This research aims to examine how to deal with radicalisation in West Java, Indonesia. To achieve this goal, researchers focused on the efforts of the national institutions in dealing with radicalisation, for instance through educational institutions such as universities and boarding schools; regional governments represented by regional apparatus organisations, for example the public education institution at the municipality level, the Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme (National Counter Terrorism Agency) (BNPT) and national defense institution (the Indonesian Army); including individual actors. As the subjects of this research, therefore the sub-state and non-state actors were chosen to see their relevance and contribution to the study of International Relations after the Black September era. Additionally, it tends to search its contribution to global peace and security. West Java became a locus of this research because the historical records that reported as a place for the growing of a radical movement. Furthermore, in the contemporary socio-political development, West Java became an area with the dynamics of Islamist thought and movement that were considered related to the radicalisation. This research uses a qualitative approach with descriptive analysis methods utilizing interview data collection techniques, field observations and utilization of online information both historical and contemporary. In order to build conceptual frame-
work the research concerned on societal security and radicalisation. This research found that efforts in dealing with radicalisation are still state centric, with the limited involvement and contribution of sub-state and non-state actors. This limitation has triggered society and made them concerned about the possibility of extremism and/or fanaticism with violence, which can lead to intolerance so that it became a threat to societal security and even national security.

Keywords: societal security, radicalisation, non-state actors, sub-state actors.

In a global context, one of the events that shocked the world took place on September 11, 2001 (9/11). It was considered as a radicalisation related to the Al-Qaeda terrorism movement that attacked the vital objects of the United States, which was a response to the involvement and support of the United States for Israel in the Gulf War and a number of other regions in the Middle East (History.com). After the Cold War, the United States popularised Western cultures, such as democracy, free market, human rights, freedom of individualism throughout the world (Huntington, 1996). This action leads to the clash of cultures between the West and Non-West, especially with Islamic values.

Since 9/11, the United States has carried out campaigns to combat terrorism throughout the world and marked the beginning of a new round of Western relations with Islamists (Ramos, 2013). This event seemed to have lifted back Western relations with Islamists in the event of the success of the 1979 Islam(ist) Revolution Iran as evidence of resistance to Western global domination. Furthermore, the Western countries also perceive the Islamist fundamentalism movement as a new form of political power which poses a serious threat to them (Amuzegar, 1995). Some argue that the Iran Islam(ist) Revolution is at the root of Islamist radicalism movements throughout the world (Anderson, 2008). The threat to the West has shifted from a state (Soviet Union) to non-state actors (radicalisation movements), especially global terrorist groups.

In the regional level, Gunaratna (2019) identified political-religious extremism in the Asia Pacific region. During the 1990s, Soviet-Afghan war veterans returned to their home countries to join existing radical groups or form new groups and carry out radicalisation. One of them is Al-Qaeda that claims to spread the doctrine of Jihadism to
Southeast Asian countries (Baylis, 2008). The expansion of terrorist networks in Southeast Asia has indirectly raised Islamist radicalisation movements in several Southeast Asian countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand. In Indonesia, the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and Laskar Jihad have emerged. In the Philippines and Thailand, Islamist radicalisation is manifested through the movement of ethnic minority Muslim Moro separatists and Pattani Ethnics in Southern Thailand and in Malaysia is demonstrated by the existence of the Malaysian Mujahedeen Collection (KKM). Some of the Islamist radicalism movements are alleged to have links with Jemaah Islamiyah in Southeast Asia which intends to form an Islamic state, in the national, regional and global level (Fealy, 2004).

Radicalisation has become a concern in countries with a Muslim majority such as in Africa. In North Africa (Morocco, Tunisia and Libya), Islamist political movements are present referring to domestic factors. For example, marginalization and economic deprivation by the central government, the influence of urban currents, and social conservatism such as maintaining traditional Islamic values from the flow (invasion) of foreign cultures and westernization. Meanwhile the Islamic view is a core component that shapes the identity of people in Africa (Pargeter, 2009). Historical antagonisms that affect the collective memory of African societies have also been a driving force for radicalisation in Africa, including the historical aspects of the struggle of African peoples’ independence from European colonial powers (Githens-mazer & Githens-mazer, 2009; Pargeter, 2009). Radicalisation in Africa has threatened national peace and security so that it has implications for national, regional and international security policies (Aning & Abdallah, 2013) as well as regional and international regimes (Ismail, 2013). For countries in Africa, as in Morocco, the country encourages the formation of governance as an effort to improve state and human security (Alaoui, 2017). Thus, the cooperation between government and African Muslims is need to deal with radicalisation (Solomon, 2014).

