Political Perspective of Indonesian Civil-Military Relation in the Reform Era

Ratnia Solihah, Siti Witianti, Mustabsyirotul Ummah

Civil-military relations will always be interesting to discuss in the democracy system. It relates to power supremacy in a state. Indonesia Post-Reformation of 1998 finds a turning point for civil-military relations. In the five different leadership periods, discover the differences in the patterns of civil and military relations in Indonesian democracy. This paper focuses on the dynamics of civil-military relations in Indonesia for five periods of government (BJ. Habibie, Gus Dur, Megawati, SBY dan Jokowi) within a political perspective seen from the military politics, military and political aspects of the Reformation era. This paper is examined using the literature study method. Indonesia’s context shows that explaining and establishing civil-military relations in the transition is not easy. The New order inherited a sufficiently strong political structure in the government by giving the civilian sphere to be filled with the military. On the one hand, the military as part of an Indonesian community or a citizen’s part is a state agency that relies on the decision of the political leader. But on the other hand, the military’s autonomy of civilians will provide an opportunity to irresponsibly in the name of The Guardian of the State. Interpreting civil-military relations in Indonesia’s Democratisation after the reform era becomes more complicated because of diverse understanding. Therefore, it needs to address various models of relationships that can accommodate the Indonesian political-cultural pattern.


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The civil-military relations in many new states after World War II become an interesting issue to discuss. Those states have chosen democracy as their system while the militaries have a long history within to gain freedom. The militaries that struggled for independence have taken part in the political decision-making process (Poelinggomang, 2000).

In Indonesia, independence became a starting point for military involvement in politics. The military made themselves as an institution through a long war against the Invaders. Struggle for independence made them do not only physical activities in war but also the country’s founding strategies. However, after the condition turned into normal and stable, the military gave the government to civilians. From the first year of independence, Indonesian military officers tended to politics as a revolutionary soldier. The tendency got stronger in the year along Dutch Aggression. They had to overcome the threats and handling the communist rebellion in Madiun that made critical political situation in 1948 (Muchtar S.P., 1999, p. 52).

Civil supremacy over the military, as a feature of the implementation of a good democracy, is proven repeatedly to experience various exams and barriers. Since the establishment of the Indonesian Government, the Indonesian military has had a huge role in determining the historical line of Indonesian struggle. Therefore, during the five years of the Indonesian Revolution (1945-1949) we can easily witness how to plug the military role. The role of army politics becomes important considering the most striking characteristics of the dualism of leadership, i.e. military and political (Said, 1991, p. 5).

Later in the new order period, the Association of ABRI in politics was seen while in practice the military was not only allowed to follow the political world but also “with other social-political forces” involved in state life, which is sourced on the legal aspects of empirical. The institutional or individual military is involved in various activities (Leni, 2013,p. 39-40):

1. As the pillar of the new order, the TNI was in the DPR through the line of adoption though not the party but Susduk DPR/MPR RI which confirming the position
2. As stabilizers and Dynamizers, TNI’s political presence is embodied through Golkar. In addition to ensuring the passage of
the democratic system, the New Order politicians also strive to produce the dominant political force

3. TNI is not only present in legislative institutions but also executives. It can be seen from the TNI who sits on key positions in the government, both active and retired.

4. To support the welfare of the TNI family, President Suharto also gave many business opportunities

5. Besides the military duty and economy, TNI has function to modernize the military within the AMD (ABRI Masuk Desa) Program

In the new order era, the military controlled the power. The military confirmed confidently the truth of dual function which legally known as a doctrine. That doctrine explicitly refuses the point that the military needs to keep the distance from politics while declaring the military as a saviour of the state and guardian of the state ideology, Pancasila. In other words, the Dwi Function was developed into a number of basic assumptions as justifications for the role of military politics, which includes (a) Historical value, in this case the Indonesian military is perceived as an institution that has its history as a people’s army that plays a major role in dealing with military resistance; (b) Securing the ideology of the state, in this case the military is responsible for securing the state ideology, Pancasila; (c) Form of the State, the Military formulates the view of the form of the state of Indonesia as a unitary state governed by the family system. Military and civilian are one family, who have the same rights and responsibilities. Departing from several basic assumptions, the military confidently implemented a dual function policy, which in practice brought the TNI to become an important part of the power system in Indonesia. The military emerged as Power Elite (Maliki, 2000).

