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Humanitarian Arms Control, Symbiotic Functionalism and the Concept of Middlepowerhood[1]

Initial Remarks on Motivation, or Why another Study on the Landmine Case?

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This article arises from dissatisfaction with predominant accounts concerning changes in interactions between nongovernmental actors and governments in contemporary world politics, namely the image of a tension between so-called state-centric and transnational worlds. Specifically, it can be conceived of as a response to an ongoing stream of celebratory commentaries on the alleged victory of the transnational world over the state-centric one in what has been hailed by commentators as a paradigmatic case: the campaign to ban antipersonnel landmines.

The interpretation presented here can be seen as a corrective to what seems to be a universal generalisation of the nature of the relationship between governments and nongovernmental actors at both the theoretical and empirical levels. In an attempt to overcome this simplistic dichotomy, I make two arguments: firstly, counter to the popular perception that there is tension between the two 'worlds,' I argue that the landmine case suggests the emergence of a new type of functional-symbiotic relationship between key governments and nongovernmental actors. Secondly, while not denying the input of nongovernmental actors in the landmine case, it is suggested that a crucial moment enabling the landmine campaign to gain momentum was brought about by the

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emergence of a new type of reasoning by key governments, the Canadian one in particular. It was this change in governmental reasoning which provided an opportunity for nongovernmental involvement on the issue.

In order to examine the functional-symbiosis between governments and non-governmental actors,[3] it is worth examining their interactions, in particular assessing the heuristic potential of the two approaches known as the *global-governance approach* and the *governmentality approach*. The former, largely influenced by (James N.) Rosenau, has, over the last fifteen years, served as the basis for major studies addressing the interactions between governments and non-governmental actors. This approach, however, raises a number of problems; in particular Rosenau's claim about the tension and power struggle between the two worlds. As a means of overcoming these shortcomings, the governmentality approach, originally devised by Michel Foucault, can be applied. It is precisely this dual ontology that will be contested: it is argued that the institution of political sovereignty, which is Rosenau's basic premise for his distinction between the two worlds, is an indeterminate criterion for explaining interactions between governments and nongovernmental actors insofar as there have been significant differences in ways of organising the exercise of sovereignty among various states. The main objective of this section is to propose a theoretical apparatus capable of analysing the main object of study, i.e. the changes in the interactions between some governments and nongovernmental actors.

Regarding the second argument, the governmentality approach is utilised for examining changes in governmental rationality in some states, most notably Canada, before and during the campaign to ban landmines. It will be argued that the functional-symbiotic relationship between the Canadian government and nongovernmental actors in the landmine case was a result of the shift from what is termed here the 'governmentality of organised modernity' to the 'governmentality of advanced liberalism'. It is argued that the institution of state sovereignty *per se* is an indeterminate explanatory criterion with regard to the landmine case since both of the above governmentalities can be distinguished from one another on the basis of different organisation and exercise of state sovereignty: while it was exclusively the government who exercised state sovereignty during the former, the latter allowed nongovernmental actors to participate in this conduct, thus effectively producing the joint exercise of political sovereignty.[4]

In the first instance, attention will be directed towards the concept of middlepowerhood and its political function as a legitimising factor behind the so-called 'New Diplomacy' through which Canada's exercise of political

[3] The term 'nongovernmental actors' is used to refer to non-profitmaking and charitable organisations pursuing a common interest or common good on behalf of a wider community.

[4] The terms 'state sovereignty' and 'political sovereignty' are used in this article interchangeably.

sovereignty, informed by the governmentality of advanced liberalism, was conducted. Afterwards, the shift in governmentalities will be demonstrated on the issue of production, funding and the use of knowledge about security. Figure 1 on page 156 is an illustration of these dynamics.

The scope of the fourth part, which represents an empirical analysis in the critical re-examination of the landmine case, focuses on the interactions of the Canadian government with various NGOs subsumed under the umbrella of the Mines Action Canada (MAC), which has itself been part of a wide transnational advocacy network, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL). Specific attention will be paid to the period of 1993–1997; the period starting with the launch of the ICBL and concluding with the signature of the Ottawa Convention, though further developments and the consequences of the shift in governmentality are also outlined and reflected upon.

Foucault and the 'New Wave' of Friendly Theorising: Shifts in Governmentalities and the Creation of the Biopolitical Individual

The global governance approach is theoretically premised upon complex interactions between different types of actors at various levels of world politics. Changes in spheres of authority and reconfigurations of power are claimed to be two of the most important consequences of these unprecedented dynamics. Political power is reputedly being transferred from an eroding nation-state to so-called global civil society, and this process is seen as highly desirable as it makes world politics more democratic (Rosenau, 2002, 70–86; 1997, 308–10; 330–63; 1992, 1–29; 1990; for an application to the landmine case see Price, 1998; Mathew and Rutherford, 2003).[5] The relationship between nation-states and nongovernmental actors can thus be viewed as a zero-sum game in which the gain of one side automatically means a loss for the other side (for an excellent analysis, see Sending and Neumann 2006).

