East European Spaces

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Central European Journal of International & Security Studies
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cejiss is published by Metropolitan University Prague Press

ISSN: 1802-548X e-ISSN 1805-482X

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Does Obama Suffer from a Goldfinger Complex?

Reflecting on Aspects of the US’s Middle East Policy

Mitchell Belfer

As President Obama took to the dais, scanned the anxious room and ploughed into his speech, not a whisper could be heard. Cairo’s al-Azhar University was still; the eyes of Egypt, the Middle East, the world, were transfixed on the representative, the epitome, of a changed America. Gone was the white-man’s-club of US decision-making and enter an American President who truly showed the face of American diversity. Everything was meant to be different. The popular jargon of world affairs shifted to include Obama’s catch-phrase ‘yes, we can’ and people genuinely expected that US foreign policy under Obama’s guidance would be more thoughtful and respectful in a bid to re-harmonise international politics and re-energise the US as a global leader. Such lofty heights, unfortunately, could not be reached. Obama, it seems, suffers from a Goldfinger Complex; all that he touched would – in his mind – turn to gold. He fell in love with his own rhapsody, his own sense of destiny, of legacy and of accomplishment. It was as though becoming president was enough to secure his place in history, a point reflected in his absurd acceptance of the absurd decision of the Nobel Committee to award him the Nobel Peace Prize for goals he would, rather than had, achieved.

Laden with such egoism, Obama engaged a world which no longer accepted American idealism, a world much tougher than an American
President who believes that his voice and the words it carries are gold. The US’s failed Middle East policy stands in testament to two Obama administrations, heavy on rhetoric and light on leadership. Despite Obama’s al-Azhar pledge that America would be, ‘respectful of the sovereignty of nations and the rule of law,’ it has become increasingly clear that neither pillar bodes well for the president or his administration which have taken to politically bullying the relatively vulnerable, appeasing the perceived strong and following a haphazard policy approach that galvanises the most dangerous state in the region; the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Under Obama’s watch the US jumped onto the Arab Spring bandwagon, but ever so slightly. Sure, they denounced Bahrain’s government for preventing riots, breaking up terrorist cells, and imprisoning those that intimidate the country’s civil society and assault and murder its security forces, and the US is actively engaged with Tehran’s local proxies, the al Wefaq bloc. And here things get tricky because Bahrain is a more dangerous place now that the US has reached out and legitimised those that use force and the threat of force to achieve their political ambitions. What was once a country with a benevolent government and civil society has become a polarised, vulnerable and less stable place because Obama is quick to bully Bahrain and empower its enemies.

But ... when Iran’s armed forces brutalise civilians and al-Maliki opens a second front against Iraq’s Sunni population, US condemnations fall mute. Or not mute: instead of condemning, a wide set of incentives are being prepared to bring Iran out of the cold and into the glowing heat of a Washington determined to break its oil-dependency on the moderate Gulf Arab states by increasing its oil-dependency on the Ayatollah’s Iran. Sure, the argument is that Iran must comply with the non-proliferation treaty to be awarded such just desserts and perhaps Obama is just gullible enough to believe that the Islamic Republic is constructing its nuclear facilities for peaceful purposes only. However, its nuclear policy is only one aspect of the dangers posed by Iran; the Islamic Republic is attempting to overthrow the al-Khalifa government in Bahrain, impose a theocracy and the US is culpable of supporting that venture. In Egypt too, Iran’s fingers lurk. Obama cheered on the overthrow of Mubarak and the false “election” of Morsi, but fell silent as more and more evidence emerged as to the Muslim Brotherhoods’ relationship to Tehran. Morsi gave Iran the green light
to deploy to the Mediterranean via the Suez Canal and not even a peep from Washington? Iranian arms ships docked in Egypt to resupply Hamas’ weapons caches and the US says nothing. But when al-Sisi arrests the perpetrators of terrible violence in Egypt, he is condemned. No wonder Russia is taking such liberties on Crimea; Putin is aware that Obama only takes action against US allies, not its enemies.

Perhaps there should be a mechanism for returning Nobel Peace Prizes, after all Obama has done more damage than good and no matter what he thinks of himself his legacy will be one of inaction, national stagnation and alienation of US allies throughout the Gulf and around the world. So, just like Goldfinger whose golden touch was an illusion, so too is Obama’s al-Azhar ‘respect for nations.’
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Developing the Methods of Estimation and Forecasting the Arab Spring

Andrey V. Korotayev, Leonid M. Issaev, Sergey Y. Malkov, Alisa R. Shishkina

An assessment of the current state, and a forecast, of the social instability in the Arab world – re: in the Arab Spring processes – is an important, relevant and daunting task. Difficulties are related to the variety of factors affecting social instability, to individual peculiarities of historical, cultural, socioeconomic and political processes in the region. In this article we have identified a set of factors that allow for the evaluation of the current state of social and political destabilisation in the countries of the Arab Spring. These factors act in long- and medium-term and establish grounds for discontent with the existing situation among the wider population and elites. The most significant factors are identified as the:

1. in/ability of the government to reduce social tensions,
2. presence/absence of “immunity” to internal conflicts and,
3. internal contradictions level (especially the intra-elite conflict).

Such indicators as structural and demographical characteristics and the external influences appear to be less significant as predictors of the actual level of socio-political destabilisation within particular Arab Spring countries in 2011. However, demographic structural factors turn out to be very important if we consider fundamental factors of the Arab Spring in general. It should be also mentioned that the significance of external influence indicators, increases while accounting for the death toll that resulted from destabilisation in respective countries.

Keywords: Arab Spring, social instability, Middle East, demographics forecasting
Introduction

This research aspires to contribute to the development of methodological tools for the assessment and forecasting levels of socio-political instability in the Arab world, as well as for the assessment of the effectiveness of measures to reduce social tensions in the Arab countries. The specific tasks of the research are: first to provide a clear selection of the main factors of socio-political destabilisation; second, present a quantitative assessment of the importance of such destabilisation factors; finally, to develop a specialised index to assess the current state and forecast social instability levels in the Arab world.

This is mainly an exploratory analysis. The purposes of exploratory analyses are: the maximum “penetration” into the data, identification of major structures, choice of the most important variables, detection of deviations, verification of main hypotheses and the development of initial models. In this regard, it is important to note that the preliminary study of data is only the first step in the process of analysis, since the results should be confirmed in other samples or independent sets of data.

Background to the Research and Problem

We commence our assessment of the methodological issues with an analysis of the research results produced by the Political Instability Task Force – a research project created in 1994 with the support of the US government. The main aim of its work was to create a database of key internal conflicts that could have led to state failure, and analysis of political instability indicators from 1955 to 2005. Over time, the working group began to study not only the cases of failed states, but also ethnic conflicts, the facts of genocide, as well as radical regime changes and issues of democratic transition modelling. The explanatory variables used in the project include the following: economic indicators (GDP, inflation, foreign trade, etc., as well as indicators related to the environment), social and demographic (population growth, mortality, etc) as well as political (ethnic discrimination, the level of democracy, etc) variables. Thus, one of the experts’ conclusions is the assertion that partial democracies with low involvement in international trade and high infant mortality are most prone to socio-political upheavals and regime change (re: Goldstone 2001). In this framework,
a few interesting findings were observed and some predictive models
(in particular, the Global Model for Forecasting Political Instability by
Jack Goldstone) developed.

Goldstone and a group of his colleagues, analysing the emergence of
political instability in various countries around the world from 1955 to
2003 have developed a model for forecasting political instability which,
according to the authors, makes it possible to predict destabilisation
with two years lead time and 80% accuracy.³ Goldstone notes that pre-
vious quantitative approaches to the study of civil wars causes – no-
tably Fearon, Laitin, Regan, Norton (et al) – have focused mainly on
the economic resources available for government and insurgents: in
particular, Collier and Hoeffler stressed that the insurgents are able to
provide themselves with necessary resources by looting; Fearon and
Laitin considered the ability of states to finance an army in compari-
son with the possibility of insurgents to take an advantage of much of
the population, rough terrain and the situation of political instabili-
ty. Some researchers (Ross, Dunning, etc) focused on the state control
of natural resources. Recent trends in the study of revolutions have
moved in a different direction adopting however, a state-centric ap-
proach that focuses on the political structures and elite relationships
as the most important factors in determining the time and place of the
revolution.

Goldstone’s model includes four independent variables: the type of
regime that defines the models present in the process of executive re-
cruitment and competitiveness of participation in the political life of
the country; infant mortality which is logged and normalised to the
global average in the year of observation; conflict-ridden neighbour-
hood, an indicator showing whether there are cases of four or more
bordering states with major armed civil or ethnic conflict, as well as
a binary measure of State-Led Discrimination. The model has been
developed by comparing the cases of instability onset to a matched
sample of control cases, and by testing the ability of variables to distin-
guish, in binary fashion, between the country-years when instability
was imminent, from those followed by a period of stability.

This model uses multiple variables and a simple specification. The
model shows accurate results in forecasting violent civil wars and
non-violent democratic changes as well, suggesting the presence of
common factors in both types of changes. While the type of regime
Developing the Methods of Estimation and Forecasting the Arab Spring

is as a rule measured using linear or binary indicators of democracy/autocracy derived from the 21-point Polity scale, the model uses a non-linear measure of regime type with five categories based on the components of state structure. At that, when the model takes into account characteristics of political regime, the majority of other economic, political, social or cultural characteristics of under study countries in represented sample did not have a significant impact on the results of research. Moreover, the replacement of binary and categorical measurements by their continuous counterparts has not led to an increase in accuracy of the model. Such a method of measuring the type of regime acts as the most powerful predictor of instability onsets. In view of this it could be concluded that the political institutions, but not economic conditions, demographics, and geography are the most important predictors of political instability.

Russian economist and historian, Sergey Tsirel, developed a simple mathematical model of the transformation of a revolutionary situation into a revolution, showing the threshold nature of such transition (see Figure 1).\(^4\) Noting that a revolutionary situation is an unstable condition in which a small impetus can bring no influence on the situation, or can cause an avalanche, Tsirel concludes that such signs and conditions of revolutionary situation as the delegitimisation of power, the availability of alternatives to the current regime, weakness of government or the presence of ‘combustible material’ (i.e., people who are ready to go into the streets and take part in revolutionary activities), are not able yet to give a more or less accurate picture of where and when a revolutionary situation can turn into a revolution, or at least into mass protests.

\(f(N)\) denotes the density of those who are ready to protest (it is calculated taking into consideration numbers of those who have already ‘gone out to al-Maydān’ before them), where \(N\) is the number of those who have already ‘gone out to al-Maydān,’ whereas \(F(N)\) designates the distribution function. Thus, \(F(N)\) is a total number of people who are ready to protest when the number of those who are already actually engaged in the protest activities is in the range between 0 to \(N\). In other words, \(f(N)\) is the number of people with a certain readiness to protest, whereas \(F(N)\) is the total number of people with such a readiness to protest or a higher degree of readiness – up to the most ‘straightforward insurgents.’
Russian economist and historian, Sergey Tsirel, developed a simple mathematical model of the transformation of a revolutionary situation into a revolution, showing the threshold nature of such transition.

If we use the notation employed in mathematics we arrive at the following expression \( f(n) = \int_0^N f(n) \, dn \). With the given \( f(N) \) the number of protesters can be calculated with the following equation: \( F(N) = N \) (if \( F(N) \) is more than \( N \), then new protesters will join them, whereas the opposite within the present model is impossible as it would imply that the protest participants are not ready to protest).

Thus, the development of a revolutionary situation in the model can be represented as a rise in the number of ‘straightforward insurgents’, reducing the threshold of fear to ‘go into the streets’ of the main mass
of people, as well as a reduction in the number of people who are not ready for a protest (A → B → C).

Tsirel’s model illustrates a set of several important empirical circumstances, in particular, a significant increase of revolutionary mood in the transition from A to B does not lead to an evident increase in the number of protesters ($N_1$), but further growth of people’s discontent leads to an explosive increase in the number of insurgents.

On the basis of the theory described above, a set of variables describing the intensity of revolutionary actions in the Arab world for analysing the Arab Spring events has been offered. Thus, the legitimacy of political regime acts as a main variable (the correlation coefficient between the rank of political regime in the degree of legitimacy and scope of revolutionary actions is 0.88).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Content of Events</th>
<th>Scale of Events (in scores)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Separate protests</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Several noticeable anti-government protests</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Numerous anti-government protests</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large-scale and prolonged anti-government protests with some violent confrontations</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large anti-government protests with bloody clashes which shook the government (rebel forces are comparable to government forces)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil war (approximate parity of forces)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Successful revolution (rebels’ victory)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Index of the Scale of Actual Destabilisation during the Arab Spring

Important factors are also the proportion of unemployed young people with higher education, the youth unemployment rate, the percentage of discriminated national and religious groups, as well as the
intensity of riots and wars that have taken place in recent decades and contributed to ‘burnout of revolutionary combustible material.’ The resulting multiple regression with four independent variables explains 93.5% of intensity dispersion in the revolutionary events in the Arab world, which could be a good confirmation of the developed theory. The scale of actual destabilisation in the Arab Spring countries based on the scale we have developed⁶ (Table 1) has been chosen as a dependent variable.

From the data obtained from the equation of multiple regression (Table 2), Tsirel marked out four most significant factors in the destabilisation of social and political regime: type of political system (\(p = 1*10^{-7}\)); a share of unprivileged groups and tribal structures (\(p = 0.001\)); youth unemployment and a share of people with higher education among them (\(p = 0.0015\)); combustible material ‘burnout’ (\(p = 0.005\)).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Non-Standardised Coefficients</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>Statistical significance (p)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Constant)</td>
<td>-1.0</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>-2.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of political system</td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of unprivileged groups &amp; tribalist structure</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>4.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demographic structural component characterizing the rate of unemployment among the youth and proportion of people with university degrees among them</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>4.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unrests and wars in recent years (‘burn-out’)</td>
<td>-0.52</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>-3.38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Dependent variable: scale of actual destabilisation of the Arab Spring countries
On the basis of indicators of social and political instability identified by us (see section: Analysis of the instability factors and their relative significance) we performed a multiple regression analysis (Table 3) whose results turned out to be rather similar to the ones obtained by Tsirel.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Non-standardised Coefficients</th>
<th>Standardised coefficients</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>Statistical significance (p)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Constant)</td>
<td>−3.977</td>
<td>1.448</td>
<td>−2.747</td>
<td>0.017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contradictions indicator (I1)</td>
<td>0.765</td>
<td>0.322</td>
<td>0.391</td>
<td>2.375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator of ‘combustible material’ presence (I2)</td>
<td>0.330</td>
<td>0.349</td>
<td>0.145</td>
<td>0.946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator of political order sustainability (I3)</td>
<td>0.475</td>
<td>0.225</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>2.112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator of ‘immunity’ presence (I4)</td>
<td>2.734</td>
<td>0.574</td>
<td>0.545</td>
<td>4.766</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External influence (I5)</td>
<td>1.552</td>
<td>1.206</td>
<td>0.155</td>
<td>1.287</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The presence of ‘immunity’ indicator (that is similar to Tsirel’s indicator of ‘combustible material burnout’ turned out to be the strongest and the most significant predictor ($\beta = 0.55; p = 0.0004$), followed by contradictions indicator ($\beta = 0.39; p = 0.034$) and sustainability of political order ($\beta = 0.30; p = 0.055$).

The external influence indicator turned out to be statistically insignificant ($p = 0.22$). The presence of ‘combustible material’ (an analogy of Tsirel’s component characterising the level of youth unemployment and the proportion of people with university degrees among them) also turned out to be statistically insignificant ($p = 0.362$). Of course, one should recollect at this point that in Tsirel’s regression analysis it was found to be the strongest and the most significant predictor. The point is that Tsirel noted that the his indicators of the presence of ‘combustible material’ turned out to be rather similar to the ones obtained by Tsirel.

Table 3. Multiple Regression Model with the Scale of Actual Destabilisation of the Arab Spring Countries as a Dependent Variable
tible material’ (level of unemployment among the youth people and percentage of the unemployed youth with university degrees) were strongly correlated with each other \( (r = 0.79) \) and with his political system type indicator \( (r = 0.60–0.69) \). Therefore, Tsirel decomposed his ‘combustible material indicator’ into two components, whereas one of those components was orthogonal to the political system indicator. In his multiple regression analysis, Tsirel used only this component.

In our case, the presence of ‘combustible material’ indicator turned out to be a very strong and significant predictor \( (\beta = 0.569; \ p = 0.003) \) when it was entered into our multiple regression model together with the ‘immunity presence indicator.’ It remained quite strong and significant \( (\beta = 0.360; \ p = 0.025) \) when it was entered along with indicators of political system type and the presence of ‘immunity’. However, the significance of ‘combustible material’ indicator was considerably reduced \( (\beta = 0.15; \ p = 0.36, \text{ thus becoming statistically insignificant}) \) with the introduction of the contradictions indicator. This is primarily due to the fact that these two indicators (‘combustible material’ and ‘contradictions’) are too correlated with each other \( (r = 0.661) \), that is why the ‘combustible material’ effect is screened by the influence of the ‘contradictions’ indicator as a result of the multicollinearity effect.

This indicates that, in the construction of potential instability index for the Arab Spring countries of 2011 the presence of ‘combustible material’ can, in principle, be neglected (as a result of too high correlation of this indicator with the contradictions index observed for the Arab countries in 2010, just before the start of the Arab Spring); however, while developing potential instability indices for other regions and other time periods the indicator of ‘combustible material’ presence should be definitely taken into consideration.

The presence of external influence turned out to be another insignificant factor \( (p = 0.221) \) in our multiple regression analysis. However, this does not mean that the influence of external factor should be ignored. A closer analysis has shown that the abovementioned result was obtained because we chose the destabilisation scale as a dependent variable. If we had chosen the number of human casualties in each of the Arab Spring countries as a dependent variable and made a multiple regression equation, the external influence indicator would have immediately become statistical significant \( (p = 0.002) \) (see Table 4).
This allows us to argue that the influence of external factor mostly accounts for the death toll that resulted from the processes of socio-political destabilisation during the Arab Spring, rather than for the scale of social and political upheavals.

Analysis of Instability Factors and their Relative Importance

A considerable number of studies that analysed the Arab Spring events, at different times, are devoted to the empirical and theoretical study of social instability factors. The most important factors of instability detected include the:

1. presence of ethnic (interconfessional, interclan, intraelite) contradictions and conflicts;
2. instability within the political order;
3. uneven distribution of socio-economic and socio-political benefits;
4. high level of poverty;
5. presence of structural and demographic rises (‘youth bulges’);
6. excessive government corruption;
7. availability of attractive alternatives to the existing political regime and others.

In this case, the basic mechanisms and important factors of social instability are dependent on the specific country under inspection and its specific historical and socio-political situation.
Statistics by historical precedents are necessary in order to identify the factors of social and political upheavals in Arab countries; to determine their relative importance, and to form a quantitative index. The Arab Spring events (2011-2014+) provide rich materials for the analysis of sociopolitical destabilisation in modernising countries with strong clan traditions.

Analysis of Arab Spring events facilitates a reflection over facilitates the review of the following internal instability factors common to the countries of this type.

First, the objective factors of instability in modernising societies, includes: a) political preconditions (type of political order; the presence of intra-elite conflict; inefficient power transfer tools), b) social preconditions (the presence of internal social, religious, ethnic, and tribal conflicts), c) demographic factors (the presence of ‘combustible material’ which is based on the demographic component), d) external factors (the presence of a significant destabilising/stabilising external factor that influence the development of a situation in the country), e) the historical background (the presence of large-scale conflicts that led to the burnout of ‘combustible material’ in the near past and f) the Islamist factor (presence/absence of the legal basis for the functioning of an Islamist-oriented opposition).

Second, subjective factors (psycho-social, cultural and historical) of instability arising in a given period of time such as: a) a crisis of unfulfilled expectations of modernisation and b) the presence of an attractive (though perhaps imaginary) alternative to the existing regime.

These factors are discussed in some detail below:

The transitional nature of political regime: The second half of the 20th century saw the beginning of an intensive transition from authoritarianism to democracy in the majority of countries of Latin America, Asia and Eastern Europe. In view of this, the area of authoritarianism prevalence narrowed down to three main regions: the Arab world, Central Asia and Tropical Africa. Authoritarianism, originated in pre-industrial times when it was the dominant type of political system in the form of the absolute monarchy; afterwards it underwent significant change and remained, in its original form, in only one country in the world – Saudi Arabia. In all other countries it has been modified into two main forms: the constitutional monarchy and the imitative republic. Thus, by the early 21st century, while generally moving toward demo-
Andrey V. Korotayev et al.

cratic political structures; several Arab political regimes transformed themselves into so-called transitional regimes. Powell and Almond wrote in the 1950s and 1960s about the transitional nature of many authoritarian regimes. This type of political regime is much less stable in the course of social and political upheavals than consistently authoritarian or democratic regimes, since the former (authoritarian) mechanisms of its functioning are being destructed, and the new democratic tools are not developed enough.

The presence of intra-elite conflict: As the events of the Arab Spring have shown again, one of the most destabilising factors is conflict among political elites. Obvious examples of this is Egypt (where there has been a conflict between the ‘old guard’ led by the top of the military, and the young reformers led by Gamal Mubarak), Tunisia (with conflicts between the army and the security forces whose numbers exceeded the military several times, and also between military and civil – first of all, party – bureaucracy), and of course, Yemen and Libya (where tribal conflicts played a crucial role during the Arab Spring and in Libya even led to a temporary state breakdown).

The inefficiency of power transfer tools: Among the main features of authoritarianism two should be specially highlighted: national consolidation and primary modernisation. However, with the process of modernisation and the transition from pre-industrial to industrial societies (and the rejection of socialist experiments in the Arab countries) there has been a shift towards the establishment of democratic institutions and, first of all, the institution of general elections. However, while in monarchic states there has been developed real inter-party competition (for example, in Kuwait, Jordan, Morocco and Bahrain, party systems emerged with winning parties having the right to form a government), in Arab republics the institute of elections had an imitative nature: in Egypt, Tunisia and Syria dominant parties existed, and in Yemen there had been a reliance on army and tribal alliances. The Algerian experience of democracy building in the late 1980s led to the landslide victory of Islamists and an ensuing civil war, after which President Abdelaziz Bouteflika returned to the authoritarian patterns typical of Arab republics. In Iraq and Libya, competitive multi-party elections were not possible at all due to the ideological component of Saddam Hussein’s and Jamahiriya’s regimes. All this has led to the fact that the republican authoritarian regimes in the Arab world have
lost effective power transferring tools (this point was critical for the regimes of Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, Muammar Gaddafi in Libya, Ali Abdullah Saleh in Yemen), in contrast to monarchies whose system implies a legitimate transition of power from father to son.

The presence of internal social conflicts: Being extremely heterogeneous in several aspects – religious, ethnic, clan etc – Arab countries are vulnerable to social splits. Thus, the infringement of the rights of the opposition in the Arab countries during the period of authoritarianism (e.g., suppression of an uprising in Hama in 1982, the extermination of Shia and Kurds by Saddam Hussein in Iraq) only aggravated the situation by putting a number of Arab States during the Arab Spring events to the threat of their territorial integrity loss. Alleged violations of the rights of the Shia population in Bahrain, from the ruling house of al-Khalifa related to Sunni Islam, has led to a long-running conflict in the country. The situation is similar in Syria, where the contradictions between the Sunnis, on the one hand, and the Alawites, on the other, led to the full-scale civil war with the threat of state collapse. A rivalry between Jordanian Palestinians and supporters of the Royal Family is also the major factor of destabilisation in Jordan which significantly complicates the process of urgent political reforms, the traditional division between the North and the South, has displayed with a new strength during the Arab Spring, again actualising a problem of the need to separate the state. Sharp clan differences, especially on the redistribution of power and economic resources, have declared themselves in Libya which is threatened of split into three parts: Cyrenaica, Tripolitania and Fezzan. We should not forget the traditional ethno-national conflicts in some Arab countries (mainly in Algeria and Morocco) between Arabs and Berbers. Additionally, a strong destabilising factor is the Kurdish issue which has become particularly acute after the fall of Hussein’s regime in Iraq and the deterioration of the situation in Syria in 2011-2012.

Combustible material: The beginning of sustainable escape from the ‘Malthusian trap’ by definition means reduced mortality and, therefore, a sharp acceleration in population growth. The beginning of sustainable escape from the ‘Malthusian trap’ tends to be accompanied by particularly strong decrease in infant and child mortality. All this led to a sharp increase in the proportion of young people in the population in total and adult population, in particular (the so-called phenomenon of ‘youth bulge’). As a result, there occurs a sharp rise in the
proportion of that very segment of population that is most prone to violence, aggression and radicalism, which itself is a powerful factor in political destabilisation. The rapid growth of the youth population requires a radical increase in the number of new jobs which is a very difficult task. Explosive increase in youth unemployment can have especially powerful politically destabilising effect, since it creates an army of potential participants (‘combustible material’) for all political (including revolutionary) shocks.

This is confirmed by the studies of Moller and Goldstone who maintain that

the rapid growth of youth can undermine existing political coalitions, creating instability. Large youth cohorts are often drawn to new ideas and heterodox religions, challenging older forms of authority. In addition, because most young people have fewer responsibilities for families and careers, they are relatively easily mobilized for social or political conflicts. Youth have played a prominent role in political violence throughout recorded history, and the existence of a “youth bulge” (an unusually high proportion of youths 15 to 24 relative to the total adult population) has historically been associated with times of political crisis. Most major revolutions ... [including] most 20th-century revolutions in developing countries – have occurred where exceptionally large youth bulges were present.22

*Burnout of ‘combustible material.’* The presence of recent large-scale conflicts can be considered as one of the major deterrent factors of social and political upheavals. As the events of Arab Spring have shown, those Arab countries which experienced recent major shocks, also managed to avoid a significant transformation of political system during the events of 2011–2012. Huge death toll produced by socio-political destabilisation in Algeria (during the civil war of the 1990s), in Sudan (especially, during the confrontation with rebels from Southern Sudan23), Iraq (especially, after the invasion of coalition forces in 2003), Lebanon (especially, during the protracted civil war24), and Palestine markedly reduced the protest activity in these countries during the Arab Spring events.25 Indeed, against such a background the population of a respective country is becoming increasingly interested in the maintenance of stability and the existing *status quo*, rather than in radical changes.
The legal basis for the functioning of Islamist-oriented opposition: In many ways, the total suppression of Islamists in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya ultimately led to the point that Islamist forces played a very important role in the Arab Spring protest movements, whereas afterwards they became main contenders in the struggle for power. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Libya, al-Nahdah in Tunisia were under complete prohibition and had almost no opportunity to conduct legal political struggle. However, Ben Ali, Mubarak and al-Qaddafi, being confident in the complete elimination of the Islamist threat in their countries were disoriented by their rapid rise. Contrarily, the continued participation of Islamists in the political life allows authorities to adapt to their political position, requirements and a format of political activity. In cases where Islamists are in dialogue with a government, the government considers them as a political rival, which allows it to adequately assess their challenges. This is clearly seen on the case of Algeria. Since the transition to a multiparty system in 1989, Islamists played a key role in the political life of the country, which resulted in an open confrontation with the army. However, as the practice of the early 2000’s showed, Abdelaziz Bouteflika managed to deal with the Islamist threat and achieved success; giving them the possibility to act within the country’s legal framework. In the elections to the National People’s Assembly in 2007, the “Green Algeria Alliance” consisting of ‘The Movement for Peaceful Society’ (Hamas), the ‘Islamic Renaissance Movement’ (al-Nahdah) and ‘The Movement for National Reform’ (al-Islah) received some 6.22% of votes and got 47 seats in the lower house of the parliament. Relatively low results were also achieved by Islamists in Sudan and Yemen, where they also had access to the legal struggle for power through participation in the elections.

