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The Road to Tehran Runs Through Europe

Mitchell Belfer

Three months since withdrawing from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), and the United States has begun to reimpose heavy sanctions on Iran. To the dismay of many in Europe, especially in Brussels, France, Germany and the UK, President Trump announced that it will be impossible for companies, and countries, to maintain economic relations with both the US and Iran—they have to choose. Armies of lawyers have sprung into action. They are exploring legal loopholes, waivers, constructing subsidiaries, opening ghost accounts, and looking for other mechanisms to protect their investments in Iran. This is near-sighted and it is irresponsible.

An air of duplicity surrounds European calls for continued engagement with the Islamic Republic. It is worrying. The glaring crimes committed by Tehran beyond its borders — throughout the Middle East and in Europe — are being white-washed. This year alone Tehran ordered the bombing of an Iranian opposition demonstration in Paris (it was, fortunately, interdicted by Belgian security ‘just in time’) and assassinated an Iranian dissident in Amsterdam. Its agents were caught ‘acquiring Jewish targets’ across Berlin and were arrested scoping-out dissident venues in Albania. Sadly, these episodes are relegated to footnotes. Europe’s business relations to Iran are, apparently, more important than the principles it purports to represent in global politics.

In 2013, when negotiations began, it was argued that the JCPOA would enrich, liberalise and ultimately empower Iran’s middle class—and they would temper Iran’s regional and international behaviour. This was a naïve expectation. Not only has sanctions relief not trickled down to ordinary Iranian citizens and has not sparked a wave of economic or political liberalisation, it has actually increased domestic repression and paramilitary operations abroad. The only Iranian bene-
factor of the JCPOA is also the most pronounced of Iran’s instruments of oppression—the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC). Mohammad Ali Jafari, the reclusive leader of the Guards, has been spending more money on the Basij militia (internal repression) and the Al Quds Force (international operations) than at any other time in the Islamic Republic’s history. That money is coming from sanctions relief and the new, especially European, business ventures. Some Europeans are getting very rich in Iran. As is the IRGC. Ordinary Iranians remain poor.

Still, many are afraid of simply scuppering the JCPOA. They ask why abandon an agreement — any agreement — that stops Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Certainly, nuclear proliferation must, at all costs, be avoided. However, this deal is not a silver bullet. A new, more comprehensive agreement needs to be negotiated.

Here’s why:

First—the deal was flawed from the beginning. It did not seek to prevent Iran’s nuclearisation only to prolong its ‘break out’ period. In theory, Tehran would have its nuclear ambitions governed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and if it were to violate the terms of the agreement, the international community would know — but not be able to do much about it. In practice, Iran suspended aspects of its nuclear programme in pursuit of other aspects. So, at present, it may not be enriching uranium but it is still researching centrifuges and, importantly, delivery systems. Iran retains the Middle East’s largest and most diverse missile arsenal. The money pouring into the Islamic Republic is enhancing that capability. The Soumar cruise missile (2500 km range), the Sejjil MRBM (2000 km range) and the Shahab 3 MRBM (2000 km range) are all capable of carrying a nuclear, biological or chemical weapon and were operationalised since the JCPOA went into effect. Any nuclear deal that does not include ballistics (re: delivery systems) is dangerously incomplete.

Second—Iran actively works against Europe’s international interests. Developing business relations with Tehran while containing it is counterintuitive. In Afghanistan, NATO is harassed and European and US soldiers are killed by a Taliban in alignment with Iran. The weapons they use and the targets they select are, partially, provided by the IRGC who are equally interested in the retreat of NATO from the region. Together with Russia and Al Assad, Iran is culpable in ethnically cleansing Syria of Sunni Arabs—and sending them into Europe as refugees. It
Editor's Analysis

retains 43 militias in Iraq and props-up the Al Assad regime to consolidate a land-corridor that links Iran to the Mediterranean Sea. From the wars in Iraq, Syria, Yemen to the war on drugs (re: Hezbollah is one of the world’s most prolific drug smugglers) and terrorism — hosting, until very recently, key Al Qaeda members including Hamza Bin Laden — Iran has taken a contrary position to the EU and NATO.

Third—Iran is engaged in proxy wars with many of the EU’s closest international allies. It is fighting: 1. Morocco (through the Polisario), 2. Saudi Arabia (through Hezbollah of the Hejaz), 3. Bahrain (through Saraya Al Ashtar and Hezbollah et al), 4. the UAE (through Hezbollah) and 5. Israel (through Hezbollah, Hamas and the PIJ). Since the Iranian takeover of Iraq, Tehran has added the country’s Kurds to its hit-list as it works at undermining Erbil’s autonomy. In its quest for regional hegemony and the proliferation of its revolutionary ideology, Tehran developed a militia-superstructure that undermines stability in key, strategic areas and is directly responsible to the deteriorating security situation in the wider Middle East.

Finally—history matters. For 444 days, starting from 04 November 1979, Iran held 52 [after a token release of 16 hostages] US diplomatic personnel hostage. They were exposed to a terrifying ordeal. Threatened with death, taunted and humiliated, the hostages were at the mercy of the Revolutionary Guard. From then until now, irrespective of Obama’s grand overtures, financial incentives or wholesale diplomatic rehabilitation, the country has never apologised or attempted to make amends for its past crimes. Instead, it has promoted and empowered those that made their careers on the backs of that episode. They can now be found on Rouhani’s negotiating teams, in the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence, they are the influential members of the theocracy and they are Iran’s international representatives. The Obama Administration, notably John Kerry, was willing to overlook 1979. For a country like Iran, whose central ideological pillar is laden with history, ignoring the past to move into the future, is perceived as a weakness. Iran knows what it did and what it does. It is time for others to remember as well and to judge Iran accordingly.

Additional US sanctions against Iran are in the works and it is crunch-time for Brussels. Either Europe can scupper the JCPOA and stand with the US to interrupt the flow of money that has empowered the IRGC, or it can interrupt the transatlantic relationship. Some, like
Macron and Merkel, have adopted a narrative that sees more value in limiting the EU-US relationship in favour of a more robust EU global strategy—including with Tehran. This would be a tragic mistake. On the other side of the world, South Korea and Japan have already scaled back and are working to end their importation of Iranian oil and sever their trade relations to Tehran. They value their relationship to Washington more. It is time for Europe to follow suit.

Whatever reservations European leaders may harbour about Donald Trump, the President does not lead a weekly, collective, chant calling for the death of Iran. Contrarily, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei — rabidly anti-American since, at least, 1958 — only refers to the US as the ‘Great Satan’ and routinely calls for its death and destruction. Until Iran’s rhetoric and its geopolitical and ideological ambitions are neatly knotted empowering it is reckless. If the EU and US further drift because of a few, narrow, European commercial interests, Iran will have done what even the USSR could not and build an insurmountable hurdle across the Atlantic.
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Schengen in Crisis?

Why Subjective Critique Matters

Markéta Votoupalová

Recently, predictions about the potential end of Schengen cooperation have multiplied. The extraordinary number of refugees coming into the EU is generally understood as the root of the problems within Schengen because the external borders were not prepared to manage such a strain. At the same time, reimpositions of internal border controls seem to be blamed for the crisis of the Schengen project. However, the reasons why the controls were reimposed and their impact on Schengen have not been explored thoroughly. Hence, drawing on the theoretical concepts of crisis and employing the discourse-historical approach, this article investigates how the states which reimposed internal controls argue about their decision, how the EU leaders react and what the future of the Schengen cooperation looks like from their perspective. It follows from the analysis that although states admit that Schengen faces difficulties, they argue, referring to the Schengen acquis, that reimpositions are to be seen rather as a remedy for the Schengen crisis, not a threat to it as scholars may imply. Overall, the article shows how important it is to establish how the concept of crisis is discursively constructed.

Keywords: Schengen, reimpositions, internal controls, crisis, discourse-historical approach

Since Autumn 2015, when Germany and Austria reimposed their internal border controls, media, politicians and experts began to doubt
whether the Schengen cooperation is sustainable.¹ Whereas some media see the reimpositions as the beginning of the end of Schengen,² scholars are usually more nuanced in criticising the reimpositions as an unfortunate way how to handle the problems since they are based on a national rather than an EU-led solution. Still, the lack of solidarity and selfish behaviour of states reintroducing internal controls is often emphasised as the main problem of the Schengen project.³

Drawing on Koselleck and his introduction of the notion of crisis,⁴ the first question that needs to be raised is what is actually meant by the Schengen crisis. As Koselleck claims, there are two sides to all crises: an objective side based on observable facts and its subjective critique. In the case of Schengen, there is an agreement on the manifestation of the problems, lying in external migration pressures, (alleged) terrorist threats and successive internal reimpositions, but specific actors perceive the crisis from different angles. Employing the discourse-historical approach (DHA), this article focuses on how the internal border controls are understood by the states that have reimposed them since 2015. These states are assumed to be quite skeptical to the overall functioning of Schengen cooperation as they decided to use this emergency mechanism. The discourse analysis aims to lay out whether the states perceive reimpositions as the main driver of the Schengen crisis as media and scholars insinuate. The findings will help understand how the crisis is constructed since it is often assumed and not explored thoroughly. However, without knowing how various actors perceive the current problems it is not possible to find an appropriate solution to them.⁵

Methodologically, the DHA was selected as it allows to study various genres within a broad socio-political context and focuses on argumentation. According to Reisigl,⁶ the DHA employs formal, functional and content-based aspects of argumentation and enables us to examine how specific actors argue about the reimpositions and their relation to the Schengen crisis. The DHA is based on two levels of analysis. Whereas the entry-level analysis consists of examining discourse topics and is quite straightforward, the in-depth analysis investigates how actors are represented (framed) and which argumentation strategies and schemes (topoi) they use. The role of the topoi is to justify what is true and right by presenting or manipulating specific arguments. The analysis follows the main topics discussed in the discourse on reimpositions, such as solidarity, the right to seek asylum and the relation
between the member states and the EU. The identified topics are discussed in the article itself (successively in legal, scholarly and political discourse) and summed up in Figure 1 which also presents the main argumentation strategies and *topoi*.

As the argumentation strategies are often implicit, the analysis may be quite demanding. In this regard, it is important to try to avoid potential misinterpretations. Hence, the analysis is based primarily on direct quotations in the respective original languages which were retrieved from official government websites and, complementarily, from public media. All translations into English are mine and the original versions are available in the endnotes. The time frame covered by the analysis begins in September 2015, when Germany and Austria first reimposed their internal controls and ends in June 2017, when the data collection was finished.

The article opens with a brief introduction of the concept of crisis. Defining the term allows to study the impact of reimpositions on the Schengen resilience in a systematic way. Since it is important to study discourse in context, a section on how reimpositions of internal border controls are perceived in the Schengen *acquis* and scholarly literature and how they relate to the crisis of Schengen follows. Finally, the discourse analysis of the political context proceeds. Concerning actors examined in the analysis, the study operates at the state level. The states are represented by their governments and their members as the initiators of official national policies and main decision-makers which are considered as individuals, not as a unified actor. Specifically, in each state included in the analysis, statements of the prime minister and ministers responsible for migration are examined; depending on the government configuration, these might be ministers of migration, interior or justice. Where relevant, the positions of respective opposition parties and reactions from EU leaders are presented to complete the picture.

By combining these layers, the article offers a multi-faceted perspective on how the discourse on reimpositions is constructed and interpreted in a broad context and thus contributes to the current research on Schengen, which only rarely uses an elaborated discourse approach.

**The Concept of Crisis**

Whereas psychology or economics offer quite detailed definitions of the concept of crisis, its development and possible solutions, interna-
tional relations (IR) scholars are much more vague in this regard and often take the concept as a given and generally understood. However, if the concept is explained, IR scholars proceed from the Greek (medical) origin of crisis which presents crisis as a sudden change leading either to recovery or death and adapt it to the nature of international politics. In this vein, Morse understands crises as circumstances affecting the survival of a political system or an interaction influencing its stability. Typically, mutually incompatible but highly valued interests are the roots of international crises. Similarly, Parker explains crisis as an intense conflict or the beginning of war or, alternatively, as a threshold between verbal and physical behaviour. Even though, as Hewit argues, violence does not necessarily need to be used in international crises, crises are frequently understood as (open) conflicts. Overall, the most typical characteristics of an international crisis encapsulate the moment of surprise and unexpectedness and the necessity to make a decision, often without adequate coping mechanisms and under considerable time pressure and stress.

Although some IR scholars such as McCormick or Tanter acknowledge the importance of studying the (inter)subjective perceptions of crises, IR scholars usually draw on a quantitative point of view and examine the objective aspects of crises. In order to fill this gap, this study analyses thoroughly how the notion of crisis per se is understood by employing a qualitative discourse approach which focuses on the subjective critique that is often neglected in IR but emphasised in other disciplines which this study draws on.

A useful introduction into the notion of crisis is given by Koselleck. Proceeding from conceptual history, he shows how the meaning of crisis has changed since Ancient Greece. From the beginning, the meaning has been twofold: an objective one based on observable facts and its subjective judgement. Later on, the notion spread out from medicine into politics, history, economics, and psychology. It could designate both specific and recurrent events, both brief and long-lasting ones. Also, it could be used metaphorically. As Koselleck argues, this diversity and vagueness in how the term has been applied caused it to lose its theoretical rigor. However, to systematise the research, Koselleck introduces four options how the concept of crisis may be interpreted: firstly, as a chain of events culminating in a serious point in time when a clear decision must be made, secondly, as a turning point leading to an irreversible change in history, thirdly, as a process
that may endanger the current situation or certain actors, or, finally, as a period of transition caused by specific processes.\textsuperscript{21}

The distinction between objective and subjective is developed upon by many scholars in various disciplines: for instance Cordero, drawing on a sociological perspective, explicitly distinguishes between ‘crisis’ (objective experience) and ‘critique’ (subjective perception). He aptly remarks that the reality of crisis is inseparable from the concept itself and that crisis provokes critique and \textit{vice versa}.\textsuperscript{22} Proceeding from political economy, Samman draws directly on Koselleck by claiming that both the objective and subjective dimensions of crisis should be explored and stresses the importance of past events that can partake in the construction of current crises.\textsuperscript{23} By the same token, De Rycker and Mohd Don argue that crises have both material and semiotic properties and are constructed through narratives and discourse.\textsuperscript{24} This brief overview demonstrates the importance of exploring the subjective dimension of crisis. Otherwise, the analysis would be incomplete. In light of this, this article enriches the current state of knowledge both about the Schengen project and about the concept of crisis from an IR perspective.

\textbf{Reimpositions as a Threat to Schengen? Legal and Scholarly Perception}

Reimpositions of internal border controls have been perceived as a controversial mechanism since the beginning of the Schengen cooperation. Abolishing national border controls in the traditional territorial sense is a major step which is difficult to take for the Schengen member states, particularly with regard to their ability to control movements into their territory. Apart from this practical perspective, border controls are loaded with symbolism since they have historically been linked to state sovereignty. Hence, there is no wonder that states are not eager to abandon the idea of internal border controls completely.

Whereas the first Schengen agreement, which was agreed in 1985, avoids mentioning internal reimpositions at all,\textsuperscript{25} the Schengen implementation agreement which came into force ten years later suggests a possibility of reintroducing internal controls for a restricted period in cases that ‘public policy or national security so require’.\textsuperscript{26} This emergency mechanism is described in the Schengen borders code (SBC) in more detail. The SBC, adopted in 2006, states that the internal borders can be ‘exceptionally reintroduce<d>’ in the case of ‘a serious threat
to public policy or internal security’ and only as a last resort.\textsuperscript{27} Specifically, internal borders can be reintroduced in the case of ‘foreseeable events’, i.e. in situations which can be predicted, e.g. sport or political events which are planned in advance.\textsuperscript{28} How to proceed during unforeseen events requiring immediate reaction is regulated by article 25.\textsuperscript{29}

The conditions of internal reimpositions were further elaborated in the Schengen governance package (SGP).\textsuperscript{30} The SGP was adopted in 2013 as a reaction to the Franco-Italian dispute (see below) and its aim was to enhance the role of the EU as an observer of the rules and to specify the conditions of internal reimpositions to prevent misusing this mechanism, which was supposed to be applied only in exceptional situations. On the other hand, a new possibility of reimposing internal controls was added to the \textit{acquis}: if a state does not follow the rules and hereby puts the overall functioning of the Schengen Area at risk, internal borders may be reimposed, as well.\textsuperscript{31} It is relevant to stress, particularly with regard to the current events in Schengen, that the SGP states that ‘Migration and the crossing of external borders by a large number of third-country nationals should not, \textit{per se}, be considered to be a threat to public policy or internal security’.\textsuperscript{32} These conditions of internal reimpositions are adopted also in the recent Regulation \textbf{2016/399} which replaces the SBC including its amendments in order to simplify the system of the Schengen \textit{acquis}.

It follows from the legislative overview, that the reimpositions are regulated quite in detail. However, states have still significant room for discretion, which is often criticised by scholars. Apap and Carrera,\textsuperscript{34} Nascimbene and Di Pascale\textsuperscript{35} and Carrera et al.\textsuperscript{36} claim that reimpositions should be avoided even if they are legally justified since they contradict the spirit of Schengen cooperation. Apap and Carrera even argue that reimpositions have been overused constantly.\textsuperscript{37} Contrarily, Groenendijk\textsuperscript{38} and van der Woude and van Berlo\textsuperscript{39} claim that reintroductions have occurred only rarely in the past. While the first group of researchers argue explicitly that a more detailed legislation and following not only the \textit{acquis} but also the spirit of solidarity and burden sharing are a necessary precondition of the resilience of Schengen, the latter scholars do not elaborate why and when internal re-impositions are justified and how they relate to the sustainability of Schengen. They merely state that they are an inherent part of it.

Hence, if reimpositions are linked to the resilience of Schengen, a rather skeptical perspective prevails in that reintroductions express
mistrust and a lack of solidarity and inevitably lead to a ‘race to the bottom’. In the past, the problem of internal reintroductions was discussed particularly in 2011, when France reimposed internal border controls after Italy had given a temporary residence permit including the right of free movement to Tunisian migrants and Denmark reintroduced its border controls with Germany as a result of a government deal with the right-winged populist Danish People’s Party. Whereas France was accused of acting in compliance with law but against the spirit of solidarity, Denmark was condemned even harsher for twisting the legislation or for directly violating it. According to scholars, both affairs showed a lack of solidarity and the determination of the states to control entries of third country nationals onto their territory in the case of a (supposed) threat.

These events bear many similarities with the current crisis when states justify internal reimpositions as a means to better manage unexpected migration flows. Also, nowadays many scholars criticise reimpositions for embodying a lack of mutual trust and solidarity both across member states and between the states and the EU and promote an EU-led approach rather than disintegrated national solutions. Börzel and Risse, Börzel and Nivet even claim that Schengen is experiencing a severe crisis which might endanger not only Schengen itself but also the whole EU. Although not all scholars use the term crisis explicitly and some directly refuse it, they always perceive reintroductions of internal controls as very problematic. According to Cornelisse, Schengen is riddled with national sensitivities and states use internal reimpositions as a symbolic expression of their sovereignty. By the same token, Dingott Alkopher and Blanc claim that states prefer national solutions, i.e. reimpositions, to being forced to share security risks on their territory.

Drawing on the definitions of crisis, scholars acknowledge that the crisis represented by the external refugee flows was sudden and not predicted but consider the reimpositions to be an inadequate response to it. They also emphasise that the solution must be found shortly and preferably on the EU, not national, level while stressing how incompatible the state interests are with the overall functioning of Schengen. Despite the nuances in the scholarly perceptions, the researchers present observable facts when introducing and evaluating the current situation in Schengen rather than how the reimpositions are subjectively perceived by the main actors.
Reimpositions as a Remedy? Political Discourse

In summer 2017, five countries kept their internal border controls due to migratory pressures. Germany and Austria reintroduced their controls in September 2015, Norway and Sweden followed in November and Denmark in January 2016. At first, all countries justified their decision on the basis of article 25 of the SBC which regulates unforeseen events and allows to reimpose internal controls immediately for 10 days and prolong them repeatedly, each time for 20 days with the total period not exceeding two months. That is why the states switched to article 24 which regulates foreseeable events afterwards. According to this article, the reimpositions have to be justified in advance (compared to article 25, which allows for an ex post explanation) and can last up to 30 days with possible extensions up to six months in total. When this period was exhausted, as well, the states, in coordination with the European Commission (EC) and the Council of the EU (Council), decided to prolong the reimpositions based on article 26, which allows internal controls in the event the overall functioning of the Schengen Area is put at risk. This step enables reimpositions for another six months with three possible prolongations, i.e. for a maximum of two years. Following the legislation, all five countries extended the reimpositions in May and November 2016 and in February and May 2017. The deadline for abolishing the controls completely was 11 November 2017.

Based on the acquis, each internal reimposition has to be justified in an official letter sent to the EC. It follows from the letters that the main reason for reimpositions was unexpected migratory pressures and their impact on internal security. Only Slovenia stressed its solidarity with other member states and said it would cooperate actively in addressing the problems. All the other states link solidarity only to securing external borders which is insufficient and therefore, internal reimpositions are necessary. In particular, Germany refers to an ‘enormous influx of third-country nationals’ which, if allowed to continue, ‘would endanger the public order and internal security’. Since the ‘massive influx’ continued, the external borders were not sufficiently secured and the transit countries did not fulfil their responsibilities, Germany decided to keep its internal controls despite its commitment to free movement and Schengen as key pillars of the EU. Similarly, Austria justified the internal controls by a serious ‘security situation caused by the huge migration flows to and via Austria and the reintroduction
of border controls by Germany’ which might lead to its ‘continuous overburdening’. Austria stresses that it is ‘not responsible for the vast majority of the persons concerned’ and deems the reimpositions to be ‘inevitable’. By the same token, Sweden, Norway and Denmark justify their decisions by pointing out the ‘threat to public policy a security’ caused by ‘unpredictable migratory flows’.

Drawing on the DHA, the *topoi* of security and danger prevail clearly when it comes to justifying the reimpositions.

Although all states stress that they act in compliance with the Schengen legislation (*topos* of rules), it is a rather controversial statement, since, as mentioned above, migration *per se* should not (notice the conditional) be the only reason to reimpose internal controls. However, it follows from the EC evaluation reports that all reimpositions are considered to be justified and in compliance with the legislation, since the high numbers of incoming migrants may threaten internal security and public order (again, an intensive *topos* of danger). Moreover, the EC stresses that it has not ‘received any complaints from citizens about the way border controls are carried out in practice’. In the last decision on prolonging internal controls, the Council states that despite progress, conditions required for ‘returning to a normally functioning Schengen area are still not entirely fulfilled’ and the overall functioning of Schengen is still at risk which corresponds with how the states argue (see below). Interestingly enough, the *topos* of rules is used both by member states and the EC to defend the reimpositions.

The official justifications bear many similarities and, as it follows from Figure 1, all countries reimposed national controls in order to control migration flows into their territories since the common checks at the external borders were insufficient. Specifically, the moment of surprise, which is typical of many definitions of crisis, is emphasised by the German Chancellor Angela Merkel: ‘When the pressure at the external borders suddenly occured, we realised we were not prepared at all’. On the other hand, as the German Minister of Interior Thomas de Maizière stated, states had some possibilities to approach the crisis as ‘the Schengen Border Code includes crisis mechanisms already now in case the external border control functions insufficiently’. Again, an emphasis on following the rules is expressed and the crisis of Schengen seems to be possible to overcome since appropriate mechanisms to tackle the problems are already at disposal.
In a similar vein, all countries agree that reimpositions are temporary but necessary as long as external borders are not secured. In order to enhance the latter, all five states agree on shifting more powers to the EU. Specifically, the European Border and Coast Guard (EBCG) is fully supported with only Sweden insisting that the actions of the new agency must be conditioned by an agreement from the affected states. As de Maizière stated: ‘An efficient border control consists of two components: protection of internal borders and protection of external borders. As long as the external border controls do not work effectively, we need to protect borders on a national level to ensure law and justice’. However, the countries do not try to hide that the time to agree on a common European solution may be up soon, so the pressure is considerable.

Understandably, Norway’s position is specific since it is a member of Schengen but not the EU. However, its leaders frequently stress that ‘Norway is dependent on close cooperation with the EU and EU member states’ and should contribute to common solutions. Indeed, although politicians admit that finding an EU solution will be difficult, there is an overall agreement that there is no other option. As the Austrian Minister of Defence Hans Peter Doskozil says: ‘I’m rather skeptical. But of course I know that there is no other way’. Overall, despite the internal reimpositions being very state-centered, all countries emphasise the need to act together and strive for an EU solution and the European framing of the issue prevails. A combination of stressing time pressure and potential danger but simultaneously of a relative ease that there is a way how to handle the problems occurs.

Although the topoi of danger and rules prevail in the argumentation of all countries, the strategies of each government are nuanced and depend on the national context. Specifically, Austria stresses the need to register and reduce the numbers of incoming migrants since it is not responsible for all of them and other states must also participate in sharing the burden of incoming refugees. The topos of burden sharing is explicitly used but not in the way of showing solidarity but rather requiring it from the others. Denmark’s reimpositions followed the Swedish decision and their aim was to prevent rather than stop migration. As the Minister responsible for migration Inger Støjberg argued: ‘we cannot end up in a situation in which there are 3 000 asylum seekers at the main train station’. In 2017, potential terrorist threats were also added to the reasons why internal controls should be prolonged.
Similar preventive reasons are stated by Norway, which moreover stresses the need to gather information about incoming (particularly illegal) migrants and criminals in order to ensure public security. The Minister of Justice Anders Anundsen acknowledged that ‘controls have a good preventive effect and we believe that many (migrants) will not try to travel to Norway because of the controls at internal borders’. Also, Prime Minister Erna Solberg said: ‘The main challenge is that migrants don’t register in the first country of entry but continue into their preferred state in Europe. This is a reason why specific countries temporarily reintroduced their border controls in compliance with the Schengen legislation’. Similarly, Sweden wanted to use internal controls to restrict and register migrants. In all three Scandinavian countries, the *topos* of potential danger is employed. In Denmark and Norway, reimpositions are perceived as a preventive measure to avoid further escalation of the crisis while in Sweden rather as a means of restricting already existing migration flows.

Whereas the representatives of the above-mentioned countries framed the reimpositions prevalently within a national discourse while stressing the *topos* of danger, German leaders stressed how crucial an EU-led approach is and how dangerous national solutions might be, even though it was the first country to carry out the reimpositions in 2015. The reimpositions themselves are perceived as a signal towards Europe that Germany alone cannot accept all refugees. According to Merkel, ‘the EU must secure the external borders together and ensure the Schengen cooperation regarding visa-free movements across borders, otherwise, nationalism might come back’. The other countries also see a coordinated EU solution as necessary but, in contrast to Germany, also mention that they have to proceed on a national level *just* because the EU has failed to control external borders.

Regarding solidarity and burden sharing, i.e. two aspects of Schengen which are frequently criticised by scholars, all countries acknowledge their necessity but require that also other member states share the burden. Particularly Austria and Denmark state that their solidarity with receiving refugees has clear limits. Also Merkel argues ‘Germany, Austria and Sweden, as I want to stress again, cannot solve the problems alone’. On the other hand, Sweden explicitly states that solidarity must also be expressed towards refugees themselves. Hence, the *topos* of solidarity and burden sharing is also used differently in each country.
Drawing on refugee treatment, all countries claim that the right to seek asylum will be ensured and not restricted by the reimpositions, which only aim at those who want to abuse the system.\textsuperscript{88} As the Austrian Minister of Interior Wolfgang Sobotka said, the reimpositions are a clear signal towards illegal migrants and smugglers who should know that not everybody will be received.\textsuperscript{89} This being said, in Austria, Denmark, Norway and Sweden, the conditions for getting asylum were made significantly stricter during 2016\textsuperscript{90} and also Germany had to make concessions to its liberal ‘\textit{Wilkommenskultur}’.\textsuperscript{91} The interconnection of Schengen with asylum policies is very explicit in all countries. As Merkel says: ‘Only if there is a reform of Dublin will we be able to preserve Schengen permanently’.\textsuperscript{92} Swedish Minister for Home Affairs Anders Ygeman claimed that if the EU fails to address the refugee question collectively, ‘the whole Schengen system is in danger’\textsuperscript{93} and Swedish Prime Minister Stefan Löfven even warned that ‘the whole Union can swing if the refugee crisis is not solved and the Schengen cooperation collapses completely’.\textsuperscript{94} Obviously, both policies go hand in hand and the Schengen crisis must be seen in a broader context of refugee politics.

The decision to reimpose internal controls has not always been straightforward, which documents the controversy of this emergency mechanism. Germany’s decision to reimpose its internal controls in September 2015 certainly contributed to Austria following\textsuperscript{95} but the first reaction of Austrian Chancellor Werner Faymann was that his country will not strengthen its border controls.\textsuperscript{96} However, he quickly gave in to his coalition party ÖVP and particularly the outspoken Minister of Interior Johanna Mikl-Leitner, who was in favour of reimpositions.\textsuperscript{97} Similarly, Denmark and Norway reacted to Sweden’s decision since they did not want to replace it as the preferred refugee destination in Scandinavia.\textsuperscript{98} Whereas Norway admitted that ‘it must follow closely what other countries do and act swiftly’\textsuperscript{99} but welcomed the Swedish decision,\textsuperscript{100} Danish Prime Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen hesitated but it took him only one day to change his mind from not wanting to reintroduce the internal borders to doing exactly that. However, he admitted that internal controls are ‘a big step backward for the idea to connect Copenhagen with Skåne and create a powerful international region’.\textsuperscript{101} Moreover, the Danish government feared that reimpositions would increase asylum applications.\textsuperscript{102} Contrarily, Sweden welcomed the Danish reimpositions by saying that ‘finally, Den-
mark takes responsibility for the Nordic region. Although this paragraph shows how difficult the decision to reintroduce internal controls might be, unanimity within all government coalitions was achieved in the end. Austria has probably experienced the most tangible differences. Whereas Chancellor Faymann and his successor Christian Kern (both SPÖ) were hesitant about reimpositions, Mikl-Leitner (ÖVP) was in favour of them and even supported fences on borders inside Schengen, which is unprecedented. (Regarding government or government-supporting parties, only the Danish People’s Party officially supports fences within Schengen and is in favour of building one between Denmark and Germany. Fences on the external borders are more common: Austria built a fence in Spielfeld (Slovenia), prepared one in Burgenland (Hungary) and planned one in Brenner (Italy) and Norway built a fence on the border to Russia, allegedly not because of refugees but as an upgrade of the border.)

Overall, regardless whether the government is rather centre-left (Sweden), centre-right (Denmark, Norway) or forms a big coalition (Germany, Austria) and whether the strongest party is conservative (Norway) or liberal (Denmark), the official position towards Schengen is it must be preserved despite the external refugee flows (topoi of security and danger). All countries emphasise how positive Schengen is, most explicitly Germany. Merkel says ‘everything must be done to keep Schengen alive’ since ‘the Schengen area is an area cherished by everybody’. She adds that ‘the current border controls do not mean the end of Schengen. I want to return to an open Europe and to a borderless Schengen’. No government representatives claim that Schengen should be abolished despite its problems. Even the skeptical Mikl-Leitner, who warns that ‘Schengen is on the brink of collapse’, claims that ‘our priority is to save Schengen’. It seems that the open borders are perceived as a significant achievement that nobody is willing to give up (topos of usefulness). In compliance with the wish to preserve Schengen, politicians seem to emphasise on every occasion that they act fully in line with the Schengen acquis (topos of rules) and that reimpositions are a last resort mechanism which is inherent to Schengen but only taken for a limited period of time in order to prevent further escalation of the crisis. All in all, as presented by the member states, the reimpositions are employed to calm the Schengen crisis down rather than to be the cause of it.
Conclusion: Crisis vs Critique
As it follows from the analysis, there is a broad agreement that the Schengen crisis was surprising and unexpected, and that it was brought about by extraordinary refugee flows into Europe, which the external border controls were not able to manage. However, while scholars criticise reimpositions for being an unfortunate, state-centered approach to the problem, all five states and the EU deem them to be an adequate coping mechanism that is embedded in the Schengen acquis exactly to tackle such a situation. At the same time, the states are aware that reimpositions are just a temporary solution and there is a time pressure to find a long-lasting one. Moreover, although the crisis is only rarely seen explicitly as an opportunity to strengthen the cooperation, states are positive that Schengen will be preserved. Interestingly enough, the analysis shows that politicians use predominantly pragmatic arguments when explaining why reimpositions are necessary and, more generally, why Schengen is an asset, particularly from an economic point of view. The symbolic value of the free movement or, on the other hand, of national border controls is not employed (as the scholarly literature might insinuate).

Furthermore, despite the reimpositions being a state-centered decision, all states want to strive for an EU solution, particularly at the external borders since only if external controls are efficient can reimpositions be abolished again. Although the topos of (potential) danger of too many incoming refugees prevail, the topos of rules is also dominant as politicians stress they act in compliance with the Schengen legislation and ensure the right to seek asylum. Reimpositions aim particularly to identify and select those who enter illegally. Despite the overall consensus on the main argumentation strategies, there are certain national specifics (cf. Figure 1) which document the importance of studying also the subjective critique of a crisis. For example, whereas Denmark puts the reimpositions into a rather Scandinavian context, Germany’s argumentation is targeted at the whole EU. Alternatively, while Norway and Denmark focus predominantly on prevention, Sweden, Austria and Germany on registration and restriction. Also, Denmark does not use the topos of solidarity, but the other countries do so frequently.

To conclude, all states intend to maintain Schengen despite the difficulties they decided to address by employing one of its emergency mechanisms. Drawing on Koselleck’s typology, reimpositions do not
need to be the beginning of an end of Schengen since the actors involved, be it the selected states or the EU, consider the reimpositions to be a way to return to a normal functioning of Schengen. Hence, they do not expect an irreversible change in history but rather a transition period after which the original state will be restored. No violent conflict is to be expected as the IR theory of crisis would suggest. In Antonio Gramsci’s words, the ‘crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear’. Reimpositions might represent these symptoms.

Of course, this study offers a specific case study and it would be interesting to see how other actors argue about the current Schengen crisis and whether they perceive reimpositions as an inherent part of Schengen or rather a threat to it. However, as it follows from this analysis, it is worth studying how the Schengen crisis is socially constructed since without understanding what specific actors mean when discussing the Schengen crisis, it is not possible to find appropriate solutions.

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## Figure 1 Argumentation strategies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perception of crisis</th>
<th>Austria</th>
<th>Denmark</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Norway</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Purpose of reimpositions</td>
<td>Control, registration and restriction of incoming migrants, for many of which Austria is not responsible</td>
<td>Last resort, only random checks, to prevent (rather than stop) illegal migration, later on against terrorism</td>
<td>Control, registration and restriction of incoming migrants, internal security</td>
<td>To prevent illegal migrants and criminals from entering, to gather information and to ensure public security, preventive effect</td>
<td>Control, registration and restriction of incoming migrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU vs national approach</td>
<td>EU approach key but as long as it is not feasible, national approach needed</td>
<td>EU has failed to control external borders =&gt; national solution</td>
<td>EU approach key, national solutions potentially dangerous</td>
<td>Norway dependent on the EU, wants to contribute, national solutions inadequate, more, not less cooperation needed</td>
<td>EU approach key, but each state responsible for its borders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External controls</td>
<td>Insufficient, stricter EU management needed, more power to Frontex welcomed</td>
<td>Insufficient, stricter EU management needed, need to control also EU citizens</td>
<td>Insufficient, stricter EU management needed, more power to Frontex welcomed</td>
<td>Insufficient, stricter EU management needed, more power to Frontex welcomed</td>
<td>Insufficient, stricter EU management needed, more power to Frontex welcomed but only if states agree with its presence, need to control also EU citizens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solidarity, burden sharing</td>
<td>Needed, all countries must share the burden, not only a few incl. Austria</td>
<td>Denmark doesn’t want to accept those who can’t continue to Sweden</td>
<td>Necessary, Germany receives more asylum seekers than it is supposed to according to EU law</td>
<td>Relocations necessary to help countries controlling external borders</td>
<td>Solidarity with refugees precondition to Schengen membership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domino effect</td>
<td>Potentially dangerous</td>
<td>Danish reimpositions reaction to Sweden</td>
<td>In reaction to Germany, Austria reimposed internal controls and Czechia, Slovakia and Poland considered them</td>
<td>Sweden and Denmark reimposed =&gt; Norway too</td>
<td>If Sweden reimposes controls, more asylum seekers who would otherwise continue to Norway and Finland may apply here</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Right to seek asylum</strong></td>
<td><strong>Remains ensured, conditions made stricter</strong></td>
<td><strong>Yes, as long as Denmark can manage applications, conditions made stricter</strong></td>
<td><strong>Remains ensured, conditions made stricter</strong></td>
<td><strong>Remains ensured and thanks to reimpositions even enhanced, conditions made stricter</strong></td>
<td><strong>Remains ensured, refugees can apply in other countries, conditions made stricter</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political agreement</strong></td>
<td><strong>ÖVP stricter than SPÖ</strong></td>
<td><strong>Unanimity within coalition</strong></td>
<td><strong>Unanimity within coalition</strong></td>
<td><strong>Unanimity within coalition</strong></td>
<td><strong>Unanimity within coalition</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Topoi</strong></td>
<td><strong>Topos of security, burden sharing, solidarity, rules</strong></td>
<td><strong>Topos of security, burden sharing</strong></td>
<td><strong>Topos of security, burden sharing, solidarity, rules</strong></td>
<td><strong>Topos of security, burden sharing, rules</strong></td>
<td><strong>Topos of security, burden sharing, solidarity, rules</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Schengen crisis</strong></td>
<td><strong>Austria follows the rules, back to normal functioning as soon as external controls sufficient, open borders cherished</strong></td>
<td><strong>Back to normal functioning as soon as external controls sufficient, mostly Scandinavian context</strong></td>
<td><strong>Back to normal functioning as soon as external controls sufficient, open borders cherished, both Dublin and Schengen reform key to preserve Schengen, everything must be done to keep Schengen</strong></td>
<td><strong>Schengen threatened by enormous refugee pressures, crucial to reduce them and control external borders properly in order to preserve Schengen, simultaneously, Dublin and Schengen help manage the refugee crisis</strong></td>
<td><strong>Schengen threatened by enormous refugee pressures, external controls must be enhanced, Dublin must be replaced, asylum cooperation precondition to Schengen cooperation</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s own. Main argumentation strategies in bold.
Notes


4 Reinhart Koselleck (1973), Kritik und Krise - Eine Studie zur Pathogenese der bürgerlichen Welt, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag.


7 An argumentation strategy is a linguistic and cognitive procedure of problem-solving which represents a relatively coherent complex of statements. Reisigl (2014).

8 Reisigl (2014); Ruth Wodak and Michał Krzyżanowski (2008), Qualitative Discourse Analysis in the Social Sciences, Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan.