The (now) classic text of such thinking, in terms of academic influence, is Rosenau's *Turbulence in World Politics*. Here and elsewhere, the author claims that the nation-state is losing its power, and that in the near future world politics will, as a result, be characterised by the 'bifurcation of macro global structures into what is called the two worlds of world politics' (Rosenau, 1990, 5). He continues by arguing that the struggle between non-state actors and nation-states will continue, and ultimately produce a stalemate between two competing entities: 'an uneasy *tension* between the two worlds would emerge as the fundamental condition of global politics' (Rosenau, 1990, 447, 453–4,

[5] For a similar argument, compare to Cronin (1999, 3–40). Put differently, since there is no logic of anarchy present (Wendt, 1992, 391–425), there is none for state sovereignty either (cf. Biersteker and Weber, 1996; Bartelson, 1995).

emphasis added). Rosenau's argument is reiterated by cosmopolitan democracy scholars, Held and McGrew (2002). These authors argue that global governance is characterized by predominantly horizontally stretched networks (global civil society) as opposed to the traditional, and largely hierarchical structures of nation-states, resulting in several infrastructures of governance with political authority being fragmented, complex, and overlapping (Held and McGrew, 2002, 1–24).

Rosenau's metaphor based on the ideas of rivalry (the transfer of power) and irreconcilability (tension between the two worlds) inevitably fails to account for the functional-symbiotic interactions between key governments and nongovernmental actors as they seem to have occurred in the landmine case. Therefore, a theoretically more suitable approach is needed, and this can be drawn from Foucault's scholarship on governmental rationalities, or governmentalities, which allows for the possibility of addressing the issue of functional-symbiosis between governmental and nongovernmental actors. This governmentality approach cannot be considered a substantive theory; rather, it is a theoretical approach which provides the user with a series of problems as well as techniques for solving them. The advantage over Rosenau's framework consists in the fact that the governmentality approach does not make any substantive claims, e.g. who are important actors, which level of analysis to focus on, or what has been the nature of interaction between actors, prior to the actual analysis of the issue (cf. Dean, 1999, 149). For this reason, it can be understood as a question-driven approach, subsumed under a broader category of interpretive-abductive approaches, dealing predominantly with "how" questions. The key term of the approach is that of *government*, in the sense of a socio-political function (Sending and Neumann, 2006), or as The Oxford English Dictionary (2002) instructs us, 'a particular system or method of controlling a country.'[6] The term generally delineates any intentional and rational activity conducted by various actors who are using different techniques and forms as well as sources of knowledge in order to shape, affect or guide themselves, interpersonal relationships, or even societal relationships regarding the conduct of political sovereignty (Dean, 1999, 10–6, 259; Gordon 1991, 2–3). It is the organisation of *government* and its exercise of political sovereignty through diplomacy as its carrier within the realm of world politics that is the main interest of this article.

Although Foucault himself was largely focused on examining the concept of governmental rationalities within the confines of the nation-state, the scope of my analysis goes beyond national boundaries (cf. Larner and Walters, 2004, 1–20; Hindess, 2004, 23–39). Strictly speaking, the frontier as a source of exclusions must be transgressed since it gives rise to Rosenau's problematic

[6] The above distinction between the two governmentalities also corresponds to the passage from disciplinary society to the society of (self)control, as suggested by Hardt and Negri (2000, 419 fn. 1) and Deleuze's (1988) interpretation of Foucault.

dual ontology. In other words, it is the practice of creating powerful dichotomies (1. inside, internal *Vs.* outside, external; 2. the state-centred world *Vs.* the transnational world) that is being contested (cf. Walker, 1993). However, transcending the border is not intended in any sense to imply a radically pluralist image of "anything goes". The institution of state sovereignty still has its importance, mainly because it is nation-states that are the primary subjects of international public law. State sovereignty is, nevertheless, an indeterminate criterion in terms of explaining the dynamics between governments and non-governmental actors: it simply does not tell us much about the organisation of these interactions,[7] hence this attempt to re-examine the landmine case by employing the Foucauldean governmentality approach. So how has *government*, as a socio-political function, been practically conducted within the realm of world politics as far as the landmine case is concerned?

The argument put forward is that contemporary transformations in world politics are transformations brought about by a shift in governmental rationalities, leading to changes in actors' activities and the level of their autonomy and responsibility. To be specific, it can be observed that an increase in the autonomy, self-regulation and responsibility of nongovernmental actors is related to the transition from a governmentality of organised modernity to one of advanced liberalism.[8] While the rationality of organised modernity has been manifest in attempts by governments to fit the interests of society as a whole to mechanisms of social welfare, the shift to the governmentality of advanced liberalism was quite the contrary. It was characterised by the employment of procedures and techniques through which individuals were recreated from originally passive political objects to active subjects and objects of *government* (Cruikshank, 1999, 19–47; Dean, 1999, 40–59; Gordon, 1991, 6–7, 35–47). During this transition, the techniques of command changed: while the governmentality of organised modernity was largely sustained through a network of *dispositifs*, 'or apparatuses that produce and regulate customs, habits, and productive practices' (Hardt and Negri, 2000, 23; cf. Deleuze, 1992, 159–67), the governmentality of advanced liberalism can be said to have achieved a similar effect through more subtle and appealing ways, in the sense of a democratic arrangement in which citizens can decide and make choices themselves. In

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[7] The adjective 'neo-liberal' does not, in this context, refer either to neo-liberalism as a political doctrine or to the set of constitutive macroeconomic rules known as the Washington Consensus. Here, neo-liberalism is not understood as a negative force, creating a number of social exclusions (Larner and Walters, 2004, 4), but rather as an art of *government* in which individuals are seen as effective and efficient political subjects (Burchell et al., 1991: ix).

