staged A bombing of a nightclub in Indonesia; bombed western housing compounds

in Saudi Arabia; attacked numerous western targets in Casablanca; bombed a synagogue in Istanbul, the Madrid trains in 2004 and the London underground in 2005.[35]

In Rusia, acts of terror are focused almost entirely in the North Caucasus with occasional acts of violence in urban centres. Al Qaeda affiliates, supporters and direct accomplices view 'Chechnya as another potential front for al Qaeda, and in particular as a gateway to Europe.'[36] Sylas talks about the 'Al Qaeda-backed rebels in Chechnya.'[37] Perhaps, one of the most prominent Al Qaeda representative was Jordanian national Khattab, a notorious warlord under their charismatic leader Chechen rebel Shamil Basaev transnational character of the "new" recruits was also noted by Gunaratna, 'By August 1995 the 6,000 guerilla fighting the Russians in Chechnya included 300 Afghan Arabs' and also '[e]xperienced *mujahidin* from Bosnia-Herzegovina and Azerbaijan' (emphasis provided).[38] Upon combining the data from the Caucasus Emirate website Kavkazcenter and the census data in Northern Caucasus, Hahn came up with the figure of 3,740 mujahidin in the region.[39]

Not only do "new" terrorists in Russia "host" cadres from around the world, they also participate in the actions of their supporters beyond Russian´s borders. Several Kabarda nationals-mujahidin were identified to have been sent to Guantanamo Bay in 2002 from Afghanistan. The list of North Caucasians fighting´s Global Jihad also includes the Dagestani Amir Seifullah Gubdenskii together with his Russian-speaking Jamaat – the team.[40]

Vidino notes that while many of the al Qaeda European members and affiliates 'are born in Europe, of parents neither Muslim nor Christian, others came from places such as Uzbekistan, Venezuela, or the United States.'[41] Pew Research Center´s 2005 study on terrorism found the following variables salient in the matter of harnessing popular support for terrorist organisations with an Islamic agenda: demography, views about Islam, opinions about democracy and attitudes towards the US.[42] According to the RAND resport (noted above), a typical group of al Qaeda supporters 'consists of diffuse or very loosely aligned supporters who welcome the news of a new terrorist attack or do not make an effort to distance themselves from al Qaeda's claim to represent their cause.'[43] Similar to transnational recruits, the Al Qaeda's constituencies can be who ever and live anywhere, an Iraqi villager, a wealthy Saudi, or a young

unemployed European Muslim, a recent religious convert, a sympathiser from the dominant group or even state officials.

On Targets and Victims

The difference between the selection of *targets* and the *victims* is another incongruence between terrorisms 1.0 and 2.0. While the victims of terrorist attacks are their direct casualties, the targets, in general, may include broader range of actors from state institutions, government al representatives, businesses, facilities or common citizens; all those whose will the terrorist groups are aiming to affect by their actions. From this perspective, the victims of the "old" terrorists were its targets. The pattern of unifying victims with targets was a distinguishing feature of 1.0.

RAND identified 142 attacks on businesses, 108 attacks on diplomats, 66 on military installations, 23 on airlines and 35 attacks on citizens in 1988.[45] Out of "old" terrorists, ETA's operatives were well known for their selective targeting. Over 60% of its victims were members of the Spanish police, military and politicians whereas civilians were mainly the '[i]nformers, drug-dealers, entrepreneurs who do not succumb to the financial extortion, people with extreme right-wing ideology, or people involved in the "dirty war" against ETA.'[46] For fostering their cause ETA used a range of tactics: 'bank robberies, kidnappings, intimidation, sloganeering through public graffiti, hard-line political posturing through surrogate political parties, exaction of a "revolutionary tax" from targeted Basque businesses, bombings, and assassinations.'[47]

ASALA, was also known for targeting the representatives of the Turkish political establishment; victims were policy-makers and representatives of the Turkish government. The Assembly of Turkish-American Associations defined the categories of ASALA's attacks, among which the most prominent were the assassinations of the Turkish diplomats throughout Europe.[48] The (R)IRA had developed the similar pattern of targets in their attacks. The Global Terrorism Database identified 826 incidents of terrorists attacking the military personnel and installations; 562 attacks on police; 550 attacks on businesses and 431 attacks on civilians from 1970 to 2010[49] undertaken by the (R)IRA.

