Quo Vadis Islamic Populism?
An Electoral Strategy

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This paper discusses how far Islamic populism as an old social movement, especially in Indonesia, rises as a new form of polarisation in the electoral mechanism in Indonesian democracy nowadays. Considered as the main group of religion in Indonesia, Indonesian Muslims appear as a contested object by the political elites to gain a vote. Yet, it is hard to conclude or even make a clear conclusion that Islam in Indonesia represented by one group, as in Egypt and Turkey. The dualism of Islamic power that exists in Indonesia represented by the traditional moderate groups (NU and Muhammadiyah) and the Khilafah-inspired moderate groups (Ikhwanul Muslimin, HTI, and the others). It encourages oligarch elites to take attention to the Islamic community in the hope of reaping votes. This paper uses discourse analysis and symbol analysis to conclude. Results of the analysis show the Islamic community makes use of the Islamic discourse and symbolisation to gain political bargaining position within electoral democracy. However, the Islamic groups who draw closer to the political elite and use a similar method to gain vote considered fail to represent the interest of the Indonesian Muslims. This phenomenon causes friction within the Islam community due to political difference mobilised through Islamic discourse and symbols as an electoral strategy and it potentially causes disintegration of the nation. However, in contrast to the mainstream argument, this paper exhibits how this phenomenon bores a new potential source to maintain and develop good democracy in Indonesia.
Keywords: Islamic populism, political identity, election, programmatic democracy.

The absence of the left-wing political groups, swept by President Soeharto as his first move to take over the Old Order, didn’t rapidly put the Indonesian Islamic groups as the new power to rule the nation.

The oppression of the Islamic groups by the President Soeharto, led by his concern of the emergence of the hegemonic opposition in addition to his military competition, pushed the Islamic groups to the edge of the political power where the Islamic groups only permitted to move in the realm of the personal piety. In the process of elimination of the communist fraction, represented by PKI, Soeharto integrated Islamic groups such as Muhammadiyah and NU, as well as the ex-Masyumi militant movement which has dissolved by Soekarno, Soeharto only provided one political vehicle for the Islamic group, namely the United Development Party (PPP). History then records that PPP maneuvers outside Golkar tended to be castrated by a structured, massive, and systematic network of rulers at the time (Hadiz, 2018; Gyene, 2019).

After the disappointing experience of Muslims during the New Order regime, the rise of reform became a forerunner as well as a sign that the Islamic group could not restrain itself from voicing its aspirations to political contestation. It was noted that as many as approximately 20 new parties out of 48 parties participated in the 1999 general election based on an “Islamic party”. Unfortunately, only PPP entered the top five which acquired 10.72 percent of the vote (59 seats). Whereas most of the other Islamic parties did not get a significant vote to win a single seat in the DPR, the Crescent Star Party (PBB) which considered the main heir of Masyumi won only 1.9 percent of the vote (13 seats), while the Justice Party was only able to collect 1.4 percent of the votes (7 seats). Some other Islamic parties such as the Nahdlatul Ummah Party (NU), the United Party (PP), the Indonesian Islamic Syarikat Party (PSII), PPI Masyumi, and the People’s Awakening Party (PKU) only get one seat each. Unfortunately, some other Islamic parties were unable to win the seat in the DPR. Islamic parties that did not get the seat then called “decimal parties” because they get less than one percent of the vote.

If PKB and PAN are categorised as Islamic parties, a different discourse was present. Three of the five winning parties were from Is-

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Islamic parties which reflect a good condition for Islamic groups. PPP received 11,329,905 votes (10.7 percent) and was ranked third, whereas PKB (12.6 percent) and PAN (7.1 percent), ranked fourth and fifth. This condition has become a sample that in fact, the interest of Islamic groups in the electoral procession is very large.

The absence of the left-wing political groups as the case in the 1955 elections until the end of PKI later confronted the nationalist forces as a single force fighting with Islamic groups. Significant frictions such as the fierce battle of the Masjumi-PKI did not accompany the contestation, or the PKI with the conservative NU (specifically related to agrarian issues). Islamic groups at the time of the 1999 elections and even after the 2004 and 2009 elections, tended to often coalesce with nationalist groups.

The closeness of Islamic groups, especially traditional groups with nationalist groups that repeatedly occupy power, inevitably presented alternative groups from the Islamic group itself. Accompanied by the growth of information flow that requires the entry of transnational Islamic thoughts, and consolidation through a long process, carried out by the Tarbiyah group so that it succeeded in giving birth to a new axis and pattern in the dynamics of Islamic groups, ultimately encouraging Islamic groups to no longer be recorded as a group with representation a single figure or institution, but rather split into several streams.