[8] An example of a study falling into the trap of considering middlepowerhood a normative ideal is Melakopides's (1998) *Pragmatic Idealism*. The author puts forward a thesis about Canadian politicians allegedly respecting the concept of middle power and carrying out the work of its 'content', which Melakopides sees as created during the Golden Age, throughout the period between 1945 and 1995. Melakopides is consequently forced to produce a consistent story of CFSP, regardless of what the particular PM or ministers' practices were like, thereby significantly skewing the account.

concrete terms, the discipline was let out from formal institutions, diffused through society and consequently internalised by citizens themselves; one can then think of it as biopower and the entire mechanism as *biopolitical* since it has been the bodies and brains of political subjects that have 'regulate[ed] social life from its interior, following it, interpreting it, absorbing it, and rearticulating it' (Hardt and Negri, 2000, 23–4).

Although Foucault (1991) refers to the former as the governmentality of welfare-state, this article follows Wagner's (1994) term, governmentality of 'organised modernity', also used by Sending and Neumann (2006). It does so because the politics of welfare is but one particular institutional manifestation, though most probably the central one, of a deeper reconstitution of the role of the individual in the society. As this article shows, however, another example of the same shift was a redefinition of what counted as knowledge about landmines and who produced, supplied and funded it, and its subsequent institutional embodiment into the new diplomacy. With regard to the latter, this article prefers Rose's (1993) term governmentality of advanced liberalism to the original one of neo-liberalism as coined by Foucault.[9] The reason is nicely captured by Dean (1999):

> [the neo-liberal governmentality] refer[s] to specific styles of the general mentality of rule …. [a]dvanced liberalism will designate the broader realm of the various assemblages of rationalities, technologies and agencies that constitute the characteristic ways of governing in contemporary liberal democracies … While neo-liberalism might be characterized as the dominant contemporary rationality of government, it is found within a field of contestation in which there are multiple rationalities of government and a plurality of varieties of neo-liberalism (Dean, 1999, 149–50).

Subsequently, the governmentality approach poses three challenges to the global-governance approach. Firstly, that it is not useful to examine interactions between nation-states as a generic category and nongovernmental actors because it seems counterproductive due to the different experiences of various states. The focus is shifted, instead, onto an alternative agency of middle power, that is, the interactions between the Canadian government and the nongovernmental actors involved in the landmine case. Such a perspective puts greater emphasis on the political function of specific collective national identities (i.e. the self-constructed status), thereby avoiding the pitfalls of universal accounts associated with an examination of generic identities based on the institution of state sovereignty as its lowest common denominator (Ruggie, 1998, 14).

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[9] This method is typical of Welsh's (2004) *At Home Abroad,* in which the author argues that the only way for Canada to reinvigorate her foreign and security policy is to move beyond the notion of middle power.

The second challenge is in regard to Rosenau's claim about the erosion of the nation-state and the tension between the two worlds. Specifically, I maintain that in certain states – for example, in Canada's case as a self-constructed middle power – the autonomy (including independent agenda-setting), self-regulation and responsibility of nongovernmental actors does not conflict with the interests of the Canadian government, but actually support it by enhancing the country's symbolic status and influence in world politics. Canada's involvement in the landmine case – both in terms of its governmental and nongovernmental actors – is a powerful example of how both entities cooperated in a functional-symbiotic manner.

Finally, the conceptualisation of power differs from Rosenau's perspective: although the governmentality of advanced liberalism can be seen as a kind of degovernmentalisation of the state (Rose, 1993, 296), this does not by any means imply Rosenau's transfer of power. Here, power is not understood as concentrated, possessive, stable and localized in the Weberian sense, but, instead, as a ubiquitous, relational, constitutive and spatio-temporally contingent phenomenon, defined in terms of the practical tasks of *government* (Gordon, 1991, 3). It is therefore argued that the landmine case was not an example of a *transfer* of power, but simply an increase in the responsibility and autonomous activity of nongovernmental actors.

The construction of the problematic of landmines and its subsequent institutionalisation into the ICBL by nongovernmental actors can usefully be considered in the context of the shift from the rationality of organised modernity to the one of advanced liberalism. To do this, it is necessary to look at changes of knowledge about security and thus investigate the government/nongovernmental-actor nexus. While the rationality of organised modernity is characterised by a tight bond forged between the government and knowledge about security, the rationality of advanced liberalism allows the dissolution of this bond, resulting in a situation where knowledge is being produced and subsequently supplied to the government by non-governmental actors. However, first it is worth giving some attention to what has been seen as a crucial condition for the successful implementation of the rationality of advanced liberalism in Canada's exercise of political sovereignty in the landmine case – the category of middle power as a legitimising factor of the so-called 'New Diplomacy'.

Middlepowerhood, the New Diplomacy and a Shift in the Typification of Knowledge about Security

An analysis of the discourse and political practices of Canada's post-Cold War foreign and security policy indicates the incorporation of advanced-liberal procedures into the concept of middle power. Yet there is nothing inevitable about the above combination: it is more a result of historical contingency than universal and linear development.