The crisis of unfulfilled expectations of modernisation: This factor is subjective (psychological), but very important. The fact is that modernisation usually generates high expectations in society that are fuelled by governments’ promises (the latter gives inflated promises to secure the support of society). Sooner or later, after a period of steady improvements in the quality of life in a country, a certain decline is inevitable which may lead to emotional distress, increase public discontent, and even provoke riots. Moreover, the higher the economic successes of a country, the stronger the frustration in the case of recession or a significant slowdown. The more opportunities people had, the higher
their expectations were, the greater the disappointment in case of the Government’s failure to satisfy those expectations.28

The availability of an attractive alternative: The probability that unfulfilled expectations can lead to social and political destabilisation increases if there are forces in the country actively offering a more attractive alternative. This alternative may be imaginary, or even false, but during the period of frustration and disappointment it has a real chance to attract attention, to form a protest movement and to undermine the existing regime.29

Methodological Overview

This section is devoted to presenting the methodology of our quantitative analysis of the Arab Spring events. The basis of this methodology is the development of a specialised instability index which considers the cumulative impact of the described above factors and reflects the overall potential of instability. We consider a potential, that is, the objective possibility of social and political instability of a certain level (scale). Subjective and conjunctive factors are attached to the particular situation and should be considered in a separate way in assessing the probability of protests.

The task is to form a composite index which takes into account the most important factors of social and political instability and could be calculated on the basis of statistical data and expert assessments and would allow estimating the potential social instability and its possible scale. The values of this instability index have been compared to that how really stable Arab regimes turned out in the conditions of the Arab Spring. The estimation of sustainability of Arab socio-political systems to the wave of destabilisation of 2011 that was actually demonstrated during the events of the Arab Spring is introduced using a numerical scale. In the construction of multiple regression equation the scale of actual destabilization has been chosen as a dependent variable. However, when we studied the correlation between the potential (systemic) instability and the actual destabilisation amplitude, we have detected a power-law relationship between the instability index developed by us and the scale of actual destabilisation. That is why we decided to invert the scale of the actual destabilization index, which resulted in an index of actual resistance to destabilising impulses $I_{RES}$ (Table 5):
In this case, the power-law dependence is interpreted in the following way: \( n \) times as high level of potential instability leads to an \( n^\alpha \) times decrease in the level of actual resistance (1).

\[
I_{RES} = \frac{k}{I_{UNST}^\alpha}
\]  

(1)

where \( I_{RES} \) is an index of actual resistance, \( I_{UNST} \) is an index of potential instability, \( k \) and \( \alpha \) are parameters.

Since, as noted, the index of potential political instability reflects the accumulated potential of instability in the society, then the objectively existing conditions of instability (political, social, demographic, economic, etc), as well as such important characteristics as 'historic immunity' and the presence of Islamists within the legal framework, which have a damping effect, should be considered. Accordingly, the index of potential instability is reasonable to be presented in the form of a multiplicative convolution of indicators reflecting the following:

1. internal contradictions (indicator \( I_1 \));
2. structural and demographical characteristics (indicator \( I_2 \));

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Content of Events</th>
<th>Index of actually manifested resistance ( I_{RES} ) (in points)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The system has shown a very high degree of resistance, the pan-Arab wave of destabilisation produced just some small scale protest actions</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A high degree of resistance: a few notable anti-government demonstrations</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An average degree of resistance: numerous protests against the government</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The resistance below the average: large-scale and prolonged anti-government protests with a few violent clashes</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low resistance: powerful anti-government protests with bloody collisions that shattered the power (strength of the rebel forces being comparable with the one of the governmental forces)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very low resistance: civil war (with approximate parity of forces)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extremely low resistance: a successful revolution (victory of the rebels)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5. Index of Actually Manifested Resistance to the Arab Spring Destabilisation
3. ability of the government to reduce social tensions (indicator $I_3$);
4. presence of ‘immunity’ to internal conflicts (indicator $I_4$).

Therefore, the instability index $I_{UNST}$ has the form:

$$I_{UNST} = I_1^\beta_1 I_2^\beta_2 I_3^\beta_3 I_4^\beta_4$$

(2)

where the exponents $\beta_i$ reflect the relative significance of relevant factors and are determined by calibration of index on the real events.

The methodology of the quantitative assessment of indicators, as well as a calibration of the index is necessary for the index proposed above and could be used as a tool to assess the level of socio-political instability. This methodology is based on the analysis of Arab Spring events of 2011.

**Sampling and Quantitative Assessment of Indicators**

*Contradictions Index $I_1$*

For the calculation of this index we have taken into account the following instability factors:

1. the presence of intra-elite conflict;
2. the presence of ethnic, inter-confessional, intertribal, and inter-clan contradictions;
3. the uneven distribution of socio-economic and socio-political benefits;
4. high levels of poverty;
5. excessive government corruption.

We omit the last two factors from this list due to the fact that – contrary to popular opinion about their importance in the Arab Spring – the results of the quantitative analysis of these parameters were not statistically significant. In particular, the correlation coefficient ($r$) of the poverty level with the scale of actual destabilisation of the Arab Spring countries is about $-0.05$, and the coefficient of determination ($R^2$) is equal to $0.003$ (i.e., it explains less than $1\%$ of dispersion). Similar results were obtained with respect to corruption ($R = -0.04, R^2=0.002$, accordingly). Quantitative calculations are confirmed by purely empir-
ical analysis of the situation. No Arab country has a poverty level which exceeds 20%, in contrast to, for example, India, Indonesia and several sub-Saharan African countries. And, the level of corruption in Middle Eastern countries is nearly identical to all other developing countries and regions.\textsuperscript{30}

As for the uneven distribution of socio-economic benefits, this indicator in the Arab world is comparable with that in the developed and developing countries, while being at the level of some Western European countries such as the UK and Spain and lower than in the US. In addition, however, this figure is similar in all Arab countries, so the use of it to detect differences in the Arab world does not make much sense.

In addition, we eliminate the ethnic diversity of the Arab countries from the number of indicators that make up the first indicator ($I_1$). This is due to the fact that this indicator did not play any destabilising role in anti-regime performances in 2011. So, the Arab Spring was ‘Arab’ – its main driving force included representatives of the Arab nation.

The two remaining factors (that were used to calculate the first indicator $I_1$) – tribal and inter-confessional heterogeneity and the presence of intra-elite conflict – are rather complex and could be hardly measured quantitatively. That is why, in order to estimate them, we used procedures of experts’ monitoring. The experts’ views were further quantified using the following scale (Table 5).

The assessment of the contradictions index (indicator $I_1$) for the countries of the Arab Spring is presented in Table 6.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale of Conflict Potential</th>
<th>Value of Indicator (in scores)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contradictions’ scale is below average</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above the average</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very high</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The ‘combustible material’ of social instability is, as a rule, disadvantaged social groups, and the youth is the most active in the protest movements. Since the possibility of social aggression in general has been taken into account in the preceding paragraphs, this index is appropriate to reflect a potential of the youth factor directly as a ‘combustible material’ of conflict escalation.

Due to the fact that Arab countries are mostly modernising, the phenomenon of the ‘youth bulge’ is typical for them as is generally charac-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Intertribal heterogeneity</th>
<th>Inter-religious heterogeneity</th>
<th>The presence of intra-elite conflict</th>
<th>Value of $I_1$ indicator in scores</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2&lt;sup&gt;11&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6. Assessment of Contradictions’ Indicator $I_1$ for the Arab Spring Countries
teristic for countries having to risk falling into a ‘trap trying to escape a trap’. Accordingly, while assessing the presence of the ‘combustible material’, one should proceed from the data which show the influence of the ‘youth bulge’ on the overall level of instability.

On the basis of our analysis of the Arab Spring data, the following scheme has been detected. By itself, the ‘youth bulge’ as a demographic phenomenon is (more or less) present in all countries of the Arab Spring, and (roughly) equally significant. We should also assess youth unemployment rates, the proportion of unemployed young people in the total adult population and the proportion of unemployed people with higher education among youth.

Similar to the previous section, a grade scale has been introduced here, but only the indicator of ‘share of unemployed people with higher education among the youth’ (due to the lack of adequate statistical data) was estimated on the basis of the expert monitoring, the rest two had quantitative characteristics (see Tables 7 and 8).

As mentioned, a high level of correlation \((r = 0.661)\) between the presence of ‘combustible material’ \((I_2)\) and the contradictions index \((I_1)\) brings down the statistical significance of \(I_2\) in our multiple regression, as this factor is shadowed by the contradictions index due to the multicollinearity effect.

### Indicators of Political Order Sustainability:
The Ability Governments to Ease Social Tension \(I_3\)

Previous studies demonstrated that this index is dependent on the type of political order in a country. At the same time, the analysis
of historical events has shown that the most stable regimes are either consolidated democracies (because of their strong institutional mechanisms that are able to ease social tension), or absolute monarchies and autocracies (due to their having the lever of direct impact on the social environment – the authority of the monarch, authoritarian leader or fear of repressions). The least stable are transitional regimes. On this basis, an evaluation grade scale (Table 9) has been introduced.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Youth unemployment (20-29), % (expert estimation)</th>
<th>The share of unemployed young people (20-29) in the total structure of the adult population, %</th>
<th>The share of unemployed people with higher education among youth</th>
<th>Value of indicator I2 (in scores)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8. Assessing ‘Social Combustible Material’ Indicator I2
In addition, a special role is played by the legitimate tools of power transfer. In this case, the least protected are authoritarian states with a republican (rather than monarchical) form of government. Moreover, the most prone to socio-political shocks are those formally republican states where the perspective to transfer the power within a family is maturing. On this basis, an evaluation grade scale has been developed (Table 10).

![Table 9. Assessing the Political Type Scale](image)

In addition, a special role is played by the legitimate tools of power transfer. In this case, the least protected are authoritarian states with a republican (rather than monarchical) form of government. Moreover, the most prone to socio-political shocks are those formally republican states where the perspective to transfer the power within a family is maturing. On this basis, an evaluation grade scale has been developed (Table 10).

![Table 10. The Scale of Assessment on the Availability of Power Transfer Tools](image)

Finally, we consider the fourth indicator ($I_4$) which is a combination of two factors: the presence of a large-scale conflict (we considered as large-scale

32
conflicts the ones in which the death toll has exceeded 10 thousand people) in the recent past and the participation of Islamists in the political process. The first indicator appears in the countries that have endured civil war and unrest. The following should be noted.

First, this indicator can be evaluated in a manner close to the so-called ‘soft’ ranking (i.e., the indicator is assigned a value of either ‘1’ if it is the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Power transfer tools</th>
<th>Type of political order</th>
<th>Value of $I_3$, indicator in scores</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
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<td>Morocco</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
case, either ‘0’, in its absence). At the same time, we can hardly talk about the possibility of assigning a value ‘0’ since the ‘absolute immunity’ to social unrest is a theoretical abstraction. Score scaling is therefore advisable (Table 12).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree of the immunity of society to internal conflicts</th>
<th>Indicator value in scores</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Almost absolute immunity</td>
<td>0,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong immunity</td>
<td>0,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average immunity</td>
<td>0,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak immunity</td>
<td>0,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No immunity</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 12. Scale for estimating the indicator of ‘immunity’.

Second, taking into account that one of the most common (especially in the Middle East and North Africa) factors affecting immunity to internal conflicts is the presence of prolonged internal conflicts in the recent past, as well as the presence of Islamist-oriented opposition within the legal framework of Arab States, this element should be considered more carefully. In particular, in the case of the Arab Spring, Algeria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Iraq were assigned with a score corresponding to an ‘almost absolute immunity.’

Calibration of the Index

The potential instability index (2) should be calibrated using historical data to be deployed in practical assessments. The subject of calibration is the selection of the exponents $\beta_i$ and the correlation of the index with the events scale. Analysis of the Arab Spring events of 2011 has been used for the calibration.

Using non-linear regression method, we calculate the exponents of variables ($\beta_1 = 0.8; \beta_2 = 1; \beta_3 = 0.7; \beta_4 = 0.6$), in view of which the results of the calibration of potential instability index take the following form:

$$I_{\text{UNST}} = I_1^{0.8} I_2 I_3^{0.7} I_4^{0.6}$$

(3)

It should be noted that another important additional factor – namely, the external influence – has been also taken into account during the calculations. This was done through the calculation of the external
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>The presence of large-scale conflict</th>
<th>The presence of Islamists in the legal field</th>
<th>Value of $I_4$, indicator (points)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Influence index $I_4$, according to the following scale:

0.1 – limited distorted media coverage;

0.2 – limited distorted media coverage, the presence of some information on financing of the opposition forces from abroad, some calls to resign from abroad;

0.3 – large-scale distorted media coverage, connections of the foreign state actors with the opposition parties, strong pressure in the form of calls to resign;

Table 12. Assessment of the Indicator of 'Immunity' Presence $I_4$. 

35
0.4 – information attack, reliable information on the funding of opposition forces from abroad, external pressure in the form of possible sanctions;

0.5 – all previous points, as well as military intervention.

Using the same method of nonlinear regression we have estimated the value of exponent $\beta_5$ to be equal to 1.0. Moreover, we note that taking into account this indicator is important primarily to account for the number of human casualties in the course of social and political upheaval. In the case of the evaluation of actual destabilisation scale its importance is greatly reduced.

As we remember, both factors (the presence of ‘combustible material’ $I_2$ and external influences $I_5$) have low statistical significance in the construction of multiple regression equation, and have shown themselves substantially less important than the other three in the construction of the equation of nonlinear regression. However, the complete removal of these variables from the equation of nonlinear regression (Figures 2 and 3) leads to a significant reduction of its predictive power (from $R^2 = 0.91$ and $R^2 = 0.82$).

![Graph showing the Power-Law Correlation between Potential Instability Index ($I_{UNST}$) calculated without taking into account indicators $I_2$ and $I_5$ with the index of actually manifested resistance to social and political destabilization ($I_{RES}$), natural scale.]

$I_{RES} = 6.49^{*}I_{UNST}^{-0.75}$

$R^2 = 0.82$
Figure 3. Power-Law Correlation between Potential Instability Index ($I_{\text{UNST}}$, calculated without taking into account indicators $I_2$ and $I_5$) with the index of actually manifested resistance to social and political destabilization ($I_{\text{RES}}$), log-log scale.

$$I_{\text{RES}} = 6.49^{0.75}I_{\text{UNST}}^{0.75}$$

$R^2 = 0.82$

Figure 4. Power-Law Correlation between Potential Instability Index ($I_{\text{UNST}}$, calculated taking into account indicators $I_2$ and $I_5$) with the index of actually manifested resistance to social and political destabilization ($I_{\text{RES}}$), natural scale.

$$I_{\text{RES}} = 13.87^{0.65}I_{\text{UNST}}^{0.65}$$

$R^2 = 0.91$
Thus, the final formula for calculating the index of instability ($I_{UNST}$) takes the following form:

$$I_{UNST} = I_1^{0.8} \times I_2^{0.7} \times I_3^{0.6} \times I_4 \times I_5$$ (4)

An example of calculating the instability index and its comparison with the index of resistance (see Table 5) during the Arab Spring in 2011 is shown below (Table 13, Figures 4-5).

Figures 4 and 5 show the significant distance of Lebanon from the trend line. This is primarily because Lebanon takes the first place in the world for local ethnic and religious diversity of its society which, throughout the history of Lebanon, led to the growth of social and political instability. Therefore, despite the fact that Lebanon is an example of a rather successful developing country with stable democratic institutions, the factor of ethno-religious fragmentation of society can
cause serious conflicts (close to a civil war) against the background of successful economic, political and demographic development. If we compare the index of instability and the resistance index in the period of the Arab Spring of 2011, excluding Lebanon from the list of the countries (Figures 6 and 7), a significant improvement in the correlation becomes obvious ($R^2 = 0.93$).

**Conclusions**

We have identified a set of factors that help in evaluating the current state of social and political destabilisation in the countries of the Arab Spring. These factors of instability act in the long and medium term,
Figure 6. Power-Law Correlation between Potential Instability Index ($I_{\text{UNST}}$, calculated taking into account indicators $I_2$ and $I_5$) with the index of actually manifested resistance to social and political destabilization ($I_{\text{RES}}$), natural scale (excluding Lebanon).

$I_{\text{RES}} = 14.9^{0.68} I_{\text{UNST}}$
$R^2 = 0.93$

Figure 7. Power-Law Correlation between Potential Instability Index ($I_{\text{UNST}}$, calculated taking into account indicators $I_2$ and $I_5$) with the index of actually manifested resistance to social and political destabilization ($I_{\text{RES}}$), log-log scale (excluding Lebanon).

$I_{\text{RES}} = 14.9^{0.68} I_{\text{UNST}}$
$R^2 = 0.93$
creating grounds for discontent with the existing situation among the population and elites. With respect to the Arab Spring, the most significant factors have turned out to be the following: the ability of the government to reduce social tensions, the presence of ‘immunity’ to internal conflicts as well as the internal contradictions level (especially the intra-elite conflict).

Indicators, such as structural and demographic characteristics and the external influences appear to be less significant as predictors of the actual level of the socio-political destabilisation within particular Arab Spring countries in 2011. However, the demographic structural factors turn out to be very important if we consider fundamental factors of the Arab Spring in general.\(^37\) It should be also mentioned that the significance of the external influences indicator notably increases while accounting for the death toll that resulted from the destabilisation in respective countries.

It is also noteworthy that some trigger is necessary for the latent discontent to grow in overt protest actions. Moreover, this trigger should affect the widest possible range of social groups so that the response to it would be not local, but universal, which dramatically reduces the ability of the government to control the situation. In the context of the Arab Spring the role of such a trigger was played by the following factors, the:

1. sharp and rapid increase in world food prices: the second wave of “agflation” that preceded the Arab Spring of 2011, and significantly deteriorated economic position of rather broad strata of citizens,\(^38\)
2. ‘effect of Al-Jazeera.’ It should be kept in mind that during the last 10-15 years in the Arab world, a media revolution took place which expressed in the appearance of super professional television satellite channels such as Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya. We are talking about unconditionally world-class television journalism and about television channels that had already got an immense popularity around the Arab world by the beginning of the Arab Spring,\(^39\)
3. rapid growth of the number Internet users in the first decade of the 21st century in all Arab countries which enabled political activists to use social media resources in organising protest activity and deprived (in conjunction with the activities of the satellite TV) authoritarian regimes of the power of effective information control.
The implementation of the ‘domino effect’ that leads to the accelerating rise of instability and its spread on new social strata and areas is necessary for most effective trigging of destabilisation. Because of this effect, social instability may proliferate beyond one country and be imported into the neighbouring states (as it was during the Arab Spring of 2011), but this was only possible within regional systems with relatively homogenous prerequisites to instability. Therefore, $I_{UNST}$ gives only an idea of the potential and possible scope of socio-political upheavals, but it cannot be used to predict the level of actual destabilisation in a particular region at a specific time period.

On the other hand, note that if we had calculated $I_{UNST}$, for example, for Egypt and Tunisia in 2000, the scores that we would get (13.23 and 13.83 accordingly) would rather correspond to the situation in 2011 in Yemen and Jordan. Indeed, the point that 10 years ago the regimes of Mubarak and Ben Ali would have fallen so fast, seems rather unlikely; more likely it can be argued that a slight advantage after all was on the side of the ruling regimes. And, the scores that equation (3) produces correspond to this point.

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The authors would like to note that this study was implemented in the framework of the Basic Research Program at the National Research University Higher School of Economics (HSE) in 2013.

Notes to text
31 When calculating the indicator of interconfessional heterogeneity with regard to the countries of the Arabian Peninsula, we take into account the religious affiliation of only the indigenous populations of these countries, excluding the immigrants.

Notes
6 These, and other, assessments are not based on the observations of the authors but on the analysis of literary sources and may include over- or underestimation of the values of any indexes for individual countries.
7 An analogy of Tsirel’s indicator of share of unprivileged groups and tribal structures.
8 An analogy of Tsirel’s political system indicator.


Developing the Methods of Estimation and Forecasting the Arab Spring


29. Here the analogy with crisis of Weimar Republic and victory of Hitler in April 1933 in Germany is quite obvious.


33. Note that there are grounds to maintain that the high level of correlation in this case is entirely coincidental.


Politics and Religion in Europe

The Case of the Roman Catholic Church and the European Union

Tomáš Doležal and Petr Kratochvíl

The rise of religion in international politics is often treated as a self-evident trend of recent decades. But what exactly is new about religion in global affairs that it deserves such focused attention? Is it the growing numbers of believers of major religions, or the increasing fundamentalist tendencies within them? Perhaps, the intensification of religious influence in both international and subnational conflicts or the greater prominence of religious topics in the public sphere? Alternatively, the “religious turn” may only be a temporary phenomenon related to some controversial topics that bring religion and the secular order into conflict. These few examples of different perspectives on what might be interpreted as the rise of religion remind us of how heterogeneous the manifestations of religion are. Not only are the trends within individual religions substantially different from one another, but the interactions between religion and politics take on very different forms in different parts of the world. Our work deals with a particular religious actor, the Roman Catholic Church (RCC), in a particular context, the European Union (EU). It is not our aim to reduce the complexity of the politico-religious nexus to just one dyad, the RCC-EU relationship, but since the two entities belong to the most influential actors on the European continent, we are convinced that the analysis can shed new light on the role religious actors play in world politics today. The aim of this work is twofold: to provide a special empirical focus on the recent RCC-EU interactions and to frame it in the broader perspective of a critical examination of various aspects of the rise of religion. We commence our examination with a short
discussion of the secularisation thesis, which continues to form the background of all discussions about the rise of religion. Secondly, we analyse the recent academic debates about the fundamental conundrum concerning the role of religion in international relations: are we really witnessing a rise in the political power of religion(s) or does the religious turn happen primarily in the minds of academicians who had previously neglected religious phenomena? Following our critical literature overview, we focus on the case study of the relations between the EU and the RCC. Our main question here is whether the RCC has become a more influential political actor in the EU in spite of the persisting secularising tendencies in European societies. Finally, we draw some conclusions from our case study, offering some insights about the specific manifestations of the rise of religion in Europe.

Keywords: religion, Roman Catholic Church, European Union secularisation, politics

Introduction

The rise of religion in international politics is often treated as a self-evident trend of the recent decades. But what exactly is so new about religion in global affairs that it deserves such focussed attention? Is it the growing numbers of believers of major religions? Or the increasing fundamentalist tendencies within them? Perhaps the intensification of religious influence in both international and subnational conflicts? Or the greater prominence of religious topics in the public sphere? Or is the “religious turn” only a temporary phenomenon related to some controversial topics that bring religion and the secular order into conflict?

Only these few examples of different perspectives on what might be interpreted as the rise of religion remind us of how heterogeneous the manifestations of religion are. Not only are the trends within individual religions substantially different from one another, but the interactions between religion and politics take on very different forms in different parts of the world. Our essay deals with a particular religious actor – the Roman Catholic Church (RCC) - in a particular context, the European Union (EU). It is not our aim to reduce the complexity of the politico-religious nexus to just one dyad, the RCC-EU relationship,
but since the two entities belong to the most influential actors on the European continent, we are convinced that the analysis can shed new light on the role religious actors play in world politics today.

The aims of this work are twofold: first, to provide an empirical focus on the recent RCC-EU interactions, and second, to frame it in the broader perspective of a critical examination of various aspects of the rise of religion. We commence our examination with a short discussion of the secularisation thesis, which continues to form the background of all discussions about the rise of religion. Secondly, we analyse the recent academic debates over the fundamental conundrum concerning the role of religion in international relations: are we really witnessing a rise in the political power of religion(s) or does the religious turn happen primarily in the minds of academicians who had previously neglected religious phenomena? Following our critical literature overview, we turn our focus to a specific case study: the relationship between the EU and the RCC. Our main question is whether the RCC has become a more influential political actor in the EU despite the persisting secularising tendencies in European societies. Finally, we draw some conclusions from our case study, offering insights about the specific manifestations of the rise of religion in Europe.

The Secularisation Thesis

It is impossible to explore the role of religion in (international) politics without mentioning the concept of secularisation. Not so long ago, many prominent academic voices – notably in the Sociology of Religion discipline – advocated the view that the future political role of religion will gradually diminish since the religious and public institutions will continue to drift apart, and religion will continue its transformation from a publicly proclaimed, collective endeavour to a set of privately held beliefs. The on-going critique of the secularisation theory has shown, however, how exceptional the position of Europe has been in the creation as well as the deconstruction of the theory. Generations of largely Eurocentric scholars were misled to believe that modernisation is unavoidable and that modernisation’s basic form known from Europe will be automatically adopted in a virtually unchanged form in other parts of the world as well. The expectation of the withdrawal of religion from the public to the private sphere was
usually associated with the decrease in religiousness and church attendance and/or the generally diminishing importance of religions in social and political life, the institutional separation of religious and political bodies and even the fact that religion is fading away from the public (especially political) discourse and also from everyday culture.¹

If we skip directly to the outcome of the heated academic debates on secularisation, it is clear that the academic hegemony secularisation once enjoyed has been shattered. Today, most authors agree that from a global perspective, there has been no decline of religion(s) and that the European experience of modernity should not be expected to be repeated on the global scale. To top it off, the theory is challenged on its own turf since the original religion where secularisation was explored – Christianity – has shown to be globally resistant to secularisation. In fact, some branches of Christianity such as Pentecostalism expand more rapidly than Islam – both in terms of the number of adherents and geographic expansion. In contradiction to the predictions of the supply-side religious scholars, even the number of members of the Catholic Church, the most monopolistic of the churches, has been growing.

The problem, however, is that the secularisation thesis has been most frequently criticised because it assumed a universal validity and not because it is inherently flawed. While we may accept the fact that secularisation is not a global phenomenon, we can still be convinced that some areas, most notably Europe, continue to exhibit a number of those features which are associated with secularisation. The fact is that European societies do not demonstrate such a strong and stable “demand” for institutionalised religions as people in other parts of the world (including developed areas of North America, for instance). Also, the regular church attendance has been clearly in decline in Europe over the long-term.

To describe the situation in Europe, Casanova coined the term unchurching,² Hervie-Léger talked about belonging without believing and Davie about believing without belonging; stressing the growing role of religious individualisation. The sociology of religion reminds us that when watching only the traditional and the most visible churches, we might overlook other forms of collectively shared or personal belief systems, which can cast doubts over the image of Europeans as being increasingly irreligious. Trying to reconnoitre the relevant spiritual
imaginations inspiring Europeans and current European politics is a daunting task. Nevertheless, when discussing Europe’s most visible, and demographically, its strongest religious community, the Roman Catholic Church, we can argue that there has not been any significant rise in its European membership, its church attendance or Catholic conversion in recent decades.