Inequality of perception between Islamic groups, coupled with the disappointment of certain Islamic groups due to power, as well as with indoctrinations that will someday revive a system of Khilafah at the end of time with the adoption of beliefs in theological values singly, then gave birth to a phenomenon that was detailed by Vedi R. Hadiz as “Islamic Populism”. The theoretical and definitive introduction of the terminology will be discussed later in the next discussion.

Before further discussing Islamic populism, it is necessary to understand that although scholars insert pessimistic criticisms, there is an interesting note that in the Indonesian locus, Islamic populism has now risen to become an alternative movement, which is quite influential at the grassroots level. Especially, in urban areas, Islamic populism can provide resistance against the nationalists and another group of Islamic groups themselves, namely the traditionalist group represented by NU.

For instance, the election of the Governor of DKI Jakarta 2017 can be one example of the rising of Islamic populism. Religious identity,
Quo Vadis Islamic Populism?

Ethnicity, and poverty issues merge into one distinctiveness that was built by supporters of Anies Baswedan (supported by the coalition of Gerindra political parties, PKS, PAN) to fight other candidates namely Basuki Tjahaja Purnama or Ahok supported by the PDIP political party coalition, the Golkar Party, Nasdem Hanura, PKB, PPP, and PKPI (Hamid, 2019). These issues were later strengthened by building a discourse that supporting Muslim candidates and opposing Ahok was not just a political choice, but a form of struggle in defense of the Islamic religion. Based on that issues, various series of demonstrations entitled “Islamic Defending Movement” emerged, which were later institutionalised as the National Movement for Defending Fatwa Ulama (GNPF-Ulama). The movement became a source of reference for voters in Jakarta (Hamid, 2019). Since then, Islamic populism has continued to strengthen and become a political discourse built on electoral contestation.

Even at the beginning of the rise of Islamic populism in the DKI Regional Election, the dichotomy of the representation of groups that support the candidate for governor was already seen clearly. In the Anies Baswedan Sandiaga Uno camp, there are PAN (mostly filled by Muhammadiyah cadres) and PKS (mostly filled by people from the tarbiyah group) which both of whom join because they feel they have thoughts of more modern Islamic teachings. Whereas nationalist parties such as PDIP and Golkar, as well as traditional Islamic groups filled the Basuki TP-Djarot camp represented by PKB and PPP. All this confirms that Islamic populism arose from the resistance of the faction which in this paper is defined as a modern group of khilafat, against the coalition between the nationalist and traditionalist camps.

Modern Khilafatism vs. Nationalist and Traditionalist Groups
The phenomenon of Islamic populism that emerged in the dynamics of the 2017 DKI Regional Election is the starting point for similar movements in every subsequent political momentum. Interestingly, this Islamic populism then gave rise to two opposing big streams. The first stream was brought by traditionalist groups, where these Islamic groups tended to show the unique features of Southeast Asian Islam, especially the Shafi’i school of doctrine, and showed more tolerance for

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2 This assumption is confirmed by an interview with PAN Chairman Zulkifli Hasan with Kompas.com where he stated that joining PAN with the coalition of supporters of Anis Baswedan - Sandiaga Uno considered that PAN dan PKS have same paradigm of modern islam.
the absorption of local and tribal traditions in carrying out their religious rites (Eliraz, 2004; Gyene, 2019). Figures and parties represented this group from the Nahdlatul Ulama community organisations such as the National Awakening Party (PKB) and the United Development Party (PPP). In the course of the history of the Indonesian nation, these traditional groups tend to have considerable closeness and access to power, which so far is certainly controlled by people from the nationalist circles whose main power is represented by PDIP and Golkar.

The second stream that emerged from the Islamic populism movement was the modern group of khilafat. The Muslim Ummah group that was shaded by the GNPF-MUI—which subsequently changed their name to the GNPF Ulama–could be categorised as a modern Islamic group who always tried to integrate its political movements into the pan-Islamic movement whose thoughts were driven by by movements of Islamic reformers such as Al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh (Gyene, 2019). In this political stream, they usually fight for the basic interpretation of Islamic teachings that are more stringent, by always trying to restore Islamic religious rites to match the source of the teachings in the Koran and Hadith.

In Indonesia, this modern group is reflected in the struggles of community organisations such as Muhammadiyah, Persis, Al-Irsyad as well as tarbiyah study groups that try to make democracy as a means of applying Islamic teachings in the context of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia. The cadres of the organisation spread and established political parties to participate in political contestation. The majority of political parties which become the organisation of this group are PKS, PAN, and PBB.

The interesting thing about this second group is, there is another group who have an understanding that democracy is a corrupt system so they try to establish the Khilafah. This group was represented by the Indonesian Hizbuttahrir organisation or HTI. In the Islamic populism movement, especially after the Jakarta Election, this modern group and Khilafah seemed to unite to then fight the domination of nationalists and traditionalists.