The end of the Cold War caused a philosophical mutation in the nature of terrorism: the "new" terrorism has separated its victims from its targets. The change in the terrorists mindset occurred mainly as a result of substituting its objectives from a politically-motivated confrontation to a show of universal violence. According to Stohl, "new" terror's ' victims and all that destruction were not as important to the perpetrators as the audience around the world that viewed that destruction.'[50] Rand´s "How Terrorist Groups End" includes 3827 civilian deaths and over 8000 injuries with only 110 military deaths and 221 injuries in al Qaeda attacks between 1994 and 2007.[51] This equates to approximately 97% civilian victims and casualties.

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Terrorism 2.0 attacks civilians to affect policy change. Victims are selected indiscriminately without prejudice to their religious believes, language or citizenship. Many terrorist attacks took the lives of the representatives of nominally supporting groups (for example, 38 out of the 202 victims of the Bali bombing in 2002 were local Muslim Indonesians). On a contextual level, however, the targets of 2.0 extend far beyond their actual victims to a much wider audience: all those not affected by the terrorist attacks directly. This fact makes the "new" terror in Europe a human rights violation. It was an act of violence committed with the purpose of violating the fundamental rights of the people beyond the actual location of its attacks. These terrorists do not have any bonds with their victims they do not hate them per se since they do not know them. The people they kill have nothing to do with the cause of their struggle. Nor do they represent their solution since it is the policy of the many civilised countries not to negotiate with the terrorists. They hate the system with all its living inhabitants, which brings us back to civilisational war waged by the "new" terrorists.

There is dissonance between the targets and victims of 1.0 and 2.0 in Russia. Narodnaya Volya and the Esers had a limited targeting scheme aimed government representatives, 'governor-generals, mayors, commanders of military regiments, heads of prisons, gendarmes, high-level policemen, bailiffs, constables, judges and prosecutors[...] members of the State Duma and even the royal family.'[52] The apogee of the early terror in Russia was the assassinations of the General Mezencev (1878) and Russian Tsar Alexander II (1881)

by the Narodnaya Volya. Interestingly, as a certain code of honor early Russian terrorists pledged not to kill women and children.

The Collapse of the USSR and the revival of ethnic identities brought a 360 degree shift to the MO of terrorism in Russia. Soon after the declaration of independence of Chechen Republic Ichkeria 1991 the terrorist brigades in Chechnya launched a series of unprecedented attacks on civilian and military targets. After the First Chechen campaign the dispersed Chechen forces regrouped in their hideouts and started terrorising local populations and Russian federal forces. In 1995 a total of 80 civilians died as a result of hospital attacks by a notorious warlord Shamil Basayev in Budenovsk.[53] In 1996 a whole town of Kyzlyar was taken hostage by a group of 500 boyeviks led by another militant, Salman Raduyev.[54]

In 1999–2000 the explosions of apartment houses and in subways in the Northern Caucasus and Moscow shook Russian society beyond the immediate ground-zero of the Chechen terrorism. In 2002 117 hostages died during the infamous counter-terrorism operation in the "Nord-Ost" show-hall in Moscow as a result of the neuro-paralytic gas used by the Russian troops.[55] In May 2004 a number of top-level Chechen officials were killed as a result of the explosion at a local stadium in Grozny, including the President of the Chechen Republic Akhmad Kadyrov and Head of the State Council Hussein Isayev. In the same year, as a result of taking hostage of a secondary school in the North Ossetian town Beslan and the response of Russian troops 335 people died, including 300 hostages.[56]

The differences between terrorism 1.0 and 2.0 are summed up in the table below.