The Religious Turn in International Relations: A Literature Overview

Given the different developments in different parts of the world, one may wonder what causes the spike in attention to religion in international studies. Robertson and Mews reformulated the question of the resurgence of religious-political interactions to include both sides, not only religious bodies but also the state. They argue that both have enlarged their spheres of operation, and many quasi-religious issues have been taken up by the state, including ‘birth, death, old age, sexuality, and other dimensions of individual and collective meaning, suffering and reward.’

Hence, on one hand, Robertson and Mew challenge the received view about the intrusion of religion into secular affairs by pointing to the intrusion of the state into the religious sphere as well. Simultaneously, their studies can be taken as examples of the works written in the pre-Clash-of-Civilization era and as challenging the stereotype that the importance of religion was properly grasped only after the Cold War or even after the 9/11 attacks. The argument that the turn to religion is not such a novel trend is further corroborated by a look at the number of articles with ‘religio-’ in their titles which were published in journals dealing with international relations (according to the Web of Science database). As we can see in table 1, there is not such an extraordinary increase of such articles within the IR literature as might have been thought.

Table 2 below presents a chronological analysis of the number of citations of papers and articles belonging to the same sample; those with “religio-” in the title. Unlike the total numbers of articles, where the growth has been rather slow, the numbers of citations skyrocketed. Although it is difficult to say whether the growth is a consequence of the increasing role of religion in world politics or whether the topic...
has become more popular for other reasons, the increase in the overall attention to religion is undeniable.

The range of topics covered by those interested in the nexus between religion and international politics is very wide. Some authors focus on the religious influence on present-day international relations and explore the ‘religious roots of modernity,’ both via ‘conceptual ties between some IR theories and their religious antecedents’ and by looking into the personal religious or theological inspiration of the individual scholars. Others focus on the direct impact of current religious phenomena on international relations. It is unsurprising that questions of security and conflict play a prominent role here and that works dealing with the influence of religion on conflict belong to the highly cited papers. Finally, the studies of Islam, Islamic states and Islamic political theory and practice gained considerable readerships, in particular after 9/11. Mirror reflections of these studies are those analyses which use concepts like “identity” and “othering” and explore, for instance, Islamophobia or various kinds of fundamentalisms.

Nevertheless, many other thematic links also exist, and they approach ties between religion and international relations from different perspectives. Some use older conceptual tools and focus on the
religious agency in world politics, searching for religious actors who influence politics within particular states, who constitute independent quasi-states (the Holy See), or who act as non-state actors (e.g. terrorist groups) or even transnational institutions or networks (both of these last two categories are applicable in the case of the RCC).

Another important cluster of studies includes those which deal with political theology broadly conceived and which explore the theological motivations of political actors or the theological inspiration of various political structures and institutions, often pointing to the overlap between the sacred and secular orders a society upholds. For instance, on the level of domestic politics, Putnam and Campbell show how theological and moral attitudes affect society and politics in the United States. The direct political relevance of the basic tenets of some religious groupings has also been thoroughly studied in the case of Latin America – ranging from the case of liberation theology to numerous studies of Pentecostalism, various prosperity theologies and syncretic Afro-American beliefs.

On the level of international relations, the amount of literature linking theology and international affairs has also been on the rise. In her influential piece, Kubálková even wrote about “international

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Table 2. Citations of articles and proceeding papers with ‘religio-’ in their titles published in IR magazines with academic impact accounted for

Source: The Web of Science Database
political theology” and discussed the ontological, epistemological and
methodological problems the current discipline of international rela-
tions encounters when approaching religion. The main conundrum
she addressed is the question of whether the re-discovery of religion
within the IR discipline will be simply added to the other phenomena
the discipline studies or whether an epistemological transformation
of the whole discipline will be needed to properly understand the role
of religion. There is little doubt that the study of believers and beliefs
in spiritual powers may challenge the traditional scientific/positivist
positions regarding rationality and “admissible” objects of scientific
enquiry.

Kubálková’s critique reflects a more general trend within interna-
tional studies towards a deeper metatheoretical self-reflection of the
discipline which opens up to new philosophies of science (such as sci-
cientic realism). This is partially caused by the growing dissatisfaction
with the older theoretical perspectives, such as neorealism and neoliberalism. Even though the critique of these approaches was first related
to their clash with reflectivist/post-positivist approaches, and to the
changing nature of international politics after the end of the Cold War,
religion soon became another major challenge for these older theories.
It is not only that the stress of neorealism and neoliberalism on utility
maximisation and on material power seems to be at odds with the nor-
mative motivation of religious actors, but the role of identity, which is
of utmost importance for religious communities, has been neglected
by these theories as well.

Identity has clearly become a major concept in the analysis of reli-
gion in world politics. Nowhere is the renewed importance of religious
identities more visible than in security studies. Here, two broad groups
of scholars have emerged, divided into those who claim that religion is
one of the primary causes of international conflict, and those who ar-
gue that religion produces the opposite effect. This distinction applies
to both the political and the academic debates about Islam. As Kuok
claims, there are ‘those that believe that Islam, and in some cases reli-
gion as a whole, encourages violence amongst its followers, and those
that believe that religion, including Islam, is “a positive force for socie-
ty.”' Similarly, Kratochwil points to the ‘puzzling effects of religion on
conflict, both its escalation and de-escalation.”

Excellent examples of scholarship linking religion to violence are
the studies produced by Juergensmeyer and Huntington. Juergens-
meyer’s field work focuses exclusively on the various groups with violent intentions who identify themselves with a particular religious tradition, analysing their motivations and their psychological and theological backgrounds. While Juergensmeyer’s studies are remarkably well researched, they do not provide any comparison of the religious reasons for violence with alternative explanations. Hence, Juergensmeyer does not tell us much about the possible increase in religious violence or about the relative growth of religiously motivated violence compared to other types of conflicts.

Huntington’s thesis is much more general, linking the civilizational identity and values to their religious foundations. While ‘the clash of civilizations’ thesis has been extensively criticised for its over-generalisation and selective argumentation, nobody can say today whether Huntington’s claim is not part of a broader stream of academic studies that – by strengthening essentialist religious stereotypes – can become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Buruma and Margalit point to this danger, calling it the clash of negative generalisations, and show that the animosity towards the West may have several equally plausible alternative reasons and not just those associated with religious beliefs and identities.12

Unlike Huntington’s sweeping study of religiously defined civilizations, many other authors carry out nuanced analyses of the trends and shares of religious phenomena in international conflicts such as Fox, Fearon and Laitin who ask similar questions, and in their search for answers, analyse an intimidating amount of statistical information from databases on conflicts from the second half of the 20th century.13 The resulting explanations however, are dissimilar: one study supports the importance of religion as a contributing factor of conflicts while the other claims that other causes are more relevant than cultural and religious ones.

To conclude this literature overview, we claim that although the number of studies on religion has been growing only very slowly, the topic has moved to the limelight of both international politics and its academic analysis. However, the jury is still out as to whether the role of religion assists in mitigating or promoting armed conflict. It also remains unclear whether the rise of religion in IR studies is a new phenomenon or whether the renewed attention to religion is solely a consequence of the fact that academia was previously blinded to religious phenomena. What has become clear is that sweeping conclusions
about religion run the risk of excessive generalisation and simplification. Hence, the way forward seems not to be about developing a general theory of religion but to carry out particular studies exploring the individual cases of interactions between political and religious actors.

**The Case of the Roman Catholic Church and The European Union**

This section explores one such religious actor, the Roman Catholic Church, and its political interactions with the European Union. In the previous sections (above) we came to two fundamental conclusions: first, while the claim about the universal secularisation of modern societies has been challenged on many fronts, particularly as far as non-Western societies are concerned, the basic tenets of the secularisation thesis seem to hold in most parts of Europe, whereby the EU is often seen as the prime example of this secularising trend. Second, the rise of the political relevance of religion is a trend that has an impact on the RCC and its role in world politics. Hence, the question arises, which of these (perhaps) contradictory trends prevails in Europe? Does the role of the Church diminish due to the on-going secularisation in European societies or does it increase thanks to the intensification of the political role of religion in the public sphere?

Our starting point may be the observation that the vast majority of all works dealing with the relations between the EU and the RCC have been published only (roughly) over the past 10 years. Although there were earlier works dedicated to the role of religion in Europe, we are currently experiencing a boom of fresh works on European forms of secularism, approaches to religious diversity and other general questions addressing the presence of religion in the public sphere. On one hand, recent scholarship tends to examine Islam in Europe or, more generally, diverse religious factors connected to international migration. Studies of the RCC have, incidentally, also begun to appear, and they are typically associated with the Church’s influence on democratisation, its lobbying on the EU level, the RCC's involvement in the drafting of the Constitutional Treaty and its peace-building activities (etc).

This leads us to the second question: whether the growth in academic studies on religion in Europe that focuses on the RCC’s role on the Continent is related to the actual growth of the political activities
of the RCC in Europe. The ties between the Church and the EU are manifold and they can be divided into different dimensions from diplomatic relations between the EU and the Holy See, and the official dialogue which the European Commission and other EU institutions lead with diverse religious bodies, including the Church, to EU legislation – which reflects the EU’s attitudes towards churches and religious communities – and informal and personal links between Catholicism and EU policy-makers and officials.

The RCC and the EU: The Catholic Side

To describe the ties between the EU and the RCC, we have to introduce the basic institutional structures the RCC created specifically for cultivating strong relations with the Union. The strongest Catholic body directly representing the RCC is the Commission of the Bishops’ Conferences of the European Union (COMECE). The COMECE was established in 1980 following the first direct election to the European Parliament. The COMECE itself describes the event as ‘opening up new horizons’ for the cooperation between the RCC and the European Communities, but equally important for the establishment of the Commission was the ‘aggiornamento’ and ‘the spirit of the Vatican II Council.’ The proclaimed objectives of the Commission are to

- monitor and analyse the political process of the European Union, to inform and raise awareness within the Church of the development of EU policy and legislation, to maintain a regular Dialogue with the EU Institutions (European Commission, Council of Ministers and European Parliament) through annual Summit meetings of religious leaders, Dialogue Seminars, various Conferences and by taking part in Consultations launched by the European Commission, and to promote reflection, based on the Church’s social teaching, on the challenges facing a united Europe.

While, officially, the COMECE is represented by its members – bishops from individual EU member states – the shifting focus of the COMECE is best grasped by looking at the Commission’s Secretariat in Brussels. On one hand, the COMECE and its Secretariat often bring up issues which are of special relevance for the Church; on the other, the Secretariat often takes up the issues discussed by the EU and passes
them along onto the agenda of COMECE meetings. These issues include concepts such as sustainable development, new environmental challenges (etc). Interestingly, these new issues then often gain theological clout since the COMECE typically supports its position on these new issues with theological argumentation in addition to other kinds of arguments. The most general example of such a “theologisation” of European integration is the EU’s stress on unification of Europe and the need to overcome the ethnocentric and xenophobic tendencies in European societies, which the RCC supports by theological references to the universality of salvation and the equality of human beings in the eyes of God. In other words, the COMECE not only serves as a formal bridge between the RCC and the EU, it also contributes to the Europeanisation of the Church and legitimises the integration process by providing theological justification for it.

There are also other Catholic bodies which are visible in EU politics, even if these are not directly attached to the Holy See. Caritas Europa and the Jesuit European Social Centre are two Catholic organisations that have been very active in the sphere of social policy and consultancy. Although the Jesuits have never officially represented the Vatican in Brussels, they did provide the Church leadership with information about the integration process prior to the establishment of the COMECE. Today, the Centre intensely cooperates with the COMECE – for instance, they jointly publish the journal entitled Europe Infos. The Centre is also associated with the ecumenical Chapel of the Resurrection, which, among other things, offers space for the dialogue among those who are involved in the integration process.

The COMECE, the Jesuit European Social Centre, and Caritas Europa also serve as a source of expertise for Catholic policy-makers in the EU. They often release comments on EU draft legislation, in particular concerning social, ethical/bioethical, and environmental topics. These bodies also organise seminars and maintain both formal and informal contacts with individual officials, politicians and their groupings. To put it bluntly, the Catholic bodies in Brussels engage in lobbying EU policy-makers, trying to convince them that they should vote in line with the RCC’s views.

Other bodies which discuss EU-related issues include the Council of European Bishops’ Conferences (CCEE) and the Conference of European Churches (CEC). Neither of these two however, fulfils as important a role in the EU-RCC relations as the COMECE. As far as the
former is concerned, it not only represents the clergy from EU member states but also those from other European countries. So, while the CCEE adopts positions on European integration from time to time, its focus is much larger and its knowledge of the working of the EU much more superficial. The latter also deals with the integration process in Europe, but the RCC is but one of its many members (including, among others, many Protestant denominations), and the positions of the CEC are thus not necessarily identical to those of the Catholic Church.

As complicated as the evolution of the institutional ties between the RCC and the EU has been, the establishment of the official diplomatic relations between the Holy See and the EU was even more protracted. The Apostolic Nuncio has been accredited to the European Communities since the 1970s but it was only in 2006 when the first Head of the EU Delegation in Rome was accredited to the Holy See. The EU Delegation in Rome itself admits that in this case it was the EU that caused the asymmetry in diplomatic representations by both sides, stating that only ‘with this accreditation, the European Union brought the relations to an appropriate footing of reciprocity.’

The RCC and the EU: A Textual Analysis

Another important way to view RCC-EU relations is the analysis of references to religion(s), religious bodies and churches in the basic EU treaties (see table 3). While this perspective does not tell us much about the concrete interactions between the EU and the Church, it demonstrates the trend leading from the absolute silence on religion in the early treaties, via the first references to religion in the Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997, and to the stress on the regular dialogue with the churches in the Treaty of Lisbon. However, the intensification of the relations which is evidently present there does not necessarily translate into smooth relations. First, the growing importance of religion also means a stronger resistance to its influence, as witnessed during the debates about the preamble of the Constitutional Treaty and the absent reference to God and/or Christianity therein. Second, even today, the role churches are assigned is limited to the traditional domains such as social and ethical issues.

Other official documents of the EU also demonstrate the complexity of the relations between the EU and the RCC and other churches.
The most comprehensive repository of both official and unofficial documents of the EU is the EU's own website (eur-lex.europa.eu), which contains hundreds of thousands of documents such as treaties, legislation, preparatory acts, EU case-law and parliamentary questions.

There are two general features that we observed when analysing the EU documents. First, and quite surprisingly, a high number of documents which include the terms ‘Catholicism,’ ‘Christianity,’ ‘God’ and even ‘secularism’ deals with issues connected to non-EU territories such as China, Laos, Iraq, Turkey and Tunisia (to name a few).

The second general observation is that the aforementioned terms were framed in secularised language in the documents. This means that although we speak about “religious concepts,” their specific spiritual or transcendental dimension is not visible, being overshadowed by a more earthly perspective in the documents.

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<th>EU Treaty</th>
<th>Signed</th>
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<td>Treaties of Rome</td>
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<td>Merger Treaty - Brussels Treaty</td>
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<td>‘...combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.’</td>
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<td>‘...the Community and the Member States shall pay full regard to the welfare requirements of animals, while respecting the legislative or administrative provisions and customs of the Member States relating in particular to religious rites, cultural traditions and regional heritage.’</td>
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<td>‘Declaration on the status of churches and non-confessional organisations: The European Union respects and does not prejudice the status under national law of churches and religious associations or communities in the Member States. The European Union equally respects the status of philosophical and non-confessional organisations.’</td>
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Table 3. Development of Legislation on Religious Issues in the EU Treaties

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| Article 17: ‘The Union |        |               |
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Topics like discrimination and other issues related to human rights predominate (whereby Catholics are usually in the position of victims). But various forms of critique of the Rcc are also common, ranging from criticism of the tax advantages for the Church in some countries to that of the financial assistance to the Rcc in Poland and various controversial policies of the Church (concerning, for example, the use of contraceptives, issues related to HIV, etc.).

Analysis of Church documents is equally enlightening. When analysing the most important online archives of the Rcc dealing with the EU, we discovered that the highest levels of the Church hierarchy support the integration process and EU institutions to a surprisingly large extent. Both the papal pronouncements – speeches and encyclicals – and speeches of other members of the Church leadership assess European integration very positively. However, these references to the EU are often connected with the stress on the role of Christianity in the integration process and the interpretation of Christianity as the basis
of European identity, European values or European unity as such. In other words, the EU is commended, but the RCC qualifies its support by the continuous call for a return to the supposedly Christian roots of the integration process claiming that it is ‘necessary first of all to go back to Christianity.’

While both entities support each other rhetorically, a deeper look at their interpretations of both the origin and the purpose of the integration process reveals fundamental differences. The RCC’s insistence on the Christian roots of Europe is only very rarely taken up by EU leaders. EU documents seldom mention either the ‘Christian heritage’ or ‘Christian roots.’ While individual examples can be found of cases where some parliamentary groupings or individuals mention the oppression of Christians/Catholics abroad or discuss the (missing) reference to Christianity in the preamble of the failed Constitutional Treaty, there is definitely no united chorus celebrating Christianity or Catholicism as the spiritual core of the EU.

Recent Developments between the RCC and EU

While both the Catholic support for, and the normative overlap with, the EU are tentative and conditional, there can be no doubt that, recently, the interactions between the RCC (and churches in general) and the top representation of the EU have accelerated. An official dialogue started between EU institutions and churches, religious communities and non-confessional organisations. The personal engagement of EU leaders has played an important, and often underrated, role in it. For example, Barroso’s personal interest in the upgrade of the diplomatic relations between the RCC and the EU constituted the main impulse for the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two entities at the highest level. Insiders also stress the role of the activities of (former) President Jacques Delors as well as the openly Catholic attitudes of President Herman van Rompuy in this respect.

Delors was instrumental in establishing the initiative *A Soul for Europe, whose aim was to reinvigorate the integration process after the Cold War and draw churches and religious communities into more intense dialogue with the EU.* Another platform which is attached to the European Commission and which also links its origin to Delors is the Dialogue between European institutions and churches, religious associations
The initiative stresses the need for regular dialogue with the churches, arguing that the communication with the churches ‘offers an opportunity to engage in the European integration process,’ allowing ‘for an open exchange of views on pertinent EU policies between EU institutions and important parts of European society.’

Even the name of the Dialogue stresses the equality of religious and non-religious organisations, underlining the strictly secular nature of the Union. Indeed, there are groupings in the European Parliament such as the European Parliament Platform for Secularism in Politics, which focuses on the equal treatment of various religious and non-religious associations. The Platform does not maintain direct contact to the RCC, but its proclaimed mission indicates that it can be seen as an institutionalised opposition to the growing political influence of churches.

The most recent legislative step in this matter is the introduction of the relatively short but essential Article 17 of the Treaty of Lisbon, which ‘has lifted the dialogue from good practice to a legal obligation, enshrined in primary law.’ High-level annual meetings with the three presidents of the EU institutions are the most visible part of the dialogue, whereby each of the meetings is associated with a specific topic which is high on the EU agenda and which is simultaneously seen as relevant by church representatives as well. For example, the 2012 meeting focused on the notion of solidarity.

The implementation of Article 17 is not limited to the highest levels. The strongest platform of the European Parliament, the European People’s Party Group (EPP) maintains its own variety of activities in the sphere of dialogue with the churches, such as joint conferences with religious leaders and the co-organisation of seminars on religious freedom, social issues and the discrimination of Christians (etc). Yet, the attitudes towards Article 17 in the European Parliament differ. The mentioned Platform for Secularism in Politics is, unsurprisingly, very critical of both the Article’s provisions and the appointment of a Vice President of the Parliament responsible for contacts with religious and non-confessional organisations. The Platform is convinced that this gives an unfair advantage to ‘organised religion over secular voices’ because ‘not all convictions and beliefs held by European citizens are organised.’
Conclusion

The main question explored in this article asked about the recent political interactions between the EU and the RCC. Our main conclusion is that the number and intensity of interactions have been continuously accelerating over the past 20 years. Particularly after the signing of the Lisbon Treaty, the informal contacts between the Church and the Union have shifted from the older – predominantly informal – ties to the new, more formal and institutionalised relations. The RCC gradually increased its presence in Brussels through its direct representatives (the COMECE) and other, semi-autonomous Catholic organisations. These are intensely engaged in lobbying and in daily communication with EU politicians and its bureaucracy.

As important as the formal political representation of the Church in the EU is, a substantial part of the RCC’s activities revolve around an almost invisible network of informal contacts, which include religious advisers to EU policy-makers (such as Presidents of the European Commission), the ties between church lobbyists and many members of the European Parliament, and advisory and consultation bodies related to the RCC which provide EU legislators with political and legal arguments supporting the views of the Church. Advocacy, lobbying, consultations and networking – these are the pillars on which the current activities of the RCC stand in the EU policy-making arena.

Additionally, there is much evidence to support the claim that the influence of the RCC is limited. The most visible failures of the Church to push through its views include the battle over the reference to God in the European Constitution, and the EU’s policies regarding sexual minorities. The conclusion of our analysis is, therefore, quite straightforward. It is clear that we cannot talk about a renewed alliance of the throne and the altar when discussing the interactions between the EU and the RCC. At the same time, two trends have recently gained strength, both of which make the Church more visible in EU politics. The first is the overall growth of interest in religion in the EU, albeit this interest is often connected to negative stereotypes about religion, fear of religious fundamentalism and the failing integration policies of many EU member states. The RCC, whose relations with the EU have been relatively smooth, constitutes a reliable discussion partner and an ally of the Union in most of the problematic areas. The second trend is the learning process of the Church, which is growing more
apt at using various formal and informal channels of influencing the policy-making in the EU.

Paradoxically, as the secularisation of Europe continues, the Catholic Church – and other churches and religious communities – is becoming more important since it represents a visible and still relatively large minority. At the same time, the Church is capable of clearly formulating its views, which – although they are at times at odds with the EU’s mainstream – are still defended in a way that is compatible with the fundamental EU values. Hence, on many fronts, the EU and the RCC have indeed formed an uneasy alliance which legitimises the integration project in the eyes of the Union’s Catholics and gives the Church a greater say and a greater visibility in EU politics.

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This paper has been written as a part of the research project The European Union and the Roman Catholic Church: Political Theology of European Integration supported by the Grant Agency of the Czech Republic, Grant No. P408/11/2176.

Notes


10 Friedrich Kratochwil (2005), ‘Religion and (Inter-)National Politics: On the Heuristics of Identities, Structures, and Agents,’ *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, 30, pp. 113-140.


15 Ibid.


17 See ‘Delegation of the EU to the Holy See, to the Order of Malta and to the United Nations Organisations in Rome,’ *European Union*,

Consider, for example, the local property tax-exemption for the Catholic Church in Italy, and the exemption from the tax on construction in Spain.


An adviser for religious issues at the European Commission interviewed, 22 June 2012.

The aim was to give the Union ‘a spiritual and ethical dimension,’ and the argument was that ‘every organisation that officially represents a religious or philosophical tradition with a European structure can become [a] member.’ See ‘Dialogue with Religions, Churches and Humanisms,’ European Commission, at: <http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/policy_advisers/archives/activities/dialogue_religions_humanisms/sfe_en.htm> (accessed 01 December 2012) and the European Cultural Foundation, <www.eurocult.org/uploads/docs/407.pdf> (accessed 01 December 2012).


A representative of the CEEC Secretariat interviewed on 19 June 2012.


‘Dialogue 1.’


Interwar Views on Managing Eastern European Space

Exploring Lypa’s Conceptualisation of the Black Sea States Union

Ostap Kushnir

Few people realise that the idea of establishing a Black Sea Union (BSU) – a regional bloc along the Black Sea littoral – was proposed in the immediate aftermath of WWII. This idea was primarily developed and advocated by Yuriy Lypa, a Ukrainian inter-war political thinker (1900-1944). In his books, Lypa described the dominant cultural, political and economic reasons for Eastern European states to create a supranational body in the Black Sea region. He also elaborated on the principles of common foreign and security policy of the proposed BSU and provided justification for establishing free trade and customs zones. In addition to outlining the dominant characteristics of the BSU, this article assesses the viability of Lypa’s ideas, as well as illustrates the linkages between the BSU and European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC).

Keywords: Yuriy Lypa, Black Sea Union, BSU, ECSC, Eastern Europe
Ukraine, Turkey, Russia, interwar geopolitics

The contribution which an organised and living Europe can bring to civilization is indispensable to the maintenance of peaceful relations.

Robert Schuman

The Black Sea States Union is an entity which can establish a new stage of the existence of states and a new level of European culture in its Black Sea dimension.

Yuriy Lypa
Introduction

Critically evaluating research conducted on 1918-1945 political thinking reveals a certain inequality in focus; interest in West European interwar ideologies was significantly more comprehensive than in Central, East and South Europe and social and political scientists tended to neglect those sub-regions. There are at least four explanations for this imbalance of scholarly interest. First, social scientists considered it very unlikely that original thoughts could be formed in lands with insufficient political traditions and weak national identification. Second, they explain that theories developed in occupied or dependent European states could hardly impact the international order during the interwar period. Third, they argue that interwar East European leaders and intellectuals were usually poorly educated and, therefore, could hardly generate sufficient or innovative political ideas. Not to mention that these leaders were preoccupied waging civil wars and organising revolts which left them scant time to theorise on political life. Finally, the majority of the texts that did originate from interwar Eastern Europe were never translated into French or English and therefore modern political scientists did not have the opportunity to evaluate them properly. And, importantly, the majority of these texts were stored in secret KGB archives and inaccessible for readers until the 1990’s.

Yuriy Lypa, whose research will be discussed in this article, was one Eastern European who strove – but failed – to change the interwar balance of power. However, his education and future-oriented global-scale thinking makes his work noteworthy. As a result, this research will provide a necessary impetus for a re-evaluation of East European interwar thought and shed some light on the East European interwar discourse.

Lypa was one of the few thinkers looking far beyond his time and foreseeing a new world order. This order, while stressing the importance of nation-state sovereignty and cultural uniqueness, was characterised by the significant shift to liberal coexistence and interdependence. Lypa advocated the creation of a new interstate entity in the Black Sea Region which was more advanced than the international organisations of the time. His Black Sea States Union (BSSU) would have facilitated advanced trade links, established a single and free market, launched a common foreign and security policy, and introduced
peace between member-states. Ten years later the same priorities were declared by the founding fathers of the European Union (EU), so that it can be stated that the Ukrainian geo-scholar was in-sync with his Western European counterparts even though they were more successful in implementing their visions while Lypa’s were suppressed.

It is important to note that many of Lypa’s ideas appear naïve and romantic; he was inclined to ignore the existing world order and replace it with more desirable options. For instance, he drew up plans for Ukraine to shed its Soviet skin and Polish root and emerge as an independent state in the 1940’s. But he never doubted that the USSR was doomed to collapse and all constituting it member-states possessed a moral right to pursue their national policies regardless of the Kremlin’s interests. These, and other romantic opinions, should be remembered while evaluating Lypa’s geopolitical contribution.

This work proceeds as following: First, it presents the ideas surrounding the Black Sea Space as envisioned by Lypa. This section evaluates Lypa’s geopolitical orientation and regional conceptualisation including an introduction to his proposed Black Sea State Union (BSSU). This is followed by a discussion of the dynamics of the BSSU, including the role of the USSR (later Russia) in the formation of such a union. The final substantive section of this work is based on a comparative assessment of the BSSU and the European Union (EU) and makes use of Lypa’s geopolitical thinking.