As this paper wants to reveal the Islamic populism movement that occurs in Indonesian political dynamics, the writer decided the terminology of this second group as a modern group of khilafat. Although this terminology will lead to lengthy discussions and debates, especially regarding the participation of khilafatism in procedural democracy,
the arguments from this paper are ultimately expected to be able to answer the discussion and debate.

**Islamic Populism Post DKI Election**

Islamic populism that strengthened after the 2017 DKI elections, reached its peak in the 2019 elections. Islamic populism emerged as the dominant discourse built by almost all participants in the 2019 election, lessons learned from DKI Election made all parties are claiming to be the most Islamic parties. In this contestation process, two large coalitions emerged, each of which carried the nominees of the President and Vice President. The first coalition brought the pair Joko Widodo-Ma'ruf Amin as Vice-Presidential Candidates, while the second coalition supported Prabowo - Sandiaga Uno. It is in this struggle that the internal fragmentation of the Islamic Ummah is increasingly apparent.

The first coalition to support Joko Widodo - Ma'ruf Amin, contained nationalist and traditional Islamist political parties. This happened because, the couple Joko Widodo and Ma'ruf Amin were the Presidential and Vice-Presidential Candidates promoted by the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP) as the coalition leader party, which was also the party supporting the Basuki Tjahaja Purnama or Ahok and Djarot parties in the 2017 Jakarta Election. While the second coalition that carries the pair of Candidates for President and Vice President Prabowo Subianto - Sandiaga Uno is filled with modern groups of khitafat who have long carried out Islamic populism, especially during the 2017 DKI Election.

In addition to being seen in the Presidential Election, Islamic populism is also very pronounced to appear in the political struggle of the Parties participating in the Legislative Election process. The 2019 elections that were held simultaneously, made the heat of the competition for the presidency, also felt in the struggle for the filling of legislative seats. Islamic populism movement in legislative elections can be felt from the discourse and issues that are built by legislative candidates from each political party coalition supporting the Candidates for President and Vice President. Discourses of personal transgression, close to the ulema, protecting the interests of the Ummah, are discourses that also appear as pioneers of the voice of certain Islamic parties along with the nationalist party supporting the 02 Presidential candidates Prabowo Subianto-Sandiaga Uno. Although the votes obtained were
not able to make the 02 Presidential coalition parties merged as the new government in the 2019 elections.

It is interesting then to examine carefully how the discourse and symbols used by groups who try to make Islamic populism as a means of political maneuver in electoral contestation. Especially, in the last few general elections, Islamic symbols can catalyze the vote acquisition of several parties and the presidential election coalition, as well as being able to become a group that is quite influential in the democratic competition even in the smallest private spheres of society. Not to mention, the perception that arises amid the Islamic populism movement leads to the opinion that Islamic populism can cause disintegration of the nation, which is why many do not agree on it. For this reason, this paper attempts to analyse the discourses of Islamic populism, and the potential it brings to democracy in Indonesia.

This paper uses qualitative methods with literature studies and semiotic analysis to look for theoretical explanations about the phenomenon of Islamic populism in Indonesia by looking at discourse patterns and symbols used as electoral strategies. Semiotic analysis is used to find ways in which populist actors attempt to discourage Islamic populism.

Text semiotics is a branch of semiotics that specifically studies texts in various forms and levels, where the text as a 'product of language use' is a combination of signs, especially those concerning sign systems (syntactic / paradigmatic), level of signs (denotation / connotation), relations between the signs (metaphor / metonym), the content of myths, and the ideology behind it (Piliang, 2004, p. 189). The semiotic approach of the text is used to read the efforts of Islamic discourse as an electoral issue through symbols, visual signs and those contained in the text. The semiotics approach used in this research is semiotics developed by Roland Barthes which focuses on the level of meaning related to symbols and texts and rests on the historical and cultural values of the community (Pawito, 2007, p. 164).

Barthes’s semiotic analysis uses two stages namely denotation and connotation. Denotation marks are signs that produce explicit meanings. While the connotation is a marker that can produce an implicit or hidden second layer meaning. This is done by revealing the code of a text-based on an agreement between community members (Piliang, 2004, p. 194-915). Barthes analysis helps to see the structure of values prevailing in society that is reflected in the use of certain languages as
well as trying to find hidden power relations in the discourse of Islamic populism. The symbols/signs used in the form of public service ad text and images used as campaign media were scattered during the 2019 elections.

**Discussion**

*Islamic Populism: Theoretical Perspectives*

The embodiment of the term “populism”, based on Laclau’s presentation, is generally imposed on social actors in a manner that seems demeaning, by those who ideologically tend to oppose mass-based politics in the name of a kind of ‘modern’ political rationality. This means that in simplification by Hadiz, only a few people call themselves as populists.

