End of Democracy?

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Imagine standing accused of a crime, presumed guilty and having to prove your innocence. If you cannot prove your innocence, you will be forcibly taken from your home and sent to a country that views human rights as a “theoretical luxury”. The judge in your case cannot review the evidence against you - they must extradite you unless you can show beyond doubt that they should do otherwise. Picture yourself trying to get justice when your accuser is a government determined to silence you and your family.

Now you have an idea of what it’s like to be Alexander Adamescu and to face the Kafkaesque judicial nightmare of a European arrest warrant issued by one of the most corrupt countries in the EU - Romania.

Alexander Adamescu is a writer who grew up in Germany and graduated from the Royal Central School of Speech and Drama in London. Originally born in Romania, Alexander’s family owns one of the few remaining independent newspapers in the country, Romania Libera.

However, after printing stories exposing ongoing corruption in the Romanian government, the newspaper’s publisher, Dan Adamescu - Alexander’s father - made some powerful enemies. As a result, he was publicly accused of corruption himself on national television by vengeful Prime Minister Victor Ponta, who had grown tired of the paper’s criticism of his administration.
In a swift trial, which the NGO Fair Trials International said had, “failed to respect the presumption of innocence”, Dan Adamescu was thrown in jail on trumped up bribery charges.

Despite having not set foot in Romania for years, when Alexander criticised the Romanian government for their unjust treatment of his father, he quickly found himself accused of exactly the same crime. It took a Romanian judge a mere 20 minutes to deliberate, issue and publish an arrest warrant that was hastily sent to the UK.

Unless he can prove the political motivation for the accusations or that his human rights would be breached on returning to Romania, Alexander’s wife and three young children will be left in London to continue their fight for justice alone, while he languishes in a Bucharest jail cell awaiting an unfair trial.

What has happened to Alexander Adamescu and his family is but one example of how the European arrest warrant has become a tool for persecution by unscrupulous governments. It assumes the parity of justice between EU member states where often there is none whatsoever.

Romania’s legal system has no trial by jury, nor does it commit to the principles of innocence until proven guilty and habeas corpus. It provides little check on the arbitrary abuse of power by the Romanian state, which despite years of EU membership still finds itself manipulating the judiciary to attack its opponents in a form of “lawfare”. And yet judges in other EU countries must treat warrants issued in Romania with trust and reciprocity.

EU leaders and policymakers must recognise the damage that is being done to the rule of law across Europe by an arrest warrant system that is fundamentally flawed. The European arrest warrant needs urgent reform to ensure it is not sacrificing quality of judicial decision-making for the sake of speed.

European arrest warrants issued in countries such as Romania, where countless reports have demonstrated their current inability to deliver a fair trial, must face additional levels of scrutiny until they dramatically improve their standards of justice.

Judges must be able to review the evidence for the charges levelled against suspects and where necessary, juries should be employed to deliver their verdict on the case.
Until EU officials put in these safeguards, honourable judges across Europe will be forced to put more families like the Adamescus through harrowing torment, and faith in EU law will continue to be undermined.

Notes
1. This article was originally published by The Parliament Magazine on 27 October 2016: https://www.theparliamentmagazine.eu/articles/partner_article/central-european-journal-international-and-security-studies-cejiss/case
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Special Report

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Executive Summary

Many of the methods used by the Communists in Romania pre-1989 to create a politicised system of justice and law enforcement are still in existence in contemporary Romania.

The control of judicial institutions and the subordination of the rule of law by the Romanian executive and its agencies continues to present a major challenge to attempts at reform.

In particular, the use of the justice system by the Romanian executive, and its agencies, to destroy political opponents remains a serious and ongoing problem.

EU-led external pressure to separate the judiciary and politics has failed, with the executive, including the Ministry of Justice, retaining considerable de facto power and political instruction of judges remaining commonplace.

Judicial independence came under sustained attack from 2012 onwards with the arrival of Prime Minister Victor Ponta. His administration presided over frequent political challenges to judicial decisions, the undermining of the constitutional court, the overturning of established procedures, the removal of checks and balances, and the manipulation of members of the judiciary through threats and intimidation.
Recent years have seen the executive use the judiciary, often deploying national security legislation, to stifle free speech and harass journalists, with both domestic and international journalists targeted.

The Romanian Anti-Corruption Directorate DNA has exerted heightened pressure on courts to issue convictions. Romania’s domestic intelligence service – first under the guise of the Securitate and later as the SRI – has been characterized by extra-judicial and often unlawful activity throughout its history.

The SRI’s influence now reaches into the ranks of the judiciary, further compromising its independence. SRI General Dumitru Dumbrava has stated that the security services regard the judicial system as a ‘tactical field’ of intervention in which the intelligence services were ‘keeping their attention until their final ruling.’ He also stated that the SRI was engaged in monitoring and gathering information on judges.

*It is in this context that the following recommendations are made:*

Romania must finally start to institute a true separation of powers because current limits to executive power are insufficient. Neither government nor any state intelligence agency must seek to fix or dictate the outcome of judicial proceedings.

Packing of the courts by governments must be stopped by removing the serving Justice Minister from all judicial decisions.

The Romanian prosecution must respect the independence of the judicial process and should refrain from exerting undue influence on judges by threatening courts with investigations of corruption should they pronounce acquittals.

The current practice of preferring promotions of prosecutors to the posts of judges should be balanced out to prevent a prosecution-biased criminal procedure.

A new and truly independent judiciary must adhere to the basic principles of innocence until proven guilty and trial by jury.
All current serving domestic intelligence (sri) officers among the judiciary must be disclosed by the sri and resign.

The sri should officially abandon all policies of interference with the judiciary.

The Superior Council of Magistrates (csm), which was created to assure the impartiality of Romania’s judges, should be reformed in order for some of its members to be appointed by the judges themselves to strengthen its independence.

csm must revise its nomination procedures and reject candidatures from former sri officers or politically affiliated judges. An effort should be undertaken to significantly improve open government, which means providing more transparency and information to Romanian citizens.

Romania should adopt objective criteria to ensure that the immunity of members of Parliament is not used to avoid investigations and the prosecution of corruption but as an instrument to strengthen independence between separated powers.

Corruption has to be reduced, both at the governmental and justice levels, because it represents a serious burden on Romania’s economy and administration. Anti-bribery mechanisms, such as whistleblowing and transparency, should be developed by the Romanian Government. Moreover, strengthening competition policy in public procurement and tender is a desirable solution for reducing corruption.

Romania should promote wider use of alternative dispute resolution schemes in order to create a quasi-competitive dynamic between private courts and public justice which can help the level of effectiveness of the judiciary.

The promotion of the culture of the rule of law among young Romanians, through scholastic, university programmes and eu initiatives, can help the next generation of voters to demand a better and more sound separation of powers.
Introduction

In terms of structure, this report sets out to detail and examine:

1. The methods used by the Communists in Romania to create a politicised system of justice and law enforcement in the period immediately after the Second World War.
2. How that system of politicised justice and law enforcement was maintained by the Communists in the ‘post-terror period’, and how increasingly both the leadership of Nicolae Ceausescu, and the system he presided over faltered in the face of popular resistance.
4. How the European Union (EU) sought to bring about reform of the Romanian judicial system through use of conditionality mechanisms in the pre-accession period. It also reviews the level of success and overall impact of the strategies pursued by the EU during this period.
5. The state of the Romanian justice system following EU accession, and the extent to which the need to comply with EU monitoring criteria has sadly led to the reestablishment of connections between the judiciary and institutions of the secret state.
6. The paper concludes with an overview of the current state of the Romanian judiciary, and its level of independence from political and state organisations. As such, it also makes a series of detailed policy recommendations.

The Communists Take Control of Judicial Institutions in Romania (1944-1948)

The control of judicial institutions and the subordination of the rule of law was a key objective of the Communists during the period of their take-over from 1944-1948. During World War II Romania had, under the leadership of the dictator Marshal Ion Antonescu been allied with Nazi Germany. Romanian military forces had taken part in the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union which was launched on 22 June 1941. In August 1944, however, King Michael of Romania, with the backing of the National Peasants Party (PNȚ) led by Iuliu Maniu and including other
opposition groupings, sought to launch a coup against Antonescu with the aim of installing a new government which would be ready to make peace with the allies. On 23 August, Antonescu was dismissed from office and arrested after a meeting with King Michael. By the time Soviet forces entered Bucharest on 31 August a new pro-allied government was in place headed by General Constantin Sanatescu. These developments meant that the Soviet military were not at this stage in a position to install their own indigenous political appointees.

The Romanian Communist Party (rmp) had played a relatively marginal role in the coup against Antonescu. The Communists were, however, well organised and quick to seize the initiative in the aftermath of the coup. This enabled them to secure the appointment of Lucretiu Patrascanu as Minister of Justice (MoJ) in the new government. Over the period of the following year Romania saw the appointment and collapse of a series of short-lived governments. The Communists sought to increase their influence within these successive governments whilst at the same time exerting pressure on the governments from outside through demonstrations, strikes, and the promotion of unrest. This process culminated in March 1945 in the appointment of a Communist dominated government headed by Petru Groza, and supported by the Soviet Union. During the period of the Groza administration, Lucretiu Patrascanu set about constructing the Communist system of political justice.

During the summer of 1945 over 1000 magistrates were purged, dismissed or pensioned off. Supreme Court judges were summoned to Patrascanu’s office to have judgements dictated to them. Each judge was also accompanied to court by two assessors who could overrule judgements if these were seen to deviate from party policy.1

Parliamentary elections took place in Romania in November 1946. The official results showed the Communist backed coalition securing an overwhelming electoral victory with almost 70% of the vote to 12.9% gained by the National Peasant’s Party. The elections were characterised by violence, intimidation, and electoral fraud. The British government headed by Clement Attlee refused to recognise the election results. Modern research on the Communist Party archives has, however, demonstrated that in reality it was the PNT who won the election and secured the parliamentary majority rather than the Communists.

In the aftermath of these fraudulent elections the Communists set about using the justice system to destroy its political opponents. On 14
July 1947 several leading members of the National Peasants Party were arrested at Tamadau airfield whilst trying to leave the country. Iuliu Maniu, the Peasants Party leader, was arrested at the same time.

The PNT leaders were accused of engaging in ‘treasonous’ activity. They protested in vain that leaving the country was not illegal, the Western powers with whom they were said to have conspired were not enemies, and that forming an ‘alternative government’ was a normal democratic procedure. The PNT leaders were sentenced to life imprisonment with hard labour. Iuliu Maniu died in prison in 1953. Ion Mihalache died ten years later in 1963. One of the PNT leaders, Corneliu Coposu, the PNT Deputy Secretary General, survived imprisonment and was released in 1964.

It has been estimated that in the period of the consolidation of Communist power 60,000 opposition supporters were executed, with a further 300,000 dying in Communist labour camps. The scale and viciousness of the Communist repression in Romania gave rise to an armed resistance movement the last remnants of which persisted until the early 1960s.

Political Justice Under Communism (1948-1989)

Article 65 of the constitution of the Romanian People’s Republic enacted in 1952 defined the purpose of the justice system in Romania as being:

To defend the regime of popular democracy and the conquests of the working people, to assure the respect of popular legality, of public property, and of the rights of the citizens.

Under this system the court, consisting of judges and assessors, had the right to intervene in trials and present evidence. They were also able to appoint defence attorneys. In these circumstances the defence representatives had limited capacity to act effectively on behalf of their clients.

This system, which guaranteed the primacy of the Communist Party in judicial matters was broadly typical of Communist regimes across the region in this ‘post-terror’ period. In neighbouring Bulgaria, for instance, the Communists had used similar methods in order to gain political control over the country’s legal institutions.

Alongside these institutional similarities with other communist states in the region there was also a significant element of ‘Romanian exceptionalism.’ This ‘exceptionalism’ took the form of a particular
focus on the personality of the leader as a source of power which has been described as 'sultanism.' This personalist form of leadership was instituted by Nicolae Ceausescu after he came to power in 1965, and replaced the more collective forms of leadership which had existed under his predecessor, Gheorghiu-Dej.

This meant that the institutional power of the party was subject to interventions by the leader, his family, and clan associates. A popular Romanian joke of this period described this as ‘Socialism in one family.’ During the 1970s and 1980s Ceausescu increasingly sought to cultivate a ‘cult of personality’ which it has been suggested was modelled on the forms of governance he was able to observe in China at the height of the cultural revolution and in North Korea during visits to these countries. The nature of Ceausescu’s sultanist rule brought a new element of arbitrariness into the already politicised judicial system. The personal nature of Ceausescu’s rule also acted to limit the possibilities for a non-violent, negotiated, change of government as was seen in other Communist states in the region, such as Bulgaria and Hungary.

Along with the politicised judiciary, the other main instrument for the maintenance of control in Romania’s communist system were the political police of the Securitate. At the time of the December 1989 revolution the Securitate had 15,312 personnel organised into six directorates.

These were:
1. First Directorate (Domestic Intelligence)
2. Second Directorate (Economic Counter-Espionage)
3. Third Directorate (Counter-Espionage)
4. Fourth Directorate (Military Counter-Espionage)
5. Fifth Directorate (Protection for Party Leadership)
6. Sixth Directorate (Penal Investigations)

The Centre for External Information, responsible for foreign espionage, and the 795 strong Special Anti-Terrorist Unit (USLA) were also designated as Securitate personnel.

In addition, there were 23,370 Securitate troops with bases in Bucharest, Constanta, Timisoara, and Cluj. These troops enjoyed better conditions and rations than the regular army, but many were conscripts like their military equivalents. These figures did not, however, include those Romanians who had to a greater or lesser extent, acted as informers for the Securitate.
Following the December 1989 revolution, Silviu Brucan, the veteran Communist, put the number of Securitate informers at 700,000. Virgil Magureanu, the first head of the sri, the Securitate successor organisation, gave the figure of 400,000 for the Securitate informers. Ultimately, however, the fact that most Romanians believed that there was an all pervasive network of Securitate informers was probably more important than the exact number of individuals involved in such a network. It has been observed that: ‘the Securitate were as much a state of mind as an instrument of terror.’

In spite of the existence of a politicised judiciary and the activities of the Securitate, dissent continued to grow in Romania through the 1970s and 1980s.

In August 1977 major industrial unrest broke out amongst the miners of the Jiu valley. Ceausescu was forced to travel to the Jiu valley and respond to the miners demands with a series of populist, and subsequently unfulfilled, promises. The aftermath of these strikes saw a major effort by the authorities to implant Securitate within the unions and mining community of the region. There were strikes and factory occupations in Bucharest, Galati, and Tîrgovişte in the summer of 1980. An uprising took place in the Motru valley in the autumn of 1981. Demonstrations and strikes took place in Brasov, Romania’s second city in 1987/1988. Media reports from this period also show that prisoners continued to be sentenced for small-scale and individual acts of defiance against the authorities. The revolution of December 1989 was the culmination of a series of protests in opposition to the Communist institutions of governance.

In many ways Romania has only just begun to confront the crimes committed under this system of political justice. On 10 February 2016 the Romanian appeals court upheld a twenty year prison sentence on Alexandru Visinescu for the killing of twelve people during the period from 1956-1963 when he was commander of the Ramnicu Sarat prison, ninety miles from Bucharest. Radu Preda, the head of the Institute for Investigation of Communist Crimes and Romanian Exiles (IICCRE) stated that: ‘...for the first time an instrument of Communism will face justice.’

He compared the trial to ‘a Romanian Nuremburg.’ Visinescu had until recently been living openly in central Bucharest on a ‘special military pension’.

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Special Report
Moving Forward and Standing Still

The post-Communist period in Romania began with what seemed to many to be an act of political justice. On 25 December 1989 Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu were put on trial, found guilty, and subsequently executed. The trial observed formal legality, but was widely seen as being an act of political expediency. Many of those who stood in judgement over Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu were themselves senior figures from the Communist regime. The official reason given for the swiftness of Ceausescu’s trial and execution was that his captors feared a rescue attempt might be made by elements of the Securitate still loyal to the regime. It has been suggested, however, that the more likely explanation for the speed of the proceedings was that the former leader’s judges feared that a lengthy trial would serve to illuminate their own roles and activities within the regime. The ambiguity of this act, which was overwhelmingly approved by the Romanian population, in some ways set the tone for the immediate post-Communist period in Romania. The leader was gone, but the institutions remained in place.

This element of continuity in Romanian political and institutional life was emphasised by the results of the 20 May 1990 presidential and parliamentary elections in Romania. The presidential elections were won by Ion Iliescu who was the candidate of the National Salvation Front (NSF), a grouping of former Communist leaders and officials formed during the December 1989 revolution, who secured 85% of the vote compared to 11% for his nearest opposition rival. The NSF gained 67% to 7% for their closest competitors.

There were a number of ‘positive’ factors which accounted for the success of Ion Iliescu and the NSF at the polls. The most important of these was the fact that he and his associates in the NSF were seen by many voters as being the people directly responsible for the overthrow and subsequent execution of Nicolae Ceausescu. They were also credited with bringing to an end many of the directly oppressive aspects of the Ceausescu regime. The fact that the NSF inherited many of the old Communist Party structures, networks, and resources was also a significant element in their success in first post-revolutionary parliamentary elections.

On 21 November 1991, a new post-Communist constitution was adopted by the Romanian parliament. The constitution was confirmed following a popular referendum on 8 December 1991 in which 78.5%
voted in favour with a 69.7% turn-out. The constitution was largely the creation of Antonie Iorgovan, an academician and the only independent member of the NSF government. It was heavily influenced by the French constitution. The constitution established Romania as a unitary state with a bicameral parliament consisting of the House of Deputies and the Senate. It also sought to bring into existence judicial institutions which would be independent of political control replacing the old system of Socialist justice. Following a model common in many Western European countries, including France, Italy and Spain, the new constitution established the Superior Council of Magistrates (csm), a self-ruling body whose role was to:

1. Guarantee the independence of the judiciary
2. Propose the appointment of judges and prosecutors
3. Deal with the careers and disciplinary liabilities of judges

The csm was composed of:

1. Nine judges
2. Five Prosecutors
3. The Minister of Justice
4. The President of the High Court of Cassation and Justice
5. Two Representatives of civil society appointed by the Romanian senate

The establishment of the csm was an important de jure step forward in terms of establishing a non-political judiciary. In practical terms, however, its impact during this period was limited. One of the main problems has been represented by the reduced independence of a body entirely appointed by the Parliament. In France and Italy, only part of the csm members are appointed by the Parliament, while other members are appointed by the President of the Republic and another significant number chosen by the judges themselves.

Following the promulgation of the new Romanian constitution parliamentary and presidential elections took place in September 1992. Prior to these elections a major split took place in the ruling party with the Ion Iliescu’s old guard faction renaming itself as the Democratic National Salvation Front (DNSF) and the leadership of the rump NSF being taken on by the former Prime Minister, Petre Roman. On polling day Ion Iliescu was re-elected as president with 61.4% of the vote to 38.6% for Emil Constantinescu from the Democratic Convention (DCR) coalition. In the parliamentary elections Iliescu’s DNSF emerged as the largest party with 28.29% of the vote, The DCR gained 20.16% of the
vote and Petre Roman’s 10.38% of the vote. Ion Iliescu was able to cling on to power with the support of two hard-line nationalist groupings, the Party of Romanian National Unity and the Greater Romania Party. During his second term in office Ion Iliescu used his political influence to override the theoretical independence of the judiciary and to pack its ranks with judges loyal to his regime and opposed to reform.

The slow pace of reform and stagnation in the economy led to a shift in the electoral landscape. The November 1996 elections were won by Emil Constantinescu from the dcr with 54.4% of the vote to 45.6% for Ion Iliescu. The Democratic Convention came to power eager to implement the reform agenda which had been stalled under Iliescu’s governments. The dcr government saw the judiciary which had been packed with old guard communist judges as potentially obstructive to the reform programme. The new government sought to counter this by making the csm consult the justice ministry on new judicial appointments. These actions, although motivated by the desire to promote economic and institutional reform, served to compromise the fragile independence of the post-communist Romanian judiciary.

The security services, the other pillar of the Communist legal system, were also undergoing a period of change and adjustment at this time. In the immediate aftermath of the December 1989 revolution former Securitate cadres continued to exert an influence on the political scene in Romania. The mineriada of June 1990, in which miners from the provinces descended on Bucharest and attacked opposition supporters, was widely seen by domestic and international observers as an act of extra-judicial vigilante justice directed by ex-Securitate members on behalf of the Iliescu government. The new Romanian security service formally came into existence on 26 March 1990 (Decree Number 181) under the leadership of Virgil Magureanu. General Victor Staniculescu, the Romanian Defence Minister, told parliament:

> No telephone conversations will be listened to now or in the future ... no citizen regardless of nationality, political affiliation or religion or religious convictions is the target of the cadres in the new army structures.10

This statement that the sri had abandoned the use of surveillance and wire-tapping was widely disbelieved. This scepticism was further reinforced by the discovery in May 1991 of hundreds of sri wiretap transcripts on opposition politicians buried near the village of Berev-
Further evidence of continued SRI wiretapping was provided by the testimony of SRI whistle blower, Constantin Bucur, in November 1996. According to Bucur many of the wiretaps he had carried out had been ordered by Virgil Magureanu without official authorisation. He stated that:

I became convinced that this man was not working for state security, that he was working for personal and political interests.¹¹

The SRI during this period saw repeated purges and reorganisations of personnel. The first wave of sackings took place between June and August 1991 apparently prompted by the Berevoiesti wiretap scandal. There was a second series of dismissals in mid-1994 when a number of senior SRI officers lost their jobs.¹² Virgil Magureanu held on to his position as head of the SRI, despite repeated reports of his imminent demise, until April 1997 when he was removed following the election of Emil Constantinescu as president.

The first decade after the fall of Ceausescu also saw allegations of the involvement of former and serving Romanian security personnel in criminal activity. In June 2000 a commission was set up by the Romanian government to investigate the collapse of the National Investment Fund. The commission stated the fund’s collapse constituted ‘a threat to national security’ and that fraud had been ‘committed within the fund.’ The commission also announced that of the fund’s forty county branch managers thirty six had been found to be former officers in the Securitate. The other four were former officials of the Interior and Defence Ministries.¹³ A month later, Emil Constantinescu, the Romanian President, accused his predecessor Ion Iliescu and former Prime Minister, Teodor Melescanu, of involvement in a large-scale oil smuggling operation in violation of UN sanctions. The smuggling activities had, Constantinescu stated, been facilitated by serving SRI officers.¹⁴

The Rule of Law and EU Accession (2000-2007)
Post-revolutionary Romania remained first in the sphere of the Soviet Union. A support and friendship agreement was signed in 1991. Hadn’t it been abrogated after the collapse of the Soviet Union later in the year, Romania’s path might have been different. Romania re-oriented
its views to the West. A Romanian diplomatic mission to the European Union had been established in Brussels in April 1990. The National Salvation Front stated that:

The entire external policy of the country must serve to promote neighbourliness, friendship, and peace in the world thus joining in the process of building a united Europe, the common home of all the peoples of our country.15

In 1991 a Trade and Co-operation agreement was also signed between the EU and Romania. This was followed in February 1993 by the European Agreement which created an association between Romania and the EU. Romania formally applied for EU membership on 22 June 1995.

There was a broad cross-party consensus in support of Romania’s membership of the EU. The Snagov Declaration, issued to coincide with Romania’s application for EU membership, was signed by the President, Prime Minister, and the leaders of thirteen political parties ranging from the pro-Western reformist Democratic Convention to the ultra-nationalist Greater Romania Party and the Party of Romanian National Unity. The signatories of the Snagov Declaration described the objective of joining the EU as ‘a major point of convergence and solidarity.’ Beyond these positive sentiments it wasn’t clear to what extent the Romanian political leaders understood or were supportive of the measures it would be necessary to take in order to secure EU membership.

A European Commission report in 1997 identified a series of steps that Romania needed to take to reform its justice system if it was to secure EU membership. Following the decision made by the Helsinki European Council in December 1999 full negotiations on Romania’s EU membership began in February 2000.

The start of negotiations with the EU coincided with the defeat of the pro-Western reformers and the return to power of Romania’s political old guard. In presidential elections in November 2000 Ion Iliescu gained 66.83% of the vote defeating Corneliu Vadim Tudor, leader of the ultra-nationalist Greater Romania Party with 33% of the vote. In the parliamentary elections Iliescu’s Social Democrats gained 37.09% of the vote. They were followed by the Greater Romania Party with 21% of the vote. Support for the pro-reform Democratic Convention collapsed and they managed to secure only 5.29% of the vote.
Rodica Stanoiu (born 1939) was appointed as Minister of Justice in the new Social Democrat government headed by Adrian Nastase. Stanoiu had previously been a researcher at the Bucharest University Institute for Judicial Studies (ICJ). She had been elected as a Senator for the Social Democrats representing Olt County in 1996 and 2000. In 2006, after the end of her period in ministerial office, the Council for the Study of Securitate Archives (CNSAS) published evidence showing that during the 1980s, whilst she was working at the ICJ, Stanoiu had worked for the Securitate compiling reports on her colleagues for the Securitate. In response to these statements by the CNSAS Stanoiu left the Social Democrats for the Conservative Party, the political vehicle of the businessman Dan Voiculescu, and launched a lengthy legal battle to prove that the allegations by the CNSAS were false.

In February 2014 the High Court of Cessation and Justice ruled that the CNSAS allegations were true, upholding an earlier judgement made by a court in Oradea. In view of her background, as revealed by the CNSAS, it is perhaps not surprising that during her period in ministerial office from 2000 to 2004 Rodica Stanoiu came to be seen as a major veto-player in relation to attempts to reform the judiciary.

It was not until September 2003 that, in response to pressure from the European Union and the European Court of Human Rights, the Romanian government produced a new Judicial Reform Strategy. The strategy was intended to respond to strengthen the division between the judiciary and politics, and to respond to key concerns from within the judiciary over:

1. The authority of the Ministry of Justice
2. Poor working conditions
3. Political pressures on the work of the judiciary

The development of the Judicial Reform Strategy was greeted by the European Commission as a ‘positive sign,’ but they urged the Romanian government to go further in its efforts to achieve judicial reform. Other observers described the strategy as ‘badly designed and poorly implemented’. In 2003 the Romanian constitution was revised to strengthen the status of the Superior Council of Magistrates in relation to the Ministry of Justice. Considerable de facto power, however, remained with the Ministry in spite of this constitutional change. In June 2004 three new laws on the judiciary were adopted by the Romanian parliament:
1. Law on the Superior Council of Magistrates
2. Law on the Organisation of Judiciary
3. Law on the Status of Magistrates

While this constituted a significant package of new legislation in practice they encountered familiar problems in terms of a lack of government commitment to implementation of the laws. Two Romanian judges, writing in 2009, described Rodica Stanoiu’s Ministry as: ‘The darkest period in our legal system from the standpoint of post-communist justice.’

By the end of 2004 the European Union was increasingly treating judicial reform and anti-corruption as priorities in terms of Romania’s EU accession. It was stated that if significant progress in these areas was not made during 2005 then Romania would not be able to join the EU in 2007 as planned.

In November 2004 a significant shift took place in the Romanian political landscape when Traian Basescu, the candidate of the centre-right Justice and Truth Alliance, with 51.23% of the vote, narrowly defeated Adrian Nastase, the former Prime Minister and candidate for the Social Democrats, who gained 48.77% of the vote.

Monica Macovei was appointed as Justice Minister in the new government. Macovei (born 1959) was a lawyer, academic, and human rights activist with strong links with civil society within Romania and internationally. Macovei was not affiliated with any political party. She was identified by the EU as a key agent for change within Romania in terms of judicial reform - in contrast to her predecessor who was seen as a veto player, obstructive to the reform process.

Monica Macovei moved quickly to revise the 2004 package of laws on the judiciary. The revised European Reform Law would, it was stated, represent a ‘new deal for the judiciary.’ The law was passed, in the face of resistance in parliament through the use of an emergency ordinance by the government. The Constitutional Court, however, then ruled that elements of the law were unconstitutional, and the law was referred back to parliament in its entirety. A modified version of the law was subsequently adopted by the Romanian parliament.

In early 2006 similar political conflict was witnessed in response to anti-corruption measures proposed by Macovei. The result was also similar in that it saw the measures proposed by Macovei being adjusted downwards in the face of strong political resistance. Monica Macovei did, however, succeed during her period in office, strengthening
the Anti-Corruption Directorate (DNA), which had been originally established in 2002.

In spite of this limited or qualified progress in judicial reform Romania became a member of the EU on 1 January 2007. Its capacity to achieve this objective in spite of the failings of its reform progress has caused it to be described as a ‘Successful laggard.’

Monica Macovei had sought to develop support for her reforms through contacts and engagement with civic society, academia, and professional legal organisations. Politically, however, she was an isolated figure. Much of her political backing came from the country’s president, Traian Basescu, and the external institutions, principally the EU. On 13 February 2007 Macovei faced a vote of no-confidence in the Romanian senate. The no-confidence motion had been moved by the Conservative Party, and was backed by the ultra-nationalist Greater Romania Party and the Social Democrats. The motion was passed by 137 votes to 81, figures which suggested that at least some of Traian Basescu’s Democratic Party had voted for Macovei’s removal. The Romanian constitutional court subsequently ruled that the vote did not mean that Monica Macovei was obliged to resign. Macovei’s reprieve was, however, only temporary. On 2 April 2007 Calin Popescu Tariceanu, the Prime Minister, whose relations with Traian Basescu had broken down, moved to oust Macovei.

Judicial Independence under Attack
The Rule of Law in Romania (2008-2012)

The removal of Monica Macovei stifled any impetus for reform which had existed within the Romanian government. Her replacement was Tudor Chiuariu (born 1976), a National Liberal MP loyal to the Prime Minister, Calin Popescu Tariceanu. He acted quickly to modify the laws on the judiciary brought in by Monica Macovei as part of her reform strategy. He also moved, whilst Traian Basescu was suspended as President prior to the May 2007 referendum, to oust Doru Tulus as head of the DNA. Tulus was replaced by a prominent Social Democrat known for his opposition to judicial reform.

Chiuariu also ensured that although the legislation setting up the National integrity Agency (ANI) was passed through parliament it did so in a considerably weakened form. The appointment of Lidia Barbulescu, an active Social Democrat opponent of reform, as head of
the SCM was seen as undermining judicial independence. It was also suggested that there was a conflict of interest in Barbulescu’s appointment to head the SCM whilst she was at the same time serving as a Supreme Court judge. Tudor Chiuaru was Justice Minister until December 2007. Chiuaru continued to serve as a National Liberal member of the Chamber of Deputies, and then as a Senator from 2012. In January 2015 he was forced to resign from the National Liberal Party after he received a three and a half year suspended sentence for influence peddling, money laundering, and joining an organised crime group. He currently sits as an independent in the Romanian Senate.

Between January and February 2008, the role of Justice Minister was held on a temporary basis by Teodor Melescanu. He was followed by Catalin Predoiu who was Minister of Justice from February 2008 to May 2012. In October 2011 Catalin Predoiu became mired in controversy when the Ministry of Justice awarded a 1.5 million lei contract to RVA Insolvency, a company to which his father-in-law was linked. This was ruled not to be contrary to conflict of interest regulations because the contract was funded by the World Bank rather than the Romanian state budget. Catalin Predoiu was Prime Minister for three days from 6 to 9 February 2012 following the resignation of Emil Boc. In 2005 he was elected as head of the National Liberal Party organisation in Bucharest. He was forced to resign in June 2016 after he came third in local elections in the city.

Traian Basescu secured a convincing victory in the impeachment referendum vote which took place on 19 May 2007 with 74.48% against impeachment to 24.75% in favour. In the November 2008 parliamentary elections, however, his Democratic Liberal party gained 32.4% of the vote to 33.1% for the Social Democrats. The National Liberals gained 18.6% of the vote. In the December 2009 presidential elections Traian Basescu was narrowly re-elected with 50.33% of the vote to 49.65% for his Social Democrat opponent Mircea Geona with 49.65% of the vote. Basescu’s victory was secured at the last moment following the counting of votes from Romanians living abroad.

These results produced a period of political stalemate and legislative stagnation. The lack of progress in judicial reform and the prevalence of corruption was increasingly the subject of criticism by the EU. In the 2010 EU monitoring report the Romanian government was criticised for lack of accountability and commitment to reform. There was increasing recognition within the EU that the formal pre-accession com-
mitment to Europe was not paralleled, in view of the lack of effective mechanisms of conditionality, by a post-accession readiness to move forward with the process of reform.

The continued vulnerability of the Romanian judiciary to political pressure was underlined by the political crisis in 2012 which came to a head with the move by Prime Minister, Victor Ponta, to hold a second impeachment referendum directed against President Traian Basescu in July of that year. The move to impeach Traian Basescu was approved by the Romanian parliament on 6 July 2012. Victor Ponta and his allies in parliament accused Basescu of exceeding his powers as President of Romania. Traian Basescu for his part accused Victor Ponta of staging a ‘putsch.’ In addition to using the referendum as a mechanism to remove his primary political opponent, Victor Ponta also sought to move against other public institutions. He used emergency ordinances to remove the speakers of both the House of Deputies and the Senate, and the Ombudsman. Measures were brought in to restrict the power of the Constitutional Court, and to make possible the impeachment of judges.23

Crin Antonescu, one of Victor Ponta’s key allies asserted that the Senate had the right to remove judges, and asserted that composition of the Constitutional Court was ‘a disgrace.’24

In a significant parallel set of actions Victor Ponta and the Social Democrats also sacked the head of the National Archives, purged state TV, and targeted the Romanian Cultural Institute.25

The European Commission reacted strongly to Victor Ponta’s assault on key and supposedly independent institutions in Romania. In a twenty-two-page report the Commission accused him of ignoring the constitution, threatening judges, illegally moving officials, and tampering with the democratic system.