The reforms in 1998, which led to the downfall of Suharto, became a turning point for ABRI’s control of the civilian sphere. The abrogation of ABRI’s dual function has become a touted discourse as one of the demands for reform. In 2004, the government issued Law No. 34 of 2004 concerning the Military that revoked the ABRI Dual Function (Mietzner & Misol, 2013, p. 112). Therefore, the military loses its socio-political function. They can no longer concurrently become officials or control a business directly. The structure of the Armed Forces was also reorganised into two, namely the Police in charge of maintaining secu-
rity and the TNI which guarded the national defence. This separation
directly prevented the military from interfering in civil matters.

Military reform in Indonesia has produced several cultural, struc-
tural, doctrinal, and organisational changes. These changes affected
how civil-military relations in Indonesia during the reform period, es-
pecially from a political perspective. This is the focus of the discussion
in this paper.

Several researchers have carried out several studies on Civil-Mili-
tary. Koesnadi Kardi (2014) in his study entitled “Democratisation of
Civil-Military Relations in the Reformation Era in Indonesia” shows
the importance of the study of civil-military relations. Because as hap-
pened in various parts of the world, the condition or state of civil-mili-
tary relations in a country greatly influences the course of government.
The characteristics of each country along with the history and factors
behind it have shown the specifications of each country in developing
and developing civil-military relations. However, all of these factors
will ultimately lead to the final hope of achieving a harmonious rela-
tionship between military and civilian institutions (government) that
have an impact on democratic civil-military relations.

Syamsul Ma’arif (2007) conducted another study titled, “Military in
Society: Towards a Professional TNI in the Reformation Era”. In his
study, he explained that the reforms that had been carried out were
only at an early stage, in the form of prerequisites to go to the pro-
fessional army. According to him, in the meaning of civil supremacy,
there must be recognition by all components of society towards dem-
ocratic civil-military relations, including military recognition of civil
authorities and public officials directly elected by the people through
general elections. Democratic civil-military relations in Indonesia are
reflected in the relationship between the Ministry of Defense, which
represents civilian institutions and the TNI, which represents military
institutions. The role of the TNI is only implementing political policy
in the field of defence.

David Setawan et al. (2013) conducted another study with the title
“Development of Military Relations with Civilians in Indonesia”. The
results of the study show that an urgent and urgent agenda for public
discourse is the issue of defence policy, the country’s defence and se-
curity system, defence doctrine, threat formulation, defence posture,
and defence budget. Civilians, in this case, are civil authorities such
as the government, democratically formed people’s representative in-
stitutions, and institutions such as non-governmental organisations (NGOs). The reform government has produced several policies relating to defence and security, namely Law number 3 of 2003 concerning national defence and Law number 2 of 2003 concerning POLRI. Civilian authority carries out the formulation of the two policies in the field of defence and security, where the president and minister of defence as civil authorities are formed democratically. Then a defence white paper was formulated in 2003 with the title “Defending the Homeland Entering the 21st Century” and involving the nation’s components, including NGOs and political and military experts from other institutions. The government and NGOs reflect the direct involvement of civil authorities in managing defence.

This paper specifically discusses Military Civil Relations in the Reform Indonesia in a political perspective, explaining aspects of: Military Politics, Military and Politics during the Reformation Period, and Military Civil Relations in the Reformation Period, which can be comprehensively studied through relationships military civilians during BJ’s administration Habibie, the reign of Abdurrahman Wahid, the reign of Megawati, the reign of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), and the reign of Joko Widodo (Jokowi).