11 For criticism see McClelland (1961). A specific example would be the recent


13 Morse (1972).


19 Cf. the above mentioned scholars.


25 However, spot checks are mentioned in article 2.

26 Schengen implementation agreement, art 2(2).

27 SBC (article 23).

28 Ibid. article 24.

29 Ibid. article 25.


31 Regulation (EU) No 1051/2013 (article 26).

32 Ibid. (preamble, paragraph 5).


41 Carrera et al. (2011); Nascimbene and Di Pascale (2011), Phull and Sutcliffe (2013).

42 Scuzzarello and Kinnvall (2013).


44 Phull and Sutcliffe (2013); Nascimbene and Di Pascale (2011); Carrera et al. (2011).


46 Börzel and Risse (2017).


48 Nivet (2016).

49 Cf. Ortiz (2016).

50 Carrera et al. 2015; Guild et al. (2015).

51 De Angelis (2016); Dingott Alkopher and Blanc (2016).

52 Cornelisse (2014).

53 Dingott Alkopher and Blanc (2016).

54 Slovenia reimposed internal controls in November 2015, but kept them only for a month. Also other countries have reimposed their internal controls since 2015, but not for migratory reasons (e.g. France due to terrorist threats, Malta, Poland, Italy, Portugal due to planned political and sport events). Hence, these countries are not included in the analysis.

All countries control only a part of their borders: Austria the Austrian-Hungarian land border and Austrian-Slovenian land border, Germany the German-Austrian land border, Denmark the Danish ports with ferry connections to Germany and the Danish-German land border, Sweden the Swedish harbours in the Police Region South and West and at the Öresund bridge, Norway the Norwegian ports with ferry connections to Denmark, Germany and Sweden. Cf. Council implementing decision (EU) 2017/818 of 11 May 2017 setting out a Recommendation for prolonging temporary internal border control in exceptional circumstances putting the overall functioning of the Schengen area at risk.


Ibid.


Commission opinion of 23.10.2015 on the necessity and proportionality of the controls at internal borders reintroduced by Germany and Austria pursuant to Article 24(4) of Regulation No 562/2006 (Schengen Borders Code), p. 8.

Council implementing decision (EU) 2017/818.


Markéta Votoupalová


79 „Controlltiltaket har god preventiv effekt, og det er grunn til å tro at mange ikke vil forøke å reise til Norge fordi det er kontroll på den indre grensen, (...)“ Regjeringen.no (2016), ‘Regjeringen forlenger grensekontroll,’ <goo.gl/PUqVUg> (accessed 10 July 2017).


81 From January 2016 to May 2017, Sweden carried out ID checks, not internal border controls in the sense of the SBC. These replaced the ID controls in June 2017. For more information see <goo.gl/W22eZG>.


83 „Die EU müsse ihre Außengrenzen gemeinsam schützen und das


- In reaction to Germany’s decision, also other countries considered internal reimpositions, but neither the Czech Republic, Slovakia nor Poland did so eventually. Zeit.de (2015), [’Grenzkontrollen verzögern die Einreise nur,’


97 Kurier.at (2015a).


104 This was not the case of opposition parties. E.g. the liberal opposition in Denmark presented reimpositions as an empty gesture. DR.dk (2016), ´Radikale: Løkkes grænsekontrol er symbolpolitik til ære for DF,´ DR, 5 January, available at <goo.gl/9QhTdD> (accessed 10 July 2017).

105 Migration News Sheet (2017), ´Danish People's Party wants a fence to be built at Denmark's border with Germany,´ <goo.gl/8j7By6> (accessed 10 July 2017).


116 See e.g. the speech by the Norwegian State Secretary Tronstad available at <goo.gl/SXaBGY> (accessed 10 July 2017).

Recalibration of Turkish Foreign Policy During AKP Era

Blendi Lami

Since the Justice and Development Party came to power, Turkey has taken another direction in the international scene, based primarily on the ideas of Ahmet Davutoğlu, architect of Turkish foreign policy. Different from Turkey’s conduct during the Cold War, Davutoğlu developed a new foreign policy with specific principles, with their implementation still open to debates. After Davutoğlu’s exit, it should be noted that Turkey found itself in another political context, and began recalibrating its foreign policy, as president Erdogan has undertaken a more active role under the essentials of a de facto presidential foreign policy. It is worth mentioning some shifts from Davutoğlu’s framework, such as: from soft power to hard power, from multilateralism to strategic security alliances, from zero problems with neighbours to a policy of regaining friends, from strategy of active globalisation through multilateralism to strategic security alliances, and from civilisationalist realism of Strategic Depth to proactive moral realism. The article aims to shed light on how effective the principles of Turkish foreign policy devised by Davutoğlu were, whether Turkey continues implementing his policies or has abandoned them and what the dynamics of the new Turkish Foreign Policy are (after Davutoğlu’s exit). This article argues that there has been a reorientation of the foreign policy of Turkey as a result of structural and contextual changes in the regional and international political landscape.
Keywords: Turkish foreign policy, strategic depth, static paradigm, zero problem policy, multidimensional foreign policy, recalibration

Ahmet Davutoglu has played an influential role in shaping Turkish Foreign Policy (TFP). He formulated this policy, referring mainly to the strategic location of Turkey, as he considers Turkey a ‘central’ country or power. It is near Europe, Asia and Africa, and as such, has the capability of having an important position within its region and internationally. As it simultaneously lies in many regions and is the heir to the Ottoman Empire, Turkey is ‘the epicentre of the Balkans, the Middle East and the Caucasus, the centre of Eurasia in general and is in the middle of the Rimland belt cutting across the Mediterranean to the Pacific’. Hale reinforces this idea, stating that ‘Turkey is the only state, apart from Russia, with territory in both Europe and Asia, and is affected by, and affects international politics in South-eastern Europe, eastern Mediterranean, Transcaucasia, southern regions of former Soviet Union and Middle East’.

Based on the assumption that Strategic Depth argues that a nation’s value in world politics is predicated on its geostrategic location and historical depth, Davutoglu promoted significant principles of foreign policy, becoming thus the architect of TFP, having thus a great impact on politics for more than a decade. This was a foreign policy that saw Turkey getting engaged in various realms, from solving disputes in its neighbouring countries to becoming more involved in international affairs. He believed that for Turkey to become a regional leader, it must have a friendly relationship with its neighbouring countries and a bigger influence abroad. It could be put forth that the implementation of this doctrine raised the international stature of Turkey.

However, after Davutoglu’s exit in 2016, Turkey began to recalibrate its foreign policies, due to internal changes in the country and external changes in the region. After having played an influential role in restructuring the Turkish foreign policy, his exit from the government in 2016 - along with changes in the environment of international relations –made ‘Turkey vulnerable to changes in the country’s foreign policies’. This put Turkey in a different position, as the Turkish security paradigm was grounded on reconciliation and democratisation at home, and peaceful resolution of regional conflicts, while currently ‘the foreign policy apparatus should be able to recalibrate and restructure itself vis-à-vis the problems of rising insecurity in the region...
al landscape and the difficulties of protecting engagements and new openings in the international arena.\(^5\)

The article aims to shed light on how effective the TFP principles devised by Davutoglu were, whether Turkey continues implementing his policies or has abandoned them and what the dynamics in new TFP after Davutoglu's exit are. As it tries to answer these questions, the article argues that there has been a reorientation of the foreign policy of Turkey as a result of structural and contextual changes in the regional and international political landscape.

**Traditional\(^6\) Turkish Foreign Policy - “a Static Paradigm”**

During the Cold War system, the West was Turkey's close ally, as Turkey still is a strategic point for Europe's defence, and had a stabilized position in the international arena. With the end of the bipolar world, Turkey had other alternatives and its foreign policy became more independent.

Further back in history, during the Kemalism years, the fragile Turkish state defined foreign policy based on domestic and international conditions. Kemalism, mainly focused on domestic affairs, set forth 'the policy of non-intervention, Western orientation and vigilance to protect national sovereignty.'\(^7\) Before the Second World War, Turkish foreign policy was based on maintaining neutrality in order to avoid conflicts, to become part of Europe and the West in general, as well as to protect territorial integrity. In this framework, Aïdyn offers four main sources for Turkish traditional foreign policy. These sources are the historical periods of the formation of the modern Turkish state is based.

1. historical experience of the Ottoman state;
2. Kemalist nationalist revolution and creation of the Republic;
3. Western orientation; and
4. sceptical perception of great powers and foreign interests.\(^8\)

According to Fuller, after the foundation of Turkish state, the backbone of foreign policy priorities was ‘the transformation of TFP - from the trend to expand the influence to containment’ and ‘the harmony between domestic and international politics and security issues took high priority on the foreign policy agenda.’\(^9\)

During the second half of the 20th century, two fundamental concepts explain the traditional Turkish foreign policy: maintaining the
status quo and westernisation. Traditionally, TFP is based on ‘preserving the established order within existing borders and balances’ and ‘implementing a West-oriented foreign policy’. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union appeared in the political arena as two rival superpowers representing two different ideologies, and their rivalry and threats to world peace and security were the paradigm of international relations. Being part of this new international order, such a paradigm would deeply affect TFP. This new system forced the states to behave according to predetermined rules set by the two superpowers.

Aydin clarifies the events that affected Turkey’s alignment in the Western Bloc, stating that ‘after the threats of the Soviet Union in 1945 to control the straits, Turkey risked falling under Russian influence’. In the power game between the superpowers, President Truman helped Turkey financially and militarily, and Turkey became an important ally to the West. Located between areas influenced by the two superpowers, Turkey was unable to benefit from their clash, being like a ‘garrison’ of the West, and sought to maintain its territorial integrity and security threatened by the Soviet Union.

Being a critic of this policy, Davutoglu emphasizes that ‘Turkish policymakers accepted this position as a static paradigm, and this situation deprived Turkey of producing alternative paradigms, which resulted in the natural decline of its sphere of influence’. In this way, Ataturk’s agenda for the modernisation of Western-oriented Turkey and the Cold War system of international relations were the main factors defining traditional Turkey’s foreign policy. TFP objectives depended on these two factors, and were - as stated by Davutoglu - part of a ‘static paradigm’.

**Theory of International Relation explaining TFP during Justice and Development Party (AKP) years**

According to realism, nation-states in the international system are motivated by their self-interests and pursue policies aimed at promoting what they think is best for them. According to Goodin, realism is a ‘spectre of ideas’ and is focused on four main proposals: a) states as central actors in international politics; b) the international political system is anarchic, with no supranational authority that can impose rules on states; c) actors in the international political system are rational because their actions maximize their interests; and d) all states
want power so that they can secure their self-defence. Referring to the four above proposals, we come to the conclusion that states, Turkey in our case, tend to act on the basis of their own interests by implementing the *realpolitik* to expand as much influence as possible. In this section, we will try to explain why realism is applied to the Turkish foreign policies during the AKP period.

To achieve influence in the international system, realism emphasises the fact that a state must have power. During the Davutoglu era, Turkey sought to create an international image of respect and influence. This is by relying on diplomacy and soft power. The main principles, formulated by Davutoglu, are categorized in five pillars: balance between freedom and security, no problem with neighbours, good relations with neighbours and beyond, rhythmic diplomacy and multidimensional foreign policy. Davutoglu believed that, through the implementation of these pillars, Turkey will become more powerful, will earn the respect of other states and will assert its influence.

In addition, in the post-Davutoglu period, we note that AKP foreign policy has acquired new characteristics. The new context is driven by several factors, such as the refugee crisis, the conflict with ISIS, increased terrorist attacks, the conflict with the Kurds in Iraq and Syria, the failed coup d’etat etc. Unlike Davutoglu’s conduct of foreign policy, when foreign policy was based on soft power and civilization-al multilateralism, Turkey, facing such threats, has undergone a shift from the use of soft power to exert influence over its neighbours and regional countries, taking a harder approach in trying to promote its self-interests.

It should be emphasized that ‘Davutoglu’s theories are not entirely based on a single paradigm [...] as he also employs realist, liberal and constructivist perspectives’. Therefore, there is no wide consensus between international relations (IR) theorists as to what IR perspective Davutoglu doctrine belongs to. Scholars such as Alexander Murison (2006) in *Strategic Depth and Perspectives on Turkey’s Multi-Regional Role in the 21st Century* (2015), Emre Erser in *The Evolution of “Eurasia” as a Geopolitical Concept in Post–Cold War Turkey*, and Pinar Bilgin (2007) in *Only Strong States*, argue that realism is the main theory in Davutoglu’s work. This leads to the idea that ‘choke points play an important part [...] in Davutoglu’s explanation of international behaviour. Davutoglu contends that the real reason West is interested in Turkey, and in the Middle East as a whole, is that there are numerous choke points
in the region'. Under this assumption, realism takes precedence over role of civilisations or religion. Ozkan states that Davutoglu ‘bases his theories on realist expansionist policies’. In this context, Davutoglu tries to create a new approach in international affairs ‘by modifying existing Western power politics and applying them to Turkey, and an Islamic world view’. Realism, the basis of Davutoglu theory over civilisations, is also explained by Aydinli and Mathews in *Periphery Theorizing* (2008); Ozkan in *Turkey, Davutoglu and the Idea of Pan-Islamism* (2014); Ozpek and Demirag in *The Davutoglu Effect in Turkish Foreign Policy: What if the Bowstring is Broken?* (2012).

We can note three elements of realism, reflected in the why TFP is conducted. First, *power* is crucial in international relations, because Turkey is already a regional power and, as it has gained this stature, sees itself becoming a global power. Second, *anarchy* is the idea that the world lacks any supreme authority. Turkish foreign policy follows a realist perspective as it considers the world order anarchy and tries to exploit this element - through its power. For instance, as the United States of America showed for quite some time a containment regarding its involvement in the Middle Eastern issues (withdrawal from Iraq, reluctance to oust Assad from power, ISIS factor, expansion of Iran influence, and Russia’s involvement in the region), and an inability to control the regional order, ‘anarchy fostered competition and conflict among states and inhibits their willingness to cooperate even when they share common interests’. With no central power controlling or configuring the system, the anarchy in international system favours powers such as Turkey to fulfil its interests. And third, the concept of *alliance* in the contemporary world explains the realist attitude in relation to Turkey’s alliances. This concept underscores the way of creating alliances. Realists argue that there is no permanent ally, as alliances are based solely on interests, and the benefits from an ally are also not permanent. In a multi-polar system, friends and enemies are easily identified, and ‘in this way they are focused on uncertainties and dependencies between individual states’.

During the Davutoglu era, Turkey played in such a field of IR, but, as mentioned before, the context after 2015 changed the way TFP was implemented. In 1997, Brzezinski warned that a state like Turkey is ‘volatile in its geopolitical orientation and internally potentially vulnerable, and is not only an important geostrategic player but also a geopolitical pivot, whose own internal condition is of critical importance to the
fate of the region. This is to show that a state like Turkey is prone to going through significant changes and transformations in world politics, and events such as Arab Uprisings, the war on terror, failed states in the area or the global economic crisis have naturally impacted TFP. Brzezinski’s diagnosis about Turkey is relevant. Especially after the year 2000, Turkey has earned the status of a geopolitical pivot, as the AKP foreign policy implemented the Strategic Depth doctrine, through specific TFP principles devised by Davutoglu, but the foreign policy of this ‘pivot’ has been dynamic, transforming and modifying based on its environment.

According to Keyman, since 2002, when AKP came to power, it is possible to analyse and categorize Turkish foreign policy within three periods. The first period started in 2002 and continued until 2010, in which the environment was mainly framed by the September 11 attacks and the global war on terror. During this time, TFP was shaped by soft power, active globalisation, and a suitable environment for Turkey’s proactivity. This is the period Davutoglu employed concepts of strategic depth, and civilizational, realist thinking of regional and global relations. The second period started with the Arab Spring in Tunisia and Egypt in 2010, where a strong societal demand arose for regime change in the Middle East and North Africa region, with the intention of forming democratic regimes. But this movement ended in a boomerang, paving the way for internal and regional conflicts. The military coup in Egypt and the civil war in Syria ended the possibility of transformation in the region. It went even further, as the Middle East’s instability represented an opportunity for expansionist regional powers.

Turkey was not immune from these radical changes. The regional tensions impacted the proactive foreign policy immensely. It was the time when Erdogan assumed the post of president and the tenure of Davutoglu as prime minister ended. The third period is characterized by serious security risks. Escalating conflict and instability in the region within the deepening global turmoil has made it necessary, if not imperative, to adjust Turkish foreign policy. In such a region, characterized by instability and insecurity, realism concepts such as chaos, alliances and power determine Turkish behaviour.

It is also worth emphasizing two internal events that have significantly impacted TFP. First, since the Gezi protests in May and June 2013, much of the foreign policy language emanating from Ankara
has changed considerably. This change has been profound even in the case of Davutoglu, who made a full volte-face from a language of win-win thinking and soft power to zero-sum games and strongmen aggression, justifying the government by saying that ‘first, it’s wrong to claim there is a deficit of democracy in Turkey […] Second, our success extends beyond the ballot box […] Third, though we view peaceful protests as part of a democratic system, we have to strike a balance between this principle and maintaining public order’. In comparison to Davutoglu, Erdogan’s language comes across as uninfluenced by ‘soft power’ discourse, remaining nationalist on the one hand, and committed to Realpolitik in the extreme on the other hand.

The second important internal event impacting TFP was the coup d’état attempt of July 15, 2016, an attack on Turkish establishment. After this failed attempt to seize power, the head of state was strongly opposed to the reaction of the European Union and the US administration. He believed that they did not give appropriate support to his elected government. Receiving criticism for the way it handled these events, Turkey was even prepared to turn its back to the West. Being a NATO member-state since 1952, its international alliance is clearly defined with the Western world and it was very difficult to imagine Turkey moving away from that alliance.

The reaction toward internal and external risks have given rise to a new, proactive foreign policy, which, referring to Keyman, is moving toward a proactive moral realism, with the following specifics:

Since 2002, TFP was, and continues to remain, proactive […] The perception of Turkey as a pivotal state/regional power has remained […] TFP has undergone a shift from soft power to hard power […] Turkey’s 2002-2010 strategy of active globalisation through multilateralism has significantly declined and been replaced by the establishment of, and involvement in strategic security alliances […] “Zero problems” principle ended in 2015 and has been replaced by the policy of regaining friends […] There was also a shift from “civilisationalist realism” in the 2002 - 2010 period, whose basic principles can be found in Davutoglu’s elaboration of strategic depth, to “moral realism” in the use of hard power.

In conclusion, the proactivism of TFP, as set by Davutoglu, ended in 2014 - 15, and the new foreign policy is being shaped by proactive moral realism.
Discussion on Davutoğlu Alternative

Since 2002, Davutoğlu has managed to influence the TFP and helped to establish the five pillars or principles.

One of the pillars is ensuring that there is a balance between freedom and security. From Davutoğlu’s point of view, if the Turkey was not democratic and secure, then it would not have the capability of asserting its influence in the neighbouring countries. The decision by the Turkish government to promote democracy and security in its internal affairs was motivated by the need of claiming control and influence over its neighbouring countries.

The promotion of this principle was also galvanized by the idea that Turkey was to be admitted into the European Union. Advancement of democracy and security within its internal borders was also a foreign affairs strategy aimed at cementing its global image as a stable country, hence influencing the affairs of its neighbours and regional countries.

In principle, a state needs to guarantee its internal security and eliminate threats from outside. In the domestic sphere, state organisation is inclined to restrict some essential citizen’s freedom for the sake of security. Following the logic of Davutoğlu, this restriction requires careful balancing between two extreme cases. He says: “If security is neglected on behalf of freedom then a turbulent and chaotic situation is created.” On the other hand, “if freedom is not considered a priority such as security, then an authoritarian and autocratic society will be created.”

Additionally, Turkey came up with a policy aimed at ensuring that there it had no problem with its neighbours. This is a policy that the country managed to successfully implement, especially in the Balkans, Caucasus and Middle East. The main aim of this policy was to ensure that Turkey did not engage in costly wars and conflicts with its neighbouring countries.

However, this is such a disputed principle. It is populist, but it should be emphasized that a ‘zero problems’ policy firstly creates, at least perceptively, territorial security. Davutoğlu managed to set aside perceptions of threats coming from Turkey or was able to mitigate conflicts with neighbours. This principle also seems idealistic in a chaotic region where realpolitik prevails. Edin states that ‘a major challenge for Turkey stems from the fact that it is a player in three regions and viewed by other actors as an integral part of any region.’ In addition, Turkey is in contact with various international actors.
Its relations with them are often conflicting, because it is difficult to agree on a variety of interests in a problematic region such as the Middle East. As a conclusion, it can be said that the principle ‘no problem’ simultaneously creates a positive international reputation and is difficult to be accomplished. However, as with balance between security and freedom, even the second principle has been open to polemics, and both these principles are intertwined. In fact, ‘zero problem’ is a principle that helps Turkey take a very active role in international relations. Friedman states that ‘Turkey is emerging as a great power,’ but it cannot achieve this status if ‘it does not solve its internal problems’.34

Moreover, the third principle of Turkish foreign policy under Davutoğlu was to develop relationships with countries from other regions of the world. In fact, in a bid to be admitted to the European Union, Turkey, in the first years of AKP into power, sought to reform its laws and policies for more freedom and democratic principles. Regarding its relationship with NATO, Turkey is a member since 1951, and has the second biggest army of the alliance. From such a position, the country has acquired a solid stature. This is an indication that Turkey sought to build alliances with countries from other parts of the world. Nonetheless, alliance building with the European Union has been frustrated due to many differences of both parties.

Such policy targets a foreign policy vision, by which international relations have no restraints. This is illustrated by Davutoglu as follows:

Turkey’s engagements from Chile to Indonesia, from Africa to Central Asia, and from European Union to Organisation for Islamic Cooperation will be part of a holistic approach to foreign policy. These initiatives will make Turkey a global actor as we approach 2023, the one hundredth anniversary of the establishment of the Turkish republic.35

Rhythmic diplomacy is the fourth pillar of the Turkish foreign policy under Davutoglu. Under this principle, Turkey was to engage in intensive diplomatic initiatives aimed at cementing its image as an important regional and international actor.

As noted above, ending its status as buffer zone during the Cold War, Turkey gained the stature of a significant power in the international scene. Rhythmic or proactive diplomacy is also a reflection of this perspective. According to Davutoglu, proactive diplomacy ‘refers to a stable pro-activism in the field of diplomacy as we strive to achieve
an active role in international organisations and to open on areas in which Turkey has been limited in the past.  

The AKP position in this regard is clearly expressed in its program, emphasizing the implementation of ‘a proactive, innovative and multi-lateral external policy’, which implies the undertaking of initiatives in neighbouring countries in times of crisis. In this new context, considering expansion to create new areas of influence, Turkey increasingly aspires to embrace a global perspective.

*Multidimensional foreign policy* is the fifth pillar of the Turkish foreign policy. The aim of this policy is for Turkey to engage with international actors to harmonize its interests and not to compete with other actors. This was the main target of the Turkish leadership when it sought to establish ties with the United States, NATO and the European Union. This approach does not align with former politics based primarily on traditional concepts of security. TFP is no longer one-dimensional, but it includes a wider range of issues, such as economics, culture, diplomacy or energy. Thus, there is a shift from the static polarisation of the international system during the Cold War. Davutoglu claims that taking this new position ‘is a natural phenomenon for Turkey’, meaning that its geostrategic position creates a golden opportunity to implement a multidimensional foreign policy.

Turkey’s international political stance is a ‘heavy burden’ without a proper management of diplomacy, especially in the complicated theatre of international relations. Keyman underlines his doubts about the purpose of this new TFP vision. He sets out three possible reasons for the debate:

There is a “thick scepticism with a strong ideological take” on the new TFP behaviour, and it is perceived as a means by which the AKP government attempts to widen the legitimacy and power of its Islamic-authoritarian governance [...] There is another version of scepticism, which claims that Turkey is turning its back on the West, and moving towards the East. Yet, this version presents a “thin scepticism”, which is less ideological in its orientation [...] The third form of scepticism raises the question of realism and sustainability: how realistic and sustainable is Turkey’s proactive and multidimensional foreign policy?

It is important to stress that geography forces Turkey to be part of a vast network of foreign relations. Turkey’s role in the region as well as
in the world in the coming years will be determined by Turkey’s political developments and its ability to adapt to both domestic and foreign policy levels. As Friedman lists the powers of the future in his prominent book *The Next 100 Years*, he notes that ‘Turkey is a stable platform in the midst of chaos. The Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Arab world to the south are all unstable. As Turkey’s power grows—and its economy and military are already the most powerful in the region—so will Turkish influence’.

### Current TFP Recalibration

The aforementioned principles - set by Davutoglu - have created the tracks in which TFP after 2002 was re-established. AKP vision was thus reflected in Davutoglu’s principles. This policy departed from the Cold War’s ‘static paradigm’, where Turkey was focused on preserving the status quo and Westernisation, to a somewhat more independent policy during the last decade of the twentieth century. And, since the AKP’s victory, Turkey has begun implementing the Strategic Depth doctrine, the source of five main principles of TFP.

Focusing on the AKP years (2002 - 2018), we note that, due to Turkey’s internal and external dynamics during this period, there has been a foreign policy recalibration. While this article aims to shed light on how TFP principles have changed over the years of the ruling AKP, in this section we try to analyse the current recalibration of the principles that began to be implemented in 2002 and reveal their actual configuration. As we examine how the principles have changed or evolved during AKP years, we must point out that TFP has shifted from soft power to hard power, from multilateralism to strategic security alliances, from zero problems with neighbours to a policy of regaining friends, and from civilisationalist realism of Strategic Depth to proactive moral realism.

Regarding the first principle devised by Davutoglu, *balance between security and freedom*, we must point out that in the early years of its implementation, there was a tendency to achieve this balance. This principle was meant to strike a balance between freedom and security. But, as Turkey has been facing many challenges, such balance has not produced the desired results. For instance, one significant aim has driven Turkish domestic security policy since 2002, which is preventing the establishment of a Kurdish state either within Turkey or in Iraq (after 2003) and more recently Syria. Davutoglu warned again in 2012,
echoing his principle that ‘Turkey must establish a lasting security/freedom balance, by liberalizing its political system and abandoning its erroneous habits of the past, when viewing society as a potential enemy sucked its energy in vicious internal discussions’. Given recent events, there is only a slim chance that the AKP government will allow a softening of its security policies towards the Kurdish regions. All of this has resulted in a Turkish state that, driven by post-coup paranoia, is likely to use force, repression of the media, and other more disreputable means to achieve its internal security goals ‘to the detriment of freedoms’.

Another example of the failure of this balance, which directly reflects the development of foreign policy, is also the coup d’etat attempt on 15 July 2016, whose impact on internal security policy in Turkey has been crucial. Since coming to power in 2002, to meet EU accession criteria, the AKP government also implemented measures to bring the military within civilian control. The so-called Gulenists were blamed for the coup by the Turkish government. The consequences have been dramatic. The Economist states that “Mr Erdogan is fast destroying the very democracy [. . .] About 6,000 soldiers have been arrested; thousands more policemen, prosecutors and judges have been sacked or suspended. So have academics, teachers and civil servants, though there is little sign they had anything to do with the coup. Secularists, Kurds and other minorities feel intimidated by Mr Erdogan’s loyalists on the streets.” Far from being the good ally of the past, Turkey blamed U.S. for the coup, with no evidence. Different to the early years of AKP government, when the country was considered the model of a prospering and stable democracy, Turkey is now threatening to turn its back to the West and the democratic practices. Therefore, Davutoglu’s principle of ‘security/freedom balance’ is imbalanced in favour of security.

In relation to the zero problems principle, Turkey envisions an enhanced regional engagement. Davutoglu insisted that ‘we believe that this is an achievable goal, if enough trust and confidence can be generated among the relevant parties’. This principle was aligned with the way Turkey tried to implement public diplomacy, intending to convey a positive image of the country to the foreign public.

Referring to what is going on in the Middle East, we see that this policy has comprehensively failed. Turkey has many problems with its neighbours. Turkey narrowly avoided conflict with Russia, after
a Russian SU24 attack aircraft was shot down by a Turkish F-16 on 30 November 2015, although Turkish - Russian relations are currently normalized. Then on 24 August 2016, Turkey became involved in the Syrian conflict, after it became clear that without intervening, a Kurdish proto-state could become a reality on the Turkish southern border. Turkey’s relationship with Israel was badly damaged after the Israeli operation to board the Palestinian relief fleet (the so-called Mavi Marmara incident) on 31 May 2010, although relations have since gradually normalized. Relations with the U.S. administration were fraught for most of the Obama presidency. There are deep-rooted schisms with Iraq over territory and Kurdish issue. As the Americans have been collaborating in Syria with YPG Kurdish forces (People’s Protection Units) in the Syrian conflict, ‘Turkey is ready to proceed unilaterally in defence of its interests and security and [...] and is determined to meet threats to its security’. And Turkey’s relationship with Egypt is poor given Turkey’s unstinting support for the Muslim Brotherhood.

Ironically, it is said that ‘Turkey’s Foreign Policy has gone from “Zero Problems” To “Nothing But Problems”’. Although such policy worked relatively well for some time, today there is almost no ‘country of immediate interest’ for Ankara that Turkey has no problems with. From Washington to Berlin and Moscow, from Tehran to Baghdad and Damascus, you can hardly find a government in Turkey’s immediate neighbourhood and beyond that has ‘zero problems’ with Ankara.

The other principle envisions an effective diplomacy towards neighbouring regions. ‘Our goal’ Davutoglu says, ‘is to maximize cooperation and mutual benefits with all of our neighbours. In order to achieve that goal, we build our relations with them on the principles of “security for all”, “high-level political dialogue”, “economic interdependence” and “cultural harmony and mutual respect”’.

Considering EU norms, values and reform process, Turkey - EU relations had a considerable impact on Turkey’s foreign policy. For example: Sozen argues that, in the initial years of AKP in power, Turkey’s shift to soft power can be seen in Cyprus’ issue, because AKP administration changed its policy, ‘as it promised to solve this problem by following a less confrontational strategy. Turkish foreign policy shifts to a more moderate policy based on solution oriented and AKP’s new win-win strategy’. This example, as Keyman notes, illustrates Turkey’s ‘general activism'.
Regarding regional engagements, there has been a shift from ‘general activism’ to ‘priority setting’. Turkish foreign policy, especially after Davutoğlu’s exit, is concerned more about priorities and less about general activism. Moral realism and the use of hard power lead to priority setting so that Turkey can achieve the desired outcomes. As Turkey was inclined for a greater cooperation and developing relationships with countries from different regions of the world, while negotiating simultaneously with European Union, the United States, Russia or Iran - a strategy of active globalisation through multilateralism - nowadays we notice that such strategy ‘has been replaced by the establishment of, and involvement in strategic security alliances’.

However, as TFP strategy has changed, Turkey continues to be influential in such an anarchy. It has acted based on its interests in the geopolitical theatre of the Middle East, by building effecting alliances with Russia, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. The shift from soft power to hard power has emphasized the strategic importance of alliances in foreign policy making.

The fourth principle, rhythmic diplomacy, aspires to provide Turkey with a more active role in international relations. It implies active involvement in all international organisations and on all issues of global and international importance. As it was being “rhythmic”, Turkey became a non-permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, and chaired three critical commissions concerning Afghanistan, North Korea, and the fight against terror. It also undertook the chairmanship-in-office of the South-East European Cooperation Process, a forum for dialogue among Balkan states and their immediate neighbours, for 2009 and 2010. In addition, it is a member of G-20, maintains observer status in the African Union, has a strategic dialogue mechanism with the Gulf Cooperation Council, and actively participates in the Arab League. Turkey has also launched new diplomatic initiatives by opening 15 new embassies in Africa and two in Latin America, and is a signatory to the Kyoto Protocol. In this regard, the nation’s active and constituting role in the creation of the alliance of civilisations to challenge the clash of civilisation thesis was regionally and globally welcomed (The Alliance of Civilisations (AoC) was launched in 2005 by the then Prime Minister Erdogan, and former Prime Minister of Spain, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero. The AoC became a U.N. initiative upon its endorsement by the Secretary-General of the United Nations). In the initial years of AKP, Turkey’s involvement in the areas of economy,
culture, identity, diplomacy and humanitarianism raised the profile of the country as a secular and democratic government, with a Muslim population and a dynamic economy.

Since 2002, Turkey has been, and likely will continue to be, active, engaging, and assertive both regionally and globally. However, there are some limits to the effectiveness of this rhythmic diplomacy causing counterproductive impacts, especially if it is managed unilaterally without considering policy alignment with Europe and the United States. These fractures with the West have reduced the legitimacy and the effectiveness of this principle, giving way to the interpretation that Ankara is turning away from the EU.\textsuperscript{54} On the other side, Turkey should focus on its priorities, not only to make its proactive foreign policy realistic and effective, but also to keep its role in global politics as an important and pivotal actor. Today, the nation’s regional and global engagements focus on Syria and Iraq, as well as on Africa, and operate on the basis of the priority of security concerns.

However, since 2010, all of Turkey’s soft power capacities have declined significantly. Instead, in ways similar to Cold War years, Turkey’s hard power capacities have become more visible in bilateral and international talks. From the war against ISIS to the establishment of stability, from managing the refugee crisis to state building, the essential role of Turkey is perceived more in security terms rather than in terms of economy, culture, identity and democracy.\textsuperscript{55} Turkey’s military and geopolitical hard power capacities have begun to draw attention. Turkey’s strategic buffer state capacity to contain ISIS, to manage the refugee crisis, and to contain Iran and its regional power aspirations have become more important than its soft power capacities.\textsuperscript{54}

The fifth principle is adherence to a \textit{multidimensional foreign policy}. Turkey’s relations with other global actors aim to be complementary, not in competition. Such a policy gives priority to Turkey’s strategic relationship with the United States, through the two countries’ bilateral strategic ties and through NATO. It considers its EU membership process, its good neighbourhood policy with Russia, and its synchronisation policy in Eurasia as integral parts of a consistent policy that serve to complement each other. This means that good relations with Russia are not an alternative to relations with the EU. Nor is the model partnership with the United States a rival partnership against Russia.\textsuperscript{55} Only Turkey can play this important role because of its geopolitical and geostrategic location connecting both continents.
Turkey’s multidimensional foreign policy has been firmly established, and has been largely successful. One of the threats to this policy came when the relations with the United States were expected to collapse in 2007. A serious problem with the United States seemed imminent, due to the developments concerning the Armenian resolution and the Iraqi situation. On 17 October, 2007, the Turkish Parliament voted in favor of allowing the Turkish Armed Forces to take military action against the Kurdish forces based in northern Iraq, openly opposing the U.S. Later that year, Turkey recalled its ambassador to the United States after the House Committee on Foreign Affairs passed a United States resolution on the Armenian Genocide in the Ottoman Empire. Nevertheless, by the end of 2007, Turkish-American relations had evolved such that both sides emerged with a better understanding of each other; channels of communication continue to remain open on both sides. After the on-again, off-again relationship between the United States and Turkey, it is worth emphasising their latest agreement over the Kurds in Syria in June 2018. In regard to the EU, although the integration process has slowed down, a serious deadlock was avoided and the process was not suspended. The relations with EU have not progressed at the desired level, sometimes have deteriorated, but Turkey and EU interests are intertwined.

As a reaction to the shaky relationship with the West, an institutionalized pattern of relations with Russia emerged. Ankara’s closeness with Moscow strengthens the former’s political leverage against the U.S. and European countries with which Turkey currently does not enjoy good relations. Ankara’s procurement of Russia’s S400 missile system is not only a military move, but also a diplomatic one, sending a strong message to its Western allies. Russian - Turkish rapprochement also helps relations between Ankara and Tehran. Iran, Turkey and Russia have become the three guarantors of the Astana talks, aiming to solve the Syrian conflict politically.

This principle seems more immune towards the latest changes, as Turkey continues its quest for a great power. One good example is Turkey’s multidimensional foreign policy with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN): A. Selvarajah, Singapore’s ambassador to Turkey, in an exclusive interview with Anadolu Agency said: ‘In the past, Turkey has focused on its European accession and European membership. But today Turkey wants to also look beyond Europe to other parts of the world. Turkey’s strategy of having a multidimension-
al foreign policy is kindly welcomed by the ASEAN countries. Thailand’s ambassador, Suwat Chirapant, said that ‘ASEAN was a huge market with over 600 million people, and we are looking for Turkey to be a hub connecting China, India, Japan and Korea with Europe, Africa and the Middle East’.\textsuperscript{56}

However, despite this successful policy, Keyman emphasizes that ‘considering the multidimensional policy, the present nature of involvement seems to be more focused, selective, and globally limited’.\textsuperscript{57} He highlights that there is a transition from Proactivism/Regional-Global Engagements to Proactivism/Selective Engagements, dictated by the context in which Turkey finds itself and responding to ‘anticipatory, change-oriented and self-initiated behaviour in specific situations’.\textsuperscript{58}

After the change of nature in the international context, Turkey continues to pursue a balanced, multidimensional foreign policy instead of its traditional relatively western orientation. The current dimension is partly dictated by the rejection of EU and strained relation with the US. Turkey does not accept the ‘privileged partnership’ offered by Germany and France, and has been defiant to many U.S. policies. This new context has led ‘Turkey to search for new alternatives’.\textsuperscript{59} As this TFP principle continues to adapt to the new context, we can refer to Davutoglu, as follows:

There is no longer a Euro-centric cultural life. China and India are rising with their own culture; Islamic world is becoming more culturally vibrant, Africa is rediscovering itself, and creating an African consciousness modernisation is increasingly multidirectional; the angle between modernisation and westernisation is getting steeper. New power centres are emerging; Turkey with its geography, history and culture, is a candidate to be one of these new centres.\textsuperscript{60}

**Conclusion**

Finally, there is a significant shift in the foreign policies of Turkey, after Davutoglu’s exit from Turkish political scene, meaning that he had an undeniable effect on TFP. His departure coincided with an era of changes in internal and foreign policy. During the time when Davutoglu was influential in Turkish foreign policy, Turkey managed to follow five specific principles that were used to determine its relationships with neighbouring countries and the world at large. We have noticed that these principles are undermined, as Turkey has recalibrated the
foreign policies, especially after the year 2015. For instance, Davutoğlu believed that for Turkey to have influence all over the world, it must first secure its borders and promote democracy. The current government does not tolerate criticism and has demonstrated anti-democratic policies, with the coup d’etat attempt and Kurdish issue being the main factors of the eroding security/freedom principle. Erdogan, embodying the Turkish establishment, has also departed from the ‘no problem’ policy, where Turkey sought to promote peaceful co-existence with its neighbours. The reason is because of the changing dynamics of international relations and the rise of regional powers such as Saudi Arabia and Iran. This change in policies is seen with the conflicting relationships that Turkey is having in the Middle East, as well as disagreements on many issues with the European Union and the United States. The relationship of Turkey with these countries has altered significantly, and so has their cooperation. Turkey’s position in the international community depends more and more on hard power to exert influence over its neighbours.

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Notes
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Identifying the Continuity Patterns in the Contemporary U.S. Defence Planning

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The article is aimed at analysing the U.S. contemporary defence and military planning from the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), developed in the 1990s and consolidated during the War on Terror, to the Third Offset Strategy that will guide the Pentagon’s efforts until 2030. It will be argued that this process of military innovation based on the legacy of the RMA and aimed at keeping the American military-technological edge while countering the Anti-Access/Area-Denial threats may inspire a new revolution capable of transforming the art of war while ensuring the country’s military supremacy up to 2050.