The report acknowledged the polarised nature of Romanian politics: However, this political context cannot explain the systematic nature of several actions. They raise serious doubts about the commitment to the respect of the rule of law in a pluralist democratic system. Political challenges to judicial decisions, the undermining of the constitutional court, the overturning of established procedures, and the removal of checks and balances have called into question the government’s respect of the rule of law and judicial review. The Commission is in particular extremely concerned by the indications of manipu-
lations and threats which affect institutions, members of the judiciary.26

The Venice Commission of the Council of Europe was also harsh in its criticism of the actions of the Ponta government. Judges from the Constitutional Court sent two letters to the Venice Commission, one before the poll in July and one afterwards in August, complaining about the ‘virulent attacks’ they had faced from the Ponta government.

Polling for the referendum took place on 29 July 2012. Traian Basescu had urged his supporters to boycott the poll. The results showed 88.7% of those voting to be in favour Basescu’s impeachment with 11.3% against. Turn-out, however, stood at 46.24% putting it below the 50% threshold. The 50% threshold had been an established part of Romanian regulations on the holding of referendums. It had been removed by Victor Ponta and his allies, but reintroduced immediately prior to the referendum under EU pressure. The Constitutional Court ruled that the referendum was invalid.

In the aftermath of the referendum Philip Gordon, US Assistant Secretary visited Bucharest and met both Victor Ponta and Traian Basescu. In a statement to the media he drew attention to: ‘Credible allegations of large scale fraudulent voting, attempts to alter voter lists, and attempts to pressure the Constitutional Court.’27

The constitutional crisis of 2012 was characterised by the political analyst, Vladimir Tismaneanu, as a failed ‘coup attempt against democracy.’28 These events illustrated the continued willingness of some politicians to attempt to assert control over Romania’s public and judicial institutions. More positively, however, it also showed the readiness of the Constitutional Court to resist the attempted encroachment on its sphere of activity by the government.

Romania’s Renewed Alliances: The Judiciary, the Secret State and the Anti-Corruption Drive (2012-2016)

In spite of his failure to remove Basescu in the referendum Victor Ponta was able to consolidate his political position within Romania in elections held at the end of the year. In the December 2012 elections, Victor Ponta and his Social Democrats secured an overwhelming victory with 58.61% of the vote to 16.21% for the opposition Right Romania Alliance. It was widely assumed that Victor Ponta would be able to go on to secure the presidency of Romania in an election held in November 2014.
In an unexpected result, however, Ponta was defeated in the second round of elections by Klaus Iohannis, the centre-right candidate from Sibiu in Transylvania, who gained 54.43% of the vote to Victor Ponta’s 45.4% of the vote. Victor Ponta remained as Prime Minister until 4 November 2015 when he was forced to resign over charges of corruption and public demonstrations over the Colectiv night club fire in which 32 people had died. Victor Ponta was replaced as Prime Minister by Dacian Ciolos, a former EU Agriculture Commissioner, who headed a technocratic government.

The arrival of Klaus Iohannis and Dacian Ciolos in government was seen by international observers as ushering in a supposedly new era in Romanian politics. This positive political trend was viewed as being paralleled by developments in the legal/judicial sphere.

The National Anti-Corruption Directorate (DNA), under the energetic leadership of Laura Kovesi since 2013, and the Directorate for Organised Crime and Terrorism (DIICOT), were taking an increasingly active role in acting against corruption and criminality in Romania. In 2014 the DNA secured the convictions of twenty-four former mayors, five ex-MPs, and two former ministers including former Prime Minister, Adrian Nastase. In 2015 the DNA brought charges against fifteen MPs, four of whom were former ministers including Victor Ponta, and Sorin Oprescu, the former Mayor of Bucharest.

Romania was praised in the European Commission’s Co-operation and Verification Mechanism (CVM) monitoring report for 2015. It stated that: ‘The track record of the key judicial and integrity institutions in addressing high levels of corruption remains impressive.’

Frans Timmerman, First Vice-President of the European Commission, commented on the report saying that:

Over the last year we have seen the professionalism, commitment, and good track record of the judiciary and anti-corruption prosecutors and reforms being internalised. I am encouraged to see that Romania continues to make reforms and the positive trend continued in 2015. These efforts must be stepped up in 2016. In particular to prevent corruption and see that judges can do their job properly.

The methodology used by the DNA has, however, raised serious questions with regards to its impact on the independence of the judiciary. The DNA and DIICOT anti-corruption investigations are heavily dependent on the Romanian secret state, in particular the Domestic
Intelligence Service (SRI) for logistical support in the form of the provision of wiretapping evidence.

In February 2016 the Romanian Constitutional Court ruled that it was unconstitutional for the SRI to conduct wiretapping operations on behalf of the DNA and DIICOT. Laura Kovesi responded by stating that this move would endanger the anti-corruption fight. On 11 March the Romanian Prime Minister, Dacian Ciolos, used an emergency ordinance to overrule the Constitutional Court and enable the DNA and DIICOT to continue to use wiretap evidence supplied by the SRI. In April 2016 Laura Kovesi publically criticised the head of Romania’s External Intelligence Service, the SIE, for failing to provide surveillance evidence on Romanians living abroad.

The support provided by the SRI is undoubtedly useful to the DNA and DIICOT in the conduct of their investigations. It is interesting, however, to note the difference between the situation in 2016 when the use of surveillance by the security services is presented as essential to the establishment of a society governed by the rule of law and the situation in the 1990s when, as noted earlier, the ending of security service surveillance was seen as a key requirement for creating a free, open and truly democratic society.

It is in this context that there have also been recent suggestions that the influence of the SRI has reached into the ranks of the judiciary thereby further compromising their independence. In an interview given in May 2015 SRI General Dimitriu Dumbrava stated that the security services regarded the judicial system as a ‘tactical field’ in which the intelligence services were ‘keeping their attention until their final ruling.’ He also stated that the SRI was engaged in monitoring and gathering information on judges. Following this interview, a complaint was issued by the National Union of Judges, Association of Prosecutors, and the Association of Magistrates of Romania which called on the Superior Council of Magistrates to determine whether the SRI had compromised the independence of the judiciary. A press statement issued by the judges stated that:

General Dumbrava’s statements unveil a system that pretending to watch over respecting human rights and the fight against corruption is actually brutally breaking these fundamental rights.31
The Superior Council of Magistrates subsequently determined that such a comment did not indicate an infringement of judicial independence. Interestingly when, in August 2016, a vacancy arose on the Superior Council of Magistrates it was not considered to be a barrier to Lavinia Nicoleta Cotofana’s candidacy that previously she had been a member of the SRI for eleven years.32

Reaching Beyond Romania’s Borders
The Case of the British Journalist Stuart Ramsay and German writer Alexander Adamescu (2016)

On 7 August 2016 Sky News ran a story in which their highly awarded senior correspondent, Stuart Ramsay, and a news team met a group of gun runners offering weapons for sale in a forest in western Romania. The Romanian authorities reacted with fury to the story. The DIICOT Chief Prosecutor, Daniel Horodniceanu, was swift to declare that the report was merely a: ‘A scenario made up by British news.’

While Stuart Ramsay and Sky News stood by the integrity of their investigation, and the Romanian authorities subsequently arrested the Romanian gun runners who they said were really hunters pretending to sell legally held rifles, DIICOT also sought to start a criminal investigation against Stuart Ramsay and the other Sky journalists for ‘spreading false information affecting the security of Romania’. 

Alongside this story a number of journalists and NGOs in Romania were equally swift to voice their unease at the authorities’ actions stating that it was likely to do more damage to Romania’s reputation than the original Sky News report.33

Likewise, the arrest warrant procedure for German writer Alexander Adamescu has sparked worldwide criticism. Alexander Adamescu is the son of businessman Dan Adamescu, accused of bribery charges in 2014 and seemingly Romania’s public enemy number one. After Alexander Adamescu spoke out about the treatment of his father, whose case was highlighted by the NGO Fair Trials International as having “failed to respect the presumption of innocence,”34 the DNA Chief Prosecutor Laura Kovesi appeared on live television in March 2016 to request Alexander Adamescu’s arrest on the same charges. The case was filed in front of a judge who summoned, heard, deliberated, wrote and
published Adamescu’s arrest warrant in less than two hours. Alexander Adamescu was subsequently arrested in London through a Romanian EAW shortly before he was due to speak at a public conference with British journalists on the topic of the abuse of EAWs and the erosion of the rule of law in Romania.

While these stories initially appear to be of minor importance, in reality they have profound implications in the context of the European Arrest Warrant for writers and journalists in Western Europe. For if nothing else they provide a worrying insight into the way that the Romanian legal and security authorities operate, choosing to use legal threats against journalists and writers rather than face a potentially embarrassing and truth-telling story.

Conclusion and Recommendations

In the aftermath of the Second World War the destruction of the independent judiciary in Romania was a key priority for the Communist Party. Considerable resources and a methodology based on terror were utilised to bring about the dismantling of the independent judicial system. Once in power the Communists put in place a system which was subordinate to the leader and the party, and maintained by the pervasive security services.

In the post-Communist period the task of rebuilding an independent judicial and legal system has been formidable. Those seeking to bring about change have frequently faced opposition from political forces, and from within state institutions.

During the pre-accession period Monica Macovei’s attempts to institutionalise judicial independence in preparation for joining the EU were repeatedly obstructed and the measures watered down by political actors who did not share her enthusiasm for the practicalities of reform, as opposed to a theoretical commitment to joining Europe.

In 2012 the judicial system faced a concerted attack on its independence led by Victor Ponta and the Social Democrats. It was an attack which was only thwarted with difficulty. This failure of this attack was partly due to international intervention, on the part of the EU and the US government, but also due to the readiness on this occasion of the judiciary to resist state encroachments on their sphere of activity.
In recent years a wide ranging anti-corruption drive headed by the Anti-Corruption Directorate (DNA) has been underway in Romania. The anti-corruption drive has produced large scale convictions on corruption charges of senior political and business figures. While the anti-corruption drive has been praised by some in the EU and US, it has however also thrown up its own contradictions with many suggesting that the Romanian secret state is once again proactively undermining and compromising the independence of the nation’s judiciary.

Considering the Rule of Law Index 2015 of the World Justice Project, Romania is part of the second group selected by the index, classified as an upper-middle income nation. The first group is composed of EU, EFTA and Northern American countries. Every country’s justice system and rule of law enforcement is evaluated through a set of macro and micro indicators. In the global ranking for the enforcement of the rule of law Romania is 32nd of 102 nations. In its group of upper-middle ranked countries it is third of thirty one. As far as the macro-indicators of “Constraints on government powers” are concerned Romania is significantly under the average of the western developed nations in every micro-indicator. Regarding the macro-indicator of “Corruption” the worst micro-indicators are “corruption in the executive branch” and “corruption in the legislature” where Romania is very far from the developed countries and under the average of the upper-middle income nations.

The worst result for Romania among the macro-indicators of the index concerns “open government” where its average is significantly underdeveloped compared with the average of its group. Romania’s best performance is seen in the macro-indicators of fundamental rights, order and security, and law enforcement. In these sectors, the indicators show that the country is significantly over the average of its group and not so far from the group of developed countries. Regarding civil justice some indicators such as “accessibility and affordability” and “no discrimination” are very close to the average of developed countries, while other indicators such as “justice corruption” and “improper influence of government” show very poor results, significantly far from the average of the developed nations. The last macro-indicator is criminal justice. Here, lower scores are, as in the case of civil justice, “improper influence of government”, “corruption” and “due
process of law”. Indicators that measure effectiveness and efficiency of criminal justice are much better and consistently above the average of upper-middle countries.

Romania is in a top position among the upper-middle income nations but it is still far from the standards of developed countries. Its justice system is acceptable concerning the respect of fundamental rights and order and security. Procedures and practices are fast, with a good level of efficiency and effectiveness. However, rule of law indicators, in particular corruption and the improper influence of government in the justice system are too low and seriously compromised even for a post-soviet country.35

While some analysts have demonstrated that progress has been made in terms of institutionalising change within the Romanian judicial system, progress remains slow and patchy.

Cristina Dallara has highlighted the positive role played by the involvement, particularly of younger Romanian judges and legal professionals, in international networks and organisations, Dallara has emphasised the role these networks play in socialising and changing the attitudes of those involved.

Similarly, Martin Mendelski has argued that while the eu-supported attempts to push forward the judicial reform process have had a positive effect in terms of increasing legal capacity and bringing Romanian laws in line with international legal standards, he also presents evidence of how the reform process has been much less successful in entrenching judicial impartiality.36

Today, the Romanian judiciary continues to face pressure in terms of political and institutional demands and exigencies. This issue needs to be addressed if the rule of law is to become institutionalised, over the long term, within the country.

It is in this context that this paper makes the following specific policy recommendations:

1. Romania must finally start to institute a true separation of powers because current limits to executive power are insufficient. Neither government nor any state intelligence agency must seek to fix or dictate the outcome of judicial proceedings.
2. Packing of the courts by governments must be stopped by removing the serving Justice Minister from all judicial decisions.
3. The Romanian prosecution must respect the independence of the judicial process and should refrain from exerting undue influence
on judges by threatening courts with investigations of corruption should they pronounce acquittals.

4. The current practice of preferring promotions of prosecutors to the posts of judges should be balanced out to prevent a prosecution-biased criminal procedure.

5. A new and truly independent judiciary must adhere to the basic principles of innocence until proven guilty and trial by jury.

6. All current serving domestic intelligence (sri) officers among the judiciary must be disclosed by the sri and resign.

7. The sri should officially abandon all policies of interference with the judiciary.

8. The Superior Council of Magistrates (csm), which was created to assure the impartiality of Romania’s judges, should be reformed in order for some of its members to be appointed by the judges themselves to strengthen its independence.

9. CSM must revise its nomination procedures and reject candidates from former sri officers or politically affiliated judges. An effort should be undertaken to significantly improve open government, which means providing more transparency and information to Romanian citizens.

10. Romania should adopt objective criteria to ensure that the immunity of members of Parliament is not used to avoid investigations and the prosecution of corruption but as an instrument to strengthen independence between separated powers.

11. Corruption has to be reduced, both at the governmental and justice levels, because it represents a serious burden on Romania’s economy and administration. Anti-bribery mechanisms, such as whistleblowing and transparency, should be developed by the Romanian Government. Moreover, strengthening competition policy in public procurement and tender is a desirable solution for reducing corruption.

12. Romania should promote wider use of alternative dispute resolution schemes in order to create a quasi-competitive dynamic between private courts and public justice which can help the level of effectiveness of the judiciary.

13. The promotion of the culture of the rule of law among young Romanians, through scholastic, university programmes and eu initiatives, can help the next generation of voters to demand a better and more sound separation of powers.
In 2017, Romania will have been an EU member for ten years. It has attempted to modernize the judicial system since the pre-accession phase and it is likely that it will continue to do so for many years to come. What happens to Romania is a crucial test for the entire European Union. The Romanian experience could serve as an example to potential future EU member states (mainly Serbia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Bosnia Herzegovina and Albania). It will tell us if the EU enlargement has been beneficial – in promoting the rule of law and in determining a real political, economic and social convergence – as it was intended to be.

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To understand the current character of the Middle East region, one must have a clear picture of the context in which the prevailing order was formed. One must take into account the relationships between parties, the dominant behaviour patterns of the entities and institutions that created and shaped the regional order and interference from external forces. However, periods of stability and instability and ongoing security issues are best explained by power, ambition, behaviour and interaction of the regional powers (Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey). The relationships and conflicts between these powers, as well as examples of cooperation and integration, will be at the centre of our examination of the changes in the regional order of the Middle East during the past seven decades.

Keywords: Middle East, regional powers, regional order, integration, conflict, region, Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey

Introduction

Since the 1990s, regional institutions, conflicts and powers have been gaining ground as topics of discussion regarding the new global order, the changing distribution of power in the post-Cold War world and the unequal development of the economies and security in different
regions. The decentralisation of international relations helped both to strengthen the autonomy of regions, which were no longer influenced by the great powers’ rivalry, and to increase the assertiveness of non-Western powers in international politics. Already during decolonisation, the regional security dynamics in non-Western regions was strengthened by the emergence of new states and the limited influence of traditional powers. Economic and regional institutions were born and from the 1950s onwards, regional power centres became providers of public goods together with the world powers, thus contributing to the formation of regional orders. The transformation of a bipolar system into a ‘world of regions’ therefore helped non-Western entities rise to power. This, in turn, increased academic interest in these regions, creating the ‘regional turn in IR theory’. Even in spite of this, some aspects of research remain largely neglected. For instance, efforts to conceptualise the term “regional power” or to approach theoretically its influence on the regional order, are scarce and insufficient. Therefore, this text aims (1) to contribute to the theoretical debate about the connection between regional power distribution and the character of regional order and (2) to support previous research on Middle East power hierarchies.

The Middle East is a suitable case for the research of power hierarchies, as it is ‘crowded’ by powers. The structure of this region is therefore multipolar, although there is no consensus as to which states can be considered regional powers. In our text we consider Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey to be the regional powers. The region should also be remembered when examining the form and stability of regional orders, as it is a region connected to descriptions such as ‘Shatterbelt’ or ‘war zone’. Dispute over which nation is the dominant regional power is characteristic of the Middle East, though no state has reached that status yet as rival efforts are effectively preventing it. Bearing in mind the absence of a ‘dominant power’, the conflicted and unstable character of the regional order and the underdeveloped system of regional governance, the following question arises: Is the struggle for a privileged position in the region and the enforcement of different versions of regional order contributing to conflicts and the deterioration of interstate relations?

Authors of hegemony theories such as the Power Transition Theory view the existence of a dominant or hegemonic power, or a group of states supplying its position, as a condition for maintaining securi-
They form a regional order for the benefit of other states by building structures for regional governance and the management of public goods. Therefore, the suppositions of this theory imply that if a region has no dominant power, or cooperative group of powers, it has a negative impact on the stability of the order. This results in conflict in relations and a low level of integration and institutionalisation. This leads to the following question: How does the current distribution of power in the Middle East influence regional cooperation and integration, when there is no dominant regional power that would support and maintain cooperation and integration within the region, and when regional powers are competing against each other and cannot supply the role of dominant power? The present paper reflects on the influence of the existence of multiple power centres and their relations on the development of regional order in the Middle East in 1945–2010, using the assumptions of the Power Transition Theory.

The First Phase in the Formation of Regional Order 1945–1967

At the beginning of the 20th century, a large part of the Middle East was under the influence of the UK and France. After the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, it was the Western powers who wanted to organise the emerging region as a Westphalian system of sovereign states. However, as the order was defined by external powers, it was challenged from the very beginning by both existing and newly independent Middle East states. World War II weakened the influence of colonial centres, which boosted the growth of local power centres. Under these conditions, a regional order was forming. It was characterised by the establishment of diplomatic ties, the first major integration projects and conflicts, the evolution of (pan)ideologies, power ambitions of Egypt and the efforts of the USSR and the USA. These superpowers promoted their interests through client relationships with local leaders, which divided the region into rival blocs. However, many states in the region had their own ideas, which often opposed the policies and interests of the world powers.

Although the idea of a modern nation state was imported into the Middle East by the Western powers, it was initially accepted by those
who strived for independence. Pan-Arabism, which flourished in areas under foreign governance, supported the idea of countries achieving independence independently and uniting later as an Arab state.\textsuperscript{15} The popularity of pan-Arabism showed that a regional order modelled on the West was not the organisational ideal of Middle East societies.\textsuperscript{16} Thus appeared the first major issue of Middle East politics—the expansion of the Westphalian system of states combined with pan-Arab views, which directly endangered the sovereignty and legitimacy of emerging states. At the same time, new political elites strived to protect their nations’ newly acquired independence from transnational movements, imperial powers and regional rivals. Thus they soon adopted the institutions of sovereignty and state-centred nationalism,\textsuperscript{17} which compromised their legitimacy in the face of existing sub-state and growing supranational identities. The crisis of the legitimacy of the modern state manifested itself fully in the 1950s and 60s, when the promoter of pan-Arabism, Gamal Nasser, led the 1952 overthrow in Egypt, and this revolutionary spirit spread to Iraq (1958), Yemen (1962) and Libya (1969). Nasser’s vision of Middle East arrangement spread in a similar way, using a combination of pan-Arabism, anti-imperialism, anti-Zionism, neutrality and socialism.

The late 1940s in the Middle East were marked by the start of the prolonged Arab-Israel conflict and the first fragmentation of the region due to differing views on the ideal form of regional order. The importance of both conflicts is obvious, since ‘historically, the regional Arab system has evolved around two main conflictual foci—inter-Arab competition for regional hegemony and the Palestine problem.’\textsuperscript{18} The Arab-Israeli wars repeatedly disrupted regional security and were accompanied by a number of smaller military clashes in Israel and its surroundings. Moreover, the fight against the Jewish state became an indispensable part of the regional powers’ foreign policies. The second conflict was related to normative ideas about the functioning of the region. On one hand, Transjordan and Iraq supported the efforts of European powers to create regional security structures.\textsuperscript{19} On the other hand, Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia criticised the activities of the Western powers in the region and saw the creation of Israel as the culmination of their neo-imperial politics. By the end of the 1940s, pro-Western regimes had started losing legitimacy because they were unable to protect Palestine, while revolutionary ideas were spreading,
starting disputes in the Arab camp. The impulse for the formation of the Egypt-Syria-Saudi Arabia coalition came from the integration efforts of the Hashemite monarchies and the emergence of the Baghdad Pact. This was an alliance of conservative states backed by the US and the UK, meant to balance the influence of Egypt and to prevent the penetration of the USSR into the region.

The collapse of the Baghdad Pact, the defeat of Western powers and Israel during the Suez crisis and the creation of the United Arab Republic (UAR) led to the height of Nasser’s fame in the region during the second half of the 1950s. This era can also be described as ‘a decade of contestation over the legitimacy of the state and the “requirement” for pan-Arab institution-building’. Jordan and Iraq, concerned by the growing power of Egypt, created the Arab Federation as a response to the emergence of the UAR. Egypt set up the ‘informal pan-Arab regime’ with the idea that the foreign policies of its Arab supporters would adapt to the common Arab interest, which, however, Egypt had defined. This “Arab interest” included a negative attitude towards cooperation with the European powers and criticism of Israel.

Many radical and formally Socialist republics (Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Libya) considered revolutionary pan-Arabism inspiring, but the pro-Western monarchies (Saudi Arabia, Jordan and, at that time, Iraq) saw it as a tool of Egyptian dominance. That is why they promoted a state-centred version of Arabism called ‘Political Arabism’, which, unlike Pan-Arabism, does not aim to create a united Arab state and does not put Arab interests above the interests of individual states (which are, however, defined by Arab values and can be limited in the name of Arab solidarity). This ideological struggle of regional powers between 1958 and 1964 was fittingly called the ‘Arab Cold War.’ The subject of dispute was the desired normative order of the Arab world—revolutionary Egypt strived to establish an Arab state, while conservative Saudi Arabia wished to maintain the status quo in the region.

However, several events changed both the regional environment and the policies of Arab states. First and foremost, the position of Egypt—the leader of the Arab world up to that point—began to diminish. Its participation in the Yemen conflict and wars against Israel weakened its material forces, and its camp of “revolutionary” republics fell apart when Syrians and Iraqis became worried about its dominance. Their disputes over which nation best represented the one and only correct Arabism led to the radicalisation of Arab nationalism and a number
of risky activities in the name of the Arab cause, mainly the Six-Day War. Egypt also lacked the economic resources to maintain its leading position and was becoming dependent on foreign aid from oil producers, including its former rival Saudi Arabia. Their defeat in the Six-Day War eventually proved Egypt was not capable of protecting Arabs from Israel, which led to ‘the collapse of Egyptian material and symbolic hegemony.’

It also meant a major change in the regional order, because the conflict ended the Arab Cold War and changed the rules of modern Arab politics.

The plan to unite all Arabs failed not only due to ideological disputes in the Middle East, but also because of competition between the US and the USSR, which limited autonomous regional development. They were each trying to expand their influence in strategic areas, gain allies and secure access to supplies of oil and natural gas. Cooperation within the region could not be facilitated even through integration projects; they often did not last long, and many of them strengthened the division between the competing camps of Arab states without improving regional unity. Economic integration and inter-Arab trade remained very low, due to political competition, underdeveloped economies and trade with countries outside the region, mainly in the West. Perhaps the only issue that Arab states agreed on was the non-existence of Israel—only the non-Arab countries of Turkey and Iran recognised Israel’s independence.

Throughout the 20th century, Iran participated in regional politics much more actively than Turkey and was not immune to the activities of regional rivals, especially Egypt. Disputes arose from their incompatible interests as they both had leadership ambitions. From the 1940s to the end of the 1970s, Iran was one of the main pillars of American policy in the Middle East, together with Israel and Turkey. With US support, the Shah’s Iran was ‘the centre of regional hegemony’ in the Persian Gulf. However, as a US ally and member of the Baghdad Pact, it met with the resistance of anti-West Egypt. Tehran saw the rising popularity of Nasserism as a threat to territorial integrity, should the Arab minority living in Khuzestan respond to the Pan-Arab call. During the Arab Cold War, Shah Pahlavi supported conservative governments against the revolutionary forces, as overthrowing the allied monarchies would strengthen Egypt’s influence and jeopardise Iran’s interests. Hateful propaganda by both states, coupled with Egypt’s support for the Iranian opposition that was striving to overthrow the
Shah’s regime, made relations cool from the 1940s to the 1960s. In 1960, after Tehran recognised Israel’s independence, diplomatic relations were suspended altogether.

The Second Phase in the Formation of Regional Order 1967–1979

When Egypt lost its position, it left room for other states in the region to increase their influence. For oil producers, this was possible thanks to rising income from the sale of oil, for non-oil producers through the consolidation of power (connecting the political and military elite). Even Saudi Arabia wished to replace Egypt as the Arab leader. It took advantage of weakening Pan-Arabism and introduced its own alternative version of supranational identity, more suited to its own interests that did not undermine the legitimacy of the regime: ‘pan-Islam.’ Pan-Islam can be described as ‘an ideology calling for the unity of Muslim peoples worldwide on the basis of their shared Islamic identity.’ In this context, King Faisal initiated the formation of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) in 1969. Within this organisation, the kingdom was able to strengthen its position among Muslim Arab states, thanks to its religious authority. The affiliation of most Middle East countries with the Islamic world implied Islamic solidarity and unity. This would replace the idea of unity primarily promoted by Egypt, which was based on belonging to the Arab world. It turned out, however, that the OIC became yet another platform for competition between powers (Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Iran) who could not agree on the role of the OIC or on a single interpretation of Islam. Their disagreement limited the capabilities of the organisation to unite Muslim states and the OIC evolved into another ‘limited intergovernmental alliance.’ However, inter-Arab relationships improved with tighter cooperation between the new Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and the Saudis and growing tensions between Arab states and Israel.

The Arabs’ need to coordinate the fight against Israel during the Yom Kippur War (1973) led to the creation of a trilateral alliance composed of ‘the largest (Egypt), richest (Saudi Arabia) and most pan-Arab (Syria) states.’ In spite of their ideological disputes, these countries managed to decide consensually on regional issues and stabilise at least the Arab part of the Middle East, since the alliance was ‘powerful enough to set
the Arab agenda in the postwar period. Saudi Arabia participated in the war solely through political and financial support for the fighters, but its role was crucial. It declared an oil embargo against the US and the Netherlands as countries supporting Israel, which strengthened its position as defender of the “Arab cause.” It did not become a regional leader because it lacked the military power necessary to maintain the set regional order, yet together with Iran it still was an important player in the Persian Gulf. These two significant US allies created a ‘twin pillars policy’ based on security cooperation that attempted to maintain stability in the Persian Gulf. Nevertheless, the Iranian Islamic Revolution (1979) turned the relationship of cooperation into rivalry and no new sub-regional order was created.

The temporary cohesion of regional powers was supported by the growing economic ties between countries. In the 1970s, a specific ‘division of labour in a pan-Arab market’ was established, based on the principle that oil producers provided capital to poorer neighbours (Egypt, Syria, Yemen, Palestine) as development aid or defence funding, in exchange for cheap labour. Even intraregional labour migration grew this way, further interconnecting Arab society. At the same time, regional organisations were created, making room for strengthening trade within the region or providing an institutional platform for inter-Arab development aid. However, a relatively low level of trade, the state-centrism of the poorer countries and tightening of the rich countries’ economic relationships with external actors limited the development of inter-Arab economic cooperation. Even extensive financial aid from the Gulf countries to poorer areas did not diminish the differences in economic levels, which reflected differing interests. Egypt and its bad economic situation led to cooperation with the US, which offered financial aid and the return of the Sinai Peninsula occupied by Israel. For Cairo, it was economically unsustainable to stand at the head of the Arab world in the fight against Israel. In the late 1970s, Sadat made peace with Israel, which changed the regional environment significantly. Mistrust grew between Arab countries, producing selfish behaviour, because they had no guarantees that more states would not choose the path of a separate peace in exchange for US economic incentives. Fear and hostility towards Israel seemed to be ‘the strongest bond among the Arab states’ for a long time. But since Egypt and Saudi Arabia were dependent on American military support, their in-
terests deviated from the interests of the Arab world and helped to destroy the order that had worked until to the mid-1970s, thanks to their cooperation.

Since the 1960s, it had become apparent that the Westphalian system was no longer seen as a “temporary” form of regional arrangement, but prevailed over other alternatives including a single Arab state. Even with new efforts at integration, countries focused more on intergovernmental cooperation and did not create federative formations that would limit their sovereignty. Political integration projects from that time ended unsuccessfully, with the exception of the SAE. However, the idea of Arab solidarity and unity survived and, until the early 1990s, it prevented violent conflicts between Arab states and influenced the functioning of the League of Arab States (LAS). At LAS-organised summits, the countries coordinated a joint course of action against Israel, supported the Palestinian cause and suppressed more radical regimes, weakening the exhausting inter-Arab competition. In the following decades, the LAS repeatedly faced challenges it was not able to deal with which had negative impact on its functioning and authority in the Arab world.

The Third Phase in the Formation of Regional Order 1979–1990

The end of the 1970s was marked by the collapse of the order established by the Arab triangle and by the events of 1979—the Egypt-Israel peace treaty and the Iranian Islamic Revolution—which radically influenced regional politics. The regional isolation of Egypt and the weakening of Iran as a result of the revolution made it possible for other local powers to consolidate their position. During the following decade, the region was affected both by power struggles between states whose opposing ideas on the character of the order could not help stabilise the regional environment, and by non-state political and armed movements.

After concluding peace with Israel, Cairo became an important ally of the US. However, it had got on the wrong side of most of the Arab world, so it strengthened cooperation with its non-Arab neighbours. However, the Islamic Revolution soon overthrew the allied monarchist regime and destroyed the American idea of regional arrangement
maintained by the ‘triangle of stability’—Egypt, Israel and Saudi Arabia. After the Camp David negotiations, other moderate Arab regimes, supported by the US, were supposed to recognise Israel and keep peace and stability. But the American efforts failed, since excessive identification with US politics and strategic aims alienated some of the countries from their neighbours (Egypt) or created internal instability (the Shah’s Iran). This is why the Saudis did not want to let themselves be tied to Washington’s position, although to this day they remain dependent on American military supplies. Moreover, US allies started competing for the financial and military support of the Americans, which further weakened the pro-America coalition.

Together with the power vacuum that appeared in the Arab world after Egypt’s isolation, regional politics was also destabilised by the Iranian revolution. The revolution changed the rules of Middle East politics, overturning existing commitments between allies—Iran cut diplomatic ties with Israel, Egypt, Jordan and Morocco and waged an exhausting war with Iraq. The US lost a key ally, and the new Islamic regime became a threat to their interests and the main rival for their allies—Israel, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. ‘The downfall of the Shah also signified the breakdown of the old regional order’ and the following development in political and security relations can best be interpreted as ‘the search for a new regional order.’ Iran rejected the status quo and its idea of new regional order lay in the fight against imported culture and an effort to spread Islamic values.

The weakening of Iran caused by the revolution was welcomed by Iraq and Saudi Arabia, who became, arguably, the most powerful Gulf countries. But the situation was not completely positive: The establishment of the Islamic government created a threat to both neighbours. Iraq underestimated the power of the new Iranian regime and provoked the longest and bloodiest war in modern Middle East history. The conflict proved that for most countries in the region, Iraq was unacceptable as a leader. After all, it could not even manage to persuade other Arab countries to take a united anti-Iran position. Some Arab countries (Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, etc.) aided Iraq with money and military supplies, but their motivation was fear of a Shiite Iran victory, not good mutual relations. Moreover, Syria and Libya, Iraq’s power rivals, supplied arms to Iran. In the 1970s and 1980s, Iraq had sufficient material resources to become a regional power. However, Saddam Hus-
sein’s aggressive politics, which caused two wars and a worsening of relations with Iran, Syria and the Gulf monarchies, could not achieve a leading position among Arab states.

The Shah’s downfall had both positive and negative consequences for Saudi Arabia. The collapse of one US ally strengthened the positions of others, including the Saudis. But the efforts of the Iranian government to export the ideas of the Shiite revolution beyond its borders was a threat to conservative Sunni regimes, especially those with large Shiite populations—Bahrain, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Their leaders feared Iranian support for opposing Shiite movements on their territory, so they decided to give massive financial aid to Iraq in the Iraq-Iran war. The victory of Iran would have far-reaching consequences for the balance of power in the region, as well as for the home affairs of conservative monarchies.46

The Islamic Revolution was also significant for the Middle East regional order because it added a strong ideological element to the power struggle between Iran and Saudi Arabia, which had previously been absent from their relations. Both countries claimed the position of leader of the Islamic world and were trying to promote their own opposing version of ‘Islamic universalism.’47 The general aim of Islamism is to ‘establish an Islamic state governed by Sharia and eventually uniting all Muslims, the whole umma.’48 Islamic unity should ostensibly erase all national, linguistic and tribal borders across the Islamic world, which would be more than just a consolidation of Muslim solidarity. The Saudi idea of pan-Islamism,49 however, is based on strengthening the unity of Muslim countries based on Islamic solidarity, while maintaining state borders. The Saudis also pursue the spreading of ‘Wahhabism’ (a form of Sunni Islam). The Iranian conception of pan-Islamism also lies in the strengthening of Islamic regional unity, but it tries to spread the ideas of the Islamic Revolution, drawing on anti-Americanism, anti-Zionism and monarchist regime criticism. This is why it supports Shiite and radical Sunni movements fighting non-violently or violently against Israel, the US and some Arab monarchies.