Table 1.

	Terrorism 1.0	Terrorism 2.0
Existential Rationale	Collective social justice	Cosmic ideas
Cognitive Frames	Rational	Irrational
Goals/Objectives	Systemic change	Systemic destruction
Popular Support & Geographic Area	Regionally/Locally recruited/ Territorially limited	Transnationally recruited
Targets/Victims	Same/Military/governments/politicians	Different/mainly civilians

Europe is familiar with the phenomenon of terrorism. Throughout the centuries politically motivated sub-national groups sought to foster their causes using various means of terror. As Coolsaet noted, 'Europe did not wake up to terrorism on 9/11. Terrorism is solidly entrenched in Europe's past.'[57] Car bombings in Ireland, assassinations of political leaders and explosions in Spain, France, and former East Germany are some of the signs of activity of the "old" European terrorism.

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European counter-strategies were, historically, within the competence of the member-states who were either dealing with their own terrorist organisations or with the specific cases of terrorism taking place on their territory. When terrorism reemerged after the Cold War, and especially following the 9/11 events, the European Union identified terrorism as 'a growing strategic threat to the whole of Europe.'[58] As early as 2002 the EU adopted the Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism, which provided an overly broad definition of terrorism, including the attacks against person and physical safety, attacks on governments and the military, various types of hijacking, production, possession and usage of 'weapons, explosives or nuclear, biological or chemical weapons ... release of dangerous substances, or causing fires, floods or explosions ... interfering with or disrupting the supply of water, power or any other fundamental natural resource'[59] The Framework Decision also defined the authority of the European Union member-states and the urged them to establish clear law-enforcement measures against terrorism.

The Strategy marked, according to De Goede, the start of "preemptive" counter-terrorism policies in the EU where the Decision, by 'criminalising terrorist groupings, terrorist financing and terrorist facilitation fulfills a precautionary function that enables the pursuit and punishment of suspects who have not engaged in any violent act but may (or may not) do so in the future.'[60] In a effort to further develop the "preemptive" effort to create a unified response to the increasing attacks of the global terrorist networks in Europe, the EU issued its Framework Security Strategy in 2003 where terrorism was included as threat number one to European security. The Strategy acknowledged that Europe had become 'both a target and a base for such terrorism: European countries

are targets and have been attacked.'[61] This way the Strategy incorporated the renewed vision of the European member-states to jointly counter terrorism as 'a global scourge that requires a global response'[62] The Strategy, thus, became the foundation for the future counter-terrorism efforts in Europe.

It was not until the 2004 Madrid bombings that the EU took one of its most important steps: the creation of the position of the EU Counter-terrorism Coordinator who coordinates counter-terrorism within the EU, monitors the implementation of the counter-terrorism measures and represents the EU in cooperation efforts with third parties. Another milestone in EU counter-terrorism legation followed the London underground attacks in 2005 after which the UK proposed the creation of the European Counter-Terrorism Strategy to unify the efforts of the member-states to protect the citizens of the whole Union by ensuring due fight against terrorism within their borders.

The Counter-Terrorism Strategy follows the Security Strategy's guidelines in the fight against terror states in that '[d]ealing with terrorism may require a mixture of intelligence, police, judicial, military and other means.'[63] The Strategy puts these means into its four pillars of the European security foundation: prevent, protect, pursue and respond. Jointly these aim to decrease the fear in European societies of the threat of terror and creating a joint pan-European anti-terrorist shield. The Strategy was a step beyond the initial post-Cold War "opening" of the common European space to external influences and back to Churchill´s post-WWII version of the 'noble continent.'[64] The four pillars of the Strategy show the *exclusionary-protective* character of the EU counter-terrorism measures directed against the growing challenges of terrorism 2.0 coming from the extraterritorial Islamists groups with footholds in the European Muslim communities.