The issue of radicalisation is also a growing concern in the European region. Radicalisation can be done by non-state actors to achieve hegemony in a nation-state (Bashirov & Lancaster, 2018). Radicalisation per se has even evolved to be individual radicalisation (lone wolf radicalisation), in which the prevention requires monitoring of the community and the Internet to detect and manage threats (Dechesne & Meines, 2012). Berger (2016) found that radicalisation has some im-
plications for Western European governments in shaping security policies and creating social cohesion. However, Vidino & Brandon (2012) suggest that the characteristics, philosophies, goals and challenges of counter-radicalisation strategies in various European countries need to consider the unique political, cultural and legal elements in each society. In fact, the policies tend to narrow the tolerance limitation as an effort to prevent radicalisation that shows the development towards perfect liberalism in post 9/11 Western societies (Kühle & Lindekilde, 2012).

The problem of radicalisation in Southeast Asia is influenced by ethnicity; idealism to build a new country and group fanaticism. This radicalisation has the ability to shift separatism to radical Islamist ideologies in the Islamist political struggle against the state (Sugunnasil, 2006; Yusoff, 2010). The ethnicity factor arises due to the neglect of local community concerns, the repressive attitude of the military and the rise of militant Islamist forces. Apart from these factors, Islamist radicalisation in Southeast Asia is inseparable from the international dimension, such as the separatist movements in the Southern Philippines or Southern Thailand, as well as in Aceh. Indonesia is involved with radical Islamist networks in other parts of the Muslim world. They develop because of access to weapons and popular support and networks with Muslims in the Middle East Tengah (Chalk, 2010; Gunn, 1986; S. Jones, 2018; Rabasa, 2003). The previously-mentioned networks are Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) with affiliation to Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) that encourages the youth in Southeast Asia to join violent groups (Ramakrishna, 2017). In the context of Southeast Asia, such as in Indonesia, Hwang (2018) shows why and how individuals support and join extreme Islamist groups, how the circle of study, conflict, school and friendship becomes the path for radicalisation that supports terrorist groups.

There are several studies of Islamist radicalisation in Indonesia, including studies of the development of radical Islamist networks in Indonesia, the historical roots, and the ideological foundations and factors causing their development (Fealy & Borgu, 2005; Hadiz, 2008; Jamhari, 2003; S. Jones, 2016; Naupal, 2019; Ward, 2008). There are also studies of patterns, pathways, religious considerations and psychological processes that encourage militant individuals to stop participating in acts of violence (Hwang, 2018). The development of radicalisation in Indonesia is also reviewed by Mietzner & Muhtadi (2018) and marks
the growth of conservative Muslims who are more educated, prosperous, organised in groups that are in line with their neglect by the government. In the context of Indonesia’s ideology, when faced with the growth of radical Muslims, N. Jones (2005) shows that Pancasila is the basis of plurality growth in Indonesia. It is necessary for Indonesia to develop a strategy of pluralism and its policies, so that the government considers Pancasila with religious pluralism in the security context.

Security, in this context, is not focused on fulfilling the form of state security, which confirms that terrorism is a threat to the existence of the state, but rather looks at the form of human security, particularly societal security which becomes a global concern regarding the existence and survival of human life. The community’s fears towards the development of radicalisation that lead to exclusivism, intolerance and verbal and physical violence and even lead to terrorism is not impossible to be a threat to societal security in West Java.

Based on the previous research studies above, it is shown that radicalisation is an interesting phenomenon to be discussed, especially when the study of radicalisation in Indonesia is placed on the realm of the dynamics of development at regional and global levels. Research on the development of radicalisation in certain parts of Indonesia is still limited. The research studies above still place the phenomenon of radicalisation within Indonesia’s broad scope. Those studies are also related to security studies, particularly societal security in Indonesia and in the context of International Relations, and can be a reflection for the development of limited Islamic International Relations from previous research studies. Therefore, this research is conducted to fill the limitations of previous research studies regarding efforts to deal with radicalisation that were confronted with societal security in West Java, Indonesia. In addition, this research is conducted using the field survey method and interviews with a number of participants across West Java Province which complemented the method for the research that had been conducted. This research seeks to answer thoughts and considerations on the conducive involvement of sub-state and non-state actors in the face of radicalisation in West Java, Indonesia.

**Research Methods**

The focus of this research is on one of the major provinces in Indonesia, West Java. The reason for choosing this research location is that West Java Province has an important position in Indonesia, namely as...
a buffer province of the national capital, so that the social and political dynamics that develop in this province have an impact on national policy. In the history of the development of radicalisation in Indonesia, West Java became one of the regions to form a radical movement in Indonesia after independence. Some districts or cities in this region became the centre of massive Islamic growth. The ‘qualitative research’ is chosen as an approach, assisted by historical as well as descriptive analytic research methods, to review the history of the development of radicalisation in Indonesia from independence until now. Research object is picked and told to be further descriptively analytically analysed according to the conception of societal security and radicalisation. In addition, field observations are also carried out, both in the review of the context of the phenomenon studied and in the confirmation process (triangulation) in this research.