Populism, in a simpler sense according to Allan Knight, is a special political style that shows the closeness of relations with the people. In another words, Kenneth M. Roberts also stated that populism is a top-down mobilisation of mass politics carried out by personalistic leaders to oppose the elite in the name of people’s suffering (top-down political mobilisation of mass constituencies by personalistic leaders who challenge the elite groups on behalf of an ill-defined pueblo, or “the people”).

However, in contrast to what Laclau meant as populist, Mude and Kalwaster (2012) as quoted by Hamid (2019), said that today populism is often used as a label for politicians who aggressively build the impression of being defending the interests of people used to fight the ruling elites.

In line with Hamid, Kusumo and Hurriyah also quoted Cas Mudde’s opinion which suggested that the characteristics of populism that the basic philosophy of populism is divided into three characteristics, namely anti-establishment (anti-establishment), authoritarianism, and nativism. Anti-establishment is understood as a philosophy that Emphasise s the value of wisdom and virtue of ordinary people or the silent majority against the establishment of rulers (Acemoglu, Egorov, & Sonin, 2013, p. 771). Populism reflects deep cynicism and hatred of existing authorities or government officials. Ordinary people are homogeneous parties who are considered good and worthy to replace dishonest elites.

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Furthermore, authoritarianism is understood as support to bring up personal power given the power of leadership, to lead strongly and charismatic so that it can be considered to reflect the will of the people. Whereas xenophobic nativism or nationalism assumes that all “people” are uniform or homogeneous entities with the same identity, the state must exclude people from other countries and cultures. Populism supports monoculturalism rather than multiculturalism, prioritises national interests over international cooperation, closes and limits liberal values.

More specifically, Mudde (2004) simplifies populism as an ‘ideology’ which conceptualizes society as ‘ultimately separates into two antagonistic and homogeneous groups, namely ‘pure people’ versus ‘corrupt elites’.

The concept is also in line with Albertazzi and McDonnell (2008), where both argue that the characteristics of populism as something that depends on the idea of a ‘pious and homogeneous society’ which is confronted with ‘a group of elites’ and ‘dangerous others’. The latter is in turn described as a group of people who “hinder (or attempt to block) society to be sovereign in their rights, values, prosperity, identity, and voice”.

The spirit of resistance is then fused with the views or beliefs of the value that religion is an integrated matter, in the sense of being united and inseparable from politics. Islam is a din wa daulah, where based on that, the social problems, including the state and political problems, are a problem that is inseparable from the problem of religion (counter-secularism). This view certainly arises based on a belief in the perfect and comprehensive nature of Islam, so that according to them, Islam encompasses three ‘D’ (Din, religion; Dunya, world; and Daulah, state) (Kasdi, 2015). The manifestation of that view then leads to the urgency of political power as an effort to uphold Sharia or Islamic laws. Enforcement of the Islamic Sharia was asked as a solution to various problems, especially those that hit Muslims in Indonesia. However, in reality, Islamic populism has not yet touched on these views.

Islamic populism itself was born because of the colonialism in Islamic countries – including Indonesia as a majority Muslim country.


Its birth was stimulated by the past euphoria where Islam was predicted to have prevailed and almost controlled two-thirds of the world. Garadian (2017) in his book review explained that in the experience of Indonesia and Egypt, movements that carried the old ideas of Islamic populism even managed to reach the working class and even met with anti-colonial movements and nationalist movements which generally came from the bourgeois and aristocratic circles. It was here that the embryo of a social class coalition that was incorporated from various class structures began to form. They are united by several similarities such as the pain of marginalised systems and have a dream to build a modern nation-state in the future. In this initial phase, dreams based on Islamic law (Sharia-based visions), as commonly found in new models of Islamic populism, and tend to be vague.

If classical populism tends to imagine that “Muslim people” are oppressed by greedy elites, then the new variant of Islamic populism imagines people who are stripped both in the socio-economic aspects even including culture, which is carried out by other major forces that control social order, which is seen as a character of isolation. If the old populism rested on the working class or peasantry, the social basis of the new populism in the context of neoliberalism was a multi-class alliance articulated through identity as the basis of the fabric of solidarity. But most importantly, the similarity of the classical movement with the new Islamic populism that is equally continuing to undermine the discourse on dogmas “Islam is under attack”.

Revealing the Weaknesses of Islamic Populism in the 2019 Elections: The Blurring of Ideology

What is interesting in the case of Indonesia is the meaning of the Islamic populism itself which brought the polarisation of Islamic populism, precisely confronts Muslims vis a vis Muslims. This polarisation occurs because of a differentiator namely, the modern Islamic Khilafatism group represented by the GNPF-Ulama raises the discourse of resistance to the government because it is considered oppressing Muslims, facing counter-discourse promoted by nationalist and traditional groups represented by Nahdlatul Ulama, where the institution builds the discourse that the government always supports and fulfills all the interests of Muslims as stated by Jayanto. That is, if it refers to the meaning of Islamic populism that was explained in the previous section, the Indonesian case gave rise to a new form, which seemed to
shift the struggle between the masses and the elite, but instead collided the masses with the masses through discourse.

