FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY AND THE EU'S CFSP

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Abstract: *This article examines some of the main phases of French activities within framework of the EU´s Common Foreign and Security Policy. Since the end of the Cold War the Fifth Republic has become obsessed with strengthening European political and military importance around the world. This was caused not only by the collapse of the bipolar world order, but also by France's clear ambition to regain its global power status. In the twenty-first century, Paris was a main architect of the CFSP, however not all of its initiatives were successful. After the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, France continues to pursue its goal to obtain such a level of integration, which will ensure Europe's place as a one of the most important pillars in the new multi-polar world order and France as a pillar within such a configuration.*

Introduction

The development of the EU´s Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is certainly one of the most important priorities of French foreign policy. During the Cold War, French initiatives jump-started the slow process of Europe's (re)empowerment on the international scene. For example, the revitalisation of the Western European Union (WEU) in the 1980s was a project strongly inspired by Paris. The collapse of the bipolar system presented both new opportunities and challenges for the European integration process. At the beginning of 1990s, as a historical initiator and promoter of a united Europe, the Fifth French Republic was faced with a choice: either to continue and support European integration, or to forfeit its position as a leading country in Western Europe. According to Szeptycki, the French postulates to develop a European integration process after 1989 were caused mostly by the disadvantageous changes in the international environment. Therefore, France became more

interested in the development of a European identity than other countries. Szeptycki suggests that there were several motives for creating the CFSP and they became key goals for French diplomacy. Firstly, political cooperation between European Community members seemed naturally, consequential and supplemental for economic integration. Secondly, the CFSP would enable more effective protection of European interests and values, which were threatened by hyperpuissance – re: the US. Thirdly, the realisation of the CFSP would allow Europe to promote its values such as: peace, liberty, international law and environment protection. According to Palais d'Elysee, the world needed Europe as an example of the 'power of peace,' focused on the economic, social and cultural problems.[1] That would also allow the realisation of a more, traditional goal of French foreign policy; building a multi-polar world order with Europe as one of its pillars and France as one of its main gravitational pulls.[2] Gordon formulated a similar opinion, noting four explanations for why the Fifth Republic became so tied to the idea of the CFSP. These are:

- The unification of Germany that was perceived as a challenge for Paris;
- The need to complement European integration with political cooperation;
- The need to ensure the safety of Europe if the United States withdraws its forces;
- The need to have a greater impact on European matters.[3]

In the following years, the Fifth Republic confirmed that European integration, especially its political and security dimensions, would become one of the key goals of its own foreign policy. Thanks to French activities, together with German and British cooperation (re: the St. Malo Summit), since the end of the 1990s, the EU has made tremendous progress towards constructing a unique European identity in international relations. Such progress was accelerated by the Kosovo War (1999), when it became apparent that the EU had no crisis response capability. To develop such tools the Helsinki Summit later the same year became a turning point in the European Rapid Reaction Forces development as it produced a constructive blueprint for such forces.[4] The process was also influenced by the 9/11 terrorist attacks as well as the Iraq War in 2003. A "transatlantic divorce," as referred

to by the French, initiated several new ideas that extended the EU's military capabilities.

France, the Constitutional Treaty and European Security

The most important achievement for France at the beginning of the twenty-first century was the Constitutional Treaty. The 'Constitution for Europe,' shaped predominantly,[5] included a number of legislations that opened new perspectives for the CFSP. To start with, the Constitutional Treaty established a Foreign Affairs Ministerial post, whose main task was to conduct the Union's foreign and security policy, by giving them the initiative in the foreign and security matters under the mandate of the Council of Ministers. The minister could also perform a similar role in the area of Common Security and Defence Policy and had a right to represent the EU in the international environment. The Constitutional Treaty also established a European External Action Service, which was tasked with supporting the office of the Foreign Affairs Minister. According to Czaputowicz, the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe expressed European ambition in playing a major role in international relations[6]. That opinion was also supported by (then) Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt, who observed that Europe should become a 'counterweight' to the US, but in a constructive way. He also claimed that Europe's autonomy is not an attempt to 'strengthen the ESDI by weakening NATO.' These ambitions were also a long-term goal of the Fifth Republic. As Palais d'Elysée stated several times, Europe should become a counterweight for American influence in the world, while avoiding bilateral rivalry. Europe and the US should continue its equal cooperation, especially in security affairs.[7]