Data collection is carried out through interviews with a number of participants, including policy makers in the Government of West Java as representatives of sub-state actors. The educational institutions represented by public and private universities, religious- and general-based universities, pesantren across the West Java, including Cianjur and Sukabumi in the west; Bandung, Cimahi and Sumedang in the central; Garut, Tasikmalaya, Ciamis, Banjar, Pangandaran and Kuningan in the east; Bekasi, Depok and Bogor as the buffer zone areas of the capital; and Majalengka, Cirebon, Indramayu, Subang and Karawang in the north. Those nineteen regions in West Java became a source of interviewers and participants in field research. In addition, interviews are conducted with groups in the community. Researchers also conduct interviews with the leaders of institutions that tackle terrorism (the National Counterterrorism Agency for West Java) and the security forces (TNI and Police) as state actors who are leading sectors for security in Indonesia.

Researcher conducts data analysis on an ongoing basis during the course of the research until the end of the data collection process. This data analysis process takes place from the beginning of the research to drawing conclusions from the results of the research. While the data recording and writing is done by utilizing the forms of research instruments, including: the researcher per se, field notes, tape recorders, and photographers. To maintain data validity, the researcher uses data checking techniques from various data sources in various ways and at various times. Researcher cross-checks data obtained from interviews with participants, data from field research and documentation studies.
Theoretical Frameworks

The literature on radicalisation has been extensively studied in the in doing research. Researcher reviews the literature on radicalisation and societal security compiled according to the conceptual framework of the research.

There is no universal definition of radicalisation, both in the level of the academic community and practitioners. In fact, the concept of radicalisation is still debatable and has not found consensus on the causes, nature and limitations of radicalisation in academic literature (Mandel R, 2009; Sedgwick, 2010). The word radical comes from the Latin meaning root and radix, as an expression for 'going to the roots' (Mandel R, 2009). At the most basic level, the meaning of the word radical is to represent or support an extreme part of an action (Oxford English Dictionary, 2019). Radicalisation is a process in which someone becomes an extremist (Mandel R, 2009). Radicalism is also interpreted as an understanding or flow aimed at social or political change or renewal through violent means (Christmann, 2012). Some academics consider that radicalisation involves various factors and complex dynamics, being extremist is a process, so studying radicalisation is an attempt to discover the nature of the process. Radicalisation is the process of growing individuals or groups with a tendency to reject dialogue and compromise with different parties (Schmid, 2013). Those who embrace radicalism are those who want to bring their political thoughts or ideas and reinforce doctrines by means of violence. They can come from a variety of ethnic, national, political and religious groups (Living Safe Together, 2015).

From the various definitions above, radicalisation can mean two things, radicalisation of thought and radicalisation of action. This is in line with the opinion of Neumann (2013) who sees that radicalisation has two meanings, namely emphasizing extremist thinking (cognitive radicalisation) and extremist actions (behavioural radicalisation). At the level of thought, radicalisation is a form of internalization of a set of beliefs starting from recruitment that transforms itself into a weapon of jihad or the process of adopting an extremist belief system that is a precondition for a willingness to use, support or facilitate violence. However, there is no connection between extremist political beliefs and political action (violence) and the two phenomena can be examined separately. Being radically cognitive does not require a person to be a terrorist. Borum (2011) states that many terrorists do not
deeply believe in doctrines that have extremist nuances and may not radicalise in the context of any traditional sense. They are interested in certain activities or groups for other reasons. Ideology and actions are sometimes related, but not always—it is needed to understand the difference between the two terms. There are a number of determinants for Islamic ideology which have problems with security. For example, anti-democracy, blaming the West for all issues concerning Islam, and understanding and or helping acts of terrorism (Jordan & Boix, 2004).

In another context, radicalisation has a broad meaning that emphasises large changes in society that may or may not bring threats to democracy whether or not there is use of violence/threats in achieving its goals (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009). Radicalisation can be violent or non-violent. Violent radicalisation means an action taken to achieve political or other goals using violence. The result of this violent radicalisation is in the form of terrorism, when someone is very optimistic in using violence to achieve various goals. Every terrorist is radical, but not every radical is a terrorist. This means that radicalisation can develop in various directions, including forms of non-violent radicalisation. For example, radicalisation allows a person to be motivated to commit to intense dakwah or missionary practice or to strong religious service. This non-violent radicalisation is linked to the desire to actively support broad changes in society in various ways but without violence (exclusively).