This battle can be seen clearly in the simultaneous General Election process in 2019. With ease, we can see the battle between the two groups that are both carrying out Islamic populism movements, in the coalition of political parties supporting the Presidential and Vice-Presidential Candidates who competed in the 2019 Elections. Two coalitions are facing each other in fighting over the executive power in the 2019 elections.

These two coalitions have continued to develop a discourse on which they can best represent the interests of Muslims. The first coalition is the Indonesian Coalition for Work led by PDIP, showing the process of building this discourse explicitly by appointing KH. Ma’ruf Amin as the assistant to the incumbent president, Joko Widodo. The election of Ma’ruf Amin can certainly be read easily as the first step of counter-discourse that the Indonesian Coalition seeks to do against the discourse attacks of the opposing camp, which often labels this coalition as an anti-Islamic, anti-ulama, and coalition, etc. This assumption is reinforced by the background of Ma’ruf Amin, which is closely related to Islamic symbols such as his position as Kyai as well as Rais Aam NU and the chairman of MUI. In this coalition, several parties claim to be affiliated with Nahdliyin citizens, such as the United Development Party and the National Awakening Party.

While in the second group, the Islamic populism movement is represented by the modern Islamic Khilafatism group, which is fronted by the GNPF-Ulama. In this group, Islamic populism is carried out by overhauling the issues and discourse that have been built since the DKI Jakarta Regional Election. In its journey, the discourse war between the two groups then narrowed to an issue that precisely when viewed from the final results of the contestation met different results than they got when the DKI Jakarta Governor Election.

This different result can be seen when we analyse the comparison of votes obtained by the coalition parties of the two camps during the 2014 elections with the 2019 elections, both in the legislative and presidential elections as shown in the following table.
Table 1. Votes for Political Parties in the 2014 Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nama Partai</th>
<th>Perolehan Suara</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PDI-P</td>
<td>23.681.471</td>
<td>(18,95%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golkar</td>
<td>18.432.312</td>
<td>(14,75%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerindra</td>
<td>14.760.371</td>
<td>(11,81%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P. Demokrat</td>
<td>12.728.913</td>
<td>(10,9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKB</td>
<td>11.298.950</td>
<td>(9,04%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAN</td>
<td>9.481.621</td>
<td>(7,59%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKS</td>
<td>8.480.204</td>
<td>(6,79%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nasdem</td>
<td>8.402.812</td>
<td>(6,72%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>8.157.488</td>
<td>(6,55%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hanura</td>
<td>6.579.498</td>
<td>(5,26%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKB</td>
<td>1.143.094</td>
<td>(0,91%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: kpu.go.id

Table 2. Votes for Political Parties in the 2019 Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nama Partai</th>
<th>Perolehan Suara</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PDIP</td>
<td>27.053.961</td>
<td>(19,33%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerindra</td>
<td>17.594.839</td>
<td>(12,57%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golkar</td>
<td>17.229.789</td>
<td>(12,31%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKB</td>
<td>13.570.097</td>
<td>(9,66%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nasdem</td>
<td>12.661.792</td>
<td>(9,05%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKS</td>
<td>11.493.663</td>
<td>(8,21%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demokrat</td>
<td>10.876.507</td>
<td>(7,77%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAN</td>
<td>9.572.623</td>
<td>(6,84%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>6.323.147</td>
<td>(4,52%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perindo</td>
<td>3.738.320</td>
<td>(2,67%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berkarya</td>
<td>2.929.495</td>
<td>(2,09%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSI</td>
<td>2.650.361</td>
<td>(1,89%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hanura</td>
<td>2.161.507</td>
<td>(1,54%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBB</td>
<td>1.099.848</td>
<td>(0,79%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garuda</td>
<td>702.536</td>
<td>(0,50%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKPI</td>
<td>312.775</td>
<td>(0,22%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: kpu.go.id

From two tables above, it is shown that the vote acquisition of dichotomous Islamic parties only fighting overvotes in the same segmentation of society, which if analysed simply through Geertz categoriza-
tion is a society classified in the characteristics of Santri which tends to practice Islam conservatively, where they made Islam as the main issue and identity in their political movements. While for the Abangan and Priyayi, they tend to still choose parties with nationalism nuances as an election choice. This analysis is shown by comparing the results of the last two elections held, where the increase in votes experienced by PKS as the main motor of Islamic populism together with the GN-PF-Ulama by 1.42% in the 2019 election compared to the 2014 election, and the increase experienced by PKB of 0.65%, in fact, accompanied by a decrease in votes experienced by PPP by 2.01%. The amount of increase and decrease in noise is certainly not a coincidence. Although it requires deeper research, but simply from the figures that emerge, it can be seen that the three parties with the ideology of Islam who carry out Islamic populism are only fighting over the voices and sympathies of the same and that is all.