Research Method
This study used a qualitative research approach, because the problem of civil-military relations in politics was considered unclear, holistic, complex, dynamics. Besides, the researcher intends to understand deeply by finding patterns, concepts, and theories related to the problems of Civil-Military Relations in the Political context. Data collection in this study uses a literature study by collecting and reviewing various references that are in line with the issues raised in this study.

Result and Discussion
Military Politics
“Military politics” is not a subject or conception that is black and white and demarcated. There are various perspectives and there is no one concept that covers it all. But apart from the ideal conception of military politics, it can be observed that no military in the world is completely apolitical and has no influence at all in the realm of politics or state policy. Modern military officers will always tend to increase their influence in politics and/or the policymaking process (Perlmutter and Bennett, 1980, p. 3).
In general, military politics can be interpreted as “intentional and substantial involvement in the process of making and allocating political, social and economic power and values.” (Watson and Danopoulos, 1996, p. 4). Military politics is a non-military role, which is often seen as an anomaly — an improper oddity — and is therefore often called “military intervention”. It is said to be an anomaly, because of the assumption that the military was created to fight against the country’s external enemies, not to rule. Political activities and roles are more precisely seen within a spectrum of gradations - “to what extent” - which can be measured by a scale, for example, the way the military plays the political role or the prerogative rights that it “protects.” (Barany, 2007, p. 10).

At one point in the spectrum, there is a coup and full control of the government, while at the other end there is full military subordination under civil authority. Almost all militaries around the world are between these two extremes. In other words, we can interpret military politics narrowly and formally or broadly and informally. In a narrow sense, military politics can be interpreted as full control of the seat of government (usually through a coup), whereas broadly speaking, military politics can be seen as an “unofficial” influence of the army in the political process and state policymaking.

How we choose between these two big lenses will depend on the essence of civil-military relations in the country, namely the strategic interaction between political leaders and military leaders that have evolved throughout history. This civil-military interaction needs to be viewed in a minimum of three arenas (Stepan, 1988, p. 3-4), namely: First, the arena of civil society, where civil-military interaction plays a role in forming or “controlling” various social movements and social organisations. Second, the realm of political society, where military civil-military relations are a form of a struggle overbroad public and political force, including in political and legislative parties. Third, in the realm of government, where civil-military interaction is focused on continuing and full control of government tools to “manage” the other two arenas.

The role of the military in the formulation of national security policies as well as the degree of organisational autonomy (issues of budget, structure, rank) is sometimes a test of the extent to which civilians can control the military. Whereas in the economic field, the role of the military might include the areas of the defence industry, commercial
and commercial industries, the media, transportation, to regional development. These various roles usually coincide with social activities in the fields of health, education, and disaster management (Alagappa, 2001, p. 37). The broader this role, the greater the political power of the military. These non-military roles are also usually wrapped up in the discourse of “national development” or “national defence.”

The politicisation of an officer corps usually comes from: (1) Some political or ideological officers influence their peers and are usually driven by the infiltration of several civil elites, (2) the emergence of new state ideologies which are then “crammed” into the military, such as fascism or communism, or (3) dramatic events occur that politicize entire generations such as the war of independence (Perlmutter and Bennett, 1980, p. 16). But over time, the conception and role of military politics, whether narrowed or expanded, will depend on internal military factors and overall civil-military relations. Furthermore, the actions or behaviour of civil society, the performance of government in improving the welfare of the people, and the level of state threat, are also usually decisive. Likewise how military behaviour is interpreted by the wider community and how civil authorities oversee them (Feaver, 2003, p. 63).