Radicalisation cannot also be released in the context and normative issues. The word “radical” does not stand alone. Its substance varies depending on how the mainstream in society sees it and within a certain period. Different political, cultural and historical contexts, in certain respects produce different ideas from ‘radicalism’. As in North Korea, the principle of freedom of speech is called radical; this is different from Western countries that uphold this principle. In the 1980s, the idea of same marriage was seen as radical, but now those who oppose it are seen as fundamentalist and radical. In fact, ‘radical’ is attached to Martin Luther King Jr. as a civil rights leader who was threatened by the government in his struggle (McCarthy & McMillian, 2003). ‘Radical’ for groups of people are fighters for the freedom of others, so the term is often used to serve political agendas rather than describing social phenomena, which can be learned impartially and objective. In the sense that labelling a person or group of people as radical will lead to the question “radical in relation to what?” This is also the meaning of
radicalisation, which depends on what is considered mainstream or acceptable, adoption of certain beliefs or behaviours can be seen as radicalisation, being progressive, or returning to roots. Thus, radicalisation ultimately depends on the context and its meaning will always invite debate. Likewise with the term extremism, it has a variety of meanings, one of which is political ideas that are diametrically opposed to the main values of society, which in the context of liberal democracy for example, can take the form of racial or religious supremacy, or an ideology that negates basic human rights or democratic principles, or a method used by principals to achieve their political goals by denying life, liberty and human rights (Scruton, 2007).

Researchers also tried to map radicalisation at three levels of awareness, that is, radicalisation at the level of thought that is referred to as vision, mission, and goals. Then, radicalisation at the policy level refers to programs, policies and strategies. Finally, radicalisation at the level of action refers to various actions or actions with a tendency to violence or even terrorism. Then the researchers chose one of the three levels as a priority, namely radicalisation at the level of thought. As a limitation, the term radicalisation in this research refers to a process of developing extremist ideologies and beliefs that is likely to lead to verbal violence and threaten collective identity, but does not necessarily mean being involved in acts of terrorism or acts of violence.

The next concept that is relevant in this research is about the concept of security. After the Cold War, there was an expansion and deepening of the concept of security caused by the development of forms of threats to security, so that the discussion of security threats was no longer related only to the military or the state as its referent object. The complexity of this security threat can be seen from the increasing number of things that must be secured by the state, such as theoretical, population, cultural, and economic prosperity from fatal disruptions or damage (Salmon & Imber, 2008). The same thing was stated by Buzan, Woever & Wilde (1998) which categorised threats into five sectors, including military threats that could threaten all components of the country, political threats that attack the state non-military to state sovereignty, economic threats that attack the economy of a country, societal threats that threaten the state’s identity or the existence of the identity of community groups (nation, religion, language and culture), and environmental threats that have a very broad referent object and concern the existence of every living creature on earth. These
five sectors have the potential to pose threats to national security and to individual security such as threats to the economic, social, and environmental sectors.

In the context of this research, the potential threats that emerge that are against the societal sector because the thought of radicalisation with violent extremism cannot be denied as a threat to Indonesia’s national security through a new identity that enters the sphere of local communities. This societal sector is related to collective identity, so threats to this sector are associated with the identity of a group of people who are recognised together, such as language, culture, religion, and national identity that can come from within and outside the country (Buzan, 1991).

The societal aspect also cannot be separated from the context of maintaining state sovereignty. This is in line with the opinion of Wæver, Buzan, Kelstrup & Lemaitre (1993) that there is a meeting between state security that Emphasises threats to its sovereignty and societal security which Emphasises community identity. The problem of language, religion, and culture is part of the idea of state that must be maintained and protected from the entry of foreign values that can threaten identity (Buzan, 1991). This threat to identity can be caused by a mixture of foreign cultures which erodes the values of the local culture. With the intention that the threat can be driven by the existence of institutions that preserve language and culture, such as museums, schools, and newspapers, to pass down the identity of the community to the next generation (Roe, 2005).

Furthermore, Buzan et al., (1998) have explained issues that posed a threat to societal security, including migration that caused contamination and shifting population composition at the destination country, horizontal or vertical competition with the emergence of linguistic and cultural rejection, even the emergence of integration that is driven by a new, stronger identity that replaces the old identity. In the context of maintaining societal security, this research is not directed to build so that the state tightens borders to control the flow of immigrants as revealed by Buzan et al., (1998), nor does it seek to dominate the ruling government as a consequence of preventing identity of the majority, or form a self-government such as the Zionists in Israel, or also live separate from the majority like the Jews in Europe. This research explores how communities with various elements in it are able to have the power to prevent the spread of radicalisation that is not impossible
to damage the collective identity of the people of West Java by bringing different languages, customs, religious teachings, and cultures.

**Analysis**

*The Development of Radicalism in West Java*

Java is one of the provinces with high dynamics of Islamic development. In the demographic aspect, the Muslim population of West Java reaches 97%. In the socio-political aspect, also Islamic organisations developed massively in West Java, including the transnational Islamic movement, which competed in spreading its influence with Islamic organisations in the mainstream, such as Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and some of the transnational Islamist organisations such as Hizb ut-Tahrir, Tablighi Jamaat, and Salafiyah Movement. There is also the Islamic Defenders Front Militia (FPI) as a local radical Islamist movement which helped to enliven the dynamics of Islamic development in West Java by promoting social morals in post-Decentralisation developments in Indonesia in 1999 (Facal, 2019).