The Black Sea Space

Lypa developed the idea of the BSSU in his work entitled The Destination of Ukraine – a series of geopolitical essays (1938). In this work, Lypa argues that the Black Sea states should deploy a new geopolitical perspective in determining their national security identities so that they be redefined as key territories between North and South – not East and West – and use their unique positions to grow in power and ensure theirs and regional security. As Lypa noted, the East-to-West axis was the most risk-prone for those states since it entailed the abandoning of natural advantages and would transform the Black Sea states into colonial annexes of more advanced nations. Speaking particularly about Ukraine, Lypa argued that the ‘North-to-South axis is the only organic axis for Ukrainian lands [...] Ukrainian statehood requires access to the Black Sea and the upper parts of the Dnieper river.’

The argument
was supported by historical evidence that the most powerful regional actors always imposed their control over North-to-South relations. For instance, the kings of the Kyivan Rus filled their treasuries by taxing merchants who travelled from Varangians to the Greeks. This money allowed kings to conduct effective military campaigns and destroy alternative North-to-South trade routes (f.e. in Khasaria).6

Building on his original observations, Lypa’s second book, The Black Sea Doctrine (1940), spends considerable time defining the unique geopolitical features of the Black Sea space – as a separate group of self-sufficient states which were temporarily transformed into colonies. These states possessed relatively weak cultural and economic relations to the European and Asian worlds. The Black Sea space was locked within itself; it was historically formed by common channels of trade and communication (rivers running from North to South), the common mentality and peoples’ habits, as well as by the common memory of huge empires and leaders who proved that strong geopolitical powers can form along the Black Sea littoral.7

To illustrate the uniqueness and self-sufficiency of this space, Lypa compared the Black Sea basin to a fortress with the Black Sea itself comprising the heart of the fortress. Its Eastern walls were constituted by the Caucasian states stretching up to the Caspian Sea and Volga River, its Western walls running along the Carpathian mountain range and the borders of the Balkans. The fortress had also three gates: the Danube, the Caspian Sea, and the Bosporus. Turkey was considered to be the foundation of the fortress and Ukraine its vault.8

In assessing the perception of Fortress Black Sea by world powers, Lypa reminds on local colonialism. For West European strategists, the Black Sea states were European while their Russian counterparts treated these states as Russia, distinguishing them between “Small Russia,” “Danubian” and other fragmented and dependent territories.9 At the time, the world powers denied, in word and deed, the Black Sea states the right to become independent. Lypa agreed that such denial could be justified since the Black Sea region was politically disorganised and economically underdeveloped. However, the Lypa saw such conditions as a temporary problem. To eliminate them, he drafted a political strategy for the Black Sea states to regain sovereignty and acquire real power. This focused on integration-to-unification and the creation of the BBSU.
Re-Administrating the Black Sea Space and the Creation of the BSSU

The chief reason for attempting to reconstitute the Black Sea region and construct the BSSU was the perceived lack of adequate deterrence mechanisms to counter-balance the multi-directional pressures mounting in the region. As Lypa was writing-up his *Black Sea Doctrine*, WWII was on and the Black Sea region under tremendous pressure. The USSR, Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and, to a lesser some extent, France with Britain, were politically and economically expanding into the region. The USSR attempted to build railways that connected the Caucasus, Donbass and Central Ukraine to Moscow and redirecting the flow of people, goods, and resources East. Nazi Germany – after the annexation of Austria – attempted to deepen the Danube so that larger amounts of goods could be transported from the Balkan states to Western Europe and vice versa. Italy aimed to control Albania, which was a direct threat to Turkish security while France and Britain tried to strengthen their positions in Bulgaria and the Caucasus, cracking Turkish influence in the region. Against this backdrop, Lypa advocated the BSSU to raise state security under conditions of external penetration.

The first step for the unification of the Black Sea states – particularly Ukraine, Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania and the Caucasian states was the creation of free trade and customs zones. Lypa considered that the liberalisation of financial policies would unite the Black Sea states into one interdependent self-sufficient economy. Moreover, taking external pressure into account, Lypa stressed that the middle of 20th century was the right time for the creation of the free trade and customs zones, at least between independent states.

The successful launching and deepening of economic interdependence was to be ensured by further industrialisation. In 1940, the Black Sea states were mainly agricultural though teeming with opportunities in mining and heavy industries. However, due to mismanagement, bribery and low education among local authorities, these states were unattractive for investors. To make matters worse, agricultural productivity deteriorated year on year.

One option to reach the standards of the more developed countries was to generate enough capital within the borders of the BSSU and investing them into the development of domestic facilities. No foreign direct investment was appropriate due to the concerns of economic
security. To succeed in producing internal capital, the Black Sea states should return to the old – one can even say medieval – patterns of cooperation, which Lypa defined as artiles. Historically, artiles were semi-formal associations for various enterprises. Payments on job-done were standard and based on verbal agreements. Based on the joint actions of families, clans, and communities with specialisations in a narrow field of activities, these artiles could provide the necessary preconditions for the economic growth of the BSSU. To illustrate the efficiency of proposed patterns, Lypa mentioned that several artiles from the 19th century were competitive in tobacco- and salt-production, agriculture and sea trade, cargo shipping, military affairs, delivery of the post, among other activities. Lypa described this pattern of economic activities as the “capitalism of solidarity,” which should have existed and developed as an alternative to ‘individualistic Western capitalism and Communist police capitalism.’

The proposed BSSU could satisfy its demands in raw materials through the prudent use of available resources – mineral deposits, soils, rivers, and population – on the territories of the Black Sea states. According to Lypa’s calculations, hard coal could (have) be extracted in the Donbass basin (reserves estimated circa 5 bln. tonnes), crude oil could be pumped from Transcaucasian valleys (reserves estimated circa 6,400 mln tonnes), manganese, copper, and iron could be excavated in the Central Ukraine and Southern Turkey. Also, crops, fruits, and vegetables could be easily cultivated on black-earth soils; this food would be enough to feed the entire BSSU population. All extracted or cultivated resources could be easily transported from one state to another via Black Sea routes and river systems. Lypa noted that more than 50 river ports existed in the region equipped to moor and operate with large vessels. Rivers could also ensure the production of hydroelectricity; their potential was estimated to be (approximately) 8,760,000 h.p. Finally, the common maritime character of people inhabiting the Black Sea littoral would allow them to find a common language and forge a strong socio-political community. As a result, sooner or later, the 140 million BSSU residents would be in position to pursue their ambitions on the international level and to change the global balance of power.

Regarding foreign policy, Lypa believed that the precondition for a strong Union was rooted in the political unification of the Caucasus. People inhabiting those terrains, dispersed and exhausted by constant wars, should stop their conflicts to enjoy a common welfare. Peace,
political stability, and fruitful cooperation on the Eastern walls of Fortress Black Sea would assist in the sustainable development of the BSSU and work for the joint exploration of Iranian oil fields and facilitate trade with the Central and East Asian countries. Moreover, a unified Caucasus would become a secure path to the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean, which was of significant importance when considering that the Black Sea had weak connections to the worlds’ oceans. Lypa even claimed that connections with Iran and Iraq constituted the only possible drawbridge of the Fortress. Lypa also advocated that an Idl-Ural independent state should emerge at the estuary of Volga river to cut off Russia from access to the Caspian Sea. To succeed with this task, a BSSU foreign policy was to target the self-identification of the indigenous people in Western Asia, particularly the Kazan Tatars, Chuvashians, and Bashkirians, who were oppressed by the USSR.

One other issue in the re-administrating of the Black Sea space resided in moving the centre of Orthodox Christianity from Istanbul to Kyiv. Lypa claimed that the capital of former Byzantium had already become the pillar of the Muslim cultural world and, therefore, had lost its value as the centre of ancient Christian tradition. Only Kyiv, blessed by St. Andrew at the very dawn of its existence, possessed both historic traditions and a favourable location to become the new seat of the ecclesiastical throne. Such a rearrangement would encourage the development of Christian communities in the BSSU, as well as decrease tensions between Christians and Muslims in Turkey.

Finally, the BSSU leaders were strongly encouraged to benefit from the ideological rivalry between the ‘three imperialisms’ attempting to colonise the Black Sea region. Lypa understood that the underdeveloped and disorganised East European states were not in a position to use hard power for their protection and that many of them remained under occupation. Therefore, high-level diplomacy and coordination of foreign policies were the most applicable tools to manoeuvre between the competing regional interests in order to gain time for re-industrialisation and rearmament.

The Lynchpin of the BSSU

Solidity within the Fortress would be assured by the mutually beneficial cooperation between Ukraine and Turkey. Somewhat akin to Ger-
many and France’s role in the current EU, these states were expected to constitute the lynchpins of the BSSU.

While describing Turkey, and defining its geopolitical interests, Lypa argued that it’s optimal development path rested in a north-bound expansion; justified by the specific allocation of mineral resources along the Black Sea shores (Northern Turkey), the intention to enter the new markets of East Europe and the Caucasus, and the necessity to withstand French, British and Italian pressure coming from the south and west. Ukraine was, according to Lypa, also pressed to the Black Sea by Russian assaults so that no reasonable alternatives remained except exploring the space to the south. Its major coal and iron ore basins, particularly in Donetsk, Lugansk, and Kryvyi Rig, were also located relatively close to the sea. The centripetal expansion of both states would strengthen the connection between them and catalyse the emergence of the BSSU geopolitical lynchpin. This linchpin, as Yuriy Lypa advocated, should have risen notwithstanding adverse circumstances and external obstacles. Moreover, the post-war period provided a solid chance for it to appear as major superpowers would be focused mainly on domestic recovery.

Turkey, having experienced the reforms of Kemal Atatürk in the formative years of the 20th century, entered a phase of dynamic growth. Lypa advocated Atatürk’s rejection of Ottoman ambitions and traditions of pan-Turkism in order to build a self-sufficient state on the Anatolian peninsula. The separation of clerical and state power was necessary for this, as well as the forceful repatriation of Greeks, Armenians, Kurds, and other minorities. Kemal’s policies and the transformation to local nationalism revived the confidence of the Turkish people in their state and encouraged them to re-think their geopolitical priorities. Ukraine, despite being oppressed for centuries, also managed to preserve its cultural uniqueness largely untouched. Lypa emphasised that its citizens were reluctant to adopt any kind of foreign ideologies even if those ideologies were introduced forcefully. Also, like the Turks, Ukrainians were less inclined to behave emotionally, preferring instead a rational approach to solving social issues. These features would grant them the right to administer the BSSU. Finally, possessing 4/7 of the terrains and resources in the region, Ukraine would evolve into the engine of the Union; this state would supply the BSSU with crucial resources, qualified workers, and statesmen. The fact
that Ukraine remained within the USSR – and a sliver in Poland – was treated by the author as a temporary hurdle, which would be overcome in the immediate future.

The geographic proximity of Turkey to Ukraine and the adoption of free, unlimited trade within the BSSU would increase revenues in both states. The economic justification for this could be found in the trade patterns of ancient times, the middle ages, and modern times. Also, Turkey was the most active sea trader with Ukraine in 1924-28 when Soviet Ukraine was not so rigorously controlled by Moscow’s central plans and could conduct a relatively independent foreign policy. Finally, in the middle of the 20th century Turkey was very interested in purchasing Ukrainian cotton products and machinery and Ukraine required Turkish wool and cattle.

Lypa also advocated that Ukraine and Turkey should forget their former conflicts to face the future challenges together. Being united, he argued, they would accumulate enough military power to ensure security and prosperity for the entire region. Again, examples for this could be found in history. At the beginning of the 20th century the Turkish government was very supportive of the idea of a Ukrainian state and even hosted diplomats from Kyiv between 1917-1920. Unfortunately, the idea of Ukrainian independence failed as nationalist movements lost the war of liberation in 1921. However, it did not stop the Turkish government from signing, on 21 January 1922, an Act of Friendship with Soviet Ukraine. That was one of the few international acts ever signed on behalf of Soviet Ukraine and, probably, the only one classified as a ‘priority act.’

The common maritime outlook shared by Ukrainians and Turks was also significant for forging the lynchpins of the Union. Lypa characterised this as one full of blind love for adventures, endeavours, and discoveries. This is what inspired people living on the shores of the Black Sea and simultaneously triggered the majority of their problems. Adoring heroism and perceiving the world emotionally, they typically lacked the ability to make precise calculations or to build realistic plans. Consequently, that often produced overestimation of power and defeat in conflicts with weaker, but smarter enemies. On the other hand, this love of heroism also ensured their cultural preservation in unfavourable conditions; they rarely forgot their heroes and past victories.
The lynchpins created by Ukraine and Turkey, as Lypa saw it, was the crucial precondition for reducing external threats, boosting the economy of the USSR, allowing it to abandon its colonial penetration, pacifying the conflicts in the Caucasus and Balkans, and restricting European superpowers in achieving their regional ambitions.

_Ostap Kushnir_

_The Role of the USSR (Russia)_

Given the content and context of Lypa’s geopolitical writings and their intended objectives, it is normal for readers to infer that the author was ignorant to the Nazis minor, and USSR’s major power position in the region. Such an assumption is patently erroneous; he clearly recognised Soviet Russia’s disproportionate presence and its ambitions. However, he considered its influence to be in long-decline. During the interwar period the USSR changed its economic priorities and started developing facilities located East, in the Asian part of the USSR. Notwithstanding Ukraine and the Caucasus states, new centres of industry were sprouting-up along the White Sea littoral and in the republics of Kazakhstan, Buryatia, Western and Eastern Siberia (near contemporary Omsk, Semey, Ulan-Ude, and other cities). If we look at Soviet statistical data, these new centres accounted for some 80.5% of all Soviet industrial output in 1939. Also, the exploration and exploitation of Asian coal basins tripled the extraction of this deposit between 1913 and 1939. And, the USSR launched an ambitious project to explore the basins of the Angara and Yenisei rivers in Siberia to ensure the production of the cheapest electric energy in the world as well as provide access to new coal reserves. Lypa’s argument that such a significant economic shift would diminish Russian influence in the Black Sea region was therefore grounded.

Lypa was also driven by what he saw as historical destiny; the ultimate collapse and dissolution of the USSR and Russia itself. The specifics of this demise are articulated in his 1941 work entitled: _The Division of Russia_. Such a collapse, Lypa contended, was based on a three-dimensional equation – which is relevant for our own times.

First, Lypa supposes that Imperial Russia’s territorial expansion – commenced under Tsar Ivan IV Vasilyvich (a.k.a. Ivan the Terrible) – was a haphazard affair that left the country and its successor, the USSR, vulnerable and likely to fail. Instead of solving mounting, internal polit-
ical, social and economic problems and consolidating the body-politik, Russian autocrats expended the nation’s wealth on expensive wars in a diversionary tactic to redirect public concern to fighting external foes. Russia, literally had to expand or die. This policy priority consequently led to dysfunctional governance structures over a multinational and multi-denominational empire. Russian rule on new lands was always supported by the rigorous enforcement of centrally adopted decisions, ubiquitous corruption, and imposing military supervision. Sooner or later, Lypa predicted, such policies would crack; there would not be enough armed strength or political will to preserve the state.

Second, the nature of the Russian people was crucial. Russians were described by Lypa as skilful administrators who abandoned their origin and traditions to struggle for power in the heterogeneous empire. They were considered pragmatic and persistent in their attempts to incorporate bureaucracy into every sphere of social life. Also, since the 18th century, the core of Russian power and spirit resided in St. Petersburg and Moscow and most Russians were unwilling to discover the rest of their Empire. That unwillingness led Lypa to conclude that Russians did not form or represent an original nation, they were pure administrators, nothing more; and such a mental vacuum could not keep the Empire together for a long time.

Third, Russian foreign and domestic policies were regarded as ingredients for national destruction. Lypa reflected that total war was, for Russia, the idol of imperial rule. Wars could easily be started because the majority of population supported it eagerly: peasants experienced such heavy wars that even they began to look with hope to gain new territories. After new lands were conquered, Russians often ordered the elimination local peculiarities which could trigger obstacles for the smooth running of the administration. This often entailed the elimination of everything: architecture and monuments, livelihoods and people. As a result of such devastations: the fuel needed to ensure a history of rural-urban animosity, national distrust and local governing structures that could (and would) outlive the central authorities in St. Petersburg and later Moscow.

Simply, Lypa was certain that Russia’s long-term policy orientation was unsustainable and would ultimately bring about the collapse of the Empire. And so, conceiving of a unique Black Sea Union made sense to Lypa since the inevitable collapse of Russia (ussr) would cre-
ate a vacuum and an opportunity, the states of the Black Sea littoral needed to build their collective consciousness and form a Union or face the trials of a collapsed USSR and likely penetrations from Western states individually. So, instead of reading Lypa as a blind and naïve futurologist, it is more accurate to describe him as understanding that the states of the Black Sea littoral stood a better chance of survival in a pack than alone. This idea resonates to our own times as many of the region's woes stem from dysfunctional cooperation and the ease of penetration from exogenous states.

Lypa’s BSSU and the EU: Similarities and Differences

Lypa’s conception of re-administrating the Black Sea region seemed to be too pioneering and innovative for the times – the interwar years, followed by WWII. Even today it is hard to believe that these states – enjoying independence for 25 years already – possess the necessary potential and political will to unite and become a regional superpower. Not to mention that the international discourse is not suitable for this. However, several of Lypa’s ideas about the new political priorities and new world order proved, over time, their relevance and a living example, the EU, is a testament to the intersection of normative approaches for the sake of realistic ambitions related to peace, security and economic prowess among former belligerent states.

First, the intention to create the EU was derived from the concept of solidarity of destinies (solidarité de fait), declared by (then) French Prime Minister, Robert Schuman who, together with the leaders of the other five founding countries, concluded that dealing with the new common challenges required the application of new common strategies. Fearing the ideological and military threat coming from the USSR, and attempting to switch German activity from destructive to constructive ends, they agreed that nothing would be more simple and yet wide-reaching than uniting the coal and steel branches of their economies (1951) in order to regulate and establish transparent controls over the two most important war-ingredients at the time. The leaders of France, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy, and (West) Germany recognised that they had to begin real, fundamental, cooperation or face even greater uncertainties in the future. They were too weak to survive external threats on their own and too weak to prevent the
internal revival of Nazism. And, they urgently needed to boost their economies to restore pre-war power and security. The same driving forces were defined by Lypa as crucial for the emergence of the BSSU. The external threat resided in the colonial ambitions of the Western and Eastern states to grab the Black Sea region, internal threats were rooted in the severe fragmentation of the states. Also, the only way to gain power and security was seen in the drastic modernisation and industrialisation of the BSSU.

Second, the EU’s founders advocated peaceful cooperation within the Union and promoted stability along its borders. For instance, France and Germany were expected to abolish their historic rivalry and launch mutual beneficial trade.31 The North African countries were supposed to become closely affiliated to the Union so that they could be used as the resource of suppliers and transit territories. The Balkan states also were to become pacified to bring stability to the backyard of the EU. The principles of solving – actually – simmering conflicts and stabilising the situation along the borders were also stressed by Lypa who steadfastly believed that the Caucasian nations should relegate their rivalries to mere footnotes of history in order to enjoy the comforts of economic growth and political stability as a union. The same could be said of the historical rivalry between Turkey and Ukraine; Lypa simply thought it to be the leftovers of a time that no longer exists. Pacifying the internal space and establishing an Idl-Ural state would result in the free access of the BSSU member-states to the world’s oceans, Iranian oil, and Asian markets; the Caucasian and Caspian states would be transformed into reliable transit and resource supplying partners.

Third, both the EU and the BSSU were not considered to be simply ‘for-profit’ projects created in times of crisis. Both Unions advocated solid cultural foundations. The EU’s architects appealed to the common European identity shaped by Christian (Catholic and Protestant) humanism, Greek philosophy, and Roman law. Moreover, all European states were indirectly united by the history of their interactions, notwithstanding whether the experience of these interactions was constructive or destructive. Lypa, for his part, considered that all BSSU member-states shared a common Black Sea heritage and identity. The distinguishing features of this identity lay in a decidedly maritime outlook, an emotional rather than rational perception of the world, and a blind love of heroism. Also, the BSSU states had a rich history to unite them, as well as a spiritual tradition initiated by Orthodox Christianity.
but also including Islam and Western strands of Christianity and Judaism. In other words, while the **EU** stresses an identity of religious homogeneity and political/national heterogeneity, the **BSSU** was meant to be based on a religiously heterogeneous configuration and political harmonisation into a singular, homogeneous bloc. The **BSSU** was not only a project for security and prosperity, but for establishing a family of nations.\(^\text{32}\)

There are, of course, clear discrepancies between the **BSSU**’s corner-stone and the guiding principles of the **EU**. For instance, the **EU** was founded as a Union open to the world, it was greatly dependent on foreign direct investments, particularly on US financial aid under the European Recovery Programme. Contrarily, the **BSSU** was intended to be a self-sufficient entity with no need for foreign capital which would only divide and then sub-divide the littoral as it had time and time again in the past.

And, liberalism was recognised as the dominant ideology of the **EU**, and contrasted against Lypa’s intentions to construct the **BSSU** on the principles of nationalism.\(^\text{33}\) The revival of the artiles can be justified from an economic perspective; however, the nationalistic basis of the **BSSU** could possibly slow the overall development of the region, not to mention the possibility of new external and internal conflicts emerging as a result of competing visions of the nationalisms present in the region. Having described the **BSSU** as a free-trade and customs zone, Lypa did not take into account further stages of integration, such as launching a common currency or establishing a political union, again in contrast to the **EU**.

Yet, Lypa’s ideas about the practical, strategic and even humanitarian driving forces behind the unionisation of the Black Sea littoral were more than a reflection of Western processes; they were a set of unique observations likely to have inspired Shuman and his counterparts as they sat, took toll of the devastations of WWI and looked for ways out of the cyclical forces of history. Lypa’s ideas were revolutionary precisely because they sought to do what people thought, and likely still think, cannot be done. However, if France and Germany, Germany and the UK can work together in a single European Union then there is no reason why Lypa’s own ambitions cannot be realised for peace and later union between Turkey and Ukraine seems easy compared to peace and union between France and Great Britain.
Conclusion

Yet, for now, the weight of history has prevented the rise of the BSSU. To give flesh to Lypa’s conception, a strong shake-up in interstate relations is needed which is very unlikely to happen within the existing geopolitical architecture. Romania and Bulgaria, which should constitute the Western wall of Fortress Black Sea, have entered the EU and are bound by obligations coming from Brussels. Russia still possesses an efficient leverage of pressure on the Caucasus states and will not lessen its influence in the future as evidenced in its Crimea and Eastern Ukrainian adventurism. The Eastern walls of Fortress Black Sea also have significant cracks in them. Ukraine itself remains too corrupt and chaotic to take the lead and invite other countries of the Black Sea space into a union. Turkey shows only token interest in establishing a trade and customs zone with its neighbouring states so it refuses to serve as the foundation of the Fortress. Even the weak attempts to facilitate trade between Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova, in the ranks of the GUAM agreement, was inefficient and unproductive and cannot diminish Russian domination of the region.

However, the historic value of the ideas of Lypa and the discourses that later surrounded these findings need to be appreciated. The Ukrainian thinker evoked the conception of a new-type of organisation in 1940, a decade before the EC/EU was even considered. Moreover, Lypa completed sophisticated economic calculations and conducted interdisciplinary research to prove the viability of his plans. Lypa’s BSSU was not without its organisation and theoretical flaws, however it was drawn up by only one man in the conditions of total war and political prosecution. And, it could have been significantly improved on if Lypa had not been brutally murdered by the NKVD in 1944.

Yuriy Lypa’s geopolitical conception intended to unite and transform the Black Sea states into a real functioning mega-power. To achieve that goal he advocated the revival of North-to-South geopolitical thinking, a concentration on internal economic transformations, and the insulation from external political influences. The Black Sea States Union could have become a self-sufficient entity locked within its borders; at least, it possessed enough resources to do so. Also, the BSSU could have shaped interstate affairs in the region pursuing the policies of peace. This entailed attempts to unify the Caucasus states, cut Russia off from the Caspian Sea, and expel the French, Germans, Italians, and British from the neighbouring states. What the future
holds in store, in this regard, remains anybody’s guess. What is certain, is that Lypa will be remembered for his uncompromising humanitar-
ian-nationalism that was more inclusive than exclusive and sought to patch centuries of distrust and animosity for a regional peace that all could enjoy.

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Notes
1 Łukasz Adamski while describing the early 20th century Ukrainians once stated that they did not and could not form any kind of nation as they lacked a conscious national self-identification. Only Ukrainian elites identified themselves as Ukrainians. The same national inferiority was applicable to other peoples residing in Eastern Europe. See Łukasz Adamski (2011), Nacjonalista Postepowy (Progressive Nationalist), Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, p. 37.

2 The beginning of the 20th century was a very challenging time in the Black Sea region, because of the partial dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the eruption of the Balkan Wars in 1912 and 1913, the breakout of WWI and the Ukrainian War of Independence and series of civil wars between 1917 and 1921, the Turkish 1919-1922 War of Independence and conflicts between Russian Communists and Tsarists in the Caucasus.

3 Lypa’s father was a Minister in the 1917-1921 Ukrainian governments (Tren-
tralna Rada and Dyrektoria) and therefore Yuriy Lypa had a chance to com-
municate with the brightest Ukrainian intellectuals of his time. Also, he studied law in Kamieniec-Podolski University between 1918 and 1920. In 1922 he moved to Poland and was enrolled as a student in Poznan Medical University (graduated in 1928). Some sources state that between 1922 and 1928 he was awarded a scholarship and spent some time studying in Great Britain.

4 Particularly, one should consider Konrad Adenauer’s 24 March 1946 speech in Cologne, Robert Schuman’s Declaration of 9 May 1950, Alcide De Gasperi’s speech to Italian Communist Senators on 15 March 1952, Jean Monnet’s speech to the National Press Club in Washington on 30 April 1952.

5 T. Podkupko (2009), Geopolitychni Doslidzhennia Yuriy Lyp in kontekst]

6 Apart from Kyivan Rus there existed other powerful states in the Black Sea region benefitting from North-to-South trade and military campaigns. Lypa mentioned the Kingdom of Pontus reaching its zenith during the

83
rule of King Mithridates IV (121–64 BC); about the Cossack Hetmanate in
the times of Dmytro Vyshnevetsky (1550–1563) and Bohdan Khmelnitsky
(1648–1657). Also, Lypa wrote that the Kyivan Rus was the most power-
ful during the reign of King Sviatoslav the Brave (945–972) who destroyed
Bulgaria, Khasaria, threatened Byzantium and even considered moving the
capital to the Danube estuary.

Yuriy Lypa (1942), *Chornomorska Doktryna (The Black Sea Doctrine)*,
Ukrainian Black Sea Institute, vol. 13, p. 74.