In a democratic country, civil-military relations as a normative reference should have the following characteristics (Betz, 2004, pp. 13-14):

a. The defence minister usually comes from civil society, and ideally knows in-depth about defence management and can “represent” the military in domestic politics. Furthermore, the ministry of defence is usually not dominated by active military officers. This not only influences the policymaking process but also relates to democratic oversight and control.

b. The primary role of the military is usually to advise civilian authorities on defence matters and sometimes voice military organisational interests in government - not create their policies. Therefore, there is usually a clear line of legitimate authority (especially in the context of operations and mobilisation of troops), especially in military relations with civilian authorities. Besides, to carry out this function, military institutions usually also need to be protected from political infiltration.

c. Legislative institutions usually have to be able to play an active role in checks and balances against the government and the military (especially in the context of defence policies and budgets).
In addition, the public must be able to criticize, care, and debate defence policy openly. Nevertheless, this usually depends on the level of public awareness of defence issues.

Military and Politics in the Reformation Era

Democracy will eliminate the role of military politics. But in reality, the process of democratic consolidation is always filled with political and economic uncertainties so that the military’s “opportunity” for politics remains. Moreover, military reform efforts often do not touch the issue of the political role of the military. Almost all militaries everywhere will have a tendency to doubt, or question, the effectiveness of democracy as a system of government.

The precondition for a democratic country, according to Huntington, is the freedom of politics from military interventions. The demand for a democratic political process that is free from military intervention makes the position of the military must be properly translated. Another discussion from Huntington (1968), the military should not get a strong position as a “praetorian guard” or guard of the stability of the regime, because it is prone to misuse of its functions by personal actions. In other words, the military, which has a big role in politics, tends to be in harmony with political dictatorship and personalism. The military does not deal with politics, but politics cannot be separated from military affairs such as policies on national security. Therefore, the military is obliged to carry out state security tasks based on policies determined by politics (Huntington, 1981).

In Huntington’s view (1981), civil control must do something related to the relative strength of the civilian to the military, which is a form of control, both subjective and objective civil (Kardi, 2014, p. 234). Subjective civil control is focused on maximising the power of civil or group control whereas objective civilian control focuses on maximising the professionalism of officers. This division has to do with the absence of a professional officer corps. So the most possible form of civil control is subjective civil control. The core of objective civilian control ensures that the military elite will be more effective with a record of reducing its influence in national decision-making (Setiawan et al, 2013, p.78).

Perlmutter (1998, p. 167) argues that the motivation of the army to intervene is political, even if it is driven by social conditions that are not institutionalised. According to him, two conditions can provide an opportunity for the military to intervene. First, social conditions,
a country where social conditions are weak then the interests of the group will be spread in a very high frequency. Moreover, if the state structure is weak then political institutions do not function effectively and thus social control is ineffective and results in the military having the opportunity to intervene. Second, political conditions. Military intervention arises from civil problems. In many cases, the military’s return due to civilians asked for support when the political structure was fragmented in political factions and the constitutional apparatus did not work.

In the view of Eric A. Nodlinger (1990) related to civil-military relations, the political role played by the officer corps can be seen in three roles categories namely moderators, guardians, and rulers. The military has a moderator character when civil-military relations are very fluid. Civilians who have patrons or back-ups from the military hold politics and governance. Guardians refer to the military’s role as bodyguards and supervisors of the running of the government. The military is involved in politics only at a macro-strategic level. The category of rulers is a situation when the military controls all fields, especially politics, in this context it can lead to a military regime.

In countries with strong consolidated democracies, the military is subordinate to civilians. This view stems from the understanding that the military domination of civilians in politics is contradictory to the realm of democracy. Experience in Indonesia shows that civil-military relations marked by military dominance during the New Order proved to be a major obstacle to democracy. The military’s rejection of this view will not only disrupt civil-military relations but will also raise the perception among civilians that the military is one part of the threat to democratic governance. The Democratisation agenda is closely related to efforts to reduce the military’s role in social responsibility and politics, if not eliminating it, namely returning the TNI to its function (repositioning) by increasing the principles of professionalism.