In the context of formal politics, the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), which is a manifestation of the Muslim Brotherhood movement in Indonesia, has a strong mass base in West Java. Then West Java became a mass base of Islamists, referring to the consolidation of conservative Islamic politics which was manifested in the 212 Alumni Association, Islamic Community Forum (FUI), and the National Fatwa Guard Movement (GNPF). Some of these organisations have also become a driving force to fulfil the Prabowo-Sandiaga voting bag in the struggle to win the Presidential Election to achieve a superior voice in the 2019 Presidential election in West Java. This is also supported by Islamic political parties, mass organisations, and new preaching movements in West Java.

In the historical aspect, the political dynamics in West Java were coloured by local radical Islamist movements. West Java became the basis of the Darul Islam / Indonesian Islamic Army (DI / TII) movement led by SM Kartosuwiryo (Van Bruinessen, 2013). This movement had bases in Garut, Tasikmalaya, Cianjur and Ciamis and spread to South Sulawesi and Aceh under the lead of Kahar Muzakar and Daud Beureuh which began in the 1940s to 1960s (Lim, 2005; Umam, 2006). The aim of the movement was to implement Islamic *Sharia* apart from the Indonesian Government (Van Bruinessen, 2002). One area in West Java Province, which has influence in the development of Islamic conser-
vatism, is Tasikmalaya. Tasikmalaya is famous for its “Santri City” due to the large number of Islamic boarding schools and Islamic organisations that grow in this area. One of them is Miftahul Huda Manonjaya Islamic Boarding School. KH Choer Affandi, one of the DI figures of his time, found the pesantren. His pesantren network has spread beyond Tasikmalaya (Takwin et al., 2016).

In addition, there is also the Masyumi Party which has a populist Islamist mass base in Indonesia. Even in this party, Kartosuwiryo was once a member of the executive board and commissioner for the West Java region (Effendi, 2017). In the 1955 election, 23% of the Masyumi Party vote was cast in West Java, which contributed greatly to the party’s victory. The two organisations above (DI and Masyumi) have different ways of struggle; Masyumi moves constitutionally in the formal channels, whereas DI prefers using arms against legitimate government and establishes an Islamic State of Indonesia based in West Java. After the Masyumi Party was banned by the government, among them established the Indonesian Islamic Dakwah Council (DDII) to fight for Islamic ideology in Indonesia. DDII became the first Islamist organisation to send students to the Middle East based on scholarships from Saudi Arabia to study in the country.

The dynamic development of Islam in West Java does not rule out the possibility of leading to the development of radicalisation. The climate is conducive to the development of Islam in West Java as a means for the radical Islamist movement. Both are based on radicalism and violence extremism even that is referred to as terrorism and to expand the network through recruitment and outreach. This is in line with research results from the International Republican Institute (IRI) in 2017, which concluded that, West Java is vulnerable to extremism with violence. In addition, the Setara Institute (in Hasani and Naipospos, 2010) also shows that there are at least four agendas of the radical Islamist movement in West Java, including the establishment of Islamic Sharia, eradication of moral decadence, heresy, and anti-apostasy movements. To achieve this goal, some radical Islamist movements have resorted to physical or violent channels that have caused social unrest. This certainly raises concerns, because acts of radicalisation that lead to acts of violence, it is not impossible to trigger the acts of terrorism.

In other developments, the results of research in 33 provinces in Indonesia concerning radicalism show that West Java is second in the index of vulnerability (46.6) to radicalisation (Khozin, 2013). Correspond-
ingly, Lazuardi Birru concluded that West Java became the province with the highest level of radicalism after Nangroe Aceh Darusalam. According to him, the vulnerability of radicalism in West Java is influenced by several factors, including understanding jihad, alienation and deprivation, acts of intolerance, threatened positions, feeling insecure, the agenda of Islamism, and radical membership (detiknews, 2011). Intolerance and radicalism in West Java are shown by the issue of moral decadence that underlies sweeping actions against objects deemed as nests of disobedience, racism sentiment issues that are narrated in ethnic Chinese economic inequality vs. indigenous communities, issues of Muslim and non-Muslim minorities affected by physical violence or non-physical, raising support for the implementation of Islamic Sharia through regional regulations. The emergence of local radical movements in West Java is associated with the genealogy of the movement towards the existence of the Islamic Syarikat, Masyumi, and Darul Islam in the past. Whereas in the current context of Indonesian democracy, the application of Islamic law is no longer through armed channels, but constitutionally, namely regional regulations (Takwin, et al., 2016).

These forms, if left unchecked, might lead to radicalisation and violent extremism in achieving its goals. Furthermore, the results of the Wahid Foundation survey on the tendency and behaviour of intolerance found that West Java was the highest province that had cases of radicalism and intolerance in Indonesia (Izan, 2016). Especially if we observe that demographically, the majority of people in West Java are Muslim with varying degrees of diversity, ranging from traditionalist to modernist Islam, from moderate to radical who tend not only to radicalise other identities of different religions, but also towards fellow Muslim different thoughts, ideas, and groups.