Keywords: United States, defence planning, revolution in military affairs, transformation, third offset strategy, American way of war

‘The United States is by its nature a technological nation. The American regime is a technical contrivance intended to achieve an unnatural end – peace and tranquility [...] technical solutions to the problems of war are as natural as bravery was to Spartans [...] For Americans, weaponry is even more essential than courage or leadership.’ With this evocative quote about the United States’ fascination with technology begins The Future of War, published in 1998 by George Friedman – founder of the
Stratfor strategic intelligence consulting firm and founder and chairman of *Geopolitical Futures* – and his wife Meredith. Based on the idea that smart weapons would revolutionize warfare and that US technological superiority would guarantee its future military supremacy, this book was written when the country was in an exceptional situation: its main antagonist had disappeared, Washington had been consolidated as the great pole of global power, the world would enjoy apparent peace and stability, many nations of the former Communist Bloc wished to integrate into the Western sphere, the American economy was once again taking off and its warfare hegemony seemed guaranteed by the achievement of a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) that claimed to set a cleaner, more effective, precise and resolute style of waging war.

However, many of those hopes vanished in Afghanistan and Iraq, the military occupation of which once again demonstrated the severity of war. Although the campaigns of Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrated the weaknesses of fighting in irregular scenarios and moderated the proclamations of the previous decade, they allowed the country to develop revolutionary technologies and produce smart weapons, drones or cybernetics, as well as to exploit new methods of warfare, to conceive joint operations in the ground, aerial, naval, space and cybernetic dimensions, and to identify the soldier as the weakest element in the war machine. Today, having consolidated the revolution, buried the War on Terror, popularized the technologies that made up the hard core of the past RMA while looking towards Asia-Pacific, the United States again seems to hear the siren songs of technology with the launch of the Third Offset Strategy, aimed at increasing the technological and military gap with its potential adversaries, replacing the traditional model of forward presence and power projection, capable of culminating in a new RMA, as the Second Offset Strategy did in the 1970s.

This article will analyze the US defence planning from the RMA developed in the 1990s and consolidated during the War on Terror to the Third Offset Strategy. This process of military innovation based on the legacy of the last RMA will guide the country’s strategic planning until 2030 and may inspire a new revolution capable of transforming the art of war. Thus, understanding that 1) defence policy is the dimension of national security which establishes the goals, sets the objectives, and provides the necessary means to guarantee the defence of the country
with military instruments, and 2) that defence planning is the process focused on defining and obtaining the force structure and the catalog of capabilities needed to meet national defence objectives with available resources, this article will analyze the configuration of the US defence planning and will highlight the continuity patterns between the RMA in the 1990s and the Third Offset Strategy that will guide the Pentagon’s efforts until 2030.

**Revolution**

The fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 triggered a succession of political changes that culminated in the collapse of the Eastern Bloc, the disappearance of the USSR, and the reconfiguration of the European map. Those great events marked the end of the bipolar international system, placed the United States at the top of a new world order, and forced it to restructure the defence policies of the old foes.

In this historical context, the US defence planning was marked by the payment of the ‘peace dividend’ or the reduction of military expenditure, demobilization of forces, and reorganization of units. It also entailed the configuration of the country’s post-Cold War strategic pillars (the articulation of a hegemonic order that would prevent another regional or global competitor from emerging) and the search for an RMA that promised to provide its armies with military dominance against any opponent, permitting to reduce both spending on defence and support the strategy of primacy that the Bush Administration would profile to build the new world order. Thanks to the information revolution based on the country’s technological and industrial leadership along with a focus on widening the military gap with its strategic competitors, this revolution seemed to be the solution to all the political, military and economic issues that the United States had to address after the end of the Cold War.

Considered as the paradigm of a successful military innovation, an RMA entails a profound change in the way of waging war that stems from the exploitation of new technologies, doctrines and forms of organization. This new catalogue of military capabilities renders the pre-revolutionary model irrelevant or obsolete and provides enormous superiority to the military that first achieves this revolution. However, it will be able to maintain this military superiority for a limited time, as with the passage of time new technologies will spread and its adversaries will try to emulate (to copy in an uncritical way), assimilate (adapt...
to their specific situation) or develop answers (either asymmetric or counter-revolutionary) to end this superiority.\footnote{10} \footnote{11}

Although there were numerous RMAs throughout history –from the reforms of Xenophon in the fifth century BC to nuclear war in the twentieth century– that have transformed the way we conceive of making war, the revolution that Washington sought in the immediate post-Cold War era and consolidated during the War on Terror\footnote{12} began to take shape in the 1970s, coinciding with the advent of the Information Age. Since then, computer science, the Internet, satellite communications, geolocation systems, and robotics or artificial intelligence\footnote{13} have been integrated into the militaries and have transformed their processes, practices, organization and capabilities. Its greatest advantages lie in providing a unique capability to acquire, filter and interpret unlimited amounts of information of military interest, share it with users who need it almost instantly and neutralize any possible threat with unprecedented speed and precision.\footnote{14} It is therefore not uncommon for sensors (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance or C4ISR), platforms (invisible to remote sensing or detection systems) and precision or smart weapons to be considered as the pillars of this revolution whose preliminary effects were observed in 1991.\footnote{15} \footnote{16} \footnote{17} \footnote{18} \footnote{19}

Although individually these technologies provide great improvements in the way to conceive, to plan and to conduct the operations, what is truly revolutionary is that all systems – as it can be observed nowadays with the connectivity between computers, smartphones, tablets and other electronic devices – are networked, allowing soldiers to know and control what happens around them, either by recognizing the terrain, identifying the threats, designating targets or beating targets based on their situation, threat or availability. This is the premise on which the concept of ‘system of systems’ is based, which, regarded as the essence of this RMA, allows to accumulate an immense amount of information on the area of operations, to turn it into useful intelligence data for the forces that operate on the terrain and immediately take advantage of it to beat the adversary.\footnote{20} \footnote{21} The ‘system of systems’ also laid the foundations of the ‘network centric warfare’, a new style of combating based on the use of small forces integrated in networks, organized in swarms, distributed on the battlefield and able to beat enemy targets before they realize they have been discovered.\footnote{22} Indeed, network centric warfare will not only be one of the central elements
of this RMA, but also of the Third Offset Strategy recently launched by the Pentagon, based on network interconnection and using swarms of land, marine, submarine, and aerial robots.\textsuperscript{23, 24}

In conclusion, the integration of sensors, decision makers, platforms, weapons, and forces into a network would not only improve the planning and conduct of operations, but also lay the foundations of a revolution that would occur when the armed forces implemented new capabilities aimed at exploiting the potential of the ‘system of systems’. Consequently, in order to achieve this revolution, not only should new platforms, sensors and weapons be acquired, or the existing systems be digitalized to conduct network centric operations, but new forms of action should be developed (joint, combined, rapid, decisive, expeditionary and effects-based operations and consolidation of the space and cyber domains), as well as organization (streamlining and flexibilization of command structures and networking the services), and leadership styles (decentralized tactical command and direct strategic control).\textsuperscript{25, 26, 27}

On the practical level, this revolution began to take shape after the Vietnam debacle in the aftermath of the crisis of the traditional American way of war, grounded on the country’s industrial capacity to sustain a long war,\textsuperscript{28} and the growing threat of war on the European front.\textsuperscript{29, 30, 31} This revolution was based on the dream of Undersecretary of Defence William Perry – who, between 1993 and 1997, served as the head of the Pentagon and whose work was essential to consolidate the RMA – ‘... to be able to see all high value targets on the battlefield at any time; to be able to make a direct hit on any target we can see; and to be able to destroy any target we can hit’.\textsuperscript{32} It was projected as a Second Offset Strategy\textsuperscript{33} that would alter the fragile balance of forces on the European Central Front in favor of NATO in the 1970 by harnessing Western technological potential to multiply allied military power by balancing the Warsaw Pact’s quantitative superiority without resorting to nuclear weapons in the event of a war in Europe. The revolutionary effects of these changes were identified by the Soviet General Staff\textsuperscript{34} in the 1970s and analysed in detail by the Pentagon in the 1980s.\textsuperscript{35} However, it was not until the spectacular triumph of the coalition led by the United States in the Gulf War of 1991 that this revolution reached worldwide fame.

Therefore, it is not surprising that this RMA seduced the American political, military and industrial class and articulated its defence
planning until the War on Terror. Not only did it seem to be akin to the American strategic culture, along with the promise to supplement the reduction of human, material, and financial resources due to the peace dividend with technology, but it also promised Washington the future warfare supremacy and the possibility of continuing to use military power as a foreign policy tool with little to no political, economic or social costs. In other words, ‘... this revolution in military affairs offers the United States the possibility of doing “more with less”, enabling it to maintain its military power even at a time of shrinking U.S. defence budgets.’

However, the Pentagon initially showed a lukewarm interest in this possibility because after the debacle of the USSR its main priority was to accommodate the strategic pillars of the country to the immediate post-Cold War and to outline a strategy of primacy that would preserve its future political hegemony. Only some key players, such as the Secretary of Defence Dick Cheney, Undersecretary Paul Wolfowitz and General Colin Powell (who would return to prominent posts in the George W. Bush Administration years later) and the armed forces – with the sole exception of the Navy, fearing that the RMA would render its formidable naval and anti-submarine fleet obsolete – joined in the discussions. They were attracted by the effects that this revolution could have on the country’s military strategy, its fighting style, or because they could use it as a weapon in its internal struggles for the allocation of resources and political influence in a situation marked by the financial crisis and the collection of the ‘peace dividend’.

It was not until 1993 – coinciding with the conceptual consolidation of the RMA and the elaboration of the Bottom-Up Review, the first major revision of the US post-Cold War defence policy – that the Department of Defence not only began to consider using the possibilities offered by the revolution to solve some of the strategic issues that the country had to face, such as maintaining the capacity to fight in two geographically separate conflicts (Korean Peninsula and Middle East) with a smaller force structure than that maintained during the Cold War, but also started the search for this revolution, which was considered increasingly fundamental for maintaining hegemony both on the battlefield and in international affairs.

Three years later, the Pentagon sponsored the revolution with the publication of the Joint Vision 2010. This guide for the development of military capabilities planned for 2010 confirmed its existence, and set
the course for achieving this revolution that promised to inaugurate a ‘new American way of war’ that, based on the US technological edge, full knowledge of the battlefield and the ability to conduct precision attacks from great distances, would allow the country to obtain fast, clean and decisive victories against any adversary. In 1997, the political class did the same with the first Quadrennial Defence Review. This roadmap that drove the defence policy of the second Clinton administration (1996-2000) not only recognized its existence and supported the pillars of the revolution identified by the military elite, but understood that its achievement was vital to facing future dangers and contributing to American political hegemony well into the 21st Century.

To this end, it was proposed to take advantage of the ‘strategic pause’ to develop and implement revolutionary capabilities, to accommodate the country’s military architecture to future risks, and to modernize selected legacy military platforms to maintain sufficient forces to participate in any conflict that could be unleashed while designing the army of the 21st Century. This process, aimed at achieving the revolution and preparing the American defence framework to meet the risks and threats that could materialize in the first decades of the third millennium, was called ‘Transformation’.

Although this roadmap considered it essential that the United States transform its military power to achieve the revolution and prepare for an uncertain future, the timidity of the proposed changes in the structure of forces and in the catalog of military capabilities; the low budget allocation for the development and acquisition of new capabilities (the initially proposed expenditure objective was never achieved) and the high participation of its armed forces in peace operations and crisis management (which in the face of the Republican Congressional refusal had to cover expenses with funds initially earmarked for modernization and training), de facto paralyzed the transformation until George W. Bush reached the White House.

Transformation

The election of the former Governor of Texas, George W. Bush, as the President of the United States was the definitive impulse to the RMA. Captivated by the promises of the revolution, advised by some of his staunchest supporters and aware of its role in supporting the shaping of the 21st Century world order, President Bush and his Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld outlined an ambitious transformation pro-
cess aimed at achieving the revolution by 2015-20 while preparing the US defence architecture to meet the emerging challenges. To this end, not only did they design a security policy that would bury the warfare paradigm of the Cold War, but they also set the defence transformation – from the force structure, catalogue of capabilities, and military deployment patterns to the organization, operation, administration, and financing of the Pentagon – as one of the top priorities of the Republican Administration.54 55 56 57

However, transformation replaced the revolution as the framework for US military planning, as witnessed by the Quadrennial Defence Review following the events of September 11.58 This fateful date not only ended the ‘strategic pause’, initiated after the end of the Warsaw Pact and marked the beginning of the War on Terror whose effects still continue, but it also forced the White House to rethink its defence policy by convincing it of the extreme urgency of accommodating its security architecture – a huge, rigid and bureaucratic structure still anchored in the Cold War paradigm – to the 21st Century, accelerating its transformation and allowing it to test the revolution.59

Grounded on the search for Osama bin Laden, the dismantling of Al Qaeda and the Afghan and Iraqi military campaigns, the War on Terror served to uncover the limitation of US military power, to break the apparent unipolarity of the post-Cold War international order and facilitate the rise of new powers capable of limiting influence and disputing regional hegemony of the United States.60

The baptism of fire of the new American way of war took place in Afghanistan, where a small force specifically formed for Operation Enduring Freedom, with permanent close air support, collaborating with the Northern Alliance, equipped with modern technologies and using sophisticated tactics overthrew the Taliban regime, isolated Al Qaeda in the mountains and in neighboring Pakistan and established a transitional government in just over a month. This victory surprised the Pentagon, which preached that the way the war was waged was an unmistakable sign that the revolution was about to consolidate. Thus, it proposed to accelerate the transformation.61 62 63

A few months later, preparations for Iraq’s invasion began. Determined to overcome the shadow of Vietnam embodied in the Weinberger-Powell64 doctrine, Rumsfeld developed a plan of operations that would exploit the revolution and drive the transformation. After a brief deployment and concentration of forces, a joint ground-am-
phibious force with permanent air support paralyzed the Iraqi government, causing a total confusion in its armies, nullified the military opposition, and achieved a stunning, overwhelming, and seemingly decisive victory in a few weeks.65 66

Both triumphs seemed to validate the preliminary results of the RMA, the potential of the military transformation and the effectiveness of the new American way of war. However, following the transition from major combat operations to stabilization, factors such as the small volume of forces used,67 armaments employed, limited training in stabilization, reconstruction or counter-terrorism, limited knowledge of both countries or the lack of intelligence grid on the ground;68 combined with the absence of coherent plans for peacemaking or the incorrect decisions taken after overthrowing both regimes, helped an insurgency breakout that jeopardized local authorities and forced Washington to wage a long, controversial, and costly war.

The emergence of the insurgency – as it happened in Vietnam decades before – caught the Pentagon, which, seduced by technology, had forgotten that war is a clash of opposing wills and that any actor tries to exploit its opponent’s weaknesses, fights with the means it has at its disposal and uses the strategies that provide greater revenues. Thus, faced with the technocentric US military style, the Afghan and Iraqi insurgencies conceived responses that exploited the limitations of the American way of war and the vulnerabilities of the advanced societies. Among these weaknesses one can stress the volatility of domestic public opinion and the pressure of the international community; the fear of human loss and collateral damage; the subjection to restrictive and anachronistic war customs; the anxiety about political costs and electoral effects of operations; the requirement to restrict its scope, impact and duration; the reluctance to use ground forces in operations or the need to use force in a limited and restrictive way.69

Not only did the insurgency reveal the shortcomings of the new American Way of War in low-intensity environments and the limitations of RMA’s technocentric model, but it also showed how difficult it is to pacify hostile territories, the human and material costs involved in any imposed change of political regime or new operational requirements motivated by participation in both campaigns.70 71 72 These factors motivated the abandonment of the revolution in the US military agenda and a change of direction of the military transformation – from preparation for future conflicts to resolution of the present problems –
that the services adopted immediately but that was not formalized until the *Quadrennial Defence Review 2006*, which laid the groundwork for Bush’s second term and the appointment of Robert Gates as head of the Pentagon.\textsuperscript{73, 74}

This strategic turnaround led Gates to focus on conducting the Afghanistan and Iraq campaigns and building adequate capacities for post-conflict stabilization, national building, or counter-insurgency during his tenure at the Pentagon (2006-11). This was accomplished through adjustments in defence planning (prioritizing the resolution of identified problems), military programming (redefining, slowing down or deferring the purchase of the big ticket programs to free up funds that would allow the acquisition of other materials needed for present missions\textsuperscript{75}), expenditure structure (defraying ongoing missions and maintaining training standards and modernization plans) and force structure (by increasing Army and Navy personnel, reconvert ing artillery units into infantry units, increasing special operations forces, civil-military cooperation units, rethinking deployment cycles or regulating the presence of military contractors); and consolidated with the signing of the *Defence Directive 3000.07* of 2008, which placed irregular war on the same level as the conventional one and required the services to implement all changes necessary to efficiently fight in both types of conflict.\textsuperscript{76, 77, 78, 79}

However, the elimination of Osama bin Laden allowed President Barack Obama to redefine the War on Terror,\textsuperscript{80} to advance the withdrawals from Iraq (2011) and Afghanistan (2014, postponed until the situation improves); and to replace the current strategic model with a new framework that will guide defence planning over the next decades. It is conditioned, therefore, by the lessons learned from ten years of war – especially by the shortcomings of a force prepared to fight against technologically advanced opponents when having to wage an irregular war and the limits of the American way of war – as well as by the current domestic and international situation, which again focuses on maintaining the warfare supremacy against any future enemy by launching a new process of military innovation capable of motivating a new RMA.

While the War on Terror has had dire effects on US policy and international security, revealed the limits of its military power and facilitated the consolidation of new regional powers capable of competing with Washington, it has also once again demonstrated the
country’s unbeatable conventional superiority, exposed the military gap with its competitors, and has matured revolutionary technologies and capabilities (especially drones, robotics, and cyber) to the expected Revolution in Military Affairs which has been a great qualitative leap in the art of war, since the United States’ way of fighting today has little to do with its past.\textsuperscript{81} 82 83 84 Despite this, American military supremacy no longer seems so large due to the diffusion of technologies that articulated the past revolution and its integration into asymmetric and hybrid strategies; the economic crisis, which has forced to reduce the total cost of defence\textsuperscript{85} as well as the War against Terror, which has consumed vast resources, eroded the military institution, forced to develop capacities of limited utility for high intensity conflicts and prevented implementation of the major modernization programs projected in previous years.\textsuperscript{86} 87 Although this new model more closely related to the American strategic culture began to be articulated in early 2012 with the presentation of the Defence Strategic Guidance,\textsuperscript{88} 89 it was consolidated in late 2014 with the launch of the Third Offset Strategy.\textsuperscript{90}

**Offset**

Based on the legacy of the RMA and the technological leadership of American industry,\textsuperscript{91} this process of military innovation seeks to address the strategic issues that Washington must face after the War on Terror and to maintain – as it has promised the previous revolution in the immediate post-Cold War – the level of military ambition with less economic, human or material resources and greater political constraints, as well as to widen the capacity gap with its potential adversaries. More specifically, it is intended to increase the country’s capacity to project its military power in anti-access and area denial (A2/AD)\textsuperscript{92} environments, to reinforce conventional deterrence and to impose a high opportunity cost on potential adversaries seeking to compete with the country in technological matters.\textsuperscript{93}

Since the Gulf War of 1991, the country’s potential adversaries have studied the characteristics of the new American way of war and have been equipped with technologies (C4ISR systems to digitalize the battlespace, smart weapons to accurately beat the enemy targets and stealth or unmanned platforms to enter risk areas), and capabilities (joint action, network centric warfare, special operations forces or cyberwar) linked to the RMA.\textsuperscript{94} 95 96 On the other hand, they have also developed responses – such as A2/AD measures – to prevent Washing-
ton from projecting its power and exploiting its technological-military potential. In the words of former Secretary of Defence Chuck Hagel: ‘... We are entering an era where American dominance on the seas, in the skies, and in space – not to mention cyberspace – can no longer be taken for granted. And while the United States currently has a decisive military and technological edge over any potential adversary, our future superiority is not a given’. More specifically, the Pentagon considers that it faces four major problems when it comes to projecting its military power:

- The vulnerability of facilities where US forces are stationed, such as the bases of Guam (United States), Diego Garcia (United Kingdom) or Okinawa (Japan) to Chinese missiles, thus compromising the model of advanced presence and power projection.
- US opponents are fielding C4ISR systems capable of detecting, identifying and following any American movement over great distances.
- Non-stealth aircrafts, which represent the bulk of the country’s air fleet, are increasingly vulnerable to advanced enemy air defences.
- Satellites, and thus the capabilities they provide, from global positioning and navigation to intelligence, observation or communications, are increasingly vulnerable to physical or cyberattacks.

In other words, the diffusion of the capabilities that provided the country with post-Cold War supremacy and laid the foundations of the RMA, together with the development of A2/AD means specifically designed to limit the country’s military superiority, are increasing the vulnerability of forward bases, surface ships, manned aircraft or space satellites. This reduces the military gap produced by the RMA, and reduces the utility of the paradigm of presence and power projection, effective since the dawn of the Cold War. And when this happens, its conventional deterrence model will be compromised, the impact of its advanced presence on regional stability will be limited and its superpower role will be damaged. As a result, Washington’s allies - particularly those in the Asia-Pacific or the Middle East - are likely to question the country’s ability to defend them in case of need, leading to a security dilemma likely to trigger new weaponry proliferation and even transform the current system of alliances.
Consequently, the Third Offset Strategy is based on the legacy of the contemporary RMA and the American scientific and technological potential to redraw the military divide between Washington and its opponents, guarantee the capacity to project its military power to any point on the globe and reinforce the security commitments between the country and its allies.

To achieve these objectives, the Pentagon will draw two lines of action: on the one hand, it will exploit the supremacy that the United States maintains in key military capabilities of the recent RMA, such as unmanned operations, naval and air operations to large distances, stealth operations, submarine warfare or engineering and systems integration to ensure, with a smaller but more advanced army, the advanced presence and power projection in A2/AD environments while reinforcing its strategic leadership and forcing its opponents to embark on arms race that they probably will not be able to follow, as in the case of the Second Offset during the Cold War. On the other hand, it will prioritize conventional deterrence by denial (reducing the enemy’s perception of their ability to achieve their military objectives) and deterrence by punishment (by ensuring the ability to retaliate against high-value targets to show that any disruption of the status quo will have an unaffordable cost for the attacker). In any case, if it cannot avoid aggression against US interests or its allies, Washington must be able to respond quickly and decisively to stop the attack, to force the cessation of hostilities or to achieve an undisputed victory over the enemy.

In conclusion, with the Third Offset Strategy, the Pentagon will try to:

- Combine legacy capabilities (Cold-War systems or those that have been used ever since) with the development of new materials and operational concepts that allow the country to combat the full range of operations in multiple operations theaters concurrently.
- Reduce US dependence on forward naval, air and ground bases.
- Protect itself against the loss or degradation of satellites.
- Take advantage of the global presence of its air and naval forces, the responsiveness of its aviation and missiles and the effectiveness of its unmanned platforms.
- Exploit precision strategic strike capability to threaten any enemy target inside or outside the theater of operations.
• Lead a new arms race by exploiting the technological-military areas that lead the country (such as drones, artificial intelligence, cyberspace, submarine warfare, strategic attack, systems integration) and where its opponents still lack the necessary know-how.

• Use alliances between the country and its allies and friends to strategically position itself and share regional defence costs and responsibilities.

Developed as the answer to the strategic questions that surround the United States, the Third Offset Strategy will guide US defence planning until 2030. However, taking into account that it may be implemented in a restrictive budgetary environment, even President Trump has promised to boost the military spending and rebuild the military\textsuperscript{107} and several modernization projects cannot be deferred (nuclear arsenal, anti-missile shield, satellites or cyber capacities),\textsuperscript{108,109} the Pentagon will try to combine, as much as possible, the material assets inherited from the Cold War or those that have been used since 1991\textsuperscript{110} with the development of new systems – strategic stealth drones, new stealth bombers, combat robots, cyber weapons, C4ISR systems or electromagnetic guns – which will become the technological strands of the future wars.\textsuperscript{111,112}

Although this strategy will possibly guide US defence planning until 2030, its development – and more specifically the acquisition of material means the acquisition of the necessary enablers or the research of revolutionary technologies – in a context marked by the scarcity of financial, human, and material resources, will require implementing unpopular measures that will raise controversies between the political and industrial class and corporate resistance in the military. On the one hand, the structure of forces, the catalog of capabilities, deployment patterns and institutional balances among the three armies set by the \textit{Quadrennial Defence Review} for the period 2014-19\textsuperscript{113} should be transformed. On the other hand, the Pentagon’s spending structure should be reconsidered in order to guarantee the financing of the Third Offset armament programs. The development and acquisition of these projects will require funds to be obtained by reducing the structure of forces, rationalizing infrastructure, processes and programs, outsourcing services or suspending – as a step prior to the definitive withdrawal – modernization plans for all those materials deemed obsolete within the new strategy, unable to survive in A2/AD environments, such as
Conclusion

Despite enormous changes in the international scene since the end of the Cold War, the Pentagon’s reflections have revolved around technological innovation as the engine of military change and its defence planning has been grounded – apart from the War on Terror, which altered the initially proposed order of priorities – in maintaining a military-technological gap with its potential adversaries as a tool to achieve military supremacy and political hegemony. This techno centrism cannot be explained only by the technological and military leadership of the country or by the innovative capacity of its military-industrial complex, but by a strategic culture that prioritizes the search for technological solutions to any strategic, operational or tactical problem that surrounds the country.

In this context, in the immediate post-Cold War period, US defence planning was marked by search for a revolution that based on the application of information technologies in the field of defence not only promised to contribute to the peace dividend and to solve the strategic issues of the country once the Soviet threat disappeared, but also to extend its supremacy against any of its future adversaries. Although the campaigns of Afghanistan and Iraq revealed the new face of the war and exposed the limitations of the new American style of fighting, these conflicts also allowed accelerating the transformation to achieve the revolution. However, while Washington was articulating this change in the way of combat, the technologies associated with this revolution – smart weapons, drones, C4ISR systems or cybernetics – spread globally, access to them was democratized and many countries emulated the US military model, attempted to assimilate the revolution and adapt it to their needs or conceive measures to end the superiority of this RMA.

Today, once the War on Terror has been stopped and with a focus on the Asia-Pacific region, the Pentagon has launched a new process of military innovation capable of motivating a new RMA. Based on the country’s technological capabilities, focused on ensuring access to any part of the globe regardless of an enemy’s A2/AD measures and aimed both at enhancing the links with its allies and partners and forcing potential competitors to initiate arms race that its military-industrial
complex should not be able to follow in the short-medium term, the achievement of the Third Offset Strategy will not only motivate the development of new operational concepts, new military capabilities and new styles of planning and conducting operations, but it will also consolidate a new RMA.

However, by refocusing its attention on technological supremacy as a tool to guarantee political hegemony and to steer the strategy towards China, the United States not only runs the risk of forgetting the lessons of the War on Terror and obviating foreign strategic tendencies unconnected to high politics, but also of turning a hypothetical conflict between Washington and Beijing into a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Time will eventually tell how this new process of military innovation is configured and consolidated, and if successful, how it will motivate a new revolution in military affairs that will bring a new leap in the art of war.

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Notes


4 Posen states that any policy of primacy rests on technological superiority that allows power projection in the common spaces (oceans, air, space and...
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cyberspace). Not only has this idea been present to this day, but it also is latent in the Third Offset Strategy recently set by the United States to expand its future military gap with its competitors (Barry Posen (2003), ‘Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony’, International Security 28(1), pp. 5-46).


8 It is generally considered that any military innovation has three components: it changes the way in which military forces operate in the field; it is significant in scope and impact, and it is tacitly equated with greater military effectiveness (Adam Grissom (2006), ‘The Future of Military Innovation Studies’, Journal of Strategic Studies 29(5), pp. 905-934). Although an innovative action can take place both in peacetime and at war, it is more likely to come up during a war either because a conflict tests previous approaches or it forces adaptation to war surprises, as it happened in the case of the RMA (Serena Chad (2011), A Revolution in Military Adaptation, Washington DC: Georgetown University Press; Guillem Colom (2008), Entre Ares y Atenea: el debate sobre la Revolución en los Asuntos Militares, Madrid: Instituto Universitario General Gutiérrez Mellado).


12 Although the latest study on this RMA situates its consolidation between the years 2025-35 (Barry Watts (2011), The Maturing Revolution in Military Affairs, Washington DC: CSBA), there is an enormous disparity of opinions from those that consider that the revolution occurred in the eighties to those that consider that they will overlap in time (Colom 2008, pp. 147-51). However, the authors of the article consider that this has already occurred because the ways of fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan (normalizing the use of drones and smart weapons, conducting joint operations or exploiting cyberspace) are different from the past, as many potential adversaries of the country are endowed with the capabilities linked to the revolution, along with the fact that Washington has launched a new process of military innovation that could culminate in a new RMA.

13 Most of these technologies, such as Internet, GPS, drones, precision projectiles, stealth platforms or C4ISR systems had been developed by the Pentagon’s Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and were a part of the ‘Assault Breaker’ program, one of the pillars of the Second
Offset Strategy. To learn more about the close links between DARPA and RMA, see Richard Atta (2003), Transformation and Transition: DARPA’s Role in Fostering an Emerging Revolution in Military Affairs, Alexandria: IDA.


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Sloan (2002).

Friedman and Friedman (1998).

Although public opinion recalls this war with the images of precision-guided munitions reaching their targets and stealth aircraft penetrating enemy’s defences, precision weaponry represented only 10% of projectiles launched by the United States (contrasting with 70% employed in 2003) and 7% of stealth aircraft, which had to be permanently escorted by fighter-bombers (Andrew Cockburn (2015), Kill Chain: the Rise of the High-Tech Assassins, New York: Henry Holt & Co.; Peter Singer (2009), Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21st Century, New York: Penguin).


This concept was forged by Admiral William Owens, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff between 1994 and 1996, who argued that the technological pillars of the RMA already existed as they were the result of millionaire investments to confront the Soviet Union. However, the integration of all elements of forces into a ‘system of systems’, that would provide almost real-time information on everything that goes on the battlefield and allowing accurately beat virtually any target from great distances and with little to none collateral damage, was completely revolutionary.

David Alberts, John Garstka and Frederick Stein (1999), Network Centric Warfare: Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority, Washington DC: CCRP.


Watts (2011).

Colom (2008).


William Perry’s testimony to the US Senate Armed Services Committee (February 28, 1978).

The First Offset Strategy was launched in 1955 with the New Look of the US defence, which prioritized the use of nuclear weapons to reduce the total amount of the country’s defence and to counter the Soviet conventional superiority, which was reflected in the construction of an impressive atomic arsenal, the configuration of the nuclear triad and

34 Although the United States promoted this military innovation, the first to identify its revolutionary potential were the Soviet strategists, who articulated the concept of Military Technical Revolution to warn that these technological advances would allow the NATO to stop a Soviet aggression in Western Europe without the nuclear weapon, thereby altering the balance of forces on the continent (Adamsky 2008).

35 The potential existence of a Military Technical Revolution aroused the interest of the American analyst Andrew Marshall, whose influence would not only be vital to consolidate the RMA, but also to articulate the Third Offset Strategy (Andrew Krepinevich and Barry Watts (eds.) (2015), *The Last Warrior: Andrew Marshall and the Shaping of Modern American Defense Strategy*, Nueva York: Basic Books). Marshall, the mentor of several generations of defence analysts who have held key positions in the Pentagon and major think tanks in the country, led several task forces to work out whether these changes could transform the art of war and how Washington should proceed to achieve the revolution. The most influential group and supporter of the revolutionary theses brought together experts such as Fred Ikle, Albert Wohlstetter, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Henry Kissinger and Samuel Huntington (Alfred Ikle and Albert Wohlstetter (eds.) (1988), *Discriminate Deterrence*, Washington DC: GPO).

36 Defined as the set of objective factors (geography, demography, economy or history) and subjective factors (ideas, values or military tradition) that explain the perception that countries hold on the use of force or their predilection for a certain war style above another, strategic culture conditions national defence and military culture. In this sense, the US tends to be anti-intellectual, ahistorical, anti-strategic, optimistic, pragmatic, technocentric, industrial and mechanistic (Adamsky 2008). Consequently, the RMA and currently the Third Offset Strategy are adapted to its strategic culture.

37 Indeed, this revolution also seemed to be the solution to the problems of advanced societies at the turn of the century, such as the erosion of the citizen-soldier model and the end of universal conscription (that took place in the United States in 1973), the reduction of military spending, growing participation in crisis management operations, the need to preserve military supremacy in the face of future adversaries, and especially, it seemed to mend the growing difficulty of post-heroic societies to employ military force as political tool (Guillem Colom (2014a), ‘La revolución militar posindustrial’, *Revista de Estudios Sociales* 50, pp. 113-126).


43 Secretary of Defence Les Aspin’s Commencement Address at the National Defence University (June 16, 1993).
45 Joint Chiefs of Staff (1996), Joint Vision 2010, Washington DC: GPO.
47 Department of Defence (DoD) (1997), Quadrennial Defence Review, Washington DC: GPO.
50 Seen as the period between the demise of the Soviet Union and the emergence of a new global competitor, this concept was first officially used by Secretary of Defence Les Aspin in the Bottom-Up Review (1993). Widely used by the Clinton Administration to justify its defence decisions, it was heavily criticized by the opposition, which sought to take advantage of the apparent post-Cold War stability to transform the defence to achieve the RMA.
51 It is worth mentioning that, in order to fund the RMA the Revolution in Business Affairs was launched, based on the promotion of scale economies, centralization of the procurement processes, simplification and flexibilization of administrative procedures, the use of dual and commercial off the shelf (COTS) technologies or the outsourcing of services that would allow optimization of the defence management and guarantee the necessary funds to pay for the revolution (Ashton Carter and John White (2001), Keeping the Edge: Managing Defense for the Future, Cambridge: MIT Press).
53 Although this conviction can be observed in several public statements, his first pre-election speech in defence, written by Richard Armitage and delivered at the Charleston Military Academy (South Carolina), on November 23, 1999 is very significant (James Kitfield (2005), War & Destiny: How the Bush Revolution in Foreign and Military Affairs Redefined American Power, Washington DC: Potomac).
57 Department of Defence (DoD) (2001), Quadrennial Defence Review, Washington DC: GPO.
58 Bush’s security and defence program was outlined by the so-called Vulcans – a group led by Condolezza Rice and composed by Richard Armitage, Richard Perle, Dov Zakheim, Paul Wolfowitz, Scooter Libby, Robert Zoellick, Robert Blackwill or Stephen Hadley (Mann and Mann 2004) – and contains several of the proposals drawn by the neoconservative think tank Project for the New American Century in its controversial document ‘Rebuilding America’s Defences’ (Thomas Donnelly (dir.) (1999), Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century,
Washington DC: PNAC). More specifically, it called for the withdrawal of the forces deployed in peace operations, the limitation of interventions abroad to the defence of the national interest, the preparation of the armed forces to combat future conflicts, and the direction of the expenditure towards the construction of an anti-missile system and the transformation of security and defence architecture of the country (Kitfield 2005).

Codified in the *National Security Strategy* (2002), the War on Terror was removed from official jargon after Obama’s appointment and was replaced by *Overseas Contingency Operation*, used to prove missions’ spending, *War Against Al Qaeda* present in the *National Security Strategy* (2010) or *The Persistent Threat of Terrorism* stated in the 2015 edition.

60 Cimbala (2010).
62 In this regard, it is important to note the speech of Bush at the Charleston Military Academy (December 11, 2001), Rumsfeld’s words at the National Defence University (January 31, 2002) or the parameters on which the controversial exercise Millennium Challenge (2002) was articulated, which had to validate all the principles of the RMA and ended up suggesting the limitations of the new American way of war.
63 Elaborated by Secretary of Defence Caspar Weinberger in 1984 and refined by Chief of Staff Colin Powell in 1991, this doctrine suggests that the country’s armed forces should be used as a last resort above all with strategic objectives and defined political ends. Raised to avoid another Vietnam, it was dismissed by Rumsfeld as anachronistic, obsolete and restrictive.
65 To this end, it is important to note the statements of Secretary Rumsfeld and General Franks –commander of the multinational force in Iraq– before the Senate Committee on Armed Forces (July 9, 2003) or the speech of Under Secretary of Defence for Policy Paul Wolfowitz at the US Naval War College (June 20, 2003).
66 Estimates by military commanders set force levels between 100,000-150,000 for Afghanistan and 350,000-500,000 for Iraq. However, the invasion of Afghanistan began with just over 5,000 soldiers and that of Iraq with less than 100,000 due to Rumsfeld’s determination to exploit the new American Way of War.
67 Paradoxically, this allowed the controversial *National Security Agency* to become an indispensable player in both campaigns by providing huge volumes of phone and internet information about insurgent actors and consolidating the RMA’s cyber side.
69 Guillem Colom (2014b), ‘La seguridad y la defensa estadounidense tras la guerra contra el terror’, *Colombia Internacional* 81, pp. 267-290.
70 Tomes (2012), pp. 303-315.
Indeed, the reform of the military programming is one of the main challenges that the Pentagon must face due to the inflexibility, corporatism and lack of coordination of this model still anchored in the Cold War. Although the Revolution in Business Affairs was promoted in the 1990s, at that time an attempt was made—though without much success—to rationalize procedures, unify requirements, outsource management, increase competition, strengthen public-private partnerships, increase financial flexibility, use a spiral design to save costs on R+D or cancel obsolete programs (Ashton Carter (2014), ‘Running the Pentagon Right: How to Get the Troops What They Need’, Foreign Affairs 93(1), pp. 101-112).

Chad (2011).

Cimbala (2010).

Gates (2009), pp. 6-18.

This, in turn, will facilitate the consolidation of the concept of ‘hybrid warfare’, which combines the use of regular and irregular means while exploiting propaganda, information warfare or cyber operations, as can be observed in Ukraine (Rens 2016).

Although US strategic documents continue to underline the importance of combating international terrorism and Washington is leading the operations against Daesh, this mission is the fifth in the order of priorities outlined by the Quadrennial Defence Review (Department of Defense (DoD) (2014a), Quadrennial Defense Review, Washington DC: GPO, p. 61).


Colom (2016).

Martinage (2014).

In 2011 the Budget Control Act was signed into law which reduced the Pentagon’s base budget—the necessary item to ensure the Pentagon’s minimum operation—to $487 billion, a figure that might be reduced by half if the public deficit is not contained. In addition, a sequestration mechanism of an additional 7% was introduced that would be activated if government and opposition did not agree on spending, as happened in 2013. However, since then the base budget has increased as follows: $496,300B (2014), $497,300B (2015), $521,300B (2016), $521,800B (2017) and $574,500B (2018).


In fact, the content of this strategy—prepared by Obama’s Administration to present an adjustment plan prior to the 2013 budget debate and block the Republican Congress—has been formalized in the Quadrennial Defence Review (2014) and in the National Security Strategy (2015). In addition, on the military level, many of its provisions had already been suggested in the National Military Strategy (2011) and codified in the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (2012).
90 Department of Defence (DoD) (2014b), *The Defence Innovation Initiative*, Washington DC: GPO.

91 Although most of the technological advances traditionally came from the military – and in the US from DARPA – today many of the leading technologies (robotics, remote guidance, visualization, biotechnology, miniaturization, advanced computing and big data) come from the civil sector. In fact, this is the idea behind the *Long Range Research and Development Plan* (2014) that will support the technological proposals of US civilian industry to mature them and integrate them into the systems that will be essential to consolidate this strategy.

92 In general terms, while anti-access strategies are intended to hinder the deployment of forces in the theater, area denial strategies seek to not keep an opposing force out, but to limit its freedom of action within the operational area (Andrew Krepinevich, Barry Watts and Robert Work (2003), *Meeting the Anti-Access and Area-Denial Challenge*, Washington DC: CSBA). Although A2/AD measures have been a latent concern of American strategists since the Clinton Administration, proliferation of anti-aircraft systems, anti-ship missiles, cruise missiles, anti-submarine weapons and a wide range of asymmetric means by countries like China or Iran are forcing Washington to consider how to project power in these environments and launch the Third Offset Strategy.