The fight between Tehran and Riyadh for the role of the Islamic world leader transferred to the grounds of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. It became an arena for the dispute over who would oversee the pilgrimage to Mecca (hajj);50 the holy Islamic sites of Mecca and Medina are in Saudi territory, while Iran is the only Islamic state run by the clergy. Therefore, Riyadh tried to stop the spread of revolution-
ary Iran’s influence in the region and to weaken its dependence on the US, which reflected on the effort to balance Israeli power and keep US interference in regional politics at the necessary minimum. One of the means to achieve this was supposed to be the new sub-regional organisation, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). In 1981, King Khalid initiated its establishment, and Saudi Arabia continues to dominate the organisation thanks to its size and power. Through security measures and cooperation, the GCC was meant to help members protect themselves from external threats (Iran) and instability stemming from the Iraq-Iran conflict, and the interference of powers in regional politics.

In the military sphere, the Gulf states are still dependent on Western (mainly American) military technologies. In security issues they still prefer to rely on external rather than regional powers, from whom they fear possible dominance and interference in their internal politics.

Although political and security integration within the GCC has its limits—stemming from unresolved (usually border) disputes or differing attitudes towards key issues of regional politics (relations with Israel and Iran, for example)—the GCC is still one of the most successful organisations in the Middle East. Especially in the economic and cultural fields, the council has seen some success in the form of members’ cooperation (a customs union was established, for example) and together it creates a ‘political and economic micro-climate.’ Most importantly, the creation of the GCC, together with the continuing weakening of the LASS, led other countries in the Middle East to establish alternative sub-regional organisations aimed at strengthening and deepening political and economic cooperation.

The Defence Council of Libya, Ethiopia and South Yemen (1981), joined states that disagreed with Saudi politics on many counts and was meant to fight imperialism, Zionism and reactionary politics. In 1989, the Arab Cooperation Council (ACC), a defence and economic pact, joined Iraq, Egypt, Jordan and North Yemen as states ‘left out’ of integration in the GCC. However, Egypt criticised the Iraqi annexation of Kuwait (1990) and the ACC stopped working. Also in 1989, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and Libya created the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), whose aim was to implement a policy of the free movement of goods and persons and to connect forces in negotiations with the stronger European Community. Deeper economic integration was not reached, however, because states competed in the economic field over investments, and were divided by power rivalry between Algeria
and Morocco and differing positions on the West Sahara issue. Lastly, Turkey, Iran and Pakistan created the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) in 1985.\textsuperscript{57} Nevertheless, relations between secular Turkey and theocratic Iran changed radically after 1979, and even though mutual trade was flourishing, relations were cooled at the political level. Kemalism, the official ideology of Turkey, became a target of criticism by Ayatollah Khomeini. Moreover, Iran tried to weaken Turkish secularism through Islamist propaganda smuggled into the country.\textsuperscript{58}

It is obvious that outside the GCC, other sub-regional organisations had very limited success or else failed entirely after a few years. This was caused by cultural and economic differences, opposing interests on key political issues, mutual mistrust and the fact that more powerful countries used organisations as platforms for their power struggles. It seems that ‘the conditions for the development of the region’s secondary institutions never existed.’\textsuperscript{59} Authoritarian governments were unwilling to compromise and delegate part of their sovereignty to a higher entity, which prevented long-term integration, states did not trust one another and integration initiatives by the regional powers provoked fear of dominance in weaker countries. Moreover, the fact that integration occurred on a sub-regional level contributed to further fragmentation of the region.

In the 1980s, the Iraq-Iran war, the Israeli intervention in Lebanon (1982) and the Lebanese Civil War (1975–1989) showed a certain disunity within the Arab world.\textsuperscript{60} Arab states, polarised by a number of opposing interests, strengthened their own military forces through massive armament, which heightened insecurity in the Arab camp about others’ intentions. This led to self-motivated behaviour and the consolidation of alliances with external actors, who were a lesser threat than their own neighbours. With these new security dilemmas, the “Arab brothers” saw one another as potential military threats. The League of Arab States could not ease the negative consequences of an anarchist system. It was unable to respond to the Israeli invasion in Lebanon, or the Iraqi plea for help when, after 1982, the Iraq-Iran war started turning to Iraq’s disadvantage. Also in the 1980s, \textit{LAS}’ authority was diminishing and it was becoming the symbol of inter-Arab conflict. Governments managed to consolidate their power\textsuperscript{61} sufficiently to withstand supranational ideologies (pan-Arabism and pan-Islamism) and they prioritised state interests. The preference of state interests over pan-Arab ones led to a fragmentation of the Arab core of the Mid-
dle East and kindled its internal conflicts. In addition, it strengthened Arab states’ vulnerability to threats from non-Arab countries (Iran and Israel), manifesting itself fully in the Iraq-Iran war and the Israeli operation in Lebanon (Arab states were unable to create a united alliance). In the 1980s, pan-Arabism had no real appeal and the surviving idea of Arab solidarity was being weakened by the fragmentation of the Arab world. This was taking place partly due to pan-Islamism and partly to solidify the institution of the modern state. The competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia for leader of the Islamic world and the growing popularity of Islamist movements make it obvious that pan-Islamic ideology had a real impact on regional politics.62 Also in the 1980s, a rather atypical alliance of Middle East actors was born—Syria, Iran, Hezbollah and, originally, Hamas. Syria supported Iran in its war against Iraq, while Hezbollah, funded and armed by Tehran, fought in Lebanon against Israel, thus helping Syria protect its interests and shift the balance of power in its favour.63 From the point of view of world powers, Israel and “moderate” Arab states, this alliance created a “potentially dangerous cocktail”64 regarding their interests and the question of regional leadership. The Middle East and its Arab core were fragmented and weakened and there was nobody to unite it. The end of the decade, however, brought an important change, when, after decades of isolation, Egypt, “by far the largest and most important Arab state,”65 began to participate in regional politics and the power struggle again. A balance of power prevailed in the region, sufficient, perhaps, in maintaining the system, though not enough to keep the peace.66 The situation was unstable, since it was based on balancing power between Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Iraq (which had strong revisionist tendencies). The Iraqi invasion and attempted annexation of Kuwait commenced a decade of instability and insecurity in the Middle East, and the further shattering of the Arab world. Thus began a new phase in regional order development.

The Fourth Phase in the Formation of Regional Order
1990–2010

1990 is significant in Middle East politics in two important ways. First, it symbolises the end of the Cold War, which strengthened the position of the US, in the world and in the region. Second, after the annexation of Kuwait, the crisis in the Persian Gulf occurred. This had a deep
influence on power distribution in the region and the level of stability and security.

Since the 1990s, the basis of American strategy in the Middle East has been two-pronged. First, the US has attempted to increase the power of its allies (Israel, Egypt and Saudi Arabia) through military and financial aid. Second, it has strived to weaken and isolate countries who criticise American interference in regional politics and the spreading Western political and cultural values. (It has punished Iran through economic sanctions, for example). This has deepened the polarization of the region and weakened regional institutions which, in order to function, need consensus and cooperation of the majority (or all) of the regional countries.\textsuperscript{67} Regarding the formation of regional order, two American military interventions (1991, 2003) that served also as tools to establish American hegemony in the Middle East, were even more significant. It is open to debate whether the US confirmed its hegemonic position,\textsuperscript{68} or if any \textit{Pax Americana} system emerged,\textsuperscript{69} but, in any case, US influence on the character of regional order cannot be marginalised. Military interventions and alliances with local states limit the autonomy of the Middle East.

The Gulf Crisis directly caused the disintegration of the existing regional order, because it led to the redistribution of power in the region, the beginning of the peace process and the culmination of the fall of pan-Arabism. Saddam Hussein’s Kuwait adventure was meant to secure for Iraq the leading position in the Arab world, but in ultimately caused its downfall. As a consequence of the conflict and sanctions imposed on it in the 1990s, the country was economically ruined. The weakening of political influence was partly caused by the fact that by attacking a “brother” Arab state, Hussein made enemies of a number of Arab countries. The balance of power in the Middle East swerved in favour of Iran, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, an important player in freeing the annexed Kuwait.\textsuperscript{70}

The increase in power was apparent especially in Iran. Saudi Arabia was directly involved in the war and, because it felt threatened, it hosted hundreds of thousands of American troops on its territory, which provoked unprecedented criticism in the Muslim world; Iran tried to use this fact to strengthen its position. In the 1990s and 2000s, struggles between Iran and Saudi Arabia continued, intensifying after the Saudis participated in the anti-Iraq coalition and moved closer to the US. The threat Iraq presented to the Gulf monarchies made the GCC
countries strengthen their alliances with Western states, mainly the US, and started a new round of armament, further escalating tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia. This was deepened by the support of competing factions in the Afghan civil war (1992–1996), building the Iranian nuclear and missile programme, and opposing views on the ideal form of regional order and the conception of pan-Islam.71

Even though Iranian foreign policies are often pragmatic, ideology is an integral part of Iranian regional politics and the promotion of the Islamic revolution, anti-Western rhetoric and the fight against Israel must make room for practical policies. Tehran is trying to change the regional status quo from a political (ideological) standpoint, by ‘framing the regional agenda,’ not through a war among powers.72 However, the Iranian regional project has serious flaws. Arab states prevent the spread of Islamic revolutionary ideas on their territory and ‘[n]one of them wishes to exchange the United States for Iran as a security manager of the region.’73

Due to bad relations with Sunni Arab regimes, Iran is trying to win the favour of the ‘Arab street’ and the Muslim ummah. Iran presents itself as a state fighting against US interference, Israeli politics and “traitor” monarchist regimes.74 These regimes allegedly act as puppets of the West and their political system is supposedly incompatible with Islam. Iran is trying to de-emphasise differences between Shiites and Sunnis and between Arabs and Persians in order to maintain the support of the Arab Sunni majority in the Middle East. However, not all Shiites want an Islamic government modelled on Iran.75 Another obstacle for the Islamic order may be the fact that Iran is not a constructive power. It criticises its rivals, but cannot solve the issues that are destabilising the Middle East, causing Arab countries turn to other local or world powers.

The Gulf War in 1991 also offered an opportunity to start a peace process between Arab actors and Israel, which became one of the most important milestones in the development of Middle East order. In 1994, Israel concluded a peace agreement with Jordan. To this day, however, Israel has not established diplomatic ties with most countries in the region, which weakens the institutions of sovereignty and diplomacy in regional politics. The Palestinian National Authority was also established (1994), although a sovereign state never emerged. The question of an independent Palestine has always been a cause for the ‘Arab Street’, thus helping regional powers to gain ‘political points’ in
power struggles.\textsuperscript{76, 77} Since the 1970s, the importance of the Arab-Israel conflict for Middle East politics has lied mainly in the political and symbolic realm and it can no longer be considered ‘the epicentre of the region’s violence,’\textsuperscript{78} which has moved to the Persian Gulf.

Egypt and, to a lesser degree, Saudi Arabia have played important roles in the peace process. Egypt has hosted a number of peace talks and has participated in multilateral negotiations on various practical issues, providing impetus for regional development programmes and economic cooperation. It has also acted as mediator in bilateral talks.\textsuperscript{79} When the second Palestinian intifada (2000–2005) caused a blow to the peace process, Saudi Arabia tried to revive the peace talks by presenting the Arab Peace Initiative (2002), though it could not prevent their collapse. This was a disappointment for Egypt and Saudi Arabia, though not for Iran or Iraq, who had criticised the peace process all along. Regional order partially reverted to where it had been a decade earlier. The war in Iraq in 2003 buried all chances of restoring peace talks. The Arab-Israel conflict lost its significance in light of American war efforts. The war radicalised the positions of some key players in the Arab-Israel conflict (Syria, Israel, Hamas) and increased instability in the region and the sense of insecurity on the part of the Jewish state.\textsuperscript{80}

The third reason why we consider the Gulf conflict a significant event in the formation of regional order, is the fact that the conflict destroyed ‘the last remnants of the pan-Arab idea.’\textsuperscript{81} After all, it was the first war between Arab states, which up to that point had only engaged in ideological disputes. The conflict itself was made possible by the fact that Arab states diverged from Arab norms, tearing down all normative limits of behaviour. Their behaviour was now governed by each nation’s own interest and the logic of the balance of power. When this system failed and the balance of power tipped towards Iraq, the first aggression toward an “Arab brother” occurred. Furthermore, the war divided Arab countries into two camps—members of the anti-Iraq coalition (Egypt, Syria, the Gulf monarchies, Morocco) and Iraq supporters (Yemen, Libya and Sudan). The fragmentation of opinion in the Arab world also influenced the functioning of the LAS, making it ‘the chief institutional casualty’ of the Gulf War,\textsuperscript{82} when the summit of August 1990 ended in a fiasco. The summit symbolised both the deep divisions between states, and the toothlessness of the League, as the
solution eventually fell to foreign actors (mainly the US and the UN), significantly lowering the authority and trustworthiness of the organisation.

The war in Iraq ended the process of the formation of the modern state system in the Middle East, which, however, did not go hand in hand with fostering state identity. Arab countries could not manage to overcome their weaknesses, partly because of their authoritarian character. The drop in popularity of the pan-Arab idea, and the existence of hated regimes who had touted the ideology in previous decades, helped spread Islamic ideology. Political Islam was on the rise in the Middle East even before the annexation of Kuwait. Islamist groups in various Arab states comprised the main opposition, criticising governments for denying liberties, usurping power, bad economic policies, socio-economic inequality in society and cooperation with the West. Political Islam transferred legitimacy from states to political movements, building their objectives on Islamism.

Because of the gap between progressive Westphalianisation of the Middle East system and the strengthening of supranational Arab-Islamic identity in the population, there is no significant overlap between state and nation. This further weakens states’ legitimacy and the institution of sovereignty. We can speak of a ‘New Arab Cold War’—an ideological conflict between the Arab public that is represented by various movements and defends the Arab-Islamic order, and governments criticised for their regional politics and cooperation with the US. US intervention in the region has provoked strong criticism from the Middle East public, and deepened anti-West and anti-US sentiment.

The new Arab ideological conflict dates back to 2006, when the Israel-Hezbollah War took place. It was the culmination of processes that gathered pace after the second war broke out in Iraq (2003–2011) and resulted in the weakening of regional autonomy and the growth of the supranational Arab public sphere. The consequences of American intervention were mostly negative for the region. The level of violence and instability grew, mistrust between states deepened and the wave of migration out of Iraq destabilised its immediate surroundings. Also, there was the threat of ‘Balkanisation’ in the country, as the position of armed groups operating in Iraq was stronger and, once more, regional organisations proved themselves powerless in solving conflicts.
The start of the millennium in the Middle East was marked by a ‘new regional disorder,’ following the previous development phase of the region and characterised by instability and a high number of conflicts.

The weakening of Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime also influenced the regional distribution of power. Iran, Saudi Arabia and Syria got rid of a long-standing rival, and the resulting power vacuum started regional power struggles over which nation could promote its own vision of regional order. This boosted the rivalry between two camps—the ‘radicals’ (those who were anti-West, the revisionist states of Iran and Syria and non-state movements such as Hezbollah, Hamas and others) and the ‘moderates’ (conservative, pro-American states wishing to maintain the status quo—namely, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan and Israel). At the start of the 21st century, there were proxy conflicts, which became an opportunity for a regional ideological power struggle between the radicals, led by Iran, and the moderates, led by Saudi Arabia and Egypt. These were the July War (2006), Israeli interventions in the Gaza Strip (2008-2009, 2014) and the civil war in Syria (since 2011). In addition to existing economic (rich oil producers vs. low-income countries) and ethnic (Arab vs. non-Arab countries) fragmentation, which had influenced the dynamic of regional politics for decades, there were new struggles between these so-called radicals and moderates. These struggles, particularly Saudi-Iranian rivalry, also display strong sectarian tendencies and represent yet another sign of regional fragmentation: the Sunni-Shia divide. Sunni Arab states feel threatened by both Shiite Iran and Shiite minorities within their own territories. This sectarian divide became one of the main features of contemporary Middle East, particularly after the fall of Saddam Hussein, and has strong potential to further destabilise regional security.

The war in Iraq ‘increased fragmentation of the region [...] and continued to a crisis of regional leadership’ for several more years. This crisis was nothing new for the region, but it seriously complicated any collective solution to regional problems at a time when the Middle East was facing the extremely urgent issue of the strengthening of Islamic armed groups. The example of Iraqi insurgent groups was followed by a range of radical opposition movements in neighbouring countries. Thus, the Iraq war helped consolidate these actors’ positions at the expense of the states. These insurgent groups’ activities have increased sectarian violence and internally weak countries have been unable to
cope. At the same time, some groups are also a tool for Iran, Syria and Saudi Arabia to project power, using regional instability to debilitate their rivals.93

Neither in the Iraqi nor in other conflicts did the LAS or the GCC play a significant role in the renewal of peace. Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey tried to mediate in some conflicts, but regional organisations were often paralysed by struggles between states. The first Gulf War became the cause of the break-up of the Arab Cooperation Council and no new (sub-)regional organisation has emerged since the 1990s. With increasing frequency, actors striving to maintain the status quo have turned to Western powers led by the US for help in balancing the power of enemy regimes and non-state militias. With help from these Western countries, they build their own military power, only increasing criticism from anti-Western regimes and Islamic groups.

The stability of the Middle East, peaceful relations between countries and economic development have all been disrupted since the 1990s due to many events and processes: intra-Arab and intra-Muslim disputes; the collapse of the peace process; the outbreak of two intifadas (1987, 2000); massive long-term armament of states; two Gulf Wars and resulting post-war instability; the strengthening of non-state actors; and pressure from the US on Middle East countries to join them in the war on terror after the 9/11 attacks. At the same time, no region-wide institutional structures have been built with support of cooperating regional powers, which could solve the emerging crises and raise the region’s autonomy in the face of interventions by world powers.

Conclusion

From the end of WW2 until the start of the 21st century, there were several regional powers in the Middle East—Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey—and a number of other countries claiming this status. None of these powers became the dominant one or the leader of the entire region. On the contrary, their relatively balanced power led to all these nations claiming the leading position and enforcing their own version of regional arrangement. At times, they assumed the role of protector of the regional status quo (as Saudi Arabia has done for decades); at others, its violator (in various periods this was the case of Egypt or
Iran). As individual powers and “candidates” competed for this privileged position in the Middle East, the region became polarised. Instead of efforts to cooperate and integrate, and thus strengthen regional unity and stability, conflicts erupted. Without any fundamental consensus, it was impossible to define the main regional problems and find solutions.

Even though it was usually the powers who initiated the establishment of regional and sub-regional organisations, they often used them as platforms for power struggles, instead of pushing for standards and policies supporting the peaceful coexistence of states. For these reasons, the Middle East is lacking a central unifier in the region. By contrast, the distribution of power has changed several times during the period under study. This has occurred as the consequence of exhausting wars (Egypt); significant changes to the domestic political scene, including related changes of foreign policy (Egypt and Iran); and power growth in other countries (mainly Saudi Arabia and, in the 1970s and 1980s, Iraq).

When there is no dominant power with the potential to unite and stabilise the region, a calm environment can only be ensured by a shared attitude of a coalition of regional powers, which will maintain a stable balance of power and avoid conflicts. In the Middle East, such a situation has not yet occurred. Neither a dominant power, nor a group of states supplying this role, has contributed to the creation and upkeep of regional order and the distribution of public goods. In such a situation, a country’s dependency on external powers increases, because they supply the function of local powers, thus weakening their own country’s position and the overall autonomy of the region. The limited stability of the region is the result of the absence of systemic legitimacy. In this case, peaceful relations depend largely on the unstable balance of power between the several most powerful actors, and on the creation of fragile alliances.

Since power in the region is distributed relatively evenly and there are contrasting visions of regional order, it is unlikely that any of the current powers will soon emerge as the dominant force. The events that have afflicted the region since late 2010, when the Arab Uprising started, have caused a change in the distribution of power in the region and confirmed that there is an intra-regional power struggle underway, fragmenting the region internally. Egypt and Saudi Arabia, both being Arab regional powers, have some advantage, in that most Middle East-
ern countries deem their ideas on the region’s arrangement more acceptable than the ideas of non-Arab powers. On the other hand, Egypt has long-term economic problems, and its dependency on aid from oil monarchies and the US has always weakened its position, which has become even weaker since the 2011 revolution. Saudi Arabia is one of the richest states in the region, but it has a weak demographic base and its military capabilities are not strong enough to maintain and guarantee regional security. A relative advantage for Iran and Turkey lies in their strong demographic and military power bases, but in a mostly Arab region neither is a strong contender for the dominant power. Iran’s military strength, while an asset regarding the nation’s role as security guarantor, is also a hindrance, when most states in the region view Iran as a military threat. Turkey must deal with the fact that geographically and politically—at least for most of the period from WW2 to the 2000s—it is on the periphery of the Middle East, and for it to emerge as the dominant regional power, it would have to participate more actively in solving regional issues.

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Notes
4 The Middle East is defined as the region including territory from Morocco to Iran and from Turkey to Yemen.
6 See Martina Ponížilová ‘Delimitation of Regional Powers in the Middle East in the 20th and 21st Century’ [article draft to be published in the journal Medzinárodné vzťahy in 2016].


9 A region can only include one dominant power or hegemony (a subsystem with unipolar structure), but there may be more than one power centre (bi- and multipolar subsystems).


11 Regional order is understood to be the general organisation directing activities and relationships between units in a region. It comprises a set of informal institutions (sovereignty, diplomacy, territoriality, great power management, nationalism, /pan/ideology, religion, conflicts, security dilemma, arms race, balance of power) and formal institutions (international organisations and regimes), which influence the behaviour of parties and their interactions. Different forms of order are caused by the different character of relations between units. They can fall anywhere on the scale ranging from high instability and conflict to stable order with peaceful relations and widely shared values and norms.


13 It was only after WWI that a ‘critical mass of independent actors’ emerged. It was necessary for the development of regional security and a political dynamic free of the dominance of colonial powers (Buzan – Wæver /2003/, p. 188). The final year of the period examined was another milestone in the development of regional order, which has been deeply changed by the events since the end of 2010, in connection with the Arab Uprising. A new phase in the development of order has emerged, and since it is still underway, it has not been included in this paper.


15 Ana Gonzalez-Pelaez (2009), ‘The Primary Institutions of the Middle Eastern Regional Interstate Society,’ in Barry Buzan and Ana Gonzalez-Pelaez (eds.) International Society and the Middle East: English School Theory at the Regional Level, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 94.


17 Raymond Hinnebusch (2009), ‘Order and Change in the Middle East: A Neo-Gramscian Twist on the International Society Approach,’ in Barry Buzan and Ana Gonzalez-Pelaez (eds.) International Society and the Middle
Middle East Regional Order


19 e.g. the Middle East Command, the Middle East Defence Organization and the Baghdad Pact


22 The Arab Defence Pact, Islamic Middle Eastern regional pact or the so-called Greater Syria.

23 Simon Murden (2009), ‘The Secondary Institutions of the Middle Eastern Regional Interstate Society,’ in Barry Buzan – Ana Gonzalez-Pelaez (eds.) International Society and the Middle East: English School Theory at the Regional Level, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 120.


26 Kerr citation according to Valbjørn and Bank (2012), p. 5.


32 Murden (2009), p. 135. The idea of Islamic unity did not generate a response among the Middle East countries. On the contrary, there was a dispute between the socialist republics and Saudi Arabia, which criticised them for collaborating with the USSR with its unacceptable atheist ideology of communism.


36 Only in 1968–1979 were ten regional developmental institutions established.
The asymmetrical mutual dependency did not have the potential to foster Arab solidarity (Murden /2009/, pp. 122–123) and in the mid-70s Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia started quarrelling over the Arab-Israel conflict solution instead of cooperating.


Murden (2009), pp. 121, 137.

e.g. the Federation of Arab Republics joining Egypt, Libya and Syria in 1971–1977.


Such as the collapse of the agreement on Joint Defence and Economic Cooperation, the annexation of Kuwait, etc.


Saudi support of war-time Iraq therefore aimed ‘to maintain a status quo in the Persian Gulf and in the Middle East.’; Väyrynen (1984), p. 348.


Murden (2009), p. 137.


gcc countries have limited military force and in this aspect the organisation, even as a whole, cannot compete with the military capacities of Iran or, previously, Iraq.


It continued the function of the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD), uniting these three states from 1964 to 1979.


Murden (2009), p. 133.


Oil monarchies could satisfy the socio-economic needs of citizens, who in
“exchange” overlooked shortcomings in the country’s political life. Republics (e.g. Syria, Iraq) consolidated power mainly by repressing the opposition and military mobilisation.

62 And it was the ‘growing weight of the Islamic discourse’, which underscored even more strongly the downfall of pan-Arab nationalism.; Sela (1998) p. 219.


64 Fawcett (2011), p. 44.


69 Hinnebusch (2009), p. 223.

70 Even though it does not have sufficient coercive capacities to assume the role of ‘regional security guard’, its participation in the anti-Iraq coalition was politically significant.; Rosemary Hollis (1999), ‘Capitalizing on Diplomacy,’ in Phebe Marr (ed.) Egypt at the Crossroads: Domestic Stability and Regional Role, Washington: National Defense University Press, p. 142.


74 During the government of reformist president Mohammad Khatami (1997–2005) Iranian politics were “lighter” on ideology and relations with Arab monarchies and the US became warmer. The loss of emphasis on ideology was partially caused by the high costs of the war with Iraq. Iran realised (much as Arab countries led by Egypt had done) that subordinating foreign policies to ideology is too expensive (Hinnebusch /2009/, pp. 221–222). The rhetoric of conservative Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005–2013) was, once more, full of anti-Israeli and anti-American slogans, and the criticism of regional rivals led to a renewed coolness in relations with Saudi Arabia and the US.

75 Axworthy (2009), p. 211.


77 Most inter-state conflicts in the region in the past century were related to Israel, and no Arab leader could afford to ignore the Palestinian issue.


83 Hinnebusch (2009), pp. 222–223.

84 Valbjørn and Bank (2012), p. 5.

85 e.g. Hezbollah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, al-Qaeda

86 Trans-Arab media such as the Qatar tv channel Al-Jazeera and the Saudi Al-Arabiya, which dominate the media space in the Arab world, contribute to the creation of regional politics.

87 For instance, in the Hezbollah-Israel war (2006) the Arab public sympathised with Hezbollah, while Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan criticized the movement for its activities (Valbjørn and Bank /2012/, p. 8).

88 Valbjørn and Bank (2012), p. 15.


93 Hashmi (2009), p. 192.
Ironically, prison and imprisonment plays a significant role in the development of radicalised and extremist individuals and movements—a point highlighted by the recent enquiry into the radicalisation process of Islamists in Europe. The fact that prison might act as a ‘school of crime’ is one of the most debated issues in the field of penology and has begun to impact decision making in the areas of judicial affairs, social work, policing and public policy more generally. The state penitentiary system is intended to correct and improve a person who committed a crime – driven by whatever ideology or without any ideology. However, sometimes, prison becomes the vehicle for criminal and radical ideological careers. This article presents an attempt to revisit and reapply some concepts of labelling theory, developed by sociologists, to analyse a succinct political science issue in terms of the relationship between penal systems and governance structures. This work questions what and how measures taken by state agencies to persecute law-breaking activities of various types may contribute to increases in these activities, their intensity and scale. This work deploys a comparative methodology and examines Romania (criminal), Russia (criminal/ideological) and Pakistan (ideological) to gauge the level of radicalisation occurring in their prisons.
Keywords: radicalisation, Romania, Russia, Pakistan, prisons, crime, punishment, corruption, ideology

Introduction

Prison and imprisonment plays a significant in role in the development of radicalised and extremist individuals and movements—a point highlighted by the recent focus into the radicalisation process of Islamists in Europe. The fact that prison might act as a ‘school of crime’ is one of the most debated issues in the field of penology and has begun to impact decision making. The state penitentiary system is intended to correct and improve a person who committed a crime—driven by whatever ideology or without any ideology. However, sometimes, prison becomes the vehicle for criminal and radical ideological careers. This article revisits and reapply some concepts of labelling theory, developed by sociologists, to analyse a succinct political science issue in terms of the relationship between penal systems and governance structures. This work questions what and how measures taken by state agencies to persecute law-breaking activities of various types may contribute to increases in these activities, their intensity and scale. This work deploys a comparative methodology and examines Romania (criminal), Russia (criminal/ideological) and Pakistan (ideological) to gauge the level of radicalisation occurring in their prisons.

That prisons can function as a breeding ground for organised criminal and extremist activities is nothing new and an assortment of powerful subcultures are known to have developed from within prison walls—such as the Russian blatnoi mir (criminal world) which is a self-sustaining community funded entirely through illegal activities. And it is not only criminality being fostered in prisons: they often incubate socio-political and religious extremist organisations. The cases of Sayid Qutb and Abu-Bakr Baghdadi are illustrative of the phenomenon.

And, prisons have been shown to act as a way of transference—of turning people from one type of deviant behaviour to another one. For instance, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (the de facto father of ISIS), began as an ordinary criminal and became a radical Islamist in prison. Transference is also reflected in levels of criminality. Both Romania and Russia—owing to their lack of adequate rehabilitation mechanisms—have seen the steady increase of repeat offenders that go on to commit more and
more criminal acts. In short, prison is – in many places – the school for radicalism and criminality instead of detention for the sake of the punishing of offenders.

Before delving deeper into this dynamic and exploring the comparative cases of Romania, Russia and Pakistan, it is important to provide an overview as to the theoretical foundations this work is built on and to tease out some of the deployed terminology.

Theoretical Framework

A common thread that stitches together organised criminal activities (Romania, Russia) and religious extremism (Pakistan) is the nature of the agent or perpetrator of certain, deviant and radicalised behaviours. It is therefore important to highlight that this work is, in fact, focused on how some penal systems encourage the very things they are meant to punish—deviancy and the requisite violations of law that act as a challenge to social order and norms. While, for this work we define both political extremism and criminality as, essentially, a single type of deviant behaviour even though – as will be discussed at length below – the reasons for such behaviours may differ. For instance, in Romania and Russia, the issue mostly gravitates around politically motivated neglect of corruption in the prison apparatus while in Pakistan it is closely connected to the infiltration of the penal system by those with overt or covert Islamist sympathies.

In short, this work considers the issue of radicalisation as involving a specific type of deviant behaviour regardless of its ideational grounds. Radicalisation means increasing readiness to challenge the social order and its norms or a readiness to undertake more “radical” acts which can be defined as more provocative, violent and wide-scale. But that also includes willingness to join and form appropriate structures and organisations (although in some cases that can be very general kind of membership or virtual interaction with networks). However, the most important aspect includes the willingness to directly challenge the social order.

This raises an important question about the driving forces behind deviance. Sociological studies on deviance long ago pointed out that the sources and causes of initial deviance may differ from the sources and causes of continuing deviance. Lemert, for instance, argued that the initial causes of individual deviance (including criminal behaviour)
in many cases are different than those which determine its further continuation. He proposed to define them as primary and secondary deviance, correspondingly.¹

Lemert insisted that primary deviance is “polygenic,” i.e., generated by numerous factors while the secondary is driven not by original causes but by the external reaction to the primary deviance. Secondary deviance reflects ‘how deviant acts are symbolically attached to persons and the effective consequences of such attachment for subsequent deviation on the part of that person.’² Incarceration – in all its forms and types, i.e., before the trial and after it – may be considered the strongest type of that external response, and taking into custody in many cases labels a persons as a deviant with regard to existing social order. That creates premises for possible secondary deviance and, hence, radicalisation.

Conditions in jail – both treatment by administration, contacts with other prisoners or arrested, possibility of communications with outside world while in jail, etc. – significantly shape subsequent choice how to behave of a person after he or she is released from the prison. He or she can either choose to return to following the social order norms and conventions or the person can opt for further challenging these norms. And if the conditions in jail would facilitate the latter choice, then the jails become a place of radicalisation and part of the problem of deviance and not part of its solution.

So, one implication concerns the role of institutions in facilitating radicalisation. In other words, where ideologies (their content, basis or sophistication) are used to justify deviance by deviant persons to themselves or others, the level of radicalisation largely depends on the institutions where arrested and/or convicted persons are detained. Based on this hypothesis, the following factors characterising the work of, and conditions in, the institutions where arrested/convicted persons are held are focused on. These are the:

1. **general conditions in jails and prison system**—space availability, the autonomy of a prison system from police, state prosecution and other government agencies and socioeconomic conditions

2. **framework conditions for radicalisation**—indoctrination and the organisation of law-breaking groups, which involves the cohabitation of various types of criminals (leaders and ideologues of criminal or radical groups) and the free (undisturbed by law enforcement agencies) socialisation between them
3. framework conditions for the continuation of law-breaking activities—the availability of communication channels with the outside world that may be used for the continuation of criminal or ideologically-based law-breaking activities and opportunities to avoid giving up criminal or radical activities despite being taken into custody.

This hypothesis posits that radicalisation will increase with the deterioration in general conditions in jails, and with improving framework conditions for radicalisation and continuation of law-breaking activities while in prison. To verify this hypothesis, this article takes three cases in which various types of radicalisation can be easily observed, yet the extent of radicalisation differs significantly. At the same time, all three cases share some common traits as far as the problem is concerned.