*Societal Perspectives dealing with Radicalisation: Sub-state Actors*
Sub-state actors can be viewed as part of the state when representing national interests and structural patterns that are not separate in the context of central and regional relations in the development aspect. Sub-state actors can also be viewed as independent units that are autonomously capable of making decisions, policies, and territories representation in relation to other actors domestically and internationally. The involvement of sub-state actors in dealing with radicalisation is interesting to study because it is out of state-centric which is expected
to consider preventive options, the use of moderate efforts through dialogue and soft non-military approaches. However, sub-state actors with elements of legitimacy, legality and power capacity within their scope are possible to face the growing radicalisation in society. Licensing of domicile, conducting economic activities, conducting certain activity and visiting to the area within the scope of the territory authority becomes the authority for sub-state actors to conduct observation and supervision in the framework of preventive action.

Some vulnerability aspects that develop in the community may trigger the growth and development of radicalisation. From the existing vulnerabilities, it is easy to exploit towards radicalisation. These aspects include poverty, unemployment, income inequality, injustice in obtaining economic and political rights, policies based on minority discrimination such as ethnic and religious, coercive approaches in dealing with problems trigger the emergence of radicalisation in the community. Within the scope of public service authority in the regions, surely the function of the sub-state actors becomes relevant. Sub-state actors can also face radicalisation with their knowledge of the diversity of migrants who can increase the vulnerability, both domestic and foreign nationals. The diversity of migrants is a hallmark of plurality that cannot be avoided in society, but the regulatory mechanism is needed so that the role of the community can be involved in maintaining plurality while staying on the symptoms of tendency to pose vulnerability. In Indonesian society, *sistem keamanan lingkungan* (siskamling) (neighbourhood security system) is known, which is a non-governmental effort to maintain neighbourhood security and order, even opening socialisation and inter-citizen communication to strengthen relationship. The community needs to be fully aware that neighbourhood security is a shared responsibility, not leaving it to security officers. So that all suspicious activities in the community can be monitored optimally. This is possible to prevent radicalisation and terrorism. Besides that, one of the efforts that can be done to strengthen the resilience of the region is the need for social communication by security actors or institutions (Djuyandi, 2017).

The diversity of immigrants can be interpreted in terms of collective identity. The more diverse elements of its societal collective identity, the more vulnerable it is to be exploited by radicals. Collective identity that triggers vulnerability to radicalisation can be based on religion, ethnicity and race. There is also a form of vulnerability that can be
indicated but it is uncertain what kind of vulnerability is. This fact refers to the perception of cultural threats by the community such as forms of music, fashion, and film that can weaken collective identity according to the perception of other community groups. In this context, radicalisation not only refers to a religious basis, but also based on culture when foreign culture is seen as part of self-characteristics that are manifested in various forms of life so waiving or even eliminate the nation’s collective identity. Sub-state actors at the local government level to the sub-district and urban village (kelurahan) can play an optimal role in preventing the emergence of vulnerability caused by diversity in the community. Increasing Pancasila values as a state philosophy such as tolerance, equality before the law, opportunities to access employment and political positions, anti-discrimination, freedom of worship need to be strengthened in society through a variety of activities, both socialisation and other forms of activities that lead to increase the values above.

The radicalisation based on politicisation of religion can be felt when selecting the president and vice president of the Republic of Indonesia. This issue can divide the community into at least two parts, which support the presidential, and vice presidential candidate's number 1 and number 2. It is easily utilised by efforts to lead to radicalisation and fanaticism of groups which can divide unity. The doctrines of each supporter of the two groups were able to radicalise at the community level. Supporters of number 1 form the discourse that the candidate is a religious choice and descendants of famous religious leaders, or by the term nyantri (student at traditional Muslim school). Meanwhile, supporters of number 2 developed discourse as candidates who are concerned about the welfare of the people and determined based on the agreement of the ulamas (Muslim leaders) in Indonesia. The developing discourses were used as doctrines utilised by radicalism activists to radicalise society. This indicates that identity politics based on religion still plays a role in Indonesia in achieving its objectives.

Reflecting on the above explanation, efforts to deal with radicalisation are still limited to carried out by sub-state actors. The vulnerability that comes from diversity shows that the knowledge has not been spread to the population so that exposure to radicalisation still touches the realm of grassroots and is still limited to involving residents to deal with radicalisation. Limitations in identifying potential vulnerability in society will also lead to limitations in community participation in
dealing with radicalisation. Likewise, the discourse that developed at the elite level is still limited to state politics, the case of money politics, the distribution of power, and the development of its doctrine is still within the scope of state leadership. This shows that the thoughts and or considerations of the political elite are still dominant around a limited country regarding community welfare, overcoming unemployment, increasing access to the same economic and political channels, education and affordable health. Therefore, it needs to be balanced by efforts to deal with radicalisation that is not state centric.