The Preventive pillar aims at disrupting the grounds nurturing and supporting terrorists. It focuses on 'limiting the activities of those playing a role in radicalisation, preventing access to terrorist training, establishing a strong legal framework to prevent incitement and recruitment, and examining ways to impede terrorist recruitment through the internet.'[65] Following from its title, the Protective pillar is built 'to protect citizens and infrastructure and reduce our vulnerability to attack, including through improved

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security of borders, transport and critical infrastructure.'[66] The European Border Agency was given a leading role in securing EU borders against incoming threats, strengthening already strict anti-immigration policies among the European states.

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The migration issue is, perhaps, the most sensitive aspect within the Protective pillar. Europe has been a traditionally point of destination for numerous waves of migration. In recent history this occured during WWI and WWII and at the end of the Cold War – from East to West and South.[67] At the end of the 1990s however, migration started attracting the increased attention of receiving countries and has resulted in social tensions which, as recent spates of violence in France, the Netherlands and UK attest, occasionally spill over into violence. The tragedy of July 2011, when the Norwegian fascist, Anders Brevik, bombed a government building in Oslo and murdered 77 people as part of an "anti-multiculturalism Crusade" mass shooting may be placed.

The popular discontent with the large numbers of immigrants in Europe are further exacerbated by the threats uttered by top-level EU officials which suggest that their countries may leave the common European Schengen zone in case of the continuous flows of migrants,[68] the statements on previously unthinkable failure of the multiculturalism[69] and cut down the numbers of current immigrants[70] are some of the responses by European governments to the growing popular resentment within European host communities against the incoming migrants. The Swiss Minaret Controversy[71] (2009) and the French Burka Ban[72] (2011) reflect this growing animosity towards their Muslim communities, which is directly linked to their perception of the impending threat of civilisational change.

The *Pursue* pillar addresses 'disrupt[ing] terrorist activity and pursue[ing] terrorists across borders.'[73] This pillar fosters active co-operation between the EU member-states in the matter of unifying their anti-terrorist efforts and harmonising their actions against trans-national terrorist cells. Finally, the *Respond* pillar promotes 'rapid sharing of operational and policy information, media co-ordination and mutual operational support, drawing on all available means, including military resources.'[74] In addition to these measures, the EU would be engaged in crisis management operations and providing assistance to the EU citizens in non-EU countries.

The evolution of terrorism in Russia includes traditional terrorists organisations that were later replaced by the state terror of the Communist party, which itself gave way to the "new" mid-range type of terrorism: sovereignty-driven but employing the civilian-targeting tactics. The end of the Cold War catalysed national self-determination movements in ethnically-defined political entities through the former USSR. While most of the former Soviet republics soon successfully ended their quests for independence there were some minor ethnic formations whose self-determination was denied by the new sovereign states of which they were once members.

In Russia this process continues with unrest in Chechnya. Contrary to the evolution of terrorism in Europe, its Russian counterpart grew only "half younger" and remained in the intermediary phase of politically-laden and territorially-confined partisan warfare with symbolic acts of mass civil violence in Chechnya proper and irregular terrorist spill-overs into neighbouring regions and Moscow. Ever since the dissolution of the USSR, terrorism in Chechnya had a separatist character. Thousands of citizens and Russian military personnel died during the First (1994) and the Second Chechen Wars (2000).[75] As part of their counter-terrorism strategy the Russian government has adopted a number of *inclusionary-preventive measures*. The 2006 Federal Law on Counter-Terrorism defined terrorism broadly as 'the ideology of violence and practice of influence on the decision-making of the state authorities, local self-governance bodies or international organisations, aiming at intimidation of the population and/or other forms of unlawful violent actions.'[76] The law was an important step in giving broad authority to the Russian military to participate in counter-terrorist operations within and beyond the legal borders of Russia. More specifically, the law focused on the order, conditions, leadership, means, negotiations and an end-state of counter-terrorist operations within Russia and beyond.