Temporally, the study is rooted in the past two decades. This time selection was made in order to preserve the relevance of the study so as to better inform the wider international public as to the dangers of dysfunctional penal systems. Also, this timeframe represents
1. the accession of Romania to the EU and NATO and the issues it faces impacts its relationship to those organisations, such as its exclusion from the Schengen space,
2. the continued transition of Russia away from its Soviet past and towards a still-indeterminate ideological place,
3. the clear shift in Pakistan towards Islamic radicalism.

The study posits that the conditions prevailing in the jail system of respective country plays a crucial role in radicalisation and the article compares two general sets of parameters for the three selected states. First, the level and dynamic of deviant actors and behaviours – both of a general criminal nature and of a political/religious nature. This is done by comparing the known data on organised criminality, and other information on criminal activities, and violent activities by the radical political and religious groups (large-scale attacks and terrorism, etc.). Due to the nature of the problem, the situation is better characterised by qualitative description.

Second, the study compares the conditions prevailing in specific prison systems. This means both comparing known general data on capacities and needs, and other information on incarceration conditions in the three selected cases. Again, emphasis shall be made on qualitative description.
The aim of the study is to determine whether the correlation between these two sets of parameters – deviance prevalence and the situation in prisons – may be established. Additionally, similarities and differences in prison conditions in the three countries will be identified to make an attempt at explaining the specific problems with radicalisation these countries face.

A Note on Case Selection

Prior to shifting attention to the case-work this article relies so heavily on, it is important to justify the deployment of three very different states in order to support the main hypothesis of this work.

First, these countries had and/or have to struggle with political, social and religious radicalism. While today’s Romania has few radical political groups, in the past it had a large and extremely sophisticated Orthodox radical movement called the Iron Guard. While this work limits itself to the contemporary period, it is important to note that Romania has a heritage of radicalisation. Russia – for its part – struggles with an assortment of radical political and religious groups—primarily (but not exclusively) Islamists. Pakistan has been waging a nascent war of attrition against a host of radical political and religious groups (re: Lashkar-e-Jhangvi) and large-scale radical insurgents such as the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). In short, all the testing cases have a heritage of combatting radicalisation.

Second, – and in addition to radicalised groups – Romania, Russia and Pakistan all have mature criminal communities; although the degree of sophistication, areas of specialisation and specific traits differ. Briefly, Romania’s and Russia’s organised criminal communities are sophisticated and well-established with known projection on a global scale, helped on by very large and influential diaspora communities in important cities and states around the world. For Pakistan, the organised criminal community is mostly niche-centred in narcotics trafficking (heroin) on an industrial scale.

Third, while the investigation here commenced with Romania (as a starting point), it was important to select two additional cases to provide stronger evidence in terms of penal systems working against their intended goals to the point that they can be termed as – in some cases – incubators of radicalism of a political and/or criminal nature. So, while Romania and Russia share certain socioeconomic, religious, historical,
political and cultural traits, they remain different enough as to be able to provide a more in-depth analysis of how radicalism is being produced by their penal systems’. This dyad is especially important since Romania joined the EU and NATO and the expectation that it reformed its judicial system should have set it apart from Russia, which went through a different set of post-Cold War changes.

Pakistan – in obvious contrast – is a completely different case from both Romania and Russia—an Islamic republic located along the frontiers of the Middle East (re: Iran) and the South Asian Subcontinent (re: India). Pakistan remains an under-modernised state (compared to Romania and Russia), was located in the US-led camp during the Cold War (it was not part of the socialist bloc), and is plagued by continuous political instability. Despite these differences however, the fact remains that all three cases have – on initial investigation – shown that some form of political and judicial dysfunction is producing radicalism among inmates rather than detention being a source of social rehabilitation.

This work now turns to a case-by-case evaluation of Romania, Russia and Pakistan in order to better understand what their particular penal situations are.

**Romania: General Conditions in Jails and the Prison System**

The main penitentiary institution in Romania is the National Administration of Penitentiaries which is situated under the supervision of the Ministry of Justice. At present, Romania has some 45 prisons and detention centres, of which 16 are referred to as maximum security prisons. Highlighting the most important stages in the formation of the modern Romanian prison system, we need to highlight the factors that played a crucial role in its formulation. In our view, the key event in the transformation of penal system in Romania was its transition from the Ministry of Internal Affairs and its placement under the Ministry of Justice as of 15 January 1991. This step was consistent with the standards prevailing in democratic countries of Western Europe. Transferring the control of prisons from the Interior Ministry to the Ministry of Justice was an indication that the prisons had become a social institution to solve practical problems, rather than punitive institutions meant to deter and punish.
An important process in development of the Romanian criminal justice system commenced on 01 February 2014 with the introduction of the new Romanian Code of Criminal Procedure which was considered ‘more than the Penal Code, the Code of Criminal Procedure is the test paper of democracy.’\(^3\) The new Romanian Code was adopted to correspond to the standards imposed by the European Convention on Human Rights. The expectation that Romania’s justice system was joining the ranks of the EU was, however, premature.

According to the statistics, the number of convicted persons increased dramatically after the collapse of communism in Romania. Three key explanations have been floated around Romanian institutions and media and offered to the EU to explain the rising prison population between 1991 and 2016:

1. the rise in criminal behaviours that accompanied the transition to a market economy,
2. the increasing of the length of confinement for maximum sentences,
3. the absence of non-custodial alternatives.\(^4\)

In other words, the working logic is that in the period of transition – of shifting from a centrally planned to a market economy – generated more criminal activities and more criminals. Romania’s judicial reaction to that increase was a platform of deterrence that increased mandatory minimal sentences for particular crimes. This swelled prison population came at a time when tremendous state budget cuts were taking place and the penal system was unable to cope. To make matter worse, Romania incarcerates nearly all convicted criminals and few non-custodial alternatives are visible. This implies that the already overstretched prison system becomes even more retarded since all levels of crime – from petty theft to murder – are punished by some form of incarceration and detention. In numbers, the prison population in 1989 was situated at some 29000. By 2001 that number had jumped to 50000. This growth negatively impacted prison conditions, which are often criticised for lacking adequate hygienic equipment, medical facilities and modern penal programmes for social rehabilitation.

Since the 2001 cresting of prison number, a sustained push by Romanian authorities to reduce prison-time coupled with the settling into the market system by Romania’s next generation have driven down prison number. As of this year (2016), only 28062 prisoners are recorded in Romania.\(^5\) However, reduced numbers and less-overcrowding
has not stopped the radicalisation of incarcerated persons and the trend towards the opposite has not escaped EU attention—Romania’s prisons continue to be heavily criticised by European authorities and human rights activists.

Opportunities for Criminal Radicalisation in Romania

Most penal institutions in Romania remain overcrowded and although the total number of people locked into Romanian prisons declined over the past years, prison conditions remain poor and far below European norms. Overcrowded prisons, and improper detention conditions, brought 29 decisions against Romania in the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg and the country is under threat of a pilot decision due to repeated violations of the European Charter of Human Rights. According to reports of the Association for the Defence of Human Rights in Romania, the Helsinki Committee and the Association for Human Rights and People Deprived of Freedom, most prisons in Romania were overcrowded and had inadequate conditions, including insufficient medical care, poor food quality, mould in kitchens and cells, understaffing, an insufficient number of bathrooms, poor hygiene, insects, an insufficient number of doctors (including no psychologists and psychiatrists in some prisons), lack of work and inadequate educational activities." The Council of Europe anti-torture committee (CPT) delegation visited Romanian prisons in 2014 and collected information of beatings to inmates by special intervention forces. The Romanian Minister of Justice very recently admitted lying to the ECHR about securing funds for new prison investments.

Overcrowding, as well as related problems such as lack of privacy, can also increase rates of violence and radicalisation. One of the most evident examples of this situation is the growing number of prison riots and at least 6 prison riots erupted so far in 2016 over poor conditions of detention. Prison riots illustrate how bad conditions of living may result in the outbreak of violence.

The Continuation of Law-Breaking Activities

In Romania, the percentage of former repeat offenders hovers around 54%—a fact that demonstrates – to a certain extent – the failure of penal politics in the country. There are many factors that push former
inmates to return to criminality, though one stands out as being systemic and avoidable: post-incarceration opportunities.

Sociological research has indicated that in addition to the now routine fear of remaining unemployed and discriminated against after incarceration together with very high levels of drug abuse within prisons has led to a curious radicalisation among Romanian prisoners. This is reflected in specific gang recruitment within prison walls. While the Băhăian Gang is a case in point – having grown in strength and numbers since the leaders’ 2010 arrest and 2013 imprisonment – it is the wide collection of Romania’s Romani Clans that reveal the dangers of radicalisation. Of these, the most notorious are the Duduieni, Caran and Gigi Corsicanu Clan and the Feraru Clan, both of which have their leaders in prison. In both cases, membership of the organisations flowered since clan leaders entered the prison system; they exploit poor and vulnerable inmates for cooperation in and beyond Romania’s prisons. This is more than a local or even a national problem since many of the activities involve human, weapons and drug smuggling throughout Europe.

There is another side to the story of Romania’s justice system however and there are serious allegations that Romania continues to use its penal system for political reasons—to imprison government critics and intimidate others. This is dangerous because it has the potential of turning law-abiding citizens into national criminals for issues that are not regarded as criminal by other members of the EU and has strained relations with other EU members through the systemic misuse of the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) in pursuit of political dissenters. In this way, Romania lacks a true and neutral arbiter situated above the political classes.

Russia: General Conditions in Jails and the Prison System

According to the Russian Federal Penitentiary Service (FPS), some 645,350 people were serving prison sentences in 2016. Russia’s main institution for law enforcement, control, and oversight of functions involving the punishment of persons who have been convicted of crimes is the Russian Federal Penitentiary Service. It was created in 2006 and was placed under the Russian Ministry of Justice. In 1990, the crisis of the criminal-executive system was due to lack of finances, but by 2000 the financial problems were solved. Currently, the FPS has the highest
budget in Europe and it increased by almost 6 times from 48 billion roubles in 2004 to 269 billion roubles in 2015.\textsuperscript{10}

But budget size cannot be an indicator of a high-level high-quality prison service. According to a report by the Council of Europe on the study of prison systems among member states, Russia, with the largest budget for Penitentiary Service among European countries, still spends 50 times less per capita than in the EU norm.

Between 1993 and 2001 a number of new laws were adopted in Russia that may be considered as major steps in aligning Russia's prison system with prevailing international standards. The transition of the Penitentiary service from ministry of Interior to ministry of Justice took place in 1998. However, in 1990, the spiking problem of crime led to a hugely increased prison population—resulting in overcrowding and deteriorating conditions. In recent decades, the Russian incarcerated population was still tremendous, despite falling crime rates. The number of crimes in Russia has decreased by 38\% for nearly 10 years. At the same time, the number of prisoners decreased by only 18\%.\textsuperscript{11}

\textbf{Opportunities for Criminal Radicalisation in Russia}

In the case of Russia, the radicalisation process in prisons may have both social and religious roots. Religious radicalisation is usually connected with jihadism and similar ideologies of religious-political violence. Muslim minorities make up approximately 12-14\% of Russia's population that can be compared with Muslim society in some European countries. But the overwhelming majority or Russian Muslims are not migrants. They are not isolated from the dominant culture and don’t perceive themselves to be rejected by society. But some of them, mainly youth, may be influenced by radical ideas from abroad. The religious radicalisation in Russian prisons was widely discussed in the media over the past 3-5 years because of ISIS propaganda and the swelling number of Russian Muslims fighting in the Syrian civil war on the side of the jihadists. Some experts are alarmed that some imprisoned radicals use the isolated prisons to recruit and integrate new members for terrorism.\textsuperscript{12}

Religious communities in prisons offer a way out of isolation as well as new social networks, and may afford important physical protection against other prisoners. There are about 61 mosques and more than 230 prayer rooms in the Russian prison system. The number of official
Muslim communities is more than 950.\textsuperscript{13} Prison authorities are fearful of the growing influence of illegal ‘prison jamaats,’ where young incarcerated Muslims may adopt extremist ideas. In 2016 the number of those convicted for terrorism and complicity in terrorism grew by 2.5 times. Despite that this category was among the smallest number, cases of terrorism is growing rapidly.\textsuperscript{14}

The other kind of radicalisation you may find in Russian prisons is social radicalisation that is mainly connected with criminality. Russia’s prison system has its own peculiarities. The overwhelming majority of Russian penal institutions are situated separately and far from the cities, and have their own infrastructure. Historically, in Russia there were prison-towns and prison-villages, which are on its balance sheet settlements, highways, kindergartens, schools, stadiums and houses of culture. Due to its infrastructure, which involved prisoners and ex-prisoners in the economic life, is already a basis for their specific criminal environment.

\textbf{Table 1. Criminal Recidivism in Russia, 2005-2015}

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<td>For the first time</td>
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<td>302.9</td>
<td>263.7</td>
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<td>2 times</td>
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<td>129.0</td>
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<td>3 times</td>
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\textit{Source: Практика рассмотрения ходатайств о досрочном освобождении осуждённых в российских судах /Аналитический отчет (версия для контролирующих органов); под ред.О.М. Киюцинной, ИПСО. – СПб., 2016. С.13}
the proportion of previously convicted persons reached 44%-45%—an absolute record in the history of modern Russia.

The growing number of inmates that repeat criminal acts indicates the deep crisis of the penal system in Russia. People return time and again to prison, and use the experience to become members of criminal families. Prison in Russia does not heal, but prepares criminals for their next crimes.

Pakistan: General Conditions in Jails and the Prison System

Pakistan has, over the past two decades, faced huge organised criminal structures and politically (MQM) and religiously-motivated (TTP, Lashkar-e Jhangvi etc.) violent movements which resorts to armed struggle and terrorism. To a large extent, both criminal and ideational-driven law-breaking activities are interlinked, although this issue, as Hassan Abbas pointed out in the case of Taliban movement, remains ignored in many publications on the issue and points that also 'criminal influences rally the group.'

Pakistani jails are overcrowded. For instance, in the late 2000s, Rawalpindi’s Adiala Jail accommodated 6195 prisoners although it had the capacity only for 1900.15 The situation seems to be consistent: in 2015 the same jail continued to struggle with over-crowdedness and more than 6000 people remained incarcerated there.16 The problems with general conditions of imprisonment in Pakistan cannot be reduced to over-crowdedness alone. While a high-security prison in Dera Ismail Khan has a lot of free places, the conditions are characterised by local observers as a ‘sweltering hell.’17

Every province of Pakistan regulates issues related to its prisons itself and even more difficulties exist because of the ‘lack of communication’ between prison administrations and Pakistan’s numerous security agencies.18 The methods of jails administration are unsophisticated. Prisoners are tortured and mistreated, yet there is no effective control of prisoners’ activities: ‘during that time in hell in Mach [jail] his beard turned pure white,’ complain the insurgents who go on to say that ‘jails, torture and suffering won’t change our jihadist commitment.’19

Due to such inhuman treatment and problems in the justice system the prison system has a serious image problem. To get incarcerated in many cases probably means that arrest (and even more – convic-
tion of a person) in public opinion does not necessarily mean labelling the person as socially destructive or vicious. On the contrary, there are signs that the contrary can happen—such a person receives positive support as a victim, or even hero, who challenged a corrupt and unjust system. According to one Taliban fighter, ‘long imprisonment hasn’t slowed down our momentum, resistance and commitment to the fight.’

Labelling starts early with very easy resorting to taking into custody. Even Pakistani officials complain of the ‘routine use of pre-trial detention, even for non-violent offences.’ Many people waiting for their trial or are in under trial and not convicted, spend years in prisons. Actually the number of those awaiting trial far exceeded (in the 1990s) the number of convicted criminals in the country’s jails and there are no signs of improvement in this regard afterward.

Opportunities for Criminal Radicalisation in Pakistan

Religious and political radicals are held together with ordinary criminals and members of organised criminal structures. Since the late 1990s, there were reports that the convicts are held together with prisoners awaiting the completion of their trials and in many cases it was reported that adults were held in the same cells as minors. Then, in the late 2000s, for instance, in Adiala Jail in Rawalpindi only 1972 prisoners served their terms while 4223 were in the prison while awaiting trial.

Control over prisoners is very low due to insufficient resources and competency of prison personnel. The level of the control methods is illustrated by the fact that most prisons lack psychologists and other advances medical treatment. According to the former head of Punjab police, ‘our government focuses more on providing vocational training to criminals than on psychological therapy.’ And, it was only in April 2015 that the prison administration in the biggest Pakistani province of Punjab decided to train prison personnel in criminal psychology. Moreover, it was announced that ‘hardened criminals [...] currently detained [...] for terrorist activities, sectarian killings and other crimes of a heinous nature who will be given specialised psychological therapy.’

The reality of gang activities inside Pakistan’s prisons have existed on an industrial scale for many years. Although the report of 150-strong tribally-based gang (biradri) in a jail in Sindh province, which pursued
various activities ‘ranging from openly selling narcotics to criminally assaulting small children in the adjacent children’s jail’ refers to during the late 1990s: the problem has remained.26

The Continuation of Law-Breaking Activities

A paradoxical situation is clear: on one hand, some observers complain that in Pakistan ‘Taliban prisoners simply disappear into a black hole with no possibility of contacting their families and no protections under the Pakistani constitution.’27 On the other hand, prisoners frequently continue to keep outside contacts involving continuation of their law-breaking activities. Thus, even in ‘a heavily guarded jail considered one of the most protected prisons in the province,’ prisoners apparently got what they needed brought inside and outside by ‘sympathetic wardens,’ and managed to communicate with the Taliban by cell phones.28 The problem of illegal communications is well known to prison authorities in Pakistan.29

Pakistani prisoners do not have much motivation to stop or even reduce law-breaking behaviours not only because they can stay in touch with their criminal or radical comrades but also because they can hope to soon get their physical freedom. There are wide opportunities for them to be released than in other countries. First, Pakistani government practices massive releases of prisoners as a ‘good will gesture’ meant to achieve some political aims. However, some observers believe that ‘the prisoner releases seem to have only succeeded in funnelling commanders and fighters back to the fighting.’30

Second, jailbreaks are a regular occurrence and organised collective escapes, some of them involving hundreds of prisoners – e.g. in April 2012 and July 2013 in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province – are not especially rare. In this former case, prison guards did not resist the break-out and reportedly not one of those involved in freeing the prisoners was killed: ‘the militants asked them to get aside and leave.’31

Such porous barriers between prisons and outside world of law-breaking communities cannot but foster radicalisation of both criminal and extremist political-religious communities. A spectacular case of such radicalisation involves a religious extremist who, after a stint in Guantanamo Bay prison, was re-arrested in Pakistan. Despite spending five years in a jail run by the Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency he not only re-joined the extremist community, but
quickly rose to become the Taliban overall commander for southern Afghanistan. This demonstrates that imprisonment failed to isolate him, and, on the contrary, provided him – like many others prisoners – with a “heroic” image.

Pakistani prisons create excellent conditions for the continuation of law-breaking at ever higher levels of intensity and sophistication. The combination of criminal radical elements in Pakistan has produced consequences for the prison system as well. According to Khalid Abbas, (then) inspector-general of Pakistan’s prisons, ‘either the government should voluntarily hand over jails to [the Taliban] or it should take serious measures and build a high-security prison [for terrorists and sectarian militants]. The existing jails have been built to keep ordinary prisoners.”

Conclusions

The research conducted in this study generally confirmed the main hypothesis and it is clear that the intensity of problem of radicalisation – both of a general criminal and ideational (political or religious) nature – correlated with the deterioration in general conditions in jails, and with improving framework conditions for radicalisation and continuation of law-breaking activities while in prison. At the same time, there are clear differences between the countries under investigation—which can be explained by differences in the intensity of the third factors which we studied as those constituting the conditions for radicalisation in prisons. Concerning the problem of radicalisation, Romania fared better than Russia and Pakistan owing to better general conditions in Romanian prisons. However, Romanian prisons remain a hotbed for criminality and criminal radicalisation. The situation in Russian and Pakistan looks similar to each other though, with Russia, generalisations were deployed since the country is huge and conditions in jails differ immensely region to region.

How can these finding be interpreted?

Poor conditions in jail encourage prisoners to continue their illegal activities and socialise with other, likeminded, people. Jails can fail to become real hurdles for criminal and extremist activities, especially when corruption (in Romanian, Russia and Pakistan) and porous security (largely Pakistan) make them penetrable. If somebody is interned
in such an ineffective prison does not necessarily put an end to his or her law-breaking activities since s/he may be freed (massive escapes at Pakistani jails, politically-motivated releases and amnesties), removing one more reason for some to give up their deviant behaviour.

Likewise, the perception of prisons by wider populations matter. Prisons are not only for criminals but also for those challenging an unjust system or those who by accident and without any guilt become the victim of the unjust system. In reviewing the casework for this article, several high-profile examples have surfaced as to people incarcerated for political reasons. This is similar in all three of the cases under scrutiny—Romania, Russia and Pakistan.

Prison conditions, the harshness, inhumane, abusive and humiliating practices of prison personnel together with other deprivations do not positively rehabilitate criminals regardless whether they follow general criminal behaviours or political and religious ideologies. Instead, they conceal the lack of efficient strategies, tools and resources for de-indoctrination and bringing them to more socially acceptable behaviour. The exception to this is, of course, those that are imprisoned for political reasons; an area that requires further research and investigation.

Siarhei Bohdan, Gumer Isaev

Notes

2 Ibid, p. 82.

Gabriel Tical and Maria Roth (2012), 'Are Former Male Inmates Excluded from Social Life?' European Journal of Probation, 4:2, pp. 62-76.


Gabriel Tical and Maria Roth (2012), 'Are Former Male Inmates Excluded from Social Life?' European Journal of Probation, 4:2, pp. 62-76.

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Moreau and Yousafzai (2013).


Moreau and Yousafzai (2013).

The Egyptian revolution of January 2011 failed and did not change the fundamental political structure of the country, which ended up under military rule. Leading scholarship will be examined and reasons for the revolution’s failure will be presented in historical, regional and domestic contexts. This work argues that several essential conditions for successful revolution and democracy promotion did not occur. These include a change of the country’s elite, reformation of state institutions, and an inability of the revolutionary masses to establish lasting broad coalition. Unique Egyptian peculiarities contributed to the failure of the revolution and transition to democracy. These included a strong military, an inability of the revolution’s initiators to develop their success and lasting support from international networks of the existing elites. The Egyptian experience will be examined within a larger context of regional social and political changes.

Keywords: Egypt, Arab Uprising, revolutions, regime change, democracy promotion, failed revolution, army, military

Introduction

December 2010 marked a new stage in the history of the Middle East. When the Arab uprising began in Tunisia, spread over the region in a matter of months and the socio-political architecture of the region started to change—affecting international relations. By the end of 2013, almost every Arab country had been touched by the wave of uprisings, three Arab leaders (Tunisia’s Ben Ali, Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak and Libya’s Muammar Qaddafi) had been deposed while Libya, Syria and Yem-
en were torn apart by civil war. The fallout persists until the present. Tunisia and Egypt have been undergoing difficult transitions searching for ways to bring back stability and move towards building more democratic societies, while the Gulf States are fearful of another wave of unrests as the number of Islamists in the region continues to grow.

Egypt is regarded as a regional power and a crucial element in regional stability. That is why the future of the Middle East region is heavily dependent upon the outcome of the Egyptian search for its way towards stability. To understand the destabilisation and political turmoil of the country and region, it is important to understand the changes in Egypt. The military overthrow of the first democratically elected president in 2013, after Mubarak was forced to resign in 2011, reflects the forces which mitigate against some desired changes of the Arab uprising.

Egypt went through a transition period from Mubarak’s resignation through military rule to Islamist rule, producing mass protest against democratically elected Mohamed Morsi, which ended with his removal from power in summer 2013. The military’s performance after Mubarak’s resignation defined the nature of Egypt’s further development to a large extent and the following actions. The path chosen by the Egyptian military including tight control over the executive, legislative and judiciary branches, altered the country’s path towards democracy. This article examines why the Egyptian ‘January Revolution’ of 2011 ended in military rule and an absence of qualitative change in country’s political, economic and social institutions. The work argues that revolution in Egypt failed as it did not ultimately improve the country’s political, economic, social situation and in general did not create conditions for qualitative change of the system.

The 2011 uprising led only to the overthrow of the person who embodied the regime and ultimately promoted domestic instability and contributed to further volatility in the region. The revolt against Mubarak did not change the fundamental political and social structure of the country.

This article argues that according to the research on revolutions, essential conditions for successful regime change were not in place or did not occur.¹

These include:

1. The elites—as products of the Mubarak regime, remained powerful and did not perceive the state as inefficient and unjust to undertake fundamental change,
2. The institution of the army—comprising the core of the Egyptian political and economic elite and representing an essential part of the regime, did not allow the entire system to collapse as they were not alienated from the state,

3. Existing international support networks—safeguarded the regime from transformation by supporting the military,

4. A low level of unity among revolutionary forces—that initiated the uprising,

5. The revolutionaries showed their inability and unpreparedness—to sustain progress as a coalition of revolutionary groups and elites did not emerge.

The article ultimately concludes that Egyptian revolution ultimately failed as the country returned to its pre-2011 state when the same elites with an authoritarian leader are in power. In the end, revolutions in countries like Egypt do not necessarily lead to a qualitative change of the existing system and usually pose major threats to both internal and regional security.

Multiple theories of revolution support this analysis. The role of the military during and after the 2011 uprising, its place in the existing system and the reality of the institution of an existing strong army influenced the Egyptian uprising and democratic transition in Egypt.

The role of the military in revolts in Tunisia and Egypt, which ended differently, will be compared. Institutional differences between the two countries’ armies hugely contributed to the different outcomes of the two uprisings. This comparison shows the decisive role that the Egyptian military played during the revolt and the transition period, contributing to Egypt’s failure to undergo a profound political and economic transformation; Tunisia, meanwhile, is enjoying a relatively successful transition from authoritarian rule to a more democratic one.

In January 2011, Egyptians initiated massive demonstrations in Tahrir square. Judging from the footage of the protests, a variety of factors initially mobilised people: poverty, rampant unemployment, government corruption and autocratic governance. Ultimately, however, the focus shifted to overthrow the regime of President Hosni Mubarak, who had governed the country for 30 years. The first uprising of January 2011 ended with ousting Mubarak from power. The military then seized power and prepared the country for democratic elections, which resulted in victory for the Islamists in summer 2012. Later, in June and July 2013, popular demonstrations against Islamist rule erupt-
ed and the military stepped in once again, deposing the new president Mohammed Morsi and taking the power for themselves. Later in 2014 Egyptians elected the former head of Egypt’s Armed Forces Abdel Fat-tah el-Sisi as a new president.

The final result is that Egyptian regime has not changed much since the January 2011 uprising. The regime that was personified by President Mubarak has not been deposed and its institutions and elite have not been changed; moreover, the main attribute of not only the Mubarak regime, but of all previous Egyptian presidents’ regimes—the army—has remained in power. It is fair to say that the current regime in Egypt is almost exactly the same as the one existed during Mubar-ak’s rule.

Defining Revolution

Research on revolutions have undergone through four primary generations over the last century.² With each generation it included more and more revolutionary cases which, on the one hand, increased knowledge accumulation, but on the other, complete answers to such key questions as under what conditions do revolutions occur, what regimes are most susceptible to revolutionary changes, what is needed for revolutionary forces to succeed, still elude the field. Yet, for each of the question, there are robust sets of factors that consistently occur across the great variety of revolutionary cases which helps to understand when revolutions are more likely to happen. It should be noted that these conditions are not law-like as the exact mechanisms may vary across events, and they work differently in different contexts.³ As a result, the scholarship on revolutions has developed consistent sets of general findings which outline when revolutions are more likely to occur:

1. when states’ structures face increasing pressure (economic pressure and/or tensions with other states)
2. when regimes are unable or less able to accommodate or coopt contention due to their underlying nature (patrimonial and personalist regimes are in particular brittle)
3. and when contention is supported by broad coalitions of revolutionary groups and elites.⁴

With the revolutions of the 21st century – re: Colour Revolutions and the Arab Uprisings – the scholarship on revolutions started to focus more on the area- and type-specific studies of revolutions, although

Alexey Khlebnikov
acknowledging the basic sets of findings of the previous generations of the scholarship.

The area-specific studies of revolutions, in this case in the Middle East, found out that for a revolution to succeed, a number of factors have to come together. Goldstone, in analysing conditions for a successful revolution, synthetised previous research findings and adapted them to the Middle East. He concluded the following:

The government must appear so irremediably inept that it is widely perceived as a threat to the country’s future and its elites (especially in the military) are becoming alienated from the existing regime and not willing to back it any longer; a broad-based section of the population, spanning ethnic and religious groups and socioeconomic classes, must mobilize; and international powers must either refuse to step in to defend the government or constrain it from using maximum force to defend itself.5

Bellin, examining robustness of authoritarianism in the Middle East, reinforced Goldstone’s findings about the role of the military during the uprisings.6 She concluded that the state’s coercive apparatus has proved to be the key factor in determining resilience of authoritarian regimes in the face of revolutionary events in the Middle East. Below in this article the key role of the Egyptian military will be thoroughly examined.

It is also important to consider several basic definitions of ‘revolution’ offered throughout the last century. According to the view presented by Johnson that ‘revolution is a change, effected by the use of violence, in government, and/or regime, and/or society.’7 This definition is quite broad and basically includes any type of violent change in government and society which may or may not lead to institutional transformation. Stone – for his part – specified that historians distinguish the ‘seizure of power,’ which leads to a major restructuring of government or society and replaces the former elite with a new one—from the ‘coup d’état’—which involves no more than a change of ruling personnel by violence or threat of violence.8 This definition brings up an important distinction between major changes in socio-political structures and just a simple change of ruling personnel.

Another definition, given by Davies, is that ‘revolutions are violent civil disturbances that cause the displacement of one ruling group by
another that has a broader popular basis for support. This definition does not take into account that popular support is not the only factor that determines the success of a revolution. Sometimes it is not a determinant at all.

In contrast, Skocpol defines revolution as ‘rapid, basic transformations of society’s state and class structures [. . . ] accompanied and in part carried through by class-based revolts from below.’ However, this definition presumes that revolutions happen predominantly as a reaction to economic issues by the lower classes. This is not always true, especially in an era of globalization that has brought modern amenities and goods to people.

Goldstone, in his 2001 work, ‘Towards a Fourth Generation of Revolution Theory,’ argues that the above-mentioned definitions of revolution do not encompass all common elements of it, and include changes which do not seek to transform institutions and justification of authority like coups, revolts and rebellions. Hence, he synthesises previously existed approaches and offers the following quite embracing definition:

- an effort to transform the political institutions and the justifications for political authority in a society, accompanied by formal or informal mass mobilisation and noninstitutionalised actions that undermine existing authorities.

A problematic thing about defining ‘revolution’ is the risk of confusing it with coups, revolts or rebellions that do not necessarily lead to a change of institutions, authority or society and, thus, do not lead to the qualitative change of the existing system. This is why it is important to determine whether the Egyptian uprising was a revolution that brought qualitative political transformation (from authoritarianism to a more democratic system, for instance) or pave the ground for it, or if it was simply a coup that resulted in the mere change of ruling personnel, and to define reasons behind that.

This question goes in line with one of the persistent problems of the research of revolutions – revolutionary aftermath, which is to assess the immediate, mid-term and long-term aftermaths of revolution. Therefore, it is important to examine the immediate outcomes of the Egyptian revolution and check if it has brought socio-political transformation or has created the conditions for a change towards more democratic system.
Framing the Egyptian Uprising

The events of January-February 2011 in Egypt can hardly be seen as a successful revolution which brought qualitative changes into its political, economic and social structures. In fact, what happened was a change of ruling personnel: The president and his inner circle were deposed by the military. The regime itself had not been changed. Its political and socio-economic institutions, and elite, remained intact. Moreover, the army, which forms the majority of the political elite and a big portion of the economic elite of the country, remained in power.

In short, a central finding of today’s revolution research is that revolutionary movements can only succeed when the ruling regime, particularly the strength of its coercive apparatus, becomes substantially weakened or its coercive forces refuse to repress revolutionary masses either because they stay neutral or because they build successful coalition with the revolutionary forces.

In the Middle East this is particularly relevant. Firstly, because the military is exceptionally robust there thanks to the access many states have to hydrocarbon, geostrategic, locational, and secondary rents. Secondly, because many Middle East states maintained international support networks due to their service to Western security interests. In addition, the military plays a key role in countries of the region for about a century and still holds a grip on power. The majority of rulers of Middle Eastern nations have a military education (former presidents of Egypt, Yemen and Tunisia; the current presidents of Yemen and Egypt; the King of Jordan; the emirs of Qatar and the UAE; Saudi princes; etc.) while the political and economic elite of many of these countries is closely connected with the military and military itself is deeply embedded into economy. This article examines how Egyptian military played the crucial role in not letting revolution succeed.

Another condition for successful revolution involve large coalitions of revolutionary groups and elites as challengers. In Egypt such coalition failed to be born as large, most influential and capable part of Egyptian elites, the military, was not interested in changing substance of the existing system, although it agreed to change its form. Thus, Egypt’s political elite, a product of the Mubarak regime, has remained in power, creating just a façade vision of joining the revolution but in fact staying aside, guarding the system.

The above-mentioned prerequisites for successful revolutionary change — a weakened security apparatus, a weak state, and a large co-
alitions of revolutionary groups and elites — were not in place in 2011 in Egypt, where the existing regime had ruled since 1952 (the last time a major social and political transformation occurred). Egypt’s institutions, political and economic elite had been forming for half a century and, in fact, it did not build a coalition with the regime challengers. President Mubarak contributed much to preserving the system and reinforcing its institutions and was just the embodiment (albeit a charismatic one) of the regime. So, with his resignation the regime did not collapse but continued to exist.