Sub-state actors represented by the regional government, province, city, district, sub-district, urban village, up to hamlet and neighbourhood need to be involved in dealing with radicalisation. The reach of the bureaucracy that reaches grassroots can be used for community empowerment in preventing potentials that lead to acts of intolerance, violence and racism. For example, how communal activities can be developed and maintained in a community, such as inclusive religious activities, social activities as a form of concern for other affected communities, joint neighbourhood security system (siskamling), traditional arts activities, and preservation local cultural values need to get a portion to be appreciated in the community. This is also part of the local cultural heritage that enriches national culture, as well as a form of local wisdom. In this case sub-state actors can provide support for the implementation of various activities. Activities of *Musyawarah Perencanaan Pembangunan* (musrenbang) (development planning discussion activities) involving various community leaders, government elements and the security and order apparatus can be an alternative in building communication and coordination facilities in the region as an effort to deal with potential vulnerabilities and trends in radicalisation that occur in the community, so that they are not only as an activity administrative routine that has the substantial meaning contained in these activities.

**Societal Perspectives dealing with Radicalisation: Non-state actors**

Efforts to deal with radicalisation are not limited to state and sub-state actors, but also need to involve non-state actors. In the context of this research, the intended state actor is a social organisation, which includes religious groups, youth and nonprofits-oriented social organisations. This group is seen as a civil society; a community that is not only as a form of community independence faced with the state,
but also as an instrument in realizing certain values in society such as justice, equality, freedom and pluralism. In addition to the groups, individual actors can play a role in dealing with radicalisation, such as religious leaders, community leaders, traditional leaders, academicians (universities) and youth leaders. They can move simultaneously in encouraging inclusive values, tolerance and plurality in the midst of society, in addition to the above autonomous groups or organisations.

Religious mass organisations such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Muhammadiyah and other organisations in Indonesia have a strategic position in conducting surveillance, preventive efforts and prevention of the development of radical ideologies or violent ideas from groups affiliated with terrorism or ISIS. The advantage of these mass organisations is that they have a real and clear membership base so that their active involvement, both at the level of policy formulation through their participation in the formulation of laws or regulations on the prevention of radicalisation as well as in the aspects of advocacy and outreach, is relevant to be carried out. These organisations as part of civil society can actively include priority agendas regarding prevention to counteract thought or actions. Efforts to deal with radicalisation must be a program or platform that is intensively carried out both in internal discussion forums and actions that can be taken to help government programs.

Religious leaders or other community leaders who have moderate insight also have a strategic position in containing radicalism in society. The existence of these figures can be a partner for the government or security forces in taking radicalisation prevention measures. The role of religious or community leaders and mass organisations can be synergized to become a layered force as a stronghold in facing radicalisation through various types of preventive activities and other non-violent actions such as campaigns, discussions, seminars, inter-faith dialogs aimed at providing awareness to society that radicalisation and acts of violence have the potential to threaten unity, values of tolerance, plurality and societal security in society. As an example, the discourse that developed in the community that the concept of jihad is seen as an effort to fight the infidels who are interpreted as non-Muslims. While Islam teaches the concept of jihad in a persuasive, constructive, and bringing benefit to humans. There are other religious terminologies that are interpreted politically to be used by certain parties.
Education is one of the keys in facing radicalisation. Educational institutions can build critical thinking, especially towards the younger generation in responding to developing information, especially when radicalism infiltrates through the cyber world. Educational institutions can play a strategic role in combating the narratives of radicalism with counter narratives. Like Islam Nusantara narrative developed by Nahdlatul Ulama, Islam Berkemajuan (the progressive Islamic) narrative developed by Muhammadiyah. Both of these organisations have effective educational institutions that can be instruments in dealing with radicalisation through the office of opinions that develop in society that lead to radicalism and violence. The community needs to be aware that all religions teach values of tolerance, peace, non-violence, mutual respect and pluralism.

The current challenge for tertiary institutions is to develop prejudices and claims that tertiary institutions in Indonesia are the center and seeds of the development of radicalism. Tertiary institution becomes a place for students with a variety of potential they, also known as a nursery place for people who are critical, open minded and intellectual. Some observers say that radicalism on campus is growing because of the development of right-wing student organisations. The growing discourse of the debate about the compatibility of Islam and democracy is part of strengthening radical understanding. Radicalists view that Muslims who accept democracy as Muslims who have deviated from Islam, without exploring Islamic values that also accommodate democratic values, such as Islamic teachings on tolerance, equality before the law, plurality and mutual respect for differences. Islamic movements or organisations outside the campus are able to spread their wings into the campus, such as Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (the Islamic Student Association), Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasional Indonesia (the Indonesian National Student Movement), Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia (the Indonesian Muslim Student Action Unit), and even Salafi organisations make campus as a venue for organisational regeneration. So, the leaders of tertiary institution need to control campus facilities, mosques and prayer rooms, student centers and other public spaces that are used as a vehicle to conduct coaching and recruitment.