7 Ibid, p. 9.
8 Ibid, p. 75.
10 Ibid, p. 90.
11 Ibid, p. 80.
12 Yuriy Lypa and L. Bykovski (1941), *Chornomorskyi Prostir (The Black Sea
Space)*, Atlas, Ukrainian Black Sea Institute, vol. 6, pp. 9-10.
13 Yuriy Lypa (1942), *Chornomorska Doktryna (The Black Sea Doctrine)*,
Ukrainian Black Sea Institute, vol. 13, p. 37.
14 Ibid, p. 42

In this regards Zonguldak Province with its coal reserves should be men-
tioned. As Lypa put it: ‘The major coal reserves are allocated along the
Black Sea shores stretching for 180-200 km from Inebolu to Ereğli and for
50-55 km inside the country.’ Also, significant deposits of natural gas were
allocated in Bolu, Marmara, and Çorum Provinces. Finally, the Northern
Provinces of Turkey were rich in gold deposits. See Lypa (1942), p. 44.

15 Ibid, p. 44
16 Lypa wrote that Syria was under French control which caused only minor
problems; French imperialism was the least aggressive. Major problems
were caused by British troops deployed in the Cyprus-Haifa-Suez triangle
and on the territory of Greece. The main problem for Turkey resided in the
Italian presence on the Dodecanese Islands; the Italians had their stron-
gest naval base there only a few dozens of miles away from the Turkish
mainland. See Lypa (1942), p. 49.

17 Ibid, p. 42
18 Regarding Ukrainians, Lypa cited Polish etnographist Aleksander
Jablonowski (1829-1913): ‘Ukrainians are perfect, punitive, and operation-
al soldiers satisfied with any kind of supplies. Ukrainians are inborn con-
servatives; [that can be seen in everything] starting from their family life,
ending with religious rituals. They are not inclined to religious fanaticism,
despite how it may have seemed in the past. Ukrainians don’t care about
dogmas and reluctant to any changes because these changes don’t influ-
ence their outlook.’ See Lypa (1942), p. 11.

19 Yuriy Lypa wrote that throughout the centuries Ukrainian administrative
intelligence was used to run other states, particularly Russia. Names such
as Rozumovskyi, Suvorov, Kochubei, and Paskevych were well-known in
the modern times Europe. See Lypa (1942), p. 12.

20 Recall, for instance, the trade patterns during the Kingdom of Pontius, Ky-
ivan Rus, and Cossack Hetmanate (see endnote 6). Regarding Hetmanate
times, in 1650 the Convention on Trade was signed between Zaporozhian
Cossacks and the Ottoman Empire in which the free movement of Cossack galleys and vessels was granted in the Black Sea ensuring stable incomes to the treasury of the Zaporozhian Sich making it independent from Russian and Polish financial aid.

22 Ibid, p. 44.

23 For instance, in 1648 during the war of liberation with Poland, Zaporozhian Cossacks were supported by Turkish and Tatar horsemen, which allowed them to conquer lands up to Warsaw. In 1658 Zaporozhian Cossacks with Turkish support managed to defeat Moscovian troops and pave the way to defenceless Moscow. Also, between 1669 and 1681 the Ottoman Empire bribed Cossack hetman to get guarantees that their armies would not join the war in Europe on the side of Austria or Poland. See Lypa (1942), p. 118.

24 Ibid, p 146.

25 Lypa never drew a line between Russia, the Russian Empire and the USSR.

26 Ibid, p. 87.

27 Tsar Nikolai I is reported to have said to French traveller, Astolphe de Cus- tineduring during dinner that 'You think that you are surrounded by Muscovites, – the tsar said pointing at his environment. You are wrong: this man is from Germany, this is from Poland, this is from Georgia, that one is of Finnish origin, this one is of Turkish [...] All of them constitute Russia.' See Lypa (1995), Rozpodil Rosiyi (The Division of Russia), Institute of Ethnography NAS of Ukraine, p. 44.

28 Ibid, p. 50.

29 Ibid, p. 25.


31 Ibid, p. 60.

32 Lypa (1942), p. 89.

33 As Lypa put it, ‘Nationalism as the search for the nation’s identity cannot restrict itself by underlining only the external features of the nation and its struggle for political independence. The search for a nation’s identity will consequently lead to the emergence of a [nation’s] own forms of social life and labour.’ And later, ‘Having discovered their identity they [nations] would feel, more distinctly, every oppression of this identity. Brutal political pressure from abroad and economic exploitation will appear in their nakedness.’ See Lypa (1942), pp. 78, 85.

34 According to the official version, Yuriy Lypa was detained by the NKVD as he was suspected of partisan activity and killed during his unsuccessful attempt at escape. However, the unofficial version claims that Lypa was asked by Soviet officers to treat their soldiers (as well as being a political scientist, he was also a bright surgeon). Officers agreed to grant him security, however did not keep their word. Several days later Lypa’s body was found by peasants in the woods. People who found the body stated that Lypa was tortured and killed by his own surgical instruments.
In this article I argue that non-state actors (NSAs) can play an important role in international sanctions politics, which has been underestimated due to the state-centred view of international sanctions theory. Even though NSAs do not have access to the decision making process and, until the beginning of the 1990s, the politics of international sanctions were dominated by Cold War oppositions, I will explore the different ways in which NSAs work towards the implementation of international sanctions by using examples from the sanctions regime against apartheid South Africa and Burma (Myanmar). Throughout the apartheid regime in South Africa, NSAs in the West organised a boycott movement that forced companies to withdraw from the country. During sanctions against Burma (Myanmar), human rights organisations and the opposition network controlled the critical flow of information between Burma (Myanmar) and the West regarding the Burmese Government and provided evidence of human rights violations. With Barber (1979), I will show that NSAs promote sanctions for achieving three different objectives and that the success of these sanctions could not be measured on the policy outcome alone. The case study of Burma (Myanmar) is based on semi-structured interviews held with members of the opposition network and NGOs in Brussels, Thailand and Burma (Myanmar) in 2010 and 2012.

Keywords: Sanctions, Non-state actors, human rights, Burma (Myanmar)
The Theory of International Sanctions

Even though sanctions are often criticised for having counterproductive effects, sanctions can be an instrument to coerce political concessions, strengthen international norms and promote peace. Sanctions are often defined as a bargaining tool and therefore as an alternative to military intervention. Generally, sanctions are not viewed by scholars as an instrument of punishment, but in order to be successful, sanctions have to induce political changes in the target state. Consequently, the research on international sanctions is focused on questions about how to make them (more) successful. Whereas, at an early stage of sanctions’ research, their effectiveness was generally rated as negative, scholars later paid attention to the conditions of success and to possible ways to circumvent negative effects. In what is probably the most frequently cited empirical study on international sanctions, the authors Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott rated as successful 34% of the 116 cases analysed.

Even though the research was criticised the study provides empirical evidence for the common understanding that sanctions can achieve foreign policy goals. In their third edition, the authors reach the same conclusion: of 204 documented cases, sanctions were successful in 34%. Sanctions are most likely to be effective if they aim to achieve moderate political change, the target state is an ally of the states initiating sanctions, sanctions were implemented comprehensively or they primarily affect local elites or, in democracies, the average middle class voter.

But despite the potential of sanctions to achieve political change and compliance with international norms, they have often worsened the conditions of the population in the target country. Wood argues that in order to stabilise their regime, leaders in targeted countries increase their level of repression in response to sanctions; in democracies the negative consequences of sanctions are much higher than in democracies. Hence sanctions are not a panacea and not always a peaceful alternative. To measure the effectiveness of sanctions, Giumelli argues that they should be evaluated according to alternative measures.

In the general logic of international sanctions it is assumed that economic losses lead to political compliance because the issue at stake is not worth the price, therefore sanctions must exact maximum economic harshness. From this perspective it is not obvious that non-state actors (NSAS) in the target state pressure for sanctions, but sanctions
‘need not bite in order to work.’ Therefore NSAs can call for smart sanctions that focus on the governing elite. When NSAs call for comprehensive sanctions they perceive these measures to be the best option according to its alternatives.

Although there are reasons for NSAs to demand international sanctions, the research has largely neglected NSAs as actors in relation to international sanctions. The research is mainly focused on international sanctions as an instrument of foreign policy, whereby states and Intergovernmental Organisations (IGOs) are the main actors. Kaempfer and Lowenberg belong to the few scholars who consider NSAs as important for the decision making process of international sanctions. They regard the decision making process in the initiating state as a process of negotiation with the involvement of various actors. Because, within the initiator state, sanctions could appear as protective tariffs that increase the supply of national goods, and interest groups could pressure decision makers within the initiator states to implement sanctions. Despite this, the strategies and perspectives employed by NSAs in relation to international sanctions have yet to be reviewed in a systematic way. Factors for success and the conditions under which countries are likely to initiate sanctions have been the primary focus of sanction research.

Generally, the success of an international sanctions regime is measured in terms of the fulfilment of the aims a particular sanctions regime was meant to attain. Most researchers follow the definition of Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott and determine its success solely based on the policy outcome in the target country and the contribution made by sanctions. In this approach, which is conducted by means of quantitative research, sanctions are successful when the goal sought by the initiator was (in part) realised through sanctions. Therefore, in conventional wisdom, sanctions are only regarded as successful where there is policy change.

But Barber, who had more than 30 years ago, distinguished between three different objectives for international sanctions. The primary objective is associated with the policies of the target states. States and IGOs implement international sanctions because the targeted government threatens to disrupt international peace or violates international norms, such as human rights. Sanctions, therefore, are a negotiating tool which is aimed at bringing the government policy of a target
state in line with international norms. The secondary objective of international sanctions is connected with the states that impose the sanctions. By imposing sanctions the initiating states demonstrate, to voter groups and the public throughout the world, their willingness to implement international norms. On the international level, states can show other governments their view on particular issues by imposing sanctions.

With regard to the secondary objective international sanctions function as a communication tool directed at the public, other governments and the international community. The tertiary objective of international sanctions is concerned with the international normative order. By imposing sanctions against the violators of international norms, governments highlight the importance of norms.

If the objectives of international sanctions are not limited to the policy of the target states, this means that the success of sanctions should also not only be evaluated in terms of policy impact. Sanctions as means of communication and the protection of international norms could be successful without achieving policy changes in the target state. Baldwin also argues that the success of international sanctions can only be rated in relation to other instruments with the potential to achieve policy change. Therefore, sanctions should not simply be measured in their own terms but also in comparison to, for example, diplomacy, humanitarian intervention or war.

Non-state Actors in World Politics

At the beginning of the 1990’s, NSAS proliferated as the new actors in world politics, whereby the universe of NSAS is necessarily diverse. NGOs, as a main group of actors within NSAS, were described as the vanguard of global civil society with their attempt to change the world for the better.

In answer to globalisation and the fact that national governments (alone) could not deal with international issues, early research considered NGOs to be problem solvers and a democratic force in a changing world. However, after more than two decades of intensive research on NGOs there has developed a certain scepticism about the legitimacy and real influence of NGOs. There is no question that NGOs as part of the global civil society were successful in implementing norms in var-
ious areas. The International Campaign to Ban Landmines for example, founded in 1992 as a global network in over 90 countries, played a major role in the Ottawa Process that led to the signing of the Mine Treaty in 1997.

But the research on NGOs has mainly documented their influence on policy areas not in touch with security and economy such as environment and human rights policy. Summarising the extensive research on NGOs, social movements and other non-state actors in international politics have shown the potential they have to shape the international system. NGOs are important actors in international politics due largely to their campaigning potential: they pressure state and non-state actors to bring their policies in line with international norms.

Dingwerth and Pattberg explored the proliferation of transnational rule-making organisations in the area of sustainability politics and analysed a strategic shift from lobbying rule makers to making and implementing the rules themselves. At the same time, NSAs and the political system are interdependent, as NSAs can only prosper within a more or less stable and peaceful international system.

In autocratic states, NSAs are often challenged by the state and have to find alternative ways to attempt the implementation of international norms. When non-state actors are faced with repression at home, the boomerang model and spiral model indicate that support from international advocacy networks can help to place human rights violations on the agenda of IGOS. As a result of the international pressure by IGOS and NGOs the target government will often comply with international norms.

But Policy areas concerned with international security are still dominated by nation states and are not primarily oriented around democratic principles, such as the decision making process of the UN Security Council. In this article I concentrate on NSAs that promote international sanctions for the realisation of international norms, such as human rights. In particular these actors are NGOs, international human rights networks, media organisations and (political) organisations in exile. I analyse the strategies used by these NSAs in the attempt to implement international sanctions that are part of international foreign and security policy.
Non-state Actors and international Sanctions

Globalisation and the increased responsibility of the international community to protect human rights norms have made it necessary to integrate the expertise and the activism of NSAs into the international policy realm. Consequently, since the 1990s, NSAs have had more access to the decision making process. However, even during the Cold War human rights organisations had an impact on international politics. Case studies on the Anti-Apartheid Movement in the western world demonstrate that NSAs were relevant actors in sanctions policy from outside the political system due to their advocacy for private sanctions against companies and other profiteers of apartheid politics. In contrast, in current sanction regimes such as in Burma (Myanmar), NGOs have preferred to try to influence the decision making process of IGOs and states, instead of imposing private sanctions.

I selected South Africa and Burma (Myanmar) for the case studies to analyse if the strategies and influence of NSAs had changed over the years. In both cases the call for international sanctions gained much support from the civil society in western states, inter alia due to the popular opposition leaders Nelson Mandela and Aung San Suu Kyi. In this article I distinguish between international and private sanctions. Private sanctions are sanctions imposed by non-state actors. Unlike international sanctions, private sanctions have an indirect impact on the target state, because private sanctions are imposed against those who profit from the violation. For example, private sanctions were imposed against companies that sought to lower their financial expenditure by operating in areas with poor social and labour standards.

A precondition for NGOs to become actors of international sanctions’ policy, regardless of whether they impose private sanctions or are aimed at influencing the imposition of bilateral or multilateral sanctions, is the access to information about human rights violations in the potential target state. Yet, particularly in autocratic states, it is quite difficult for western human rights organisations to gain access to this information because regimes frequently seek to inhibit free flow of information. This is why NGOs who call for sanctions often exchange information, and/or have a close relationship, with liberation movements or political opposition groups in the target state, for example: the ANC (African National Congress) in South Africa or the NCGUB.
(National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma) in Burma. In South Africa it was mainly the ANC which provided evidence of human rights violations and was crucial for the coordination of the different national Anti-Apartheid Movements in the western world.

The ANC established the boycott movement as a strategy for the isolation of South Africa in nearly all spheres such as sports, music and science that were adopted by all Anti-Apartheid groups around the world. Therefore, scientific associations like the World Archaeological Congress suspended South African memberships. The Anti-Apartheid Movement can be viewed as a ‘movement of movements,’ under which numerous individuals, organisations and institutions from around the world were associated around the objective to abolish racial segregation.

The Anti-Apartheid Movement was founded in 1959 by exiled South Africans in the UK as a response to the appeal of Albert Luthuli and other ANC leaders who asked for international support of their objectives. Initially, the British Anti-Apartheid Movement was focused on the boycott of South African products to support the victims of apartheid as well as support the South African struggle for freedom and thus fight for the abolition of apartheid.

Following the Sharpeville massacre in 1960, violent conflict and the oppression of the South African opposition intensified, and the Anti-Apartheid Movement in the western world started growing. In most western countries like the Netherlands, Germany and France a national organisation called the Anti-Apartheid Movement was set up. These NGOs shared the objectives and strategies of the ANC and the Anti-Apartheid Movement in the UK. Thus not only South African exiles and the American Civil Rights Movement supported the South African struggle for freedom, but during the following decades the Anti-Apartheid Movement gained more and more support from labour unions, churches, the peace movements and individuals. They were united by condemning apartheid as a violation of the equal treatment of all persons.

In Burma (Myanmar) the situation was much more complex. With the NLD (National League for Democracy) in liberated areas and the NCGUB there was also a political opposition, but in exile, comparable with the ANC, however they did not have a coordinating function for NGOs and pressure groups, which the ANC did have. Secondly, the access
to information critical to Burma’s government politics was until the beginning of the transition process in 2011 much more difficult. Among other strategies the Burmese government legislated information laws which impose penalties on the transfer of critical information. Therefore human rights organisations beyond Burmese borders helped to establish a network of information transfer with secret reporters and messengers to bypass the government’s control of information. Secret messenger teams from local human rights organisations in the border region collected information about human rights violations in Burma, and with the help of advocacy and network organisations, this information was disseminated. Advocacy and network organisations in the neighbouring states, particularly in Thailand, compiled reports based on this information and drafted a political strategy. Based on these reports, pressure groups in the western world such as Burma Campaign UK and international human rights organisations like the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) have demanded action by the international community and civil society against the Burmese violation of international human rights norms. But the network was not only made up of human rights organisations. The political opposition such as the NLD and the parties of the ethnic nationalities played an essential role in the network as, from the perspective of human rights organisations, they were struggling for democracy and self-determination in Burma (Myanmar) and were oppressed by the former military government. Thus, the international opposition network sought to support the objectives the government elected in 1990 as well as ethnic nationalities, although NGOs nonetheless made independent decisions about their strategies.

Following the brutal oppression of the 1988 uprisings in Burma (Myanmar) where more than 3000 people were killed by the military, political activists left the country and founded organisations to struggle for democracy from outside Burma (Myanmar). Media organisations in exile, such as Democratic Voice of Burma and the Irrawaddy, were founded by political activists after their release from prison in the early 1990s. These media outlets not only provide uncensored information about Burma to the western world but also to the people inside Burma (Myanmar) as they report in English, Burmese and partially in ethnic languages. Therefore the international human rights network on Burma (Myanmar) was made up of local human rights organisa-
tions that were organised into local advocacy and network organisa-

tions to compile their information in special reports, political opposition parties that are also organised in networks such as the Forum for Democracy in Burma, media organisations, which provide uncensored information to Burma and the whole world, as well as international human rights organisations and Burma pressure groups outside Burma, which try to place on the international agenda information about human rights violations and the objectives of the political opposition. This network is shown in the figure; thereby the arrows symbolise the flow of information and their direction.

While present day access to information concerning human rights violations can be complicated, the conception of human rights as specified in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is more or less globally agreed upon (that is ratified by most governments). In order
to become actors for international sanctions policies NSAs have to give evidence of human rights violations and need to name those responsible.

Until the end of the 1970’s the Anti-Apartheid organisations were hindered by the fact that racism was not globally recognised as a violation of human rights. The former colonial states were condemning apartheid as an expression of colonialism and a world dominated by the west. Therefore, in the democratically structured UN General Assembly, apartheid was a frequently discussed issue and several resolutions were adopted in 1952 after India brought a draft resolution naming the situation in South Africa a ‘race conflict resulting from the politics of apartheid.’ But the General Assembly does not have any binding instruments in regard to sanctions, and prior to the end of the Cold War the UN Security Council was dominated by the self-interest and the confrontation of East and West political blocs. Due to the inability of the United Nations to act, and the partial non-acceptance of racism as human rights violations, despite the experiences of Nazi Germany, most sanctions by states in the western world like the US and western IGOS such as the European Economic Community were implemented in the 1980s. The UN Security Council was pressured by former colonies to impose sanctions against apartheid South Africa, yet with the arms embargo in 1977, only very limited sanctions were possible.

Thus, in order to become actors for international sanctions policies, NGOs must first succeed in getting general acceptance that the situation in the potential target state is a violation of global norms, and secondly, must give substantial evidence for these violations.

NSAs as actors in international sanctions policies can follow two different paths. As actors from the inside, they try to influence the decision making process directly by informing decision makers about human rights violations or gaps in existing sanction regimes. As actors from the outside, NSAs become the initiators of private sanctions and work towards non-state isolation of the state where human rights violations are taking place. As actors from the inside NSAs can have a direct influence on the decision making process by having meetings with decision makers or delivering speeches. Today NSAs in principle have access to the decision making process of IGOS and within states, mostly because NSAs are perceived as helping to handle the requirements of
governing in a globalised world. NSAs do not have permanent access
to the decision making process of sanctions at the international level
such as the UN Security Council or the Council of the European Union.
But the sanctions against Burma indicate that NGOs have access
to lower level decision making processes that could have an impact
on higher decision making processes. At the EU level, NGOs used the
EU Parliament as a door opener, because ‘the EU parliament is quite
open, they are like a big NGO. If you are first successful in raising your
case there, it can be expressed with a stronger voice by the EU parlia-
ment quite easily’ (interview: international human rights organisation
(IHROA) 2010). However, even with the EU parliament NSAs’ access is
not guaranteed, so it is part of the long term work of these organisa-
tions to establish contact with Members of European Parliament in
order to facilitate access (interview IHROB 2010).

NSAs do not need to directly shape the opinion of decision makers,
however. They can also have indirect influence when they modify the
public opinion, which places states or IOs under pressure to act. By
the end of the 1970s, public opinion in the western world was mainly
in favour of sanctions and the international isolation of South Africa.
In the US, public opinion had an enormous influence on the imposi-
tion of the Anti-Apartheid Act. When President Reagan attempted to
veto the Act he was out voted in the House of Representatives as well
as in the Senate.2

During the Cold War, NSAs were largely actors from the outside.
Their access to the decision making processes of western states and
the United Nations was limited. On the one hand, NSAs did not try
to influence bilateral and international sanctions themselves. They
did not consider the western world and IOs like the UN as impor-
tant in regard to combating human rights violations. Therefore, NSAs
had close relations with the alliance of former colonies and the former
socialist bloc, which was in opposition to the South African govern-
ment.3 As such, NGOs implemented largely private sanctions against
the profiteers of apartheid politics, such as banks and financial insti-
tutions in the US. Among other strategies, NSAs called for a boycott of
South African fruits and pressured supermarkets in the western world
to stop selling these fruits. In the US, private sanctions against banks
were quite successful. In response to the call from the Anti-Apartheid
Movement, student groups and South African churches within universi-
ties in the US, and the Council of Churches, threatened the large scale
withdraw of money from banks if they did not stop doing business with South Africa. Thus, NSAS did not ask states and IGOs to impose sanctions; they directly forced non-state actors to respond.

In the decades following the 1990s, NSAS also implemented private sanctions against Burma (Myanmar), although to a lesser extent than against South Africa. By the end of the 1990s several companies such as Apple Computers, Carlsberg Beer, Pepsi and Kodak were forced to withdraw from Burma due to negative publicity by NSAS’ campaigns aimed at these companies. Today, however, private sanctions are more likely to be linked to international (bi- and multilateral) sanctions. In 2004, the EU implemented an investment ban (lifted in April 2013) on state owned companies in Burma, which was meant to target the main economic sectors but, crucially, the oil and gas sectors were excluded. Human rights organisations and single-issue NGOs such as Burma Campaign UK massively criticised these EU sanctions, and in particular France, for weakening the EU Common Position. Accordingly, NGOs began a Post a Pineapple to the Foreign Secretary Campaign and the Totalitarian Oil Campaign to demonstrate that only unimportant sectors were targeted by EU sanctions. With Post a Pineapple to the Foreign Secretary, the Burma Campaign UK in 2006 launched a campaign to call attention to the fact that the EU had banned companies from investing in a pineapple juice factory in Burma but did not take any action to stop investments in the more lucrative oil, gas and timber sectors. The campaign invited the public to send pineapples, fresh, tinned or dried, direct to the British Foreign Secretary. By the end of the 1990’s human rights organisations such as Earth Rights International and Burma pressure groups started campaigns to force TOTAL and other oil companies out of Burma. The organisations launched reports about Total’s role in funding and protecting Burma’s dictatorship. The campaign was taken up by more than 40 organisations in 18 countries.

In contrast to South Africa, in the case of Burma (Myanmar) NSAS did not aim at comprehensive isolation via private sanctions. Private sanctions against Burma were used more specifically to outlaw single companies and to protest against an international policy, which gave priority to economic interests and not to international norms such as human rights.

In sum, NSAS themselves have shifted their activity in two ways. In regard to sanctions today, they are more concerned with trying to influence international sanctions and are less engaged in private sanc-
sanctions policies. A second shift took place from the national to international level. Especially in the European states, NSAs are less concerned with national politics and have shifted their engagement to the EU level, as well as their geographic location to Brussels. This shift of engagement is caused by the fact that since 1992 the EU is working towards a common foreign policy and unilateral sanctions by EU member states are only rarely implemented. During the apartheid in South Africa, NSAs were active at the national level. Student groups for example tried to convince their universities to reconsider their investment policies. When NGOs launch campaigns these days they are aiming to act globally. For example, a consortium of over 200 groups was participating in the Free Burma’s Political Prisoners Now Campaign in 32 countries spread over five continents.

**Sanctions: NSAs’ Perspectives and Objectives**

By calling for international sanctions or implementing private sanctions, NSAs as well as state actors pursue different objectives. The primary objectives of NSAs are linked to the circumstances of the target state and especially the violation of international norms by the government. NSAs call for international sanctions or impose private sanctions, because a government systematically violates human rights norms; as with Burma (Myanmar) the government used forced labour, repressed the democratic opposition movement, fought against ethnic nationalities by trying to suppress their will of self-determination and let people suffer by denying people access to basic health care. In the case of apartheid politics, the South African government constructed a system of racial discrimination in all areas of social and political life. The governments used force in order to consolidate power and shot dead hundreds of protesters at the Soweto Uprising alone.

By calling for sanctions, NSAs effectively advocate for the punishment violators of human rights norms and pressure governments to bring their politics in line with international norms as they have been specified in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Charta of the United Nations, and international treaties. When states and IOGs impose sanctions for primary objectives, sanctions are a tool for negotiation in order to alter the politics of the target states. Neither decision makers nor researchers regard sanctions as appropriate tools for
punishing governments. But human rights groups are not concerned with finding the best way to proceed in terms of international diplomacy. Instead, they strive to render unacceptable any non-conforming behaviour and therefore call for sanctions which promote a responsible stance in compliance with international norms. Sanctions as a tool for punishment always achieve their goal, even when the objective of the initiator – to change the behaviour of the target – is not realised and the mere enactment of the sanctions is an indictment of the target state. In this sense, the perspective of human rights groups on sanctions is associated with the objectives of criminal law that impose penalties on unlawful treatment regardless of whether penalties change behaviour or not.

The secondary objective of sanctions is connected, as Barber noted, to the initiators themselves. By calling for international sanctions or by implementing private sanctions, NSAS criticise the lack of normative orientation in international politics. NSAS assume that IGOs or states are not willing or able to punish human rights violations. Particularly in the case of private sanctions against South Africa, it became obvious that the Anti-Apartheid Movement in the West did not regard states of the West, and decision making processes with high western influence such as the UN Security Council, capable of acting against apartheid politics. Therefore, NSAS implemented private sanctions aimed at the isolation and punishment of South Africa. After the Cold War, NSAS changed their strategy and now tend to act as insiders and are more focused on shaping actions and agendas of the international community.

In principle, NSAS regard IGOs and states – after the Cold War – as strong actors of international norms. However, even though the international community now has a greater array of instruments available to stop or condemn human rights abuses and support peace, IGOs and states are still reluctant to utilise them. By calling for international sanctions and actions, NSAS challenge these other actors to overcome their reluctance. Hence the call for international sanctions is an instrument of communication between NSAS and IGOs to remind IGOs and states of their responsibility to protect international norms. At the same time, by calling for private and international sanctions, NGOs also communicate with the public. NSAS show their capacity to protect international norms and demonstrate that they are important actors within international politics.
In general, the tertiary objective of international sanctions is concerned with the international normative order. By imposing international or private sanctions, states and NSAs outlaw norm-violating behaviour and strengthen normative principles within the international community. Despite the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, apartheid was not recognised as a violation of human rights throughout much of the world in the 1950’s and 1960’s. By calling for private sanctions, the Anti-Apartheid Movement punished the government of South Africa and placed racial discrimination on the social and political agenda in the West.