Even if viewed partially, in areas that have a considerable Santri mass base such as those in West Java, the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), in the legislative contestation in Bandung Regency for example, was able to increase its voice drastically from before 2014 only as many as 6 seats, in the 2019 legislative elections jumped to 10 seats, meaning up by 66.66%, and slowly, PKS was almost able to erode Golkar’s dominant voice for years in Bandung Regency. Golkar lost one seat (11 seats in 2019) when compared to 2014 (12 seats). Even in the West Java election, the Gerindra Party as the strongest opposition of the Government at this time, managed to win the vote recapitulation results, followed by PDIP, and again, the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS)\(^7\).

However, when viewed from the national vote, shows the failure faced by these Islamic populism movements, because after all, the one who wins the battle in both the executive and legislative is the PDIP Party that is a representation of the ideology of nationalism. The failure in question is, the inability of Islamic parties to offer a universal value that is reflected in the programs offered to be able to attract nationalists, both from internal Muslims themselves and non-Muslims.

This certainly raises quite a critical criticism of the Islamic parties, which in reality cannot provide an ideological platform represented

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6 Harian Pikiran Rakyat, 15 Mei 2019 dengan tajuk “Lampu Kuning Bagi Golkar”.

in the offer of programs so that they are considered to represent the interests of Muslims in particular, and the interests of the Indonesian people in general, which in turn broadens the pot community segmentation which is used as a source of votes. During this time, offered by Islamic populism movements, has not led to universal values that are a common solution. So that its emergence is considered a movement that can threaten national unity. This also raises concerns, that Islamic populism can lead to national disintegration.

This condition can occur as a result of the presidential system in Indonesia, which requires the existence of a majority government that forces election winners to accommodate all interests. So that the wheels of government are run based on the interests of the elite to please all parties, not on the idea of what they want to uphold. Election contestant political parties, both Islamic and nationalist ideology, have never offered a clear ideology that should be drawn from the programs they offer.

**Discourse and Symbolisation of Islamic Populism in 2019 Elections: Towards Representative Politics**

The phenomenon of populism in Indonesia is becoming an interesting study, especially the presence of Islamic populism which is very evident in the 2019 elections. Islamic population that emerges is not only the domain of one of the presidential candidate pairs or a narrative of the campaign of certain Islamic political parties. But the narrative of Islamic populism is played by both sides who are contesting as well as by all of their supporting parties using the Islamic platform.

The discourse that has arisen in Islamic populism revolves around individual skill, social excellence, respect for religious teachings and scholars and fighting for the interests of Muslims. These discourses are reproduced discourses during the 212 ulama and anti-Ahok movement. This discourse arises from a variety of concerns, criticisms and inner conditions of Indonesian society which are easily influenced by the narratives that appear on social media as a propaganda tool. On the one hand, Islamic populism is used by Islamic groups with differing views to get closer to the elite and power. In addition to differentiating the identity of one Islamic group from another.

The issue of individual piousness that emerged during the election was whether Jokowi or Prabowo had prayed correctly or not. A fierce debate on social media became very counterproductive. For moderate
Islamic groups, Jokowi’s proof of individual skill is the inauguration of the National Santri Day. As for the Islamic khalifate group, this did not show much of Jokowi’s piety. On the other hand, Prabowo’s Islam is doubtful because he comes from a family of different religions, divorced from his wife and attends Christmas mass where the video is widely spread. This becomes a counterpoint to question Prabowo’s Islam, but it is denied by the Islamic Khilafatism group which chose Prabowo to represent the interests of his group. So there is an assumption that radical Islamic groups (read: modern khilafat) as mounts to raise the issue of Khilafah in Indonesia. This then sharpens the friction of Islamic groups who have different political preferences.

Other discourse about Islamic populism that emerged most during the 2019 Presidential Election was the issue of respect for religious scholars and religious teachings which gave rise to the Ijtima Ulama phenomenon which was bound in a volume. This phenomenon is an antithesis of the 2017 DKI Election case which later became the main point of rival between Muslims in the election.

Jokowi’s camp used the discourse first when choosing a vice presidential pair by directly electing KH. Ma’ruf Amin as a representative of Ulama 212 to show that Jokowi is also a pro-Ulama. Besides, an interesting campaign narrative used with the tagline “umara-ulama for advanced Indonesia”. The symbolisation of Jokowi-Ma’ruf holding hands in a sarong and kopeah costumes further reinforces the symbolisation that Jokowi’s camp has closeness and is in favor of Indonesian Muslims.