93 Secretary Hagel's statement in Simi Valley (November 15, 2014).

94 Martinage (2014).

95 Horowitz (2010).

96 As stated in *The Third U.S. Offset Strategy and its Implications for Partners and Allies* (January 28, 2015), Deputy Secretary Robert Work – one of the main supporters of the Third Offset Strategy and maintained in his role by General Mattis – argued that these developments are summarized in nuclear weapons, anti-ship, anti-air missiles; long-range strike missiles; counter-space; cyber; electronic warfare and special operations capabilities.

97 Hagel's speech in Newport (September 3, 2014).


101 Although in the wake of increasing Russian assertiveness – in spite of Washington's numerous appeals to increase military spending and thus sustain its own security and support the transatlantic link – an arms race is deemed improbable in Western Europe, the United States is reinforcing its military presence in the region to ensure its commitment to its allies and partners.


103 Although the arms race is always mentioned, and especially 'Star Wars' initiated by Ronald Reagan, as one of the factors that contributed to the systemic crisis of the Soviet Union, it is necessary to remember that the Second Offset Strategy was crucial. In fact, Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, the top Soviet military authority between 1977 and 1984, warned that the new technologies (guided armaments, drones and C4ISR systems) developed by the United States would allow the Atlantic Alliance to defeat the Warsaw Pact without resorting to the use of nuclear weapons. Consequently, if
Washington succeeded in undermining the Soviet strategy of maintaining a larger volume of conventional forces than the ally, not relying on nuclear deterrence to ensure European security and the transatlantic link, the balance between the two blocs in the region would inevitably disappear. In addition, it was stated that Moscow lacked the technical skills, organization or industrial infrastructure needed to develop these technologies, and therefore could not compete with the United States in the arms race based on information technologies (Adamsky 2008, Kagan 2006, Atta 2003).

The role of the nuclear arsenal can be seen as the ultimate reason for national deterrence and pillar of widespread deterrence as the country’s commitment to the security of its allies is obviated. In this sense, although the American doctrine states that this type of attack could motivate an atomic response, the emphasis in the conventional means seems to suggest that the country tries to replace the extended nuclear deterrence with the conventional deterrence to avoid being involved in a nuclear conflict due to a limited crisis in Europe, the Middle East or Asia-Pacific.

Indeed, many weapon systems used then – such as the Mi-Abrams tank, the AH-64 Apache attack helicopter, the Tomahawk cruise missile, the F-117 Nighthawk and B-2 Spirit stealth bomber, or the AEGIS an anti-aircraft integrated naval weapons system, to name just a few – were the product of the Second Offset and formed the basis of the last RMA.


Department of Defence (DoD) (2014a).

Central Europe on Russia-Ukraine Conflict

Positions and Responses

Tetiana Sydoruk, Dmytro Tyshchenko

The article analyses the positions of the Visegrad Group and the Baltic countries on the Russia-Ukraine conflict that erupted in 2014. The public discourse about the Russian-Ukrainian conflict is affected by the following main factors in these countries: historical heritage, concern for their own safety, the current political situation, economic and financial interests of transatlantic relations. The authors prove that Poland, Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia are united by the perception that the Russian aggression in Ukraine is a threat to their national security, they support tough policy of anti-Russian sanctions on the international arena and assist Ukraine at the level of declarations and activities. Nonetheless, the level of their participation and support for Ukraine depends upon their actual capabilities and domestic and foreign policy priorities. Reactions of other V4 countries to events in Ukraine are more restrained. The evaluation of origins and consequences of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict by Slovakia, Hungary and the Czech Republic is mostly based on the context of personal political preferences of individual leaders, energy and, in general, economic relations with Russia along with the anti-liberal, anti-American and Eurosceptical rhetoric of some political forces.

Keywords: Russian-Ukrainian conflict, Ukrainian crisis, Central European states, sanctions, condemnation

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**Introduction**

Positions and interests of the Member States perform a significant role in creation and implementation of foreign policy of the European Union. This stems primarily from the restrictions associated with unanimity voting in the Council of the European Union and the European Council on the basic amount of foreign policy and security issues. In most cases, it is necessary to achieve consensus amongst the Member States on certain actions and decisions of the EU. However, such consensus repeatedly acquired forms of ‘rotten compromise’ significantly limiting the effectiveness of the joint activities. For example, very ambitious Polish-Swedish proposals upon an ‘Eastern Partnership’ had come to naught after the Member States in the EU institutions managed to reach a consensus. Otherwise, this could have made a great contribution to the current European Neighbourhood Policy. The position of the EU on the international stage is, therefore, often ‘the lowest common denominator’ and its elaborating process is long; the energy is being used to resolve internal disputes, rather than forming a strong common position in relation to other states. Consequently, the consensus is often the result of nothing more than a political compromise.

The positions of the Member States are very important for the formation of the EU’s comprehensive long-term strategy, which would aim at strengthening Ukrainian statehood and its integration into Europe and coherent EU policy towards Russia in the conditions of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Accordingly, it is crucial to understand the seriousness of the differences between the Member States and the instruments of influence on the current situation.

The Russia-Ukraine military conflict demonstrates weak cohesion of Europe to external threats. Its main reason is, without a shadow of a doubt, a divergence of interests of EU members in terms of their foreign policy priorities in general and towards Eastern Europe in particular. American realist Robert Kagan notes on this occasion:

> Even the Europeans of the 21st century, despite all the advantages of their union, unable to unite against a predator in their environment and, like in the past, willing to give at the mercy of the weakest to save their own (financial) skins.

In our opinion, such a verdict is exaggerated and perhaps premature. Although there are doubts and some EU countries do not approve, say,
increased economic sanctions and other restrictive measures towards Russia, the result in the end is clear – none of the Member States dared veto the joint action of EU position on these issues. The EU countries reaching a common position on rejection of the Russian actions in Ukraine and the imposition of economic restrictive measures in respect of common agreement of all 28 Member States is a significant achievement. On 21st December 2017, the Council of the European Union prolonged economic sanctions targeting specific sectors of the Russian economy until 31st July 2018.³

It has become, though, more difficult to maintain this consensus. Critical asymmetries have been growing between the Member States in the issue of continuation of the sanctions even without mentioning the imposition of new restrictive measures on Russia. No differences in the positions are as evident as in Central Europe, which seemingly would have showed similar assessment and a common response to the crisis.

The Visegrad Four countries and the Baltic States were surprisingly divided in relation to the conflict’s sides. Their reaction to the events in Ukraine was not unanimous despite the common history as Soviet satellites, and (for most of them) being occupied by Moscow in the twentieth century, the recent experience of their transformation, good understanding of contemporary Eastern Europe and Russia, geographical proximity to the conflict area, deep historic, cultural, social and economic ties with their neighbours in the East. Poland and the Baltic States took up the most rigid and principled position on the Ukrainian crisis, annexation of Crimea by Russia and the following military campaign in Donbas. Each state has its own internal motives for such behaviour associated primarily with their recent history. In contrast, the response of the Southern part of Central Europe to the events in Ukraine was more restrained. It ranges from cautious condemnation in Slovakia to clear pro-Russian voices in the Czech Republic and Hungary.

The debates in the EU on sanctions against Russia have deepened the differences between the countries of Central Europe, and particularly the Visegrad Four (V4) countries and the Baltic States. Warsaw, Tallinn and Vilnius are appealing to deepen restrictive measures against Russia and exclude it from the SWIFT system and even expressed willingness to supply weapons to Ukraine; Prague, Bratislava and Budapest openly declared their doubts about the effectiveness of
sanctions. Moreover, the countries have been pointing out the negative effects on their own and other EU countries, and strongly opposing the military assistance to Ukraine. It is clear that the factor of their energy and financial dependence on Russia plays an extremely important role here. Their post-war history, dependence on Moscow via Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance should have at least contributed, though, to a greater understanding of the potential threats from the Kremlin. The diversity of views and reactions from Central Europe casts doubt on its ability to act as an internal advocate for the eastern neighbours within the EU and weakens the EU’s ability to respond effectively to the spiral of violence in Ukraine.

The positions of the Visegrad Four and the Baltic countries during the crisis in Ukraine and the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and their role in shaping a common EU position on these issues have become the subject of attention of a number of authors. Anna Kyrydon and Serhiy Troian, Mihał Baranowski and Bartosz Cichocki analysed the position and activities of Poland towards both sides of the conflict. Vytis Jurkonis, Merle Maigre, Kristine Berzina studied the activities of the Baltic States. As to the Visegrad countries, Alfred Kramer, András Racz, Frank Markowic scrutinised the policy and stance of the V4 thoroughly and in general. Alexander Duleba, Mateusz Gniazdowski concentrated on the positions of separate countries of the group.

Even though the conflict in Ukraine is still ongoing and the approaches of the countries of Central Europe on it undergo certain modifications, the analysis remains relevant scientific task. In view of the above mentioned, in this article we aim to reveal the reasons and substantiate the factors underlying the different and often conflicting positions of the Visegrad Group and Baltic countries on the crisis in Ukraine and the Russia-Ukraine conflict. We focus on differences in political attitudes and public debate to assess causes of the conflict that range from the aggression of Russia (Poland, Lithuania) to civil war (Czech Republic) and approaches on the need of implications of EU sanctions against Moscow. We argue that the following main factors have the most effect on the public discourse on Russian-Ukrainian conflict in V4 and Baltic States: historical heritage, concern for their own safety, the current political situation, economic/financial interests, and transatlantic relations.

The article consists of three parts. The first part discloses the results of research on approaches of the countries that took the most
strict and principled position on the “Ukrainian crisis”, annexation of Crimea by Russia and escalation of the conflict in eastern Ukraine (Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia). In the second part, we provide results of this study on “Russia’s proponents” in V4. In the third part, we compare the differences between these two groups of countries. From there, the article clarifies the significant differences in political and public debates on the conflict in Ukraine, important nuances in the energy sector and economic relations with Russia, personal political preferences and priorities of foreign policy of the leaders of V4 and the Baltic states in relation to Ukraine and Russia. This may contribute to the discussion about how to resolve the conflict and the extension and the consequences of European sanctions against Moscow.

The Positions of Hawks
The earliest and most principled positions on the ‘Ukrainian crisis’, the annexation of Crimea by Russia and escalation of the conflict in eastern Ukraine were formulated by Poland, Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia. The positions were formed under the influence of various factors. The first component implies the states’ security. For these countries, the aggression of Russia in Ukraine has exacerbated the security situation in the Baltic-Black Sea region and raised questions about the security of the NATO member states via collective defence. Strong transatlantic ties are another essential factor that determines the formation of the positions of Poland and the Baltic countries on the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. It is important to note that the US presence in Europe is seen as guaranteeing peace, security and stability in the region. Accordingly, from the very beginning, it was important that the EU and the United States agreed on common positions and actions, including the issue of sanctions against Russia. The last but not the least important factor is that Ukraine is an important target country for Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in context of the Eastern Partnership. Moreover, the aforementioned Partnership was previously prioritised since the largest portion of aid for development was transferred to the countries of the Eastern Partnership. We will consider the positions and activities of each country in relation to the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

Poland
Poland has responded to the crisis in Ukraine since its early days. The Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius, the question of signing the
Association Agreement with Ukraine and prevention of further violence in Ukraine were central issues in Polish bilateral and multilateral negotiations with the Ukrainian government and its EU and NATO partners. Polish then-Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski, along with his French and German counterparts, was an intermediary in negotiations between the protesters and the President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych on 20th February 2014 aiming at ending the violence and encouraging the dialogue between Euromaidan and V. Yanukovych. However, despite its early activity and practical action, Poland was not included into the ‘Normandy format’, a framework of negotiations between Germany, France, Ukraine and Russia on tackling the Russia-Ukraine conflict established in June 2014 in Normandy, France, during the celebration of the 70th anniversary of Operation Overlord. The format operates mainly through telephone calls between the heads of states and respective foreign ministers.

Then-President Bronisław Komorowski and Prime Minister Donald Tusk, Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski and Defence Minister Tomasz Siemoniak condemned the annexation of Crimea and the Russian aggression in eastern Ukraine. B. Komorowski, in an interview with German radio stations on 30th August 2014, stated the Russian invasion in Ukraine, warned Europe on the policy of appeasement of Russia, supported sanctions against Moscow, and called for the strengthening the eastern flank of NATO.  

From then on, Poland has focused primarily on actions that could be implemented by the European and transatlantic organisations in response to Russia’s behaviour. Within the European Union, Poland supported the visa restrictions and economic sanctions against Moscow, and their expansion in response to the continuing military aggression of Russia against Ukraine; within NATO, Poland actively advocated for confirmation guarantees of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty through practical steps to strengthen the territorial security of the eastern areas of the Alliance. Poland defended the idea of increasing presence of the allied troops on the northeast side during the preparations for the NATO Wales Summit in September 2014.

Poland has allocated €100 million credit assistance to Ukraine and €2.5 million to the scholarship programme for students of the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, and Crimea (in 2015). More than $1 million was also provided as humanitarian assistance. The Polish government
also allocated €170 000 for treatment and rehabilitation of Ukrainian militants (85 people).\textsuperscript{15}

As to the military assistance to Kyiv, Warsaw did not take a clear position. It is willing to sell weapons to Ukraine but does not take any specific decisions on this matter. The continuous discussions on the weapon supply to Ukraine showed that when it comes to the military aspects of the conflict, the Polish reaction to the Russian invasion into Ukraine is not univocal.

Such situation caused a barrage of criticism of the government for allegedly drifting in the conflict in Ukraine. Namely, Poland agreed to limit its military assistance to Ukraine with non-lethal equipment, it postponed the entry into force the fourth chapter of the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU related to the deep and comprehensive free trade area, and more than modest results of the NATO summit in Wales. Zbigniew Bujak, one of the Solidarity leaders, labelled the passivity of the Polish authorities on Ukraine as ‘treason’.\textsuperscript{16}

The behaviour of the Polish Governments of D. Tusk and E. Kopacz followed a certain logic: Poland will not affect upon the resolution of the conflict in Ukraine, the best that the Polish government can do is act systematically with partners in the EU and NATO. As former Prime Minister Eva Kopacz said in her address to the Sejm on 1\textsuperscript{st} October 2014: ‘[…] it is important to prevent the isolation of Poland as a result of unrealistic targets set themselves’.\textsuperscript{17} Another statement was made by Grzegorz Schetyna, successor of Radosław Sikorski as foreign minister, towards the Sejm on 6\textsuperscript{th} November 2014:

The rush of isolationism and anti-Western sentiments and denial of European values will build a wall that will separate Russia from Europe. Critical assessment of the policy of Russia does not change the fact that we will remain neighbours and economic partners (p. 36).\textsuperscript{18}

This position is not surprising, taking into consideration that at the beginning of the first term, the Tusk government’s Eastern policy was based upon the fact that open scepticism towards the EU co-operation with Russia and too much ambition on EU relations with Ukraine could lead to isolation of Poland on the international arena, as it had been under the previous 2005-2008 government. Hence, the Polish government offered Russia a “normalisation” in 2008, hoping that it would return Poland in the mainstream of the policies of the EU and NATO and improve its position in these organisations. Some subse-
quent events may indicate that this assumption was correct, including the election of Tusk as President of the European Council.

Inauguration of the newly elected President of Poland Andrzej Duda from the opposition party ‘Law and Justice’ (won the second round of presidential elections on 24th May 2015) was held on 6th August 2015. The new president has declared its intention to make deep adjustments to the foreign policy of the country. Because of winning the parliamentary elections of 25th October 2015, the Law and Justice Party obtained the opportunity to form a government. The new Prime Minister was the party vice chairlady Beata Szydło.

Nonetheless, despite the drastic changes in the echelons of power, Poland has not changed geopolitical course towards Ukraine, as the country is its closest neighbour. In addition, Poland cannot conduct independent foreign policy because it is a member of the EU and NATO. However, one can still talk about some important changes in the Polish position on the situation in Ukraine. Firstly, Andrzej Duda put forward an initiative to expand the Normandy format by having Poland and possibly other countries join the negotiations. The reason for this is an idea of exhaustion (the need for optimisation) of the format and the need for continued negotiations. Secondly, unlike some other Western allies of Ukraine, Andrzej Duda believes the option of freezing the conflict in eastern Ukraine is completely unacceptable, because it would mean a permanent source of possible threat for Europe. Thirdly, the Polish President is consistent in his plans to return to the idea of ‘Intermarium’ (the concept of Józef Piłsudski) that is associated with creation of a confederation of the states of Central and Eastern Europe, the Baltic states, Ukraine and Belarus.

Taking into consideration circumstances where the Baltic and CEE countries are members of the EU while Ukraine is not even a candidate for EU membership, not to mention the sensitive international position of Belarus, it is evident that the prospects for the implementation of this project are quite bleak. However, despite the unsuccessful rhetoric the idea of strengthening co-operation, especially a military one between Ukraine and the CEE and Baltic countries, is very important. Fourthly, Poland’s position in relation to the Russian Federation looks now even tougher, less dependent on Berlin and more focused on the US. Fifthly, the “Law and Justice” party is largely Eurosceptic and insists on a stricter policy of Poland within the EU. This Euroscepticism has already affected the politics of Poland in the EU, as well Warsaw-Berlin
Therefore, the question is whether Poland can be an *advocate* for Ukraine in the EU in the absence of constructive relations with Brussels and Berlin. Finally, after “Law and Justice” came into power, disputes in bilateral relations with Ukraine have appeared in terms of disagreements on certain historical periods. On 22nd July 2016, the Polish Parliament (Sejm) adopted a resolution declaring 11th July a National Day of Remembrance of Victims of Genocide perpetrated by Ukrainian nationalists against Poles during World War II. As the resolution text says, ‘[…] citizens of the Second Republic were brutally murdered by Ukrainian nationalists’. The unprecedented cooling in relations between Poland and Ukraine in the entire period of the Ukrainian independence occurred after this resolution raises a question of whether the *advocate* of Ukraine in Europe become its ‘prosecutor’ and what consequences it will have for bilateral relations for the position of Poland on Ukraine and Russia in the conflict in eastern Ukraine.

Despite the importance of the official position of Warsaw, an extremely high level of support of Ukraine by the Polish public should be noted. Many Poles, journalists, politicians, diplomats, students, human rights activists and volunteers have become direct participants of Euromaidan and events in eastern Ukraine. According to surveys of the Transatlantic Trends Fund, 78% of Poles are in favour of economic assistance to Ukraine, 77% support sanctions against Russia, and 67% support aid to Ukraine, even if it increases the danger of conflict with Russia. Jarek Podwor ski, a member of association “Generation” in Katowice, organizer of humanitarian convoys to the Maidan and ATO combatants, points out:

In Poland, foremost the society worried about Ukraine, not the state ... We were collecting warm clothes and money to the Maidan and ATO. This was not done by the state, but by donations of ordinary Poles, private foundations and volunteers...

**Lithuania**

The active role of Lithuania during the crisis in Ukraine and in conditions of the Russia-Ukraine conflict is not accidental. Lithuania has been a supporter of Ukraine for many years for reasons that range from its own diplomatic ambitions to sincere belief that Ukraine has always been and should remain part of Europe. Lithuania defends the interests of Ukraine in various international organisations and supports it
on a bilateral level, as evidenced by numerous visits by politicians and senior Lithuanian officials in Ukraine. It is necessary to note an unprecedented participation of the Lithuanian civil society in Ukrainian events that started with local solidarity actions with the Euromaidan and later manifested in voluntary missions of doctors, charity concerts aiming to support Ukraine.

The substantial Lithuanian support for Ukraine is the logical result of its priorities and long-term efforts in the countries of the Eastern neighbourhood. Guided by the concept of “smart power”, Lithuania has been consistently increasing its international subjectivity and diplomatic capacity. Thus, even before it was one of the most outspoken critics of Russia’s actions in Georgia in 2008 and the main opponent of the EU to resume negotiations with Russia on a new agreement on partnership and co-operation after Russia failed its obligations according to the ‘Medvedev-Sarkozy plan’. On the eve of the Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius in 2013, Lithuanian diplomats were active in European capitals to provide the historical possibility of signing the Association Agreement with Ukraine, and in Kyiv, they were urging the same from the Ukrainian leadership. After the summit, Lithuanian politicians made some official visits to Ukraine: 4th December 2013 – the Speaker of the Lithuanian Parliament Loreta Graužinienė, 13 December – Lithuanian Foreign Minister Linas Linkevičius. Public support of the Ukrainians was also high. Many Lithuanians came to Kyiv on weekends during Euromaidan, and civil society organisations sent buses with solidarity groups and musicians with concerts in support of the Revolution of Dignity. Lithuania provided medical care for victims of violence in Ukraine. Government and individuals covered medical expenses of more than 60 Ukrainians, including treatment provided to Dmytro Bulatov, Head of Automaidan. Many other activists received long-term visas and some of them used the opportunity to escape in Lithuania and join solidarity actions there.29

Presiding in the UN Security Council, Lithuania initiated an emergency meeting on the crisis in Ukraine in February 2014 and subsequently remained active in this matter not only at the UN but also in the institutions of the EU, NATO, and OSCE. Lithuania unequivocally condemns Russian aggression against Ukraine, claims the responsibility for the events in Ukraine, accuses Russia of supporting terrorists, and insists on the recognition of LNR and DNR as terrorist organisations. Lithuania supports anti-Russian sanctions and their expan-
sion, and defends the introduction of a military embargo on Russia, criticises the ‘weak’ position of the West regarding Ukraine; declares possible introduction of national anti-Russian sanctions; is willing to supply arms to Ukraine and the Ukrainian military conduct training in Lithuania. Perhaps none of the European leaders can compete with Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaitė on the severity of comments addressed to Russia.

The President of Lithuania condemned the Russian invasion in eastern Ukraine in August 2014. She noted it was a breach of international peace and security and proposed to classify Russia’s actions as a war against Europe. ‘Russia is in a state of war against Ukraine and that is against a country which wants to be part of Europe. Russia is practically in a state of war against Europe’, stated the President before the European Council in Brussels. In an interview in November 2014, the Lithuanian President called Russia a terrorist state and said if Russia was not stopped in Ukraine, the aggression could spread to Europe: ‘[…] today Ukraine is fighting a war on behalf of all Europe’.

Lithuania allocated €50,000 to the NATO Trust Fund for Ukraine and provided assistance to the Ukrainian army for €43,500. The state provides monthly treatment and rehabilitation of Ukrainian soldiers and civilians from the Anti-Terrorist Operation Zone (ATO); supplies with helmets, body armour, bulletproof panels, dry rations and medical supplies for the Ukrainian military. Lithuanian humanitarian assistance to Ukraine exceeded 250,000 euro. Together with Poland, Lithuania created the Polish-Lithuanian-Ukrainian brigade “LITPOLUKRBRIG” (Ukraine – 545 soldiers, Poland - 3000, Lithuania - 150-350); it also trains members of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, joint military exercises and treatment of military personnel.

There are many reasons that explain this position of Lithuania. Despite the fact that it is part of the Euro-Atlantic community as a member of NATO and the EU, it has repeatedly felt pressure from Russia. This varied from attempts to influence individual politicians to numerous barriers in trade, business and communications on the border with Russia, not to mention the constant attempts to manipulate the historical memory of Lithuania.

Estonia

The first official reaction of Estonia to the “Ukrainian crisis” was made after the bloody clashes in Kyiv on 18th-20th February 2014. President
Toomas Hendrik Ilves issued a statement insisting on ceasing the violent situation in Kyiv and starting a political dialogue between government and opposition. He warned that Estonia was ready to support sanctions against those responsible for violence. In March 2014 in response to Russia’s actions in Ukraine, the National Council of Defence of Estonia at an extraordinary meeting called for strong countermeasures from the EU and NATO. A few days later, Foreign Minister Urmas Paet stated that Russia’s actions and threats against Ukraine violate the UN Charter and endanger peace and security in Europe. In the same month, the Parliament of Estonia adopted a statement in support of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine.

Estonia supports sanctions against Russia and has provided an assistance package to Ukraine in various European and Euro-Atlantic forums. In late August 2014, when a significant number of Russian combat troops entered eastern Ukraine, Toomas Hendrik Ilves insisted that it should finally dispel any doubts as to Russia’s participation in the conflict. In September 2014, he visited Kyiv to express support for the country towards political and economic reforms. The Estonian president during a meeting with Ukrainian leader said that the Ukrainian-Russian conflict is ‘a war between Europe and non-Europe… the conflict between different systems of value’. Among other things, he also said that Estonian hospitals were willing to take the treatment of seriously wounded Ukrainian freedom fighters. It is worth noting that previously Estonia had provided aid to victims of the protests on Euromaidan. Moreover, the government increased the number of available scholarships for Ukrainians in Estonian universities. Estonia treated 15 Ukrainian militants from the ATO area later and has allocated €120 000 for humanitarian aid (generators, sleeping bags, &c.).

Estonian President Thomas Ilves has repeatedly accused the West of allowing Russia annex Crimea and unleashing war in eastern Ukraine, in particular, in an interview to The American Interest. According to his statements, the Kremlin has stated its aggressive intentions numerous and used weapons to promote its interests in the neighbouring countries. The EU and the US did not respond to it and allowed the Russians to behave aggressively.

Latvia
Assuming the presidency of the Council of the European Union in the first half of 2015, Latvia gained an opportunity to contribute actively to
the formation of the EU response to the aggressive behaviour of Russia in Ukraine. However, one should note that the Lisbon Treaty, having entered into force in December 2009, slightly altered the institutional construction of the Union. The Presidency in the EU Council of Foreign Affairs is carried by High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the role of the Presidency in other configurations of the Council makes it impossible to directly influence the agenda of EU’s foreign policy.

Latvia’s approach to the events in Ukraine must balance two opposing aspects. On one hand, Latvia is experiencing possible risks of aggression and therefore must increase defensive measures. On the other hand, it has deep cultural and economic ties with Russia. Therefore, it is the most open to cooperation with Russia among the three Baltic countries in order to promote de-escalation in Ukraine and is less supportive of isolation of Russia.

Latvia strongly supports Ukraine’s sovereignty and its territorial integrity. The government condemned annexation of Crimea and considers the Russian aggression in Ukraine a threat to peace and stability in Europe. It also calls for greater NATO presence in the Baltic countries and supports sanctions against Russia. During the conflict in eastern Ukraine, Latvia provides humanitarian assistance and expert support to Ukraine (including treatment of Ukrainian wounded soldiers), provides seminars for government and civil society to combat corruption, and takes groups of children (12-17 years old) from the ATO area. Latvia insists on the need for a higher degree of protection of the Baltic States by NATO and welcomes the decision of the United States to place their forces in Latvia. Despite close economic ties, Latvia supported sanctions against Russia and ‘is fighting’ it in the information war.39

Latvia has not fully turned away from its big neighbour nonetheless. A large Russian minority has close ties with Russia and the two countries have very significant trade relations. Almost 30% of the Latvian population speaks Russian as a first language, but many ethnic Russians cannot vote in elections and have special status of non-citizen.40 As a result, while some political and business circles insist on a rigid position against Russia, others call to support economic and cultural ties with it. Actions of Latvia concerning Ukraine and Russia are more moderate than, for example, neighbouring Lithuania. In response to the declared willingness of Lithuania to provide Ukraine
with weapons, Prime Minister of Latvia Laimdota Straujuma stated that Latvia would support Ukraine ‘differently’. In fact, Latvia will maintain the economic and cultural doors open for Russia if the situation in Ukraine moves toward de-escalation.

The economic and infrastructural dependence on Russia largely influences the attitude of Latvia to the events related to the crisis in Ukraine and the Russian invasion. Gazprom owns 34% of the Latvijas Gāze national gas company, and Latvia is completely dependent on natural gas supplies from Russia. The economic impact of Russia spreads beyond energy. It is one of Latvia’s largest export markets. However, the government of Latvia supported the sanctions, despite the heavy losses that they can bring to the economy. Latvia has suffered greatly from the Russian embargo on imports of dairy products, meat, fruit and vegetables from the EU. Because of falling demand from Russia, the wholesale price of milk in Latvia decreased by 25% during the period from July to November 2014, while the price of butter and cheese went down at 10-20%. The market price of vegetables decreased by 30-50%. The Government notes the significant economic losses associated with sanctions but stressed the political significance of the latter. Prime Minister L. Straujuma warned that the worst scenario for Estonia is a 10% GDP fall if Russia breaks all economic ties with Latvia. She stressed that this is unlikely to happen, but if so, preserving of political sovereignty justified the economic difficulties: ‘We cannot retreat from the sanctions. [...] The independence is more important than the economic difficulties that we can overcome’.

Poland, Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia are united by the perception of the Russian aggression in Ukraine as a threat to their national security, support for tough anti-Russian sanctions policy in the international arena, assisting Ukraine at the level of declarations as well as the level of specific actions. However, the degree of participation and support for Ukraine depends on their actual capabilities, domestic and foreign policy priorities, and ranges from providing weapons to Ukraine (Lithuania) to a more moderate position (neighbouring Latvia). Within the EU and NATO, all four countries play the role of ‘hawks’, urging the West to actively resist Russia and to help Ukraine by all available means, including military assistance. In terms of strengthening their positions on the conflict resolution, Poland and the Baltic States should seek to strengthen regional dialogue within the New Europe, for example through the Visegrad Group, the Central European Initiative, or civil
society organisations. It is extremely important to achieve common understanding of the nature and consequences of Russia’s challenges for Europe and to co-operate more closely with Germany, which has taken a leading role in uniting for a common EU policy on the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Co-operation with the United States in order to coordinate their own positions and actions of the partners, and contribution to formation of a new EU policy towards Eastern Europe within discussions on the improvement of the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership are necessary as well.

“Putinverstehers” in Central Europe

Kremlin media is actively working in Central Europe and is shaping the views of a sizeable pro-Russia constituency in those countries. Russia managed to create a large reservoir supporters and sympathisers among extreme left and extreme right parties. According to Van Herpen, these “Putinverstehers” or “Putin apologists” help to the Kremlin’s propaganda offensive and “did not hesitate to condone Russia’s act of aggression”.

Hungary

The Hungarian government is much more pro-Russian than any other V4 country. There are two main aspects that could explain such Hungary’s position towards Russia. First of all, there is a profound level of economic relations with Russia, namely Russian investment. In order to overcome economic problems in the country’s economy and realising that the EU is not the best solution to resolve them, the government seeks to broaden its economic co-operation with non-European countries, namely Russia and China.

Hungary is also an opponent of sanctions against Russia largely because of its dependence on Russian natural gas (Hungary is more than 80% dependent on gas from Russia). Moreover, Russia is Hungary’s biggest trade partner outside the EU.

Another factor of such an alliance with Moscow is similar ideology. According to Viktor Orban, the Hungarian Prime Minister, the model of Western democracy is not efficient anymore and Turkey, China or Russia are good examples of it. The Russian annexation of Crimea was, according to Russian officials, caused by the desire to protect the Russian-speaking people who live on the peninsula. Orban shares the same point of view and the same ideology, expansionist nationalism: he often speaks about Greater Hungary that would include Hungarian
minorities living in the neighbouring countries – in Romania, Ukraine, Slovakia and Serbia. Mr. Orban also calls for autonomy of the Hungarian minorities in Ukraine that reach almost 200,000 ethnic Hungarians. In the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Budapest states that Ukraine cannot be stable without giving rights and autonomy to its minorities because Kremlin accuses Kyiv of discrimination against national minorities (namely Russians).47

Slovakia

According to Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico, diplomacy and politics are the only solution for the Ukrainian crisis with neither military action nor economic sanctions. It comes from long warm relations with Russia, and the economic factors are the key here because the energy industry of Slovakia is heavily dependent on Russia. Regarding the question of sanctions on Russia, Slovakia stands against but does not go against the unity of the EU and NATO: “In Crimea, we have witnessed a violation of international law. The current dialogue takes place in conditions of war and economic sanctions. Nobody wants that Russia suffers more”, says Fico.48 However, Mr Fico also said that he could not imagine any foreign soldiers being based in Slovakia.

Fico is one of the candid opponents of economic sanctions against Russia. He also rejected demands to increase military expenditure within NATO in view of Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine.49 In spite of the anti-sanctions rhetoric, the Slovak authorities approve all restrictive measures against Russia adopted by the EU.

The Russia-Ukraine conflict caused most Central European countries to increase their military budgets. Bratislava does not intend to do this thus because of very limited resources. According to the World Bank, the Slovak Republic allocated only 1 percent of its GDP to the Defence Ministry between 2011 and 2015.50 A lack of interest in defence will lead Slovakia to a greater dependence on Russia because Bratislava relies on aging Russian-made military equipment that will need to be replaced.

The President Andrej Kiska (in office since June 2014) has criticised the government for its uncertain position on the Ukrainian crisis. The public of Slovakia is also divided over the crisis. According to one poll, almost a half of the Slovak citizens (45%) are in favour of European integration of Ukraine. At the same time, 49% think that the EU should not impose sanctions on Russia.51 Parliamentary elections in March
2016 influenced the policy of official Bratislava towards Ukraine that is characterised by the consolidation of position of President Andrej Kiska (centre-right forces) and Prime Minister Robert Fico (ruling centre-left forces).

The migration crisis in the European Union also caused positive transformation of stereotypes about Ukraine and prompted the government to choose quite a critical position regarding the EU’s migration policy: In September 2015, Mr Fico complained about the unfair, complicated procedure for obtaining Schengen visas by Ukrainians, and meanwhile Brussels required Bratislava to accept refugees from the Middle East.52

Bratislava, during its presidency in the Council of the EU in the second half of 2016, sought to increase its international prestige and strengthen its influence on the development EU’s common policy towards Russia’s war against Ukraine. Slovak leaders count on effective co-operation with Ukraine as a non-permanent member of the Security Council, namely to co-ordinate measures to stabilise the security situation and promote democratisation in Eastern Europe and to support relevant projects in Ukraine and other participating countries in the Eastern Partnership as one of the main priorities of the future Slovak EU presidency.

Czech Republic
The position of Prague on the Russian-Ukrainian conflict is still ambiguous because it is a country of multiple policies.53 The Czech President’s stance towards the Ukrainian crisis is controversial that could be explained by his close association with the Russian political elites in spite of strong support of Ukraine by the government. According to President Miloš Zeman, there is a civil war in Ukraine. He even questioned the presence of Russian troops in Ukraine, but later admitted that there is ‘Russian aggression’ and ‘the invasion of Russian troops’.54 President Miloš Zeman also supported the idea of finlandisation of Ukraine, stating that Ukraine should not join NATO and must remain neutral.55

Czech authorities are trying primarily to defend the interests of Czech exporters, especially those linked to the Russian market and heavy engineering industries. Former Prime Minister Bohuslav Sobotka says the sanctions have not produced positive results so far, while their expansion severely hit the Czech economy. In his opinion, the
Czech Republic cannot lose the Russian market, because if so, Chinese products will occupy their place and then a return to the Russian market after the end of the conflict will be impossible.⁵⁶

Many Czech officials and experts think that the biggest weakness of the ‘Minsk process’ is the representation of the West by the two largest trading partners of Russia – Germany and France, and two guarantors of the Budapest Memorandum⁵⁷ – the UK and the US. Moreover, there are different tools used in the peace-making (and keeping) process: Russia considers the Minsk Agreements as instruments of its hard power, aggressive political and military pressure on Kyiv aiming at ‘freezing’ the conflicts. The EU views the agreements as solutions for the conflict in a peaceful way, by soft power instead.

As to sanctions, Prague occupies a ‘betwixt and between’ position. The Czech Republic stands against economic sanctions against Russia in general; however, it actively supported the first two rounds of the sanctions. Moreover, it stopped the Rosatom-led Temelín nuclear project.⁵⁸ With relation to NATO, Prague supports strengthening of the Alliance’s positions in the Baltic States. Hence, the Czech Republic is much more committed to the common stance of West against Russia’s military aggression than neighbouring Hungary or Slovakia.

Common and different positions of the Visegrad Four countries and the Baltic States

Visegrad and Baltic countries, despite differences in political and economic interests in relations with Ukraine and Russia, preserved unity on issues of territorial integrity and European aspirations of Ukraine, and condemned Russia’s actions from 2014 to 2016. The V₄ and Baltic States supported the territorial integrity of Ukraine in official statements in the context of the annexation of the Crimea and the war in Donbas during this time. They considered Russia’s policy as one that violates the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, making other public statements on Russia’s need to respect international law.

Notwithstanding, the achievement of consensus was difficult because of personal political sympathies of some leaders (such as President of the Czech Republic M. Zeman, and his Hungarian counterpart V. Orban), ethno-political interests in Ukraine up to the requirements of formation of national-territorial autonomy in its composition (Hungary), economic ties with Russia (Slovakia, Czech Republic, Hun-
The assessment of causes of the conflict varied from aggression of Russia (Poland, the Baltic States) to ‘civil war’ (Czech Republic). The approaches on the need and implication of the EU sanctions against Moscow were different as well. This measure has been criticised by Hungary, which is almost totally dependent on energy supplies from Russia, and is the borrower of loans, followed by the Slovak Republic (due to the power factor and powerful Russian information influence in the political and social sphere of the country) and the Czech Republic, where needs of its economy is the main priority. Even though there is such differentiation, Central European States are objectively interested in the security of Ukraine (as first-order neighbours and economic partners) as well as having opportunities for strengthening their weight in European politics.

In spite of existence of common approaches in policies of V4 and Baltic countries on Ukraine, there are also clear differences between them. They can be explained by the following factors: historical heritage, concern for their own security, the current political situation, economic and financial interests and transatlantic relations.

The Republic of Poland showed the most uncompromising approach to the assessment of the 2014 events, annexation of Crimea and military aggression in Donbas, defending imposition of sanctions on Russia. Extension of the Normandy format, flexible alliances in the Baltic-Black Sea region, placing NATO infrastructure in the Baltic States and Central Europe became main goals of the Polish foreign policy installed soon after the dramatic changes in the higher echelons of power in 2015 and coincide with the national interests of Ukraine. However, a complex of humanitarian issues (e.g. the problem of massacres of Poles in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia) appeared to be extremely sensitive to representatives of right-wing conservative forces that have come to power in Poland and, therefore, require much accuracy in today’s Ukrainian-Polish relations.

The Baltic States that have common land border with Russia and where the Russian language minority makes a significant part of the population are well aware of the situation in Ukraine. They, as well as Poland, do not consider the conflict in eastern Ukraine as a domestic conflict, and consider the Russian factor and advocate the continuation and intensification of the sanctions against Russia. The Baltic countries have stepped up measures on strengthening their own security and defence, including placing additional NATO forces on their
territory. Lithuania is one of the biggest lobbyists of Ukraine in the European Union among them. In contrast, Estonia and especially Latvia demonstrate more reserved positions.

Hungary, in addition to latent ethnic and political animosities with Ukraine (Budapest requirements concerning expansion of autonomy for the Hungarian minority in the Transcarpathian region), has significant economic ties with Russia not only in the energy sector but also in other economic areas. The main political players in Hungary in recent years have been using anti-liberal and anti-American rhetoric, searching for their own development model, and therefore indicating respect for the political system of Putin.

The policy of the Slovak Republic on the development of relations with Ukraine, precisely on the Ukraine-Russia conflict, is rather controversial due to different foreign policy positions of Slovakia's leaders.