In 2000, NGOs such as the Burma Campaign UK and Tourism Concern were boycotting the travel books market leader Lonely Planet. NGOs criticised Lonely Planet claiming the company had played down the human rights situation in Burma and was encouraging tourists to travel to Burma. Consequently, the next edition of Lonely Planet Myanmar (Burma) was updated providing not only a detailed description about the human rights situation and the political system, but also pages of arguments listing pro and contra points on travelling to Burma. Through this campaign NGOs made a connection between human rights, tourism and politicised tourism in countries suffering from conflict and crises. Sanctions implemented for tertiary objectives are in principle always successful because they strengthen normative principles and can deter others from violating international norms.

In conclusion, by calling for international sanctions and implementing private sanctions, NSAs are not focusing simply on the best opportunities to gain political change in the target state. Rather, sanctions are more an instrument to uphold international norms by punishing and working against those who break them. In addition, sanctions are also an instrument of communication to demonstrate the capacity of NSAs in the eyes of public and state actors. From the perspective of NSAs, the success of sanctions is not limited to the policy outcome and the primary goals sought by the initiator. The determinants of success provided by the research on international sanctions do not have any meaning for human rights groups because NSAs justify sanctions on a moral basis. Human rights groups argue that the international community and the public have to take charge of outlawing the violations of international norms. From the viewpoint of NSAs, a strategy of engagement and diplomatic consultation without punishing the
The success of international sanctions was brought into the discussion by Baldwin. He postulated that sanctions ought to be considered in relation to other instruments or scenarios to change the target’s politics. According to states and IGOS, alternatives to sanctions are generally diplomatic consultation as part of an engagement strategy. In the case of South Africa, the engagement strategy of the 1960’s and 1970’s did not induce major political changes, therefore the European Economic Community and the US imposed sanctions at the beginning of the 1980’s. Before the elections in 2010, the strategy of international sanctions against Burma (Myanmar) was perceived as a failure by some European countries, such as Germany, for example. For this reason European countries were considering (partly) lifting sanctions. For the NSAS, however, the alternative was not at the international level as human rights organisations saw no alternative to punish the Burmese regime for violating international norms. An alternative scenario was simply the escalation of violent conflict, because the Burmese people would have sooner or later been unable to bear the repression any longer.

According to NSAS, sanctions against Burma and South Africa were a less violent option than civil war. Only days before the 2010 elections in Burma the KNLA (Karen National Liberation Army) announced by video statement that they were looking for a change. If change did not occur they would carry out their duty to defend their “motherland,” fight against their enemies, protect their people and stand up for righteousness. After the election, heavy fighting broke out between the Burmese army and Karen forces. When people are suffering from tyranny and oppression, NSAS and even the Universal Declaration of Human Rights argue that rebellion is the last resort and could lead to civil war as a consequence. International and private sanctions are therefore also an instrument of solidarity with the oppressed population in the target state. According to human rights groups, sanctions demonstrate to the population in the target state that the international community or international civil society supports their plight. Resist-
ance groups risk losing solidarity if they resort to the use of violence for more than simple defence. In South Africa, resistance groups also perceived international and private sanctions as a display of solidarity for their objectives.

Arguing that ‘sanctions hurt but apartheid kills,’ resistance groups and the Anti-Apartheid Movement wanted the international community and civil society to implement sanctions because they would thereby acknowledge the claims of the people discriminated against in South Africa. Without sanctions as a symbol of solidarity with the oppressed people civil war would have been more likely because armed resistance could be perceived as legitimised through such resistance struggles.

Another dimension of sanctions, which is often overlooked in the political arguments of decision makers and think tanks that are focused on sanctions as an instrument to obtain political change, is that sanctions lower the extent to which initiating states provide economic support, which helps maintain the state violating human rights norms. Human rights organisations and other social groups have clearly illustrated that campaigns against companies operating in countries such as Burma (Myanmar) and South Africa aimed to restrict the exchange relationship between the western world and the states violating the norms.

Boycotting fruits from South Africa was not aimed at ending the apartheid system but making sure that consumer behaviour in the western world would not prolong human rights abuses in South Africa. The same argument is made when NSAs call for international sanctions like arms embargoes or investment sanctions. An embargo on arms is not suited to change the target’s political system or to decrease the availability of weapons comprehensively, especially if it is not implemented by the United Nations or neighbouring states. However, arms embargoes imposed bilaterally or by the EU guarantee that no new weapons from these countries are sold to the norm violating country and therefore cannot be used against the civilian population. Even if private and international sanctions are not always effective in terms of influencing the target’s policy directly, they ensure that exchange relations between target and initiator do not prolong the violation of international norms.

Nevertheless non-state actors and even NGOs are not homogenous groups of organisations with a single perspective on international
sanctions. Particularly in the case of Burma (Myanmar), there were a lot of NGOs and think tanks that opposed sanctions. NGOs such as the Network Myanmar believed that sanctions against Burma have failed and that the international community should have revised its policy. These NGOs adhere to a political rather than a normative perspective, and assess the outcomes of sanctions only in regard to political changes. However, there is also common ground between state and non-state actors in terms of debates and perspectives on sanctions. Both sides wish to avoid any harm to the civil population caused by sanctions.

Conclusion

This article has demonstrated that NSAs are relevant actors of international sanctions policies. During the Cold War, NGOs and social movements did not regard IGOS and the states of the western world as major players in the struggle against apartheid. It was the former colonial states and the former socialist bloc that put apartheid on the agenda of the UN General Assembly. The Anti-Apartheid Movement acted locally in the western world and through boycott campaigns forced companies and banks to withdraw from South Africa. Nowadays, as shown by the sanctions against Burma (Myanmar), NGOs call on IGOS to impose sanctions against the violator of international norms. If they impose private sanctions, NGOs generally aim to set new standards or criticise international decision making processes for giving preference to economic interests rather than human rights.

Finally, by calling for international and private sanctions NSAs make a normative or ethic argument which does not limit the success of sanctions to the aim policy change in the target government. Especially human rights groups perceive sanctions as an instrument to punish states that violate norms, and therefore, they strengthen the international normative order. Furthermore, international and private sanctions are a symbol of solidarity with the oppressed population in the target country, and on this basis, sanctions should be considered in relation to alternative scenarios or instruments. Even if bilateral sanctions are not specifically suitable to change a target states policies they help ensure that the initiators of the sanctions are not contributing to more violations of international norms.
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Notes


Western Imaginary and Imagined Defense Strategies of Eastern Europe and its Borderlands

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This work discusses how the Western imaginary or the way “the West looks East” reinforces the construction of “unstable” or ambivalent identities in the new European countries, as well as the margins of Eastern Europe. Particularly, it deals with the Western discourses that locate Eastern Europe and its margins in the ambivalent state of spatiotemporal transitionality, and explores the possible defence strategies of the latter. The abovementioned Western discourses are roughly divided into the “stigmatising” and “enlightening,” though both imply a certain type of stigmatisation. The “othering” and “asymmetrical” discourses are considered as examples of the stigmatising discourse, while the “civilizational” – which is translated into the “elitist” – within the local settings, is considered as an example of the enlightening discourse. Furthermore, two extreme ways of “symbolic escape” by the new European countries (the cases of Poland and Romania) and the margins of Eastern Europe (the case of Georgia) are discussed: ‘a radical emigration ... [alongside] cultural amnesia’ and a ‘passionate nationalism and hyperbolic pride.’ The question is posed whether these strategies can help avoid stigmatisation. Based on both the research by other scholars and the recent cross-cultural research conducted among the youth in Romania, Poland and Georgia by the author of this work, it is illustrated that such means of symbolic escape can cause further stigmatisation and be largely responsible for a kind of failure discourse characteristic to the representatives of the abovementioned new European countries and the margins of Eastern Europe.

Keywords: Western Europe, Eastern Europe, youth, discourse, stigmatisation, nationalism, bricolage
Introduction

In this article, paper I attempt to contribute to highlighting the issue of the controversial processes of integration and division, of blurring and consolidating borders, and of growing sameness and lasting difference. I attempt to illustrate how this duality provokes a new politics of ambivalence in the New European countries and the margins of Eastern Europe, locating these societies in the ambivalent state of spatiotemporal transitionality.

It is a widespread assumption that borders are becoming fuzzy and that never was the shifting of places as easy as nowadays. Usually scholars bring the example of European Union (EU) as a case to consider. Despite this, the discourse on “Fortress Europe” has gained new insights. How is it possible that in the conditions of the on-going EU enlargement the frontiers of Europe are constantly consolidated? How have the countries that managed to “return” Europe after the collapse of the communist regimes, need to constantly prove their Europeanness, while those remaining on the margins of Europe desperately try to persuade the European “core” that despite their peripheral position, they belong to Europe because of their historical and cultural heritage. The cases of Romania and Poland, on the one hand, and Georgia, on the other, represent wonderful examples of attempting to prove one’s Europeanness both when it should not be questionable (as Poland and Romania are EU member countries) and when it is still questionable (as Georgia is not a part of the EU).

I became interested in the youth discourses about integration with the European “core” and their attitudes to Europeanisation in light of the EU membership/non-membership. For this purpose, I conducted qualitative social research (June 2010-December 2011); namely, in-depth interviews and focus groups with youth aged 17-25 in Georgia, Romania and Poland. I conducted 50 in-depth interviews and 2 focus groups with young people in Tbilisi Georgia, 33 in-depth interviews and 5 focus groups with young people in Bucharest Romania, and one of the main cities of Transylvania, Cluj-Napoca, and 14 in-depth interviews and 3 focus groups in Krakow as the old capital of Poland, which is believed to be more exposed to Western influences than other parts of the country. The collected data was transcribed and submitted to qualitative content and discourse analyses.

In what follows, I describe certain findings of my cross-cultural research and aim to illustrate how Europeanisation discourses provoke
a new politics of ambivalence responsible for upholding ambivalent identities that constantly negotiate between the Europeanising forces and the national. In order to make sense of why and how these ambivalent or ‘unstable’ identities are constructed, it is necessary to get familiar with the ‘Western Imaginary’ and the way ‘the West looks East’ as the latter encourages particular discourses and respective responses to/strategies against them among the “new” European countries and the margins of Eastern Europe.

The Stigmatising Discourse and Strategies against Them

What are Western European discourses about the new European countries and the margins of Europe? Citing one of the more famous examples by Maria Todorova, most scholars researching recent developments in Eastern European countries (Elias, Taras, Melegh, Kiossev, Goldsworthy, etc.) agree that the West invents the ‘Eastern other’ as its “opposite” and through this discourse the West ‘essentialises’ the Eastern identity. Different narratives can be applied to back up this ‘essentialisation’ and the Western ‘inventors’ are especially concerned by being tactful in this regard. Therefore, these days, the most widespread narratives would probably be the one on ‘the idea of an on-going transition [...] to an ideal social form [though] postponed into the indefinite or localised out of the reach of the locals’ or the ‘philanthropic idea’ of supporting the upward movement in the name of civilisation.

One could think of other narratives or even sub-narratives though it is not the purpose of this work to discuss them, but rather to show their impact on the construction of the locals’ perceptions of the Westernising/Europeanising forces. I will try, instead, to unite these narratives in some wider categories roughly dividing them into two discourses: stigmatising and enlightening, though both imply a certain type of stigmatisation.

By stigmatising discourses, I suggest those that voluntarily or involuntarily result from a negative labelling of the representatives of the Eastern and Central European countries, or those located even farther along the periphery. One example of a stigmatising discourse is the abovementioned “othering” discourse, which views societies in the light of descending civilisational scale and emphasise the difference between the so-called “new” or “emerging” European countries and “real,” and “old” Europe.
Another example of the stigmatising discourse is the ‘asymmetrical’ discourse, including the one of Europeanisation, which is asymmetrical enough to silence all those somehow denied membership of that ‘universally valid’ community [...] This asymmetry alone and the emerging binary oppositions are powerful enough to deny a ‘real existence’ to those who are in a midway or bottom position on such a scale.

What are the strategic responses of the targets of the stigmatising discourses? That is, how do they try to ‘respond to these vicious games of inclusion and exclusion?’ Concerning the ‘othering’ discourse, Todorova presented a comprehensive analysis of projecting the stigma and the accompanying frustrations on those located farther to the East and, as a result, Orientalising them, while simultaneously Occidentalising oneself as the West of the ‘other.’ A wonderful example of such a response is presented in the publication by the Federal Trust entitled ‘The EU and Romania – Accession and Beyond’ (2006). In the chapter on ‘Romania and the Future of the European Union’ the author discusses the importance of Romania – as a political agent – to the EU because of its ‘cultural and geopolitical belonging’ to Central Europe, and because of its neighbourhood with both Eastern Europe consisting of Ukraine, Moldova and Russia, and ‘South-Eastern Europe (the Balkans), where Romania has a tradition of intense contacts unburdened by hatred and conflict.’ In addition, Romania is presented as a real supporter of ‘Turkey’s accession to the EU, as well as that of Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus and of the Western Balkan countries.’

This is an attempt to push the borders of Eastern Europe farther to the East and to exclude oneself from both Eastern Europe and the Balkan region. We can also see an attempt to present oneself as a peaceful country, ‘unburdened by [ethnic] hatred and conflict,’ and ultimately, more civilised than the Balkans. Finally, not yet (at the time) being a member of the EU, Romania was nevertheless considered as such an ‘important political agent’ within the EU that it already promotes other less important agents’ (located farther East and South-East) incorporation in it.

The ‘asymmetrical’ discourse provokes its own strategic response as well. As the main danger connected to it is ‘to silence all those somehow denied membership of that “universally valid” community’ (which is represented by Europe), the ones ‘in a midway or bottom position’ desperately strive to gain European status and to prove that they are genuine European societies:
On a “sliding scale of merit” no one should want to be out of “Europe” and social and value patterns it represents or, more precisely, is aligned with.\textsuperscript{13}

Therefore, Romanians need to constantly reiterate: ‘We are Europeans’ or ‘We are a part of Europe.’\textsuperscript{14} Poles emphasise their ‘national uniqueness [that] reinforces Poland’s attractiveness vis-à-vis the European Union’ even in their parliamentary speeches.\textsuperscript{15} Concerning Georgians, whose European status is rather questionable, they need to persuade both themselves and the outsiders: ‘I am a Georgian, therefore I am a European!’\textsuperscript{16}

However, to sound more trustworthy, they have to persuade the powerful European players that the latter are in need of the Eastern, Central, South-Eastern or more peripheral regions on the margins of Europe. One vivid example can be found in the same paper by Severin which produced the following conclusion:

\begin{quote}
Romania needs the EU as much as the EU needs Romania’ and alongside the trivial idea that ‘what is good for Europe is also good for Romania,’ presenting the new truth that ‘what is good for Romania is good for Europe.'\textsuperscript{17}
\end{quote}

A similar case can be found in the Polish politicians’ discourses on the ‘Polish national mission in the EU before joining it. This mission is perceived as essential for the EU and politicians argued about Poland’s ‘preferential treatment’ by the EU implying that due to its exceptional mission and national uniqueness, Poland must be treated by the EU in some special, less demanding way [...] differently than, say, other EU candidate countries.\textsuperscript{18}

A corresponding example from Georgia is represented by the discourse on Georgia’s strategic importance for Europe as a potential energy transit state, providing Europe with the gas from the East and competing with the Russia’s monopoly over the hydrocarbon. In Georgia’s mundane discourse, Europe is pitied for having to play by Russian rules in order to survive cold winters, and the alternative energy projects, in which Georgia is considered to be a ‘corridor’ for supplying Europe, are ascribed a missionary value.

**The Enlightening Discourse and Strategies against Them**

Besides stigmatising discourses, or rather alongside them, there are powerful enlightening discourses, which could be termed the euphe-
mistic forms of stigmatisation. The enlightening discourses aim to “enlighten” the new European or not-quite European societies and to transform them into “real” democracies of “true” Europe. One of the examples of the enlightening discourse is the “civilizational” discourse, which implies that Europe (or more precisely, the EU) has a cultural mission of cultivating ‘true European values’ among those to be transformed into “real” democracies. Consequently, EU accession and the accompanying Europeanisation process are considered as ‘the most authentic form of modernisation.’

Usually, the main supporters of this discourse are local intellectual and elite groups, who may continuously argue that “Europe” brings “tolerance” and “rationality” into our not truly “European” country and tend to complain about their country’s inability to properly encompass and enact European values and modes of life, starting from the distorted forms of individualisation, ending with the poor quality of toilets on Hungarian trains. Thus, the civilisational discourse is translated into the elitist discourse within local settings. Scholars researching this topic bring various examples of the local intellectuals’ call for abandoning “irrational” or “unworthy” local customs and for the rejection of “Eastern” local nationalism drawing a clear line between the image of the “national” as past and “old” and the “European” as “future” and “new.” Furthermore, Europeanisation is considered as the only means for overcoming the ‘backwardness’ of their population. Some authors go even further and state that ‘from time to time the local intelligentsia openly called for the help of the West – in their wording – “to colonise” the local population.’

Thus, certain perceptions are constructed, spread and supported through the aforementioned discourse, particularly those that the locals have various ‘unworthy’ customs, which should be abandoned in the name of civilisation; that the locals are usually “backward,” and unable to promote desirable developments in their society and are in need of someone from the outside to teach them; and that the locals need to reject their local nationalism – which is “Eastern” – and should move to the post-nationalist state in order to catch up with “true” Europeans as the Western European countries have already stepped into the post-nationalist era.

The prevailing strategy against such discourses, can be traced in the New European scholars’ critical reflections on ‘the East-West slope’ and more recently the Western scholars discussions of ‘socially con-
structured’ or ‘imagined’ borders between Western and Eastern Europe, which could hardly be taken down because of their ‘intangible’ or ‘ephemeral’ nature, as well as the volumes aiming to illustrate that the nationalisms in the Eastern and Western European countries have never been as divergent as widely believed. Furthermore, entire volumes could be devoted to identity studies from local perspectives; to articulate critical self-awareness and verify the power of local self-reflection against the need of being taught from the outside.

Can ‘Symbolic Escape’ Act as a Solution?

Let us now discuss the folk defence strategies against both the stigmatising and enlightening discourses since these are closely intertwined because of their overt or latent stigmatising character. Such defence strategies are sensibly summarised in Kiossev’s paper under the subtitle: ‘The Dominant Strategies of (Dis)Identification.’ He describes two ways of ‘symbolic escape’ representing two extremes: the first strategy is ‘a radical emigration... [alongside] cultural amnesia’ and the second is a ‘passionate nationalism and hyperbolic pride.’

To start with the first strategy, it is no secret that many people from the geographical parts of Eastern Europe migrate to its Western segments – especially since their countries’ entry into the EU – as crossing borders has become much easier, while Western Europe provides more job opportunities and pays better. Poles talk a lot about their compatriots’ mass migration to England and Germany; Romanians produce the same narratives about their compatriots’ massive migration to Italy, Spain and France. The descriptions of their experiences of staying abroad are amazingly similar: Polish youth regretfully admit that ‘people don’t have a good opinion about’ them in Britain and Germany, while the Romanian youth disclose that they have ‘a bad name’ in Italy, Spain and France. Thus, the ease of crossing the borders can be considered as both a success (new opportunities to study and work) and a failure (negative stigmatisation by recipient societies). It is remarkable that the failure discourse related to migration is missing only in two interviews conducted in Romania and one interview conducted in Poland. The following two examples represent the Romanian and Polish narratives related to their trips abroad:

When I am in Germany, I try to speak German so that people think I live there for a long time and I am a part of their
country, because I have a family there and my cousin told me: When you speak Polish here, they think you are stupid, they want to go away from you, etc. Some people abroad are ashamed of our country.\textsuperscript{30}

What struck me in this narrative was a sudden shift from the first to the third person! My respondent did not conceal that she avoided revealing her nationality in Germany though was ashamed to openly admit that she was among those, who were ashamed of their own country. It seems national sentiments are quite strong even when individuals are ashamed of their nationality.

Many Romanians are ashamed of their national identity because of their compatriots’ behaviours abroad. This is what happened to us in Italy: We were the Erasmus programme students and were going to organise a Romanian party, four of us. But suddenly there was that episode of the Romanian or Gypsy [pausing here and emphasising that either could be] crime against an Italian woman and we were in panic. We immediately started speaking English instead of Romanian because our parents would call us and say: ‘Don’t speak Romanian – otherwise some angry Italians might be around, understand you speak Romanian and [take] revenge!’ It was the first time we experienced a racist issue [...] There was a sudden hope when the Pope appeared on the balcony in the Vatican and preached about tolerance. You feel a kind of relief but then you hear some people were beaten in a supermarket just because they were Romanians. As the Erasmus program students we were supposed to exchange the values and be proud of it, and the weekend we spent was really scary!\textsuperscript{31}

Here, again, my interviewee does not say anything about her being ashamed of her nationality; rather it is the story of being scared of an offensive treatment by the recipient society. However, returning to the very first sentence in this paragraph and realising that the rest of the paragraph is the evidence for the first sentence, which actually represents the main argument, it becomes clear that the whole story was meant as an example of ‘Romanians [being] ashamed of their national identity’ because of what their fellow Romanians or maybe even Gypsies (often perceived as the ones spoiling the name of Romanians) go abroad.
Along with sharing their stories of staying in West European countries, the interviewed young people also shared their strategies for avoiding stigmatisation. Polish respondents disclosed – with a sad smile or an ironic tone – how they desperately try to adopt the British accent after a few months’ stay in Britain; moreover, how they try to even speak Polish with the British accent! Romanians confess with the same sad smile or the same ironic tone that while staying abroad they try to hide their nationality; moreover, that sometimes they even pretend to be Italians!

I guess these desperate attempts can be viewed as a defence strategy against the Westerners’ discourses on how after joining the EU several hundred thousand East Europeans were on their way to invade Western Europe, which is well evidenced by a caricature from one British newspapers depicting a long line of trucks with the signs: Romania, Bulgaria, Latvia (etc) and a large poster on the borderline saying: ‘Welcome to London, equal crime opportunities for all!’

This is one of numerous examples of East Europeans’ representation in Western discourses as criminals responsible for most of the recent ills occurring in the peaceful and democratic societies of Western Europe. But can imitating a British accent or pretending to be an Italian help avoid stigmatisation? I would say it causes double stigmatisation (from both one’s compatriots and the citizens of a recipient country) and its accompanying failure discourse characteristic to both Romanians and Poles (and probably other ‘Easterners’ as well).

The second type of symbolic escape’ is considered to be a ‘passionate nationalism and hyperbolic pride.’ As illustrated above, it is assessed as a purely “Eastern” phenomenon as the scholars have a general agreement on the fact that the Western European countries live in the post-nationalist age (though no doubt one could find the examples of nationalist discourses all around Western Europe). And even if there are expressions of nationalism in Western Europe, they are still more acceptable than the similar phenomena in Eastern Europe viewed through the dichotomy of “civic” (or Western) and “ethnic” (or Eastern) nationalisms; the former ‘characterised as liberal, voluntarist, universalist, and inclusive,’ while the latter ‘glossed as illiberal, ascriptive, particularist, and exclusive.’

However, ‘a key difference between civic and ethnic nationalism is that the latter is usually undertaken by insecure ethnic groups.’
And, even if some authors trace the recent revival of nationalism or ‘backdoor nationalism’ in Eastern Europe, they argue the EU is largely responsible for it. For instance, Fox and Vermeersch state that ‘contrary to expectations, the accession of the EU’s newest members did not sound the death knoll of nationalism in the region; rather, it signalled its reinvention and, in certain respects, reinvigoration.’

The expressions of ‘passionate nationalism’ and the ‘hyperbolic pride’ intertwined with it can be found in different kinds of ‘identitary concerns.’ Iliescu describes them on the example of Romanians and states that such ‘an identitary obsession [...] frequently prevails in Romania’ and is represented by such traits as ‘focus upon “glorious” past events,’ ‘the tendency to overrate (national or ethnic) particularities [that] leads to encapsulation of “Romanianism” in a certain distinguishing feature,’ the emphasis on ‘being special’ and ‘different from others,’ ‘a tendency towards self-celebration,’ as well as ‘identitary fear [...] that one’s identity could be affected (forgotten, altered, modified, etc.) by what is going on around (on the continent, in the whole world, etc.)’ exemplified by Romanians’ complaints about the attempts of ethnic Romanians’ ‘Hungarisation’ in Transylvania or ‘Russification’ in Eastern Moldavia.

A similar ‘identitary obsession’ can be traced among Georgians. The ‘focus upon “glorious” past events’ is the most common feast narrative in Georgia; ‘the tendency to overrate (national or ethnic) particularities’ exemplified by the narratives that Georgians have a unique alphabet that creates its own language group, that Georgian polyphony is one of the most ear-pleasing, that Georgians are one of the most hospitable nations, or that Georgian food and wine are among the best in the world, which make the Georgians’ most common everyday discourses, does present ‘Georgianness’ as a distinguishing characteristic; emphasis paid to ‘being special’ and ‘different from others’ is not alien to Georgians either and there is even a popular saying: ‘All of us, who are the best, are Georgians.’

Although this popular expression is perceived in a humorous way, the one on ‘Georgia as a Mother of God’s land’ is the dominant religious, as well as mundane, discourse of the country. The narratives on Georgia’s victorious past, Georgia as the first Orthodox Christian country being under the special protection of God’s Mother, Georgians’ famous hospitality and marvelous food and wine, etc. provides fertile grounds for special pride and ‘self-celebration.’ Finally, Georgians have the same ‘identitary fear’ that their ‘national spirit’ can be endangered
by the on-going rapid socio-cultural transformations, by the globalising forces, by various religious sects and denominations coming to the country and threatening Georgian Orthodox beliefs, etc. But the two most alarming threats are represented, on one hand, by the powerful northern neighbour (Russia) that has been trying to subordinate Georgia for two centuries and, on the other hand, by certain Westernising forces that, despite stimulating some positive innovations, might be harmful to local traditions.

Poles would probably echo this discourse in a somewhat more modest way. Analysing Polish political discourse since 1989, Krzyzanowski observes that it is characterized by

the topos of national uniqueness, frequently paired with the topos of definition of the national role [that] appears to have the main role... the topos of national history is invoked to support the said uniqueness of Poland and portray Polish collectivity as exceptionally experienced throughout its history, and, therefore, as able to substantially contribute to the creation of the new Europe and its identity.38

In addition, the ‘identitary fear [...] that one’s identity could be affected [...] by what is going on around,’ even if it relates to the EU influences (nothing to say about the Russian factor), is not alien to Poles either. To return to the Polish political discourse in the recent period, it seems to underline that

Poland must remain conscious of the non-ideal character of the EU as the object of collective aspirations and motivations: it emphasizes that Poland must always remain watchful of its national interests irrespective of the developments within the EU.39

The author of this paper has also revealed the expressions of ‘passionate nationalism’ in the in-depth interviews with youth from new European countries though both Romanian and Polish youngsters believe they lack national sentiments. They think it is especially visible now, when ‘a very strong idea of the united Europe has been promoted’ and many young people consider their identities as European rather than just Romanian or Polish, which can shadow the feeling of national. As Anita (aged 19) put it: ‘I still feel that I am Polish but some people just forget about that and they want to be European; they try to be European and forget about their roots.’ Or, to quote Alina (aged 24):
I think we [Romanians] somehow lose our identity. It is bad for the country. We have to be more nationalistic [...] I think we should be prouder of our culture, our values. We start to forget about these things and to adopt the Western or, as we say, European ones.