The Constitutional Treaty also contained several important solutions concerning the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). First, the Petersberg Tasks were updated and adjusted to the challenges of the twenty-first century. Second, member states committed to creating multinational military forces, ready to be deployed by the EU. Third, the creation of the European Defence Agency (EDA), as an institution supporting EU efforts to improve defensive capabilities. Article I-41 introduced mutual solidarity if

any member state is the target of military aggression. Again, it was France which sought to adopt more comprehensive options than those offered under NATO's Washington Treaty. Paris has often criticised NATO's key, Article 5, as being insufficient in ensuring the safety of NATO's European members. That is why the Constitution for Europe introduced an obligation to help member states with all available means. The Constitutional Treaty also codified the EU's cooperation mechanisims in combatting terrorism.[8] This document can therefore be perceived as being breakthrough for the development of the CFSP. The most important sections of this Treaty, the Foreign Affairs Ministry and the mutual solidarity in defence, correspond to key parts of France's strategy for advancing its own international relations ambitions. Therefore, these two additives to the EU's international engagement should be measured against France's ideal-type international position.

Consequently, and because of the deep connection between the Treaty provisions and France's international ambitions, controversy arose in public and leadership circles in traditionally neutral EU member states: Austria, Sweden and Finland. However, it was supported by Great Britain which had been reluctant to duplicate the defence functions of NATO and the EU. The Constitution was signed on 29 October 2005 in Rome. Paradoxically, and despite France's influence an engine behind the realisation of the Treaty, it failed largely due to the French society's reluctance to further submit parts of its sovereignty. In May 2005, 54.87% of the French electorate voted against the ratification of the Constitution,[9] an act repeated by the Netherlands. The outcome of the referendum came as a great surprise for French political elites, who were, for the first time, faced with vote of no-confidence for the European policy of the Fifth Republic.[10]

Chaouad and Nies noted that the setbacks of the ratification process hinder French initiatives to further develop the ESDP and neither did it influence the EU's international activities in any significant way. The EU simply cooperated under older arrangements.[11] Indeed, France and its partners continued their efforts to deploy the first Battle Groups as elaborated in the *Headline Goal 2010* document, which assumed that the EU would develop the capacity to deploy small, well armed and trained, rapid reaction forces for preventing crises. Some of the most important tasks for the

Battle Groups were humanitarian interventions, rescue and peace-keeping missions, peace enforcing operations, disarmament, and anti-terrorist actions as well as security capabilities development. *Headline Goal 2010* also listed the main EU security projects untill 2010 as:

- Improving cooperation between military and civilian components within crisis management operations;
- Developing the European Defence Agency;
- Obtaining strategic transportation capabilities;
- Achieving fully operational Battle Groups by the end of 2007, as well as a maritime component.[12]

Eventually, the EU, supported by France, built 20 Battle Groups, mostly consisting of multinational forces. Additionally, France was engaged in the development of civilian components of the ESDP. In December 2004 the European Council adopted the *Civilian Headline Goal 2008*, which concluded document concluded that the Union's crisis management operations should consist of military forces together with civilian components. Both were to be ready to launch missions within thirty days of the date of the decision.[13]

Major breakthroughs were however made in 2007; after the "phase of reflection" Germany proposed adopting a new document, an answer for to most significant challenges facing further European integration.[14] This effort was boosted with the May 2007 election of Sarkozy.

The Lisbon Treaty and European Security

On 21-23 June 2007, the European Council decided on a negotiating mandate for the Intergovernmental Conference to determine the final shape of the new EU Treaty. The conference started in July at the ministerial meeting in Belgium, lasted 3 months and in October 2007, at the European Council meeting in Lisbon, the new document was adopted.

The Lisbon Treaty reformed many important fields related to European integration, in particular the CFSP. The new Treaty however copied many of the solutions, with slight adjustments, from the Constitution for Europe. Ultimately, the core legislation remained intact. The Foreign Affairs Minister post was replaced by a High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security

Policy (article 9).[15] That change was due to fears expressed by several states, that the Foreign Affairs Minister might limit national sovereignty in international relations and in the declarations attached to the main document, member states concluded the main legislation in foreign policy and security matters. The Treaty ensured that the EU would not interfere in member states' external activities.[16] The EU also obtained legal subjectivity and the Lisbon Treaty cancelled the Constitution's legislation concerning the European Council's rotational presidency; replaced by a president with a 2,5 year cadence, whose main tasks were to preside over the Council's activities, to prepare and support the Council's work, to support consensus in the EU and prepare reports of the Council's actions for the European Parliament.[17] As some have noted, depending on the person holding this office, the president might greatly influence the external actions of the EU.