The entire system of political and economic institutions in the country proved to be quite strong and resilient, contributing to the regime’s survival. The revolution did not ultimately succeed because the revolutionary masses failed to keep united and to continue their push for change after Mubarak’s resignation. Existing elites, particularly the military, have become the biggest obstacle to change. Regimes typically possess tools which help them to weather times of crisis. Their organizational and institutional capacities (both military and civilian) are usually far more sophisticated than those of the rebels or protesters, and help them repress opposition and maintain legitimacy. Thus, in the case of Egypt, the military was the primary obstacle to the qualitative change of the regime.

The Role of the Army in the Egyptian Uprising and Transition Period

The military played a key role in the Egyptian uprising of 2011 and during the subsequent period, including the 2013 coup. In order to understand the role army played in that period, it is important to understand its historic role in Egyptian society and in the country’s political and economic system.

The army traditionally plays a prominent role in the political systems of the Arab states. Throughout the twentieth century, the military has been a key element of a country’s successful performance. Anti-colonial revolutions played a central role in establishing a new ruling elite throughout the Middle East which had been formed predominantly by military officers. The Egyptian army built up its authority, credibility and gained public support over the second half of the twentieth century. The army was perceived as a force that guarded the national interests and protected the country from chaos.
The Army as Egypt’s Primary Cohesive Force

The army has played a decisive role in changing colonial regimes in the majority of Arab states. By the early 1950s, in the absence of active, consistent opposition parties, the army was the most organised force. From the end of World War I through the 1930s the biggest and most influential party was the Wafd party. However, the Wafd refused the army’s offer to take power after the ousting of Egypt’s King Farooq in 1952. The party also refused to cooperate with the Free Officers (the core movement of the Egyptian revolution of 1952), who eventually seized the power. Ultimately, the military had to take over governmental functions and had become responsible for the fate of Egypt. So what did the army look like in those times?

In 1922, Great Britain formally declared Egypt’s independence, although Egypt’s sovereignty was very limited and it remained a de facto colony. A big shift in Britain’s policy towards Egypt occurred before World War II, when the British concentrated more of their troops in Europe decreasing military presence in the colonies. In such circumstances, Egypt was granted a right to increase its army from 11,500 to 60,000 soldiers. Eventually, King Farooq had to recruit future officers from the middle class, as he needed to enlarge his army in a very short time. It is important because traditionally, officers of the tiny Egyptian army were from rich families. Starting in 1936, the Egyptian Military Academy began accepting young men from peasant families who consequently became the backbone of the Free Officers Movement, which ultimately took power in Egypt.

When the Free Officers toppled the king in 1952, they had neither governing experience nor a wish to govern the country. They were attempting to get rid of colonial governance and a corrupt monarchical regime. The refusal of the Wafd party to cooperate with the Free Officers caused the army to take power. Their lack of governing experience and the continuing decline of the Egyptian economy induced the Free Officers to use the cadres of the old regime, which provided them with necessary expertise. Thus, the Egyptian revolution of 1952 resulted not only in the deposing of the king and liberating the country from British colonial rule, but also with the formation of the new elite, which rapidly gained broad popular support. After the coup, the Free Officers launched deep reforms that addressed the concerns of the masses and brought relatively quick results—further enhancing the army’s image as the nation’s saviour. Agrarian reform (the most
important issue in the Arab countries at that time) increased their popularity and secured the support of the Egyptian countryside, while Egyptian foreign policy became more independent and was perceived by the population as patriotic.

All these factors contributed to the formation of a new political system in Egypt with the army playing a distinct role in it. Since the overthrow of King Farooq in 1952, five Egyptian presidents have come from the military: Muhammed Naguib, Gamal Nasser, Anwar Sadat, Hosni Mubarak and Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. In 2011, more than half of Egypt’s 29 governors were former military. This underlines that the military keeps its strong positions even after the 2011 uprising. However, all Egyptian presidents have had to deal with the army in order to maintain the civil-military balance. Control over the military has always been necessary to avoid the risk of coups. This has led to the constant shuffle of senior army officers and has made the military present in almost every sector of Egypt’s life. For instance, one of the most recent ones happened in 2014-2015 when young engineers, university professors and experienced managers were appointed as governors replacing many governors from the military.

The Egyptian Military and the Economy

The weight Egyptian military has in the country’s economic system is very important, because it defines military’s fiscal health which impacts its will and capacity to confront changes of the existing system. The Egyptian military is deeply involved in crony capitalist relationships. The economic interests of the military elite are well protected by businesses that have being formed in their interests for decades. As a result, the military has built a business empire that controls from 15 to 35 per cent of Egypt’s gross domestic product, according to various estimates. Economic ventures with substantial military share are in the military-industrial complex, state-owned holding companies and their numerous subsidiaries. Economic projects, approved and protected by the regime, account for a substantial part of the military’s economic benefits.

Over the last 20 years the military has begun to increase its portfolio by diversifying its traditional spheres of economic influence. It has expanded into sectors ranging from maritime transport to oil and renewable energy, from real estate development to heavy equipment leasing.
It has also increased its share in the economy by launching joint ventures with transnational companies that reach into several economic sectors, including public-private ventures. All this has firmly incorporated the military into the country’s economy which makes it regime’s largest stakeholder interested in preserving its substance in any form.

In the last years of Mubarak’s reign, the cabinet of his prime minister Ahmed Nazif – which was composed mainly of technocrats – launched a privatisation process which the military perceived as a threat to its own economic interests. Given the large share of the military in the Egyptian economy, it was a logical move by Mubarak to enhance positions of country’s economic technocrats by creating a competitive counter-balance to the military influence in economic sphere. In addition, his son Gamal Mubarak was a strong figure among younger generation of technocrats. Such move was perceived by the military elite as an attempt to limit and even decrease their share and influence in the economy by putting private-sector oligarchs close to the president and his family in a stronger position. However, since the uprising of 2011 and the resignation of Mubarak, many of his cronies have been on trial for corruption and some of them have left the country. This eventually left no serious competitors whose ambitions could harm or oppose the army’s plans for economic expansion.

**The Egyptian Military and Foreign Support**

Long-standing international support, both political and economic, greatly contributed to the economic strength of the Egyptian military. For years Egypt’s has been receiving financial aid from its major international supporter, the United States. During the last 30 years, the US has provided Egypt with more than $40 billion USD in military assistance — about 80% of the country’s total annual military procurement budget. This equals $1.3 billion USD a year in military aid from 1987 to present. Between 1948 and 2015, the US provided Egypt with $76 billion USD in total bilateral foreign aid. The US suspended financial aid to Egypt only for short periods of time, the most recent one was in 2013 after the coup which deposed democratically elected President Morsi (it was fully resumed it in 2015). However, even if the US decides to withhold funds, there are plenty of regional cash-rich countries willing to provide financial support to Egypt. Starting in July 2013, the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait pledged a combined $14 billion USD in aid to
Egypt,\textsuperscript{35} which is enough to cover any loss in American or European financial aid for several years.

This aid helped to keep the Egyptian army in a good fiscal health for decades, maintain its strength, keep its equipment up-to-date and gave it the capacity to use force, or the threat of force. This financial aid strengthens the military’s power, making it more resilient and unwilling to change the existing system as they are its primary beneficiaries. In addition, the military is a key pillar of the Egypt’s statehood and the main guarantor of its stability, and the US views it as the central partner. Turbulent and volatile Egypt is in no one’s interest, including the US, so, as long as the Egyptian military guaranties stability of the country and keeps it from sliding into the chaos Washington will support it. Moreover, Egypt’s strategic importance makes its military crucial to providing US and Western security interests such as ensuring a reliable supply of oil and gas (although with the shale gas revolution, the importance of this will somewhat decline); the security of Israel; containing radical Islamists; controlling immigrant flows, and counterbalancing Iran. This is why Egypt’s military maintained international support networks which provide it with necessary financial and political assistance\textsuperscript{36} keeping it strong and effective enough to manage the country.

Foreign aid and support to the Egyptian military contributed to maintaining its economic strength, thus, creating an additional obstacle for the country to undergo fundamental social-political change over the last five years. Egyptian Revolution of 2011 have failed to cause the qualitative change of the existing system and to pave the ground for that change. According to Skocpol, Bellin, Goldstone and others, an essential condition for successful revolution was not at place: Egypt’s state institutions and its coercive apparatus (the military, security services, etc.) remained strong and effective enough to prevent regime change.\textsuperscript{37}

The Role of Egyptian Military in the 2011 Uprising and After Mubarak

The regime in Egypt, which traces back to Nasser and the Free Officers, turned out to be very stable and viable, as its structure is still in place today. The Egyptian uprising of 2011 did not break the existing state system. It is worth noting that the army was not involved
in the anti-Mubarak demonstrations in January 2011. This neutrality in fact saved its credibility before the Egyptians. On 11 February 2011, after Mubarak was ousted, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (scaf)\textsuperscript{38} assumed control of the country. Its main goal was to oversee the transition and ensure that the power would be transferred to a civilian government elected by the people. The scaf considered itself the sole actor with the relevant skills, experience and capacities necessary to protect the country from both domestic and external threats.\textsuperscript{39}

Given the spread of internal insecurity in Egypt, and the rising regional instability (the Sinai and uncertainty in Libya and Sudan) during the time of January 2011 events and after, the scaf simply could not put the country’s fate into the hands of civilians (who could drag it into chaos) or let anyone question or challenge its own privileged status. With resignation of Mubarak the scaf regarded almost all political parties as self-centred in their programs and narrow-minded in their behaviour. The only organised political force that the scaf took seriously was the Muslim Brotherhood. Although the military took on the role of arbitrator, guarding the state’s security during the transition to the elected parliament and president, it did not wish to remain in the political spotlight and to be held responsible and blamed for every mistake and failure. The scaf did not intend to be sidelined either, nor it wanted to lose its self-ascribed role as the guarantor of constitutional legitimacy and security and be stripped of its economic privileges. Besides, the scaf did not want to see political institutions in the hands of single Islamist party. Therefore, its objective was to stay in the background, arbitrating from behind the scenes.\textsuperscript{40}

As a result, the scaf relinquished power on 30 June 2012, upon the start of newly elected Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi’s term. Although the scaf was first viewed as the revolution’s protector, many started to see it as an agent of the counter-revolution as it held all power in the country after 2011 uprising for over a year. During that period, the military was able to keep the country from descending into chaos—despite accusations that they were purposely delaying handing power over to a civilian government by suppressing major demonstrations that demanded an end to military rule. Ultimately, the army did transfer power to an elected civilian government, as it promised. Thus, it fulfilled its main obligations and saved its image.
Egyptian history is a record of the army guarding the interests of the secular state and their own elite position in the system of power. Egyptians in general treated the army as a liberator and defender of the country’s national interests, which allowed it to utilize this popular trust in such important moment. With regard to the Muslim Brotherhood and President Morsi, the army’s policies failed to meet people’s expectations after Mubarak’s resignation, a revolutionary mood returned to the masses and it resulted in large protests against the Brotherhood rule. This time Egyptian military joined the coalition of anti-Brotherhood forces, creating a needed sufficiently broad and cross-cutting coalition which successfully deposed Mohamed Morsi and his Islamist government. The military stepped in removing members of the Muslim Brotherhood from leading governmental positions. As a result, Egypt witnessed a coup which was against newly elected president and Muslim Brotherhood, who desired to monopolise power.

When Morsi had become a president he undertook certain steps to limit and decrease the role of the military. He removed old generals of the Mubarak era such as Minister of Defence Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, Chief of Staff Sami Enan and General Intelligence Director Mourad Mouwafi, promoting younger officers to their positions. Basically, Morsi intended to make an alliance with the military to secure their support and get control over the coercive apparatus. The military realized the intensions of the MB and threat they pose to their positions, and supported public demonstrations against their rule which led to the Islamists’ loss of power.41

The military once again demonstrated its superiority and took the power because they had the capacity, needed support and experience to do so. Basically, the regime developed a system which functions well and regulates itself with the help of the army balancing between military-civilian-secular edges. Once the military realized that not only the form but the substance of the existing system was about to change, it deposed the Brotherhood. Therefore, the Egyptian uprising did not lead to the system’s transformation, but only led to the change of leadership.

In the case of the 2013 coup, the army’s aspirations to get rid of the Islamist regime and the people’s desire to regain the “stolen” revolution and its results coincided and created the necessary coalition of
convenience. It led to successful seizure of power with the decisive role of the military. As a result, the army even gained more respect and trust on behalf of Egyptians whose “revolution” they “saved.”

One could argue that the July 2013 coup against Mohamed Morsi could be described as a counter-coup. However, this would not be accurate. First, ousted President Morsi and his party came to power legitimately via democratic election – they attained power by a popular vote which they managed to consolidate and secure. Therefore, when mass demonstrations started in Egypt against President Morsi and his push for Islamic rule, the Egyptian military stepped in and deposed the Muslim Brotherhood.

Second, it must not be forgotten that the Egyptian military never left Egypt’s political arena and was practically behind all major political moves. Their decision not to rescue Mubarak and to sacrifice him in order to protect the existing regime well-demonstrated their intentions to stay in power and adapt to changing realities. In a way, Mubarak’s resignation in February 2011 was less about the success of the uprising than it was a move to keep the existing system alive. As an evidence, the key power figures in the years after Mubarak resignation were from the military.

The head of the Egyptian General Intelligence Directorate, Omar Suleiman, became vice-president after Mubarak’s resignation, while Aviation Minister and former Chief of Egypt’s Air Force, Ahmed Shafik, became prime minister. On 11 February 2011, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) took power from Mubarak and became the ruling body of Egypt until 30 June 2012. SCAF was headed by Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, who had served as the Minister of Defence under Mubarak and was his close friend. The council also included service heads and other senior commanders of the Egyptian Armed Forces, namely Air Marshal Reda Mahmoud Hafez Mohamed; Air Force Commander Sami Hafez Anan; Armed Forces Chief of Staff Abd El Aziz Seif-Eldeen; and Mohab Mamish, Navy Commander in Chief. They all served in their new positions until August 2012. Essentially, while Mubarak and some of his cronies were deposed, strong political figures from the military assumed the power.

When Mohamed Morsi was elected as a new president of Egypt, he changed the SCAF’s personnel, basically promoting senior military officers who were four to eight years younger than their prede-
cessors. General Abdul Fatah Al-Sisi (current president of Egypt) was the youngest member of the SCAF before Morsi became the president. Morsi and the Brotherhood understood the importance of the military and the inevitability of an alliance with them. In addition, an alliance with the military would provide Islamists with strong coercive apparatus and guarantee financial and military assistance from the US, as Washington views Egyptian military as its key partner.

Thus, when the Muslim Brotherhood came to the political arena and attempted to sideline the army, the military took decisive action and stripped them of power. It cannot be considered a counter-coup, simply because the military regained the position they had before the 2012 elections, basically bringing Egypt back to where it was after the Mubarak’s resignation.

*Tunisia... A Different Role for the Military
A Different Outcome of the Uprising*

It is important to indicate why the Egyptian revolt is different from other revolts in the region. Tunisia— where a revolution took place and the process of elite change is ongoing—serves as a good example. This comparison will show the differences between role of the military in Egypt and in Tunisia and how these differences led to different outcomes of their respective uprisings. The argument that revolutionary movements can only succeed when the ruling regime, its strength and especially the strength of its coercive apparatus become substantially weakened\(^46\) is well-substantiated in Tunisia’s case.

The role of the military in Tunisia is very different than in Egypt. The Tunisian military is not engaged in country’s politics. Upon the creation of the Tunisian military in June 1956, President Habib Bourguiba excluded them from political participation and set up a clear institutional separation between the country’s new political structures and the military. He wanted to establish a professional and apolitical army modelled on Western European countries.\(^47\) Keeping the military out of politics and limiting its size and budget allowed him to reduce putschist ambitions and the risk of a coup.\(^48\)

Even when Ben Ali came to power, the general position of the army remained unchanged, despite Ali being a career military officer himself. Even Ali’s decision to increase the military budget, was aimed
more at providing internal security than at expanding the military’s influence. Ben Ali’s distancing himself from the military, his preoccupation with internal security and the fact that he relied more on the police and intelligence services gave the army little stake in politics or the economy.\textsuperscript{49} This created a situation in which the army’s ties to the Tunisian economy were minimal—nearly absent—giving the military little incentive to protect or fight for the existing regime. In short, the Tunisian military’s role in the political and economic life of the country has been strictly limited since the 1950s. Essentially, they serve as an apolitical guardian of the state and the constitution.\textsuperscript{50} The Tunisian military, in stark contrast to the Egyptian military, has no substantial political or economic stake in the existing regime. The military’s small size, small budget and exclusion from political and economic life made the army reluctant to oppose regime change and transformation of the system. This is why Tunisia is experiencing rather peaceful and smooth path towards democratic development while Egypt is not.

\section*{Revolution and Roadblocks to Democratic Transition}

The Arab uprisings are tightly connected with the problem of democratic transition. The Middle East, being a region with primarily authoritarian regimes, did not follow the path of democratisation which happened in 1980s-1990s after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, nor did it follow the wave of Colour Revolutions in 2000s. When the Arab Uprising started in late 2010 it was met with high expectations and hopes that it would pave the road to the democratization and prosperity in the region. However, the first year of the Arab Uprising in the Middle East proved the opposite, demonstrating only one relatively successful example of Tunisia. As a result, the region has become more turbulent and generated new challenges for the region and beyond such as the rise of Islamic extremism and uncontrolled movement of refugees.

It is important to note that transition to democracy issue is very complicated. Besides, while domestic conditions of a state matter for the democratic transition, the role of external factors should not be underestimated, especially when the Middle East is concerned. Many scholars conducted research in attempts to find the reasons why the states of the Middle East predominantly remain authoritarian and fail to take a democratisation path.
As it was already mentioned in the sections above, according to the findings of research on revolutions, the presence of a strong, coherent and effective coercive state apparatus is the major roadblock to successful revolution and subsequent conditions for transition to democracy in authoritarian states. The will and capacity of a state’s coercive forces to oppose democratic initiatives, which undermine their status and positions, almost negates the possibility of fundamental change in certain Middle Eastern countries (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Bahrain, etc.). In addition, external support for the existing regimes (and in particular the military) in the region safeguard them from qualitative institutional change. These important arguments indicate the dissonance between the declarations and real actions of some Western countries towards the Middle East.

The dissonance appears when Western democracies support autocratic regimes in the Middle East through military and economic assistance, thereby contributing to their robustness and increasing their resistance to change. Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, for instance, enjoy US patronage and military protection, despite clear undemocratic nature of the regimes in power and obvious violations of the human rights. However, political, economic and security interests (oil supplies, counterbalancing Iran, the fight against terrorism, military bases in the region, security of Israel, etc.) outweigh idealistic concerns. That results in the relative stability of autocratic regimes in the Middle East and the continuous absence of democracy.

The Egyptian military is an essential part of country’s system and the guarantor of its security and stability. It is deeply incorporated into the Egypt’s economic and political structures. Those facts make the military the primary recipient of US and European assistance and the only reliable provider of their interests in the region.

*Foreign Assistance and Democracy Promotion*

Foreign or external aid is tightly connected to the question of democracy promotion. The debate among scholars about the impact of the external democracy promotion on the domestic policies of states is ongoing. Scholars such as McFaul, Fukuyama and Gershman argue that foreign aid has a positive impact on the transition towards democracy. Other researchers disagree, arguing that there are many issues, such as methodological difficulties with evaluating the impact of the exter-
nal assistance. Researcher Stephen Knack’s argues that ‘no evidence is found that [foreign] aid promotes democracy.’

The US and EU consider themselves committed to the promotion of democracy in Egypt, however, their policies hardly push the political change in Egypt. Oppositely, they undermined it by being incoherent and controversial. In 2009, Vincent Durac’s research indicated that the Western scale of ‘inconsistency between the asserted aim of supporting political change and that of maintaining a stable and friendly Egypt have the paradoxical effect of strengthening, rather than challenging, the position of a regime that is deeply undemocratic.’

As stated above, the main problem with Western assistance to the MENA states is in the ability to strike a balance between security and creating conditions for democratic transformation. In the case of Egypt, the US has provided both economic and military assistance with the precondition that the Egyptian government will demonstrate progress towards democracy. However, in more than three decades since 1970 Camp David Accords, US economic assistance to Egypt has gradually declined; since the late 1980s, it has been drastically reduced. The difference between annual military and economic aid is enormous: $1.3 billion USD versus $250 million USD respectively in 2010-2013. As a result, maintenance of the Egyptian army’s fighting capacity, anti-terrorism cooperation with Egypt and security and stability of the state are evidently of a higher priority for the US national interests than Egypt’s transformation to democracy.

Even in the case when Washington suspends its financial aid to Egypt as it was in 2013 after the coup which deposed democratically elected President Morsi (although it fully resumed it in 2015) or if the US and/or the EU are dissatisfied with the progress of their aid recipients towards democracy and decide to withhold funds, there are plenty of regional cash-rich countries willing to provide financial support to Egypt and to those in power. Starting in July 2013, the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait pledged a combined $14 billion USD in aid to Egypt, which is enough to cover any loss in American or European financial aid for several years.

However, importance of the security issues is quite clear in the Middle East realities and in Egypt in particular. Egypt is the most populous
Arab country in the region (87 million in 2015). If it gets destabilised, the entire system of regional security will be undermined. A nation of almost 90 million people in a chaos or fragmentation is able to bring a lot more instability and volatility to the region and beyond than the much less-populous states of Iraq, Libya or Syria that are already in chaos. Therefore, the transition to democracy has been quite problematic in Egypt: what appears to be one of the main obstacles to democratic transition is also the guarantor of the country’s security and stability. The balance between democratic governance and security is of the highest importance in such states. However, the dissonance between democracy promotion and security maintenance is clearly evident.

Another aspect of democracy promotion in the Middle East is the US image in the region. After 9/11, President George W. Bush declared democratisation in the Middle East a strategic priority. This aim, however, was undermined by several factors: the one-sided US approach to the Palestine-Israel question; the association of democracy promotion with military intervention and the failed policy towards Iraq; the use of harsh counterterrorism measures that cast a shadow on democracy promotion; the tendency to doubt the winners of elections when they seemed worrisome (such as in the Palestinian territories in 2007); and the discrepancy between democratic rhetoric and concrete action in places like Egypt and Pakistan. These factors have led to the situation when the US is rarely perceived as a promoter of democracy in the region. According to 2012 Pew Research Center public opinion poll majority in Jordan (67 per cent), Turkey (58 per cent), Tunisia (57 per cent) and Egypt (52 per cent) believe the US government opposes democracy in the region.

The subsequent victory of Islamists in the elections in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen and Libya after the ousting their rulers reduced initial enthusiasm in the West and in the US in particular about the ‘Arab Spring,’ which was labelled this way because at the very beginning this process was majorly seen as the democratisation of the region. The people who desired changes and participated in protests in Egypt were not able to create lasting broad coalition with other forces (Islamists, political and economic elites) which could increase their chances to successful
revolution. Thus, they lacked the necessary capabilities, support and power, which ultimately contributed to the failure of their sincere and positive aspirations.

Missed Opportunities and the Muslim Brotherhood

The initiators of the Egyptian uprising were mainly urbanites, with the core force consisting of young educated people. As they represented the most educated and active class of society, their expectations were the highest. This provides a legit explanation to why they went out to Tahrir to protest. However, the majority of Egypt (57 per cent) is rural and is less modernised, less educated and more conservative than the moving force of protesters. As a result, in the case of democratic elections, the rural majority is likely to win (having equal access to the voting stations), voting for candidates who are closer to them ideologically. This is one of the reasons why the Muslim Brotherhood won both elections, presidential and parliamentary in 2012.

Another reason is that the Muslim Brotherhood enjoys huge grassroots support. It has been providing much needed social services in impoverished, mostly rural areas for several decades. Thus, the Muslim Brotherhood quite easily received the majority of votes and secured the majority in Parliament (along with the Salafi Al-Nour party) by mobilising public support throughout the country. After Mubarak’s resignation, the military did not put any legal restrictions on the Islamic groups in Egypt. This led to their increased participation in political life and ultimately brought them to power. Weak secular-liberal groups which lack unity, experience and the capacity to act, could not seriously challenge the Islamists. The possible opponents from the former ruling National Democratic Party, who did possess the necessary knowledge, experience, and capacity to act, were discredited by their corruption and connections to Mubarak. Consequently, the vacuum appeared which was soon filled with more organised and competitive forces.

After securing the majority in the Egyptian Parliament and winning the presidential elections, the Muslim Brotherhood used these victories to consolidate its power and expand the rule of sharia law, doing so under the military’s supervision. Even after the election of Morsi, when he made moves aiming at undercutting influence of the military,
the latter appeared to be much stronger and demonstrated its control of the situation.

It could be argued that President Morsi tried to reduce the military's influence in the political sphere and establish a more transparent and democratic regime in Egypt, and if he'd had more time he would have succeeded. At first glance, this appears to be the case. Morsi had started removing the remaining elements of Mubarak’s inner circle—old generals like Minister of Defence Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, Chief of Staff Sami Enan, General Intelligence Director Mourad Mouwafi, and others. By doing so, Morsi got quite a positive reaction from the public on the wave of anti-Mubarak sentiments.

In fact, it turned out that he tried to get younger members of the military on his side by promoting them to the positions of their predecessors. Basically, Morsi intended to make an alliance with the military to secure their support and get control over the coercive apparatus. He also tried to promote Brotherhood members and sympathisers to important political posts, consolidate power and push a conservative Islamic agenda (it must not be forgotten that Morsi is tied to the conservative wing of the Muslim Brotherhood). In fact, Morsi declared his assumption of full constitutional power, causing strong resentment among both the general public and elites.

This attempt to push an Islamic agenda and strip the military of power ultimately failed when popular demonstrations against the Muslim Brotherhood erupted. The military could not allow anyone to question their political and economic standing in the system and stepped in, siding with the people, basically implementing a coup. The Muslim Brotherhood’s attempt to dominate the political arena and overpower the army failed. In addition, the inability of the Muslim Brotherhood to deliver a viable economic plan also contributed to their ultimate failure.

After anti-Islamists protests and coup of 2013, the military took hard steps against Islamists. They outlawed the Muslim Brotherhood on 25 December 2013. They declared it a terrorist group, criminalised all its activities—including its financing and membership in the organisation—launched a demonization campaign and severe repressions against its members. The military understood that the Muslim Brotherhood was a dangerous opponent with the ability to generate public support throughout the country via its vast grassroots activity.
In fact, the Muslim Brotherhood could eventually undermine the power of the military, hence Egypt’s security. Moreover, the historical rivalry and hostile relations between the military and Islamists in Egypt also contributed to the army’s decision to outlaw it. However, such decision has mixed results. On the one hand, it created better conditions for the formation and rise of more cohesive secular liberal parties and political organisations—albeit, under the close control from the state. On the other hand, it marginalised a powerful actor supported by a large swath of Egyptians, as the majority of Muslim Brotherhood support comes from the rural population, which makes up to 57% of the country. Another negative consequence is that the MB’s exclusion from politics could turn them toward terrorism and sympathies to radical Islamist groups in the region that are currently on the rise.

Here lies the paradox: an uprising which topples an authoritarian leader, but subsequent developments do not satisfy expectations of the active, liberal (but relatively weak) revolutionary forces. In fact, even using democratic tools—such as fair elections—undemocratic forces can come to power. This is what ultimately occurred in Egypt. The liberal democratic forces that initiated the uprising, and were at its heart, could not secure the results of their revolutionary achievement.

**Drawbacks of Modernisation**

Even if revolutions happen to succeed, those who were at the heart of them often do not become the victors. More often, the groups that were excluded from political activity under the former regime (the Muslim Brotherhood, Salafis), use their superior organisational capacity and considerable grassroots activity to come to power. The youth movement which was at the heart of the Egyptian protests in 2011 was leaderless and lacked organisational and political experience to create lasting and broad coalition, including with elites; this led to its marginal involvement in subsequent political life. At the same time, more organised actors whose role in the protests was minor (the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafis) took advantage of the new political opportunities. As a result, the Muslim Brotherhood came to power through democratic elections, getting about two-thirds of the Parliament seats and winning the presidential chair.
According to Russian philosopher Nicholas Berdyaev ‘all revolutions end up with reactions. It is inevitable, it is the law.’ World history has demonstrated that the sustainability of democratic achievement heavily depends on the degree to which a society is modernised, its cultural traditions, the external environment, etc. This is why countries with high socio-cultural and economic levels, which have already travelled the thorny path to democracy, experience revolutions (or revolutionary reforms) that result in quite stable democratic regimes. Two good examples are the Portuguese revolution of 1974 and the revolution in Czechoslovakia in 1989. Those revolutions were predominantly non-bloody and happened in short periods of time. On the contrary, if a society is not modernised enough and has a high illiteracy rate, a larger rural population, a strong influence of traditionalists, low status of women, absence of democratic experience and idealisation of democracy—and where all parties are not ready to behave according to democratic rules when they lose elections—then Berdyaev’s law comes into play and the way to democracy becomes extremely difficult. It also should be noted that if the forces which form the core of the regime are strong they hinder democratic transformation. This can lead to either violence, or a military coup which will return a country to authoritarianism.

A country needs to have certain degree of social, economic and cultural development to pave the ground to the democratic development. In fact, the modernisation of big countries never goes evenly. As a result, a modernising country may have a modernised ‘centre’ and a poorly modernised conservative rural ‘periphery,’ where the majority of the population lives. This is the case in Egypt. That is why the (more or less educated) revolutionary youth who initiated the demonstrations ultimately lost their leadership position. The language and rhetoric of the Muslim Brotherhood were closer to big parts of the population, and their grassroots decades-long activity could not be challenged by anyone except the state. As a result, the Muslim Brotherhood high-jacked the outcome of the Egyptian uprising. However, when the public became dissatisfied with Islamic rule and the performance of the Brotherhood, Egyptians again took to the streets. In this situation, the most organised, cohesive and experienced force in Egypt—the military—stepped in to prevent chaos and oversee a smooth transition.
Conclusion

The Egyptian uprising, in fact, appeared to be a failed revolution, because those who initiated it failed to secure power⁷² and pave the ground for qualitative change in political and socio-economic structures of the regime.

This work examined two Egyptian uprisings, 2011 and 2013 and it explained the crucial role the Egyptian military plays in the political system, being the most cohesive, experienced and respected force in the country. Egyptian military is a robust institution with a big stake in Egyptian political and economic life which did not lose the trust in the efficiency of the existing system. Unlike in 1952, the uprising of 2011 did not change the country’s political elite; the country did not start a ‘new life.’

The comparative case of the Tunisian and Egyptian militaries demonstrated how the different nature and role of the military in each state’s system hugely contributed to the outcome of the uprising and the transition which followed. The example of the Tunisian military confirms that an army which is excluded from the political and economic life of a state is less opposed to the change of the existing regime. On the contrary, the Egyptian military was one of the main obstacles to a fundamental regime change.

Another important factor that contributed to the failure of the Egyptian revolution is that the country was not ready for change. There was no cohesive secular political force with solid governmental experience (except the army and former NDP bureaucrats). The army’s power over political and economic institutions allowed it to maintain its strength and fiscal health. The Egyptian military successfully maintained international support networks that secured additional financial assistance and political support. The weakness of the revolutionary forces, and the military’s failure to create a more competitive political space (by creating coalition with liberal forces, for instance), made it extremely difficult for secular-liberal forces to compete with the Islamists.

Another condition for successful revolution – large coalitions of revolutionary groups and elites as challengers – was not at place. Successful coalitions might take various forms and involve different actors as long as they are sufficiently broad and cross-cutting of social cleavages.⁷³ In Egypt such coalition failed to be born as large, most influential and capable part of Egyptian elites was not interested in changing substance of the existing system, although it agreed to change its form.
Egypt’s political elite, a product of the Mubarak regime, has remained in power, creating just a façade vision of joining the revolution but in fact staying aside, guarding the system.

The failure of the Muslim Brotherhood to manage the country in such a critical period, when peoples’ expectations were extraordinarily high, led to mass dissatisfaction and another call for change. Although the Brotherhood was the most organised political force, they did not have governing experience or the capacity to implement meaningful political and economic reforms. Besides, they did not control Egypt’s coercive apparatus and did not have rigid support from foreign actors that could assist them in holding power. Eventually, Egypt had returned to its pre-2011 state when the same elites with an authoritarian leader in power govern the country.

As a result of the uprising of 2011, the political figurehead is different, but the political system, and the economic power is in the same hands, meaning that the regime is still in place. In countries like Egypt, revolutions often do not reflect the desires of those who initiated them, do not usually succeed and do not necessarily lead to democracy or pave the ground for moving towards more democratic development. With such a robust military, Egypt is unlikely to undertake the fundamental political and economic reforms necessary to move it towards democratic change in the near future. Although they have allotted more space for secular-liberal political groups (by banning the Brotherhood), the military remains in control of the entire Egyptian political system and this is unlikely to change anytime soon. However, the need for experienced cadres who can manage a massive reformation of the Egyptian economy will force the existing regime to cooperate with technocrats. This allows for the slight possibility of a slow transition to a technocratic government—although under the condition that the economic position of the military would remain unshakable. Either way, Egypt would experience more political turmoil.

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Notes


10 Theda Skocpol (1979), States and Social Revolutions, Cambridge University Press, p.4.


12 Such findings were made in several works:

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The stability of socio-political systems and the risks of destabilisation in the process of political transformation are among the most important issues of social development; the transition to democracy may pose a serious threat to the stability of a respective socio-political system. This article studies the issue of democratisation. It highlights the high economic and social costs of a rapid transition to democracy for countries unprepared for it—democracy resulting from revolutions or similar large-scale events. The authors believe that in a number of cases authoritarian regimes turn out to be more effective in economic and social terms than emerging democracies, especially those of a revolutionary type, which are often incapable of ensuring social order and may have a swing to authoritarianism. Effective authoritarian regimes can also be a suitable form of transition to an efficient and stable democracy. Using historical and contemporary examples, particularly the recent events in Egypt, the article investigates various correlations between revolutionary events and the possibility of establishing democracy in a society.