However, there are some respondents, who state that after their country joined the EU, they have become more nationalistic:

After joining the EU I have become more nationalistic than I was before. When you feel that you are a perfect market for the developed countries to sell their products and, in addition, they make you believe that it is only you who benefit from them, that before you were not civilised, and that you are a true European now, it’s hard not to become a nationalist.\(^{40}\)

Another respondent sharing the very same concern that the EU makes Romanians believe that it is only them who benefit from being within the EU, calls it ‘European hypocrisy’ suggesting everyone to be aware of it ‘for our own good.’\(^{41}\)

Concerning the Georgian youth, the in-depth interviews revealed that, despite being positive about EU integration (that is also illustrated by the recent nationwide surveys\(^{42}\)), they are concerned about its side effects and think that as an outcome Georgians’ national sentiments, particularly their national pride and self-esteem, might be harmed:

Joining the EU will probably be beneficial in the economic terms as it might bring more investments; however, I am afraid, we will have to adjust to lots of different regulations that are alien to our country. I guess it will cause lots of objections and at least the inner protest of Georgians, who cannot stand being controlled, especially from the outside, and consider it as a form of subordination harming their self-esteem and pride.\(^{43}\)

Furthermore, despite that the interviewed Georgian youth consider themselves as quite nationalistic, they also state that ‘the epoch of being pro-Georgian hasn’t started by now [sic]\(^{44}\) calling their peers for action to ‘protect our deeply cultural from the outside attempts to demolish it\(^{45}\) and to preserve the ‘national spirit.’

Can a ‘passionate nationalism’ be an effective means of escaping stigmatisation? Quite contrary, it evokes further stigmatisation being viewed by the post-nationalist West as an expression of chauvinism,
racism, and xenophobia, and usually results in various kinds of ‘external conditionality’ supported by ‘a strong bargaining position’ of Western Europe. For instance, it can be represented by the sanctions of different severity for the already acquired EU members or by a warning for the countries hoping to ever be incorporated in the EU structures that their integration will be postponed to the even more indefinite future.

On the Local Way of Doing Things

The imagined defence strategies against the stigmatising and enlightening discourses discussed above represent the ways of ‘symbolic escape.’ However, the interviewees the New European countries and the margins of Europe not only search for the ‘symbolic’ solutions to challenge this reality but also apply the actual strategies of cultural resistance, represented by retraditionalisation (modern representations of the traditional) or cultural bricolage, varying from rediscovering the local, even copying the local, to creatively mixing the Western, predominantly European, with the local.

On one hand, there seems to be an attempt to mimic the West, especially the EU, whose standards and norms the three countries under investigation try to follow. On the other hand, there is an obvious attempt to do things in a local way, which predominantly implies a kind of bricolage – a mixture of the local with the Western. Youth discourses evolve along the same line: they complain about imitating the West and copy-paste everything Western. The common perception that everything Western is considered to be ‘of a better quality, more modern and civilised’ is assessed by my respondents as a ‘local mistake.’ Consequently, they call for a ‘selective incorporation’ of the outside elements. On the other hand, they stress their own ways of combining the elements from different contexts, making the point that although not all the examples of bricolage can be considered as successful, they still represent their attempts to do things in their own (local) way and to keep or invent ‘specificity.’

The first and most common strategy of cultural resistance emphasised by the youth from all three countries is ‘rediscovering’ the local:

Now a popular trend is to rediscover our own. You know, now all of us are into bio stuff and lots of women I know are redis-
covering their mothers’ or grandmothers’ recipes [...] and this is searching in the traditional [sic], I guess.\textsuperscript{51}

Together with “rediscovering” the local in everyday life, the interviewees bring a number of examples of such a rediscovery from painting, music, cinematography, etc. For instance, Irina (aged 24), herself an artist, stated that in response to copying the Western, a few years ago young Romanian artists started copying the local. She brings an example of the Cluj School of painting, which is characterised by a specific style and distinctive features such as the emphasis on social issues, expressionism, the domination of black and white colors, etc., and can be immediately identified as a Romanian style. She thinks that the young Romanian artists tend to imitate the Cluj School as the whole Western style of painting became not just boring but so common that by going back to the national style one wants to be not unique but, you know, somehow special, not common.

Andrei (aged 25), a film director, talks about the same strategies in cinematography noting that Romanian films have very specific and quite outstanding style easily recognizable as Romanian with its realistic and naturalistic emphasis, long talks, rather shaky camera, less care for technical aspects and more care for how feelings are transmitted, etc. He argues that Romanians can benefit a lot from the Western support but then they can always do things in their own way, even if it does not imply only successful cases:

I think we are in a good position, where we try to take money from the EU and it’s not by chance I am saying this first! We don’t take good examples, we just take money mainly and at the same time, we keep our way of doing things, and this comes with good and bad examples. Even though we are European, we are still very, very much Romanian!

Alongside rediscovering the local, there is also a trend of creatively mixing the local with the Western. It seems that Western cultural trends encourage improvisation and result in a culture-specific bricolage reflected in the modernised representations of the local. The respondents bring a lot of examples of such a bricolage from various areas of social life, including fashion, food, architecture, painting, music, etc.

According to my Georgian respondent, Irakli (aged 21), a DJ at one of the popular music clubs:
I may use the Western cover to decorate my Georgian sketch but it always remains Georgian and I am extremely proud of it! Some young people even state that combining the Georgian with the Western has its historical roots, that the Georgian-European bricolage, exemplified by ‘Shin,’ ‘Zumba,’ ‘Assa-Party’ and other Georgian performers today, has started in the 19th century, and that ‘Georgian academic music itself is a product of the combination of European music with Georgian folk.’

Romanian and Polish respondents recall similar examples stating that their cultural traditions, say, traditional music, can be a powerful means of stressing the local and resisting the Western, especially the Western musical styles dominating the music scene in the world. One of the most often cited examples among Polish youth is the group ‘Zacopower,’ which presents Polish folk songs and music in a modernised way that is ‘combining it with the best elements of modern Western music,’ while Romanians often mention the group ‘Fara Zahar’ (‘Without Sugar’), which ‘adapts the Western-style music to the local reality and uses lots of irony and sarcasm to present social aspects of Romanian life.’

That’s how glocalisation works: by adopting Western cultural elements and combining them with the local ones, especially folk, in a culture-specific way so that on their side ‘reworked traditional themes provide the basis for innovative and adaptive responses to outside influences.’

Besides those cases of bricolage one can be proud of, the young people recall less successful and even quite ‘strange’ cases of bricolage. And although some assess them as failures and some perceive them as shameful, they tend to believe that these cases might still represent the strategies of cultural resistance.

Georgian youths confessed that there is a fashionable trend of being intelligent they try to follow, which is more an image than a true aspiration, and they share a number of cases when they spend a whole day at a literary café as if they were getting familiar with the latest fiction though they might stare at the same page for hours, or when they take their own comics to a university library and pretend they are getting familiar with academic material. One of my Georgian respondents commented on this trend:
I have a feeling it’s a kind of response to this political project of ‘enlightening our youth’ though you would ask: why such a distorted response? I would reply: It is fetishism, a mock on our politicians’ obsession with promoting these Western-style educational standards, which stays on the surface and doesn’t really go deeper. Maybe it’s not a very successful attempt but it’s a specific way to cope.57

Corresponding examples are seen among the interviewed Romani-an and Polish youth. The often cited case of Romanian bricolage is ‘manele’ – the ‘trash pop, which originates from Turkish-Arabic roots and combines all these strange elements from elsewhere, including the local Gypsy music.58 As the plot of manele is usually about money, women, expensive cars and houses, most of the young people perceive it as shameful though quite often they confess that despite the fact that their peers would commonly refuse that they listen to manele, many of them still do. They think that manele can be descriptive of the Romanian reality though not in a sense that Romanians have all these golden things and expensive cars, or they possess the mansions in Spain, but these ideas and the respective attempts can be seen in the society.

Nevertheless, they state that ‘this kind of music rejects the impact of the Western culture in a way.’59 We can conclude that manele, with its carnival characteristics, might represent the resistance to the Western-style order and rule through its emphasis on the ‘barbarian’ elements and its attempts to reverse the normality (the same way as a carnival reverses an everyday routine). It might have a deliberately shocking effect; being used as a means of cultural resistance.

Another example of the bricolage from a very different sphere of life, though still applied as a means of cultural resistance, may be found in Polish reality. My Polish respondents share the following observation: After the collapse of the communist regime we were desperate to adopt everything Western; then we found out that the actual Western didn’t coincide with our ideal of the Western and our expectations were not met. Now, searching for the solution out of this difficulty, we have invented a very strange thing - we have combined the Soviet and European bureaucracies, which is a dangerous combination but we have tried to find our own way.60
Based on the above discussion, there are various strategies of cultural resistance that the youth from Romania, Poland and Georgia apply; from rediscovering the local, even copying the local, to mixing the local with the Western. Despite that not all the cases of such bricolage can be considered successful; it turns out that even the strange examples of bricolage can be applied as a means of cultural resistance insomuch as they represent the local way of doing things. However, the question remains as to whether these strategies of cultural resistance alter the actual situation resulting in the decline in both the failure discourses by the youth of the presented three countries and the stigmatising and enlightening discourses by the targets of their cultural resistance, or whether they are as much imaginary as the ones of symbolic escape.

Conclusion: On Ambivalent Identities

On a sunny autumn day I was sitting in a park in front of the sociology building of Bucharest University together with my respondent Elena – a PhD student in sociology. She was talking about two types of discourses among Romanians that resulted from EU integration: the official one, as she called it, which avoided focusing on the national identity and attempting to stress how great it was to be the part of the EU, and the folk one, which, in her words, was an outcome of ‘the negative image of Romanians in Europe,’ especially after joining the EU, revealing both the disappointment in the EU (with the accompanying national sentiments) and the shame caused by the fact of being Romanian while staying abroad. It seemed from her narrative that the official discourse gained popularity (even if it did not sound authentic to many Romanians) because the folk one (even if it represented reality) made them feel uncomfortable and embarrassed. Therefore, Romanians, especially the younger generation, did their best both to avoid expressing their national sentiments and to articulate their pro-EU attitudes. Elena considered herself, like most of her peers, as evidence for this argument.

However, when the interview ended and we started chatting about the local folk songs and dances, some of the local holidays and certain cultural traditions, Elena gradually got so passionate that she finished her discussion with the following sentence: ‘Now I realise I am a nationalist. Yes, definitely yes! Da, da!’

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Notes

1 According to the popular Romanian saying, the border between Western and Eastern Europe runs through Transylvania.


5 Maria Todorova (1997), Imagining the Balkans, Oxford UP.


10 Todorova (1997).


16 A popular expression by a former Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania that quickly enjoyed wide acceptance among the Georgian public.


18 Krzyzanowski (2009), p. 110.


21 Ibid, p. 115.
Western Imaginary and Imagined Defense

28 See, for example, Identity Studies, Volume 1, 2009, available at: <http://www.identitystudies.ac.ge/index.php/IStudies/issue/view/1> (accessed 03 March 2010). This volume represents the first joint attempt to reflect on the peculiarities of Georgian identity by influential Georgian social scientists.
30 Agnieszka, aged 20.
31 Alina, aged 24.
37 In Georgian: Rac kargebi vart, qartvelebi vart.
38 Krzyzanowski (2009), pp. 103-104.
40 Andrea, aged 23.
41 Lucian, aged 20.
43 Sandro, aged 20.
44 Anano, aged 19.
45 Giorgi, aged 18.
46 Guido Schwellnus (2005), ‘The Adoption of Nondiscrimination and Minority Protection Rules in Romania, Hungary, and Poland,’ in Frank
The term was introduced by a famous anthropologist C. Levi-Strauss in his book *The Savage Mind* (1962).

From a focus group discussion with the BA students of Political Science at Bucharest University.


Maria, aged 21.

Luka, aged 21.

Paul, aged 20.

Elena, aged 19.

It is believed that ‘privileged forms of national identity have been those assumed to be linked with [...] a “folk” culture’ (Edensor, 2002, 141).


Giorgi, aged 18.

Vlad, aged 23.

From a focus group discussion with the BA students of Political Science at Bucharest University.

From a focus group discussion with the MA students of Humanities at Jagiellonian University, Krakow.

‘Yes’ in Romanian.
Is Regime-Change a Solution for the Iranian Nuclear Crisis?

Nicoleta Laşan

Since 2002, a distinct Iranian nuclear crisis has attracted the attention of the international community and – despite renewed negotiations in the 5+1 formula – it remains one of the most salient threats to international security. The ineffectiveness of preventive means already deployed in a bid to solve the Iranian nuclear crisis has raised the prospect of utilising other, more robust methods such as the use of armed force for the purpose of regime change. The problem is not only related to the feasibility of regime change option but also to its utility in stopping the Iranian nuclear programme, since large parts of the Iranian population support the programme. This article analyses the strengths and the chances of success of such policy as well as its weaknesses and the factors that indicate the possibility of a failure on the medium and long term if this option is chosen.

Keywords: Iran, nuclear programme, nuclear proliferation, regime change, armed force

A Background to Iran’s Nuclear Programme

Iran’s interest in developing nuclear technologies dates back to the 1950’s, when Shah Reza Pahlavi received technical support from the US through the Atoms for Peace Programme. In this initial phase, Iran was driven by regional fears and the deepening tensions with its rival, Pakistan and as a reaction to the Soviet Union’s nuclear posture, since Iran was (then) a steadfast ally of the US and worked with Washington to deter Soviet expansion into the Gulf region and hem it in along the Caucasian mountains and Azerbaijan.¹ The first contract for obtaining
nuclear technology (1957) with the US was based on civilian nuclear assistance but included the sale of enriched uranium. The agreement requested that both parties cooperate in the research for peaceful uses of nuclear technology. In addition, the US offered the Tehran Nuclear Research Centre a research reactor in 1967.

In 1973, the Shah of Iran made public the country’s ambitious plans regarding nuclear energy; plans that envisioned the construction of 20 nuclear plants before 2000. A year later, the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran (AEOI) was established and Iranian nuclear scientists began a decade-long engagement with Western technicians. This led to the conclusion of multiple contracts with Western states on nuclear energy: with the US (1974) for purchasing 8 reactors, with (FDR) Germany (1974) for the construction of the Bushehr reactor by Siemens, and with France (1977) for the construction of 2 reactors at Darkhovin.

With the 1979 Islamic revolution, and the subsequent disintegration of the pro-Western government of Shah Pahlavi, Iran’s nuclear programme was suspended owing to a clear brain-drain of Iranian scientists to the West and the international isolation of the Islamic Republic following the US Embassy hostage-taking. The West severed economic, political and military ties to revolutionary Iran. Luckily – in hindsight – by the time of the sweeping revolution, the construction of two reactors at Bushehr remained incomplete, and Siemens promptly withdrew from the country. These losses, coupled with the opposition of the new head of the state, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, towards nuclear weapons – considered, at the time, as contrary to the basic principles of Islam – severely undermined Iran’s nuclear programme and cast it by the country’s security wayside.

In the mid-1980 however, Iran’s Ayatollah revised his position on nuclear weapons. Khomeini reformed the AEOI and places great resources in the pockets of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) to acquire nuclear technologies as well as research and develop Iranian assets. Tarock points to the 1980-1988 war with Iraq as the main reason for Iran’s rediscovered desire to build nuclear weapons, since that conflict witnessed the metaphorical ‘gloves coming off’ and both belligerents used weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the form of tactical and strategic chemical and biological weapons. Iran and Iraq (which had, in 1981 lost its main Osirak reactor to Israeli warplanes) both sought nuclear weapons as a lesson learned from their brutal conflict.
At the same time that Iran was developing nuclear power plants, it also commenced activities at Isfahan and Karaj. With the exception of the acquisition of technology for the uranium conversion from a Chinese company, Iran was unable to purchase other facilities necessary for the nuclear cycle. It then decided (mid1980’s) to buy technology for uranium conversion from the black market. Through contacts with the Pakistan network headed by Abdul Qadeer Khan (AQK) which dealt with the illegal sales of nuclear technology, Iran purchased (1987) P1 centrifuge components, drawings and technical specifications for this type of centrifuge for the sum of $3 million (USD). At the same time it received, without requesting, a 15 pages document that contained the description of the transformation of uranium into metal uranium.

With the acceptance of nuclear power and weapons by Khomeini, Iran’s attitude to the technology dramatically changed and in the first decade after the Islamic Revolution a series of new cooperative relationships were harnessed including the signing of a series of contracts with Pakistan (1987) – an irony, since these two states are locked in a seemingly perpetual rivalry – and China (1990). Both agreements referred to the training of Iranian nuclear personnel and, additionally, China offered Iran certain types of reactors, but ultimately – under the weight of US pressure – changed course and this aspect of the contract was not fulfilled. Also, in 1990, there was rapprochement between Iran and the USSR, which led to the signing of a cooperation agreement in nuclear technologies while Iran purchased complex technology for military aircraft. The dissolution of the USSR again retarded Iranian nuclear ambitions.

Getting back on its nuclear feet required a further decade – or so – and Iran undertook a series of experiments regarding different stages of the nuclear cycle; experiments that were mostly recognised and reported to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) after the Iranian nuclear programme began to draw the attention of the international community in 2003. The experiments in this period were not restricted to uranium conversion and centrifuge production, but also focused on plutonium separation, an activity that took place at the Tehran centre between 1988 and 1993.

The contacts and the cooperation with the AQK network continued throughout the 1990’s – as later revealed to the IAEA. According to Iranian declarations, this time it was the Khan’s network that approached an Iranian company with the aim of selling it uranium conversion
technologies. In order to compensate for the low quality of the P1 centrifuge components delivered in the 1980’s, the network offered Tehran (1996) a complete set of drawings for P2 type of centrifuge.\(^9\)

Despite early suspicions by Russia that Iran was trying to build nuclear weapons in the mid-1980’s – and therefore challenge Soviet supremacy in the Caspian Sea region – cooperation between the two states continued after the Cold War. In 1992, Iran and Russia signed, as part of a long-term cooperation and trade programme, two agreements on support in the nuclear energy field. The nuclear assistance was to materialise in the construction of nuclear plants for Iran, the recycling of nuclear waste, fuel delivery for research reactors, the production of isotopes for scientific use and medical research, and the training of Iranian scientists in Moscow. Negotiations on the construction of the Bushehr reactor were finalised in 1995. Experiments did not stop during this period. According to the declarations of Tehran, Iran imported (1991) a quantity of 1800 kg of natural uranium for use in various experiments, the contents of which remain out of the public eye.\(^10\) Then, in 2001, Iran began work on the construction of two nuclear facilities at Natanz: the pilot enrichment plant of a smaller dimension was to comprise 1000 centrifuge for uranium enrichment up to the level of 5% and the enrichment plant of commercial dimension was to comprise 50000 P1 type centrifuge for enrichment up to the level of 5%.\(^11\)

The National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) – an Iranian opposition movement in exile – accused (2002) the Iranian government of secretly constructing two nuclear facilities, one in Natanz for enrichment, and one in Arak for the production of heavy water. Initially, Iran publicly responded to these accusations by denying the existence of these two facilities, but the declarations of this group were confirmed in December 2002 when CNN published satellite photos of the two new nuclear facilities and the standard denials were dropped from Iranian rhetoric.

Following the NCRI’s 2002 revelations, the IAEA requested, in September, an inspection of those locations. The inspections occurred in February 2003, occasion on which Iran declared for the first time the construction of the two enrichment facilities at Natanz, one pilot and one commercial, as well as the construction of the heavy water facility at Arak.\(^12\) In other words, it confirmed the NCRI’s accusations and had to admit that it again sought nuclear technologies.
In the first comprehensive report issued by the IAEA in June 2003, Iran was accused of not adhering to its international obligations from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) by not reporting the construction of the nuclear facilities at Natanz and Arak, not declaring the importation of uranium in 1991 and denying access to IAEA inspectors at the Kalaye Electric Company. Also, in this report, the IAEA mentioned that it received information in May 2003 about the intention of the Iranian authorities to construct a heavy water reactor at Arak and a fuel manufacturing plant at Isfahan in the near future.\(^\text{13}\)

Until August 2003, when the IAEA issued a new report on Iran, Agency inspectors made new discoveries consisting of: the presence, at Natanz, of samples of highly enriched uranium; the testing of the first centrifuge cascade at the Natanz pilot plant; and the recognition on the existence of an enrichment programme starting in the 1980’s for which it benefited from external support in the form of centrifuge drawings.\(^\text{14}\)

Despite the threats made by Iran that it would end cooperation with the IAEA due to the deadline imposed for clarifying its nuclear programme, Iran showed a willingness to cooperate with the international community in November 2003. Through a letter sent on 10 November, to the IAEA, Iran agreed to sign the Additional Protocol, as requested by the Agency and by the international community, and to voluntarily proceed to a suspension of all enrichment activities.\(^\text{15}\) Following the signing of the Protocol and the Paris Agreement with the EU-3 (France, Germany and the UK) in 2004, Iran suspended its nuclear activities voluntarily – and only for a limited time.

While the European leaders were trying to sign agreements with the leaders in Tehran, the IAEA did not stop its efforts of informing the international community as to the stage of Iran's nuclear programme. Consequently, in November 2004, the Agency issued one of the most comprehensive reports regarding the programme, which contained a chronology on each stage of the nuclear cycle in which Iran undertook in the past. At the end of the report, the conclusion was that Iran had made substantial efforts over the past two decades to develop an indigenous nuclear cycle. In this sense, it had made experiments to acquire knowledge on almost every aspect of the nuclear cycle.\(^\text{16}\)

From 2004 until the present Iran’s nuclear programme has seen spectacular evolutions which include, among other things: the final-
ising of the Busher nuclear plant, improvements to the 2 plants at Natanz, the inauguration of the heavy water plant at Arak, the continuation of the construction of the heavy water reactor at Arak, the construction of a new enrichment facility at Qom, the construction of a fuel manufacturing plant at Isfahan, and enrichment up to the level of 20% starting in 2010.

After 8 years of investigations, the report issued by IAEA in November 2011 is probably one of the toughest, as it contains several details and clarifications on the possible existence of a military nuclear programme. The information available to the Agency indicated that Iran undertook the following relevant activities for the development of a nuclear explosive device: efforts, some with success, to purchase dual use equipment and materials by individual and entities from the military sector; efforts to develop on undeclared paths nuclear material; buying information and documents relevant for developing nuclear arms from a clandestine network; activities for developing indigenous drawings of a nuclear weapon, including the testing of components necessary for nuclear arms.\(^\text{17}\)

After years of disputes between Iran and IAEA on clarifying all aspects related to Iran’s nuclear programme, in November 2013 the two sides were able to agree on a Framework for Cooperation, an agreement that preceded the signing on 24 November 2013 by Iran and the P5+1 group of a Joint Plan of Action which will be valid for a period of six months to allow the sides to negotiate a comprehensive agreement. Despite these developments, the IAEA concluded, in its report issued on November 2013, that

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\text{while the Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material at the nuclear facilities and LOFs declared by Iran under its Safeguards Agreement, the Agency is not in a position to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and therefore to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities.}\(^\text{18}\)
\]

In other words, there remain serious doubts that Iran’s nuclearisation is entirely peaceful. Against this backdrop, it is interesting to see the reaction of the international community. Iran has certainly produced a nuclear crisis and it is important to see how this crisis is perceived and the means deployed to overcome it.
Reactions of the International Community to Iran’s Nuclear Programme

The first attempts to solve the Iranian nuclear crisis came from the EU-3, which signed two separate agreements with Iran in 2003-2004. The first, the Tehran Declaration – signed on 21 October 2003 – meant that Iran agreed to sign the Additional Protocol with the IAEA and to suspend its enrichment activities, while the EU states promised, in exchange, improved access to technology and deliveries in a number of other areas. In other words, the EU-3 agreement to Iran was based on Iran signing another agreement. Furthermore, following the agreement signed with European leaders, Iran transmitted to the IAEA (October 2003) a series of documents that aimed to clarify the chronology of the Iranian programme from the 1980’s.

Verifying the suspension by Iran’s nuclear activities has proved to be a hard and complex process for Agency inspectors since: verification was limited to places indicated by Iranian authorities, the Agency being unable to confirm that there were undeclared locations where the activities continue; some suspended activities, such as production of centrifuge components proved to be extremely difficult to verify in practice.\(^\text{19}\)

Following intense negotiations between the EU-3 and Iran, at the end of 2004 the two parts signed a new cooperation agreement, entitled the Paris Agreement. The document, officially signed on 14 November 2004, stipulated that Iran would extend the suspension process to include all the enrichment and reprocessing activities, including the production, testing and assembly of centrifuge, any activity related to plutonium separation, and any tests or production activities at the uranium conversion facilities. In exchange, the European states agreed to restart negotiations with Iran with a view to concluding a Trade and Cooperation Agreement and to offer clear security incentives to Iran.

The agreement was well received by the international community and by the IAEA, but soon fell under intense scrutiny. Among the main criticisms were the voluntary (re: not mandatory) character of the suspension and the direct link between the suspension period and the negotiations between the two parts related to a series of other matters. Another criticism was the fact that the agreement did not request the Iranian authorities to suspend also the construction of the heavy water reactor at Arak.\(^\text{20}\) Discussions, meetings and negotiations between the
leaders of the European three big member states, supported by the European Union High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, and the leaders in Tehran dominated 2005. In order to contribute to an atmosphere as adequate as possible for negotiations, even the IAEA reports were extremely short and concise on the evolution of the nuclear programme. Still, negotiations were too slow and marked by the lack of trust between the sides and even the absence of the desire to reach out to a compromise. Iranian leaders used every occasion to announce that the suspension is temporary no matter what the results of the negotiations with the EU leaders would be.

The lack of progress in the negotiations with the EU-3 led Iran to inform the IAEA, on 01 August 2005, that they would restart activities at the Isfahan uranium conversion facility. Before restarting these activities, the EU-3 presented Iran, 05 August 2005, a proposal for a Long Term Agreement. The package included assurances of the Europeans that they would help Iran in the nuclear, technological and economic areas in exchange pledge that Iran would abstain from developing nuclear arms and that they would halt all the activities in the field of uranium enrichment, plutonium production and the construction of the heavy water plant.

Iran fully rejected the EU-3 package claiming that there were not enough attractive incentives, and the absence of clear engagements on security issues that were very important for Iranian leaders. Iran wanted a deal that would solve all its problems with the West, and this agreement did not correspond to the requests of Iran. On 08 August 2005, Iran restarted activities at the Isfahan uranium conversion facility.

Iranian rejection brought about a changed tone in nuclear diplomacy. If, until this time, the international community showed patience in order to let negotiations between the EU-3 and Iran produce a tangible outcome, things started to change with the decision of Iran to restart the uranium conversion activities. There were more and more voices asking for the file to be sent to the United Nations Security Council, an action Iran wanted to avoid at all costs.