Civil-Military Relations in the Reformation Era

After President Suharto’s New Order collapsed and ABRI’s “dual-function” ended, the civil-military relations have undergone many changes. The condition of civil-military relations in Indonesia after the New Order government was directed to create a balanced and controlled pattern of civil-military relations. Objective civilian control of military power was minimised, but not eliminated.
At this time, the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia were placed as an instrument of national defence, and civil governments have the right to issue policies and handle the field of defence. However, to organize harmonious and democratic civil-military relations, the government must have a program or agenda that is arranged systematically and compatible with the existing problems.

Besides that, the participation can be built with improving their expertise, involvement, and an active role in civil discourse and policy formulation defence and security. The post-New Order government has produced several policies relating to the defence sector, i.e. Law No. 3 of 2003 concerning National Defense and Law No. 34 of 2004 concerning the TNI. The civilian authority carries out the formulation of the two policies in the defence sector. The President and Minister of Defense act as democratically formed civil authorities while the House of Representatives as a representative institution of the people representing the interests of the people.

Comprehensively, civil-military relations in the reform can be seen in some of the leadership eras of the government, such as:

* **A. Civil-Military Relations during the reign of B.J. Habibie**

In the civil administration under President B.J. Habibie, the policies retrieved in managing civil-military relations are still relatively similar to President Soeharto’s period. Military during the B.J. Habibie is none other than the military legacy of President Soeharto whose political role is only at the doctrinal level.

The TNI organisation is still entirely under the control of the TNI High Commander led by TNI General Wiranto, who fully supports Habibie’s leadership by taking advantage of this great opportunity. On May 22, 1998, Habibie’s first opportunity to increase his legitimacy is reducing the number of ABRI members in the MPR from 75 to 38 seats. Another policy has ended the practice of active military officers who occupying non-military positions.

Also, the military has completely cut off its relations with Golkar. The name change of ABRI (Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia) became TNI (Indonesian National Army) in April 1999. But the changes that had taken place in the central government had not yet been socialized at the regional level. The existence of territorial command in the region stands parallel to the civil administration with a strong influence.
According to the Huntington’s view of the concept of civilian control of the military, what Habibie’s government has done is aimed at maximising military professionalism and showing the distribution of conducive political power between military and civilian groups to professional behaviour.

**B. Civil-Military Relations During the reign of Abdurrahman Wahid**

During the reign of President Abdurrahman Wahid, who replaced Habibie after the 1999 elections, the process of military depoliticisation with a pattern of civil-military relations led to civil supremacy with its great intervention. Policy changes made by the government at this time can be seen as part of political reform by creating the terminology of civil supremacy. Some policies that have important implications for civil-military relations, particularly in the areas of defence, such as:

1. Separation of the Ministry of Defense, which is divided into 2 sectors, the Defense and the Security sector. The Defense Sector deals with security issues related to the foreign military defence, which are managed by the Department of Defense. While the Security sector was placed under the Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs (Menkopolhukam). The security sector governed by this ministry focuses on complaints on domestic issues that lead to civil security. The responsibility itself is borne by civilians, such as POLRI and Satpol PP.

2. Post-the New Order era, for the first time in history, the president appointed a Minister of Defense who came from civil society and had no military background and was also not a retired military officer, namely Prof. Dr Juwono Sudarsono (1999-2000) and Prof. Mahmud MD (2000-2001).

3. The separation between TNI and POLRI. In the previous period, the TNI had four armed forces: the Army, Navy, Air Force and Police. Then the President separates them so the TNI becomes an independent organisation. At the reign of Abdurrahman Wahid, the issue of dismissal or appointment of military officials is relatively dependent under the control of the President, although the effect is not as great as President Suharto in the New Order era. In this case, President Abdurrahman Wahid claimed that it was an effort to uphold civil supremacy and also as an
effort to minimise the dominance of the role of military politics. However, President Wahid’s intervention that was far from the internal problems of the TNI and the patronage he provides, reached its peak after President Wahid issued a Decree on July 23, 2001, where the TNI did not add the contents of the decree at all.