Like Slovakia, a proportion of Czechs have rather pro-Russian views explained by traditional Russophobia, Pan-Slavism, presence of Russian capital in the country, a large number of affiliated sites and think tanks holding economic ties with Russia. The support or neutral attitude to the Russian position on the Ukrainian question is in fact a marginal position among active public and politicians, as evidenced by demonstrations against President Miloš Zeman, who openly condemned the development of Ukraine in post-Maidan period and named the struggle in Donbas a 'civil war'.

The Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary opposed the imposition of EU sanctions on Russia in late summer – early autumn 2014, explaining their position with economic arguments. They have later repeatedly advocated reduction or complete abolition of the sanctions. Acceptance of the EU position on extension of the sanctions by the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary is caused by their dependence on Brussels and Berlin in economic and other matters. One can anticipate their future attitude: Prague, Budapest and Bratislava will follow all the consensus decisions within the EU regarding Ukraine, at least until Berlin supports the current common EU position on the Russian-Ukrainian conflict.

**Conclusions**
The countries of Central Europe officially unconditionally support the territorial integrity of Ukraine at the present stage and condemn Russia's actions in Ukraine as violation of its sovereignty and ba-
sic principles of international law. However, several constants have emerged with respect to the Ukrainian question among members of the Visegrad Group and Baltic States despite common interests in many strategic issues. Differentiation in assessing the meaning of political changes in Ukraine, the annexation of Crimea and the conflict in the Russian-Ukrainian border may be explained by historical heritage, homeland security issues, current political situation, economic interests, and significance of the transatlantic relations. Policies of Central European and Baltic countries on the ‘Ukrainian’ issue can be considered common in fundamental issues, but in practice provide short-term national interests, without taking into account the strategic interests of the region.

Difference between the approaches of the V4 countries and the Baltic States is not conducive for unity and impugn their willingness and ability to act as an internal advocate for the EU’s Eastern neighbours. It also reduces the ability of the European Union as a whole to respond effectively to the spiral of violence in Ukraine. This requires co-operation upon strengthening regional dialogue on fundamental changes in the security between the countries of the region and their partners in the EU and across the Atlantic east of their borders. Regional fora such as the Visegrad Group or the Central European Initiative, along with civil society, can promote a stronger regional consensus in response to the new challenges that have arisen between Russia and Eastern Europe. The Polish concept of new unions in Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic States seems highly germane.

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Notes


18 Ibid.


20 Ibid.

21 Ibid.


23 Ibid.


33 Ibid.
34 Maigre (2015), p. 16.
41 Bērziņa (2015), p. 27.
43 Bērziņa (2015), p. 27.


Markowic (2014).


Mateusz Gniazdowski and others (2014).

The Budapest Memorandum, signed by the USA, UK, Russia and Ukraine in 1994, declared a non-nuclear status to Ukraine and guaranteed its territorial integrity and inviolability of its borders. China and France joined the Memorandum in 1995. The remove of nuclear weapon from Ukraine was concluded in 1996. See: Olexandr Zadorozhni (2016), International Law in the Relations of Ukraine and the Russian Federation, Monograph: Kyiv: K.I.S., p. 87.

The IS and Attacks on the Oil and Gas Sector in Iraq

Lukáš Tichý

Attacks on energy sectors are an important part of the strategy of Islamist militant and terrorist organisations such as Al Qaeda and its offshoots or the Taliban. In connection with this, this article focuses on the attitude of the global Islamist terrorist group the Islamic State (IS) with regard to terrorism, specifically targeting oil and gas sectors as a political instrument of its strategy in the Middle East and North Africa. The main aim of this paper is to describe and analyse the forms, goals and motives of the IS terrorist attacks on the oil and gas industry and the accompanying criminal activities conducted by the IS in Iraq, some examples of these attacks, and their possible impact on energy security. At the theoretical level, the article is based on the concept of terrorist attacks on energy sectors. On the methodological level, the paper is based on the case study method.

Keywords: Islamic State, oil, gas, Iraq, attack on the energy sector, energy security

Introduction
The Islamic State (IS) or Daesh is a Salafi jihadist militant group originating in Iraq that follows the Wahhabi doctrine. Initially (1999–2004) the group that eventually became the IS functioned under the name Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (Organization for Monotheism and Jihad). This group was founded in Jordan in 1999 and was led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Following the 2003 invasion of Iraq by the U.S. forces and their Western allies, al-Zarqawi’s strategy of drawing the US into an exhaustive and long-lasting conflict which would damage its image...
as a superpower. To that end, he planned to instigate a spiral of sectarian violence between the Sunni and the Shias. Zarqawi hated the Shias and perceived them as traitors and infidels. In October 2004, when al-Zarqawi swore loyalty to Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda, he renamed the group, and it was then commonly known as al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI, 2004–06). The group targeted Coalition and Iraqi forces and civilians in order to pressure foreigners to leave Iraq, reduce the Iraqi popular support for the US and the Iraqi Government, and attract new recruits.

After the death of al-Zarqawi in 2006, when his house was the target of American air raids, command of the group was taken over by Abu Omar al-Qurashi al-Baghdadi. With the unification of AQI with six other Sunni groups in Iraq, he made major contributions to the formation of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI, 2006–13). In 2010, Abu Omar al-Qurashi al-Baghdadi died in a US-Iraqi operation, and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi took power in his place. When the civil war in Syria started in 2011, the ISI fought against Syrian forces and gained ground throughout the region. In 2013, al-Baghdadi renamed the organization the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) or, alternatively, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), thus starting its incursions into Syria. Since early 2014, ISIS has been conducting operations in Iraq as well. At first the IS took a part of Anbar with the cities of Ramadi and Fallujah, and in mid-June 2014, Mosul and Tikrit and other towns in the north of Iraq were also captured by the IS after its fighting with the demoralized and poorly trained Iraqi army. On 29 June 2014, ISIS declared its conquered territories in Iraq and Syria to be a caliphate, and it changed its name to the Islamic State.

The aggressive behaviour of the IS has been the subject of many articles and monographs, and it is hard to find an aspect of this security threat which has not been sufficiently studied. Nevertheless, it is still possible to make further contributions to this field of research. This article offers a profound analysis of IS terrorist attacks specifically targeting energy sectors in the Middle East as a strategic and political instrument in 2014–17. The main focus will be on IS energy-related terrorist attacks in Iraq. Although the IS suffered a number of territorial losses in both Iraq and Syria in 2016–17 – especially Mosul, its largest city in Iraq, and the Syrian town of Raqqa as the “capital” of the IS – and has been severely weakened, the IS fighters retained their military strength and
are ready to conduct further terrorist attacks on the energy sectors of Iraq\textsuperscript{11}, which can cause serious damage and jeopardize energy security.\textsuperscript{12}

In connection with this, the main goal of the article is to describe and analyse the forms, goals, and motives of the terrorist attacks on the oil and gas industry and infrastructure conducted by the IS in Iraq, some examples of these attacks, and their possible impact on energy security. This article should contribute to the general understanding of the issue of energy-related terrorist attacks and show in detail the energy strategy and the related fighting methods of the IS in Iraq, which the IS will eventually try to transfer to Europe and the USA.

The first part of the article defines terrorism and the problem of terrorist attacks targeting the energy industry. These definitions provide the main theoretical framework of the article. The second part analyses the importance of the energy issue and terrorist activities targeting the energy industry and infrastructure in the strategy of the IS. The third part describes the methodology, or more specifically, the main method of the attacks, and some select examples of IS energy-related terrorist attacks in Iraq. The fourth part then provides specific examples of IS terrorist attacks aimed at oil and gas sectors and other illegal activities of the IS in Iraq.

Terrorism and terrorist attacks targeting energy sectors

There is currently no generally accepted definition of terrorism. On the contrary, there are endless debates about the types of behaviour that may be included under the term of terrorism and those that do not belong in the concept.\textsuperscript{13}

The Definition of Terrorism

To give an example of a definition of terrorism, the Department of Defence of the United States of America defines terrorism as the ‘unlawful use of violence or threat of violence, often motivated by religious, political, or other ideological beliefs, to instil fear and coerce governments or societies in pursuit of goals that are usually political’.\textsuperscript{14} Paul Pillar, a former deputy director at the CIA’s Counterterrorist Centre, lists four basic features of terrorism: (1) premeditation and long-term, deliberate preparation; (2) motives which are always political in character (to change the status quo) and never criminal; (3) attacks on civilian targets; and (4) terrorist operations that are not conducted by regular armies but by subnational groups or organizations.\textsuperscript{15}
In November 2001 the European Parliament defined terrorism to include acts that ‘are intentionally committed by an individual or a group against one or more countries, their institutions or people with the aim of intimidating them and seriously altering or destroying the fundamental freedoms, democracy, respect for human rights, civil liberties and rule of law on which our societies are based’[...]

Pascal Boniface, the director of the Institute of International and Strategic Relations in Paris, states that ‘terrorism is an indirect strategy focused on intimidating Western countries while avoiding the threat of war and attempting to reduce the chance of discovery [of the proponents of terrorist acts – author’s note] as much as possible’.

Another interesting definition is provided by the UN in Resolution number 1373 (2001), which denounced the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in the harshest of terms and described them as a threat to international peace and security. Three years later, the UN Security Council (UNSC) issued Resolution number 1566 (2004), which characterized terrorism as an especially dangerous phenomenon conducted ‘with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public […], intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act […].’

Looking at all the various definitions of terrorism and what they have in common, it could be said that terrorism is the blind, undifferentiated, politically motivated killing of a defenceless civilian population. Terrorists commit mass murder of civilians who are unfortunate enough to be in the wrong place at the wrong time. The high fatality counts are a tool through which the terrorists influence the afflicted society and its top political representatives. This article, in full accordance with UN SC Resolution 1566 (2004), thus defines terrorism as premeditated, politically motivated violence which is perpetrated specifically against non-combatant targets with the aim to influence a local or international audience.

In this context, terrorism can be conceptualized as a violent language of communication. ‘Violence always demands attention – owing its life-threatening character – and impresses those at the receiving end as well as immediate and secondary witnesses. Communicative theories of terrorism focus on the persuasive and dissuasive effects of terminal violence or conditional violent intimidation of one group on various other witnessing audiences as well as the role of mass media in this signalling process’. Similarly, according to Jan Eichler terrorism...
as a security relations phenomenon is an extreme form of communication with the public which has four main elements: (1) the transmitter of the message, which is always the individual terrorist or terrorist group; (2) the target, which is the dead and wounded people who had the bad fortune to be in the wrong place at the wrong time; (3) the message, which is always addressed to the policy makers of the afflicted states; and (4) the feedback of the terror target, which is the result of political evaluation. The relations between these four elements are guided by one basic principle: the addressee of the message, that is, the object of the extortion and terror, is not the victim of the terrorist attack. The damage caused deliberately by the terrorists is never self-serving but always instrumental. Every dead or crippled person, and every financial loss that is a result of the attack is a message and an instrument of indirect pressure on leading political representatives, who are expected to either do what the terrorists want or stop doing what the terrorists do not like.

The communicational aspect of terror represents a major tool for analysing the goals and motives of an individual attack or the threat thereof by the IS, which targets energy sectors and engages in related criminal activity. Every terrorist attack on an energy sector has a goal and a motive, and its implementation and realization send a clear message from the given terrorist organisation both to the political functionaries of the afflicted state and to the political representatives of Western countries in general.

**Terrorist attacks on energy sectors**

According to Ali Koknar, the concept of terrorism targeting energy sectors is not strictly limited to armed attacks on power plants, oil and gas infrastructure, or refineries. This concept also includes other illegal activities aimed at such facilities, such as the theft of oil or gas from pipelines, extortion, or the funding and support of groups that conduct the aforementioned attacks. In general, it may be said that energy-related terrorism is a criminal activity that causes significant losses aimed at energy facilities. In connection with this, Tamara Makarenko divides energy-related terrorist attacks into seven categories of different degrees of threat to various parties in the industry.

The first, most common form of attack by virtue of its immediate effect and the instability it causes, is bomb attacks on fuel pipelines,
which can also cause major damage to the national economy and threaten to cause a loss of lives. This type of attack is part of the tactics used by various guerrilla groups in civil wars, especially in Latin America, but also by terrorist organisations in the area of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). The second form, which is an inseparable part of these pipeline attacks, consists of the sabotage of oil and gas lines. These attacks’ primary purpose is to cause losses to the national economy. Although sabotages are not very common from a historical perspective, there is reason to presume that this type of operation is becoming more popular with terrorist groups. Energy-related sabotages are conducted for three main reasons: (1) to steal oil and subsequently sell it on the black market; (2) to distract attention without loss of life; and (3) to exert subliminal political pressure or provoke corporate concessions.25

The third form is attacks on the offices of oil companies. Yet until recently such attacks were rather limited both in scope and in the number of human casualties caused by them. Such attacks were mostly symbolic and committed for reasons of propaganda. The fourth form – attacks on oil depots, petrol pumps, or refineries – is even less frequent than bomb attacks on offices and management. Considering the security level of such facilities (apart from petrol pumps), such targets are extremely difficult to penetrate and offer only a minimal chance of success. Nonetheless, it would be naive to think that such attacks do not take place at all, as in extreme cases, such assaults have been conducted by both various separatist groups and frustrated national armies (for the latter, they were usually last-ditch solutions).26

The fifth form consists of raiding or hijacking energy facilities and taking hostages. Such operations are not a common tactic of terrorist groups due to the relatively high level of security present at the facilities. Although such attacks tend to be connected to local groups, these operations are conducted by both left-wing and right-wing terrorist organisations, which are usually motivated by the promise of both ransom money and publicity. The sixth and most lethal form of attack on an energy sector, as far as potential civilian casualties are concerned, is a direct military assault on the staff of oil facilities or gas processing plants. The last, increasingly frequent form of energy terrorism consists of kidnapping the employees of oil and gas companies. Considering the ease of execution of such operations, kidnapping for ransom money is a frequent tactic for three main reasons. First, it is a source of
funds; second, it serves as a protest against the corporate tactics of energy companies; and third, it serves to hamper and prevent the surveying and development of oil fields – thus causing considerable damage to the given country’s finances.\textsuperscript{27}

Terrorist attacks targeting energy sectors present a great threat to energy security in any location that is or could be subject to such attacks, while the possible economic consequences are potentially devastating with regard to the targets of these attacks, such as pipelines, depots, tankers, staff, refineries, LNG and oil terminals, etc. The vulnerability of this transport infrastructure means that any stoppage of supply or production can have a severe impact on economies that are dependent on energy resources.

The basis of terrorism targeting energy sectors consists of attacks on the energy infrastructure and industry, including power plants, power grids, refineries, and oil and gas fields, but it also includes other illegal activities connected to these attacks which aim to destabilize the government or the region.\textsuperscript{28} Apart from actually contributing to political and economic instability, energy-related attacks may be intended as a show of resistance to national governments and also as a means of putting pressure on foreign powers and international corporations that have a strategic interest in countries producing oil and gas. That is, terrorist attacks on energy sectors may in some cases be an important part of a terrorist organization’s strategy for fighting foreign powers.\textsuperscript{29} Furthermore, it is becoming increasingly frequent for terrorists to target pipelines as a means of obtaining economic resources to finance further terrorist operations, or as a means of increasing their influence among other groups vying for control of the given area.\textsuperscript{30}

\textbf{The importance of energy and attacks on energy sectors for the IS}

Energy and energy-related attacks have a special place in the IS strategy, as the energy interests of the IS are, first, the effective use of currently existing oil and gas fields within Syria and Iraq and their expansion (for example, into Libya); second, increasing oil and gas production to provide funding for the organisation through sales of these resources; and third, taking control of new oil and gas fields and attacking the fuel transport infrastructure to punish and economically damage the West and other enemies of the IS. The IS’s energy strategy sees oil and, to a limited degree, also gas as the main pillars for its vision. At the same
time, the IS’s shura (council) identified oil (and gas) as a key instrument for the survival of the uprising and, more importantly, as a tool for financing its ambitions of creating and expanding the caliphate.31

The central role of energy, mainly oil and gas, is reflected in the power structure of the IS. Although the leader of the IS, al-Baghdadi, showed a willingness to delegate certain responsibilities to his subordinates and thus relied largely on his regional governors (walis), who administer their territories according to rulings decided by the central shura – an approach that makes the IS strongly decentralised with regard to the territories it controls – quite the opposite is true in the case of mineral resources. Oil and gas, together with military and religious operations and the organisation’s sophisticated media presence, are controlled directly by the high command, which is the only IS authority in this matter.32

The main interest of the energy strategy of the IS, which is trying to launch its own oil industry that would be similar to national and international oil corporations, is the endeavour to make the greatest possible use of the wealth of energy resources in its territories, which represent a stable and reliable source of income. This strategic vision was clear from the very start, when (initially) ISIS and later the IS took control of parts of Iraq and Syria and consequently gained access to a number of Syrian and Iraqi oil deposits and gas fields. Over the course of 2014 the IS took control of more than 60 percent of the Syrian oil production and slightly less than 10 percent of the Iraqi oil production.33 American government estimates claim that the oil transactions in that period generated about $2m–$4m per day for the IS.34

Nonetheless, in 2015, air strikes by the U.S., Russia, and their allies on the infrastructure, smuggling routes, and oil and gas facilities of the captured territories resulted in the recapturing of some of the oil and gas fields held by the IS and a reduction in the oil and gas production.35 However, the IS still retained a number of gas and oil fields in both Iraq and Syria in 2015-2016, chiefly in eastern Syria and north-eastern Iraq.36 In 2016, the IS controlled less than 10 oil fields with a total production capacity of about 16,000 - 20,000 barrels of oil per day (bpd), and the financial revenues from their oil sales decreased to $0.5m per day.37 The IS oil production also fell sharply in the first half of 2017 and according to the IHS Conflict Monitor, the IS’s average monthly oil revenue in Iraq and Syria at the time was down some 88 percent from the 2015
figure in the first half of 2017, which meant that it was approximately $0.13m per day. Table No. 1 lists the numbers of IS oil fields, their production capacities, and the revenues from the oil sales for each year between 2014 and 2017.

Table 1: A year-by-year comparison of the figures for IS oil fields, oil production, and revenues from oil sales for the period 2014-2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>Years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The number of IS oil fields</td>
<td>20 - 25 oil fields</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The IS oil production capacity in barrels per day (bpd)</td>
<td>56,000 (120,000) bpd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The IS oil revenues per year in US dollars</td>
<td>$730– 1,460m per year</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: compiled by the author

The energy strategy of the IS, which focuses on attacks on energy sectors, has three directions. First, IS fighters assault oil and gas fields, pipelines, and energy facilities in order to try to take control of them, with the main purpose of acquiring these resources being to help fund the terrorist organization. Second, jihadists of the IS attack energy targets with the aim of damaging the energy industry of the given country, and their main motives for these activities can be (1) to stop the supply of oil and gas to Western countries, thereby damaging their economies; (2) to limit the supply of these resources, thereby increasing the price of oil; and even (3) to use their burning of some oil and/or gas fields as a delay tactic to cover their retreat. Third, IS fighters attack energy sectors, take hostages and/or kidnap employees of Western companies with the aim of destabilising and weakening their enemies’ economy and punishing them, obtaining ransom money or bringing attention to themselves or their organisation. However, the main motive is usually to damage the credibility of a specific state, as such attacks might show that it is not able to ensure its internal security.
Methodology and select examples of IS terrorist attacks on oil and gas sectors

On the methodological level, the article is based on the case study method, which is understood to mean a detailed analysis of the case that was chosen as the subject of the research. Its aim is to provide a profound comprehension or causal explanation of the case. Its advantages are the depth of analysis it offers to every researcher and that it encompasses a relatively large amount of facts and endeavours to facilitate their complete evaluation. This treatise understands a “case” of a terrorist attack to mean a specific type and form of terrorist activity or an attack on an energy sector with the condition that the case study then frames the overall terrorist activities, i.e. energy-related attacks, together with the related criminal activities of the IS in Iraq in 2014-17.

The oil and gas-related terrorism that is conducted by the IS in Iraq is influenced by several factors. Firstly, Iraq is a very rich country in terms of oil and gas. Iraq holds nine percent of the world oil reserves and two percent of the global gas reserves, and is the second-largest petroleum producer and member of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) after Saudi Arabia. Secondly, the economy of Iraq is highly dependent on exports and sales of minerals. Crude oil export revenue accounts for 93 percent of its total government revenues. Thirdly, Iraq has long been dealing with the consequences of a military intervention, which creates a situation in which the IS can realise terrorist attacks targeting the energy sector more easily. In other words, the energy potential of Iraq, as well as its economic dependence and hence its strong vulnerability to various shocks affecting oil production and exports, are well understood by the IS, for which the energy issue is an important part of its strategy. These are major reasons for the IS operating in Iraq.

The main sources for our analysis of the IS terrorist attacks on the Iraqi energy sector are the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), the Global Incident Map (GIM), and the set of research literature prepared by the Institute of International Relations Prague on the given topic, which contains approximately 120 pages and includes descriptions of energy-related terrorists attacks by the IS in Iraq in the period from 2014 to 2017. The various forms of IS terrorist attacks targeting the energy industry and the related illegal activities perpetrated by the IS which are described in the following text only represent a sample of such cases, but the aim of the sample is to help us to understand the
goals and motives of the terrorist activities of the IS in Iraq. At the same time, the individual forms and shapes of the terrorist attacks and their goals and motives that are presented here are derived from specific examples of IS attacks targeted at the energy sector. The next sections will provide specific examples of such IS terrorist attacks and their accompanying criminal activities, and also discuss the main goals and motives of the IS in carrying out such attacks in Iraq.

Iraq
Since the IS made international headlines by invading Iraq from Syria in June of 2014, its territory has shrunk considerably. The IS’s caliphate spanned an estimated 36,200 km² in June 2017. This marks a 40 percent reduction in its territory since the start of 2017, and a 60 percent reduction overall since our first estimate of its size in January 2015, when the jihadist group controlled 90,800 km² in Iraq and Syria. At the same time, the IS has lost all of its major urban strongholds in Iraq. In 2017, the IS was present in the Hamrin Mountain region, which stretches from Kirkuk and Saladin - in which Tuz Khurmatu is located - to the Diyala province and the Iranian border.

In 2014-2017, the IS attacked oil and gas fields, oil refineries, and gas processing plants in Iraq for at least two reasons. Firstly, the IS attempted to control Iraq’s energy sector. Secondly, it attempted to damage the energy sector and destabilise the enemy. In addition, IS fighters ignited Iraqi oil wells as a cover manoeuvre when they were in retreat before the advancing Iraqi army.

Terrorist attacks with the aim of taking control of the energy sector
Whereas in 2014 the IS succeeded in gaining control of approximately thirty oil fields in the vicinity of Nineveh, Anbar, Saladin, and Kirkuk with an overall capacity of about 60,000 bpd, in the first half of 2016 the IS only controlled a few oil fields, mainly the Qayyara oil field in northern Iraq with a total capacity of 8,000–10,000 bpd and Najma with a total capacity of 5,000 bpd. In an attempt to regain control of some of the other Iraqi oil fields, IS fighters staged an unsuccessful assault on the Alas and Ogail fields in the Saladin Governorate in early February 2016. In mid-March 2016 a group of 150 IS jihadists attacked the Ajil and Alas oil fields but were repelled. Later in the same month the IS attacked Kurdish and Iraqi forces in the town of Makhmur, which lies just 120 km from oil-rich Kirkuk. However, with the help
of US Marines stationed in Iraq, the Iraqi army managed to resist such assaults and successfully protect the country’s energy infrastructure.\textsuperscript{46}

The Iraqi army also fought heated battles with the IS throughout the 2014–15 period for the oil refinery in Baiji with a production of approximately 300,000 barrels of refined oil products per day, which satisfies 50 percent of the country’s oil consumption. The IS assaulted the Baiji refinery on 18 June 2014 and gained control of most of it some two days later. The Iraqi army then retook Baiji and its oil refinery in a series of battles that culminated on 16 October 2015.\textsuperscript{47}

Additionally, in late March 2016, the Iraqi army’s Operation Fatah was launched against the IS in order to oust the remainder of the radicals from the two-million city of Mosul and recapture the northern Iraqi town of Qayyara along with the two surrounding oilfields – Qayyara and Najma. This operation reached its desired goals at the end of July 2016. The loss of Qayyara certainly dealt a blow to the IS, which had extracted oil from some 60 wells and sold it to help finance its activities. The IS had previously shipped at least 50 truckloads of oil a day from Qayyara and the nearby Najma oilfields to neighbouring Syria.\textsuperscript{48} At the same time, oil from the Qayyara field near Mosul often made its way to Turkey. From Turkey, according to many accounts, it made its way to Western markets in both Europe and the U.S.

In early 2017, the IS controlled several smaller oil fields with dozens of oil wells, mainly east of Salahuddin Province.\textsuperscript{49} Individual IS attempts to capture Iraqi oil fields then continued during the year. For example, at the end of February 2017, IS fighters launched two synchronous attacks on areas near Tikrit; one of the attacks was on the Ajil oil field (50 km northeast of Tikrit) and the other was on al-Mobaded, which is located east of Tikrit.\textsuperscript{50} Conversely, in September 2017, warplanes from the United States-led military coalition destroyed a fuel storage area belonging to IS in southwest Kirkuk.\textsuperscript{51} Similarly, in December 2017 Iraqi security forces cleared booby-traps placed by IS militants along a section of the Iraq-Turkey oil pipeline which stretches from the Kirkuk Governorate to Turkey while passing by al-Riyad, Baiji and Mosul. According to the Iraqi Ministry of Interior, after several months of work, the energy security directorate managed to clear the section from Kirkuk to Baiji and lift and dismantle more than 900 explosive devices along the line.\textsuperscript{52} However, at the end of 2017, the IS still controlled some oil infrastructure and two Iraqi oil fields containing four wells in the northern Tuz Khurmatu district\textsuperscript{53} and continued to steal, spill and
smuggle crude oil from Iraqi oil fields as a means to wreak havoc and fund their sputtering but surviving campaign of terror.54

**Terrorist attacks that aim to damage the energy sector and destabilize the enemy**

In early March 2015, just before the start of Operation Fatah, IS fighters set fire to the Ajil oil field. Their intention was to create a smoke wall that would block Iraqi helicopter forces attacks against IS positions around Tikrit. In the end, however, Ajil was destroyed by allied air strikes, and Tikrit was later re-taken by Iraqi forces. The IS’s decision to burn the field had almost no strategic impact.55

Similarly, first in April and then in early May 2016, IS militants used improvised explosive devices (IED) to blow up three oil wells and damage one other well in the Khabaz oil field, which lies about 20 km south-west of Kirkuk in northern Iraq and comprises approximately 41 oil wells with a total capacity of around 10,000–15,000 bpd.56

On 12 May 2016, IS fighters conducted another attack on the Khabaz oil field and destroyed two oil wells, causing a drop in production of 4,000 bpd.57 A month later, in an effort to stop the Iraqi army in its advance on Mosul, IS radicals set fire to five oil wells near Qayyara in the province of Ninive.58

Last but not least, ‘at the end of July 2016, the IS militants marched into two energy facilities in northern Iraq and killed at least five people. The first attack took place at an AB2 gas compressor station, located about 15 km northwest of Kirkuk in the Bajwan area. Four gunmen with hand grenades attacked the station leaving two guards in a serious condition. The militants then shot dead four workers in a control room’.59 The militants then allegedly went to the Bai Hassan oil station, located some 25 km further north-west, where they mounted a similar attack. One of them detonated his explosive vest at an outside gate so that the others could enter the facility. Once inside, two more men detonated their explosive-laden vests, thus destroying an oil storage tank. The Bai Hassan oil station, which had been producing 55,000 bpd, was forced to suspend all activity following the attack.60

Also, in an attempt to prevent Iraqi fighter jets from reaching their targets, the IS militants set fire to the oil wells in Tal Afar on 21 August 2017.61 Similarly, for a month and a half, IS fighters set fire to three oil wells near Hawija, which is located west of the oil city of Kirkuk. The
IS fighters were trying to use the rising smoke to avert air strikes while they retreated from the area to Hawija. Iraq launched an offensive on 21 September 2017 to dislodge the IS from Hawija.62

**IS tactics aimed at ignition of oilfields and the Iraqi offensive to capture Mosul**

As the IS lost their last two oil fields in Iraq in July 2016 and with the Iraqi offensive on Mosul in October of that year, IS fighters resorted to drastic measures as they set fire to oil fields to a greater extent than ever before. The same tactic had already been used by Saddam Hussein during the Persian Gulf War. The fires would destroy several oil wells, and the resulting clouds of smoke would make it difficult to bomb the retreating Islamists with precision. To give some examples of such attacks, retreating IS fighters torched several oil fields and oil wells near Mosul on 26 October 2016, and in early November, IS militants torched another 19 wells to stop the progress of the Iraqi army.63 At the beginning of 2017, the IS fighters set another 25 oil wells on fire in Qayyara, which is located south of Mosul.64

On 26 February 2017, the Iraqi security forces took control of the largest area of IS oil smuggling, which was located at the entrance of the fourth bridge in Mosul.65 Four months later, by mid-June 2017, the Iraqi army took control of all parts of the city and almost reached the An-Nuri Mosque, from which the IS leader al-Baghdadi had proclaimed a caliphate in the conquered territories of Iraq and Syria in 2014. IS radicals then demolished the ancient mosque with explosives on 21 June 2017. Iraqi anti-terrorist forces conquered the ruins of the An-Nuri Mosque a week later, on 29 June, and the Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi announced the overthrow of Mosul as the seat of the IS’s power in July 2017.

**Consequences of the terrorist attacks in Iraq for energy security**

Attacks carried out in order to either dominate or damage the energy sector in Iraq have had a negative impact on the Iraqi economy, which loses revenue from gas production and oil exports. They also necessitate an allocation of funds to provide security to the energy industry and repair infrastructure damaged by both the allies’ air raids and the IS. In the case of Iraq, crude oil export accounts for 93 percent of the total revenue of its government. However, it should be noted that while the IS dominated northern Iraq (excluding the Kurdistan Region...
of Iraq), impacting the oil production and refinery operations there, this did not affect the southern Iraqi oil production and exports. The IS also did not significantly affect the production in the Kurdistan Region, although the fighting between it and the Iraqi army came very close to the fields operated by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) – Khurmala Dome and Shaikan. However, some oil companies were forced to abandon their exploration projects in Iraq, which could delay future developments in oil exploration.66

Accordingly, OPEC’s Annual Statistical Bulletin 2016 mentions that Iraq’s output of petroleum products dropped from around 613,000 bpd in 2011 to around 444,000 bpd in 2015. This slashed the government’s total revenues, which are generated mainly from crude exports. Net oil export revenues stood at $89 billion in 2014 and plummeted to $18 billion in early 2016, according to the US Energy Information Administration (EIA), [and this finding was] derived from EIA’s June 2016’ [sic] Short-Term Energy Outlook. The decreasing trends show that the seizure of key oil fields by ISIS has had a significant negative effect on Iraq’s petroleum industry value in the international market compared to other countries.67

The partial interruptions in the production and supply of crude oil and natural gas in the country therefore had a negative impact on the energy security of Iraq itself. Meanwhile the unstable domestic political, ethnic, and religious situation inside Iraq led the IS to focus far more on terrorist attacks in recent times, with the main aim being to deepen the country’s continuing instability, and these terrorist attacks will likely dominate the larger part of the IS’s activities in the foreseeable future. These events could cause a panic in world markets, bringing about an increase in oil prices, which is what the IS needs.

By contrast, for the EU, the energy security impacts of IS attacks targeting Iraq’s energy sector are rather minimal since Iraqi oil exports account for only 4.6 percent of EU oil imports, and the EU does not import LNG from Iraq. Even if the situation in Iraq deteriorated and its oil exports ceased, the consequences for EU energy security would be limited as EU member states have diversified oil imports.

Conclusion
For the IS, energy represents a key area of its strategy. It focuses on the utilisation and expansion of its existing oil and natural gas production capacity as an important source of funding for its operations. The IS
also uses energy to punish Western countries and their allies. In its energy strategy the IS relies on the method of ‘use or threat of violence’, which is also a fundamental pillar of energy-focused terrorism. Firstly, this method is used in specific IS attacks on oil and gas fields, energy infrastructure, and energy facilities with the aim to either take control of the energy sector, or destroy the energy sector in an attempt to disrupt exports, raise oil prices, and/or politically and economically weaken, destabilize and discredit the enemy. The attacks could even be carried out as military manoeuvres. Secondly, the method is also used when IS fighters kidnap workers and employees of Western companies or take them hostage in order to obtain a ransom, draw attention to themselves, or damage the credibility of the state, as a successful kidnapping or hostage-taking could be seen as proof that the state is incapable of ensuring the safety of its people. It should also be mentioned that the IS does not limit its operations to attacks on energy sectors, but it also takes part in other illegal criminal activities, for example, in Iraq.

According to the GTD, in Iraq the ISIS/IS carried out a total of 259 attacks on the business and utilities sector, and this figure includes more than a third of the country’s terrorist attacks on energy infrastructure, oil and gas fields, refineries, security guards protecting pipelines and gas plants in the period from 1 January 2014 to 31 December 2017. The numbers of attacks by the IS on the energy sector in Iraq for the examined years are listed in Table No. 2.

Table 2: The numbers of the IS energy-related attacks in Iraq in 2014-2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: compiled by the author

Table No. 2 also leads to several conclusions. Firstly, in 2014-2017, the IS carried out 96 attacks on the energy sector in Iraq. This can be explained by the growing importance of the energy sector for the IS, which uses mineral resources to implement its terrorist and military activities. Secondly, the number of attacks per year in Iraq has been decreasing continuously from 2014 to 2017 due to the IS’s gradual loss of oil and gas fields, refineries, power equipment and parts of the territory controlled by it.
The aim of these IS terrorist attacks on the energy sector of Iraq is to conquer and dominate Iraq’s oil and gas fields, as well as its oil refineries and other energy facilities. The main motive is to achieve the maximum possible oil production from the Iraqi oil fields under IS control and use the subsequent sale of the oil to fund IS activities and the creation and expansion of the caliphate. At the same time, in Iraq the IS attacked oil and gas fields, gas plants, an oil station and a compressor station for transporting gas with the aim of harming the Iraqi energy sector. Likewise, IS fighters attack the energy sector in Iraq and take hostages in the process in order to destabilize the position of the enemy, i.e. Iraq, and attract attention to themselves and their organization. Finally, the IS radical fighters, as a part of their attacks on Iraq’s oil industry, ignite oilfields as a cover manoeuvre when they retreat. These terrorist attacks are influenced by a variety of motives, but the main desired end result for the IS is that they would dominate the rest of the territory of Iraq. The first motive of these attacks is to discontinue the production of oil and its export to the West, and to raise the price of oil and thus damage the Western economy. The second, more frequent motive is to undermine the credibility of Iraq by showing that it is an unreliable supplier of oil which is unable to secure oil shipments to Western countries. The third motive of these terrorist attacks, which is also frequent, is to discredit the Iraqi government, as the attacks are intended to prove that it is unable to ensure security on its own territory, and that Iraq is an unstable country that is not suitable for foreign investments.

Attacks on the energy industry and infrastructure by the IS mainly have a negative impact on Iraq, namely on its economy and energy security. In the case of Iraq, terrorist attacks on its energy sector could also have a negative impact on global (Asian and, partly, Western) energy security as a result of the related disruptions of oil supplies from Iraq.

As the IS has been losing the territories it captured in Iraq, its capacity to generate revenue has declined drastically. In Iraq, the group has lost all the oil and gas fields it previously controlled, however it controls dozens of oil wells. While the IS’s oil revenue could continue to decline in the near future, it is still likely benefiting from its taxing of fuel consumption on the local level and charging fees for tanker trucks transiting IS-controlled areas. It can therefore be expected that the IS terrorist attacks on the Iraqi energy sector will continue.
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Notes
1 The presented text is basically a new version or update of a previous article: Lukáš Tichý and Jan Eichler (2018), Terrorist Attacks on the Energy Sector: The Case of Al Qaeda and the Islamic State, *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 41 (6), pp. 450-473. The main differences are that the presented text modifies and extends the theoretical and methodological framework, changes the structure of the text and focuses only on the IS and its terrorist attacks on the energy sector in Iraq.


4 Although the group never called itself this name, this remained its informal name for many years. For more on this, see Jacob N. Shapiro (2013), *The Terrorist’s Dilemma: Managing Violent Covert Organizations*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 82-100.


An example of former IS fighters continuing in their terrorist activities might be a terrorist and militant organization called the “White Flags” or the “White Banners”, which originated in November 2017. The White Flags group is an alliance of former Islamic State militants, disgruntled Kurdish mafia members and independent local Kurdish militias. They are not from the Peshmerga or any official Kurdish security forces. The White Flags militants are currently occupying the mountains behind Tuz Khurmatu in Iraq’s Salah-al-Din province. The main aim of the White Flags is to regain control of the oil facilities in Kirkuk, which would enable them to continue in what they claimed had been lucrative oil thefts. See, for example: Mamoon Alabbasi (2018), ‘After ISIS Black Flags, Iraq Faces “White Banners” Threat,’ The Arab Weekly, 11 February, available at: https://thearabweekly.com/after-isis-black-flags-iraq-faces-white-banners-threat (accessed 27 March 2018).


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Koknar (2009), pp. 18-19.

Makarenko (2003).

Giroux (2009).

Steinhäusler et al. (2008).

Makarenko (2003).


40 Brisard and Damien (2014); Harrell (2015); The Financial Action Task Force (2015); Solomon, Kwong and Bernard (2016); Micallef (2016); Oil & Gas 360 (2017); IHS Markit (2017).


According to Iraq’s state-run North Oil Company (NOC), the IS controlled scores of wellheads in parts of the northern Ajil field which are considered contested land between the Iraqi and Kurdish governments. The terror network also still controlled some 75 percent of the Alas Dome in the nearby prominent Hamrin field. The Iraqi army has recaptured these two oilfields from the IS in an ongoing security operation in the northern Tuz Khurmatu district in February 2018. For more on this, see Hollie McKay (2017), ‘ISIS Still Stealing, Spilling and Smuggling Oil Throughout Iraq,’ Fox News, 12 September, available at: http://www.foxnews.com/world/2017/09/11/isis-still-stealing-spilling-and-smuggling-oil-throughout-iraq.html (accessed 17 August 2018); GIM (2018), ‘[Anadolu Agency] IRAQ - Iraqi Army Takes Two Northern Oilfields from Daesh,’ 8 February.


For the World, for Me or for Us?

The European Development Aid Regime

Kenneth Thomas Stiller

“We know the costs of Europe. What are the benefits?”
Nigel Farage

Whereas poverty eradication is the primary official purpose of development aid disbursed by the EU, an analysis of official development assistance (ODA) flows between 1995 and 2014 suggests that recipients’ needs are even less salient for aid by the EU than for the bilateral aid dispersed by its member states. Employing a dataset with pooled member state ODA disbursements, development aid disbursed by the EU is found to rather serve common European foreign policy goals, e.g. preparation for accession and geostrategic aims. Even though those states which acceded to the EU in 2004 received over proportional amounts of ODA both by the EU and its member states, current accession candidates and states of the EU’s Eastern Partnership do not receive such a surplus of bilateral development aid from EU member states. These findings indicate an increasingly functional division of the two European channels for allocating ODA.