The Lisbon Treaty also introduced the European External Action Service (EEAS), responsible for diplomatic relations with third party states. The EEAS would serve as a foreign ministry support and diplomatic corps for the Union. Among the most important goals of the EU in the international environment, the Lisbon Treaty listed:

- Protection of European values;
- Protection of fundamental interests;
- Security;
- Independence;
- Support of democracy;
- Rule of law;
- Human rights;
- International public law;
- Conducting peacekeeping operations and conflict prevention in accordance with the United Nations Charter.

Other goals of the Treaty included support for economic and social development, environmental protection, the promotion of international economic integration support of the Third World countries, and the support for a multilateral system, based on co-operation and good governance.[18] Closer analysis shows that such goals are almost identical to the main foreign policy preferences of the Fifth Republic. Legislation concerning the promotion of a multi-polar international order, support of democratic values, the rule of law and human rights and peacekeeping actions, as well

as conflict prevention, have all been traditional, long-term goals of the Fifth Republic since Charles de Gaulle´s presidency. Such policy similarities provides insights into the close connection between French and EU foreign policy as reflected in the Lisbon Treaty.

Another section of the LisbonTreaty was dedicated to the Common Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Article 28a, paragraph 1 stated, that the CSDP was an integral part of the CFSP and it assured the Union's operational capabilities in regards to civilian and military components. Those resources were to be used by the EU to conduct peacekeeping, conflict prevention, and security strengthening missions in accordance with the UN.[19] A significant role was granted to the EDA and its main goals listed in the Treaty included support for European defence industries and the development of European military capabilities.

Interestingly, article 28a paragraph 7 contained a solidarity mechanism whereby in the event of aggression, all EU member states were to use all means to help and support the attacked country, in accordance with the principles outlined in article 51 of the UN Charter.[20] In article 28b paragraph 1, the Treaty expanded the catalogue of Petersberg missions to include:

- Disarmament;
- Humanitarian missions;
- Search and rescue operations;
- Military advisory missions;
- Conflict prevention activities;
- Peacekeeping and crisis management.

Article 28b also introduced the EU to the war against terrorism by allowing the scope of their military operations to involve anti-terrorist objectives. Furthermore, each EU military operation should be supported by a special political representative of the EU.[21] Thus Missiroli was correct in stating that the Lisbon Treaty laid strong 'fundaments for the CFSP which should allow the Union to play a larger role in international relations – a role postulated by France since the end of the Cold War'.[22] Another opinion was formulated by Gnesotto, who stated that despite the Lisbon Treaty, the EU 'urgently needs further clarification of its goals in the CFSP, especially when it comes to security problems and the EU's realisation of its interests in the international environment.'[23] The Lisbon Treaty did not share the fate of the European Constitution though

it was rejected by Ireland, the only country to organise a referendum for public approval. In June 2008, 53.4% of Irish voters rejected ratification, which questioned the future of CFSP and CSDP.[24]

The reaction of France, one of the Treaty's main supporters, was quite severe. Although Sarkozy initially said that an 'Irish "no" is not a sign that the Irish want to leave the European Union. It is a sign that they have many different concerns in this matter.' Shortly afterwards he threatened that without the Lisbon Treaty, the EU would not be prepared for extension.[25] There were also rumours that during private conversations with Irish politicians, Sarkozy pressed them to prepare a second referendum.[26] French officials also harshly criticised the presidents of Poland and the Czech Republic due to their reluctance to ratify the Treaty until the Irish changed their minds. Senior Elysée officials described Poland´s president Kaczyński (July 2008) as a difficult partner: 'He has never been a particularly easy partner to work with in building and shaping Europe.' At the same time Sarkozy declared that he 'believes that the president of Poland will honour its signature and ratify the Treaty.'[27]

France perceived itself as a main engine (together with Germany) of the EU´s process in the political and security dimensions. Indeed, during France's 2007 presidential elections, Sarkozy emphasised his commitment to reclaim France's role as a promoter of a unified, strong and active Europe. On 06 May 2007, after winning the election, he declared: 'I believe in Europe, and I believe that today France returns to Europe.' He assured the public that he would not ignore those who perceived the EU as a "Trojan horse," not as protection.'[28] His vision of European integration had been included in his speech to the European Parliament in February (2007) where he said that he had wished to build Europe 'with the capacity to act and to defend.'[29] Sarkozy's European vision is based on two main pillars.