How has this link been forged and what has been its purpose? The answers to these questions are connected to the significance of middlepowerhood as well as the new diplomacy in the Canadian context. The association of Canada with the category of middle power has quite a long and interesting history. The notion came emerged as WWII was coming to an end: it was Canadian diplomat Humphrey Hume Wrong who devised the functional principle in the first place, and it was subsequently adopted by the Prime Minister of that time, Mackenzie King, for his own concept of middle power. Later, Canada's government unsuccessfully sought to insert a reference to a special category of middle power into the UN Charter at the San Francisco Conference of 1945. Despite the absence of formal recognition, the category of middle power, underpinned by active internationalism and the belief in multilateral practices within the UN, became the bedrock of Canada's Golden Age in foreign policy (1945–1957) (Chapnick, 1999, 73–82). As I have argued elsewhere (Thomsen and Hynek 2006), Canada's foreign and security policy had as its distinguishing feature, a notable discrepancy between political discourse, which has given the impression of linear and continuous progress, often achieved by references to the Golden Age and middle power, and practical policymaking as conducted by each Canadian government since the WWII onwards. It is the discursive continuity that has helped to form the perception of Canada as a country with a distinctive foreign and security policy, imbued with a normative ideal of middlepowerhood.

The suggested discrepancy between the linearity of discourse and the variability of policymaking concerning Canadian foreign and security policy is an important finding with respect to the methodology associated with middlepowerhood. Initially, it highlights the futility of examining Canadian involvement in world politics against the normative ideal of a middlepowerhood that is immutable in time.[10] However, another available strategy, the dismissal of the category of middle power, is not seen as a viable alternative either since middlepowerhood has been playing an important legitimising function in the introduction of the country's various practices – most recently the new diplomacy based on the governmentality of advanced liberalism – thereby preserving the semblance of continuous and linear development.[11] However, a third strategy avoids both the pitfalls of the normative-idealist view

[10] Although this point could raise a question about the possible cooption of nongovernmental actors by the government, or the Trojan horse phenomenon, available accounts (cf. Cameron et al., 1998, especially chapters 2, 3, 10–11, 19–21; for the case of small arms and light weapons, Krause, 2002, 258–9), as well as a series of personal qualitative interviews which I conducted with representatives of NGO community (MAC, Oxfam Canada and Physicians for Global Survival) and governmental officials at the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade in Ottawa during April 2006, do not suggest this.

[11] An opinion poll from spring 1996 suggests the considerable influence of the MAC's mandate, since 73 per cent of Canadians – as opposed to 22 per cent of Americans – supported the total ban of APLs (cit. in Tomlin, 1998, 211 fn. 25).

of middlepowerhood as well as resisting the temptation to reject it altogether. It can alternatively be understood as a political category constructed by relatively autonomous decision-making circles immediately after WWII (Pratt, 1983–4), with its importance stemming from the positive endorsement of both the Canadian public and international society. The category of middle power is thus considered an *empty form* which needs to be – and has actually been – refilled again and again, hence Cox's (1989, 827) assertion that 'the middle power is a role in search of an actor.'

Although Foucault dates neo-liberal governmentality back to the 1970s, its manifestation in the theme of the present analysis could only be discerned after the Cold War was over. The reason for this delay lies in the fact that the ideological polarisation of world politics effectively created an environment where self-constructed middle powers, like Canada, Norway, or the Netherlands, were swayed by the bipolarity between the US and the USSR. Andrew Cooper (1997, 1–24) therefore speaks of middle powers as (ideological and military) followers of the US during the Cold War, as compared to their newly expressed functional leadership qualities in the post-Cold War era. This post-Cold War, niche-oriented 'New Diplomacy', discursively wrapped in a popular packaging of 'middle power', lies at the heart of the change of governmental rationality, and as such is characterised by the extent to which nongovernmental actors have a significant share in the process of *government*, or, in Foucault's own words, in the exercise of political sovereignty (Foucault, 1989, 296). The distinction made earlier by Held and McGrew *between* horizontally stretched ('truly' democratic) networks of nongovernmental actors and vertically erected hierarchical structures of the nation-state does not hold water when the nature of the new diplomacy is examined (cf. Bátora, 2005). While the diplomacy manifesting the governmental rationality of organised modernity was closely associated with exclusivity, hierarchy, a culture of secrecy, and one-way communication, the new diplomacy, on the contrary, reflects the governmentality of advanced liberalism by its inclusiveness, multistakeholder character, two-way communication based on the norm of transparency, and, last but not least, largely horizontal and functional-symbiotic interactions between governments and nongovernmental actors.