This symbolisation also shows Jokowi to break away from the Ahok case related to blasphemy. Besides, the umara-ulama clash was also muted by the election of KH. Ma’ruf Amin as the Vice President’s pair. The Indonesian Narrative Going forward is echoed to show that the success of a nation will be supported by ulemas and umara who work well together in building a nation. In Barthes’ semiotic analysis, denotatively, the texts “Ulama-Umara” and “Advanced Indonesia” indeed mean that the Jokowi-Ma’ruf pair is a “leader-preacher / religious expert” pair which will, therefore, make Indonesia a more advanced country under the leadership. However, in an implicit second-tier meaning, the tagline “Ulama-Umara” at the same time counters strong Islamic claims monopolised by the khilafat group represented by the party by PKS in the election. This is because the couple promoted by the PKS is not the “Ulama-Umara” couple mentioned in a religious text.
(hadith) that a state must be led with a balance between ulama and umara.

Figure 1. Islamic Narrative and Symbols in the Jokowi-Ma'ruf Couple Campaign

In the symbolisation shown above, the narrative of ‘Indonesia Maju’ was accompanied by a sarong and kopeah costume which at the same time showed the piety of individuals possessed by Jokowi to brushed aside public doubts about Jokowi’s partiality towards Islamic groups. In the tradition and culture of Indonesian thought, the use of sarong and kopeah shows the level of individual acumen which Gertz classifies as a santri group. This is also supported by the support of other actors namely Ustad Yusuf Mansur and Mr. Guru Bajang as Ulama who support pair 01 to legitimize Jokowi’s Islamic discourse as an electoral strategy in the 2019 election. And the strongest support is given by Nahdhatul Ulama as the largest Islamic organisation in Indonesia helped strengthen the legitimacy of the Islamic identity of the Jokowi-Ma'ruf couple.

Figure 2. NU Young Generation Instruction for Choosing Jokowi-Ma'ruf

In another camp, Prabowo announced later that he was paired with Sandiaga Uno who was the Deputy Governor of DKI Jakarta who later
resigned. In terms of Islamic identity, the Prabowo-Sandi couple did not have an inherent ethical identity as demonstrated by the Joko-wi-Ma’ruf pair, which was strengthened by Islamic profiling through the symbolisation of KH. Ma’ruf Amin. However, in terms of developing discourse and symbolisation, the Prabowo-Sandi couple is no less populous than those couples are. This is because the support of scholars who are members of 212 ulama ijtima is big enough to support the couple. The GNPF cleric decided to give the mandate to the Prabowo-Sandi couple to represent the interests of Muslims in the 2019 elections.

Figure 3. Islamic Narrative and Symbols in the Prabowo-Sandi Campaign

Ijtima ulama is one of a decision-making method for the matters that cannot be found textually in the Al-Qur’an and Sunnah, so it requires a scientific procedure to determine the legal basis or decide certain laws. Ijtima has its position in the Islamic legal system as the results of the Ijtima Ulama are certainly obeyed and followed by some sections of the Muslim community. With the text and narration as in the picture above, “Ijtima Ulama Results”, denotatively shows the legitimacy of Islamic group support for the Prabowo-Sandi couple. At the same time in its implicit meaning, it is a counter-attack on the discourse of “Ulama-Umara” which was first spread by the Jokowi-Ma’ruf.

Another symbolisation and discourse that arises is the support of ustad celebrities in Indonesia, which currently has quite a large number of worshipers, namely Ustad Abdul Somad, Ustad Adi Hidayat and Aa Gym. The three of them represent the Ulama group to be a rival of the ulama symbols in the opposing camp.

In Barthes’s semiotic analysis, a hidden power relation in a text or symbol can be seen by revealing the implied or explicit codes. Disclosure of the code is assessed based on an agreement between com-
Figure 4. The Meeting of Ulemas and Prabowo became Public Attention

Source: http://cdn2.tstatic.net/tribunnews/foto/bank/images/uas-dan-prabowo.jpg

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Community members. That is, without having to struggle to explore the discourse and symbols that emerge as part of the phenomenon of Islamic populism, the community knows and instead reproduces it as an electoral strategy to be able to attract the attention and support of the political elite. So, it cannot be denied that to win the election, political elites need to approach Islamic groups and take votes from the niche.

If we view the power relations that emerge from each symbolisation and discourse of Islamic populism as an electoral strategy, it is increasingly emphasised that in the Indonesian elections Indonesian Muslims and Indonesian Islamic groups have significant power to attract elite attention. Adherents of Islam as the majority vote in the election certainly cannot be ignored and denied its existence by the eligible contestants. Discourses of alignment and mainstreaming of the interests of Islamic groups become mandatory discourse for election contestants to be able to win votes.