Sarkozy's two main goals were based on strengthening EU defence capabilities while enhancing it´s resources for conducting independent foreign policy. During his 2007 speech to the European Parliament, he asked: 'This would prove to be a clear sign that France would pursue its goal of developing EU defensive potentials.[30] In doing so it became increasingly evident that French interests revolved around gaining independent capabilities to deploy

military forces to achieve the Petersberg objectives. The retardation of the ratification process (June 2008), slowed, according to Paris, the possibility of opening a new era in political integration. Sarkozy indicated as much following the end of Russo-Georgian hostilities in late August 2008, when he linked the impotent EU response to the crisis to the lack of progress in implementing the Lisbon Treaty. Sarkozy believed that the ratified Treaty would have provided the EU with the appropriate tools for contributing to an adequate solution to the conflict. Sarkozy specifically indicated that the High Representative For Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, supported by the EEAS could have positively effected the conflict. Without them, France despite having presided over the European Council, could not adequately represent all member states.[31]

France´s EU Presidency

The significance of the CFSP and the 'Europe of Defence' concept for Paris had been supported by the main goals of the French presidency in the European Council (from 1 July to 31 December 2008), and developed under the slogan of a 'Europe that acts to respond to today's challenges.' One of the five main goals of the presidency indicated the urgency of the further development of the ESDP and the formulation of the Union's common security doctrine.[32] Paris Palais d'Elysée during this was committed to:
- Developing the resources allowing the EU to obtain the status of a global subject in crisis management operations;
- Fighting against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;
- Fighting against terrorism.

These tasks were to be implemented in cooperation with NATO North, the UN and the African Union (AU). France also pursued the further development of the European Rapid Reaction Forces as assets for conducting crisis management operations and expanding of the civilian components of the CSDP and strategic air transport. Paris was interested in deepening cooperation between national defence industries and military research institutes while strengthening the EU's minister of defence role in the decision-making process for crisis management.[33]

The second pillar of Sarkozy's European vision concerned heightening momentum for the EU's international relations related actions. This was to be achieved via multidimensional partnerships in Africa, Asia, Middle East and the America´s. Such engagements were not primarily of a political or security nature - as more traditional alliance structures had been - they rather gravitated around economics, social issues, and environmental cooperation.

France sought opportunities to promote both its (and, by extension, the EU's) interests and its most coveted values: the rule of international law, the proliferation and defense of democracy, the protection of fundamental human rights. Promoting a multidimensional track for EU activities through the establishment of a broad network of partners would, it was hoped, facilitate a more international role for the EU, with France at the helm. This was the dominate policy thinking in Paris as France assumed the EU presidency to the European Council.

It did not take long for French plans to materialise, hoisting the importance of the EU's CFSP while further projecting France's international influence. Indeed, such mutual policy enhancements (re: France's and the EU's) are clearly reflected in France's Mediterranean initiatives where Sarkozy proposed the creation of a Union for the Mediterranean, an institutional arrangement meant to mimic the EU's budding supranationalism and economic solutions to political problems. The first step was rooted in strengthening the so-called Barcelona Process, which was, essentially, an infrastructural thrust literally paving the way for deeper and more comprehensive trade partnerships between the EU and non-EU Mediterranean countries as well as between non-EU Mediterranean countries themselves. Such a narrow set of ambitions rapidly expanded beyond the initial scope and priority lists transformed from economic-centric partnerships between EU, North African and Middle Eastern states to broader coordination in: foreign affairs, security-related issues, regional social and cultural issues, human rights, and environmental protection. Despite the expansiveness, and problematics surrounding such an ambitious proposal for Sarkozy such a policy would ultimately 'build peace in the Mediterranean … like yesterday we built peace in Europe.'