Keywords: europeanization, development aid, EU, multilateralism, multi-level governance, ODA


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Whilst in the past decades several states and international organisations emerged as major donors of aid, including United Nations agencies, Bretton Woods institutions and regional Development Banks, the European Union constitutes a special case regarding development policy. Even though the nation states of Western Europe have been responsible for major shares of global foreign aid flows since the very advent of the concept of development assistance, the European Union itself, too, has emerged as a major provider of foreign aid, even surpassing official development assistance disbursed by UN institutions by twice the entire UN system’s aggregate disbursements.

Interestingly, development cooperation is a policy area of shared responsibility between the EU and its member states, implying that both the EU and its individual member states govern formally independent policies in this field. However, since its member states exert significant influence on decision-making within the European Union’s institutional design, it does not solely pose one additional donor, but rather a second level available for member state governments to allocate foreign aid through. Considering repeated attempts to shift more responsibility in this policy field to the European level and ongoing discussions on the distribution of competencies in this domain, understanding the interaction between those two levels will be essential to properly assess the consequences of potential changes. Hence, the aim of this article is to assess how member state preferences impact foreign aid allocations by the European Union as well as to identify the function EU aid fulfils in between the national level and global international organisations.

Contrary to many studies that focus on legal aspects and institutional adjustments in order to explain the European aid regime, an empirical approach will be employed. Whereas poverty eradication is declared the primary aim of all EU development assistance efforts, closer scrutiny indicates that they are not more targeted at this aim than the efforts of EU member states are. As will be shown, development policy of the EU has historically strong linkages to the preferences and policies of its member states, albeit the interconnectedness seems to decrease in recent years. Furthermore, the structure of member states’ preferences is a decisive determinant of foreign aid allocations by the Union, which, nevertheless, is subject to EU enlargement as well as the institutional design of the European Union. The results of the analysis conducted in this paper also provide hints of an emerging functional
division between European aid policies, with EU aid serving common European geopolitical interests, whereas member states decreasingly employ bilateral aid to pursue European interests abroad.

**Why losing Control? The Concept of Multilateral Aid**

Maizels and Nissanke distinguish between bilateral and multilateral foreign aid and examine, in an analysis with a quite limited time frame, that the latter is allocated much more according to recipients’ actual needs than bilateral flows, which, as they find, in most cases serve the interests of the donor.³ Replicating Burnside and Dollar’s study on aid⁴ whilst employing different methods, results provided by Headey indicate that this might indeed be true, albeit bilateral aid seems to increasingly focus on recipients’ needs after the end of the Cold War.⁵ Easterly and Pfutze, more differentiated, conclude that development funds tend to implement a range of desirable practices of foreign aid best and United Nations institutions do worst, which are both multilateral donors, while bilateral aid ranks somewhere in between.⁶ These results raise questions as multilateral aid is not different from bilateral aid in terms of real flows from donor to recipient, from tax-payers in a developed nation to the poor in a less developed state.

Allocating foreign aid flows multilaterally is *per definitionem* inevitably associated with a loss of control for donor countries, only the degree of loss being dependent on the institutional design of the international agency. The general public seems to at least implicitly recognise this condition as Milner and Tingley identify different preferences on multilateral aid spending among partisans in the case of the opponents’ victory prior to the US presidential election in 2008.⁷

Why then, do governments choose to allocate foreign aid multilaterally and lose control? Scholars have examined two basic arguments on this issue. Firstly, Rodrik employs the institutional capacity of multilateral agencies in order to argue that they have advantages both in centralising information, thus being able to implement efficient aid policies in recipient states, and facilitating the implementation of aid conditionality, which makes aid payments dependent on policy changes in recipient states.⁸ Hence, whereas bilateral aid seems to have a rather strategic and strong regional focus, e.g. US aid to the Middle East, Japanese spending in South East Asia or a European emphasis on Africa⁹, Rodrik argues that multilateral flows would be detached from these considerations.¹⁰ In accordance with this consideration, Reins-
berg considers multilateral aid relationships to be less politicised after finding that multilateral donors hardly respond to political liberalisation of recipients. Multilateral aid channelling depoliticises foreign aid and might thus allow punishing human rights violators collectively, argue Lebovic and Voeten.

Moreover, it is argued that collusion by donors or the prevalence of a dominant donor might improve aid efficiency in recipients as aid projects are less fragmented, local wages are not perverted by competition, which otherwise might curb the recipient’s bureaucratic quality, and expertise can be centralised and efficiently exploited. Indeed, many recipient countries deem further cooperation among donors necessary for the effectiveness of foreign aid.

Concerning the second explanation for multilateral aid, Milner bases her argument on the interest of donors both to employ foreign aid for strategic purposes and to ensure the legitimacy of aid at the same time. Given that ordinary citizens have very little detailed information on development assistance, Milner argues, donors need to provide development-oriented multilateral aid in order to credibly signal the necessity and usefulness of foreign aid to their constituencies, even though multilateral aid ‘is surely of less direct political utility to donor governments’. Hence, the result would be coexistence of rather strategic bilateral aid and rather development-oriented multilateral aid. Indeed, arguments made for multilateral aid to be rather orientated towards recipient-side determinants have been supported by empirical findings in terms of focus on development needs and human rights records in recipient states.

However, even though multilateral agents tend to formalise the process of aid allocation, which can include the adoption of ‘quasi-legal frameworks’, multilateral aid can certainly also serve domestic interests, for instance by providing contracts for national companies. The decision to use multilateral allocation channels of development assistance, nevertheless, seems to be dependent on national preferences and their congruence with multilaterally achievable outcomes, resulting in vastly differential significance of multilateral aid among donor nations.

It is noteworthy that all of the above-mentioned explanations for the existence of multilateral aid do not actually derive from changes in the strategic interest of donors but rather either from the institutional decision-making procedure that tames the implementation of individ-
ual strategic interests or from the necessity to partly signal development-oriented behaviour in order to maintain the pursuit of national interests through foreign aid. Thus, strategic donor interests are likely to be the main reason why bilateral aid remains to be the prevalent type of development assistance. Still, although the decision to channel aid through multilateral agencies might be strategic in intent, it could thoroughly foster development in consequence.

The European Aid Regime

While many donor countries allocate development assistance both through bilateral and multilateral channels, member states of the European Union simultaneously and increasingly also disperse development assistance via the EU itself, thus effectively employing a third level in this policy area (Figure 1). Remarkably, even though the OECD considers EU aid to be multilateral in nature, some scholars label it bilateral aid. However, neither of these is fully adequate if the institutional framework of the European Union is taken into account.

Figure 1: Total Foreign Aid Commitments to Specified Recipients over Time. [Source: Author]
Up to the present, EU aid comprises two channels with distinct budgets. Firstly, the European Development Fund (EDF) serves as an aid instrument and is funded by contributions from member states in multiannual frameworks, which can voluntarily be increased. It was founded during the initial stages of European integration in 1958 and targeted at the especially indigent group of African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries as well as at oversea territories of member states. Although the European Commission, and to a lesser extent the European Investment Bank, as supranational institutions implement the fund, decisions are made by the so-called EDF committee, which consists of member state representatives, under the rule of qualified majority voting or unanimity for budget decisions and institutional changes, respectively. While member states’ individual contributions have been increasingly aligned to their corresponding general EU budget contributions and thus their economic capacities, repeated attempts to include the EDF into the Union’s general budget have been rejected by member states for diverse reasons. Secondly, several programmatic development policy instruments, most notably the Development Cooperation Instrument or the European Neighbourhood and Partnership instruments, are directly funded from the European Union’s budget, which commands its own revenues since 1970. This, of course, is not to say that these funds are therefore managed independently of member states’ preferences and influences. Indeed, even though this aid channel is funded by the Union’s own budget, its management is subject to the above-mentioned clash between intergovernmental and supranational influences, which is shaped by external influences like EU enlargement rounds or institutional advancement in the course of European integration.

Maizels and Nissanke consistently conclude in their empirical analysis of donors’ motivations for aid that French aid favours former colonies, whereas economic interests explain the bilateral aid allocation of Germany and, maybe surprisingly, Britain best. Essentially, the Lomé Convention, which over decades governed the EDF, was an expression of special political relations of which aid was only one component. Its direct and current successor, the Cotonou Convention, which was signed in 2000, continues to embed aid into a more general, economic and political partnership agreement, although being criticised for its neoliberal approach.
In fact, the share of EU aid attributed to least development countries with the strongest need for poverty reduction successively decreased over the past decades, even falling behind the share allocated by EU member states to these countries (Figure 2). Accordingly, in the context of foreign policy realignment in 1997 the European Commission declared the post-colonial era to be over, which some assign to the prevalence of globally-oriented member states over regionally-interested EU member states and the subsequent shift towards normalisation of relations to ACP countries.\textsuperscript{31} It must be recalled that the initial setting of the European Community with six member states and a dominant French government was subject to continuing accession of states that had little strategic interest in Sub-Sahara Africa, beginning with Spain and Portugal, which emphasised ties to Latin America via Austria, Sweden and Finland until the Eastern European enlarge-
An interesting result of these paradigm changes is a sharp decline in relative EU aid flows also to ACP countries, despite their low level of development and the rhetoric focus on poverty alleviation.\textsuperscript{33, 34}

Moreover, the linkage between EU aid and the national preferences of its member states seems to have significantly weakened in the course of the past decades as far as the correlation of aid allocations is concerned (Figure 3). Since then there seems to have emerged a new paradigm of EU development policy, of which a central aspect is the respect for normative values such as human rights.\textsuperscript{35, 36, 37}

**Figure 3:** Correlation between EU and selected Member State Aid Flows over Time. [Source: Author]

European Aid as a Two-Level Game

Furthermore, it seems reasonable to assume that EU aid policies might be more than solely an expression of aggregated member state preferences. The European Union was supposed to become and is a hybrid
type of aid allocating institutions as its institutional setting combines perks of multilateral agents like the relative depoliticization of aid relations for individual member states and formalisation of aid programmes, but also attributes of bilateral aid through members’ comparatively strong impact on aid allocations and the embeddedness into a comprehensive political entity.

Based on these institutional implications, the theory employed in this paper is rooted in preference structures of involved stakeholders and mechanisms that interfere in the process of preference aggregation. As Putnam describes in his “two-level game”, interaction between the domestic and foreign policy can be exploited by actors in order to generate more preferable outcomes, thus ‘enabling them to achieve otherwise unattainable objectives’. While member state governments, of course, do not have to find an agreement for European aid policies on a national level, they can be assumed to behave respectively as they attempt to implement their preferences through the EU budget, seeking to shape EU aid flows as suitable as possible to their own preferences. Hence, transmitting Putnam’s general concept to the issue at hand, the European aid regime can be described to be an interacting two-level game, which, given the institutional order, results in three stages of policy-adaptation to actors’ preferences.

Firstly, individual national strategies and interests shape national aid programmes and bilateral flows as these states are sovereign to disburse aid to whomever they want to, for arbitrary reasons. Secondly, with increasing common aid volumes disbursed and, as stated above, mediated by European institutions, EU development policies allow member states to implement their preferences and interests through this channel, too. Although individual states may articulate their interests, bargain accordingly and more or less succeed in shaping aid allocations, final EU aid flows are a product of the aggregation of member states’ interests and consensus-making in the council in consideration of agenda setting by the European Commission and the EU bureaucracy. Furthermore, EU aid has to be distinguished from typical multilateral aid concerning the amount of detailed reliable information that is available to member states as a result of common negotiations.

Hence, thirdly, member states could take these results into account when adopting their final foreign aid allocations, which would make EU decisions impact bilateral foreign aid flows disbursed by member states. The salience of this effect, nevertheless, might strongly vary
among member states depending on tendencies of EU aid or national strategies and preferences or their involvement in a particular recipient state.

Two dimensions of development aid policy, which are conditioned by the mechanisms that rule aggregation of national preferences and are represented by the second stage in the above mentioned interacted two-level game, could be decisive for the structural shape of EU aid allocations. The underlying effect on EU aid regarding this dimension is caused by the sheer process of preference aggregation. While member states might allocate aid in order to objectively foster development in recipient states, they are very likely to also employ development aid as a foreign policy tool to a certain extent. However, some strategic purposes of foreign aid like support of arms trade deals, securing military relationships (as is argued the US did) and generating benefits for national companies are not applicable for EU aid, due to the mere fact that the EU is solely a confederation of states as well as the aggregation of these states’ preferences, which might be diametrically opposed. In addition, while strategic aid policies might be rooted in the preferences of governments, the Council of the European Union and its 28 members are subject to high levels of fluctuation. To sum up, the mechanism for common decision-making establishes implicit mutual control that is expected to tame national non-programmatic self-interest, analogous to similar observations concerning compliance with human rights in Europe due to the establishment of mutual control mechanisms. EU aid, then, should be less influenced by strategic interests as compared to member states’ foreign aid and rather be driven by recipient needs. Hence, referring to the above-mentioned continuum, the first hypothesis is derived, which can be described as EU-development hypothesis:

**H1: Lack of development is a stronger predictor of EU aid flows than of member state aid.**

While development-oriented aid should then be expected to be in the focus of European Union institutions, relative strong involvement of member states in the decision-making process on the European level could potentially introduce some more typical aspects of bilateral aid flows, making EU aid taking a position between more strategic bilateral aid flows, on the one hand, and flows disbursed by more independent multilateral agencies on the other. As opposed to the effect that is
claimed to cause the focus of EU aid on development-oriented purposes, the reason here rather concerns the decision-making mechanism in the Council of the European Union than the sole existence of intergovernmental negotiations. For instance, while a qualified majority is necessary in the Council, the existence of a ‘culture of consensus’ as well as the fact that many decisions are made unanimously even without institutional need to do so, highlight the importance of national interests and informal bargaining power. In consequence, to a certain extent European aid is likely to resemble the aggregation of national aid allocations. Since policies with higher chances to be agreed on are those in the interest of EU members, the member state-interest hypothesis states:

**H2a:** The higher member state aid flows to a certain recipient, the higher can EU development aid flows be expected.

Note that while the first hypothesis states that strategic intentions are expected to be less salient for EU aid, this might not be valid in special cases, namely if many EU member states have a common strategic interest in recipient countries. In such a case, the second determining dimension of EU aid would be decisive, namely the structure of member state preferences. If member states’ interests in a particular recipient are quite homogeneous, they might be able to jointly push for increased aid flows to this very recipient. The realisation of national strategies through EU aid is much harder or even impossible if members’ interests in a certain state are very heterogeneous, as incentives for delegation are higher and delegation therefore more likely if principals’ preferences are close to each other. The reasoning behind this point is that not only the absolute amount of member state aid to recipients indicates member state interests and shapes EU disbursements, but also its composition. If, for instance, one member donates 10 million € to an arbitrary recipient state, it will be less likely to impact common decision-making and to have this interest reflected in European aid contributions than if ten member states donate 1 million € each. In consequence, if a broad coalition of member states enters negotiations with strong preferences towards a single recipient of aid, these members should be able to shape negotiations. Hence, in the case of disagreements, aid is likely to end up being spent on those interests that are broadly represented in the Council, for which reason the member state-preference hypothesis states:
**H2b: EU aid allocations will be higher if member state interests in a certain recipient state are more homogeneous ceteris paribus.**

However, as has been mentioned, EU enlargement rounds and resulting diversification of interests have the ability and do alter the internal dynamics of decision-making processes in the European Union. Giving the increasing and quite pronounced programmatic formalisation of EU development policies, it is possible that member states have lost their grip on the allocation of EU development aid. While it is quite complex to establish meaningful absolute relationships between member states' actual flows and EU development policies in order to evaluate this explanation, it might be insightful to analyse their congruency over time in order to identify major tendencies in influence of member states on EU development aid. As shown above, despite its rhetoric focus the share of EU aid directed to least developed countries has decreased over the past years, possibly indicating that development might actually have become a less salient determinant of aid flows and raising the question whether this change rather follows member state aid flows or diverges from them. The Union's enlargement as well as the strengthening of EU institutions in legal terms might have caused an intra-EU power shift towards supranational institutions. Thus, the following supranationality-hypothesis follows from these considerations:

**H3: EU aid flows are decreasingly determined by aid allocations of EU member states.**

If EU aid is indeed increasingly detached from member states’ national foreign aid flows than a mere aggregation, it remains unclear what purpose EU aid would serve then. Nielson and Tierney argue that if principals cannot agree on proposed policy changes, the agent’s own position becomes more favourable as it might exploit the preference structure due to the principal’s lacking ability to act unified.\(^4\)\(^3\) Thus, EU aid should be expected to aim at fulfilling the Commission’s policy goals, which is above all the eradication of poverty, as has been repeatedly stated. A second potential explanation would be that EU member states engage in ‘laundering’, namely shifting policies to another level or agency if they are unfavourable for bilateral relations. Regarding such considerations, it seems reasonable that certain states play a superior role for common foreign policy targets of the European Union and EU member states are willing to support these nations.
However, bilateral aid might seem inappropriate for this purpose to some governments. Recalling Milner’s point of multilateral aid as a signal to constituencies, European aid might indeed be exploited to prove development commitments of member states, while in fact it serves geopolitical interests. Given the EU’s official rhetoric on development policy and emphasis on poverty eradication, it does not surprise that although Europeans know less about the actual flows of common European development aid than about national aid policies, significantly more advocate for increases in European aid than in national aid according to the Eurobarometer. Hence, it might be that member states employ this channel of foreign aid as a strategic foreign policy instrument, resulting in disproportionately high amounts of aid allocated to recipients of geopolitical interest. It is noteworthy that while the preceding two hypotheses refer to EU aid as a function of member state preferences and their structure, this argument does base on a superordinate preference outside the set of national development policy preferences, but on selective delegation by member states to the European level. Thus, if the predicted effect indeed exists, this would indicate that member states are aware of the common need to engage in those interests even though they do not provide bilateral aid accordingly. In consequence, this hypothesis might be called the EU-interest hypothesis:

**H4:** *If a recipient state is of major importance for the EU’s foreign policy goals, it will receive larger shares of EU aid ceteris paribus.*

As far as the third stage of the theory on European multi-level aid is concerned, an effect of the existence of multilateral aid disbursed by the EU on member states’ policies and their bilateral foreign aid flows could be possible. This might possibly be realised by common actions towards certain recipient nations or implicitly by independent but systematically differing policies. As has been ruled by the European Court of Justice, furthermore, development aid policies of member states may not exert adverse consequences on respective EU policies. Concerning the interaction of foreign aid flows disbursed by different donors and their economic properties more generally, Frey raises the question whether foreign aid can be considered to be a public good. He models the interaction between the aid flows of a small and large donor under the presumption that donors’ utility is a function both of their own and other countries’ aid. As a result, the small country would
be expected to decrease its spending to a certain recipient if a total amount which is perceived to be sufficient can be reached given aid flows by the large country. If aid was such a good and oriented towards the recipient’s basic needs for development, he states, the marginal benefit of aid would decrease with increasing total aid, resulting in mutual substitution effects by donors and therefore making their aid flows responsive to each other. However, in his analysis Frey finds that such a perception of foreign aid is not appropriate as donors do not consider others’ contributions, but apparently allocate aid for strategic reasons.

If European aid serves foreign policy purposes and member state interests are indeed selectively delegated towards the European level, member states could be expected to anticipate the flow of EU aid they jointly adopted and to reduce their own contributions to this group of recipients. In fact, assuming that rational interests drive member state aid policies, incentives to exploit European foreign aid policies would be provided. In such a case, EU aid might have a substitution effect and crowd out member states’ bilateral aid flows. Thus, the fifth and last hypothesis states:

\[ H_5: \text{Member states’ aid contributions to recipients of common European interest decrease over time.} \]

**Data and Operationalisation**

In order to test the aforementioned hypotheses, a new dataset was compiled that includes aid flows from 1970 onwards until 2014. A case is defined as recipient-year and comprises all recipients which received any amount of ODA by the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee, with the exception of EU members’ overseas territories and small island states that do not provide comparable data. In total, these are 154 states and 5,889 cases, with a small share of these not receiving any aid by the EU and its members. On the donor side, all EU member states are included that report their aid flows to the OECD, which are all except Bulgaria, Croatia, Latvia and Malta.

The dependent variables are operationalised as total commitment of ODA in constant 2011 US-$ by the EU and EU member states as retrieved from the OECD. Since original data are generally reported in US-$, they are not converted to euros as this might cause potential distortions. In order to be able to compare EU aid flows with those
of its member states, a variable that contains aggregated aid commitments by EU member states is created, which is subject to a changing composition and only includes states that were EU members at time of the commitment. This measure is preferred over actual aid disbursements as commitments closer approximate the intention of donors to provide development assistance to a certain recipient state, irrespective of possible obstacles in its implementation\(^49\). Since the range of aid flows is quite large and would render estimates being highly sensitive to few observations, the variables were transformed with the natural logarithm having been taken. Since no constant has been added before, cases without any aid flows received are transformed into missing values, which, however, is acceptable for the theoretical framework in this paper\(^50\). In addition, a variable for the annual growth rate of aid committed by the EU or its member states, respectively, is included in order to account for the fact that aid increases to a recipient might only reflect a higher general budget. Given that development policies are often part of long-term relations, most models include lagged dependent variables as independent variables because it is adequate to assume that attitudes of donors towards recipient states do not comprehensively change every year.

In order to account for the heterogeneity of member state preferences toward recipients, the author constructed a variable that aggregates the vote share in the Council of the European Union of all member states that in the same year also made any commitment to a respective recipient, irrespective of the amount. While the disregard of the amounts of aid is necessary in order to solely focus on the structure of preferences, the consideration of donors’ vote shares in the Council discriminates between typically larger and smaller donors, thus preventing high sensitivity of the measurement to marginal amounts contributed by small member states. Data on Council vote weights originate from Jakob Lempp\(^51\).

Concerning explanatory variables, several motivations for providing aid are considered. Beginning with recipient-based explanations, the level of development is operationalised by including GDP per capita of recipient states, values having been retrieved from the World Bank and provided in constant 2011 US-$ PPP\(^52\). Since it is possible that larger states receive preferential treatment by donors, the absolute number of population, also retrieved from the World Bank, is included in the models as well. Controlling for recipient-based factors that might
shape the flow of development aid, two more variables are included. Firstly, human rights violations might result in ceasing aid efforts by donors in order to sanction respective regimes instead of potentially securing their liquidity, even though the standard of development is quite low. Human rights violations in recipient states are operationalised with higher scores on the Political Terror Scale (PTS)\(^{33}\), using values from Amnesty International, as far as these are available, and values from the US State Department otherwise. Since it is unlikely that there are linear relationships between aid commitments and human rights violations but donors might react to a threshold, the author included dummy variables for each stage of the PTS that does not indicate a good human rights record. Using PTS data aims to identify solely political violence and basic human rights violations committed by state parties. The separation between human and political rights has to be considered as the policy goals of poverty alleviation and sanctioning of autocratic regimes can be diametrically opposed to each other. In order to acknowledge this potential trade-off, the variable Polity2 from the Polity IV project\(^{34}\) is employed.

Since supporting economic ties might be one of the main determinants to shape foreign aid flows, data on bilateral exports from European Union member states are included in the analysis\(^{35}\). Furthermore, since IMF export data for the EU comprise exports of all 28 EU member states, irrespective of their actual date of accession, an aggregated EU export variable was constructed that only includes exports of states that have been EU members at the time when goods have been exported. While the EU itself does not export any goods, the Union's volume of exports is a reasonable proxy for the salience of economic relations between the EU and recipient states and thus for economic interest in developing countries. All data on exports have been log-transformed as well. As the historical relation between donor and recipient, most notably by former colonial ties\(^{36,37}\), tends to be salient, dummy variables for former colonies are included. Data are retrieved from Paul Hensel's data on colonial history\(^{38}\). Only states that have still been colonised after WW2 are included. Based on the evolution of European development policy, two country groups can be identified to be potentially of significant foreign policy interest for the European Union. Firstly, the group of African Caribbean and Pacific states (ACP) played a major role in the emergence of a common European development policy and might still be in the focus of the Union's aid focus.
Hence, a dummy variable for all ACP countries is used, which includes all current ACP states. Secondly, a dummy variable *EU Interest* has been created that includes all former aid recipients that would eventually become EU member states, as well as states that have accession candidate status or a part of the Eastern partnership programme of the EU, no matter at which point in time agreements were signed or came into force, because the point made in this paper is that the EU has a permanent geostrategic interest in these states which precedes any formal agreement. It is noteworthy, nonetheless, that this category includes only states that are officially linked to the EU. While, of course, these states might be of different levels of interest for the EU, for instance depending on whether a state is a potential member or solely a partner, they all have a pronounced special importance for the Union’s foreign policy, constituting its political ‘backyard’.59

**Methodology and Analysis**

It is worthwhile having a closer look at the pattern of aid commitments by European donors, which is adequate for the purpose of analysing the coordination between the EU and its member states (Table 2). It is noteworthy that during the whole period comprised by the data set, which begins in 1970, only four cases appear in which the European Union provided aid to a state that did not receive any foreign aid by EU member states through bilateral channels, from which fact can be inferred that member state aid commitments are generally a precondition for allocating EU development aid. In three of those cases, however, member states resumed aid commitments the following year.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Obs</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
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<td>17.351</td>
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<td>9.21</td>
<td>22.129</td>
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<td>ODA by EU members (ln)</td>
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<td>Annual growth of ODA by members</td>
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<td>GDP per capita (ln)</td>
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<td>1.074</td>
<td>5.508</td>
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<tr>
<td>Population (ln)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Polity2</td>
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<td>EU Exports (ln)</td>
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<td>2.02</td>
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<td>26.034</td>
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</table>
The focus of the analysis in this paper primarily concerns the amount of foreign aid that is allocated by the European Union and its member states. Analyses are restricted to the time frame between 1995 and 2014 as a significant amount of data is not available beforehand as well as for theoretical reasons as most European donors only in 1995 began to provide aid to former Soviet and communist states, which constitute a significant number of recipients. Regarding the research design as well as model specifications employed, the data set contains some flaws. Even though the relatively large number of observations is an advantage in dealing with such a data set, the problems of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation still appear in the analyses conducted. In order to account for these problems as well as for the fact that the assumption of independence of errors is most likely violated among observations of the same country, regressions are conducted as pooled OLS models with clustered standard errors, thus allowing for non-independent standard errors within the clusters. Nevertheless, since the data set virtually contains the entire population of European aid flows and the primary purpose of this paper consists of identifying patterns in these flows and not transposing the results, concerns regarding external validity of the results are less worrisome.

In order to assess the first hypothesis of EU development aid being more directed at the alleviation of poverty and development interests than aid by EU member states, a regression model is employed that solely includes explanatory variables that are recipient-based. Besides GDP per capita as proxy for development needs, the model includes the logged size of population, the PTS scale dummies as well as the Polity2 variable, thus controlling for human rights violations and untrustworthy political regimes, respectively (Table 3 in the Appendix).
Indeed, whereas wealth has an expected negative impact on the quantity of development aid, the result cannot find significant differences in the relevance of recipient states’ wealth as determinant of aid flows by the EU or its member states. While the point estimates of the regressions imply that EU aid decreases by 2.7 percent and EU member states’ aggregated aid by 4.4 percent if GDP per capita increases by 10 percent ceteris paribus, the estimations confidence intervals overlap and impede to conclude that EU member states commit significantly less aid to poorer recipient states. Given that poverty eradication is the superordinate goal of EU development policy, this finding provides hints that rhetoric and actual policy diverge.

In order to also examine the impact of strategical determinants of foreign aid, which are not directly related to lack of development or needs in recipient states, a general model is compiled that accounts for these factors (Table 4). The first and second models provide independent analyses of the determinants of aggregated foreign aid committed by EU member states and the EU itself, respectively. The third model accounts for the possibility that EU member state aid allocations shape aid disbursed by the EU and the last one is compiled in order to test the impact of preference heterogeneity among member states on the distribution of development aid by the EU. If employed as an independent variable, the aggregated amount of member state aid and the Council vote share of countries that provided aid to a recipient are not lagged as it is assumed that commitments on the national level and the European level in the same year are driven by the same set of member state preferences. Interestingly, exports to development aid recipient countries seem to be connected to increased aid allocations by both the EU and its member states, with this effect being more pronounced for member state aid flows.

Furthermore, less authoritarian recipient states can be expected to be rewarded with an aid surcharge by both the EU and aggregate-ly through EU member states’ bilateral aid flows. In addition, while ACP countries still receive a higher amount of aid by the EU than non-ACP countries in equal conditions, there is no such additional amount awarded by EU member states\textsuperscript{61}. Lastly, both the EU and its member states allocate higher amounts of aid to countries that are likely to be of strategic importance for European foreign policy. It is noteworthy, however, that the quantitative dimension of this effect is vastly higher for aid committed by the EU than for aid by member states, with
those states receiving ceteris paribus about 160 percent more foreign aid from the European Union than aid recipients without geostrategic importance according to the base model for EU aid. The third model includes the aggregated amount of aid committed by EU member state as an explanatory variable for EU aid allocations. Indeed, if this interconnection is acknowledged, recipients’ GDP per capita, population size and the value of exports by EU member states do not exert significant impact on the allocation of EU aid, whereas the amount

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Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

[Outlier (Solomon Isl.) excluded from fourth model]
of foreign aid committed to a certain recipient by member states does meaningfully determine the amount of aid allocated by the European Union. The fact that GDP per capita ceases to be a significant predictor could potentially be a cautious confirmation of EU aid being indeed not more aimed at poverty alleviation than bilateral aid disbursed by its member states. Moreover, the effect of geostrategic importance on EU aid allocations even increases.

Table 5 and 6 in the Appendix provide regression results of the same models for temporal subsamples from 1995-2003 and 2004-2014, respectively. The results of the member state impact-model in these subsamples and the impact of member state aid commitments for EU aid indicate that the salience of aid by member states as determinant for EU aid flows has declined, while still being an important determinant. The effect of member state aid commitments on those by the EU over time based on the member state impact model is visualised in Figure 4. While aggregated aid commitments are a substantially posi-
tive and significant determinant of EU aid flows throughout the whole period, their salience declines over time, as suggested by the regression analyses of the subsamples. In fact, the linear estimation of the effect over time indicates that the decline has been statistically significant, even though only by a minor margin. In consequence, hypotheses 2a and 3 cannot be rejected, albeit the latter one must be understood in the context that member state aid flows still substantially impact aid commitments made by the EU. However, while the EU did not allocate significantly more aid to less developed states between 1995 and 2004 if member state aid flows are considered, there is such an effect since 2004. This might partly have been caused by the detachment of EU and member state aid, considering that the subsample after 2004 shows no major differences between the EU basic and member state impact models.

To control for the heterogeneity of member state preferences, an interaction term of the total amount of member state aid and the vote share in the Council of the European Union of all member states that committed any amount of foreign aid to the recipient is included. The member state impact model is extended with this term, which results in the fourth model of Table 4. The coefficients of the interaction term appear to be both statistically and substantially significant both for the whole period under consideration and the temporal subsamples. A linear estimation of the results of the fourth base model helps to clarify the substantial meaning of the effect of member state preference heterogeneity on member state aid flows as predictor of EU aid flows (Figure 5). The voting share of member states that gave aid to a recipient are indicated on the horizontal axis, while the vertical axis shows the coefficient of the effect of member state aid flows on EU aid flows over different magnitudes of the Council share.

A higher vote share of EU member states that gave foreign aid to a certain aid recipient country is associated with a stronger impact of member state aid on aid commitments made by the European Union. If, for example, the mean value of member state aid commitments of about $69 million (or 18.06 as logged variable) is considered, an increase in the Council vote share of donors to this recipient from 50 percent to 70 percent is assumed. Calculating the impact of this change on EU aid flows under consideration of the marginal effects of Figure 6 and the coefficient for the Council vote share-variable from the regression table, it can be concluded that such an increase in Coun-
cil support would be associated with an increase of about 10 percent in EU aid. The difference between 20 percent and 70 percent support in the Council is even more pronounced, resulting in EU aid increasing by approximately 30 percent, even if the total amount of bilaterally allocated foreign aid to this recipient by all EU member states would remain the same. Hence, there is strong evidence that the pattern of development aid allocated by EU member states is a strong predictor for the shape of EU aid flows, but not necessarily the total amount of aggregated aid.

Furthermore, it seems worthwhile to have a closer look at the quantity of EU development aid commitments and the preference structure of EU member states, which is shown in Figure 6 with separate graphs for the period before and after the EU’s Eastern enlargement in 2004. The red vertical lines in both plots indicate the threshold for reaching a qualified majority in the Council.

Figure 5: Effect of Member State Aid as Predictor of EU Aid for varying Levels of supportive Council Vote Share. [Source: Author]
is apparent that prior to 2004, the qualified majority threshold also constituted a barrier for high quantities of development aid disbursed by the European Union. In fact, there is only one case that falls below this threshold with an aid quantity of more than $500 million, namely Ukraine in 1995. Interestingly, most cases that stand out due to high aid payments below the threshold are Eastern European countries, hinting at a motivation to provide foreign aid to these states, independently of member states’ preferences. Likewise, the overwhelming majority of cases above the threshold that are associated with outstandingly high aid transfers are Eastern European countries, of which many are EU members by now. After 2004 and the EU’s enlargement, this clear pattern has changed. There are no cases in which all EU member states would have allocated aid to a recipient state. This arises due to the fact that not all new member states of the EU actually provide ODA and, if they do, the number of their recipients is quite limited. In addition, the graph shows that there are several states which have received more than $500 million in foreign aid even though EU member states giving aid to this country did not constitute a qualified majority in the Council. While these states, again, are primarily (South-) Eastern European states and EU accession candidates, these also include some African states as well as recipients in the Middle East.
Regarding the fact that the threshold for reaching a qualified majority in the Council does not pose a barrier anymore, two circumstances are likely to affect this change. Firstly, most countries that accessed to the EU in 2004 and thereafter had been aid recipient states prior to their accession. In consequence, these countries, if they did at all, created their own national development aid policies only slowly. Given these countries’ level of development, the dimensions of those national policies are hardly comparable to those of Western European states. Hence, when these states became members of the EU, they not only had virtually no experience on being on the donor side of development aid policies, but also hardly commanded national policies to be pursued in the Council of the European Union. Thus, it might be possible that these states remained rather silent in negotiations and were not substantially involved in decision-making. Secondly, the institutional setting might explain the shifting pattern. Nearly simultaneously to the Eastern enlargement, the Treaty of Nice substantially altered the voting procedure in the Council. In the aftermath of the enlargement qualified majority-voting did not only concern the votes in the Council, but also required a majority of member states to agree to policies. Indeed, in most of the cases above $500 million aid without the voting weight reaching the threshold, the majority or at least close to the majority of EU members provided some amount of ODA to the recipients. In addition, these donors almost exclusively include the major three donors, namely France, Germany and the UK, who can be assumed to possess overwhelming bargaining power in the Council and alone almost have the power to block decisions. Hence, even though the threshold for Council votes cannot be reached, member states are able to implement their preferences through the European level, especially if they act as large interest coalitions. Nevertheless, a vast number of recipients that receive over proportional amounts of development aid by the European Union are Eastern and South-Eastern European states. As the regression results indicate, recipient states that are assumed to be of special interest for European foreign policy can be expected to receive a much higher amount of aid than other states, with the supplement allocated by the EU being vastly higher than the additional amount provided by EU member states and amounting to about 200 percent of aid to similar countries of no interest. Hence, the EU allocates three times as much development aid to countries of interest than to a similar country of no political interest for the EU, everything
else being equal. Furthermore, whereas this effect as determinant of EU aid flows is significant and relatively constant throughout the periods of both subsamples, strategically important recipient states are expected to have received increased amounts of aid by EU member states until 2003, but not thereafter according to the regression analysis conducted\textsuperscript{16}. This finding might not be surprising considering that the composition of the countries captured by the dummy variable EU Interest changed after ten Eastern European states became ineligible for receiving aid by joining the EU in 2004. Therefore, in the period prior to 2004, this variable included states with a highly realistic accession perspective. As indicated by the regression results, these states have been rewarded with increased amounts of ODA by both the EU and its member states. After 2004, however, several accession candidates, albeit with a more distant accession prospect, as well as the countries of the EU’s Eastern Partnership remained to be included in the variable and still received additional amounts of foreign aid by the EU, which are of quite similar quantity as those committed before 2004 when eventual member states were part of this set of recipient states. Thus, it can be inferred that current accession candidates and partners in the Eastern Partnership gained in importance for the EU’s development policy, even though the overall effect remained constant over time. The significance of this finding only becomes fully clear, however, if the diverging attitudes of the EU and its member states towards these countries are assessed. The plots in Figure 7 show the changing impact of variable EU Interest on the amount of development aid committed

Figure 7: EU Interest as Predictor of Foreign Aid Commitments over Time. [Source: Author]
by the EU and its member states over time, based on the first and second base models.

While the linear estimates indicate that the surcharge amount allocated by the EU has more or less remained constant over time, the additional amount of aid provided by EU member states to these countries of geostrategic interest for Europe has significantly decreased. Indeed, there is no significant preferential treatment given to those states any longer. These diverging developments might hint towards an increasingly functional division among the EU and its member states after 2004, which shifts most responsibility for those countries of geostrategic interest to the sphere of the EU, allowing for a unified approach towards these states that are assumingly a common interest of the EU, and therefore for all its member states.

Clearly, member state foreign aid flows to these countries do not cease to exist and approaches of EU member states towards these nations differ substantially. The salience of the variable for individual member states' bilateral aid flows is indicated in Figure 8 in the Appendix. For countries with a traditional policy focus on Eastern Europe such as Austria, Germany and Greece as well as Sweden, recipient countries of geostrategic interest have even gained in importance regarding bilateral aid allocations. On the other hand, quite clear decreases of the surcharge to these recipient countries can be observed in the cases of Belgium, Denmark and the Netherlands. For other EU member states the effect of European geopolitical interests on bilateral aid flows did not alter significantly in the course of time and remains either insignificant or even negative, which is notably the case for Spain and Italy, which have traditionally less interest in Eastern European affairs. Nevertheless, while individual member state preferences diverge, in their entirety bilateral aid flows by EU member states and EU aid flows increasingly diverge regarding aid to relatively developed recipients that might be of geopolitical interest to Europe.

**Discussion**
Common European development policy has undergone a process of formalisation and separation into diverse policy tools in the past decades, with the focus of rhetoric being directed on its primary goal of poverty eradication and aid effectiveness by augmenting policy coherence. While the formalisation of aid programmes can indeed contribute to
increasing the effectiveness of foreign aid and preventing development aid to be employed as a tool of non-transparent foreign policy goals, the European Union’s relatively clear distinction into different development policy instruments remains questionable. Overall, foreign aid given by the European Union is not more oriented towards the poorest recipient states than aid allocated by its member states, with the Union’s share of aid to least developed countries massively decreasing during the past decades. In this context, the formalisation of development policies might raise concerns that more politicised purposes are explicitly identified and served through separate development assistance programmes. The exclusion of these policy goals from the communicated superordinate aim of poverty eradication is apparently justified by doing so. Since bilateral aid is less structured in these terms, one of the major differences between the EU and its member states concerns this formal and rhetoric separation of policy goals to be achieved by allocating foreign aid, even though at the end of the day the European Union’s development policy seems to be neither more oriented at recipient needs nor less strategic than those disbursed bilaterally by its member states, revealing a gap between declared goals and reality. These circumstances might partly be caused by the continuously high influence that member states exert on EU development policies through the Union’s institutional design. In fact, EU members aim at remaining in charge and repeatedly prevented further integration in the field of development assistance, indicating that the dual institutional design of the EU in this policy area is a result of feasible integration in some areas, namely regarding aid to ACP countries which France was able to enforce several decades ago and that still is subject to an enhanced relationship, and the unfeasibility of Europeanisation in other domains of development policy. The congruency of foreign aid provided by the EU and by its member states is therefore a logical consequence.