According to Huntington’s theory related to civil-military relations, the military under Abdurrahman Wahid could be classified as subjective civilian control, because Abdurrahman Wahid conditioned the president’s power as the highest authority in controlling the military.

C. Civil-Military Relations During the reign of Megawati

Under the reign of Megawati, the president is being conservative by not meddling in military affairs. The new government is more concerned with the functional role of the military with issues related to security, separatism, and territorial integration. The most visible changes during this reign was the role played by the government in political issue, including the abolishment of ABRI Representative in the elected MPR/DPR. The positions of minister, governor and district head are no longer comes from the military; The discharges of the TNI/POLRI faction after six elections, and since 2004, the TNI and POLRI institutions have left the political stage in the MPR, DPR, and Provincial, Regency and City DPRD.

Judging from the military policy of the Megawati government, the emphasis on Huntington’s theory leads to the subjective civilian control while civilians during this reign were more asking for support from the military for the reasons stated above. Megawati wanted to establish good cooperation between the civilian and the military at first, but the military was used as an opportunity to build their political strength following the history of the military itself.

D. Civil-Military Relations during the reign of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY)

During SBY’s administration, civil-military relations were more towards an ideal form, where civilians were in control of SBY’s government. The civil supremacy carried out in maintaining the harmonious relationship between civilians and the military is highly adapted to SBY’s main ideas as known as the reformist army by upholding the values of army professionalism. His steps in maintaining civil-military
relations with military professionalism cannot be separated from the placement of people who have the capability in civilian and military understanding. For example, Prof. Dr Juwono Sudarsono as Minister of Defense has a mandate from President Yudhoyono to do two things: to maintain the neutrality of the TNI and to systematically regulate the procurement of Alutista (defence equipment; the main tool of the weapons system) in the Department of Defense.

The success of the Yudhoyono reign in limiting the role of military politics towards civil-military relations following Huntington's concept related to an objective approach to civilian control. With SBY's record of accomplishment as a driving force for internal reform of the TNI, the President also avoided involving in TNI's internal problems. The military during President SBY was more characterised as a moderator, while SBY's background in the military made the military have clear boundaries in government.

**E. Civil-Military Relations During the reign of Joko Widodo (Jokowi)**

According to observers and former generals, not all TNI officers and soldiers accepted gracefully that the TNI only played a role in the field of national defence without carrying out a civilian role. The consequences can be seen in Jokowi's reign. When President Jokowi relied on the TNI support in the face of police pressure and political parties allied with former President Megawati, the TNI crawled into areas outside of defence. The TNI has signed several agreements with several ministries and state companies to, for example, provide security at airports, bus and train stations, and help farmers to improve yields. Some officials have called for military involvement in the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) to counter the efforts of the police and political allies to cripple corruption eradication institutions.

Besides, President Jokowi also nominated and appointed an army general to become a TNI commander, which broke the reform convention to rotate the post between the navy, air force and army. This condition, as stated by Vedi Hadiz, was seen as a step to attract the army to his side, bearing in mind that the President faced so many difficulties from his friends and opponent, only the army who was able to frighten the police.

According to Agus Widjojo, the involvement of the TNI in politics will increase the risk of thwarting the process of transition to democ-
racy in Indonesia. In his view, there were weaknesses on two sides: President Jokowi who lacked confidence without the presence of an army on his side, and the military whose many members were still “nostalgic with a large role” in the past. Although in the past the TNI had a despicable reputation, since Suharto resigned, the image of the TNI has improved. According to the Conflict Policy Analysis Institute in Jakarta, the TNI benefited from a comparison with the image of the police which deteriorated this year due to their attack on the KPK. This condition allows the TNI to portray itself as an honest party, with a civilian perspective and loyalty to the President.