Given the current situation in the Middle East and North Africa (early 2011), it is difficult to conceive of Sarkozy's Mediterranean

policy as anything except naive (at the least) or malicious. However, it is necessary to contextualise France's regional interests since it is clear that France and the EU depend on the South and East Mediterranean for their economic stability. Hence, regional harmony must be seen as a vital French interest. In fact, Sarkozy was certain that his Mediterranean policy would encourage the bridging of political gaps between the Arab states and Israel, Greece and Turkey and Morocco and Algeria. Sarkozy continued to suggest that a Union for the Mediterranean would not be an organisation of 'north against south, not Europe against the rest … but united;' in other words, it was to be an organisation for reconciliation much like the Schuman Plan was for Germany and France in the 1950's. The Union for the Mediterranean was realised during the 13 July 2008 Heads of State Summit.[34]

Consequently, the Union for the Mediterranean can be assessed from two perspectives. First, it afforded the EU and France opportunities to cooperate – with greater influence - with South and East Mediterranean states. In trailblazing such cooperative relations on behalf of the EU, France was, in some ways, labouring to construct a viable socio-political and economic bridge over the Mediterranean and may be seen as a unifying actor in the region. Second, and alternatively, the Union for the Mediterranean sparked internal EU tensions since it was seen as duplicating the existing political infrastructure embedded in the Mediterranean Partnership programme and was therefore a waste of money. Additionally, critics were wary of the unifying force of the Union for the Mediterranean. Since it would be impossible to harmonise relations between the EU and *all* South and East Mediterranean countries simultaneously such a plan may inadvertently lead to further divisions in Africa: between those granted preferential treatment and those kept at arms lenght, not to mention African states south of the Sahara.

France, Lisbon and Transatlantic Security Architecture

Any failure in enhancing the CFSP through the Lisbon Treaty would also thwart French plans to construct new architecture for the Euro-Atlantic security system based on close and equal partnership between NATO and the EU. While it is true that both actors

were not in competition and should ultimately complement each other, Sarkozy was interested in carving a political niche in transatlantic leadership. On this point compromise was reached and it was agreed, even if tacitly, that NATO would primarily deal with 'hard' security challenges, while the EU would assume responsibility for so-called 'soft' security issues. To confirm this idea, it was essential for France to normalise relations with NATO and Sarkozy prioritised France's full re-entry into NATO's military structures. However, this was done against the backdrop of a key requirement: that the EU should militarily contribute to the "Europe of Defence" concept.

Visions of relations between EU and NATO in the twenty-first century were fully introduced by Nicolas Sarkozy during the Sarkozy's vision of EU-NATO relations were introduced during the 45th Munich Security Conference (07 February 2009) in which he suggested that unipolarity (re: US hegemony) has been an international problem since 1989: 'We are living in a world of relative powers. It's a first observation around which we should plan our strategies. As Angela Merkel said, as Donald Tusk said, one power cannot face major problems or conflicts in the world (...) We need new powers, to [...] pressure belligerents and achieve peace.' In this way, Sarkozy articulated a key foreign policy goal, that France sought to create a multi-polar world order based on cooperation to solve global security challenges. In this context, Sarkozy referred to Franco-American and Euro-American relations: 'I am very attached to our friendship with the United States of America. It is a friendship between independent and respecting allies (...) We all face the same problems: terrorism, [re: nuclear] proliferation, attacks against network systems, climate changes (...) That is why in a family, as we call the West, Europe and America, we have common values, we need to defend together, not to force others to our will, but to convince. Europe has made its choice between European constructions and NATO. We have built peace on both. And France is attached to [this model].' For Sarkozy the basis of European peace – and possibly international peace - are common values. Without Euro-Atlantic values, you cannot belong to the 'family' of NATO and the EU: 'In the European Union you have to be prepared to share your own independence, and in NATO you have to be ready to help your allies. It's

a family (...) NATO and Europe are very important for the stability of the world.' Referred to his first 'pillar:'

> In my conception the deal is simple: it's Europe of defence *and* NATO, not Europe of defence *or* NATO. This is why in strengthening Europe you have to simultaneously strengthen NATO. It would be a grave mistake to weaken one to develop another. However I understand that this choice is not a simple matter for a contemporary France.