As has been shown, not only do members’ bilateral aid flows reasonably well predict the shape of the common European foreign aid policy, but also does the heterogeneity of member state preferences towards recipients determine the amount of aid provided by the EU. Nonetheless, repeated EU enlargement rounds and increasingly diverse bilateral aid policies have meaningfully reduced the link between bilateral and EU aid flows.

However, as EU aid becomes less dependent on member state aid flows, where does it go then? The analysis conducted in this paper has
indicated that states of geopolitical interest for Europe are - independent of member state preferences - over proportionally favoured by foreign aid provided by the EU, whereas these recipients continuously experience less special treatment by the entirety of all EU member states, albeit individual foreign aid contributions to these countries differ among member states. In consequence, it seems that the EU’s development policy has, to a limited extent, evolved from being shaped by dominant national interests into the direction of becoming a foreign policy tool of the Union and common interests. This development might be best described as EU foreign aid becoming rather a club good than a public good, which allows implementing common European interests that are implicitly shared by all member states. This level of aid allocation allows for separating foreign aid from member states’ political relations to respective recipient countries. By doing so, potential coordination dilemmas are prevented and the European bargaining position can be substantially improved, thus strengthening the EU as coherent political entity in terms of political relations to these countries of interest.

In the context of Milner’s theory of multilateral aid as mechanism to signal commitment to development goals, this finding might be interpreted insofar as EU member states, especially if they have traditionally insignificant ties to Eastern Europe, might shift this more politicised part of their foreign aid policies to the European level. By doing so, these interests are subject to public scrutiny to a far lesser extent, given that foreign aid disbursed by the EU experiences surprisingly high approval ratings, even though it is under less public scrutiny than bilateral aid flows of respective member states. By communising this strategic component of European aid and correspondingly acting as unitary actor, member states’ political costs can be reduced. While the results of the analysis at hand seem to show a potential change in the direction that coordination in the European aid regime primarily signifies functional division, it will be up to future research to identify in more detail how the EU impacts individual member state policies, especially in regard to those recipients of political interest for the European Union.

Furthermore, an analysis of formation of national foreign aid policies of Eastern European EU member states and their targets might be of particular interest for future research. These states developed national policies almost from scratch while being simultaneously involved in the EU’s development policy.
Finally, the results of this paper indicate that EU foreign aid is increasingly not merely the aggregation of its members’ aid flows, but rather adds another dimension to them. This should be kept in mind for upcoming decisions regarding the institutional setting of EU development policy, for instance, concerning the potential unionisation of the European Development Fund after the Cotonou Agreement will expire in 2020.

Kenneth Thomas Stiller

Kenneth Thomas Stiller is affiliated to the Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford, and may be reached at kenneth.stiller@politics.ox.ac.uk.
## Appendix

### Table 3: Recipient-Need Model

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Observations: 2,192, 2,405

R-squared: 0.130, 0.512

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Outlier (Solomon Isl.) excluded from Member State regression
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Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Estimates of Variable ‘EU Interest’ over Time

New Member States excluded due to insufficient numbers of observations
Notes

1 www.thesun.co.uk/archives/politics/804887/record-bill-for-eu-is-19bn/
10 Rodrik (1995)
13 Knack & Rahman (2007)
19 Lebovic & Voeten (2009)
For the World, for Me or for Us?

The aid commitment data provided by the OECD include few small negative values, which are likely to indicate repayments of loans by recipients. However, it would be unsound to assume that foreign aid has been paid by recipients to donors, for which reason these values were set to zero.

The dimension of aid flow variables impedes adding a constant as either its amount is not negligible or, if too low, results in distorting outliers that are even more disadvantageous for the analysis.

While there are more specific ways to measure lacking development, GDP is a very reliant proxy and closely correlated to those other variables as well as available for almost all states. As Neumayer (2003) furthermore argues, other need-based determinants tend to be insignificant if GDP is included.

More specifically, the variable includes Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia before their accession to the EU in 2004 when they became ineligible to receive ODA; official candidate countries for accession which are Albania, FYR Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Turkey; potential candidate countries Bosnia/Herzegovina and Kosovo; Countries of the Eastern Partnership, which are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova Ukraine. Unfortunately, due to missing values for context variables, Bosnia/Herzegovina is entirely excluded from the regression-based analysis.

This method provides substantially the same key results as regressions with panel-corrected standard errors and random-effects GLS regressions with clustered standard errors, in many models even calculating equal
coefficients. The only major difference is that these methods identify the Polity2 variable to be most often significant to the 95% level.

Neither is there an aggregated member state bonus if ACP countries are replaced with a dummy that includes former colonies of EU member states.

The volatile effect of the stages of the Political Terror Scale should be mentioned. These dummy variables describe significant deviation in the amount of aid as compared to the first level of the scale, which indicates a very good human rights record and only accounts for about 10% of all observations in the data set, even less after 2004. Therefore, regression results for this variable should be interpreted quite carefully, especially given the fact that all PTS dummies exert a positive and significant impact on aid allocations in the analysis restricted to the time period after 2004.

A qualified majority in the Council of the European Union had been reached with 62 of 87 votes (71.3%) between 1995 and 2003 as well as 232 of 321 votes (72.3%) after the Eastern enlargement in 2004 and 255 of 345 votes (73.9%) since 2007.


Even if Turkey, which received over proportionally high shares of aid by the EU in recent years, is excluded, substantial results do not differ.

In order to assess the impact of EU Interest on bilateral aid flows over time, the following regression model was conducted for each of the 15 ‘old’ EU member state, including the variable of former colonies applying to seven member states:

\[
\text{ODA(ln)} = \beta_1 \text{ODA}_{t-1}(\text{ln}) + \beta_2 \text{GDP per capitat}_{t-1}(\text{ln}) + \beta_3 \text{Population}_{t-1}(\text{ln}) + \beta_4 \text{PTS}_2 + \beta_5 \text{PTS}_3 + \beta_6 \text{PTS}_4 + \beta_7 \text{Polity2} + \beta_8 \text{National Exports(ln)} + \beta_9 \text{Former Colony} + \beta_{10} \text{ACP} + \beta_{11} \text{EU Interest} + \beta_{12} \text{EU Interest*Year} + \beta_{13} \text{Year}
\]
The debate on and around “killer robots” has been firmly established at the crossroads of ethical, legal, political, strategic, and scientific discourses. Flourishing at the two opposite poles, with a few contributors caught in the middle, the polemic still falls short of a detailed, balanced, and systematic analysis. It is for these reasons that we focus on the nitty-gritties, multiple pros and cons, and implications of autonomous weapon systems (AWS) for the prospects of the international order. Moreover, a nuanced discussion needs to feature the considerations of their technological continuity vs. novelty. The analysis begins with properly delimiting the AWS category as fully autonomous (lethal) weapon systems, capable of operating without human control or supervision, including in dynamic and unstructured environments, and capable of engaging in independent (lethal) decision-making, targeting, and firing, including in an offensive manner. As its primary goal, the article aims to move the existing debate to the level of a first-order structure and offers its comprehensive operationalisation. We propose an original framework based on a thorough analysis of six specific dilemmas, and detailing the pro/con argument for each of those: (1) (un)predictability of AWS performance; (2) dehumanization of lethal decision-making; (3) depersonalisation of enemy (non-)combatant; (4) human-machine nexus in coordinated operations; (5) stra-
tégic considerations; (6) AWS operation in law(less) zone. What follows are concluding remarks.

Keywords: autonomous weapon systems, killer robots, lethal decision-making, military ethics, artificial intelligence, security regulation, humanitarian law, revolution in military affairs, military strategy

Anzhelika Solovyeva
Nik Hynek

The speculative term “killer robots” has increasingly been penetrating into ethical, legal, political, strategic, scientific and academic discourses. “Robots” in this collocation are designated as a “colloquial rendering for autonomous weapon systems” (AWS). These are in turn delimited by the International Committee of the Red Cross as weapon systems that “can independently select and attack targets, i.e. with autonomy in the ‘critical functions’ of acquiring, tracking, selecting and attacking targets,” and by the United States Department of Defense as weapon systems “that, once activated, can select and engage targets without further intervention by a human operator.”

Discussions in relation to the integration of this technology into combat “have ranged from the moral and legal implications, to technical and operational concerns, to issues about international security and worries about cyber vulnerability.” A truly “multi-dimensional” debate arose primarily around the central ethical concern of the moral and legal acceptability of delegating “to a machine or automated process the authority or capability to initiate the use of lethal force independently of human determinations of its moral and legal legitimacy” – as accurately emphasised as the primary object of the debate, for example, by Peter Asaro and as will be elaborated in more detail below in this paper. This debate has been largely flourishing at the two distinct points and involving multiple actors. Currently, there are more than sixty non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in the international campaign calling for an international legally binding treaty to prohibit the development and use of AWS. States are also involved into the discourse and the main venue for United Nations deliberations on AWS is the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons in Geneva. Military personnel, scientists and lawyers, ethicists and philosophers have contributed to the discussion. While critics call for a blanket preventive global ban on the development, production and use of this warfare technology, some proponents insist that, on the contrary, there may exist a “moral imperative” for their deployment in
and that a blanket prohibition may bring serious humanitarian risks, considering the possibility that AWS may potentially become more discriminating and more ethically preferable to alternatives.12

It is worth clarifying that these apparently incompatible positions do not exist independently of each other. Largely, the pieces of literature produced by the representatives of the two positions make it clear that both sides in the debate do recognise the existence and are aware of the content of counter-arguments to their own visions of the problematic. They both indeed use a set of axioms, raise certain hypotheses and issues to impugn the contradictory point of view. So no great monologue: it is the proper debate. This article neither aims to take sides in the debate or to question any of its building blocs intellectually, nor does it aim to draw a line between the two camps agent-wise or to simply retell the debate. Rather, the goal is to move “beyond” the existing discussion, in the following ways:

a. This analysis aims to move the debate to the level of a first-order structure by suggesting the authors’ vision of a comprehensive operationalisation of the debate. Based on the writings of both proponents and opponents of AWS development and deployment as well as on other related sources and analytical articles, the paper aims to reveal multiple argument–counter-argument chains in relation to certain matters of the dispute in a multi-issue manner and a parallel counter-posing manner. The latter, within the context of this paper, means not counter-posing certain agents’ visions against one another, but substantially counter-posing arguments themselves that in some way appeared in a related discussion by any of the cited authors. The focus on details in this analysis will help to demonstrate the full-fledged, double-sided nature of the key aspects of the debate.

b. For achieving the just-mentioned, this analysis aims to go beyond the broader categories of legality, morality, ethicality, military utility, political and strategic implications of “killer robots,” which the debate is largely being built around. Instead it constructs the framework of six specific dilemmas, potentially raised by autonomous weapon systems. Each consists of constituent parts or supporting matters of the dispute. By analytically separating the dilemmas and (sub)sections, this paper aims to highlight that each of them represents a certain controversial
aspect of the debate. However, at the same time these multiple aspects are considered and presented in this paper as interlinked and intertwinned to form one common picture with regard to the nature of AWS and the challenges they pose. It is important to note that the way these dilemmas and their components are specified and structured in this paper, with each aspect potentially deserving its own place in future research, will also provide the reader with an analytical framework that may make it easier to detect and analyse multiple interlinkages between these aspects in greater depth and in multiple possible ways, which is beyond the scope of this article due to space limitation.

**Delimiting the object of the debate**

The robotic revolution in military affairs is currently underway as the next paradigm shift in the nature of warfare following the introduction of gunpowder and nuclear bombs.\(^{13}\) Robot is a powered machine that senses, thinks and acts.\(^{14}\) Robotic systems can (be) operate(d) semi- or fully-autonomously but they “cannot depend entirely on human control.”\(^{15}\) These are currently widely present in the modern battlefield and the functions vary from providing intelligence gathering, surveillance, reconnaissance, target acquisition and designation to engagement capabilities.\(^{16}\)

To specify though, “robots are not weapons systems until they are armed”\(^{17}\) and specifically a certain category of “armed robots”\(^{18}\) or “robot weapons”\(^{19}\) form the core of this debate. Robot weapons are not new to the modern combat. Most of the currently deployed armed robots today are semi-autonomous (e.g., the United States Air Force’s Predator), but some autonomous systems are also emerging (e.g., the United States Navy’s Phalanx Close-In Weapon System).\(^{20}\) However, fully autonomous robot weapons “do not yet exist.”\(^{21}\) The debate is built around the idea of a preventive ban. It is, thus, fundamental for the purpose of this article to clarify the boundaries between the so-called “killer robots” and other armed robots that have been used in the battlefield.

**Fully autonomous (lethal) weapon systems**

We begin by bringing together a variety of collocations used to refer to the debated technological category, going beyond the emotive, one-sided, and analytically unproductive term “killer robots”. Our ac-
ademic preference lies with a more neutral alternative term “autonomous weapon systems.” Other options include lethal autonomous weapon systems, lethal autonomous systems, autonomous lethal technologies, lethal autonomous weapons, lethal autonomous robot weapons, fully autonomous weapons, fully autonomous armed robots, fully autonomous robotic weapons and others. They all allow for a capture of the two most distinctive features of this specific robot weapon sub-category, which encompasses “fully” and “lethal” autonomous weapon systems. These two features differentiate the debated category from the existing armed robotic systems.

While remotely operated systems, primarily including “drones and unmanned ground and underwater vehicles,” feature “systems based on robotic technologies,” can be used offensively and can be “lethally armed,” they may be more correctly described as “uninhabited” rather than unmanned systems, although they are referred to in either way. This is because their autonomous mission is primarily “to navigate, but not select and engage targets, autonomously” and they only “enable those who control lethal force not to be physically present when it is deployed.” In turn, AWS will “add a new dimension to this distancing” where in addition to being physically removed from the kinetic action, humans will also become more detached from decisions to fire/kill and their execution. Importantly, such systems will “eliminate human judgement in the initiation of lethal force.” AWS will close the gap between uninhabited and unmanned warfare.

It is worth noting that some weapon systems are already “able to identify, track and engage incoming targets on their own” and “can already be set up so that humans are cut out of decision-making.” However, they represent only “the precursors” to the capabilities that will appear in future autonomous systems. Defensive weapon systems are currently the only type of autonomous robots that have been deployed and they can only fire on targets within well-delimited areas, therefore, they can be seen as “extensions of electric fences.” Besides being solely defensive weapons, which are stationary or fixed, and are designed to operate within tightly set parameters and time frames, such systems are primarily pre-programmed to fire at inanimate targets. Counter-rocket, anti-missile and anti-aircraft systems represent this definition in practice. Although there also exists SGR-A1 “robotic stationary platform designed to replace or to assist South Korean sentinels in the surveillance of the demilitarized zone between North and
South Korea” and it can operate in an unsupervised “mode” whereby, importantly, also “any human being detected there is classified as a target,” this system is also only a precursor to the debated robot weapon sub-category because, although potentially expected to initiate autonomous lethal force, it is designed to operate in a strictly structured environment, i.e. “Korean demilitarized zone” where human access is “categorically prohibited.” Importantly, with regard to the systems described in this paragraph, humans still “decide when and where to deploy the weapon, and can intervene to prevent its operation.”

In turn, AWS will “operate without human control or supervision in dynamic, unstructured, open environments, attacking various sets of targets, including inhabited vehicles, structures or even individuals,” potentially being able to “learn and adapt their behavior.”

To summarise, “killer robots” or, better still, true autonomous weapon systems (AWS), in their proper meaning and as referred to in the context of this article, can be differentiated from all other robot weapon categories by a unique combination of features defining their category: (1) they are fully autonomous, including (a) their ability to operate without human control or supervision in dynamic, unstructured and/or open environments and (b) their ability to engage in autonomous (lethal) decision-making, autonomous (lethal) targeting and autonomous (lethal) force; (2) they could be used as offensive autonomous weapons; (3) these are all part of advances in Artificial Intelligence (AI) that will distinguish fully autonomous weapon systems from the existing weapon technologies because true AWS will be able to operate without human oversight, instead – on the basis of “artificial intelligence algorithms,” also potentially permitting them to engage in “machine learning.” The detailed discussion of related artificial intelligence or machine learning as distinct phenomena or processes is beyond the scope of this article, which aims to refer to them in the context of the dilemma analysis.

**Dilemma analysis**

The debate on and around the just-delimited robot weapon category of AWS, as already specified above, concerns primarily the possibility of their autonomous lethal force. Those opposing AWS deployment and calling for an international pre-emptive ban on AWS build their argument on the basis of the deep convergence of a deontological view-
point and a consequentialist standpoint. With regard to the former, by “taking ethical conduct by humans for granted (‘humans are ethical, and robots are not’),” they believe, as accurately summarised by Peter Asaro, that it is immoral by itself to kill without the involvement of human reason, judgement and compassion and outsourcing lethal decisions to machines may automatically mean the regress in ethics and morality, thus, it should be illegal. With regard to the latter, their deontological position is supported by the multi-dimensional consequentialist analysis of “expected benefits and costs flowing from AWS deployment,” which they use to substantially prove costs are likely to “outweigh the sum of the expected benefits.” This is where their argument meets the multi-dimensional counter-argument by those “giving up on human morality altogether (‘humans fail to act ethically, so we need ethical robots’)” and insisting that robots’s potential ability to perform better than humans in the battlefield means the achievability of ethical robot autonomy and establishes a “moral imperative” to make use of AWS in combat. The following paragraphs serve to provide a deep insight into these multiple argument – counter-argument chains in relation to AWS deployment. Although the primary issue of the dispute largely drives their content, the argumentation goes deeper in many regards touching on all potential implications of AWS deployment, as either directly or indirectly related to the central concern.

Dilemma no. 1: (Un)predictability of AWS performance

The prospects of exercising human control over as well as being able to understand and predict the patterns of AWS performance is a core concern underlying multiple issues related to other dilemmas and their (sub)sections.

The argument against AWS deployment warns against the difficulty of reliably predicting the behaviour of complex autonomous systems. Humanity risks not only having “little knowledge of — or control over — what is being done in its name,” but also potentially facing multiple challenges and dangers, including the one of robots “running amok.”

Double-edge sword of pre-programming

A mathematical formula or a magic algorithm for intelligence does not exist meaning a machine will never be fully identical to a human. While the importance of human judgement and reason by themselves
versus computational formulas will be highlighted within the next dilemma, here will be presented the analysis of the technical aspect of the inability to fully replicate human intelligence through algorithms. With regard to this, there is the choice between the two contradictory pre-programming options for AWS, neither of which seems attractive.

a. **Software rigidity.** Robots lack “situational awareness,” “contextual intelligence or common sense, on par with humans.” That means decisions implemented via an autonomous system cannot be based on observations of the situation to which the decision relates but are “based on whatever information is available through experience and foresight at the time the machine is programmed.” Robots “cannot be programmed for all eventualities” though, especially in military scenarios, and even “sophisticated algorithms are subject to failure if they face situations outside their intended design parameters.” This may result in contextual misperformance caused mainly by the two major challenges in this regard: the “problem of relevance” of information, and the “problem of representation” of subjects and objects in combat situations.

Firstly, one only relies on relevant information in a given context that is “relatively easy for humans to do, but very difficult for computers.” The latter may potentially face the challenge of information or data limitation combined with their limited ability to capture subjective human meanings. Secondly, testing environments “may be substantially different than more complex, unstructured, and dynamic battlefield conditions” and there is a risk that a robot’s world model “may not correspond exactly to reality” due to the limitations of its sensors and processing algorithms, harsh conditions such as dust, noisy and low-light conditions, dynamic environments or explosions, which may drastically change the environment. Looking ahead, “rigidity can easily lead to bad consequences when events and situations unforeseen or insufficiently imagined by the programmers occur, causing the robot to perform badly or simply do horrible things.”

b. **Software flexibility.** The agenda aimed at the creation of (artificial) super-intelligence, alternatively – strong artificial intelligence or superhuman intelligence, is also a concern. The idea behind is to develop strong machine intelligence capable of reaching
and potentially surpassing, outstripping or exceeding human intelligence.\textsuperscript{80} AWS super-intelligence promises to be “capable of independently interpreting and even setting its goals and acting to attain them,” acquiring “great volumes of data themselves and categorise it in new, sometimes unexpected, ways,” acting “on that information with speed and precision unobtainable by human controlled systems” and “capable of learning from experience and improving performance.”\textsuperscript{81} The latter implies the process of machine learning, which means a robot will act by rules that are “not fixed during the production process, but can be changed during the operation of the machine, by the machine itself.”\textsuperscript{82} The potential capabilities for “shape-shifting” in reconfigurable systems\textsuperscript{83} and creating other robots through “self-replicating”\textsuperscript{84} have also been mentioned as potential components of the overall picture. In the era of super-intelligence it may be too hard to foresee the behaviour of a robot “introduced to novel situations”\textsuperscript{85} or to “predict with reasonable certainty what the robot will learn.”\textsuperscript{86} AWS warfare risks evolving “not only beyond human control,” but even possibly “beyond human understanding.”\textsuperscript{87} As a potential outcome, super-intelligent machines “may pose a threat to humans, either deliberately in pursuit of its own goal or inadvertently in optimising some pre-set goals.”\textsuperscript{88} At best it may lead them to overwrite their own programming, especially with regard to the most fundamental aspects of the Laws of War (LOW) and Rules of Engagement (ROE),\textsuperscript{89} and at worst humanity may face a “robot revolution.”\textsuperscript{90}

\textit{Inherent software unpredictabilities}

The “inherent weaknesses in AWS” encompass those mechanical issues that “will always be the Achilles’ heel of any tasking and deployment of any weapon system.”\textsuperscript{91}

\textit{a. Software imperfections.} All programs have “bugs” implying “errors in the logic of the program itself” that are typically undetectable and may either manifest themselves in specific circumstances, usually only during the execution of the program, or even never manifest themselves.\textsuperscript{92} Additionally, any system is subject to breakdowns, malfunctions, glitches.\textsuperscript{93} The computer program used in the robot’s on-board computer may consist of “millions
of lines of code” written by teams of programmers, none of whom knows the entire program, that results in the impossibility to “predict the effect of a given command with absolute certainty, since portions of large programs may interact in unexpected, untested ways.”94 To highlight, “as complexity of any system increases, the more opportunities exist for errors to be introduced.”95 Programming bugs and system malfunctions lead to accidents96 and “mistakes by military robots may be fatal.”97

b. **Cybervulnerability.** Any system is subject to interferences.98 Bugs are typically considered to be software vulnerabilities that can be exploited by hackers to cause the system to do something other than what it is designed to do on a regular basis, or even can lead to AWS being hijacked.99 Unsurprisingly, as computer programs become more sophisticated, they simultaneously become more vulnerable to cyberattacks.100 There is a risk that using this channel, the enemy – be it a state or a non-state actor – “might be able to use cyber means to take control of an autonomous weapon system and direct it against friendly forces or a civilian population.”101

**Superhuman pace of battle**
AWS will be “able to process information and reach decisions sequentially and via parallel processing at speeds that are orders of magnitude faster than humans.”102 They will be able to make decisions in nanoseconds, while humans may need a minimum of hundreds of milliseconds for the same.103 Such a pace of the battle, where decisions are taken with “superhuman speed”104 meaning “the speed of action on the battlefield would eclipse the speed of human decision-making,”105 may be “way beyond the speed of human intervention” leaving humans with “little control over the battlespace.”106

**Unpredictability of device-device interactions**

a. **Coordinated attacks.** Increasingly, “it will become necessary to deploy multiple robots to accomplish dangerous and complex tasks” in a form of multiple robot system architectures executing coordinated attacks.107 One potential drawback of a network architecture involving autonomous devices may be that, because of the complexity of such a system, the interaction can be unpredictable.108
b. Friendly-hostile interaction. As more and more countries (attempt to) develop AWS and autonomous counter defences, “these weapons as well as command and control systems will inevitably interact” and when “any mobile device controlled by software programs interacts with a competing hostile device controlled by unknown software, the result of the interaction is scientifically impossible to predict.” The “speed of their unpredictable interaction” may further exacerbate this concern.

The counter-argument rests on two pillars with the first one criticizing biased framing of AWS (un)predictability, and the second one clarifying that “there is no such thing as ‘complete’ autonomy in the sense of a machine operating entirely independently of any human.”

Biased framing of AWS (un)predictability versus conventional warfare

a. Unpredictability of existing systems. The problem of malfunction is not unique to AWS but is the case with different weapon systems ranging from catapults to more complex computer attack systems. Cyberattacks are also not new, as has been repeatedly demonstrated in cases with predator drones that “have been regularly hacked by militants.”

b. Unpredictability of human conduct. Human soldiers, in turn, are subject to a number of psychological factors, which are to be discussed in detail within the context of the next dilemma, that “render their behavior unpredictable.” In turn, software-based AWS may “potentially remove much of the unpredictability of human behavior in the battlespace.” By taking the human being out of the decision-making chain, AWS may at least “partially decouple the limits of the system from the limits of its operators.”

Illusion of unrestrained robotic autonomy

It is fundamentally incorrect to describe autonomous systems “as being ‘independent’ machines that operate ‘without human control’ ” or as “ ‘intelligent’ machines having the capacity for ‘choice’ or ‘truly autonomous’ operation.”
a. **AWS is never human-free.** A “fully autonomous system is never completely human-free.”

Fundamentally, the “development of an artificially intelligent system is in fact just an exercise in software development,” where subsequently the only function of a computer is to run the installed software, and although it may seem that “the system itself is ‘choosing’ between two alternative courses of action,” in fact, the choice is “made in advance” by the person writing the program. Whether concrete actions are “explicitly programmed into a machine,” or whether “technologies of artificial intelligence are employed to allow the machine to adapt its behaviour dynamically,” in either case AWS “behaviour originates not in the machines themselves, but in the minds of their developers.” The only difference between these actions and more familiar actions in the battlefield is that there will be a pronounced “lag-time between the latent human decisions built into the causal architecture of the weapons system itself and the anticipated combat effect of that weapon system that later eventuates.”

b. **AWS are never order-free.** Additionally, AWS “autonomy should be considered in light of the existing command and control structure” that does not presuppose operation without orders. Human combatants are in fact expected to act in accordance with “a regulatory and governance framework ranging over a set of considerations, from the international law of the sea, to humanitarian law and a range of treaty obligations, all the way to specific rules of engagement,” and full autonomy to act without external restraint has seldom been granted even to the human commanders.

**Dilemma no. 2: Dehumanization of Lethal Decision-Making**

The removal of a soldier from the battlefield leads to “dehumanization of killing” that may already, to some extent, manifest itself in the use of remotely operated drones. AWS may simply mean a step further in dehumanization of warfare.

The argument against AWS deployment insists that further robotisation may transform warfare into “unempathic automated industrial process.”
Combat deprived of healthy human emotion

Humans tend to engage in emotional reasoning and human emotions may play a positive role in combat. “Healthy” emotions, which may include an innate reluctance or inhibition to killing, guilt, concern, mercy, the ability to empathize and the capacity for compassion, serve as “drivers of prosocial behaviour and moral sensitivity” producing “a major obstacle to killing in war” and “an important check on the killing of civilians.”

AWS run by a program has no human emotions, thus, will be unable to employ them. Not only will the deployment of these so-called soulless killers in combat “make killing easier,” but it will also result in “the deprivation of hope” for some kind of empathy, mercy, and reprieve.

Combat deprived of human judgement and reason

As “the context gets more complex, it becomes impossible to anticipate all the situations that soldiers will encounter, thus leaving the choice of behavior in many situations up to the best judgment of the soldier.” Human decisions in combat are guided by human judgement and human reason. The significance of those in the military context cannot be denied. Let alone that the boundaries between groups such as “friend” or “foe” are “often poorly defined and heavily value-laden,” recognising a civilian and a combatant is of central concern. “This distinction makes it legally permissible, at least sometimes, for combatants to kill enemy combatants” and makes it “almost never legally justified for combatants to kill innocent civilians,” however, at the same time “combatants retain certain rights, like the right to surrender, and not to be killed unnecessarily” and there are “cases in which it is legally permissible to kill civilians.” The distinction is blurry. In addition to “the lack of a clear definition of civilian,” with regard to combatants it is also “not just a matter of uniform; soldiers who are wounded, have surrendered or are mentally ill are also immune.” This distinction may also be highly problematic “in guerrilla and insurgent warfare, in which combatants pose as civilians.” It may be challenging for robot sensors not only “to distinguish between a man carrying an AK-47 and a man carrying a walking stick,” but especially to distinguish “between a civilian carrying a weapon and a combatant.”

To specify on their role, in the military context, human judgement and human reason are, firstly, “necessary to comply with the law.”
Law is by its essential nature imperfect, incomplete, and subject to interpretation. Human situational understanding and judgement, which enable considering and drawing insights from different, potentially incompatible or contradictory, perspectives thereby keeping the legal system on track, “exceed any conceivable system of fixed rules or any computational system.” Secondly, there may be the “distinction between fundamental morality and practical law.” The “ability to think morally based on one’s values, and to give oneself the moral commands” is also a “distinctive human characteristic.” To put it bluntly, moral reasoning also cannot be codified or programmed. “None of these are fixed values, and human reasoning often involves “qualitative rather than quantitative judgements.” Depriving the combat of human judgement and human reason will eliminate the human determination of morality and legitimacy of lethal force, including the right to surrender. Importantly, the human ability to disobey illegal and immoral orders will also be eliminated.

Combat deprived of military honour
One interesting argument against AWS warfare is that humans are capable of “morally praiseworthy and supererogatory behaviour,” as exemplified by heroism or “going beyond the call of duty,” something that machines will not be able to replicate. This is linked to the concept of military honor, which is a human value because robots will follow orders without being aware of making sacrifices. Using AWS in combat will be a violation of this principle.

The counter-argument denies “the mere potentiality” of a human combatant’s mercy, compassion or honor “should make a difference if, in fact, this potentiality does not materialize.”

Biased framing of AWS warfare versus human warfare
It is necessary to “beware of idealizations of human warfare.” To begin with, as Ronald Arkin quoting Immanuel Kant, Albert Einstein and Sigmund Freud summarised, war and aggressive tendencies seem to be ingrained in human nature because humanity’s “propensity to wage war has gone unabated for as long as history has been recorded.” On top of that, humanity also “has a rather dismal record in ethical behavior in the battlefield,” which may, to some extents, result from certain “performance-hindering conditions.”
a. **Human biological factors.** Biological limitations to human effective and ethical performance in the battlefield may include the requirement for breathable air, rest and sleep, drinkable water and food, as well as the physical extremes of acceleration and cognitive load, and also the vulnerability to temperatures, radiation, biological and chemical weapons.165

b. **Human emotional-psychological factors.** “While it is certainly correct that emotions can restrain humans, it is equally true that emotions can unleash the basest of instincts.”166 Negative emotions or psychological factors can enter the scene.167 Emotional distortions can occur.168 Frustration, fear, stress, hysteria, panic, spite, hatred, anger, hate, prejudice, revenge, vengefulness, resentment, mental disturbance or trauma, as well as self-preservation,169 and importantly, human lack of an “offensive spirit” in certain circumstances170 – are all part of the list of factors that may potentially “cloud” human judgment.171

c. **The fog of war.** The “fog of war”172 or the “turmoil of war”173 may additionally hinder effective human performance because, in the military context, interactions often have to be carried out in noisy, stressful, and confusing conditions and are additionally challenged by the pressures of time, environmental hazards, degradation of communications, multiple control problems and perceptual challenges, as well as decisions sometimes have to be made with unclear orders or contradictory information in stressful situations.174

**Less inhuman AWS warfare**
The factors mentioned above serve as potential explanations for “human error”175 in the forms of human underreaction and overreaction.176 While the former may result in prolonging the war,177 the latter may drive excessive and indiscriminate uses of force, contribute to war crimes, friendly fire incidents and/or unjustified collateral damage, including noncombatant casualties and damage to civilian property.178

As AWS will be “devoid of negative human emotions,”179 “resilient to adverse psychological effects that underlie the perpetration of some unlawful acts by human actors,”180 “immune” to other human “performance-hindering conditions,”181 and will be able to reduce the negative impact of the “fog of war,”182 partially through removing the need for vulnerable control and communication links,183 they have “the poten-
tial to ultimately save human lives (both civilian and military) in armed conflicts.” If “programmed to never break the laws of war,” AWS would be “incapable of doing so.” “A notion proposed by the proponents of lethal autonomous robots” is that AWS strict reliance on preset technological “fixes” and “data-driven, bias-free analysis” will allow AWS both to eliminate moments of hesitation or mercy when killings are objectively necessary for ending the war sooner, in turn saving many lives overall, and to put an end on deliberate violations of the laws of armed conflict, in turn promising “fewer war crimes, fewer civilian casualties.” That means AWS may make war “less inhumane through lessening the human element from warfare.”

In addition, as human soldiers and autonomous weapon systems may be deployed in integrated architectures in the future warfare, the potential capability of AWS to independently and objectively monitor and report (un)ethical behavior in the battlefield by all parties may lead “to a reduction in human ethical infractions.”

A note on military honor
Although, as indicated above, robots may be blamed to be unaware of making sacrifices and unable to replicate human heroism, the counter-argument is that, in real combat, only a few combatants may seek combat glory, while roughly ninety-nine percent of them simply want to complete the mission efficiently and with the least possible amount of casualties. Importantly still, many medals for heroism are awarded for defensive actions, and AWS may actually be ideally suited for the overall defensive posture thereby compensating for the potential lack of human military honour in AWS warfare.

Dilemma no. 3: Depersonalisation of enemy (non-)combatant
The dehumanizing effect of AWS may be susceptible to other problems. That is “depersonalization of war” made possible through the combination of “depersonalized forms of responsibility,” which are to be discussed as a part of the legal challenges associates with AWS warfare, and “depersonalisation of the enemy.”

The argument against AWS deployment regarding the latter component is built on the assumption that by following analogies of the dronification of military interventions, the use of lethal robots will further depersonalise war and methods of killing by removing all
human attributes from the representation of the enemy and turning enemy (non-) combatants into objects deprived of moral value.\textsuperscript{199} This practice of “objectivisation” may turn warfare into “a factory of death.”\textsuperscript{200}

Absense of inter-personal relationship\textsuperscript{201}
Lethal force “has always been an intensely personal affair” with a human being physically present at the moment of the release of force and taking this decision.\textsuperscript{202} The practice of “killing at a distance”\textsuperscript{203} brought about by remote-controlled systems will be “taken to a next level through the introduction of the autonomous release of force.”\textsuperscript{204} AWS threaten to increase both distancing and detachment.\textsuperscript{205} While the physical distance from the act of killing may not be greater, the psychological distance will no longer play a significant role in AWS warfare.\textsuperscript{206} This not only will render enemy (non-) combatants “less visible”\textsuperscript{207} through reducing them to “targets” in a “dislocated reality,”\textsuperscript{208} but also will exacerbate “moral disengagement” of humans from lethal decisions in combat.\textsuperscript{209} By making it “significantly easier for them to make the decision to kill,”\textsuperscript{210} the deployment of AWS by humans may lead to more killing,\textsuperscript{211} and even encourage more unethical choices.\textsuperscript{212}

Automated death
Automating death by “algorithm”\textsuperscript{213} means treating enemy (non-) combatants simply as “things thrown out of the realm of good and evil”\textsuperscript{214} or objects “eligible for mechanized targeting.”\textsuperscript{215} In combat, where situational decisions made by individual human combatants will be replaced with general choices made by people defining the behaviour of AWS in advance,\textsuperscript{216} “the generality of the decisions” will dominate decision-making dynamics.\textsuperscript{217} However, in sample distinctions between combatants and civilians, there are “shades of grey” as combatants retain certain rights, including the right to surrender and not to be killed unnecessarily, and as it is legally permissible to kill civilians in certain cases.\textsuperscript{218} Machines “missing battlefield awareness or common sense reasoning to assist in discrimination decisions”\textsuperscript{219} may potentially leave “behind them a hecatomb of innocent victims.”\textsuperscript{220} This represents a threat to the fundamental values of human dignity and human life.\textsuperscript{221}

The counter-argument is based on the assumptions that the “introduction of AWS does not mean the introduction of an altogether new
quality of warfare” and that the deeper unbiased analysis may actually reveal that abandoning AWS may “deny protections to civilians and soldiers.”

**Biased framing of AWS warfare versus conventional warfare**

*a. Conventional warfare.* Largely, the features that make AWS problematic with regard to the values of human life and dignity may, to some extents, be present in conventional acts of war. Firstly, “much of war is mechanical slaughter” and much of “modern warfare is impersonal killing at a distance,” as has been experienced through the use of, for example, over horizon weapons, indirect fire, or buried improvised explosive devices in combat. Secondly, historical experience may provide a plenty of examples of war practices that have been clear cases of war crimes and violations of the human dignity, meaning that not weapons themselves but, rather, uses to which they are put may potentially be contrary to the values of human dignity and human life.

*b. Manner of death.* First and foremost, “seeing the man’s eyes as he stabs you doesn’t make your death any more palatable.” For victims whose life and dignity are at stake, “it is a matter of indifference whether the threat they are exposed to comes from manned or unmanned weapons, provided all other parameters of the situation are equal.” The manner of death will basically be no different in the age of AWS warfare because there is nothing more dignified in, for example, being mowed down by a machine gun or blasted to bits by a bomb, burning alive in an explosion or slowly suffocating from a sucking chest wound.