This condition also shows that the phenomena that occur are purely the excesses of procedural democracy. Procedural democracy requires a mechanism of representation and speaking of representation means speaking of representing certain entities or identities. So, in the case of the phenomenon of Islamic populism, what emerges is a symbiotic condition of mutualism, where political elites need the support of Islamic groups, and Islamic groups need political elites as a vehicle for smoothing interests and policies in favor of their groups. This applies to Islamic groups that seem to be divided between moderate Islam and Islamic khilafat, which are nothing but different vehicles for their re-
spective representations. Until now, history proves that Islamic groups in Indonesia can be a political barometer of both the issue of election issues and the representation of their identity in the political superstructure. So far, the writer has not found a rival issue that could be an electoral strategy besides the Pancasila issue, which is also vis a vis with Islam. This further shows the dominance of Islamic discourse in Indonesian politics.

The Potential of Islamic Populism for the Advancement of Indonesian Democracy: Universal Values of Islamic Tenets as Identity

The situation brought by Islamic populist movements raises many concerns and questions, especially regarding the direction of Indonesia’s democracy which is considered to be heading backward. To answer this question, one thing we need to understand is that, in a democratic country, it is difficult to exclude a political movement based on the identity of a particular group, because its presence is a necessity in a democracy. That is, efforts to eliminate a political identity movement under the pretext of saving democracy will instead lead us to a paradox that in turn can make our democracy back. What must be done is, by directing political movements of identity, in this case, Islamic populism, to be in harmony with universal values that can create consensus, both at the community and elite level, where these are the main ideas of democracy.

Elections that are accompanied by the existence of identity political movements should no longer be seen as a scourge that can lead to the de-Democartisation of Indonesia, but must be understood as a characteristic of Indonesian democracy that recognises the diversity of identities and approves them for healthy contestation through democratic election mechanisms.8

Today we still see that the identity that underlies Islamic populism still dwells at the level of personal values of certain personalities, not the universal values of Islamic teachings that can answer social problems in society. For political opponents, to break this political movement is done by making personal issues as a counter to the discourse of built resilience.

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8 Adiwilaga, Rendy, Ridha, Muhammad, & Mustabsyirotul Ummah Mustofa.. Pemilu Dan Keniscayaan Politik Identitas Etnis Di Indonesia: Sebuah Tinjauan Teoritis. Jurnal Bawaslu Vol.3 No. 2 2017, Hal. 269-284
Islam certainly has universal values that should be the main identity in underlying Islamic populism movements. For this reason, Islamic Populism, if it does not want to be seen as a neo-authoritarianism movement that is monocultural, must be able to provide a movement in response to problems that occur. If that is not done, the Islamic populism movement will instead generate ridicule and fear that the interests of other groups cannot be accommodated.

When the Islamic populism movement can offer its ideology, which is reflected through a clear program and policy direction, this will force its political opponents to do the same. Of course, this is good for the progress of our democracy where the battle that took place in the general election is a fight about the program and a clear policy direction for the interests and welfare of society at large. In the end, the discourse battle that arises, is no longer about Islam vs Pancasila which can raise fears of national disintegration, but is a battle of ideas about program concepts and policy directions that are more applicable and concrete so that they can emerge as a solution to the nation’s current problems occur, both in economic, political, social, and cultural aspects.

Conclusion
The Islamic Populism Movement in Indonesia (both modern traditionalist groups and modern groups of khilafat) which is based on discourse and symbols of Islamic values as identity is currently in the spotlight of all parties. This must be seen as a potential for democracy in Indonesia. Political opponents, who disagree with this movement, continually try to fight this movement with the issues and discourses that are built, such as the separation of religion and politics, getting stronger. If you see this, the key to the direction of democracy in Indonesia is in the direction of the Islamic populism political movement.

This Populism Movement must be able to improve the quality of ideas and discourse offered so that what emerges from this movement is the party platform and program and policy direction as a concrete representation of Islamic values and ideology in responding to problems in society. This can be a potential for democracy in Indonesia, because when the Islamic populism movement has done that, then its political opponents will do the same thing as a counter-discourse in fighting for sympathy and community choice. This condition will direct Indonesia’s democracy into a programmatic democracy, where the battle in it is about which programs and policy directions are the
best in answering the nation’s problems so that the community can prosper.

In line with this, the current Islamic populism is a signal that democracy cannot escape from the politics of representation as to the main value of both substantive and procedural democracy. If the issue of representation is raised, then equality of access and participation of all groups to be “represented” in politics, will become a valuable value for the Democratization of Indonesia as a country that has multiple entities and identities. So, in the future, the study of the phenomenon of Indonesian Islamic populism can be seen in a broader perspective to find solutions to quality democracy. So that political phenomena are no longer seen as pathologies but are studied to find new theories and formulas in creating better social and political change by utilizing the “blessing in disguise” adage.

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