Sarkozy also presented his vision of relations between France and NATO:

> Many times France was suspected of weakening NATO. It was funny because, when France was suspected of weakening NATO, we developed our place there (...) In France some people believe that NATO is a threat to our independence (...) I will never do anything what might harm the sovereignty of my country. Never. However an alliance between the United States and Europe is not a threat to our independence, rather it strengthens it (...) France can renew its relations with the Atlantic Alliance, being a free and sovereign ally of the United States (...) I had an opportunity to talk with Barack Obama and like him, I suppose that the renewal of NATO-French relations will be beneficial for the Fifth Republic, Europe and the Alliance'[35].

Sarkozy was vindicated at the beginning of April 2009 when France officially rejoined NATO after a forty year (+) absence. This policy ran parallel to events that were shaping the EU for the foreseeable future, events that France was deeply involved with.[36].

Conclusion: France and the CFSP

French efforts to save the Lisbon Treaty were accomplished in October 2009, when Ireland agreed (in a second referendum) to ratify the document. This was followed by Poland and the Czech Republic which kept their promises to ratify once Ireland agreed and their own demands met. The significance of French efforts was underlined by Barroso who declared that the adoption of the Treaty 'is a strong expression of the European institutions modernisation to achieve a more effective and transparent European Union (...) By

being one of the first countries that ratified Lisbon Treaty, France confirmed its aspirations to lead Europe.'[37]

French policy towards the CFSP/CSDP after the Lisbon Treaty was refined in 2009 by a declaration from the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs which listed the main French priorities in the development of "Europe of Defence:"

Miron Lakomy

- Development of technological and industrial fundaments for the CSDP;
- Consolidation of the EU's partnerships with NATO and the United Nations;
- Enhancement of the EU's responsibilities in managing global problems.

Those goals were to be achieved by:

- Strengthening the Union's capability of using military forces in crisis management operations;
- The development of satellite intelligence under the EU's Satellite Center;
- Increasing the effectiveness of the EU task forces via the activity of the European Defence Agency;
- The development of a 'common defence culture' and an interoperability within European military forces.

Furthermore, according to the Ministry, the EU should be ready to simultaneously conduct two large stabilisation operations (10 000 soldiers and civilians each), two rapid reaction missions (1500 soldiers and civilians) and evacuation and humanitarian missions as well as 12 civilian operations (3000 members together).[38]

French plans in the post-Lisbon development of the CFSP/CSDP faced some major obstacles. First of all, there was still no uniform idea for improving European integration mechanisms supported by all members. As Maulny and Biscop noted, there was an urgent need to create a proposal, which would indicate the main directions of development of the European Defence for the future.[39] A similar opinion was formulated by Errera who suggested that European countries must answer a few fundamental questions:

- What are the most serious threats for the European Union?
- How does the EU distribute costs of common defence?
- How does the EU use military forces in the international environment?[40]

147

Another problem for French plans, as Ghez and Larrabee noted, was a reluctance of the EU member states to further develop the CSDP. Giving a new impetus for the "Europe of Defence" idea would not be possible if all member states were not involved. According to Ghez and Larrabee, in an age of great economic and social problems in Europe, it is difficult to expect the governments of Great Britain or Germany to be enthusiastic about the French plans in increasing military expenditures, which was *sine qua non* requirement for making progress in the area of defence.[41]

For decades France was one of the most active promoters of the development of a common European defence and the EU's identity in international relations. Despite many obstacles, Paris repeatedly initiated important projects under the second EU pillar. It became clearly visible in the first decade of the twenty-first century that the Fifth Republic, motivated by the Kosovo war and rising global threats, contributed to the development of European crisis management capabilities. One of these manifestations was in the French role in the elaboration of a Constitution for Europe. The ensuing fiasco led to the situation in which the Fifth Republic lost its status as one of Europe's leaders. The ratification of the Lisbon Treaty was a chance for France to regain its significance. France made every effort to persuade other countries into ratifying the document and was rewarded when Ireland, Poland and the Czech Republic were finally convinced, in large part thanks to the efforts of Sarkozy. Since 2007, Sarkozy has been strongly interested in opening up a new era in the development of the CFSP and CSDP. Paris, following the main goals of its *politique de grandeur*, sought new ways to enhance its international power status and since its national potential was insufficient it decided to rely on the capabilities of the EU, which was within its capacity to influence. As such it might be expected that the French Fifth Republic will continue to remain a major promoter of defence and foreign policy integration in the EU, despite possible obstacles.