Keywords: democracy, revolution, extremists, counterrevolution, Islamists, authoritarianism, military takeover, economic efficiency, globalisation, Egypt
Introduction

It is not surprising that in five years none of the revolutions of the Arab Spring has solved any urgent issues. Unfortunately, this was probably never a possibility. Various studies suggest a link between revolutions and the degree of modernisation of a society.¹ Our research reveals that the very processes of modernisation, regardless of the level of consumption and the rate of population growth, is closely and organically linked to the risk of social and political upheaval, which can easily escalate into devastating revolutions and civil wars.² Therefore, cases of crisis-free development in the context of modernisation and an exit from the Malthusian trap should be considered exceptions that need special explanations. True revolutions often occur in economically successful or even very successful modernising societies. However, this very success leads other, less economically successful, less modernised societies to have unrealistic expectations, which then become the ideological basis for social upheaval. In the 2010s, the situation in such countries as Egypt and Tunisia followed this model.

Revolution and Reaction

The mood in Egypt in July 2013 was exultant. The revolutionaries were jubilant and their slogans demanded true democracy. They were triumphant because the Egyptian military had ousted the legitimate democratically-elected President.

Paradoxically, the Muslim Brotherhood’s post-revolutionary political rhetoric sounded incomparably more advanced than their secularist opponents’ archaic ideology. The secularists, as well as the military backing them, identified “the people” (in an absolutely archaic manner) with the crowd in Tahrir Square, while the Brotherhood appealed to formal legitimate democratic procedures. Why were the revolutionaries excited with the overthrow of the legitimately elected President? What was this? An absurdity? A paradox? A peculiarity of Egypt? In fact, it is simply a common outcome of revolutionary events. Thus, the major issue to be discussed is whether revolution and democracy are always closely related. ‘Every revolution ends in reaction. It is inevitable, it is a law’ wrote Berdyaev, who further explored this idea through serious intellectual efforts and personal political experience.³ Berdyaev, of course, was limited by the early 20th century context and the past and the present century have shown that the stability of the democrat-
ic accomplishments of a given revolution depends largely on the phase of society’s transition to modernisation and on its cultural traditions. Successful democratic revolutions tend to occur in countries with a high level of socio-cultural and economic development, and where a long period of fascination with, and disappointment in, democracy has already occurred (including cycles of democracy and authoritarianism). After such revolutions stable democratic regimes are more likely. Some examples are the 1974 Carnation Revolution in Portugal and the 1989 Velvet Revolution in the former Czechoslovakia. These revolutions were largely non-violent and proceeded rather quickly.

The history of such political overthrows starts in England, with the Glorious Revolution of 1688, though recent decades of human history have witnessed a large number of them. If a society is not properly modernised (re: demography)—if illiteracy is high, if the rural population constitutes a large percentage of the total population, if the strong influence of traditionalists is present, etc.—Berdyaev’s law, that a revolution will transform into a reaction, will likely come true. After some time, the idea of democracy can again start generating a new revolutionary explosion. Still, there are many historical examples of democracy and authoritarianism alternating many times. It should be noted that in less-modernised societies, a revolution faces large-scale challenges, and its intensity can provoke a strong resistance. Extending his idea, Berdyaev wrote: ‘The more violent and radical is a revolution, the stronger is the reaction. The alternation of revolutions and reactions makes a mysterious circle.’ A typical example here is China, which after the first revolution in its modern history—the democratic Xinhai Revolution of 1911—yielded to Yuan Shikai’s dictatorship. Many times attempts were made to restore democratic institutions, but China eventually plunged into long-lasting anarchy and civil war.

The path to stable and sustainable democracy is rather long and complicated. In any case, it requires a certain minimum level of economic, social and cultural development. Apart from a few known exceptions, liberal democracy, as a rule, will not endure long in countries with a largely illiterate population and a large rural population with low living standards. Modernisation in relatively large countries always proceeds unevenly. As a result, in modernising countries a rather modernised ‘core’ is formed, while the periphery (where the majority of the population lives) remains rather weakly modernised
and prone to conservatism. Revolutionaries, who claim to care for the people, typically grow disappointed in the people and the people's conservatism, particularly when the people start voting in a way that is different from the liberals’ and radicals’ expectations. This segment of the population often prefers order, stability and familiar forms of structure to some unfamiliar political ideology. Moreover, they prefer the material and concrete to some ethereal freedom.

The stability of democracy does not depend on the extent to which a constitution is democratic, but on how political institutions and actors adapt to each other and are ready to play the game. French sociologist Raymond Aron notes in his study *Democracy and Totalitarianism* that 'stability and efficiency are supported not by the constitutional rules as such, but by their harmony with the party system, with the nature of parties, their programs and political conceptions.' This naturally takes much time to achieve. Similar ideas on the high standards to be applied to a society, its leaders and bureaucracy were also explored by Joseph Schumpeter.

Thus, the people (or the majority of the people) can eventually and unconsciously betray the ideals of a revolution and the very notion of democracy. On the other hand, the populace's sensible pragmatism can prove wiser than the educated, radical, revolutionary minority's lofty ideals and aspirations. When people choose a leader by intuition—a leader with all his drawbacks, vices and egoism—they generally choose a moderate and more appropriate course for the country. At the same time, as we witness today in some Middle Eastern countries, it can happen that even the revolutionary minority itself can give up on democratic principles. Thus, the conservative majority can turn out to be more democratically-oriented. This is not surprising. As already stated, in the process of modernisation, a country's core is modernised more quickly and thus, the urban 'liberal-revolutionary' minority is surrounded by the conservative—though not necessarily 'counter-revolutionary'—majority in the provinces. The increasing adherence to democracy on the side of the conservative, 'reactionary' majority is quite natural, as with fair elections their preferred candidates have a good chance of coming to power through an absolutely democratic procedure.

Meanwhile, among the revolutionary, 'progressive' minority, the adherence to democratic ideals is often undermined when fair elections end with the defeat of their chosen candidates.
Even in societies where democracy appears restricted through the manipulation of the ‘party in power,’ quite a large part of the populace, perhaps even the majority, stays loyal to that power. Though they may be discontented in some respects, they remain conservative. The rulers can win even fair elections, but certainly in less dramatic fashion than they win rigged elections in which they garner 80-90% of votes. In theory, the incumbent party could do without election fraud, but this is how the system of ‘controlled democracy’ functions. It forces local authorities to demonstrate their loyalty, because, to an authoritarian ruler, a slight or moderate majority at elections appears to be a show of no confidence.

As to the correlation between revolution and democracy, Lenin once stated that ‘the key question of every revolution is undoubtedly the question of state power.’ In the early stages of modernisation, revolutionaries who are too devoted to their initial slogans inevitably fail, because their appeals, although attractive and inspiring to the masses, are still unrealisable under existing conditions. According to the logic of revolution, this is what makes the revolutionaries in power ignore democracy or even suppress it—as when the Bolsheviks dismissed the Russian Constituent Assembly. This continues the escalation of violence. In some cases, those who are too devoted to democratic revolutionary ideals are substituted (in a non-democratic or, less frequently, a democratic way) by those who are less democracy-driven but are more prone to radicalism. The French Revolution of 1789–1799 and the ascendance of Napoleon serves as a classic example.

Pitirim Sorokin, who studied the history and typology of multiple revolutions in the ancient world, pointed out that famine and/or war often trigger a revolution. In Greek poleis and Roman civitates, intense socio-political struggle between citizens for power and rights was much more frequent than peaceful periods. Lenin also considered the ‘aggravation of the masses’ as one of the main attributes of the revolutionary situation. However, current research presents different findings: Revolutions are often preceded by a rather long period of rising living standards. Such growth, however, often increases social inequality and stratification. This increases social tensions in a society and brings to life the idea that the living standard achieved by a part of population should become the majority’s property. At the same time, the modernisation of society allows a stratum of intellectuals to form who strive for higher living standards; students and recent graduates
are its ‘striking force.’ Naturally, the number of lucrative positions ade-
quate to their education level is always limited.

It is an important aspect of revolution theory that excessive expec-
tations emerge when the growth of living standards fails to meet the
expectations of the majority of the population. Increasing inequality
and violent breaches of common justice on the part of men in pow-
er further fuels public discontent. The most volatile situation arises
when, after a period of substantial growth, there happens to be an in-
terruption. This is often not the fault of the authorities; the path to
modernisation is never entirely smooth. However, when this happens,
people’s expectations—including those of the elite—continue to grow
by inertia, while the actual satisfaction level experienced by the major-
ity decreases (the so-called Davies’ J-Curve). As a result, the gap be-
tween expectations and satisfaction reaches a critical level and triggers
a social explosion. In respect to Egypt, this refers both to the Mubarak
and Morsi eras. Immediately after the January 25 Revolution, metrop-
olitan citizens’ expectations grew immensely while their satisfaction
drastically declined. This brought the ‘difference of potentials,’ which,
in many ways, led to the dismissal of the first democratically elected
President of Egypt. The same ‘difference of potentials’ may also turn
fatal for subsequent Egyptian regimes.

In what way is all this related to democracy? First, democracy can
become the opposition’s key idea, a magic wand that is thought to
solve all social problems.

The natural implication is that democracy is a system that will inev-
itably move the “right leaders,” the oppositionists, to power. When a
rigid regime is in power, especially a non-democratic or power-
 usurping regime, overthrowing it becomes a goal in itself. The regime em-
odies society’s every evil, and it is believed that these evils will then
disappear with the fall of the regime. The regime is seen as having no
positive, valuable or advanced characteristics. Anything positive that
may have occurred during the regime’s tenure is thought to have oc-
curred spontaneously and revolutionaries naturally assume that any
positive developments would have been even more positive had the
regime not been in place, suppressing all that is good.

However, in spite of the frustration that is widespread in society, the
ideals of democracy actually penetrate only a small minority of minds. For most people, who have a limited cultural intelligence and relative-
ly narrow vital problems, ‘democracy’ is a mere word (or something

Revolution and Democracy
established by someone but not necessary for the population to take part in). Under certain circumstances, the ideology-driven minority can attract the majority which is indifferent to democracy (but not to personal problems), and there can arise a revolutionary situation. But from this point it is a long way to a strong democracy.

There can be no doubt that the revolutionaries’ activity, their good organisation, propaganda and persistence can play a great part in elections. Still, their effectiveness is less than it was when they, the revolutionaries, were organising anti-government meetings and actions. Outcries do not lead to an easy victory. The defeat of revolutionaries is caused to a great extent by their internal disagreements, which might seem insignificant to an outside observer but are crucial to the parties themselves. As a result, democratic elections, for whose sake the revolution was actually undertaken, seem to bring victory to conservative forces. Then comes the moment of truth. Revolutionaries must ask themselves: What is more important? Democratic ideals or revolution itself? It becomes a question of whether the revolutionaries truly seek democracy or merely want to see constant overthrows and the escalation of changes in society.

This challenge is solved in different ways by different parties in different countries and situations. Some political forces are unable to reconsider the situation and to diverge from their absolutes. Thus, the Mensheviks during the Civil War in Russia hesitated to join either the Whites or the Bolsheviks, disappearing as a political force by 1922. Quite frequently, however, revolution is undertaken for the sake of rather vague revolutionary principles and, ultimately, the desire for power becomes of utmost importance.

In recent decades, in any situation where radicals have overthrown a government and their own party loses the subsequent elections, the elections are assumed to have been fixed. Thereafter, the revolutionaries insist on using force. ‘Colour revolutions’ in post-Soviet states, Serbia and other countries are a good example of this phenomenon. Democracy becomes of lesser importance than defeating the opponent at any cost.

Revolution, as any type of politics, is hardly a fair fight. Provocations, disinformation, deceit and backstage dealings are what it takes to succeed. Enmity towards government and opponents is often stirred up through direct or indirect murder (shooting from within a crowd or something of this kind) which can lead to the escalation of violence,
the formation of military guards, etc. Violence and intimidation then become the norm. Consequently, the violation of democracy is not considered something terrible. This logic is quite clear and explicable and it is at this point where revolution and democracy diverge. In short, a society with uncertain democratic values operates on the following principle: ‘We will support democracy if our candidate wins elections. If he does not, we do not need such a democracy.’ The ability to lose elections, to acknowledge the value of the rules of the democratic game, to wait for the next elections and to work hard to win—these are the essential signs of social readiness for democracy.

Why Do the Pathways of Democracy and Revolution Often Diverge?

Since revolutions often occur in societies unprepared for democracy, it often happens that at early and intermediate stages of modernisation the pathways of democracy and revolution eventually diverge. Their conjunction at relatively early stages is the exception rather than the rule. As previously stated, some exceptions include the ‘velvet revolutions’ in Czechoslovakia and some other Eastern European countries, the Glorious Revolution in England and the Carnation Revolution in Portugal. Of course, it would be highly desirable for all revolutions to follow the same scenario. However, at the initial stages of modernisation this can be hardly realised, as ‘velvet’ revolutions typically occur at the end of a long-lasting social and political development.

Political opponents can make more-or-less active attempts to turn the revolution to their advantage through reduction, renunciation or abolition of democratic procedures and institutions that were established during the revolution. Sometimes they succeed. In all cases, these attempts produce some effect—often the effect is a dramatic aggravation of the conflict. Thus, the genuine and full-scale democracy that the revolution is striving to achieve soon starts to contradict both the real purposes of revolution and other political goals and conditions. Democratically elected authorities, or even a transitional pro-democratic government, are either overthrown or separated—in full or in part—from democracy, transforming into a pseudo-democratic organization like England’s Long Parliament. One should also keep in mind that the key issue of revolution is always one of power.
Democracy is acceptable so long as it supports the domination of the most powerful group, party, social stratum, etc.

A large-scale and omnipotent democracy is not the typical outcome of a revolution. Due to the lack of necessary institutions and the inability (of some) to live according to democratic laws—and to the fact that revolution is always a struggle between opposing forces involving huge masses of people—in the revolutionary and post-revolutionary period pure democracy is reduced and transformed in differing ways and degrees, depending on a society’s peculiarities, results of political struggle and other factors. In societies that are ready for democracy and where modernisation has been completed, this can be an insignificant reduction—for example, the prohibition to propose a candidate from among the former members of communist parties. It is worth noting that universal suffrage, taken as a model today, was not legalised in a day and there were often prerequisites to voting. Even in the US, whose comprehensive democracy fascinated Alexis de Tocqueville so much in 1831, democracy was not perfect. Native Americans, African Americans and women, among others, were deprived of voting rights. Moreover, presidential elections were not direct. In 1831 in Great Britain, the cradle of modern democracy, only a small percentage of population had the right to vote. In 1789 in France, the part of the Estates-General, which first called themselves the National Assembly and then the National Constituent Assembly, passed many important laws regarding the electoral process. But one should remember that these election rules had little, if anything, to do with current notions of democracy.

Just as an embryo passes through certain stages of development, non-democratic societies go through stages of evolution on the path to democracy, associated with democracy’s limitations. However, in many cases democracy is limited, because it fails to function to its fullest extent due to the above-mentioned reasons. In the course of a revolution, these restrictions can be associated with attempts to secure political advantage; with revolutionary and counterrevolutionary violence (both of which can be observed in Egypt); with the activity of a powerful ideological or any other type of centre (for example, in Iran); with a dictatorial body; with the introduction of property or political qualifications; with assassination or arrest of the opposition’s leaders (as occurred in Egypt recently); with the curtailment of free speech; with the formation of repressive unconstitutional bodies; etc.
The post-revolutionary regime also tends to either restrict democracy or merely imitate it. In the contemporary world, some common ways of limiting democracy are the falsification of election results, the repression of political opponents (a recent example is Ukraine, where one of the opposition political leaders was imprisoned) and constitutional and legal tricks (Russia provides remarkable examples). There are some peculiar cases, such as Iran, when there is a non-democratic force, constitutional or unconstitutional, which enjoys supreme authority. The most widespread method, however, is still the military coup or attempts at revolutionary overthrow (Georgia and Kyrgyzstan provide numerous examples). Military forces step in when a democratic government decays or degrades or when a state reaches an impasse. On the other hand, the military also cannot remain in power indefinitely, or even for very long, without legalising the regime. At some point, they must hand over authority to the civilian community and hold elections.

Thus, the general political course of modernising societies follows the democratic trend, increasingly approaching the ideal, though the path getting there can be severe and painful. Development can remain incomplete, oscillating within the controlled quasi-democratic system. In Egypt, for example, the last presidential election, held 26-28 May 2014, was much less democratic than the previous one, as the Muslim Brotherhood had been proclaimed a terrorist organization.

‘Democracy is the worst form of government, except for all the others,’ Winston Churchill once said. For societies just embarking on the path to democracy, the first phrase is of utmost importance. Democracy has numerous drawbacks, though mature democratic societies have found ways to mitigate them. In young democracies, however, these drawbacks can become severe. Acquiring immunity against such ‘infantile diseases’ of democracy is a long and painful process. As a result, a society can become unstable (as in the case with lack of immunity against private property and free markets—rather egoistic institutions if they are not restricted). It is clear that the introduction of formally democratic institutions is absolutely insufficient, because, despite including multi-party elections, they often conceal or even legitimise the actual existence of authoritarian rule.22

In conclusion, we should note that the transition from an authoritarian regime to democracy occurs in three main ways: through a revolution (quickly, from below); a military takeover or coup d’état; or
a reformation (gradually, from above). In previous epochs, the reformative way was almost impossible, so the path to democracy was paved by revolutions and counterrevolutions. Still, some rather successful examples of a reformatory transition to democracy—or at least steps in a democratic direction—can be observed as early as in the 19th century. For example, in Japan, the parliament was established from above in 1889. In Germany, Otto Bismarck introduced full male suffrage in 1867, while in Prussia the election system proper was established by the Revolution of 1848. Some Latin American states experienced transitions from military dictatorship to democracy, though democracy was never firmly established in this region, barring a few exceptions. However, in the 20th century, especially in its last decades, we can find numerous examples of the voluntary dismantling of authoritarian and totalitarian regimes by the military or other dictatorships. This occurred largely as a consequence of globalisation. Examples include Spain, Chile and other Latin American countries, South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia and the USSR. Some significant steps towards democratisation were also made by the Arab monarchic states. Paradoxical at first sight, on the eve of the Arab Spring, most Arab monarchies appeared much more democratic than the majority of Arab republics.

Such a non-revolutionary transition to democracy, *ceteris paribus*, can turn out to be more direct and secure. This is especially important in societies where there is no significant positive correlation between democratic government and GDP growth rates. In authoritarian states higher GDP growth rates are more likely than in young democracies—let alone in post-revolutionary systems—and in the context of modernisation, economic growth rates are of crucial importance.

**Democracy, Revolution and Counterrevolution in Egypt**

**An Analysis of Conflicting Forces**

Our young Egyptian friends (a sort of ‘leftist liberal group of revolutionaries’) consider the post 3 July events in their country to be ‘counterrevolution.’ We tend to agree with them—except on one important point.

Almost by definition, revolutionaries regard the ‘counterrevolution’ as something unequivocally negative, whereas we believe that the present-day political regime has serious positive aspects. (Although, there is no doubt that its formation has led in the last two years to the
significant growth of authoritarian tendencies.) It may fairly be termed a ‘counterrevolution,’ as it returned to power the very same military, economic and bureaucratic elite that had ruled the country before the 2011 Revolution. However, as we have already demonstrated, this elite had ruled Egypt in a quite effective way. In the years preceding the revolution, they rather successfully (especially, against the global background) helped further the economic and social development of the country.

However, it would be quite wrong to say that Egypt has returned to precisely the state it was in before the revolution. Some newly emerging features are contributing very evidently to regime destabilisation. Foremost among these is the radicalisation of the Muslim Brotherhood coupled with the emergence of their very strong media support in the form of Al Jazeera’s satellite channel, Mubasher Misr.

The revolution in 2011 was able to achieve a rather easy victory due to the following two points: First, it was a very much a conflict among the elite—a factor that is important for the success of revolutions in general and one that was especially important for the success of all the Arab revolutions of 2011. It was primarily a conflict between the military (‘the old guard’) and the economic elite (‘the young guard’), a group of leading Egyptian businessmen headed by Gamal Mubarak. Since 2004, the government had been implementing rather effective economic reforms that led to the significant acceleration of economic growth in Egypt. The military was frightened by the ascent of the ‘young guard,’ who controlled the economic bloc of the Egyptian government. Over the past few decades, the Egyptian military has not limited its focus to security matters and has acquired valuable real estate and numerous industries. The military elite controlled (and still controls) not only the Egyptian armed forces, but also a major part of the Egyptian economy. This includes large tracts of land; various real estate; petrol stations; construction and transportation enterprises; and various factories that produce not only military supplies and weapons, but also goods such as TV sets, refrigerators, spaghetti, olive oil, shoe cream and so on. Estimates of the share of the Egyptian economy controlled by the military range between 10 and 40 per cent.

Before the events of 2011, Egyptian officers expressed concern about President Mubarak’s plan to appoint his son Gamal as his successor. Many believed that if Gamal took office, he would implement privatisation policies that would dismantle the military’s business hold-
Indeed, there was reason to expect that in the event that Gamal Mubarak did come to power, the leading Egyptian businessmen from his circle would establish effective control over the generals’ economic empire. This would be rather easy to justify due to the military’s ineffective and exploitive handling of their economic assets.

The conflict among the Egyptian elite allows us to understand some events of the Egyptian Revolution that may look mysterious at first glance. For example, throughout the revolution, the army quite rigorously guarded all official buildings, effectively blocking the protesters’ attempts to seize them. However, already on the first days of the revolution (on 28 and 29 January 2011) the army allowed the protestors to seize, demolish and burn the headquarters of the National Democratic Party, the ruling party of Mubarak’s Egypt. On closer inspection it does not seem so strange, as the real head of this party was none other than Gamal Mubarak; thus, the military elite delivered a strong blow upon its archenemy using the hands of the protestors.

It is still rather fashionable to interpret the Egyptian events of January and February 2011 as a sort of ‘confrontation between the masses of revolutionary people and the repressive authoritarian regime.’ However, through this lens, one could hardly understand the enigmatic (but extremely famous) ‘Battle of the Camel,’ in which a motley crew of cameleers—workers of tourist services operating in the Pyramids area and engaged in renting horses and camels to tourists—attempted to disperse the Tahrir protesters. The cameleers attacked the protesters while riding camels and horses, which, incidentally, rendered an exotic colour to the events of 2 February and to the revolution in general. However, if this was indeed ‘the confrontation of popular masses and the repressive authoritarian regime,’ why was it necessary for the authoritarian regime to employ such strange, amateurish figures instead of a professional repressive apparatus?

On 2 February, Tahrir protesters were confronted not by a professional repressive apparatus controlled by the ‘old guard,’ which took the position of friendly neutrality toward the protesters, but by a semi-criminal element employed by the economic elite to counteract the protesters, who were demanding the removal of Gamal Mubarak.

Thus, already in early February 2011, the protesters in Tahrir were being countered not by the authoritarian state, but by a clique of ultra-rich businessmen who did not control the repressive apparatus. This accounts, to a considerable extent, for the easy ‘victory of the rev-
olutionary masses.’ The second point that secured the unexpectedly swift success of the protestors was the formation of an unexpectedly wide opposition alliance, which united in a single rather coordinat-
ed front of diverse forces, including not only all the possible secular opposition groups—liberals, leftists, nationalists and so on—but also Islamists, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood.

The situation that we observe now is exactly the opposite. First, the Egyptian Revolution made the Egyptian economic elite reconcile with the military, and in June 2013 they acted together in a well-coordinated front that allowed for a swift overthrow of President Morsi, whereas no serious cracks in the new coalition between the Egyptian military and the economic elite (which was formed in the first half of 2013) are visible yet. The economic elite understand that, for them, it would be extremely counterproductive to continue any serious attempts to get hold of any economic assets controlled by the military; it is much bet-
ter for them to recognize the dominant position of the military in the ruling bloc, as well as the immunity and inviolability of the generals’ economic empire (sometimes through direct constitutional amend-
ments). The economic elite realise that any serious attempts on their part to get the dominant position in the ruling bloc may result in los-
ing incomparably more than what they might gain.

Second, the revolution and the subsequent counterrevolution led to an extremely deep split in the January 2011 opposition ‘macro-alliance.’ It is important to understand that this split took place along many lines. Within this macro-alliance, even the Islamist alliance was split, as the 3 July coup was supported by the second strongest Islamist party, the Islamist fundamentalists Hizb al-Noor, as well as by a number of prominent Islamic figures outside of it. Of course, the support of a sec-
ularist-military regime by the Egyptian Salafi Islamists needs special commentary. A special commentary is also needed to explain why, in July 2013, the archconservative Islamist Saudi Arabian regime acted as a faithful ally of an anti-Islamist alliance that included an exception-
ally wide range of forces—liberals, nationalists, leftists, ultraleftists and even Trotskyists. The main point here appears to be that Saudi Arabia acts as the main financial sponsor of Hizb al-Noor; addition-
ally, the Muslim Brotherhood pose a real threat to the Saudi regime.

In 1937 in the USSR, it was much less dangerous to proclaim oneself a Slavophil than a Trotskyist (declaring oneself a Trotskyist in 1937 was a good way to get immediately executed), whereas for non-Marxists the
difference between Stalinists and Trotskyists might look entirely insignificant. Similarly, for the Saudis, Trotskyists are a sort of unreal exotics, whereas the Muslim Brotherhood present a more realistic threat, being leftist Islamists who effectively question the basic legitimacy of the regime and may even take concrete steps to overthrow it. Against such a background, one can easily understand the readiness of Saudi Arabia to ally with anybody—anti-Islamist liberals and Communists, the Egyptian military and economic elite—in order to weaken a homeland enemy that threatens the very survival of the Arabian monarchies.

On the other hand, for the Egyptian Salafis, the removal of the Muslim Brotherhood from the legal political arena was objectively advantageous (irrespective of any connections with the Saudi interests), as it allowed them to significantly strengthen their own position as the primary legal Islamist party of the country. The secular leftist-liberal alliance has also been split, as the majority of its members were very frightened by a year Muslim Brotherhood rule; that is why they continue to support the present regime. However, the forces that continue to oppose the regime remain deeply split as well, as the anti-regime leftist liberal-revolutionary youth still consider any alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood out of the question. One of the youths’ main slogans translates as: ‘Down, down with all those who betrayed, be they military or Muslim Brothers!’

We believe that new revolutionary paradoxes in Egypt will continue to emerge. Revolutionary events often assume a paradoxical character. Revolutionary repressions often turn against those who were meant to benefit from the revolution. Those whose names were on banners when overthrowing the old power, often join the counter-revolutionary camp in masses. Zealous monarchists and the henchmen of authoritarianism suddenly turn into democrats, while those who considered democracy their highest value are ready to establish a dictatorship.

**Conclusion**

Revolutions have been observed for many centuries. The history of some regions, such as the Hellenistic states, Ancient Rome and many Eastern countries, can be presented in political terms as a struggle between social and political groups for the distribution of resources and power. Only from the early modern period, however, did revo-
olutions become one of the major driving forces of historical processes. Advanced modernisation and profound transformations of society are usually associated with major social and political revolutions, such as have occurred in Britain, France, other European countries, North America and, later, in other parts of the world. Starting in the modern era, most revolutions have been underpinned by seriously disproportional development, which occurs as the result of rapid modernisation. These disproportions become even larger due to rapid population growth and a sharply increasing share of urban population and youth, which further social tension.

Our study of a number of developmental models, applied to different countries in different epochs, shows that regardless of consumption level and population growth rate, the processes of modernisation are intrinsically linked to social and political cataclysms, such as revolutions and outbreaks of violence. That is why one should consider cases of crisis-free development in the course of modernisation, and escape from the Malthusian trap, as exceptional rather than typical. Revolutions frequently occur in economically successful or even very successful societies. However, this very success leads to unrealistic expectations, which then become the ideological basis for other revolutions, as evidenced by the recent upheavals in Egypt and Tunisia.

With the acceleration of historical processes, the number of revolutions has increased. The 20th century witnessed many. Being quite familiar with the theory of revolutions, Lenin noted that the basic issue of any revolution is power. Even the most legitimate change of any political regime, be it monarchical or democratic, inevitably leads to considerable breakdowns in the functioning of administrative and political mechanisms. However, revolutionary overthrows cause much more dramatic breakdowns of a system’s functioning, often bringing unpredictable consequences. In general, revolutions are, and have always been, a disruptive and devastating way of forging social progress.

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Notes

1 See, for example, Samuel P. Huntington (1968), Political Order in Changing Societies, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.


3 Nikolay Berdyaev (1990), The Philosophy of Inequality, Moscow: Ima-Press. In Russian, p. 29; see also Ted Robert Gurr (1988), ‘War, revolution and the growth of the coercive state,’ Comparative Political Studies 21, pp. 45–65.

4 In addition, scholars also tend to characterise as such some other revolutions/revolutionary reforms in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and the early 1990s, the 1986 Revolution in the Philippines, as well as the revolutionary reforms in South Africa in the early 1990s: ‘Until very recently, revolutions have invariably failed to produce democracy. The need to consolidate a new regime in the face of struggles with domestic and foreign foes has instead produced authoritarian regimes, often in the guise of populist dictatorships such as those of Napoleon, Castro and Mao, or of one party states such as the PRI state in Mexico or the Communist Party-led states of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Indeed, the struggle required to take and hold power in revolutions generally leaves its mark in the militarized and coercive character of new revolutionary regimes (Gurr (1988)). It is therefore striking that in several recent revolutions—in the Philippines in 1986, in South Africa in 1990, in Eastern European nations in 1989–1991—the sudden collapse of the old regime has led directly to new democracies, often against strong expectations of reversion to dictatorship.’ – Jack A. Goldstone (2001), ‘Toward a Fourth Generation of Revolutionary Theory,’ Annual Review of Political Science 4, p. 168; see also John Foran and Jeff Goodwin (1993), ‘Revolutionary outcomes in Iran and Nicaragua: coalition fragmentation, war and the limits of social transformation,’ Theory & Society 22, pp. 209–247; Sasha Weitman (1992), ‘Thinking the revolutions of 1989,’ British Journal of Sociology 43, pp. 13–24; Robert A. Pastor (1991), ‘Preempting revolutions: the boundaries of U.S. influence,’ International Security 15, pp. 54–86.
In a certain sense, even the French Revolution of 1870–1871 fits this model if one excludes the episode with the Paris Commune. At the same time, the experience of a number of successful countries, in particular South Korea and Indonesia (to the degree it can be considered successful at present), show that, at a certain stage of modernisation, authoritarianism may contribute to its expansion. However, in this case it objectively paves the way for its own limitation and consequent political democratisation. For detail see Anatoly Prosorobsky (2009), *A Political leader and Modernization in the East. The experience of Indonesia and South Korea in the Second Half of the 20th Century*, Moscow: imemo ran. In Russian.


9 Berdyaev (1990), p. 29.

10 Both in a particular country and in the world in general. It may seem paradoxical, but in 1990 democratic regimes were established in approximately 45.4 per cent of independent countries of the world—almost the same level as seventy years earlier, in 1922 (Huntington (1993)). On some factors affecting the genesis of democratic institutions see also, e.g., Andrey Korotayev, Dmitry Bondarenko (2000), ‘Polygyny and Democracy: a Cross-Cultural Comparison,’ *Cross-Cultural Research* 34(2), pp. 190–208; Andrey Korotayev (2003), ‘Christianity and Democracy: A Cross-Cultural Study (Afterthoughts),’ *World Cultures* 13(2), pp. 195–212.


14 E.g., Korotayev, Issaev and Zinkina (2015).


18 Davies (1962); see also Leonid Grinin and Andrey Korotayev (2012b), Cycles, Crises and Traps of Modern World-System, Moscow: lki. In Russian.

19 Voting abstention in Russia, even when mass voter turnout could be decisive, is quite a typical example. Moreover, a large number of voters (especially the young) almost immediately upon gaining the right to vote, develop an ideological skepticism. ‘Why vote? What is the use of it? Nothing will ever change. My vote means nothing.’ It seems easy to go and vote, but it is somewhat difficult, as one must make a choice. On the other hand, there is some truth in this skepticism. Some part of the Russian population is accustomed to voting: ‘They say we should, so we will vote.’ This explains how political apathy may, in a democratic way, support certain forces in power.

20 With respect to the Revolutions of 1848 and some other revolutionary events, see Sergey Nefedov (2008), The Component Analysis of Historical Process, Moscow: Territoriya buduschego. In Russian; recent examples can be found in Brazil or Ukraine.

21 An illustrative example is elections in Caucasian territories such as Karachay-Cherkessia and South Ossetia, when the opponents renounce the win of the other party, thus triggering a political crisis.


26 http://mubasher-misr.aljazeera.net/livestream/.

27 E.g., Goldstone (2001).


30 Note that military factories (virtually possessed by Egyptian generals) have a clear competitive advantage, as they can exploit virtually free labor of the conscripts—see, *e.g.*, Sherine Tadros (2012), 'Egypt Military’s Economic Empire,' *Al Jazeera In Depth*, 15 February, available at: <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/02/2012215195912519142.html> (accessed 09 January 2015).