The chief advocate of the new diplomacy, the Canadian ex-minister of foreign affairs, Lloyd Axworthy, readily referred to alleged similarities between his new diplomacy and the diplomatic practices of Lester Pearson, the main protagonist of the Golden Age. Anyone seriously interested in governmental rationalities and diplomacy as its carrier in world politics should immediately reject such a parallel. Pearson's diplomacy drew its strength from its exclusivity and secrecy, thus corresponding exactly with the main characteristics of the governmentality of organised modernity, whereas Axworthy's was exactly the opposite: media-oriented, with radical public speeches, and a definite openness as well as the involvement of nongovernmental actors in both domestic decision-

making processes and international negotiations (Cooper, 2000, 9–10). In line with the suggestion that a self-constructed status matters, it appears that the category of middle power has, in Canada's case, served a useful, though contingent, function as a kind of discursive cement between completely disparate political practices associated with two very different governmentalities. Axworthy's intention was, in fact, to use the category of middle power, which had been highly popular among the Canadian public and the international community, as a legitimising factor for a radically new exercise of political sovereignty informed by the governmentality of advanced liberalism.

The character of the political involvement of the Canadian government in the landmine case, shaped by the rationality of advanced liberalism, was expressed in developing a new functional relationship between the Canadian government on the one hand, and nongovernmental actors as well as other governments on the other. It is useful at this point to analyse this shift against the background of the production of knowledge about security. I argue that although Cooper's macrostructural explanation gives us the sense of *why* it was impossible for Canada to embrace more advanced-liberal practices up until the 1990s (the ideological polarization; followership *Vs*. functional leadership), it provides us with little insight into *how* it was possible to exclude nongovernmental actors within this arrangement.

The governmentality of organised modernity typified the environment where knowledge about security was exclusively produced by, and bound up with, the government. Correspondingly, it was the government who monopolised the definition of what was and what was not knowledge about security. The direct consequence of this ideological polarisation was, therefore, a military-based conception of national security, which effectively closed the discursive space concerning possible alternative security concepts. The prohibition of nongovernmental actors' access to the production and definition of what counted as knowledge about security was then an inevitable corollary of this situation.

Unlike the governmentality of organised modernity, the governmentality of advanced liberalism rests on the premise that 'man appears in his ambiguous position as an *object* of knowledge and a *subject* that knows' (Foucault, 1974, 323, emphases added). Thus, the crucial change has been marked by the transfer of power execution (but not the power *per se*; power becomes de-centred) from the government to its citizens through which the citizen was constituted as an active political *subject*. This change in turn allowed for the emergence of the individual as the *object* of discourse, most notably through the articulation of an individual-centred human security paradigm at both the levels of practical policy-making and security studies. Finally, the departure from a narrowly defined, military-based concept of national security and the subsequent formulation of an individual-centred conception of human security, as promoted by the Canadian government, was the crucial moment in the opening of the discursive space about security. This was precisely what was needed to enable

the individual to become an effective and efficient political subject of *government* (Foucault, 1991), thereby exercising political sovereignty together with the government.

What can be observed in this development is the dissolution of two different bonds forged during the governmentality of organised modernity, namely, (i) a bond between the government and knowledge about security and (ii) a bond concerning conditionality between funding and a particular type of knowledge production. With regard to the first bond, knowledge about security in the new order was produced and subsequently supplied to the government to an increasing extent by non-governmental actors. These actors began to fill a newly open discursive space with the knowledge based on their own expertise, experience and interpretation of what counts as knowledge about security, and the government used this knowledge, at least in the landmine case and other humanitarian campaigns, as their own. The reason for this, from the advanced-liberal governmentality perspective, is apparent: the government now considered nongovernmental actors as the most efficient source of human-centred knowledge about landmines and, as a result of a changed economy of power manifest in the government's heightened sensitivity to this knowledge, the number of nongovernmental actors involved as well as the volume of the new knowledge increased.

As far as the dissolution of the second bond is concerned, after nongovernmental actors were enabled to enter the discourse about security, a functional-symbiotic relationship between the two entities was created: nongovernmental actors began supplying the government with their knowledge about security in exchange for receiving funding which effectively enabled them to conduct their further activities associated with knowledge production in large measure.[12] This dissolution, clearly the extension of the first one, can thus be conceived of as the termination of ideological conditionality between funding and knowledge production, as was known in the rationality of organised modernity during which the government was both the source of knowledge and of funding. Furthermore, the double dissolution also indicates for the governmentality of advanced liberalism a symptomatic increase in non-governmental actors' autonomy and responsibility. Not only did these actors produce knowledge about landmines, but, most importantly, they managed to establish and frame the landmine issue as a humanitarian problem, in contrast to the previously dominant military perspective, and pass this perception to the Canadian government.

The functional-symbiotic relationship between the Canadian government and non-governmental actors can be graphically summarized as follows:

[12] The formal name of the CCW Convention is 'The Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.'

Figure I. Governmentalities and Typifications of Knowledge about Security



Re-Examining the Landmine Case: An Empirical Analysis

This section offers empirical evidence, in this reinterpretation of the landmine case, for the argument that the nature of the relationship between governmental and non-governmental actors is one of functional-symbiosis. In concrete terms, it deals with changes in the nature of interactions between the Canadian government and nongovernmental actors subsumed under the umbrella group, MAC, which has itself been part of a wide transnational advocacy network ICBL. This re-examination refutes the claim of the majority of empirical studies on landmines (Horwood, 2003; Lint, 2003; Mathew and Rutherford, 2003; Williams, 2000; Thakur, 1999; Price, 1998) that this case was an unprecedented victory of the transnational world which allegedly challenged and pressurised the state-centred one. The aim of this section is not to provide the reader with a comprehensive descriptive account of the landmine case, but rather with an analysis of its key moments in respect of the establishment of a functional-symbiotic, Canadian government/NGO nexus between 1993 and 1997.