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1   Andrzej Szeptycki (2005), *Francja czy Europa? Dziedzictwo generała de Gaulle'a w polityce zagranicznej V Republiki*, Warszawa:Wydawnictwo Scholar, p. 266.

2   Pascal Boniface (1998), *La Frace est-elle encore une grande puissance*?, Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, p. 48; Jacek Rudnicki (2000), 'Prawo interwencji a nowy system bezpieczeństwa w ocenie Francji,' in Erhard Cziomer (ed) (2000), *NATO u progu XXI wieku. Wobec nowych wyzwań i problemów bezpieczeństwa*, Krakow: Instytut Studiow Strategicznych, pp. 135-140; Anne Dulphy and Christine Manigand (2006), *La France au risque de l'Europe*, Paris: Armand Colin, pp. 206-208.

3   Philip H. Gordon (1993), *A Certain Idea of France. French Security Policy and the Gaullist Legacy*, New Jersey: Princeton UP, pp. 172-177.

4   Peter Schimdt (2000), 'Where's the Boeuf? Policy Rhetoric and Reality in the EU's Decisions to Develop a Common Security and Defence Policy,' in David G. Haglund (ed) (2000), *The France-US Leadership Race: Closely Watched Allies,* Kingston: Queen's Quarterly, pp. 128-129.

5   For instance Valery Giscard d'Estaing was the President of the Convention on the Future of Europe.

6   Jacek Czaputowicz (2005), 'Polityka zagraniczna i dyplomacja Unii Europejskiej a Traktat Konstytucyjny,' *Raporty i Analizy,* 4, pp. 1-10.

7   For example, this opinion was stated several times by Dominique de Villepin. See: Miron Lakomy (2008), 'Stosunki transatlantyckie w polityce zagranicznej Francji na początku XXI wieku,' in Mieczysław Stolarczyk (ed) (2008) *Problemy polityki zagranicznej Polski i stosunków międzynarodowych na początku XXI wieku*, Katowice: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, pp. 152, 165.

8   *Opinia Komisji Spraw Zagranicznych Parlamentu Europejskiego dla Komisji Spraw Konstytucyjnych w sprawie projektu Traktatu ustanawiającego Konstytucję dla Europy* (2004/2129(INI)), at: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/ad/548/548262/548262pl.pdf> (accessed 20 November 2010); See: *Tekst Traktatu Ustanawiającego Konstytucję dla Europy*, at: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2004:310:0011:0040:PL:PDF> (accessed 20 November 2010); Claire Piana (2005), 'Vers une Europe de la defense?' in Damien Helly and Franck Petiteville (2005) *L'Union européenne, acteur international*, Paris: L'Harmattan, pp. 101-104.

9   See: *The Ratification Process in France*, at: <http://www.unizar.es/euroconstitucion/Treaties/Treaty_Const_Rat_France.htm> (accessed 21 November 2010); See: Dulphy and Manigand, *La France au risque de*

l'Europe, pp. 84-122; Loic Azoulai and Fabrice Picod (2007), 'Introduction: La France dans la construction europeenne,' *Annuaire Francais de Relations Internationales*, VIII, pp. 430-431; Gerard Soulier (2007), 'La France et l'Union europeenne apres le "non" au referendum du 29 mai 2005,' *Annuaire Francais de Relations Internationales*, VIII, pp. 432-457; Fabrice de la Serre (2005), 'L'architecture institutionelle de l'Union europeenne comme acteur international: genese et evolution,' in Helly and Petiteville (eds) (2005), pp. 18-20, 36-40.

10 As Charles Cogan noted, France perceives European integration as a way to regain its long lost 'global power' status. From this perspective, French politicians support political and security integration to multiply their own influence in Europe and beyond. A similar opinion was formulated by Frederic Bozo and Katarzyna Kubiak. See: Charles Cogan (1999), *Alliés éternels, amis ombrageux*: *Les Etats-Unis et la France depuis 1940*, Bruxelles: Bruylant, pp. 14-42, 359-382; Katarzyna Kubiak (2002), 'Role międzynarodowe V Republiki,' *Stosunki Międzynarodowe*, 1:2, pp. 135-139; Frederic Bozo (1997), *La politique étrangere de la France depuis 1945*, Paris: La Decouverte, p. 103.

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Miron Lakomy

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