In addition, the revitalization of relevant subjects becomes urgent to strengthen national values, such as Pancasila, civic, the history of the nation, and other social sciences need to be supported and strength-
ened with national values. Campus becomes a means to discuss the nation’s problems scientifically. But it does not mean it used as an arena for the spread of anti-NKRI (rejecting NKRI) and anti-Pancasila (rejecting Pancasila ideology), because academic freedom on campus or campus autonomy is used as a means of spreading radicalism and violence. Autonomy for academic freedom needs to have clear boundaries, which are related to science, not associated with freedom in spreading political ideas that are contrary to Pancasila, such as the discourse of the establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia, so academic freedom is not intended to replace the state ideology.

Not only tertiary institutions, radicalisation also tends to develop in other school institutions, such as high school level, which is filled with a number of young people of productive age. In West Java, organisasi rohani Islam (Rohis) (the Islamic spiritual organisation) has the potential to develop inclusive Islam in addition to the potential for the spread of exclusive Islam. The West Java Provincial Education Office seeks to make religious guidance carried out by the religious can run inclusively, teaching tolerant values with the motto of Islam Rahmatan Lil Alamin. Besides that, there is an effort to revitalize the curriculum of Rohis activities in order to develop students’ potentials in a positive direction and the development of Islam, which is Rahmatan Lil Alamin. As the case in tertiary institutions, the strategic instruments of Rohis that need to get adaptation and inculcation of national values are found in their coaching and regeneration patterns, not even Rohis, intra-school student organisations (OSIS) also become a vehicle for the spread of inclusive values, tolerance and nonviolence.

Family has the potential for the growth of radicalism embryo in society. The contributing factors are the lack of parents’ attention to children and the family’s weakness to instill critical thinking. Family involvement in radicalism has actually taken place since the Darul Islam uprising. Fighting alumni in Afghanistan involve their families to conduct training, although it is only for the leaders. The figure who plays a role in transmitting the values of radicalism is not only a father, but also the whole family can play a role and influence each other. Family is the first coaching for children’s development so that it deserves attention in dealing with radicalisation. The family carries out the contemporary issue of cases of radicalism and terrorism in Indonesia. For example, in May 2018, the perpetrators involved their entire families carrying out suicide bombings. In this case, parental doctrine
to other family members triggers acts of terrorism, such as the doctrine of sacrifice to enter heaven and jihad as a Muslim obligation in the world. However, with the development of massive communication media, it does not rule out the possibility that children can become actors who can make their families think radically because through social media everyone can easily interact with other strangers. Thus, inculcation of inclusive values, tolerance, and nonviolence becomes an important part in the family besides the introduction of digital literacy and the inculcation of true religious values in the family environment. Family has a strategic position in shaping the character or personality of their children. This includes parents’ knowledge about religion also needed because they can play a role in protecting their children to maintain the values of tolerance and inclusivism which are the unifying values of heterogeneous Indonesian society.

**Conclusion**

Radicalisation can be seen as a threat to societal security when radicalisation tends to change community’s collective identity. The impacts arising from radicalisation such as anti-tolerance, anti-plurality, the use of verbal and nonverbal violence to achieve the goals are not in line with the values of Indonesian society, which is based on Pancasila. Thus, a well-designed and comprehensive effort is needed in facing radicalisation. The effort to deal with radicalisation is not only a concern for state actors, but also requires optimal involvement of sub-state actors, province, city and district, and also sub-local actors starting from the sub-district to urban village or village. In addition, non-state actors such as mass organisations (youth, religious and social), community leaders to the family as the smallest unit in society can make important contributions in facing radicalisation. Coordination between sub-state actors and state actors is one important element in dealing with radicalisation. We find that various efforts in dealing with radicalisation in Indonesia, especially West Java are still state centric. It shows that the involvement and contribution of sub-state and non-state actors are still limited. These limitations trigger community concerns about violent attitudes and acts of extremism and fanaticism with violence that lead to acts of intolerance, even leading to concerns about the emergence of threats to the community’s collective identity as part of societal security.
For further researchers, we suggest referring to the ideological foundation of Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia (NKRI) (the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia), namely Pancasila. In contemporary discourse in Indonesia, there are discourses about NKRI bersyariah (NKRI based on Sharia ideology) and NKRI berpancasila (NKRI based on Pancasila ideology). Interpretably, NKRI bersyariah can be viewed as a moderate reference between the Islamic State of Indonesia which is fought for and claimed by Islamists and NKRI without Sharia ideology, but is this ideology be compatible with Pancasila? Surely, it will be a discourse among academics and practitioners regarding the position of religion in the framework of the Republic of Indonesia which has Pancasila as its ideology.

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