Since separating from the TNI after the reform, the police have grown to become strong institutions and at the most hated because their low salaries encourage corruption and a lack of professionalism exacerbates conflicts in society. According to Sidney Jones, this has become one of the drivers of the army moving towards the civilian domain. However, Jones is not convinced that the TNI intends to return to the centre of the political stage. According to him, the TNI only wants to playback its role in the field of internal security, for example, taking an anti-terrorism role of the police. Thus, the TNI can potentially get funds outside the national budget. According to Vedi Hadiz, the increasing role and authority of the army, especially in anti-corruption policies, will certainly be met with resistance from activist groups and politicians who benefit from the development of democracy in Indonesia.

Another phenomenon stated by Al Araf is that the threat to TNI reform increased after the Draft National Security Act entered into the 2015-2019 National Legislation Program. The Civil Society Coalition for Security Sector Reform considers that the draft law can expand the role of the TNI in the civilian sphere. Previously, the military’s role was limited by the TNI Law, which was passed in 2004. Some other examples include the involvement of the army in the rice self-sufficiency project to bring order to demonstrations and strike workers. The involvement of the army in the ‘New Rice Printing’ program was carried out based on a cooperation agreement between the Minister of Agriculture Andi Amran Sulaiman and General (Ret.) Gatot Nurmantyo in January 2015.

While the involvement of the army to bring order to the demonstration/strike was based on a memorandum of understanding between the Police and the TNI in early 2018. Most recently, Jokowi’s a desire
to overcome the problem of non-job officers in the internal TNI by creating 60 new posts. TNI Commander Marshal Hadi Tjahjanto, one of which was distribute the officers to the ministry, later translated this plan. Hadi even suggested that this placement be regulated and included in the revision of the TNI Law. In addition to being involved in various civil affairs, the TNI in the Jokowi era was also used as a publicist. This was seen, for example, when Jokowi asked the military to be involved in socializing government duties and programs.

In connection with this condition, some groups consider reforms within the Indonesian National Army (TNI) to have suffered a setback, with their involvement in civic affairs increasingly. The emergence of TNI involvement in civil affairs is partly for two reasons. First, civilians have not been able to realise a professional military. This can be seen from the lack of military budget approved by Parliament. This limited budget causes a lack of Alutista, a lack of training, and the welfare of soldiers is still low, leading to a lack of professional military in Indonesia. Second, civil society leadership is still considered weak. The phenomenon that occurs in Indonesia has its characteristics because the history of the formation of the TNI is based on the struggle to expel invaders, not to enhance a career in the military field. Many things must be done by the TNI in the state administration—first in the military, politics, then the economy, for the welfare of the nation.

Conclusion

The issue of military politics is not an easy and black or white problem. The issue of military politics is the question of “how grey” the military is in politics. In the context of military politics, the military does not have to hold political office to still be able to play their political role. Especially if civilians are, still weak and cannot be considered successful in carrying out the mandate of the Constitution to prosper the people.

In the context of civil-military relations in a country, that has just experienced a democratic transition, interference or perhaps a failure in efforts to encourage military professionalism through defence policies can have fatal consequences for the sustainability of democracy. Professional identity within the military can develop only partially or stagnate, and if political stability deteriorates, the military can return to the realm of practical politics anytime.

The military as part of Indonesian society or a part of citizens is a tool of the state and therefore the position of the military must depend
on the decisions of political leaders. As a reflection of the people’s sovereignty, the military autonomy of civilians will provide an opportunity for them to be irresponsible, let alone require them to obey civilian leadership. Meanwhile, if the military believes that the military must obey to civilian leaders, what happens is military politicisation (counter-subjective) which will disrupt its status as the guardian of the state.

The indecisiveness and the absence of agreement between civil-military parties in interpreting the concept of civil-military relations will have implications for the model of civil-military relations, which will then lead to conflicts of interest between civilians and the military. The answers to questions that arise from civil-military relations generally lie in the model and description of these models where harmonisation in “proportional” equality agreed through civilian authorities is required. The military must be professional in its field and civil participation, participate in managing defence and jointly build a model of harmonious civil-military relations in Indonesia for the interests of Indonesia in the future and build a New Indonesia with a democratic format and the existence of recognition by the international community.

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