Nongovernmental actors producing alternative, human-oriented knowledge about landmines had already existed during the Cold War and the activities of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) can serve as an example of this (Maresca and Maslen, 2000). The importance of ideological depolarisation after the Cold War can therefore be seen in the fact that governments suddenly had, at least theoretically, more political space for independent action and expression of their innovative procedures. However, there were no real significant openings in the previously closed discourse on security immediately after the end of the Cold War. The activities of nongovernmental actors were therefore still largely isolated from the activities of governments. The most significant post-Cold War effort to solve the landmine crisis came from the NGOs active in demining and in providing medical help. In 1992 they established the ICBL, promoting the total ban of antipersonnel landmines (APLs) (English, 1998, 122) on the premise that the use of APLs was violating both principles of the 'Hague branch' of international humanitarian law, i.e. the principles of proportionality and discrimination (Mathews and McCormack, 1999).

The first significant – and, as later developments would show, cardinal – opening of security discourse for nongovernmental actors took place in Canada in 1993. Although Canada was one of a few countries financially supporting demining activities at the very end of the Cold War (ICBL, 2000), it was not until 1993 that the government's practices could be associated with the new advanced-liberal governmentality. A catalyst in this development was when, in 1993, the Liberal Party of Canada (LP) returned to government after nine years as the opposition party and made important changes to Canada's international and security policy. Their detailed and radical election programme, 'Creating Opportunities' (also known as the 'Red Book'), emphasized the fact

that 'Canadians are asking for a commitment from government to listen to their views, and to respect their needs by ensuring that no false distinction is made between domestic and foreign policy' (LP of Canada, 1993, 104–6). A crucial part linked to the opening of the security discourse for nongovernmental actors was acknowledged in the expressed need to have 'a broader definition of national and international security' (Ibid., 105–6). This shift corresponds to what Dean calls governmentality 'programmes', i.e. 'explicit, planned attempts to reform or transform regimes of practices …. [which] often take the form of a link between theoretical knowledge and practical concerns and objectives' (1999, 211).

After the landslide victory in the elections, the LP started to fulfil the election promise by transforming the decision-making process in terms of inclusivity concerning nongovernmental actors (Government of Canada, 1995, 48–9). In regard to the landmine case, the key nongovernmental actor which began to attend governmental meetings was the umbrella group MAC in 1995, including, for instance, Physicians for Global Survival, CARE, CUSO, Oxfam and Project Ploughshares (Cameron, 1998, 432). The reaction of the NGO community to this change of governmental rationality has been aptly summarised by Paul Hannon, Executive Director of MAC:

We had to learn, as NGOs, *how to work properly* … you cannot do those things in the way it used to be *organised*, you know, like an anti-nuclear protest [during the Cold War]. You cannot do it with a mimeograph and a few things on a poster … you cannot be ideological about these things, you have to go practical. And that is why you sometimes use business models; *you learn how to run an organisation*. That is the *most efficient way* how to do it … You bring in people who are different from you, with different expertise, so good functioning NGO boards have lawyers on them, there are fundraisers, business people, human resources experts … *We have learned that through painful way, you have to do it, that was the part of our sophistication* (personal interview by author, Ottawa, April 27th, 2006; emphases added).

The course of these meetings suggests that the MAC seized the opportunity to use them as a strategic forum for educating governmental officials within the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) on landmines as a humanitarian concern (Cameron, 1998, 432–4; Warmington and Tuttle, 1998, 48–50).[13] These meetings served as a zone of socialisation, and with the personal contribution of André Ouellet, the minister of foreign affairs at the time, functional connections, a new relationship and a new understanding of the issue started to emerge (Tomlin, 1998, 191–3).

Although Canada's government changed its stance and embraced the call for a total ban of APLs, its attention, nevertheless, was still directed towards the

[13] The first obstacle was overcome, very much in advanced-liberal governmentality fashion, by the inclusion of representatives of the MAC in Canada's governmental delegation. The two entities thus literally exercised political sovereignty together.

1995 UN review conference of the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW).[14] The government's stance on the landmine issue shifted thanks to MAC's framing of landmines as a humanitarian concern. However, this would not have been possible had the government not *(i) previously taken decisions regarding the participation of nongovernmental actors into the formal consulting process*, and *(ii) extended the general notion of what security was*. At the same time, government officials still believed in the appropriateness of UN multilateralism as a platform for bringing about this change. The development of the CCW conference soon showed, however, the impossibility of pushing Canada's radical proposal through. This was largely because the mechanism of the conference was still underpinned by the principles of the governmentality of organised modernity, as evidenced by the fact that NGOs were not permitted to attend negotiations, and also that governments needed to vote unanimously for any change to take place.[15] Despite the fact that advocates of incremental arms control saw the amended II. Protocol to the CCW Convention as a success,[16] progress was simply not significant enough for the delegation advocating the non-military, human security-oriented total ban of the entire category of weapons.