**Reduction of total war casualties in AWS warfare**

At this point, it is worth recalling an argument that “removing the human element from the equation could be potentially beneficial.” Additionally, “increased accuracy saves lives” and, as emphasized by Ronald Arkin, AWS will be the next-generation, precision-guided munitions. Due to AWS being “more accurate in their targeting and more considerate in their fighting habits than manned systems,” “the increased depersonalization in the deployment of force brought about by AWS may thus lead to greater personalization in targeting outcomes and saving lives or preventing unwarranted injuries.”
Dilemma no. 4: Human-machine nexus in coordinated operation

Even if deployed, AWS “will not, at least initially, entirely replace human soldiers,”235 but will rather be “integrated into human warfare.”236 That means while their numbers are expected to decrease on the AWS deploying side, a portion of human soldiers will “fight alongside AWS” because an army of robots fulfilling all or a large majority of functions in an armed conflict is not likely in the near future.237

The argument against AWS deployment asserts that in such a configuration “human beings will start to be placed in harm’s way as a result of the operations of robots.”238

Illusion of «push-button» war

By falling into an “illusion that war can be fought without casualties”239 in a form of a “push button” war implying “the enemy is killed at a distance, without any immediate risk to oneself,”240 humans “can fall victim to automation bias, trusting too much in the machine.”241

a. War initiation. The availability of AWS “may mean that military conflicts are initiated with the intention that they can be completed without placing warfighters in harm’s way” but, in reality, there is a high chance that human warfighters “may find themselves involved in conflicts” either because a weapon system may fail due to its software unreliability or because winning a victory may turn out to be beyond the capabilities of AWS due to changed circumstances.242 The letter may involve an enemy action, or the operation being ill-conceived in the first place.243

b. Military tasks and operations. Similarly, as “robots can play a useful role in military operations, warfighters will rely on them to complete the tasks to which they have been assigned,” but the possibility of robots’ failure may not be excluded and, in case it happens, “human lives may be placed at risk.”244

Challenges of co-existence in coordinated operation

a. Priorisation of AWS value over human life value. A combination of one robot’s price that “may range from $100,000 to millions of dollars in cost,”245 AWS significant “military utility,”246 which is to be discussed below in this article, as well as “valuable intelligence” it carries implicitly means fellow soldiers’ lives may be placed “at
risk in order to defend, service, or recover” it upon necessity. The other side of the coin may be the anthropomorphised image of AWS leading soldiers to “often treat them as fellow warriors” and being sometimes “prepared to risk their own lives to save them.”

b. **Multiple control challenges.** Even when the abundant causes of the unpredictability of AWS performance, which potentially stand also behind multiple control problems, are left on the side, there still remains a related challenge, but of a different nature. While both manned and unmanned components may be expected to operate in conjunction, including with battlefield surveillance devices, and while increasingly multiple robots may be deployed in complex tasks and missions it is still unclear how the “proper architecture for control” should look like.

c. **Friendly fire.** The boundaries between “friend” and “foe” groups are “poorly defined” and they are “heavily value-laden.” Thus, reliably pre-programming these identification parameters is challenging in the first place. A robot “that cannot distinguish between targets may be highly prone to friendly fire incidents.” Even if turning these values into an algorithm is possible, AWS may still suffer from inherent software weaknesses and unpredictabilities potentially leading fellow soldiers to be “accidentally killed by machines.”

d. **Order refusal.** Human military conduct “entails making judgments with imperfect knowledge in complex, ambiguous and dynamic situations,” but AWS will be “ill-equipped” to comprehend psychological and subjective phenomena as well as dynamic goals. That implicitly means a “conflict may arise” between some pre-programmed instruction and real combat demands leading to the refusal of an otherwise-legitimate order by the machine.

e. **Negative impact on squad cohesion.** Robots equipped with video cameras and sensors to record and report soldiers’ actions in the battlefield may “negatively impact the cohesion among team or squad members by eroding trust with the robot as well as among fellow soldiers who then may or may not support each other as much anymore, knowing that they are being watched.”

**The counter-argument** rests on the assumption that the “primary rationale for the development of unmanned systems in general (re-
mote-controlled weapons and AWS) is their ability to protect personnel who are kept out of harm’s way.”

By “removing soldiers from the most dangerous and life-threatening missions,” robots will facilitate “a reduction in friendly casualties.”

Removal of human soldiers and operators from risks of war

Using either unmanned or autonomous technology means that an army has “no skin in the game.” However, as mentioned above in the context of discussing the dimensions of distance, by increasingly removing fellow soldiers from the risks of war not only physically, but also psychologically, AWS will significantly “reduce the potential cognitive overload of operators and supervisors.” Overall, beyond increasingly ensuring physical safety, AWS may increasingly contribute to the reduction of psychiatric damage or trauma, and even psychiatric casualties mainly linked to the suicide practice, among active duty friendly forces.

Minimisation of harm to fellow soldiers in coordinated operation

a. Outsourcing tasks. Although AWS will not necessarily replace humans in combat, they may at least “reduce their exposure to life threatening tasks” as machines can perform dull, dirty, and dangerous tasks and missions that human combatants may prefer to avoid.

b. Friendly fire bias. As already pointed out previously, human soldiers “can become emotionally disturbed, suffer from battle fatigue, or simply decide to act outside of the chain of command,” which can lead, among others, to “friendly fire incidents.” AWS designed to remove human cognitive shortcomings and psychological shortcomings in decision-making promise “fewer friendly fire incidents.”

Dilemma no. 5: Strategic considerations

The argument against AWS deployment in this regard is two-fold and rests on the national and the systemic levels of analysis. It is believed that artificial intelligence in the military “will, in the very near future, have a profound impact on the conduct of strategy and will be disruptive of existing power balances.”
National strategic risks
As super-intelligence may “evolve beyond human understanding and control,”\textsuperscript{270} there is a danger of the loss of human control “over war” initiating, escalation and termination.\textsuperscript{271}

\textit{a. Loss of control over one’s own national strategy.} There may arise the so-called “Strategic Robot Problem,”\textsuperscript{272} which Srđan T. Korac summarised as “the possibility of loss of human control over the conduct of military operations, even the entire war, should we equip robots with artificial intelligence to decide independently on strategic, operational and tactical levels.”\textsuperscript{273} Let alone the risks related to software coding errors or malfunctions, and especially cyberattacks,\textsuperscript{274} when “decisions are made with inhuman speed, the potential for events to spiral out of control is obvious.”\textsuperscript{275} That makes strategy in a world with autonomous weapons “impossible to predict.”\textsuperscript{276}

\textit{b. Loss of understanding of one’s own national strategy.} Human strategy entails the instrumental use of violence in the pursuit of goals, usually social goals, has psychological attributes and a cultural dimension meaning human strategic goals may be hard to measure, and is essentially dynamic meaning human strategic goals may change in response to emerging situations and opportunities.\textsuperscript{277} In turn, AWS will be “ill-equipped to gauge these subjectively experienced and dynamic goals compared to more readily quantifiable goals,” implying their limited ability to capture and reproduce subjective meanings inherent in human strategy.\textsuperscript{278}

Systemic strategic risks
By falling into an illusion of “a risk-free war,” humanity may underestimate the potential structural risks.\textsuperscript{279} The combination of factors is listed below to support the assumption that the militarization of artificial intelligence may not only “create significant problems for the stability of the international system,”\textsuperscript{280} but may also pose a serious threat to the “ability of international bodies to manage conflicts.”\textsuperscript{281} An exacerbating factor in this regard, whose degree of manifestation is positively linked to the systemic strategic risks discussed below, is the increasingly direct incorporation of “cyberwarfare (along with its lower-threshold counterparts of cybercrime and cyberterrorism) into
armed conflict in the physical world” as an outcome of AWS development and deployment.282

a. Proliferation and strategic competition. As soon as “one nation is capable of deploying AWS that can operate without human oversight then all nations will have a powerful incentive to do so.”283 This may provoke a new strategic competition between major powers and lesser powers, and considering the nature of autonomous weapons technology this arms race will most likely be global in scope.284 Driven by “dual-use” technologies of artificial intelligence and robotics285 and additionally, unlike nuclear weapons, requiring no costly or hard-to-obtain raw materials, autonomous weapons may become “the Kalashnikovs of tomorrow.”286 Proliferation of AWS may “occur via exports, including to the grey and black markets”287 or as a result of some states developing their own AWS technology.288 The potential acquisition of AWS by non-state actors is also a concern289 where beyond “further privatisation of violence on the global level by increasing the capacity of private military companies,”290 it will only be a matter of time until this technology falls into the hands of terrorists, criminal cartels, and extremist groups.291

The concomitant danger is that proliferation may proceed without the expected level of safeguards.292

b. Lowered threshold and normalization of armed conflict. Political costs of war “come with wartime casualties” and casualties are a significant reason of armed conflicts not being more common.293 In AWS warfare, the “political calculus would not have to take into account the number of fallen soldiers,”294 while “expendable” robots may be “risked in provocative adventures.”295 As this potentially promises “easier internal legitimisation and execution of military interventions,”296 it may result in lowering of the threshold for armed conflict,297 and “armed conflict no longer being a measure of last resort.”298 At the same time, as sending machines to war does not exact “physical and emotional toll on a population,” the national public of AWS-equipped states “may over time become increasingly disengaged and leave the decision to use force as a largely financial or diplomatic question.”299 This will produce the “normalization” of
armed conflict. Merging lethal robot technology and private entrepreneurship in meeting military demands may further contribute to removing “low intensity wars outside of the public eye.”

c. *Accidental and non-attributable war.* There will significantly increase the risk of “an accidental war being triggered by the decisions of one or more autonomous weapon systems.” In AWS warfare, supersonic or hypersonic (defence) systems of one state will interact with equally fast systems belonging to another state and the “speed of their unpredictable interaction” may potentially “trigger unintended armed conflicts before humans had the opportunity to react.” In an asymmetric war, it may mean the significantly decreased amount of time available for the other side to determine whether an attack is imminent or under way, and how to respond. Misinterpretation may invite pre-emption and undesired escalation. This places states under the pressure to mobilize their forces that further increases the chance of a war occurring in error.

To dig deeper, the probability of “unintended initiation or escalation of conflicts outside of direct human control” in AWS warfare, exacerbated by the furite environment of “the anonymity of cyberspace,” may make possible “shielding” human perpetrators from the responsibility for “what might have otherwise been considered a war crime.”

d. *Facilitation of asymmetric warfare.* AWS army is “the product of a rich and elaborate economy.” The “imbalanced system of haves and have-nots” in relation to autonomous weapons will mean “the completely asymmetric 'push-button' war,” in which “deadly robots may in some cases be pitted against people on foot.” This raises a question whether it still makes sense to talk about “war,” “as opposed to one-sided killing.”

The use of AWS may encourage retaliation and reprisals by the other side. The counter-actions in this asymmetric war may include terrorism at home and abroad, potentially with civilians of AWS-deploying states being “the next-best legitimate targets,” as well as intensifying efforts to acquire nuclear or biochemical weapons. The potential use of cyber means by the enemy or non-state actors “to take control of an autonomous weapon system and direct it against friendly forces or a civilian population” may also be a part of this equation.
e. Challenges of post-conflict reconciliation. The possibility of a lasting peace after an armed conflict requires “diplomacy and human relationships that machines would not be capable of delivering” meaning AWS warfare may make “peaceful reconciliation most difficult to achieve.”

The counter-argument insists that autonomous weapon systems may be strategically, tactically and operationally beneficial to the conduct of strategy and may potentially make war less brutal at least or render inter-state war obsolete at best.

Qualitative improvement of national strategy
With regard to the issue of human control and understanding of one’s own national strategy, in the first place, assuming that AWS will “supplement, not replace, human combat forces,” strategy that involves humans, no matter that they are assisted by AWS in the battlefield, “will retain its inevitable human flavour.” Potentially still, as there is the probability that people “can deviate from orders” while autonomous systems “will do precisely what they are programmed to do,” the deployment of the latter may even potentially result in the “increased leaders’ control over how their forces behave in crises.” Going beyond, due to the potential performance superiority of autonomous weapon systems in comparison to human combatants and remotely operated systems in combat, AWS will even be “able to improve the quality of human decision-making at strategic levels” as well as will bring “tactical and operational advances.”

a. Force multiplication. Robots may bring the potential for force multiplication in military deployments. This may materialise both through each robot “effectively doing the work of many human soldiers” and at the same time through “allowing fewer personnel to do more.” The latter implies that “one soldier on the battlefield can be a nexus for initiating a large-scale robot attack from the ground and the air.”

b. Expanding physical limitations. Firstly, AWS better-informed and faster reaction needs to be highlighted because AWS abilities are greater than those of humans with regard to data absorption and data analysis. Not only will AWS be able to observe a large number of relevant aspects due to their superior sensor
abilities and to master huge amounts of data, potentially recognising patterns that may otherwise be missed, but they will also be “much faster at processing enormous amounts of data” and will have quicker potential reaction or response times than the best human could have. Additionally, if programmed to do so, AWS may more effectively “learn from its mistakes, and improve its algorithms as the conflict goes on, while humans remain rooted in their entrenched cognitive heuristics and group-think.” Secondly, AWS may extend a warfighter’s reach by enabling military forces “to reach deeper into the battle space by, for example, seeing or striking farther;” and thirdly, AWS may expand the battlespace by allowing combat “to be conducted over larger areas than was previously possible.”

c. **Control and communication links rendered obsolete.** The speed of human decision-making in combat may be “further slowed down through the inevitable time-lag of global communications” between human operators and remote-controlled systems. These links may also be threatened by electronic counter-measures by hostile forces, different environmental factors and other exigencies of the “fog of war.” AWS will “render constant control and communication links obsolete” and their ability to operate in the absence of these links is an obvious military advantage.

d. **Reduced political costs and democratic resistance.** Machines are “expendable” because “their loss does not cause emotional pain or political backlash.” The possibility of sending “an army of machines to war — rather than friends and relatives,” may “remove the democratic resistance to military deployment” in case of its necessity under a variety of circumstances.

**Positive systemic strategic impact**

a. **Less brutal war at least.** Referring to the work of Ronald Arkin, George R. Lucas summarised that the development and use of autonomous robotic technology, may at least “render war itself, and the conduct of armed hostilities, less destructive, risky, and indiscriminate.” In fact, as already pointed out previously, having “robots fight for us promises to dramatically reduce casualties on our side” that may also be true with regard to the
total number of human casualties in war due to AWS “accurate
determinations.” The general destruction associated with
armed conflict may also be expected to decrease with potentially
more precise machines.

b. Potential absense of war at best. More ambitiously, the use of AWS,
or potentially superintelligence, “would represent a chance for
a world without armed conflict.” Firstly, as AWS will be “ill-
equipped” to comprehend psychological and subjectively expe-
rienced phenomena underlying human strategy, the wider de-
ployment of this warfare technology may “assist humanity in tran-
scending some of the causes of armed conflict – be they cultural
or material.” Secondly, in ideal case, although it has been highly
debated, AWS may make possible a war in which the sides send
only robots to do the fighting, and each party to a conflict can “only
inflict economic damage” on the enemy and similarly “carries no
existential risk, and bears no cost beyond the economic.” If this
is to become a reality, “war will cease to be a desirable option by
nation-states as a means of resolving their differences.”

Dilemma no. 6: AWS operation in law(less) zone

The argument against AWS deployment insists that they “will operate
in a lawless zone.” The use of military robotics has been objected on
the grounds that it may make easier the decision to initiate a war, in
an apparent violation of jus ad bellum. What is more, “the technical
ability to properly discriminate against targets, as required by jus in
bello,” has also been a notable concern. Both points are amplified by
the problem of attribution of criminal responsibility.

Threat to (non-)use of force norm

“During the larger part of the last two centuries,” international law has
been developing “to constrain armed conflict and the use of force” and
to make them the options of the last resort. When they ratified the
UN Charter, states have agreed not to use the force without the per-
mission given by the United Nations, except for defensive purposes.
AWS, especially considering their potentially unpredictable nature and
the subsequent responsibility gap – the latter discussed below, may
make this norm against the use of force, which has been paramount in
ensuring global security, breakable.
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(Non-)compliance with international humanitarian and human rights law

AWS may bring “significant obstacles to complying with international humanitarian and human rights law.” The concept of human dignity and the right to life lie at the heart of international human rights law. The right to dignity and the right to life form the “protect life” principle that is “the guiding star whenever lethal force is used.” However, in the exceptional circumstances that prevail during armed conflicts, “human rights law remains valid, but it is interpreted with reference to the rules of international humanitarian law” (IHL). Concerns with regard to the latter “have so far most often related to the legal principles of distinction and proportionality,” to specify, how to program AWS to act in such a way that the principles of discrimination and proportionality, as demanded by the law of international armed conflict, are applicable in the battlefield in the age of AWS warfare. These principles “reflect the tension between these opposite goals” in combat, where the former “embodies the necessity of differentiating military personnel and militarily significant targets from civilians and civilian object” and the latter “embodies the requirement that any attack which could have adverse consequences for civilians must have a military objective which is not excessive with regard to the potential civilian harm.” As IHL suffers from terminological hurdles and obscurities, most importantly “the lack of a clear definition of civilian,” as well as the problem of “contradictory or vague imperatives,” its interpretation is understood to involve “subjective estimates of value and context-specificity” and human judgement. AWS “restricted abilities to interpret context and to make value-based calculations” may imply its inability to comply with international humanitarian law.

Legal review challenge

“The obligation to carry out legal reviews of new weapons under article 36 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions is important for ensuring that a State’s armed forces are capable of conducting hostilities in accordance with its international obligations,” which is problematic with regard to AWS, firstly, because “the legal review must demand a very high level of confidence that, once activated, the autonomous weapon system would predictably and reliably operate as intended,” secondly, because software-based “AWS and remotely controlled weapon systems may appear identical from the outside” and
“cheating would be all too easy since the software could be changed back within minutes after inspection.”

Responsibility gap

“Individual and state responsibility is fundamental to ensure accountability for violations of international human rights and international humanitarian law.” It is necessary to hold war criminals accountable through the responsibility attribution, and the deployment of AWS will make that “so much harder” because their use in combat is likely to create a “responsibility gap,” or, alternatively – a “gap in accountability.”

The debate is whether designers, robot manufacturers, procurement officers, robot controllers or supervisors, field commanders, state governments or presidents, or even robots themselves should be held accountable. There is a double-edge challenge because this is the first time “a weapon system will have either no one or too many people to be held accountable for mistakes.” There is a risk that military personnel may be held responsible for the actions of machines whose decisions and performance they barely control at best. At the same time it is “hard to take seriously the idea that a machine should — or could — be held responsible” for the consequences of its own actions because “those who are punished, or contemplate punishment, should suffer as a result” where such suffering must be “morally compelling.” The attempts to punish a machine will also “have limited deterrent effects, since one robot could not be deterred by the punishment of another robot.”

This problem is further compounded by the “atomized approach of the law to questions of responsibility,” which seeks to link a concrete and definable entity with some created specified effect, because it “runs contrary to the development of networks and swarms.” In any “system of systems,” attempts to draw distinctions between the components, including between lethal and non-lethal systems, especially with regard to the allocation of criminal responsibility, will become increasingly arbitrary.

The counter-argument calls to consider AWS in an unbiased manner with regard to the compliance with law and insists that, “as with most other weapon systems, their lawfulness as such, as well as the lawfulness of their use, must be judged on a case-by-case basis.”

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Biased framing of AWS (non-)compliance with international law versus conventional warfare

The general argument is that it is true that the unlawful use of lawful weapons is not a rare phenomenon in the contemporary warfare. With regard to IHL specifically, by itself, “autonomy is unlikely to present unnecessary suffering and superfluous injury issues since the rule addresses a weapon system’s effect on the targeted individual, not the manner of engagement (autonomous).” Moreover, the discrimination of combatants and non-combatants and the proportionality judgement are “no less difficult in air strikes and long-range attacks than they are with AWS.” The “fog of war” and “the lack of perfect situational awareness” dramatically complicate way to comply with the rules of international armed conflict for soldiers. In turn, as it has been discussed in greater detail in the previous sections, it may be possible to program autonomous weapon systems in such a way that these machines through avoiding many of human mistakes and failings will potentially be able to “outperform human soldiers with respect to conformance to IHL.”

Human responsibility for AWS performance

The argument that there is no responsibility for AWS performance in the battlefield has “an air of triviality” because even “if the system is autonomous, it is not autonomous to the extent that it is completely independent of human authorship.” As any machine is programmed and deployed by human beings, the “responsibility for its operations lies unconditionally with them.” To make it clear, in AWS warfare there will always be “a human ultimately responsible for launching the weapon and putting it into operation, just not selecting the specific target.”

Concluding remarks

The presented article was aimed at restructuring and operationalising the debate on autonomous weapon systems, thereby allowing the reader for a balanced assessment of the issue on multiple key fronts. Our motivation was clear: within the broad realm of international security studies, there had not been such a detailed, balanced, and systematic analysis focused on the nitty-gritties of the AWS, their pros and cons being present side to side, and implications concerning their use being flagged. Because the issue of AWS has been heavily charged with highly
normative, moral, assertive and alarmist language from the very begin-
nning, it was harder than in other security fields to get the facts right, 
and get to the level of genuine arguments to discuss characteristics of 
these weapons before pushing for a robust regulation, namely preven-
tive, wide sweeping, globally working ban. However, the practice of 
fantasizing about the “killer robots” and spreading cultural myths and 
(mis)representational idioms of the Hollywood movies to create a me-
dia-rich spectre of danger has increasingly been counter-balanced with 
the reliance on technical knowledge coupled with a legal analysis and 
the workings of the security realm. This produced the debate flourish-
ing at the two opposite poles, each being to a large degree aware of the 
counter-arguments put forward by the other side.

Unfortunately still, not all of the people involved in the so-called 
“killer robots” debate have actually had a balanced and detailed knowl-
edge of the workings of these weapons, their precise delimitation, the 
novelty vs. continuity technology, and many other preconditions for a 
nuanced and informed opinion. By abandoning the one-sided terrain 
of an increasing number of NGOs, academics, politicians and scien-
tists involved in the discussion and at the same making a step forward 
from what other neutrally analytical literature pieces had offered, we 
wished to create a first-order structure with a series of arguments and 
note-worthy counter-arguments along which the reader could easily 
navigate himself/herself. Our contribution to the debate, and a belief 
that it may help for its further cultivation and sophistication, was 1) 
to properly delimit the AWS category as there were too many flaws 
in this regard in the general debate – for us, that was to discuss ful-
ly autonomous (lethal) weapon systems, capable of operating without 
human control or supervision, including in dynamic and unstructured 
environments, and capable of engaging in independent (lethal) deci-
sion-making, targeting, and firing, including in an offensive manner; 
2) to operationalise the issue of AWS along six dilemmas that we pro-
posed as the basis, each of the dilemmas containing the detailed pro/ 
con arguments – here, we went from the discussion of (un)predictabil-
ity of AWS performance, dehumanization of lethal decision-making, 
depersonalisation of enemy (non-)combatant, human-machine nexus 
in coordinated operations, to strategic considerations and AWS op-
eration in law(less) zone; 3) to bring on board literature from diverse 
fields to enrich intellectually what the plethora of media channels 
offer, namely robotics, computer science, law, security and strategic
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studies, military ethics, philosophy and connection science. All of this has been done for the reader, in the first place, to be able to establish his/her own well-informed position on the issue through better understanding the nature of AWS and grasping the complexity of the debate. Potentially, this analytical framework, with each of its aspects potentially deserving its own place in future research, can also serve as the starting point for detecting and profoundly analysing multiple interlinkages between the dilemmas and (sub)sections in greater depth and in multiple possible ways. More generally, this article is intended to contribute to the better comprehension of AWS and more general challenges related to human-machine nexus and artificial intelligence.

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Notes


24 See, for example, Asaro (2012), p.693.
25 See, for example, Paul Scharre (2018), Army of None: Autonomous Weapons and the Future of War, W.W. Norton, Chapter 17.
26 See, for example, Sharkey (2012), p.790.
27 See, for example, Human Rights Watch (2012).
28 See, for example, Sharkey (2010), p.370.
33 Alex Leveringhaus (2016), Ethics and Autonomous Weapons, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, p.3
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38 Leveringhaus (2016), p.3.
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84 ibid, p.78.
85 ibid, p.40.
86 ibid, p.8.
88 Ayoub, Payne (2016) p.816.
95 ibid, p.79.
97 Lin, Bekey, Abney (2008), p.79.
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120 ibid, p.1335.
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222 Birnbacher (2016), p.121.
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249 Sparrow (2007), p.64.
256 ibid, pp.79-80.
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277 ibid, pp.796-797.
278 ibid, p.797.
279 Sharkey (2008), p.16.
286 Open Letter
289 ibid.
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381 Lin, Bekey, Abney (2008), p.73.
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394 Birnbacher (2016), p.120.
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A New Generation Draws the Line: Humanitarian Intervention and the “Responsibility to Protect” Today

Reviewed by Milos Rastovic

Noam Chomsky, Professor Emeritus at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), is a prolific and prodigious writer famous throughout the world for his studies of linguistics and politics.

This book is an expanded edition compiled from Noam Chomsky’s articles, lectures, and the book The New Military Humanism. Chomsky’s provocative book examines the nature of Humanitarian Interventionism after the Cold War. For Chomsky, ‘the new era’ in international relations was opened by NATO’s bombing of Serbia on March 24, 1999. Former British Prime Minister Tony Blair claimed that ‘the new generation draws the line’ fighting for ‘values’ in an era in which ‘the brutal repression of whole ethnic groups will no longer be tolerated’ (p. 1). Fighting for human rights and upholding ‘principles and values’ became a privilege only to be exercised by ‘the enlightened
states’ or so-called ‘the international community’. For the author, the
dawn of ‘the new era’ is an unprecedented historical moment in which
national sovereignty was disregarded in the name of human rights and
‘principles and values’.

By highlighting the ‘leading principles’ of ‘the new era,’ Chomsky
evaluates proponents and skeptics of ‘the new era’. This evaluation
is based on such criteria as the estimate of foreign and military aid
that ‘the international community’ proposes and how members of this
‘community’ respond to atrocities in the world. Chomsky’s analysis is
the result of his exhaustive empirical and theoretical work, and distinct-
ive methodology. He uses a wide range of sources to research inconsis-
tent strategies used in similar situations. Clearly, he investigates the
nature of these inconsistencies and parse out the forces that contribute
to them. For example, military aid and diplomatic support were pro-
vided to Turkey during the XX century Kurdish resistance – which en-
tailed mass atrocities – with no demands for assurances regarding the
human rights for Kurds. Why was ‘the international community’ less
concerned with ‘the protection of Kurds in Turkey’ than it was with the
protection of Kosovars in the Balkans? For Chomsky, the proponents
of ‘the new era’ do not offer credible reasons for this ‘inconsistency’.

One of the crucial questions posed in the book is why ‘the inter-
national community’ did not intervene militarily in response to hu-
mans rights crises in East Timor as they had done in Serbia in the same
year? Chomsky considers three officially proposed reasons for ‘the
international community’s’ bombing of Serbia: ‘[to ensure] the stabil-
ity of Eastern Europe,’ ‘[to thwart] ethnic cleansing,’ and ‘[to ensure]’
NATO’s credibility’. He argues that the third reason is most credible
because from the standpoint of the global powers, only they ensure the
‘stability’ of the region. In other words, the region can be ‘stable’ only
if it serves the interests of the global powers. In both cases, however,
in East Timor where NATO did not intervene, and in Serbia, where
NATO intervened, the consequences were tragic. In two subsequent
chapters, he investigates applications of ‘values and principles’ to study
both the cases of East Timor and Kosovo.

In East Timor, violence escalated after a referendum on August 30,
1999, in which the majority of the population of the province voted for
independence from Indonesia. As a result of the referendum, atrocities
conducted by the Indonesian army (TNI) sharply increased. Unlike the
case of Kosovo, however, no War Crimes Tribunal was set up in Indo-
nesia by ‘the international community’ to indict Indonesian forces for their violation of human rights. Chomsky exposes the ambiguous nature of ‘the international community’ and investigates the reasons for NATO’s action/inaction in both cases. He argues that the Indonesian army was supported and trained by the US and its allies. For this reason, ‘the enlightened West’ was blind to victims in East Timor.

In the case of Kosovo, the West needed the War Crimes Tribunal to justify the 78 days of bombing Serbia. In order to validate its airstrikes against Serbia, which occurred without approval of the UN Security Council, NATO searched for Serbian war crimes immediately when they came into contact with troops in Kosovo. The military intervention only made the situation worse in the region. In contrast, the United Nations civilian police had neither enough sources nor the support to investigate atrocities in East Timor. Chomsky states, that it was important for ‘the international community’ that the record about these atrocities in East Timor ‘remain hidden’ (p. 61). According to Chomsky’s research and evidence, the NATO’s bombing of Serbia was in fact followed by a substantial ‘escalation of atrocities and ethnic cleansing’. He claims that the bombing, but not human rights violations, caused the mass refugee crisis in the region. The author gives us a review of events leading up to the bombing, in which he concludes that there were not any substantiated reports enough to be a motive the bombing. Furthermore, he stresses that ‘the international community’ did not want to develop diplomatic options for solving the problem of Kosovo because NATO would then lose its own role in international relations.

From Chomsky’s standpoint, the only benefit gained by bombing Serbia were those accrued by Western militaries and NATO by confirming their own ‘credibility’ and domination in the Balkan region. He concludes that the world has only two choices regarding the use of force: either to follow the UN Charter or something better, or the great powers will do what they want when international crises arise guided by their own interests and profits.

In the wake of this, Chomsky pointedly asks: How can the universality of human rights only be applied in cases that serves the interests of the ‘enlightened countries’ who declare to have a responsibility to protect human rights in ‘the new era?’ This inspirational book offers a different study to this question and exposes the darker side of ‘humanitarian interventions’, which remain well-scrubbed for public consumption.
As in his other books, Chomsky demonstrates the wisdom of a philosopher and the precision of a linguist in order to reveal the truth about international relations and fuel a discussion about the uses and abuses of power inside it. The book is written in a clear and easily understandable language, and it will be interesting not only to scholars, but to a general audience as well. It is an important contribution to political science, and an essential reference for policy makers. The book stimulates readers to rethink different aspects of international relations with a deeper understanding of the world today. Certainly, the author’s findings and analysis are valuable for every researcher to observe the connection between military, business, and geostrategic goals.
In *Countering Terrorism*, Martha Crenshaw and Gary Lafree provide a very detailed account on global acts of terrorism. What makes the subject so challenging? Why is it so hard for governments to formulate an effective counter-terrorism policy? What are the obstacles that experts face and in what ways can terrorism best be defined, classified, studied and understood in order to design the best possible policies to counter terrorism? These are some of the questions answered in this book, which is divided in well-written, clear and understandable chapters.

The book is divided into multiple cohesive and well-structured parts that all discuss different areas of the wider subject of terrorism, from the acknowledgement that terrorist attacks are still relatively rare, to the process of attributing a terrorist attack to a certain group, organisation or party. Crenshaw and Lafree use a wide variety of databases, such as the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), which consists of around 170,000 cases, to support their findings. Arguments rely on data retrieved from these databases, some of which have monitored every terrorist attack since the 1970’s. This enhances the quality of the book.

Crenshaw and Lafree argue that mass casualty attacks – such as the 9/11 attacks, which is still the deadliest attack between 1970 and 2015 – are incredibly rare. The aftermath of such attacks has a profound influence on national and international security policies — policies and
regulations adopted after an attack are difficult to reverse. Crenshaw and Lafree also support their argument that terrorist attacks are still relatively rare by stating that in 2012, when there were 15,417 reported terrorism related fatalities, there were 437,000 homicides worldwide.

A significant point discussed in the book are the ‘failed and foiled’ terrorist attacks. Crenshaw and Lafree argue that these types of attacks are more difficult to study and are of less concern to the public. There have, for example, been around a hundred attempted plots to attack American targets post 9/11. Of these attempts, only eight resulted in casualties. But when does an attack fail or foil? Crenshaw and Lafree argue that – according to the Failed and Foiled Plots (FPP) database – a plot can either be failed or foiled due to malfunction of equipment, change of intention and external intervention. Crenshaw and Lafree define plots as successful when they are physically completed and result in tangible effects.

Crenshaw and Lafree also argue that counter-terrorism policies should be tailor-made for terrorist organisations due to the absence of a single type of terrorist organisation, underlining the differences in structure, objective, ideology and alliances. Without knowing the structure of a certain terrorist organisation, its leadership, cohesiveness and decision-making process, governments struggle to calculate a terrorist organisation’s reaction to certain counter-terrorism policies. Likewise, creating a working counter-terrorism policy for lone actors without clear affiliation and outside support proves difficult. What makes this difficult is that, although they are not formally part of an organisation, ‘lone wolves’ do identify with the cause of a certain organisation. According to Crenshaw and Lafree, these terrorist threats are so unexpected and unpredictable, that it is impossible to prevent them. For governments to attribute a certain attack to a certain organisation is a difficult process. Often, organisations take credit for acts they did not commit, or those responsible are not known at all. Being unable to punish the responsible perpetrator due to a lack of knowledge or misleading information on the responsible party, makes it, according to Crenshaw and Lafree, increasingly difficult for governments to assert blame on actors, which in return often ensures public unrest. From data, provided in the book, Crenshaw and Lafree conclude that between 1970 and 2015, there were 93,485 un-attributed cases and that, overall, only 40.3% of attacks are attributed.

To conclude, Crenshaw and Lafree have shown that defining and measuring the effectiveness of counterterrorism measures is a con-
siderable challenge. Terrorism is a concept that keeps on changing, therefore, counter-terrorism policies should evolve and change as well, based on the specific terrorist organisation and threat posed. The book might be dense in places, but for students, scholars, counter-terrorism experts, government officials and the interested public alike, it is a profound source of useful information that provides clear explanations and data, generated over the course of multiple decades, to give a reliable account on the difficulties of countering terrorism.
Refuge: Transforming a Broken Refugee System

Reviewed by George Eyong Tabe

It is often said that you cannot approve nor criticize meat you have not eaten. From a first view, the meat might seem to contain all the ingredients to make it taste best. But after the first bite, you think something is missing to make the meat tasty and delicious. The same could be said of Alexander Betts and Paul Collier book entitled REFUGE Transforming a Broken Refugee System. From the hard cover, a visible boat carrying refugees on the high seas, probably with Syrian or African refugees on board, seems to provide an in-depth analysis of the recent 2015 European refugee crisis. Unfortunately, this is not the case, as further indicated below.

Alexander Betts is a United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees (UNHCR) employee. He is also Leopold Muller professor of Forced Migration and International Affairs and a Fellow of Green Templeton College at the Oxford University. His primary area of professional expertise has always been migration, in particular the international politics of asylum and humanitarianism with a geographical focus on Sub-Saharan Africa.

Paul Collier previously worked as a director of Development Research Group in the World Bank. He is a specialist of political, economic and developmental predicaments for poor countries. Currently, he is
a Professor of Economics and Public Policy at the Blavatnik School of Government and a Professorial Fellow of St Antony's College as well as the director of the International Growth Centre and the director of the Centre for the Study of African Economics, Oxford. His primary area of professional expertise is economic growth in Africa, governance in low-income countries, the economics of civil war, etc.

Both the courses Betts and Collier teach at their respective faculties and their own bibliographies testify to the authors' knowledge in the field. With the choice of the title itself, the authors presenting themselves as 'thinkers rather than doers' (p. 22) touches upon a rather ambitious goal - to present the suffering and hardship refugees are incurring. They provide the main obstacles to a sustainable refugee crisis management. In their own words, the authors believe refugees 'need and should be entitled to expect three things: rescue, autonomy, and an eventual route out of limbo'. Unfortunately, this has not been the case as most refugees are deprived of these benefits. Therefore, the authors seek to search for a means on 'how the world can provide these things sustainably and at scale' (p.18). The key purpose is to 'restore refugees to their proper place' (p.22), that is, to provide adequate humanitarian assistance to refugees ensuring their rights are respected and their needs provided in a timely manner.

The book features three parts by two different authors. The individual sections are organized both chronologically and thematically to avoid undue repetition and to make the collection read more like a study by a single author than a compilation of essays by diverse specialists. In the introductory analysis of the research thus far conducted on refugee transformation, Betts and Collier state that never had mankind experienced a 'wide range of displaced persons in the world' (p. 22). All these happening in a civilized world, with massive developments and prosperity fostered by globalization. Furthermore, the authors concede that refugees are desperately in need of humanitarian assistance and 'yet we are turning our backs on them' (p.100). The authors go on and argue that morality has lost its meaning and as a result 'we live in disturbed world'. (p.13). The authors' purpose, therefore, 'is to restore refuge with well-defined task accepted by a majority of mankind' (p. 22).

The first part is entitled ‘Why is There a Crisis?’ Here the authors analyze the Syrian refugee crisis and their tragedies - the role of the
EU and its institutions, denouncement leading to deportations from Greece. They present the number of refugees and displaced persons in the world, comparing them with the situations in the aftermath of WWII. The focus here is to seek answers as to why things have become chaotic, that is, the horrible situations in which refugees are being treated today. The authors identify violence and fragility to be behind the refugee mass influx to Europe in 2015. Nevertheless, the authors do not provide us with a typology of violence for a better understanding.

Under ‘What Drives Displacement and Refuge’, the authors make a link between refuge and security. According to the authors, the absence of security means flight for refuge. The authors support their argument with three case studies: Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany and the Spanish Civil War. Nasty events (e.g., Jews extermination, Spanish civil war, etc.) that occurred in these countries ‘created huge civilian dislocations’ (p. 26). This assumption cannot be 100% true for refugee flight. The flight of Jews as acknowledged by the authors occurred in a time when there was no hierarchically superior nor coercive power that could resolve disputes, enforce law and order. Their argument is totally irrelevant for the mere fact that in today’s unipolar world dominated by the US, coupled with the UN Security Council Resolutions, global governance and the international community, the absence of security cannot lead to chaos.

The second part bearing the name ‘The Think’ deals with a reminder of our moral obligations. The aim here is to construct a new global refugee approach ‘not based on camps, court decisions, and panic. Rather they should be based on needs and how they could best be met’ (p. 201). Here the authors provide genuine analysis on how refugees were treated in the past (before and after WWII). The key argument and concern here is that ‘the generosity of spirit in response to refugees is not a new story to mankind, neither is it an implausible phenomenon that modernity has to invent’. Displaced Germans, Poles, Armenians and many others during WWII were given shelter by other states. The authors are therefore asking: Why should that be a big deal today? Why are states reluctant and unwilling to accept refugees? And what is our moral obligation to all these? These questions are troubling and inhumane, which is why the authors think ‘the plight of Syrian refugees fleeing violence require our generosity of spirit’ (p. 100). Furthermore, the authors believe ‘political theorists’ defiance to reach a consensus on refugees’ sufferings (p.104) make matters even worse. This
theoretically interesting and politically important argument made by the authors is regrettably short.

The third part, entitled ‘History, the Remake’, looks back at history. Here the authors seek to provide an analysis of an approach that would have worked out in Syria. They seek to grasp if their approach would also work in different parts of the world - Kenya for instance. They performed a comparative analysis and came out with final conclusions that their approach did not work in Kenya, simply because the Kenyan government has no sympathy nor toleration for refugees, especially Somali and South Sudanese refugees. The government relies on ‘encampment policies prohibiting refugees from leaving camps and denying them access to work’ (p. 220).

Initially, I indicated that Betts and Collier’s book lacked some ingredients to the final product. Even sophisticated analyses have their weaknesses and should be subject to improvement. The first concerns the author’s research design choices that may have biased some of the results or rendered them prematurely obsolete. I refer to the unavailability of the source of the collected data, e.g. ‘700 people drowned crossing to Lampedusa’ (p. 14). Neither do they provide the reader with concrete definitions of the many terminologies in their book; the origin of the world refugee for instance and the way different countries perceive refugees. The authors define a refugee as ‘someone who is outside her or his country of nationality and faces a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion’ (p. 16). But according to the Colombian government, ‘the conflict between the Colombian government and armed Marxist guerrillas that began in the mid-1960s in Colombia left over 3 million people as refugees in their own country’ (UN Regional Information Centre for Western Europe 2017). This therefore means that a refugee must not always be outside but also within. This Colombia case is a clear contradiction to what the authors claim. This is just one of the generalisations in the authors’ work.

Another problematic embedded in the book is that the authors simply have sympathy to anyone claiming to suffer for persecution as a refugee, which absolutely seems inconsistent. According to the Australian Immigration Minister ‘the Government has taken a decision in relation to those people who are fake refugees’ (Australian Immigration Minister Peter Dutton: 2017). The authors work lacks an in-depth analysis on refugees entirely. For example, they fail to analyse and pro-
vide answers to why some states like Israel would never accept refugees from other countries or regions and why Syrian refugees would not seek refuge in Israel (a nearby country) but would rather choose Europe, a more complicated and riskier route.

Paul and Collier did a great job to provide a clear picture and events that took place in the 2015 EU refugee crisis. However, the key weaknesses, in my opinion, is that much empirical analysis is missing in the book. The subchapters contain many headings completely without definitions and are hard to grasp. This work could serve well as an appropriate textbook for the introduction of studies in the given topic but would not be quite suitable for experts dealing with refugee studies.
KEEP CALM AND THINK strategic

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