A key part of the law was its territorial application with reference to counter-terrorist operations. The longest such operation in the modern Russian history took place between 1999 and 2009 in Chechnya. It was enacted upon the accession of Putin to the office of President and was officially ended by Medvedev. The operation

involved a large ground deployment of Russian troops and the installation Kadyrov as President of Chechnya. As a result, 'The Russian security forces have had a string of successes in eliminating the most effective and well-known rebel leaders.'[77] Human losses in this campaign were significant: by some estimates, about 60 000 military and civilians were killed and 65 000 were wounded.[78] Although sporadic upsurges of violence continued to threaten the local population, it was more a political rather than a tactical decision to end this operation in 2009.

Another major milestone in the counter-terrorism legislation in Russia was the 2006 Presidential Law 'On The Counter-Terrorism Measures,' which established a number of entities responsible for coordinating counter-terrorism efforts: the National Counter-Terrorism Committee (on the federal level); counter-terrorism commissions in the federal subjects (on the local levels); federal and operational headquarters and, separately, the operational HQ in Chechnya. These agencies were included in the top-down counter-terrorist scheme headed by the Putin. On the operational level, the Committee is responsible for coordination of the counter-terrorist activities between these organisational units, overall implementation of the counter-terrorism legislation in the Russian Federation and specific counter-terrorist operations. In particular, according to the Committee, 48 smaller counter-terrorism operations were conducted in 2009 as a result of which 85 terrorist acts were disrupted and 450 terrorists have been eliminated, including known al Qaeda emissaries and affiliates as well as local terrorist leaders.[79]

The counter-terrorism efforts in Russia are not limited to laws and creating numerous law-enforcement agencies and structures most substantial preventive steps were taken in the direction of working with the Muslim communities and are directly related to the territorial nature of terrorism. Unlike in Europe where terrorists were mostly recent or second or the third generation immigrants to the EU member-states, i.e. "extra-territorials," terrorists in Russia have deeper roots. If we pinpoint the hotbed of terrorism there, it would be concentrated in the North Caucasian region; if we were to narrow down the ethnic composition of the terrorists, we would receive mostly "intra-territorials:" the Chechens, Ingushetians and Dagestani, with a small number of international terrorists from

radical Muslim communities outside Russia and the representatives of the title Russian nation.

The threat of terrorism that is linked to migration in Europe is practically absent in Russia. Migration does, indeed, present an grave concern to the Russian authorities: by World Bank estimates, there are more than 12 million migrants coming from Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, and Moldova, which constitutes about 8.7% of its total population.[80]

While migration, as a separate phenomenon, is a serious factor affecting the economic, political and social climate in Russia, migrants are not, per se, related to the threat of terror in Russian discourses. The overwhelming majority of the migrants to Russia – about 11 million people between 1991 and 2011[81] – because of economic, political, and security problems abundant in the post-Soviet Republics were ethnic Russians previously residing there. For instance, Dmitriev and Sleptsov notes this specific ethnic factor of migration by pointing out that 75% of the early migrants to the Russian Federation were ethnic Russians.[82] By some estimates, the migration potential of the Russian nationals and other Russian-speaking people to Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union was 25 and 4 millions respectively.[83]

The mostly homogenous ethnic composition of migration to the Russian federation makes the "new" terrorism a strictly endemic and "intra-territorial," home-grown and largely localised phenomenon. The fact that most terrorists operating in Russia are Muslims does not affect the further spread of terror to other regions populated by Muslims. For example, the Muslim Tatars who mostly reside in the Tatarstan Republic, represent the second most numerous ethnic group in Russia – about 4% of the population,[84] while the total number of Muslims living elsewhere in Russia, by the estimates of the Council of Muftis, is 26 million, including legal and illegal migrants.[85] Muslim settlements are widespread in the Russian Federation, yet the threat of terror originates primarily from the Northern Caucasus.