A catalytic event in the development of the landmine issue occurred in the middle of UN negotiations in January 1996, when Lloyd Axworthy replaced André Ouellet in his ministerial position. This change represented a boost to Canadian efforts as Axworthy was the most vociferous promoter of the new diplomacy. It was after Axworthy assumed office that the governmentality of advanced liberalism really came to the fore. Not only was the collaboration between the government and the MAC further deepened, but Axworthy also frequently invoked the concept of middle power to legitimate and justify his radical diplomatic methods (cf. Axworthy, 1997). Positive proof confirming the success of such legitimisation is to be found in the responses from focus groups and questionnaires that were held and circulated during the final conference in Ottawa in 1997 by the company EKOS Research Associates. The overwhelming majority of heads of states, PMs, and senior government officials, who were the subject of this inquiry, associated the success of the Ottawa process with the fact that it was being steered by a group of middle powers, most notably Canada (Cameron et al., 1998, 7–13).

Axworthy had already begun to form a group of like-minded countries led by middle powers Canada and Norway during the CCW Conference and it essentially comprised the countries which had previously imposed unilateral moratoria on export, sale, and transfer of APLs and, in some cases, had even

[14] See the UN Disarmament Yearbook of 1997, pp. 105–106, for specific amendments.

[15] The members of this informal coalition were Canada, Norway, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Switzerland, and Mexico.

[16] I would like to thank Andrea Teti for this formulation.

completely destroyed their stockpiles.[17] After Canadian hopes were dashed by the CCW Conference stalemate, it was the Canadian government, namely Lloyd Axworthy as its Minister of Foreign Affairs, and not the MAC as part of the ICBL, who redirected Canadian efforts to a non-UN fast track line with its own constitutive mechanism of self-selection, commonly referred to as the Ottawa Process. Explanations in Rosenau's vein fail to take into account the development of the Ottawa Process since the dichotomic representation of states and nongovernmental actors produces analytical blindedness to this phenomenon and these accounts have therefore limited value to the extent of being misleading.[18]

With respect to the advanced-liberal governmentality of the Ottawa Process, it was the funding of the participation of nongovernmental actors, the MAC, and more generally the ICBL, by governments of like-minded countries, especially self-constructed middle powers, that played an important role in the process of knowledge production and organisation. The Ottawa Process itself consisted of a set of meetings which were sponsored by and featured self-selected like-minded states on the one hand and NGOs subsumed under the ICBL on the other.[19] The purpose of these meetings was to jointly propose, discuss, and agree on a legally binding instrument which would completely prohibit the entire category of APLs (cf. Cameron, 1998; Lawson et al., 1998). The two most important meetings were the ones organised in Norway in September 1997 and in Canada in December 1997. In respect of the former, not only did the Norwegian government sponsor activities which enabled ICBL to participate in knowledge production and sharing, but also, for the first time in the history of arms control, gave a nongovernmental organization (ICBL) an official seat in actual negotiations (Williams and Goose, 1998, 43). As to the latter, this was the actual conference where the previously negotiated and drafted treaty, the Ottawa Convention,[20] was signed by 122 governments.

The Canadian partnership between the government and the MAC, itself a manifestation of the advanced-liberal governmentality, did not come to an end, however, with the signing of the Convention. Since then the Canadian government has donated more than US $130 million to support anti-mine-related activities. A significant portion has been specifically directed towards education programs and R&D concerning demining technologies, i.e. knowledge-related issues (ICBL, 2005; Maslen 2004, 149–51). The Canadian gover-

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[17] As one highly-ranking official at the DFAIT put it, 'We had CDN $2 million to run the Ottawa Process and we used it very specifically for [funding] conferences and meetings' (personal interview by autor, Ottawa, April 21st, 2006).

[18] The formal name of the Ottawa Convention is 'The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction.'

[19] Canada's R&D donation concerning demining technologies in the period of 1997–2004 alone accounted for US $15 million (ICBL, 2005).

[20] CIDA manages a part of the Canadian Landmine Fund, alongside the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Department of National Defence.

nment has also created The Canadian Landmine Fund from which the majority of the above activities have been funded. Consequently, these new functional-symbiotic relations are reflected in the institutional discourse: to mention but two examples, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) emphasises the importance of working closely with Canadian and international NGOs in its effort to end the suffering caused by landmines (CIDA, 2006); and secondly, nowhere has the new governmentality of advanced liberalism been more noticeable than in the case of a charity focused on landmines, The Canadian Landmine Foundation (CLF). Established by Axworthy when he was still Minister of Foreign Affairs, this body has been the most important mine-related non-governmental fundraising organisation in Canada. Not only does the CLF stress the importance of the link forged between itself and the government, but it also reveals that the citizen Axworthy has been on its Board of Directors ever since (CLF, 2006).