35 See Issaev and Korotayev (2014) for more detail.


NATO and Environmental Security

Understanding the Limits of the Alliance`s Transformation during Détente

Yulia Boguslavskaya

The article explores the founding of NATO’s Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS). The founding of CCMS made NATO—an organisation which was established mainly for territorial defence—deal with the issue of environmental protection. Thus, NATO received, for the first time, a task that was global in its nature and unrelated to its primary traditional concern: the security of its member states. Earlier research has emphasised opposition to the US proposal to establish the committee, which was mounted by the other organisation’s members. Détente is often portrayed as a time when the issues of military confrontation and arms race between two superpowers, the US and the USSR, became less salient, and competition between the two socioeconomic systems became more peaceful. Détente was also a unique period in the Cold War when NATO was the most permissive to large-scale change in order to adapt to new realities of international affairs. At the same time, environmental protection had to essentially be redefined and rebranded in order for NATO to consider it a subject worthy and applicable to its own mission. The architects of CCMS narrowed the concept of environmental security to encompass only the environmental concerns of advanced capitalist societies, which stemmed from their high levels of technological and industrial development; they drew a line between these issues and the ecological problems of the rest of the world. The formation of CCMS was also an element of the
broader process of the development of political consultations in NATO. The understanding of the organisation’s mission and tasks in détente limited the amount of change in NATO brought about by introducing the discourse of environmental security.

**Keywords:** NATO, environmental security, Détente, Cold War

**Introduction**

In November 1969, the Committee on Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS) was established in the structure of NATO. This marked the introduction of NATO’s ‘third’ societal dimension, intended to administer, *inter alia*, the environmental problems of the member states. In the late 1960s, the establishment of a new agency was nothing new for NATO. At its start in 1949, NATO was little more than a treaty of alliance based on *casus foederis* provision, but over the span of two decades it acquired an elaborate structure, comprising a wide set of different bodies, dealing with military and economic issues, inter-allied political consultations and scientific research.\(^1\) Soviet scholars viewed the setup of CCMS as a move intended to make a contribution to the alliance’s military activities, to constitute the essence of NATO’s existence and to camouflage NATO’s “true” purpose and deflect attention from it.\(^2\) However, the somewhat mixed reaction that this institutional innovation met in member states make it an issue that deserves further analysis.

For some, the launch of CCMS constituted a revolutionary change in NATO’s activities. Some scholars consider it to be a progressive large-scale change in NATO’s mission and structure, as indicated by this appraisal: ‘From the start, it was understood that CCMS would be a new kind of organization, revolutionary in mission and operational methodology.’\(^3\)

On the other hand, critics of the development tended to point out the gap between the requirements of international cooperation in the provision of national security—as it is understood in traditional terms—and the environmentalist approach. It was often questioned whether NATO was a suitable organisation to carry out environmental protection activities. Some critics argued that these activities were a distraction from the alliance’s main task of providing for the collective defence of its member states, supporting the view that ‘the machinery
and purposes of military security are incompatible with environmental values.”

Scholarship suggests that change in international organisations is more likely to be the result of an incremental broadening of purview than revolutionary change brought about by visionary leaders. Haas argues that change in international organisations often occurs in the form of incremental expansion of an organisation’s purview and the range of tasks it performs; cases of radical adjustments requiring reconsideration of organisation’s mission are extremely rare. The very concept of environmental security—having the whole of humanity as its reference point and favouring broad international cooperation regardless of regional, ideological or economic differences between states—makes it a difficult concept to embrace, particularly for an exclusive international organisation centred on the territorial defence of its members.

NATO’s evolution in times of détente deserves attention given the fact that the alliance’s post-Cold War ‘transformation’—a catch-all word used to describe all kinds of change NATO underwent after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty Organization—is more often than not hailed as a highly successful development. There is a predictable predisposition to regard the establishment of CCMS as just one more example of NATO’s earlier ‘transformation.’ However, inflated praise of this institutional innovation can lead to an overestimation of NATO’s adaptability.

The US is known for having spearheaded the movement to have NATO’s purview expanded to encompass environmental issues. Sober analysis of the scale and general characteristics of this change of purview further contributes to the understanding of US’s role in NATO during this time.

This article explores the evolution of the issue of environmental security within NATO, which culminated in the establishment of CCMS. First, I briefly introduce the theoretical lenses through which I weigh and analyse the major events of NATO’s organisational evolution. Second, I explain what kind of processes in international politics made possible an uneasy alliance between environmental security and a Cold War alliance focused on the issue of collective defence. Third, I outline the modifications that the discourse of environmental security, introduced by the US, underwent during the formation of CCMS. I con-
The issue of organisational change receives much attention in organisation studies and business literature. However, scholars do not treat all changes in organisational strategy and structure as equivalent. Typically, they differentiate between evolutionary and revolutionary patterns of change, depending on the extent to which an organisation rejects habitual ways of performance or existing institutions in the field of activity. Nadler and Tushman define discontinuous change as one requiring ‘a complete break with the past’ and amounting almost to the creation of a new organisation. It occurs ‘in response to destabilizing events and periods of major disequilibrium’ in industry. In their typology, discontinuous change is opposed to incremental change, which involves focused and bounded improvements carried out routinely on a continuous basis in order to gain competitive advantage in periods of equilibrium.

Nadler and Tushman hold that ‘effective organizations are always implementing some form of improvement or modification.’ Although business literature often strongly encourages managers to bring about necessary changes intended to improve an organisation’s efficiency, the organisational ecology approach does not support the claim that ‘selection in organizational populations invariably favours efficient producers.’ Hannah and Freeman describe selection as a more complex and multidimensional process, where ‘in many circumstances, political ties are more important to survival than efficiency.’ The organisations do change and the strategic leadership by individuals plays a significant role in the process of transformation. However, the change is constrained by a set of external and internal factors, such as the distribution of sunk costs, inadequacy of information, intra-organisational politics, predisposition to loss-aversion that prevails over any ambition to gain additional benefits, legal and fiscal barriers, a need to maintain the organisation’s legitimacy, etc. An organisation’s identity can also affect the pace of change and its outcomes as well as set standards of procedure and allocation of task and authority that have become the subject of normative agreement.
Although some knowledge of organisation studies is applicable when researching international governmental organisations (IGOs), IGOs possess some peculiar features that distinguish them from their cousins in political and socioeconomic domains. These differences gain even more significance when considering the issues of their adaptation to new environments. Thus, there is a popular view that IGOs as meta-bureaucracies are ‘even further removed from citizens’ calls for accountability and efficiency.’

Since they tend to assure their survival by ‘seeking to please their clients,’ as Haas puts it, adaptive change by IGOs is often constrained by the preferences of their clients, which are at the same time the masters. Thus, the decision-making process in periods of adaptive change too often takes the form of bargaining between various coalitions of states rather than an exercise in technical rationality in order to improve the organisation’s performance.

In his account of change in international organisations, Haas stresses the role of ideology. He defines this as ‘the kind of knowledge that is the property of actors who do not subject their beliefs to systematic verification tests.’ Accordingly, ‘some guidance from an ideology is required even for minor changes of the means of action.’

Haas treats organisational evolution as a process spurred first and foremost by a ‘change in the definition of the problem to be solved by a given organization.’ Defining the problem is often based on what Haas calls ‘consensual knowledge,’ which he explains as ‘generally accepted understandings about cause-and-effect linkages about any set of phenomenon.’ He is primarily concerned with modifications of consensual knowledge in the process of organisational change. Unlike the established approaches in biology and cultural studies, Haas distinguishes between ‘adaptation’ and ‘learning.’ ‘Adaptation’ is the ability to change in order to meet new demands without having to re-evaluate the core beliefs about the causes and effects on which an organisation’s performance and legitimacy are based. He applies the term ‘learning’ to ‘situations in which an organization is induced to question the basic beliefs underlying the selection of ends.’ Following this distinction, Haas proposes three models of change in international organisations: 1) incremental growth, involving ‘adaptation’ to develop new tasks; 2) turbulent non-growth, when an organisation is being inundated with a wide variety of tasks introduced by actors with divergent understanding of the organisation’s problems and goals;
and 3) managed interdependence based on ‘learning,’ which requires a modified understanding of problems and the development of new mechanisms to solve them.\textsuperscript{28}

This work deals with the situation that occurs when an organisation undergoes change based on a new discourse that largely diverges from the general understanding of its goals, tasks and standards of procedure. It is to be expected that these kinds of change will face some resistance due to reasonable constraints imposed on any attempt to transform an organisation’s structure and mode of operation. Therefore, this paper focuses on the question of what happens to the new discourse when states use it as an agent of organisational change.

Haas has also developed three possible outcomes largely corresponding to the models of change: 1) The new discourse is incorporated into the traditional narrative about the organisation’s mission, providing for incremental growth in tasks that organisation already performs; 2) the new discourse coexists (peacefully, or with some degree of conflict) with the traditional narrative about the organisation’s mission; or 3) the new discourse gradually overtakes the traditional narrative of the organisation’s mission, restructuring the organisation’s identity.

I view the models of the possible outcomes outlined above as ‘ideal types’ in the Weberian sense. In considering individual cases of organisational change invoked by introducing a new discourse, one is most likely to observe the elements of several models. This work analyses a single case—the establishment of NATO’s CCMS. Thus, its findings do not permit us to make any generalisations about the ways IGOS embrace new ideas that shape the understanding of their missions. It seeks rather to understand what made possible the uneasy alliance between environmental security and territorial defence in the structure and scope of tasks performed by a single organisation and how the discourse of environmental security changed due to NATO’s input during the Cold War.

**Setting the Stage for Environmentalism in NATO**

According to conventional wisdom, the concept of environmentalism in the US began in 1962 with the publication of Rachel Carson’s seminal book *Silent Spring*, which made concerns about the quality of the environment a widespread public concern. Amidst this raised public
awareness, Richard Nixon, who served as US President from 1969 until his resignation in 1974, made environmental protection a priority of both his home and foreign policies. Nixon’s biographers have taken a rather sceptical view of the President’s commitment to environmentalism. Based on certain noted characteristics—Stephen Ambrose called Nixon a ‘supreme pragmatist’ and Jonathan Aitken wrote that he was ‘obsessed’ with politics and his diplomatic legacy—Brooks Flippen, the historian of Nixon’s environmental diplomacy, contends that the President’s embrace of environmental issues was mainly tactical, due to the fact that it ‘pollled well.’ Being an environmentalist at home meant imposing restrictions on industries and being at loggerheads with business. In this respect, international environmental diplomacy was a safer and ‘cheaper’ option.

Nixon provided much support to NATO, regarding the alliance as the ‘blue chip’ for US foreign policy, ensuring strong ties to the vibrant economies of Western Europe. Though he accepted that the Soviet threat might have decreased since the time of NATO’s founding, the alliance, in his view, remained vital in preserving stability in Europe. It was especially important in managing relations with Germany, a state having a serious Eastern problem. For Nixon, NATO also appeared to be an indispensable means with which to negotiate détente on favourable terms with the Soviet Union by sharing the burden more equitably with West European governments.

The notion of the Atlantic Community—encompassing different projects aimed at the integration and federalisation of West Europe and North America—still had some influence on US policy towards Europe during Nixon’s presidency, though this influence was limited. In an intelligence memorandum prepared by the CIA in January 1969, analysts depicted NATO as being beneficial to the US and its ever-expanding project of cooperation with the growing economies of Western Europe. The analysts stated that collaboration should extend far beyond the military realm. They cheered the development of inter-allied consultations, viewed as a means to expand NATO’s traditional purview, although they expressed some dissatisfaction over the pace of progress in this area, stating that ‘after 20 years, NATO’s consultative process on political and economic affairs still could not match the cooperation that existed in the military sphere.’ The CIA analysts had to admit that ‘anything like an Atlantic community [had] remained distant, and was
probably impracticable and warned against setting the objectives of inter-allied consultations too high.

The overall approach towards the expansion of inter-allied cooperation was rather pragmatic. Given the impracticability of the Atlantic Community in the short run, the authors of the memorandum still urged the US government to action. The report was prepared shortly after Soviet troops entered Czechoslovakia in August 1968, defeating the hopes of the Czechoslovak people to build a more 'humanistic' communism. The CIA analysts viewed the tragic events in the 'socialist camp' as an international crisis that caused heightened inter-allied cohesion in NATO. The memorandum’s authors considered the aftermath of the crisis to be a moment of opportunity for the US government to come up with new initiatives.

Though the memorandum’s authors considered the impact of the Czechoslovak crisis on inter-allied relationship in NATO ‘uncertain’, it is worth further consideration. The authors claimed that the invasion of Czechoslovakia caused Western Europe to re-examine the concept of détente. Previously, there had been some optimism about the evolution of the Soviet regime and that it might possibly begin to loosen its grip on East European states. Gradual rapprochement with the Soviet Union in détente could significantly improve the political atmosphere in Europe and facilitate meaningful agreements with the East in the security realm. The Czechoslovak crisis reportedly altered this view, bringing in a new understanding of détente as merely an ‘interim accommodation to the existing order.’ It became a reminder to West European governments that the Soviet Union would maintain its control over its perceived sphere of influence. Some US officials availed the opportunity to portray the USSR as an unpredictable state predisposed to use force and destabilise Europe. Thus, the CIA analysts believed that the Czechoslovak crisis undermined NATO’s role in seeking détente.

Reportedly, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia ‘generated a new impulse toward united action [in NATO . . .] symbolised by expanded consultation and postponement of troop reduction,’ but did not alter the view held by West European governments that the ‘danger of Soviet assault remained low.’ In the US, despite détente, foreign policy officials and analysts considered military containment of the USSR a lesser priority than political containment. Some argued that the possi-
bility of a military clash in Europe had not disappeared, but had diminished considerably. For example, George F. Kennan, a distinguished American diplomat, wrote in a 1972 article for Foreign Affairs: “There are today no political issues between the Soviet Union and the United States which could conceivably be susceptible of solution by war, even if the state of weaponry had not made any major military conflict between the two powers unthinkable.” This indicated that conflict between the US and the USSR was now seen more as a political rivalry than a military threat. The perception of being engaged in political rivalry compelled both parties to search for new ideas in order to gain competitive advantage.

The Establishment of CCMS and the Discourse of Environmental Security

Researchers studying the establishment of NATO’s CCMS emphasise ‘an unusual degree of US imposition on reluctant allies’ that continued even after the committee started its operation. Anticipation of resistance to the institutional innovation probably had a role to play when it came to making certain modifications to the discourse of environmental security in order to reconcile it with the traditional narrative of NATO’s mission.

On 24 February 1969, during his first presidential trip to Europe, Nixon gave a speech at the North Atlantic Council (NAC) where he outlined his vision for NATO as ‘a bulwark of peace, the architect of new means of partnership, and an invigorated forum for new ideas and new technologies to enrich the lives of our peoples.’ He confirmed the US commitment to the security of West European states and endorsed the development of inter-allied consultations as a means of sharing wisdom and jointly producing workable solutions to common problems. ‘A modern alliance must be a living thing, capable for growth, able to adapt to changing circumstances,’ he noted, implying that NATO should become something more than just an institution based on a security guarantee pact with a fixed set of tasks. Moreover, Nixon stressed the alliance’s capacity for change in order to provide additional legitimacy to its persistence. Nixon also mentioned the rising challenges of environmental pollution, which he believed deserved attention within the context of transatlantic cooperation. However, he mentioned only environmental problems that were the by-products
of advanced technologies—in other words, the problems of industrialised societies.\textsuperscript{53}

Nixon then expanded on these ideas during a private meeting of the NAC. Ultimately, a proposal was made to conduct regular meetings of deputy foreign ministers and to create a special planning group. Both institutional arrangements provided opportunities for inter-alliance discussions on long-range problems. Nixon proposed to broaden the agenda for transatlantic cooperation with an additional focus on environmental protection so that it would encompass the problems of technically advanced societies. This proposal developed into the initiative to establish the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society. By linking CCMS to the issue of encouraging inter-allied consultation, the founding of CCMS came in line with the general trajectory of NATO’s organisational evolution.

By reading the circular of the Department of State from 19 March 1969, we can observe how the discourse of environmental security was incorporated into the traditional narrative of NATO’s mission. Protecting the environment appeared as one of the challenges of modern society. “The premise of NATO engagement in this sphere could be described as a contribution to the strengthening of Western society, as a bulwark against a hostile ideology, and as an example for other societies…”\textsuperscript{54} Thus, the provision of environmental security was depicted as an important means to assure the resistance of the Western societies to the incursion of ‘hostile ideology’—a task that was probably far more important in early days of the Cold War than in late 1960s—and to gain competitive advantage in political rivalry.

The use of the phrase ‘challenges of modern society’ emphasised the perceived exclusiveness of states with advanced economies. In contrast, the term ‘environmental security’ is more global and democratic, as it implies the need for multilateral efforts without dividing states into groups based on their level of economic development. The former discourse prevailed in NATO.

The views expressed in the National Intelligence Estimate, prepared in December 1969, testified for the viability of Nixon’s approach. The report stated: “There does seem to be emerging […] a growing belief, particularly among younger people, that the established ideologies, the traditional patterns of political activity, and the historic rivalries among nations are obsolete, artificial, and irrelevant to the real concerns of the individual and the major goals of society.”\textsuperscript{55} The environ-
mental initiatives launched by NATO were apparently meant to give the alliance a new appeal, especially among the younger generation in Europe. They were also, to some extent, an attempt to deflect public attention from US involvement in Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, the US intelligence community had rather low expectations about the impact that the new CCMS would have on transatlantic cooperation in general.

The effort to give NATO a social role through the creation of a Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society has met with a polite response, but it will not materially tighten the already strong bonds between Western Europe and the US,\textsuperscript{56} stated the authors of the estimate.

According to a memorandum from Elliot Richardson, the Under Secretary of State to President Nixon, US allies expressed interest in CCMS. West Germany and Denmark were enthusiastic about discussions on the problems of modern society.\textsuperscript{57} Nevertheless, Richardson noted that there was resistance from some states. Reportedly, some of the allies had reservations about the expansion of NATO’s structure, while others were sceptical about the expediency of broadening the scope of consultations inside the politico-military alliance to include environmental issues.\textsuperscript{58} Seemingly, Richardson provided an overly optimistic view, downplaying the allied resistance to the establishment of CCMS. Most notably the UK, with the reputation of the most loyal US ally, opposed the institutional innovation, considering the idea of making CCMS responsible to the Deputy Foreign Ministers Committee (with the exception of NAC) a provision of supranationality and an attempt at ‘empire building.’\textsuperscript{59} However, once established, CCMS became a body responsible directly to NAC and with functions not exceeding those of providing a forum for inter-allied discussion and the exchange of views.

In a separate memorandum, Henry Kissinger, Nixon’s Assistant for Security Affairs, downplayed political resistance to CCMS while stressing the bureaucratic aversion to the change of established rules of operation and distribution of authority. According to Kissinger, the reaction of US allies to the idea of CCMS was positive yet cautious, while their reaction to the development of Deputy Foreign Minister meetings and the establishment of a special planning group was generally negative.\textsuperscript{60} Kissinger listed primarily bureaucratic reasons for the allies’ slowness and scepticism. First and most important, in his view, the US had mistakenly advanced the proposal through NAC. The NAC’s Per-
manent Representatives viewed the creation of alternative structures in NATO as a challenge to their prerogative and an insinuation that they were not doing their jobs properly. Second, the initiatives suggested a NATO role for Agencies of Allied Governments outside Foreign Ministries. Third, the allies were suspicious about the new structures as there was no clarity on their purpose and use. However, Kissinger’s analysis could be regarded as an attempt to conceal from Nixon the political opposition to his proposal.

The Committee on Challenges of Modern Society began operation in December 1969. Patrick Moynihan, Nixon’s Assistant for Urban Affairs, gave his assessment of its work. In his memorandum to President Nixon dated 01 July 1970, he highly praised the work of the committee. Given that Moynihan was probably the person who had contributed the most to its establishment, it is not surprising that he was very positive on its progress, calling it ‘probably now the most active and productive activity of that kind.’ According to Moynihan, the committee largely derived its success from the fact that NATO generally united technologically advanced countries who shared similar views on pollution, setting it apart from other nations dealing with the same issues. He testified that the exclusivity provided by NATO’s CCMS gave much advantage.

While noting that almost all NATO countries participated in different projects, Moynihan admitted that CCMS ‘was sustained by American energy and initiatives.’ In his view, it would probably take a long time for the program to become self-sustaining. ‘Any relaxation of American effort during that interval is likely to be fatal,’ he warned. Thus, while gaining momentum the new committee would still be heavily dependent on a US investment of time and energy.

The establishment of a new body in the structure of NATO provoked much criticism in the US. Critics considered CCMS to be something foreign to NATO and functionally detached from the organisation’s major activities. An observation made by Zbigniew Brzezinski is very telling in this respect:

The Nixon administration has moved to focus NATO’s attention on some of the latter concerns but, in my judgment, that is a mistake. NATO should concentrate on the central political issues confronting the West: having served constructively as an alliance to prevent war, it can now seek to create a new
structure of East-West security. That task is big enough, and loading new problems on NATO will not increase NATO’s political popularity or effectiveness.  

Concluding Remarks

Because the US plays a significant role in NATO, there is a tendency to view NATO’s policies as mainly the outcome of a US compromise with its allies or unilateral imposition of its will on them. However, there are situations when the organisational dimension of the alliance matters.

As in the case analysed in this paper, the traditional narrative about NATO’s mission put limits on the possibilities of change, complicated the process of innovating and brought about the modification of the initial discourse on environmental security. This modified discourse was incorporated into the established narrative about the organisation’s mission, though there remained some perceived discrepancy between the tasks performed by CCMS and NATO’s mission in détente.

The Cold War, understood to be an era of bipolar confrontation, was a historic period when IGOS in the realm of security had very few incentives and opportunities for change. In this respect, the period of détente—when tensions between the two superpowers did not disappear, but became more relaxed and latent—was more permissive to innovations in organisational development. Further examples of organisational changes in the post-Cold War period support this interpretation.

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Notes

3 A. Nejat Ince, (1999), ‘NATO Science Programme and the Committee on


Nadler, Tushman (1995), pp. 22-24. The typology proposed by Nadler and Tushman also deals with timing, defining anticipatory and reactive change.


Hannah, Freeman (1989). This observation seems linked to the treatment of NATO’s persistence after the Cold War, according to Kenneth N. Waltz. According to his account, the alliance survived because the US, being the most powerful state of the current international system, considered it to be an appropriate instrument to maintain ‘America’s domination of the foreign and military policies of the European states.’ Kenneth N. Waltz (2000), ‘Structural Realism after the Cold War,’ International Security Vol. 25 No.1, p. 21.


Haas, (1990), p. 30

Haas, (1990), p.30

Haas, (1990), p.30

Haas, (1990), p.30

Haas, (1990), p.3


Haas, (1990), p. 34.

Haas, (1990), p.36.


Brooks Flippen, (2008), p. 617


Ibid.


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42 us Central Intelligence Agency (1969), p.2
43 us Central Intelligence Agency (1969), p.1
44 us Central Intelligence Agency (1969), p.1
47 Hatzivassiliou (2016), p. 88
48 Hamblin, (2010), p. 56
50 Nixon, (1969)
52 Nixon, (1969)
53 Nixon, (1969)
58 Richardson (1969), p. 61
64 Moynihan, (1970), p.175
66 Brzezinski (1970), p. 29
This work critically examines the issues undermining the unification of Nigeria, using indicators and concepts including failed state, separatist agitation and insecurity. It forays into the inherent issues underlying the Biafran movement and the ways in which those issues, as well as Biafran agitation, are inimical to Nigeria’s development. Nigeria is a heterogeneous nation facing challenges within the balance of economic development along ethnic divisions in society. The current problems facing the Nigeria government and the Biafra separatist agitators originate in the causes and the effects of the Nigerian Civil war (06 July 1967 - 15 January 1970). Biafrans who are geographically in the South and South-East of Nigeria feel and believe that their economic and developmental prowess are not well represented in the Nigerian state, and this lack of representation leads to marginalization. This marginalization is evinced by untold hardships such as poverty, lack of infrastructure for health care and education, and generally impaired wellbeing. In order to examine these issues, this paper adopted qualitative research and intrinsic approach methodology, along with relative deprivation theory. The paper identifies and discusses the problems associated with separatist movements and how they affect national and social security, and argues that while the definition of state failure is contested and therefore Nigeria cannot yet be called a failed state, but certainly a fragile state.
Keywords: Biafra, insecurity, state failure, Nigeria, separatist movements, colonialism

Introduction

One of the main problems of the Nigerian government is that it often overlooks the challenges that undermine social security until a serious problem presents itself. From a global and international perspective on separatist movement, Brian et al. assert that ‘nearly two dozen separatist movements are active worldwide, concentrated in Europe and Asia. At least seven are violent and reflect ethnic or religious differences with the mother country.’ This shows that separatist movements span the globe.’ Similarly, Bieri indicated that agitations towards self-determination through independence have been on the increase in the EU recently. A major issue fuelling these agitations is the economic crisis and an interrelated crisis of confidence that is overwhelming the continent. The question that naturally comes to mind concerning separatism is: what are the underlying factors causing separatism and movements for self-actualization/determination? In response to that question, Dean described that there has been an ongoing debate among scholars of separatist movements who disagree on the following key point:

One of the motivations for creating new political units is the desire either to protect or to acquire wealth in a situation where territorially-based economic inequalities exist. While other scholars disagree with the significance attributed to economic inequality in separatist movements.

According to Brian the number of countries with separatist movements peaked in 2008. It is therefore worth noting that, as of 15 November 2015, the separatist movement for Biafra has re-emerged in Nigeria. This study explores the resurgence of Biafra, its causes and its overwhelming effect of undermining Nigerian unitization. In Nigeria, the political system and the democracy that the nation adopted for governance is not only faulty but bedevilled by anomalies. As a whole, Nigeria is yet to understand the tenets of democracy or how to govern the country properly. Brown see Elaigwu pointed out that it was less than a century ago that the heterogeneous peoples of what is now called Nigeria were geographically enclosed according to the grid of the colonial masters and administered as one territorial unit against
their wish. In other words, Nigeria was born as a result of Britain’s policy of imperialist. As a result, dissatisfaction continues to emanate over the years, a trend which dates back as far as the colonial, military regime era and all the way up to present-day civilian rule.

An in-depth evaluation of these periods reveals that Nigeria is yet to get it right in terms of national governance. Brown noted that the political elites often create political styles that are inconsistent with the Westminster-style political system adopted at the time of Nigeria’s independence in 01 October 1960, and that this dissonance makes the attainment of good governance elusive. In other words, copied western-style political systems have challenges in serving and addressing the multi ethnic groups in Nigeria. Despite the replacement of the British Parliamentary system of government by the United States presidential system in 01 October 1979, the influence of the copied Westminster political system lingers on. No political party or system is 100% effective in satisfying every facet of the society, but for positive progress in Nigerian society, the political system must be expected to offer more positives than negatives for the society it governs.

Ekpenyong, identified different patterns of conflict arising from the interaction of political, economic and social instability due to bad governance. This study anchors on Goetz’ identification of the root of conflict in Nigeria as being based on religion and ethnicity. Supporting this view, Lenshie see Shettima and Kashim assert that ‘Nigeria with so many ethnic, religious and sectional groups paints the picture of a potentially vulnerable society to conflicts.’ When tension was doused during the dawn of civilian rule in the last decade, the government saw the need to foster more integration and unity among Nigerians. Part of their efforts was the “federal character principle,” instituted in the 1979 constitution by the Nigerian government to represent the interests of different ethnic nationalities that make up the country.

The federal character principle is one of many policies for the integration of different ethnic groups in the country. It suggests an attempt to build a nation where equal opportunities abound and where every individual can feel that he/she has equal chance to participate in society and politics without the bias of ethnic affiliations. Unfortunately, the federal character principle has under-represented different ethnic groups in Nigeria and has not been fair as it should be. This statement is supported by Bello, who points out that although ‘the purpose of the principle of federal character is laudable, unfortunately, the applica-
tion and operation of the principle tended to differentiate rather than integrate Nigeria." Nonetheless, Okolo argues that, against the ills of federal character principle, national integration is pivotal and absolutely necessary for the stability of the country. Nonetheless, Okolo argues that, against the ills of federal character principle, national integration is pivotal and absolutely necessary for the stability of the country.12

Many challenges and problems have emerged to put pressure on Nigeria’s fragile economy and social security, factors which are leading towards state failure. The most pressing issue concerning security for the Nigerian people is the issue of terrorism amongst Nigerians themselves. The needs of every person in society revolve around food, shelter and clothing. Currently, support for a separate state of Biafra is resurging in Nigeria, which mainly takes the form of separatist agitation, including terrorism in a minority of extreme cases. There are widespread dissatisfactions among South-Eastern Nigerian protesters with the way that the Nigerian government governs the country. In this study, due emphasis is given to the stresses and strains encountered by Nigerians.

Methodology
Qualitative research with an instrumental case study approach was adopted for this study. This study is an exploratory study focused on learning about and depicting a theoretical idea in a real life context. It is a study of a particular experience of the phenomenon of separatist agitations/movements, with a view to further exploration of the indicators of human security and, conversely, state failure. The instrumental case study provides an insight into the resurgence of the Biafra separatist agitation phenomenon, insight which might help to inform academic and political leaders wishing to dissolve separatist agitations through inclusive developmental projects that foster harmony in this heterogeneous nation. The adoption of an instrumental approach for this study helps to refine the theory adopted to the specific context of the historic Biafran movement. The scope of this study is limited to Biafran agitation in Nigeria from its inception to its resurgence in 15 November 2015, and the ways in which this phenomenon undermines Nigerian security.

Conceptual Clarifications
State Failure—Akude stresses that there is longstanding ambiguity concerning concepts of state failure and state collapse. Akude stresses that there is longstanding ambiguity concerning concepts of state failure and state collapse.
tion between the two concepts was articulated by Akude see Tetzlaff who highlighted that state failure is a long-term and multidimensional process while state collapse is the endpoint of state failure process. Along the same lines, ever since the terrorist attacks on the United States, and its publication of a National security Strategy, failed states are perceived to be a haven for al-Qaeda terrorism. In summary, ‘a failed state is characterised by social, political and economic failure.’

To illustrate these definitions of state failure by focusing on Nigeria, the government seems to be helpless to prevent or adequately respond to the frequent bombing and killing in Nigeria, which leads to questions concerning the ability of Nigeria’s national security to function proactively. Taking into consideration the different definitions of failed states and state failure, such as Tetzlaff, and oviasonse, the Niger Delta, located in the South of Nigeria, and the Boko haram in the North East, both serve as good examples through which to examine the inefficiency and lack of trust which are the tenets of state failure. The Nigerian government has failed to effectively address the constant vandalism of the oil pipeline which is the nation’s economic hub, or the incessant bombings by Boko haram. Regardless of the amount of government effort employed to stop such activities, they continue. The Federal government has now put all military action in Niger delta on hold, partly due to threats from Niger Delta militants that they will destroy governmental structures. Both the Nigerians responsible for these attacks and the Nigerians affected by the constant power outages and other damage done by these attacks have expressed a lack of trust in the government’s ability to attend to their affairs and needs. The reprisal of attacks on governmental structures, including the vandalism of oil pipelines (which drive the bulk of the Nigerian economy) is an escalation of tensions that have built up over the years, including the degradation of the environment and livelihood of the people of the Niger Delta. Eyo-Essien see Uwhejewe-Togbolo indicated that oil spills did not receive attention until the late 1970s, with poor implementation of memorandums of understanding (M.O.U) between oil companies and host communities. Furthermore, environmental degradation and lack of employment have been explicitly blamed for this trend of attacks. These attacks have become a threat to national security, and the Biafran separatist movement reveals a similar resurgence of pre-existing tension and dissatisfaction.

Insecurity—To conceptualise insecurity, one needs to first understand the concept of security itself, and to disentangle the idea of se-
curity from normative and empirical concerns without questioning the legitimacy of those associations. Baldwin and Waltz talked about forms of security and survival of states in terms of military capacity on security and reduced vulnerability. Ayoob deviated from traditionalist and realist approaches like Baldwin’s and Waltz by expounding that problematic factors of insecurity are divided into two categories: increased legitimacy accorded to ethnic nationalism by the international community; and the increased incidence of state failures.\textsuperscript{20} It is the first category, ethnic nationalism, which provides the context for the discussion of the Biafran movement in this paper. Working from the understanding that the state exists solely for its citizens - to protect their lives, property and well-being - Adagba, Ugwu and Eme noted that, ‘insecurity refers to the breach of peace and security, whether historical, religious, ethno-regional, civil, social, economic and political that have contributed to recurring conflicts.’\textsuperscript{21} Ajodo-Adebanjoko and Okorie conceptualise insecurity as a situation of fear and harm towards an individual with regards to issues bearing on politico-strategic, socio-economic or ecological issues.\textsuperscript{22} Finally, ‘the Copenhagen School of Security Studies conceptualise security as a process of social construction of threats which includes securitizing actor[vi] (mostly political elite), who declares certain matters as urgent and posing a threat to the survival of the referent object, that, once accepted by the audience[vii], legitimised the use of extraordinary measures for neutralization of the threat.’\textsuperscript{23} Although this section only briefly introduces the concept of security, a detailed explanation of insecurity as it impacts Biafran people (to such an extent that it results in mass mobilisation and agitation) will be discussed in the section below titled State Failure and Insecurity as Indices of Biafran Resurgence in Nigeria.

\textit{Separatist Agitation}—Osaghae et. al. pointed out that agitation linked to social movements often manifests from grievances and social discontent against dominant practices, behaviour and conduct in the political economy such as exclusion, marginality and inequity.\textsuperscript{24} Furthermore, Osaghae et. al. see Medearis described social movements as ‘collective challenges (i.e. agitations), mounted by relatively marginal groups against powerful elites and dominant ideologies.’\textsuperscript{25} In some cases, these agitations serve as the only equipment ordinary people have with which to fight against powerful political activities, opponents and states. Horowitz, on the other hand, conceives of separatist agitation as emerging out of the doctrine of self-determination. The occurrence
of separatist agitation gives credence to the power of ideas in the political space. For him, separatist agitation can be appropriately seen to be a working out of the logic that ‘political self-expression’, usually on a territorial basis, is a necessary accompanying feature of group distinctiveness. Arguably, the factors that are attributed to separatist agitations, or secessionist threats with special reference to Nigeria, are: ‘the country’s heterogeneous ethnic composition, cultural diversity, vast size, difficulties of transport and communications, varied administrative practices, and controversial political and constitutional arrangements, besides all the problems connected with the introduction of federalism, personality clashes between Nigerian leaders before and after independence, and the absence of a strong ideological magnet.’