Knowing the "zip code" of the "new" terrorist organisations makes the counter-terrorist efforts easier from the point of view of employing the inclusionary-preventive counter-terrorism strategies. Unlike the EU, which is simultaneously implementing preventive

and, mostly, exclusionary measures directed at limiting the flows of migrants who might be increase terrorist risks, Russia is introducing state programmes directed at raising levels of education among its Muslim citizens. In 2007, Russia launched a large-scale national Action Plan on educating young Muslims. The major objective of this Plan is 'to develop and implement the measures directed at supporting the Muslim religious communities (mosques) loyal to the state by strengthening their materials and financial standings for organisation of the activities against the radical elements.'[86] To support this endeavour financially, the Federal Education Agency's Order #345 allocated some 235 million Rubles (approximately $8 million USD)[87] to seven selected universities to develop humanities and social science curricular with the specific focus on Islam in the world and Russia, in particular. The total of 800 million Rubles (circa $27 million USD) was spent to support the Muslim communities educationally and economically.[88]

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The localised nature of terrorism in Russia and its limited geographic area allowed its government to undertake integrated counter-terrorism measures directed both at protecting its citizens from the threat of terrorist attacks by the counter-terrorist operations and to cut the financial and human support to known terrorist groups. Yet the threat of terror is vital and continues to distort the normal course of life in the country. Vivid examples of non-systematic and sporadic acts of violence were the recent explosions at the Moscow subway stations in 2010 and in the Domodedovo Airport in 2011 (30 dead and 150 wounded).

Conclusions

The diverse evolutionary stages of terrorism in Europe and Russia explain the differences between the counter-terrorism approaches in these regions. While Europe treats the contemporary terrorism as largely an extra-territorial phenomena, Russia views it as its internal problem. Terrorism in Europe has moved from the state of classical "tool" of politically motivated and mostly ethnicity-based groups into the "cosmic" and universal counter-civilisational form. In Russia, however, terrorism is still mostly sovereignty-driven: it did not "grow young," it remained on the evolutionary stage of the terrorism in Europe in the 19th–20th centuries.

These differences in origins and MOs of terrorism in Europe and Russia lead to diverse countering actions. While the EU enhances the information-sharing and cooperation as a part of their common policies without active participation of Europol or national law-enforcement agencies, Russia has been involved in active military operations against known terrorist groupings. At the same time, Europe, through its exclusionary-protective programs, is building an invisible defensive fortress around its borders by installing new control procedures and preventing the inflows of new migrants from countries with unusually high terrorist activity. This problem is almost completely absent in the Russia allowing it to focus its attention on inclusionary-preventive steps to reduce the numbers of the future adepts and sympathizers from within by various educational and support programs.

Three clearly identifiable problems are shared by both the EU and Russia. Firstly, the exceptional versatility of terrorism to the changes in the external environment. As de Kerchove argued, 'terrorism is like a virus. Eradicated in some places it is continuing to adapt itself to new conditions and to draw strength from ineffective measures to control it.'[89] The ever-mutating nature of terrorism makes the governments extremely resourceful when it comes to inventing new counter-terrorism measures. Secondly however, what unites Russia and the EU is absence of choice of counter-terrorism strategies. Europe has to employ preventive measures to target the incoming threat of terrorism while Russia has no option but to face the reality of preventing home-grown terrorism from proliferating. Finally, we have the dimensional gap between the issue (terrorism) and its solutions (counter-terrorist efforts), which is, in a sense, of a physiological origin. It is difficult to kill a fly with a bear hand because a human eye and a fly's eye perceive the objective reality differently. While for a human a fly moves extremely quickly, for a fly it is a human who moves extremely slowly. Likewise, terrorism 2.0 goes beyond the conventional confrontation of terrorism 1.0 by challenging the very human dimensions of life that requires unconventional responses. A proper counter-terrorism swatter has yet to be designed.

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