Conclusion

Unlike the global governance approach aiming at providing a student of IR with universal explanations, the governmentality approach makes only limited generalisations and turns its attention to innovative political micropractices rather than macrostructural transformations as sources of a change. Yet, it gives credit to macrostructural conditions of possibility, or in Hooper-Greenhill's (1989, 63) term conditions of emergence (here ideological depolarization after the Cold War), in regard to late manifestations of the change in governmentalities. Focusing on *specific* national identities then, namely the self-constructed category of middle power, is an integral part of this strategy of limited generalisation of findings, or as Price and Reus-Smit (1998, 272) put it, 'small-t' truth claims. What is needed, then, is an empirically more sensitive explanation than Rosenau's strategy of fixing the dual ontology of the state-centric and transnational worlds to the institution of state sovereignty. For Rosenau, all states are inevitably alike insofar as they are understood through their *generic* national identities with state sovereignty as the lowest common denominator. The implication is clear: since states are painted as similar to one another, he obviously cannot consider differences among them to be potential sources of innovative political micropractices with a system-wide effect. Consequently, Rosenau has to rely on the notion of the state-centric world being challenged by the transnational world to account for what he sees as systemic transformations in world politics, thus becoming a prisoner of the logic of state sovereignty as this institution is considered a crucial explanatory factor.

One of the substantial differences distinguishing this article from the self-referential celebratory commentaries so typical for the landmine case is the refusal to treat conceptual categories as meaningful kinds. An interesting parallel is discernable in the thinking of Foucault and Cox: they work with the state and middle powers respectively as with meaningless empty containers, or

forms. Since they are meaningless, any explanation that uncritically depends on them is, inevitably, meaningless too. This is because the form *per se* does not tell us anything about the politics of the content, i.e. about the possible different ways of organising the exercise of political sovereignty with regard to the nation state, or about temporal differences in meaning as opposed to consistency in political function with respect to middlepowerhood. Foucault (1991) himself understands progressive political practices as ones that seek to transform the relationship between historically specific practices and their formation rules, rather that some kind of ultimate quest for ideal necessities or universal human subjectivities, which can be introduced into society. Conceptualising both the nation-state and middle powers as empty categories has thus an important corollary; it shows a promising way of analysing changes in world politics without the necessity of relying on normative and idealism-imbued accounts on the one hand, and on radical calls for dismantling current structures of world politics on the other.

So one can, to an extent, rely on traditional concepts, yet it is worth looking at them from new perspectives, thereby presenting heuristically innovative insights into what has widely been believed to have immutable meanings. As the previous analysis of governmental rationalities shows, despite the most central formal categories being the same, the dynamics of the governmentality of organised modernity and that of advanced liberalism were completely different. In regard to the former, it was exclusively the government who produced, funded and organised (military-based) knowledge about landmines. The access of nongovernmental actors to the security discourse was closed in spite of the fact that they did produce their alternative individual-centred knowledge about landmines. As to the latter, one can say that the government redefined 'a discursive field in which exercising power is "rationalized"' (Lemke, 2001, 190) and forged a new functional-symbiotic partnership, with nongovernmental actors supplying knowledge about landmines and the Canadian government funding this enterprise and using this knowledge in interactions with other states, both to consolidate the pro-ban coalition of like-minded countries and to discipline noncompliers through the exercise of peer pressure.

The attributes of advanced-liberal rationality examined above in the case of Canada's exercise of political sovereignty can be compared to what Geoffrey Wiseman (2004, 47) calls *middle power plurilateralism*, i.e. the notion that official entities (the Canadian government) can be joined by nongovernmental actors (MAC as the part of the ICBL) without necessitating reciprocal recognition as sovereign entities. This confirms the argument that the explanatory factor in the subject matter of this article – i.e. changes in interactions between some governments and nongovernmental actors – is not the institute of state sovereignty, but the shift to the governmentality of advanced liberalism, specifically the use of methods through which the individual became an active political subject of *government.* Not only did middle powers act in the landmine

case through nongovernmental actors, but they also gave these non-state actors a free hand in their agenda setting and issue framing as well as in strategy selection and networking. Moreover, as the landmine case demonstrated, the knowledge about landmines was produced entirely by non-state actors, and the governments of self-constructed middle powers, most notably Canada and Norway, were subsequently provided with that knowledge.

Finally, there is the question of what the Canadian government has acquired by its advanced-liberal procedure. It is suggested that a government that builds a functional-symbiotic relationship with nongovernmental actors gains a comparative advantage over other states, insofar as it has at its disposal a rare and valuable type of human-oriented knowledge about security which, in turn, serves as an important basis for the worldwide reputation and symbolic status of a given country. Governments that have formed and discursively legitimated their collective identity around the category of middle power frequently build both informal and formal coalitions of like-minded countries. For instance, as a result of successful practices of an informal like-minded group led by middle powers Canada and Norway in the landmine case, these two leading countries signed the bilateral Lysøen Declaration of 1998, and a year later expanded into The Human Security Network (HSN). As I argued elsewhere (Hynek and Waisová 2006), the aim of such platforms is not only to bring about a system-wide normative change (e.g. a prohibitive regime, be it of antipersonnel landmines, small arms and light weapons or child soldiers), but also socialising other participating actors into accepting norms, methods and procedures linked to this governmentality of advanced liberalism. It is self-constructed middle powers who often assume leadership and steer the direction of a like-minded group. The HSN is a flexible platform which can be, due to member governments' close cooperation with nongovernmental actors, regarded as the product of a plurilateralist organisation informed by advanced-liberal governmentality. Moreover, the subsequent institutionalisation of Canada and Norway's advanced-liberal experiences to the plurilateral HSN demonstrates more systematisation in what was previously ad-hoc attempts to conduct the governmentality of advanced liberalism in world politics. Thus we might be able to expect more of these developments to occur in the future.

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