Having noted that there is no well-established theory of secessionism, Boyle, and Englebert, indicated that groups facing discrimination are the most likely to resort to separatist violence. Thus, they called for political understanding of “separatism as an act of state formation, precipitated by tyranny and failure, and fueled by memories of a shared past” Furthermore, Boyle and Englebert’s findings revealed that ‘separatism is mostly a response to political conditions, rather than the manifestation of cultural differences or the exploitation of economic opportunities’. The conceptualization of Boyle and Englebert based on failures, shared past with economic opportunities in regard to the Biafra context are also explicated in the discussion below.

Theoretical Clarification

Relative deprivation theory—was first developed by Runciman to explain attitudes of social inequality in twentieth-century England. The major tenet of relative deprivation theory describes that people deprived of the things of high importance or necessity in their society - such as status, money, rights and justice among others - tend to join social movements with the hope or expectation that their grievances or dissatisfaction will be attended to. Thus, Runciman recognise ‘egoistic deprivation which refers to a single individual’s feeling of comparative deprivation and fraternal deprivation, also called group deprivation...refers to the discontent arising from the status of the entire group as compared to a referent group.’ Flynn see Singer noted that fraternal deprivation may strengthen a group’s collective identity. Flynn argued that relative deprivation theory belongs to the larger
body of interdisciplinary work known as social movement theory. Social movement theory, as described by Flynn, began in the late 19th century and includes the study of social mobilization, including its social, cultural, political manifestation and consequences.

This theory has been critiqued by scholars for failing to explain the reason that some people who feel marginalised do not take action by joining social movements. This theory has been further contested by researchers of relative deprivation theory, who point out that the factors of the theory fail to indicate another unseen factor that moves individuals or groups of people towards social movement, which is ‘the will or their will.’ The ‘will’ suggests that individuals are propelled into, or determine to join, a social movement whose activity they believe can address their discontent or marginality within society and work to resolve the prejudices they face. In other words, individuals engaged in social movements activities believe in the strength of their ‘willpower’ to help them achieve meaningful results. A denial or removal of this willpower prevents some individuals from joining, despite facing the same problems or issues as those who join social movement activities.

On the other hand, Gurr explains relative deprivation in relation to the psychological frustration-aggression theory which argues that the ‘raison d’être’ of human attitude to violence is the mechanism inherent in frustration-aggression. Though Gurr notes that frustration does not explicitly imply violence, when it is sufficient and prolonged it often leads to anger which degenerates into violence. The ‘relative deprivation’ hypothesis of Gurr portrays the discrepancy between what people think they deserve and what they can actually get. Gurr emphasise that the propensity for collective violence strongly differs with the intensity and scope of relative deprivation among collective members.

Making inferences from Gurr’s ideas concerning relative deprivation theory, it becomes evident that the struggle for a separate Biafra is the expression of frustrations held in common by collective members of relative ‘homogeneous’ societies. The frustrations and agitations conveyed by the members of Biafra is not always or inherently violent, as explained by Gurr, but can take on violent dimensions when prolonged.

The primary grievances among those who struggle for Biafra varies. Some of these variations manifest in what the peoples of Biafra feel they deserve, such as good standard of living in society, or else what they hope to achieve if such demands are not met, such as separation
from Nigeria in order to address these issues through a new government of their own – one which shows due concern for its people.

**Rationale Behind the Choice of Relative Deprivation Theory on the Biafra Case Study**

Relative deprivation theory describes an individual or group experience that occurs when people are deprived of something they either hold dear or feel entitled to. It explains the economic, political and social deprivation that are relative rather than absolute; based on perceptions of justice and self-worth just as much as on the need to fulfil basic human rights. Moreover, relative deprivation theory highlights poverty and social exclusion. The consequences of relative deprivation manifest through behaviours and attitudes, feelings of stress, political attitudes and participation in collective action. The grievances as defined through the deprivation aspect of this theory are considered instrumental in analysing the convolutions of inequality and the ‘raison d’être’ of the Biafran separatist movement and agitations in Nigeria. In other words, the theory explains the Biafra agitations as responses to deprivation and inequality that led to Biafran grievances, and explains in part the motivations for protests and rebellion against the state which is perceived as failing or insecure.

**State Failure and Insecurity as Indices of Biafra Resurgence in Nigeria**

Central to this study is the Biafran movement, which spans over four decades, having surfaced over four decades ago, quietened, and resurfaced again. Currently, the Biafra resurgence agitations have attracted serious attention, including that of the international community, as no one knows the dimension it may ultimately take. One of the advantages of the Biafra conflict that took place during the Nigerian Civil War (06 July 1967 - 15 January 1970), as noted by Goetz is that, ‘Biafra served as one of the first conflicts where issues of more contemporary complex emergencies began to develop. Biafra taught the international community how to better provide and coordinate aid and assistance to those affected by a complex emergency.’ However, from the humanitarian point of view in preparation for emergencies, Goetz, points out that, little has been accomplished in applying the lessons learned dur-
ing the Biafra civil war to present day complex emergencies. In other words, there remains the need to understand the historical nature, causes and effects of the civil war so as to better prepare for future emergencies.

The concept of ‘failed state’ is central to understanding problems of political practice and the social system of a nation. Di John described state failure in less developed countries as the effect of poor economic performance and breakdown of legitimacy and political virility of states. Furthermore, Di John noted that failed states are a haven for terrorist organisations and international criminal networks, due in part to the evident negligence of world powers. Di John emphasises that this attraction for criminal networks and organised terrorism is not limited to countries such as Somalia, Haiti and Iraq (as explicitly mentioned in his study) but is evident in practice in Nigeria.

The concept of failed state made earlier this paper is re-emphasised by Rotberg who asserts that the failure of nation-states can be attributed to internal violence with inability to provide positive political goods to its citizens and inhabitants. This ineffectuality makes the government lose their legitimacy until it gradually becomes illegitimate in the eyes and hearts of a growing percentage of its citizens. The current administration in Nigeria has proved that political goods within Nigeria are shattered. An illustrative example of state failure in Nigeria is the inability of the federal government to pay its state workers for months after payment is due; increases unemployment among the youth; mass retrenchment of workers in the public and private sectors. Also there are factional splintering and a gradual increase of internal violence leading to international concerns.

On the Failed State Index in 2016, Nigeria was ranked 13th most likely to fail out of 177 listed countries. Kinnan et al. indicated that not only would it be very dangerous for Nigeria to hit state failure, but that it takes states who have failed a very long time to recover. Examining other factors leading to state failure, such as separatist agitations, reveals that these agitations are based on the struggle to address the ‘needs and wants’ of individuals or groups of people in order to live a normal life in the society. The inefficiency of the government to produce the basic things needed by the citizenry leads to agitations, which can potentially take on a violent dimension if not attend to. Concomitantly, it is argued that government failures are characterised by horizontal and vertical inequalities in countries across Africa which have
produced ‘democratic paralyses.’ According to Ekeh, democratic paralysis manifests in the form of severe consequences and emboldened sentimental ties along ethno-cultural identity in order to starve the state of the required loyalty.

Englebert and Hummel argued that Africa has experienced fewer secessionist movements over the past 40 years than any other place in the world, which indicates that there is less likelihood of secession in Africa. As valid as their forecast may appear on empirical grounds, it fails to account for what could happen and what may not happen in the Nigerian context. Generalisation of secession findings, data and debates on grounds of empirical finding are not enough to ascertain what will and will not take place in Africa. Every single case of a secessionist movement in Africa is unique, and so it is with the Nigerian context. Things are not always as they seem, even with scenario-building and calculations, due to persistent unexplained factors. In other words, Nigerian issues are always unique and ductile. Before the problem of terrorism came into Nigeria, Nigeria was not seen as a state or a country that welcomed terrorism, but was instead known as a peaceful and calm state that attracted many immigrants who could peacefully live without problems in the very regions which are now troubled. Current observations and experiences of the Nigeria political systems, combined with deductions based on theories of unstable democratisation, allow this paper to assert the view that Nigeria could be considered a failing state.

The resurgence of ethnic agitations in Nigeria including ethnic militias such as MASSOB/IPOB of Eastern Nigeria, shows a major problem with unification and a sense of oneness in Nigeria, a problem which the government has failed to aptly manage. Successful states are distinguished from weak, failed or collapsed states based on their performance in discharging the most crucial political goods. The issue concerning ethnic militias is not limited to MASSOB/IPOB. In fact, the antecedent of MASSOB emergence lies in the OPC, led by a young Yoruba carpenter with the advertised mission to mobilise the Yoruba to break away from Nigeria and establish a new state named Oduduwa, after the mythical primogenitor of their ethnic group. This shows that ethnic tension in Nigeria is not an unusual occurrence.

The history of secessionist threats as the instruments of political bargains is a feature of Nigeria’s political evolution. This dates back to 16 May 1953 when the northern region threatened to secede, based on
the motion passed by delegates from the South that proposed Nigeria's independence be granted in 1956. The Northern threat of secession had its roots in fears that the Northern region was unprepared to compete politically or economically with the South within an independent, unified Nigeria. Nonetheless, the motion was dropped in preference for unified Nigerians. On 30 May 1967, the secessionist state of Biafra was declared, and this declaration gave birth the Nigerian civil war. Since the civil war, there has been a conscious attitude among different ethnic groups in terms of relating to each other. In other words, there exist 'deep seated xenophobic attitudes' among different ethnic groups in Nigeria. These xenophobic attitudes are noticeable in stereotyping, with derogatory generalisations present throughout Nigeria, such as the following attitudes between the Igbo, Yoruba and Hausa (Igbo being the most populous ethnicity represented by the Biafran movement, and the others being outside of that movement). The Yoruba call the Igbo “a je okuta ma mu omi” which means a person with a stone heart, or probably, dangerous and unforgiving. The Igbo, in return, call the Yoruba, “ndi ofe nma nu” which means those who use excessive oil for cooking and the Hausa call the Igbo “yanmiri do do’n doya” - 'he who eats yam' while the Igbo, on the other hand, call the Hausas, “Onye Ugu” which means someone from the hilly region. It is worth noting that there are deeper meanings attached to these stereotypic terms aforementioned. Lester and Coster said that ‘the devastation of the war left a legacy that impaired Nigerian unity and development for years.’ As pointed out earlier, the origin of separatist agitations in Nigeria is based on popular dissatisfaction, mainly with the inability and inefficiency of the government in addressing the needs of the people. To clarify further, the origin of separatist agitation groups in Nigeria such as the O’odua People’s Congress (OPC), Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), Arewa People’s Congress (APC), Egbesu Boys and other ethnic militias can be traced and linked to political marginalization, unemployment and poverty, collapse of social infrastructure and state welfare programs and also the inefficient and corrupt state systems. Furthermore, Agbu emphatically expressed that,

The tripodal ethnic terror machine represented by the OPC, MASSOB and APC, may turn out to be the greatest threat to Nigeria’s unity in this millennium. Experience has shown that civil wars develop when regional or ethnic movements are em-
boldened by state incapacity to challenge their legitimacy or by a perceived ethnic enemy within the contested political and economic spaces. This is already happening in Nigeria.46

Agbu’s view helps to explain the general problem of unrest more specifically as it applies to the Nigerian context, rather than as a generic global phenomenon in heterogeneous nations.

Why is Biafra Undergoing a Separatist Wave?

On 30 May 1967, Lieutenant Colonel C. Odumegwu Emeka Ojukwu, the military governor of Nigeria’s eastern region, declared the independence of the ‘Republic of Biafra’ Ojukwu led a breakaway movement composed primarily of ethnic Igbos who had suffered persecution and massacre at the hands of supporters of Nigeria’s Federal Military Government (FMG). Refusing to acknowledge the secession, the FMG, led by Major General Yakubu Gowon, invaded Biafran territory in July, commencing a brutal civil war that spanned two and a half years and claimed the lives of between half a million and two million Nigerians.47

After the civil war, unfortunately, Nigerians are still grappling with the issue of unity in a heterogeneous nation. Akin to the Biafra separatist agitation and its militia is the stated goal of MASSOB, as noted by Okonta, which is the peaceful dissolution of Nigeria and the re-emergence of a new sovereign state in the Eastern part of the country to be known as the ‘United States of Biafra.’ Additionally, the bone of contention among the Biafra separatist agitations against the Nigerian government is based on the fact that the Igbos have been marginalised and neglected since the military rule era in the country, which has led to the denial of provision of infrastructure, social amenities and livelihood opportunities in the federal government sector. This marginalization of the Igbos in the country’s economic and political life is indeed a continuation of the ‘war against the Igbo’ by other means.48

The Biafran agitation and grievances are better understood not by political portfolios or appointments of the southern region in Nigeria, but the human and economic development of the region. After the civil war, the ‘non-inclusiveness’ of the Igbos and other ethno-phobic behaviors in the top political circles (where deliberations concerning the country are meted out), caused the South East industries and busi-
nesses to believe that they would have limited space within a federal political system. Although the South-East region was given political portfolios, the evidence suggests that these portfolios were seen as not accommodative enough and non-effective for the human and infrastructural development of the South East and Southern regions. Consequently, the non-enabling environment and policies which diminished the livelihood and political prospects of Southern Nigerians led to agitations and calls for Nigerian dissolution, originally ignited through peaceful protest.

Simply put, the marginalization of the Igbos in Nigeria can be termed as a horizontal inequality problem which manifests in their diminished political participation and economic aspects. Dixon see Gurr and Moore described this inequality as the concept of collective disadvantages in material well-being, political access, or cultural status in comparison with other social groups.49

Building on Gurr’s model of inequality, Dixon’s description of a model for ethno-political rebellion is useful for conveying the Biafran struggle:

Ethno-political action presupposes an identity group that shares valued, cultural traits and some common grievances or aspirations. These sentiments and interests provide the essential basis for mobilization and shape the kinds of claims made by group leaders. The timing of action and the choice of strategies of participation, protest, or rebellion depend largely on political opportunities external to the group, principally its relationship to the state and external actors.50

An observation of the resurgence of the Biafran separatism movement in Nigeria finds a good fulcrum on Gurr’s model for ethno-political sentiment and strategy. This model, which combines repression, grievances, mobilisation, and rebellion is a useful lens through which to explain the intricacies of the Biafran struggle. One interesting link of Gurr’s theory in the case of Biafra is the interwoven concept of grievance. The range of grievances held by the Biafran movement also serve to portray Nigeria as a failed state according to Rotberg, who avows that failed states are ‘tense, deeply conflicted, dangerous, and contested bitterly by warring factions. Thus, in most failed states, government troops battle armed revolts led by one or more rivals. With varieties of civil unrest, different degrees of communal discontent, and a plethora of dissent directed at the state and at groups within the
Rotberg’s definition captures or represents what is obtainable for Nigeria as a state in this contemporary era. The problems of Biafran ethnic militias, ethnic violence, militant groups and insurgency in Nigeria are all indicators of failed state. Consequently, this leads to the question of insecurity, a question which begs for an answer. In Nigeria, as in every other society, there is a hierarchy of political goods and none is as critical as the supply of security, especially human security. Security in Nigeria continues to be undermined by corrupt political leaders, practices, and failed agriculture, power and education structures and systems. These root causes are compounded by their effects, symptoms such as the teeming populations of unattended and unemployed youths in Nigeria. These youths are bereft of their livelihood potentials. The same insecurity and marginalisation that push youths to agitate for improved chances of survival result is some of these youths becoming instruments of violence and crime. Using unemployment as an indicator or yard stick for examining the causes of youth agitation and violence, the statistical data below reveals some of the reasons youth tend to avail themselves for protest and agitations.

Examples of the repression that breeds Biafran grievances and agitations range from harsh governmental policies on Biafran businesses...
to destruction of markets and landed properties. A good number of Southern Nigerians have complained about how their property was destroyed by the government after land allocations for building and marketplaces. These actions make them to leave their region for a more enabling environment in other parts of the country where they can live and continue on with their business. These actions by the government are interpreted as repression and marginalization. Destruction of these landed properties is not limited to Southerners, however, they do experience a disproportionate amount. Another problem that illustrates their marginalisation is the killings and destruction of their market at the slightest religious conflict in the country, which tend to be mostly between Muslims and Christians in the North, yet the Igbos feel the most loss of property and life. These trends over the years have concretised and reconstructed the mind of the average Southerner in Nigeria to see themselves as a member of a different people that needs and believes dissolution of the country is the best way for them to meet their needs. Thus, a social construct has been born out of relative deprivation.

The chart shows the unemployment rate of people actively searching for jobs in Nigeria as a percentage of ‘labour force’ between Late 2007 and early 2015. The chart provides the latest unemployment rate according to the National Bureau statistics in Nigeria. The problem of this chart is that it has inaccurate details and erroneous. However, most statistical data on Nigerian unemployment rates like the one shown above have such erroneous interpretations that they could not be used by the government to address the issue of unemployment even if the government decided to. A detailed and comprehensive statistical analysis of unemployment in Nigeria will reveal more accurate statistics than those claimed by the behemoth National Bureau of Statistics. The claim by Nigerian Statisticians about the country’s unemployment rate standing below 10% is met with scepticism based on how the data are gathered.

Conclusion
The theory adopted for this study has been instrumental to its conceptual ability to explain the Biafra agitations in Nigeria. This paper has used the theories of relative deprivation and ethno-political grievance to address and discuss the reasons why the Biafran social movement
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has risen up against the Nigerian state. Knowingly and unknowingly, government policies and practices have aided the Biafran agitation through direct and indirect discrimination manifested in the South-East and Southern regions of Nigeria. The Biafran issue has now taken on another dimension, with recent petitions for a referendum. The problems of separatist agitation in Nigeria would not have been a major issue if the government had adhered to ‘simple’ rules such as the provision of equal rights through genuine inclusiveness of development and justice within the country. The issues raised in this paper do not only affect Nigeria, however the combined effect of these issues is unique in magnitude, as well as the comprehensive variety of issues which have drawn international attention from key bodies such as the European Union. The salient issues highlighted herein are the systemic insecurity in Nigeria and the resurgence of the Biafran movement. Forceful repression by the government through military responses to peaceful protests by unarmed civilians should be revisited and reduced to its barest minimum. This trend only reignites deep-seated waves of anger in people. To this end, Soyinka said that ‘Biafra cannot be defeated, once an idea has taken hold, you cannot destroy that idea, you may destroy the people, the carriers of that idea on the battlefield…but ultimately, it is not the end of the story.’

One of the main findings of the theory of relative deprivation as it applies to this study is that, when a group of people is marginalised for a very long time, relative deprivation paves the way for social movements and reconstructions of identity. The relative deprivation theory adopted in this study has shown how deprivation and marginalization of the people of Biafra has spurred deep-seated grievances against the state on the grounds of secession. The concept of state failure is contested, and while it probably doesn’t apply to Nigeria today and considering the economic and social tension on Nigeria over the years and Nigeria still unified, credit should be given to the government. However, as of today, Nigeria is seen as a fragile state. This fragility reveals the weakness or ineffectiveness of the central government to exert practical control over much of its territory; low-provision of public services; widespread corruption; criminality; refugees; involuntary population displacement; and sharp economic decline. The aforementioned problems are evident across Nigeria. The fragility of the state can potentially be alleviated, though, depending on how the state is governed. If the current Biafra agitators settle for reintegration.
in the country, then the following recommendations are suggested to enhance the nation's unity.

Recommendations

Without order of preferences or provisions of necessary conditions for curbing separatist agitations, the following recommendations are suggested:

1. True inclusive political institution in Nigeria should be practiced
2. Inequality among ethnic representatives that leads to problems at the micro level should be addressed
3. The needs of the people should be attended to, and paramount is the issue of unemployment among the mammoth graduates produced every year without jobs. Addressing this issue will involve indigenous developmental and economic project involving the youths; and also thereby help to reduce poverty
4. Social security measures be implemented for the citizenry
5. Environmental and public health issues should be addressed
6. Adequate infrastructures should be provided for the country, without regional bias
7. More stringent rules should be implemented on fight against corruption
8. Abuse of power should be readdressed within the legislative framework.

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Biafra Resurgence


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Global Energy Dilemmas

Energy Security, Globalization and Climate Change

Reviewed by Marat Gizatullin

In his book, *Global Energy Dilemmas: Energy Security, Globalization and Climate Change*, Michael Bradshaw, a professor of global energy at Warwick Business School and specialist in human geography, seeks to answer the question: Can we have access to secure, affordable and equitable sources of energy that are environmentally benign? Bradshaw acknowledges that the ‘business as usual’ approach to dealing with energy-related challenges is no longer a viable option because it leads to catastrophic consequences. This book is the result of five years of research and is based on significant amounts of data on energy-related issues from all over the world.

According to the author, the main question of whether energy can be at once secure, affordable and equitable highlights the uneasy relationship between energy security, sustainability (mostly in the environmental context) and the economic competitiveness of energy sources. The balance between these three main factors requires constant compromise, often occurring at the expense of the environment. Also, the ‘energy triangle’ looks very different in different parts of the globe. The starting premise of this book is that climate change is a modern day reality and requires immediate attention.

The research relies on the concept of ‘Kaya identity,’ named after Yoichi Kaya, a Japanese economist whose research is focused on energy. Kaya has suggested that CO2 emissions are related to such factors as the level of industrialisation, population numbers, CO2 intensity of
energy, etc. Bradshaw applies this concept to the modern day political map and comes up with a classification of countries based on the application of different ‘Kaya factors’—OECD countries, which are the biggest energy consumers; post-socialist economies; emerging economies, which are the fastest-growing consumers of energy resources; countries with less developed environment protection mechanisms; and the developing world.

Bradshaw thoroughly explores each group of countries and applies the main energy and climate-related dilemmas to each group; this allows for a certain degree of generalisation, but saves the research from being too broad. His classification system is a convenient way of providing an in-depth analysis of both energy-related dilemmas and the impact of regional energy approaches on global energy problems. For example, the book points out that the OECD group, while being relatively small in population, is responsible for almost half of all CO2 emissions and that ‘lifestyle changes’ ought to be introduced in order to tackle the emissions challenge. In relation to the emerging economies group, the book identifies the main challenge as the inability to balance environmental impact and economic growth. When it comes to the developing world, the main challenges are identified as the reliance on using biomass for energy, which leads to environmental problems; limited access to electricity; and the ‘resource curse’ for emerging energy exporters.

As a result of his research, Bradshaw proposes three steps be taken in order to tackle climate change: 1) decrease the energy used for each unit of production; 2) decrease the carbon dioxide emitted from each unit of energy used; and 3) take these first two steps in a ‘secure, affordable and equitable’ way. Bradshaw also suggests a number of policy and institutional framework changes that would be needed to transition to a low carbon economy.

This book is well-structured, informative and analytically thorough. Although some of the suggestions it offers might seem a little unrealistic—calls for lifestyle changes in developed countries, for example—the book summarises the environmental challenges related to energy production, transportation and consumption, and offers solutions for how to overcome these challenges. This book is recommended to anyone interested in the environmental challenges of the energy sector.
China’s Foreign Policy

Reviewed by Courteney J. O’Connor

The People’s Republic of China has, since 1949, undergone considerable change in its approach to foreign policy and its status in the international system. Now a regional power with a future as a global power, China’s interaction in the international social, economic and political arenas has increased significantly in the age of globalisation and interdependence. Given China’s rising influence in the international system, its foreign policy is of significant interest to analysts, politicians, businessmen and academics. In China’s Foreign Policy, Stuart Harris lays out an historical overview of China’s foreign policy, analysing its changes and developments. The administration of the Chinese Communist Party has, historically, not been particularly transparent or open to Western analysis.

Much of China’s foreign policy is, of course, dependent upon the situation. Just as Western history and cultural values affect the foreign policy of Western nations, so, too, do Chinese history and cultural values affect the shape and nature of its foreign policy decisions. Harris emphasises the marked difference between the Chinese and Western European experience, noting that many Western analysts fail to achieve a true grasp of China because they fail to remove their own cultural biases from analyses of Chinese actions and politics. Perception of the international system and global order, and of internal and external threats both physical and philosophical, play as large a part in Chinese foreign policy as they do in Western foreign policy—albeit from a perspective that Western analysts struggle to understand. In addition, while there are a growing number of policy-making bodies within the Chinese administration, it is still a notably hierarchical government with a highly centralised power structure that does not invite transparency or critique, either domestically or internationally.
China’s foreign policy is dependent on a multitude of variables. Most notably, and (arguably) in line with most modern states, is the ‘distribution of global power, wealth and prosperity’ (p. 47). Despite China’s growing wealth and influence in the international system, it is still technologically and militarily vulnerable, specifically to a country such as the US, which currently enjoys the status of global superpower. While the gap between the two economies is closing, and China is expected to overtake the United States as the world’s largest economy relatively soon, Harris argues that China may not be ready to shoulder the commensurate responsibility in the international system that such influence would dictate. In addition, he notes that Eastern and Western views of international responsibility differ greatly, and that China will only adhere to international rules, practices and regulations insofar as they cohere with those of the PRC, particularly as pertaining to sovereignty and non-interventionism.

China’s perception of its own vulnerability, both in the international system and particularly in relation to the US, has at least in part fuelled the drive for the peaceful rise (or peaceful development) touted by the Chinese administration. In order to hedge against potential future threats, or what China sees as current threats—be they geographical, political, technological, economic or social—the Chinese administration has introduced and driven a rapid military modernisation program intended to achieve either superiority, parity, or strategic deterrence in several key spheres: space, nuclear, cyber, and conventional weaponry (chap. 5). China’s peaceful development program hinges in part on a stable immediate environment, precluding the achievement of nuclear status by its neighbours. After achieving nuclear status in 1964, China joined the conference on disarmament in 1980. Strategically speaking, while China has achieved a strategic deterrent, it is not in the national interest for Asia to experience nuclear proliferation; as such, China’s foreign policy has developed in support of regulation and non-proliferation, to the degree that international norms and treaties do not impinge (greatly) on national sovereignty. As identified by Harris, the basic tenets of China’s nuclear policy are to have small numbers of weapons (none of which are first-use), a high degree of political control and survivability. Survivability is also key in China’s concerning space policy, which aims for parity with the United States rather than superiority or dominance. While Harris’ interpretation that China is set on parity rather than dominance is arguable, it is undoubtedly a
contentious issue and, given the opacity of the Chinese regime, unli-
ke to be fully resolved (or resolvable).

According to Harris, cyber warfare is one domain where China is
actively seeking superiority, based on both contemporary experience
and foreign policy. It is the assumption of the Chinese administration
that cyber warfare is key to future conflicts, and will possibly be the
only platform upon which conflict takes place. As such, the modern-
isation and integration of information technology systems to China’s
war-fighting capability is integral not only to China’s foreign policy,
but to its national security. Harris sees conventional weaponry, a sig-
nificant part of China’s military upgrade and modernisation process,
as a partial response to the American ‘pivot’ toward Asia, as well as a
response to naval and territorial disputes of both historical and con-
temporary times. Harris’ interpretation of China’s slow approach to
achieving parity in conventional weaponry is that the Chinese have
recognised that it will take years, possibly decades, to achieve parity
with the US and so have invested more time and resources into infor-
matised, or asymmetric, warfare capabilities. This is all possible due to
the massive, and growing, strength of the Chinese economy. Despite
the slowdown of economic growth in the past several years, China has
enormous economic resources at its command, including a significant
portion of the US’ national debt. While it may seek to influence the
international system slowly, and as part of the system, rather than a
challenger, Harris notes that China has a marked interest in the stabil-
ity of the current system.

Given the historical opacity of China’s foreign policy, and govern-
ment in general, Harris has produced a work notable for its readability
and its informative nature. It has clearly been meticulously researched,
and Harris’ depth of knowledge of the subject matter is evident in
every chapter. His style of writing is suitable for academic, civilian and
professional audiences. Not only is it eminently readable, but China’s
Foreign Policy should be commended for the depth of its analysis, con-
sidering the difficulty of the subject. It should be considered a crucial
text for anyone interested in the evolution of Chinese foreign policy.
Russian Foreign Policy

The Return of Great Power Politics

Reviewed by Alireza Salehi Nejad

In *Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of Great Power Politics*, Jeffrey Mankoff examines the course of Russian foreign policy since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. He provides a comprehensive overview of both the continuity and the changes in Russian foreign policy from the end of the Cold War to the Putin era, and analyses Russia's interactions with major global powers. Throughout the book, the author makes use of various theoretical approaches, including theories of international relations, classical geopolitical theory and Russian geopolitical tradition.

Mankoff argues that Russia's more assertive behaviour since Vladimir Putin became president in 2000, is the result of two things: 1) a deep-seated consensus among the country's elite about Russia's identity and interests; and 2) a favourable convergence of events such as the persistence of high energy prices and the check on US power resulting from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Presenting an even-handed treatment of controversial issues, Mankoff analyses Russia's interactions with major global actors, including the United States, the European Union, the Commonwealth of Independent States and China. Despite Moscow's harsh rhetoric and the deployment of Russian forces against Georgia in 2008, the author convincingly demonstrates that there is little reason to fear a return to a Cold War-like standoff with the West.

According to Mankoff, 'the substance of disputes between Moscow and Washington today looks much like that of the 1990s, Russian leaders resent being ignored, while the US fears Russian attempts to
overturn the post-Cold War status quo’ (p. 99). He argues that, rather than directly challenging the West, today’s Russia is more interested in restoring what its leaders consider to be its rightful place among the world’s major powers. The impulse behind the recent assertiveness of Russia’s foreign policy is not new, and can be traced back to the Yeltsin era, when Russian leaders abandoned a liberal, pro-Western orientation and committed themselves to re-establishing Russia as a great power. High oil prices and the restoration of a firm political hand have added fuel to the fire. Even if circumstances change or evolve, the impulse is here to stay.

Within this framework, Mankoff explores in detail the ups and downs in US-Russian relations, Russia’s complex interactions with Europe, its relations with Asia, and its dealings with its post-Soviet neighbours. As a result of this analysis he claims that Russia’s foreign policy, particularly its relations with Europe, China and the countries of the former Soviet Union ‘can be understood only in the context of Moscow’s strategy for dealing with Washington’ (p. 103). In the author’s view, ‘what was therefore notable about Putin’s approach was the degree to which he emphasized the maintenance of a basically positive relationship with the US, even at the cost of unpopular sacrifices’ (p. 101).

Mankoff concludes that Russia should be treated just like any other large non-Western state such as China, India, South Africa, Brazil, Mexico or Pakistan. These countries might frequently present a significant challenge, but cooperation with them is both possible and necessary. Unfortunately, because of the habit of thinking about Russia in terms of the bygone Cold War, it has been much harder for the West to work out a new framework for dealing with a Moscow that is neither a foe nor an ally (p. 306). All in all, this book is a valuable contribution to the ongoing international debate about Russia’s international position, increasingly significant when considering recent developments in Ukraine.
Barrie Axford's latest book, *Theories of Globalization*, provides readers with a comprehensive critique of globalisation as both phenomenon and scholarly object. Using an innovative and multidisciplinary approach, Axford gives an overview of the defining features of globalisation such as geography, culture, governance and capitalism. Axford's book doesn't try to postulate new theories, but rather to explore the paradigm within the realm of the social sciences, while at the same time creating 'a positive problem shift' (p. 2).

The volume starts by introducing key concepts and themes. According to Axford, organising all the material for this book was a daunting task (p. 3). The volume branches in three directions: identifying what has already been done in the study of globalisation; examining the key themes in the theorisation of globalisation; and determining and inferring the major standards of research. The last of these should be praised as the strongest element of the book, as it tries to bring globalisation into a single picture drawn from many inter-disciplinary approaches.

The book has a rounded structure, with one introductory chapter, eight chapters devoted to the study of globalisation and a conclusion. The first three chapters examine the study of globalisation within disciplines such as political science, sociology and communication studies. This gives the reader the necessary background knowledge to better understand the next four chapters, in which Axford synthesises a staggering array of ideas, concepts and arguments from a vast number of sources. This section of the book has both its merits and its weaknesses, one weakness being that the large number of authors quoted sometimes clouds Axford's own perspective. However, one could ar-
gue that the book’s neutral tone is to be expected from a scholar with Axford’s background and that the large number of sources is the very point of a volume that is meant to be an extensive survey of theories. Axford has put together a huge amount of bibliographical data with more than thirty pages of bibliographic entries.

Axford attempts to give readers a broad perspective on the theories behind the study of globalisation, broadening from a sectorial approach to an inter-disciplinary one, and provides tools for understanding the phenomenon of globalisation from the perspective of different disciplines. Some strengths of the volume are the quality of the arguments, the flow of ideas from one chapter to the next and the clear language. The comprehensive amount of theories woven throughout the nine chapters would have benefited a dedicated conclusion in the attempt to round the volume. Aside from that minor drawback, all chapters have a clear line of argument and provide quality food for thought to the reader.

Chapters seven and eight, which deal with governance and capitalism, are particularly interesting, as they show just how much these phenomena been influenced by globalisation and the great impact globalisation has on our lives. The attempt to provide an all-comprising perspective is rather successful and gives the reader plenty of food for thought to better shape his or her own ideas.

This book’s major contribution to the study of political theory and, more particularly, to the study of globalisation, is found in its extensive bibliography. Introducing a broad spectrum of theories within the same framework may have important effects that we cannot anticipate. Studying globalisation from a multi-disciplinary approach should be tackled with great care in order for one to grasp all its details and Axford’s attention to detail deserves high praise.

To sum up, this volume is valuable reading for scholars and students interested in the study of globalisation, being an excellent starting point in understanding the mechanisms behind it. *Theories of Globalization* includes theory by thinkers such as Castell, Hopkins and Held; this book, however, is greater than the sum of these parts.