The tougher stance of the international community regarding Iran became obvious with the adoption by the IAEA Board of Governors of a resolution on 24 September 2005. For the first time, the resolution mentioned that the activities of Iran violate the provisions of the Nu-
clear Nonproliferation Treaty and that these activities, the lack of cooperation from the part of Iranians as well as the lack of trust that the programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes are all matters that the UN Security Council deals with, as the main organ responsible with maintaining international peace and security.\textsuperscript{24}

The rejection of a proposal made by Russia for Iran to enrich uranium on its territory, was followed, in January 2006, by some steps made by the leaders in Tehran for restarting the enrichment activities by removing the seals of the IAEA at three nuclear facilities, including Natanz, with the aim of restarting the research and development activities under Agency surveillance. Due to these decisions, world leaders met in Vienna, and through a resolution of the IAEA Board of Governors, decide to send the case for analysis to the Security Council.\textsuperscript{25}

The UNSC analysed, for the first time, the Iranian nuclear case in March 2006. Due to the lack of consensus on the necessity and opportunity of adopting a resolution, it decided to adopt a Declaration of the Presidency of the Security Council. Through this declaration, Iran was asked to respond to all the requests of the IAEA, the cooperation having the capacity to lead to a negotiated and diplomatic solution that would guarantee that the programme is solely for peaceful uses.\textsuperscript{26}

A new proposal was forwarded in June 2006, this time by the newly formed P5+1 group (the five permanent members of the Security Council and Germany). The package contained a series of incentives but also possible sanctions. The refusal of Iran to accept this package determined the UNSC – reunited in a meeting in July 2006 – to adopt a resolution against Iran. Resolution 1696, adopted with a single vote against, requested Iran to suspend all its enrichment activities until 31 August 2006, and mentioned the possibility of adopting, in the future, a sanctions regime against the Islamic Republic according to Chapter VII of the UN Charter.\textsuperscript{27}

Since then, the UNSC has adopted five more resolutions against Iran which may be resumed as follows: they ban the transfer to Iran of dual-use nuclear and ballistic goods and equipment, with the exception of light water reactors; they ban the exportation to Iran of arms and technology useful for developing weapons of mass destruction; they ban the investments in the uranium mining industry, nuclear technology and nuclear ballistic technology in Iran; they freeze the assets of individuals and entities suspected of being involved in nuclear activi-
ties. The multilateral sanctions adopted by the UNSC were very limited and had little effect on the Iranian economy. Consequently, the US and EU decided to adopt unilateral sanctions, the toughest of which proved to be the ban imposed by the European states on oil imports from Iran. These sanctions were more effective than the multilateral ones and seriously affected the economy of Iran which is highly dependent on the revenues from oil exports.

The imposition of these sanctions did not lead to a halt in negotiations between the big powers and Iran. Negotiations continued infrequently, as well as the cooperation between the Iranian authorities and the IAEA inspectors. After nearly a decade without agreement on the Iranian nuclear programme, and after months of negotiations, the P5+1 group and Iran signed in Geneva on 24 November 2013 a Joint Plan of Action, which is actually an interim agreement to allow the parts to reach ‘a mutually-agreed long-term comprehensive solution that would ensure Iran’s nuclear programme will be exclusively peaceful. Iran reaffirms that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek or develop any nuclear weapons.’ The interim agreement stipulates that Iran halt its enrichment to medium-grade (20%) purity, and will give better access to UN inspectors in exchange for sanctions relief worth about $7 billion (USD) on certain sectors, including precious metals.

Despite the Geneva talks and the ceasing of sanctions, there is a deep suspicion that Iran is continuing on the path towards nuclear weapons. The question therefore remain, are there more robust steps that could be undertaken to ensure that Iran remains nuclear-weapons free? And thus ...

Is Regime Change a Solution for the Iranian Nuclear Crisis?

Considering the inefficiency of the means deployed – until now – by the international community to solve the long-term, Iranian nuclear crisis, many observers have started to research the possibility of deploying other methods. So far, besides negotiations, IAEA inspections and sanctions, whether multilateral or unilateral, the literature mentions two other instruments at the disposal of the international community: regime change and military attack. Military attack is a last resort solution with low chances of being put into practice.
The chance of regime as a solution to halting the Iranian nuclear programme is viewed in the literature as being feasible, while other researchers incline to be less enthusiastic when it comes to the success chances of this solution. Surely, regime change is not a new consideration for Iranian decision-makers and (former) US President George W. Bush actively promoted this policy. The problem is not only related to the feasibility of this option but also to its utility in stopping the Iranian nuclear programme, since large parts of the Iranian population support the programme. The last substantive section of this work analyses the strengths and the chances of success of such a policy as well as its weaknesses and the factors that indicate the possibility of a failure on the medium- and long-term if this option is chosen.

Using arguments related to the disastrous economic situation in Iran, the lack of unity among its civil society and decision-makers – and among decision-makers themselves – the presence of a deep democratic tradition (suspended in 1979) and past attempts to revolt against Iranian suppression, some authors promote the change of regime as being the most feasible method for stopping Iran’s nuclear programme. There are even voices arguing that regime change could take place relatively soon; within two years.29

Iran’s economic situation is a key factor that has analysts considering regime change as being inevitable. The economic and social situation of Iran can be characterised as follows: huge and rapid growth of the population over the past 25 years and the youngest population in the entire Middle East and some 40% of the population lives below the poverty line. There is a high number of students accompanied by a high unemployment rate, hyper-inflation and the dependency of the economy on the oil exports.30 The economic situation has become even more disastrous due to the unilateral sanctions applied, over the past years, by the EU and US, as revenues from oil exports have decreased significantly, putting a lot of pressure on the Iranian population as well as on Iranian leaders. Besides the necessity of solving these economic problems, there are also demands by the Iranian population related to the change of the current political system, without necessarily changing it radically with a democratic one.

Critics of the current theocratic system request a higher level of public participation in Iran’s political life through the election of the Supreme Leader (Ayatollah) and imposing fixed terms for his mandate;
the elimination of the veto right of the Council of Guardians regarding the candidates for the parliamentary elections; the elimination of the control imposed by clerics on the judicial system and consolidation of the powers of the elected president as counterbalance to the power of the Supreme Leader. Furthermore, a close analysis of Iran reveals the presence of strong democratic elements that encourages analysts to view regime change as possible. Among the democratic elements that characterises Iran, is the organisation of presidential elections, which may not be really democratic but are still an important event, the limitation of the presidential mandate, the existence of a parliament in which the culture of debate is present. At the same time, the Iranian state has the characteristics of a modern state, such as the emergence of a civil society, interactions with Western cultures, education, women participation in political life, access to the Internet and the existence of intellectual debates. Religious authorities and security officials may have attempted to construct a police state, but the power and aspirations of the country’s civil society continue to account for some political choices.

Other encouraging signs for those who believe in regime change come from Iran’s history of revolts and from the existence of organisations that fight for this aim. The opposition movements have intensified, especially after the “re-election” of President Ahmadinejad in June 2009. The revolts, which in the end failed, were organised under the coordination of the Green Movement, an opposition group that gained much support among young Iranians. Another revolt took place in Iran in 2010, this time organised by the bazaaris, small retailers that protested against the rise of taxes. Such movements and Iranian opposition movements in the West, gives hope to the ones that still believe that regime change is possible from the inside. Certainly the election of Rowhani revealed that the Green Movement is no longer able to mobilise thousands of supporters – mostly because of the rape and murder of activists in 2009 – but Iranian political anger helped shape the 2013 elections.

Focusing on regime change, Hemmer notes that among the benefits this solution would produce, in case of success, there are the elimination of the threat that Iran poses to the disturbance of oil deliveries from this region; the issuing of a strong message for those who proliferate on the costs of similar actions; the possible decrease in the support offered by Iran to terrorism; and even the possible elimination
of the Iranian interference in Iraq and Afghanistan; and the decrease in the nuclear ambitions of Iran. Writing from the same perspective – but exaggerating the potential benefits of such a policy – Sobhani, adds the increase in the stability and security of the Gulf States the normalisation of relations between Iran and the US, and even a rapprochement between Iran and Israel as first moves of a secular government in Tehran.

Despite optimism showed by some authors, there are indicators that render this option less-than-optimal. Counterarguments are related to economic and political areas and the history of revolts of the Iranian people. Even though the Iranian people have suffered from economic hardships, there have been few revolts by Iranians between 1982-2011, the country is virtually a police state. In these circumstances, there can be no guarantee that economic problems – especially if not accompanied by public revolts – will lead to regime collapse.

Although, above, the presence of elected democratic institutions and of signs of early democracy in Iran was depicted, these alone should not be exaggerated. The Iranian political system is very stable; being a mixture of elected and unelected institutions, in the sense that a religious institution balances each elected democratic institution. Additionally, the chances of a fundamental reform in Iran in the short- and medium-term are minimal due to the lack of an organised and coherent opposition – with the Green Movement crushed. Although some may desire an international regime change mission, there are no feasible methods for that to occur. Iraq revealed the dangers of exogenous regime changes in the Middle East and Iran would be substantially more difficult than Iraq was.

Recent political developments in Iran also indicate that regime change may not be a solution to solve the nuclear issue. Economic sanctions have led to a dramatic internal economic situation which in its turn determined the Iranian population to elect as president in 2013 a (more) moderate personality – Hassan Rouhani. His election made it possible for the P5+1 to restart negotiations and even sign an interim agreement on the nuclear file at the end of 2013. But these moves should not be taken as an Iranian acceptance of its international agreements or its rejection of nuclear weapons. On the contrary. Rouhani – even though considered moderate in contrast to former president Ahmadinejad – while reassuring the international community that Iran will not develop nuclear weapons and signalling its readiness for con-
Construcive dialogue with the global powers, clearly stated that Iran will not renounce to its indigenous nuclear programme which, he claims, is peaceful. Rouhani once announced that the ‘nuclear wishes of Iran need to be recognised by Americans’ as the programme ‘is tied into not only addressing Iran’s energy needs but also into establishing its place in the world.’ In other words, Iran’s nuclear programme is about energy and international clout and it is difficult to see how producing nuclear energy will increase its international reputation. So, Iranian nuclear ambitions are also about political power and power typically comes from arms.

Conclusion

Although considered by many scholars and practitioners as a universal panacea for solving all the problems the Iranian state has with the international community, an in-depth analysis shows that a regime change strategy may not be wholly appropriate for dealing with Iran even though the Islamic Republic is a danger to its own people, the wider region and probably the international community more vividly. Iranian society is, on its own, unprepared for overthrowing the Aya-tollah and the IRGC and it cannot rely on international support since the debacles in Iraq and Afghanistan have many deeply suspicious of regime change. In addition to the problems related to the feasibility of this solution, the problems are even more serious when it comes to its utility in putting an end to the nuclear crisis, keeping in mind the wide support it receives – or is suspected to receive – within Iran’s civil society.

In this context, it is clear that regime change in Iran is improbable in the near future. It is clear that a regime change, or any change in the policy of the Iranian Islamic state, cannot be imposed either from outside or from within by an activist minority, but can only be initiated within the framework of a domestic debate. In such a process, the international community can only play a limited role, creating a positive context by fostering containment or facilitating openings.

So, no matter how fine Iran’s game of nuclear brinkmanship is, until it crosses the nuclear threshold, there seems to be few options besides sanctions. And even the sanctions regime has hit some snares as the US
and many European states have used the interim Geneva agreements to economically engage the Islamic Republic and the sunken costs of doing so may pressure those same governments into disavowing the sanctions regime altogether. While it is impossible to predict the political future of Iran, it should be remembered that regime change – with all its uncertainty – is a better option than allowing a radicalised theocratic state develop nuclear weapons capabilities that would be used to blackmail the international community and further stifle internal opposition. Iranians certainly deserve better than what they have.

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Notes
14 Ibid, p. 3.
15 Ibid, p. 4.
33 Christopher Hemmer (2007), ‘Responding to a Nuclear Iran,’ Parameters, p. 45.
34 Sobhani (2004).
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Dynamics of Eastern Europeanisation and the Impact of “Membership Credibility” in EU Enlargement Rounds

Dorian Jano

Research on EU enlargement-led Europeanisation has extensively focused on countries from Central Eastern Europe (CEE) and only recently enriched with studies dealing with specific issues and/or countries of the Western Balkans. Yet, a more comprehensive study across current and previous potential member-state countries is needed. This article assesses to what extent EU candidate countries from Eastern Europe have been able to bring their policies and institutions – both in formal and practical terms – in line with EU requirements. By tracing the progress of all countries from Eastern Europe (1998-2012) this work shows Europeanisation asymmetry among enlargement rounds. This work argues that “EU membership credibility” is an important factor in EU enlargement-led Europeanisation performance.

Keywords: Central Eastern Europe, Eastern Europeanisation, EU Enlargement, Membership Credibility, Western Balkans

Introduction

The enlargement of the European Union (EU) eastward was a historic decision to unify the continent. The 2004 accession of the Central Eastern European (CEE) countries was only the beginning of the overall eastward enlargement project. The project of unifying the continent proceeds by the accession of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007, the accession of Croatia in 2013 and the on-going preparation of the rest of
the other Western Balkan (WB) countries. Although the EU committed itself to further enlarge eastward, the approach toward CEEs and WBS was different. The EU launched an enlargement strategy for the countries of the WB, giving them the membership perspective, only in 2000, whereas the countries of CEE gained their perspective membership in 1993. The reason for this differentiation is attributed primarily to the different transitions experienced by the CEEs and WBS. Today, the countries of CEE have already become EU member-states. Thus, the next step in fulfilling the overall ‘project of unifying the continent’ remains the enlargement of the Union towards the WB countries. What differences, if any, can we notice with regards to the degree and speed of Europeanisation among enlargement rounds? And, what are the factors that may influence the dynamics of Eastern Europeanisation outcome?

Many concerns and doubts have been raised about the Europeanisation capacity of the Western Balkan countries. The scepticism becomes more pronounced as EU enlargement conditionality and its ‘transformative power’ has been put into question. Most of the academic contributions speak of the limited impact of the EU incentives into the WBS. Others argue in favour of a strong EU leverage in the Balkan region as a result of different incentives, thus specific ‘policy conditionality’ matters more than ‘membership conditionality.’ Still, the question rests on how to produce generalised results and with what to compare whether the WB region has progressed, or not, in terms of Europeanisation. The few studies on the Europeanisation of the WB provide important insights on the differential EU enlargement impact on the specific (group of) countries and/or issues. Yet, they are insufficient for capturing the overall dynamics of the process in the region. The understanding of Europeanisation in the Western Balkans is lacking, especially when compared with that of the Western or Central Europe. Moreover, empirical studies on the CEE Europeanisation record, offers an ambivalent picture. Regardless of the growing literature on the Europeanisation of the potential member-states, comparisons among EU enlargement rounds are missing.

To address these gaps in the literature and glean comparative insights on Eastern Europeanisation dynamics, this work reports and compares the qualitative data gained from European Commission reports on the progress of all Eastern European countries. By tracing the progress of all the potential member-states (1998-2012) this work
shows asymmetry among and across EU enlargement rounds in adopting and implementing the EU acquis. In this respect, ‘membership credibility’ is an important factor in Europeanisation performance among and across EU enlargement rounds if the group of countries in the same EU enlargement rounds is considered. The credibility of EU accession matters and have major implications for the dynamics of the EU enlargement-led Europeanisation.

**Getting Europeanisation Right in Potential Member-States**

The more rigorous use of the concept of Europeanisation is closely linked to European integration. Europeanisation refers to the domestic changes attributed to the European integration process in the case of the member-states and by analogy, to the EU enlargement process in the case of the potential member-state. Eastern Europeanisation research focused on the impact of enlargement, analysing the effects the process of EU enlargement brings in the potential member-states. It answers the question how and to what extent and in what ways EU enlargement has transformed the candidate states. There are two key characteristics of the EU impact on member-states that are comparable to those on potential member-states: First, the significant extent to which EU actors and institutions direct and enforce the adjustment process, even though instruments differ; and secondly, the comprehensive nature of adjustment to cover the entire acquis communautaire. Potential member-states are subject to adoption and implementation of EU policies the same degree as current member states. Although the process of Europeanisation in the potential member-states is similar to those in the member-states, the circumstances are different. Given the candidacy status, the EU’s influence on the applicants has the added dimensions of the membership conditionality and of the accession negotiations. These circumstances give a distinctive characteristic to the Europeanisation of the potential member-states regarding first, the instruments used by the EU to influence and monitor the adjustment process and secondly, the asymmetrical relation process. Furthermore, the effects of Europeanisation in potential member-states although similar in nature with those in EU member-states are much broader and deeper in scope. The EU agenda for institutional and policy change in the candidate countries has been extensive. Candidate states must not only adopt and implement the acquis communautaire,
they should also have stable democratic institutions, competitive market economies, and respect human and ethnic rights.\textsuperscript{15}

The overall process, where European integration has an impact on to-become a member-state country is referred to as “Eastern” style or “EU Enlargement-led” Europeanisation. Thus, in the case of the potential member-states we can speak of pre-Europeanisation. All adjustments and transformations are not only ‘anticipatory effects’ preparing for accession but at the same time they are ‘anticipated effects’ having long-term implications of the eventual EU membership.\textsuperscript{16} The distinct pre-accession pattern of Europeanisation is, in principle, a transitional phenomenon. EU conditionality will remain an external force as long as the candidate countries are not yet full EU members. Once the country acquires full membership rights, the Europeanisation substance and mechanisms are expected to progressively approximate those in the member-states.\textsuperscript{17}

In this context, Europeanisation is nothing but member-state building. In very general terms, candidate countries had to become Europe-like. Or in more concrete way, they had to adopt and implement new legislation and institutions conform to EU standards prior to accession. The association process requires the fulfilment of political and economic criteria as well as compliance with the acquis requirements on specific domestic legislation and policies.

**Measuring the Formal and Behavioural Aspects of Europeanisation**

If consensus exists on what process the Europeanisation concept describes, it is questionable what its outcomes may be. This is primarily because EU enlargement has affected many aspects of the domestic political spheres being them rather institutional structure, policy-making processes and representative politics; whereas the forms of adaptation may be either communicative, formal or/and behavioural changes.\textsuperscript{18} Terms like compliance, implementation, transposition, adoption, approximation or adaptation have been used interchangeably when speaking about the outcomes of Europeanisation. Moreover, vast units of measuring them have been used, such as transposition time (rates of prompt transposition, delay in transposition), occurrence of infringement procedures (notifications, reasoned opinions, referrals and
judgments of the European Court of Justice), or domestic *performance in adoption and implementation*.

Europeanisation outcome, being a complex concept, is very difficult to pin it down to only one concrete indicator. So, at best, it can be used to summarise the association among different observable components. Facing such an issue, one has to make choices and narrow the scope of investigation by analysing only certain aspects of the Europeanisation outcome. To argue for a more comprehensive Europeanisation outcome, this work follows Radaelli’s suggestion for a more dynamic analysis, by considering not only policy change but also macro-institutional structures.¹⁹ Thus, this work considers that Europeanisation effects might take place not only on the formal level of adopting legislation but also on the behavioural level of implementation.²⁰ We code formal rule *adoption* and their practical *implementation*, separately. Then, both components (adoption and implementation) are reconnected using Boolean logic according to conjunctive ‘and’ model. In the Boolean ‘and’ logic, all components should be present, thus none of them does substitute the other.²¹ The conjunctive ‘and’ model, that is taking the minimum value of all the components, account not only for the formal aspects (adoption) but also the aspect of practical application (implementation) of the EU requirements. This is a balanced strategy for keeping the full representation of the concept and at the same time have clear and concrete indicators to measure it.

We use the European Commission progress reports to provide data for measuring both the adoption and implementation of the EU acquis conditionality in the candidate countries. In 1997, the European Commission gave its first opinion on CEE countries’ application for membership. From then on, the European commission published annual regular reports assessing adoption and implementation progress by each of the candidate countries. They are in the form of strategy, composite and comprehensive papers. In 2002, the European Commission published its first annual report on the Stabilisation and Association process for the Western Balkan countries. From 2005 onwards, the key findings of the progress are published in the format of Memos. All these reports offer a very useful source of systematic and aggregate information on a yearly base.²² The qualitative data of the reports are comprehensive and unique. They evaluate the progress of each potential and candidate country with regard to not only the formal transposition of
EU laws and policies (adoption) but also the aspect of their practical application (implementation).\textsuperscript{23} The reports used distinct qualitative phrases to describe “progress” with regard to adoption and implementation of EU requirements.\textsuperscript{24} The outcome corresponding to adoption and implementation in each of the European progress reports can be grouped into four main qualitative categories. We distinguish them according to the assessment scale of i) no progress; ii) little, few, limited or some progress; iii) progress; iv) and good or significant progress.

**Eastern Europeanisation Dynamics in EU Enlargement Rounds Compared**

Referring to Table 1, we find variation on the outcomes of Europeanisation. Similar to what has been observed in member-states, and different from previous argumentation on the CEE case, the Eastern Europeanisation outcome is neither homogenous and neither does it proceed at the same pace in all candidate countries.\textsuperscript{25} Progress in adoption and implementation of the EU’s acquis varies significantly among countries and has its ups and downs through the years depending on the domestic conditions. In general, adoption records better than implementation scores. This is because, implementation does not relate only to the political will of the potential member-states but it needs also to be backed up with administrative and budgetary resources.

We construct and compare the index of Europeanisation of the EU enlargement rounds using the compensatory “average” model.\textsuperscript{26} The average Europeanisation index represents trade-offs among the annual progress of the countries of the same EU enlargement rounds. Figure 1 reports the different average indexes for Eastern Enlargement rounds. The first index (enlarg2004) includes all eight countries of the CEE including also the Mediterranean countries of Cyprus and Malta, the second index (enlarge2007) represents the countries of Bulgaria and Romania, while the third index (enlarge2013) considers Croatia. Another index is compiled considering the average progress of the rest of the Western Balkan countries (WB-Cr). If referred to the average qualitative data, some important conclusions can be drawn on Europeanisation dynamics according to EU enlargement rounds.
Table 1. Qualitative Data on Adoption, Implementation and Europeanisation of the Potential Member-States (1998-2012).

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Source: Qualitative data extracted from Commission Opinion, Composite Paper, Annual Reports and Memos on Key Findings (1998-2012). Here we consider only the general progress evaluations on the EU standards/acquis sections, not the progress on the political and economic evaluation section. Note: B&H - Bosnia and Herzegovina, S&M - Serbia and Montenegro.
First, if we refer to the overall performance in adopting and implementing the acquis we notice a tendency of progress for all enlargement groups albeit the progress in the case of SEE is slower. There is an overall steady growing trend of Europeanisation in countries of the 2004 EU enlargement round. The 2004-enlargement group made rapid progress after accession negotiations with the second block of CEE countries started in 2000. Yet, the change is not very substantial to reach full compliance. Differently from CEE’s rapid Europeanisation, the countries of the WBS and even Bulgaria and Romania lag behind. Their Europeanisation scores are lower throughout the examined period, often to only some progress. However, the tendency of improvement can be clearly noticed given that each year some progress is achieved. What is more problematic in the case of SEE, is the slow pace at which the process of Europeanisation in those countries proceeds.

These findings offer important insights into the general debate of the EU’s “transformative power” in candidate countries. If we consider all the countries of Eastern Europe (1998-2012) in a comparative perspective, we can argue that the EU has had a relatively stronger transformative power among the CEE countries rather than in the countries of SEE. The EU differentiated impact in Eastern Europe can be seen more with regards to the pace of progress than to the absolute values of change. Moreover, the differentiated dynamics of the Europeanisation performance can be seen not only among but also within EU enlargement rounds. Thus, it is important to look at the determinants of the differentiated dynamics of EU Enlargement-led Europeanisation.

Tracing the Process: The Impact of Membership Credibility on the Dynamics of Eastern Europeanisation

It is important to trace the factor(s) that may explain the different Europeanisation trends, considering the ups-and-downs in the progress average scores of the different EU enlargement rounds. In addition to the candidate countries’ domestic factors, the broad explanatory argument in the literature is that the successful EU’s enlargement impact will depend on a credible membership incentive. High membership credibility is an effective tool to overcome domestic obstacles, and thus a determinant in the candidate countries’ Europeanisation performance. According to Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier’s (2005a) external incentive model, Europeanisation performance with depend,
among other factors, on the credibility of delivering or withholding
the membership reward and the size and the speed of the entire pro-
cess of EU accession. The quicker and the more credible the process is,
the more adaptation to acquis is expected.

In terms of credibility of the enlargement process, two major politi-
cal enlargement decisions have to be considered; the decision to open
association negotiations (Europe Agreements for CEE countries and
Bulgaria and Romania; and the Stabilization and Association Agree-
ments for WB countries) and the decision to open accession negotia-
tions. The EU, through opening of association/accession negotiations,
creates the expectation that the applicant country will at some mo-
moment join the Union, given that it has satisfied the conditions of mem-
bership. Moreover, the opening or closing of negotiations with some
states increases also the credibility of rewards for all other candidates,
as it demonstrates the EU is willing to proceed with enlargement pro-
cess.

In the case of CEE, the EU’s impact intensified once accession negoti-
ations were open (after 2000) – evidence that EU’s membership incen-
tive was credible in this year. Tracing the progress of those countries
(see figure 1) we notice that in the years when membership is more
credible, the CEE had the tendency of greater progress. The member-
ship credibility and as a consequence the Europeanisation performance
slow down once the date of accession is set. We find the European-
isation performance of CEE (after 2002) and of Bulgaria and Romania
(after 2005) to fall as the accession date is fixed. This is because the
credibility of the EU’s thread of withholding membership is very low.
The tendencies of negative impact on rule adaptation were observed in the late stage of accession even with the so-called CEE front-runners because they did not fear exclusion.34

The novelty in the context of the latter enlargements is that previous EU enlargement rounds matter and may potentially influence membership credibility and, as a consequence, also determines the domestic impact of enlargement. The argument of the importance of EU accession credibility is more obvious and pronounced in the case of the latter enlargements rounds. The very low performance of the SEE countries, and much more of the WBS, relates to the uncertainties of the membership reward. The accession of the WB countries is questionable or at best it is very distant, given the general enlargement fatigue of the EU to absorb other countries. In their overall low performance, the countries of Bulgaria and Romania (enlarge2007), Croatia (Enlarge2013) and the rest of WB progressed better towards adoption and implementation only when accession treaties with other applicants were signed (in 2004 and 2007). After a slow down in progress, the performance of the WBS gets a further push when the accession of Croatia was decided (2012). The overall Europeanisation progress of the WB countries is very low but greater progress performance is achieved when the EU enlargement process is more credible as a result of the accession of the other applicant countries. It is plausible to think that the potential candidate countries would not perform well when membership is very distant. While they would make efforts to comply with EU requirements, mostly when the EU successfully demonstrates its commitment – through opening/closing association/accession negotiations – to enlarge further.

So, the Western Balkans can be Europeanised as Demetropoulou argues and the Commission data confirms.35 The WB had made some progress, a persistent trend that is slow but with greater performance when membership is more credible. The temporal dimension of membership credibility creates at least incentives for domestic adjustment processes although not a uniform impact across all countries since their domestic conditions count and has to be taken into consideration. Thus, in addition to domestic conditions, the EU enlargement process and membership credibility should be kept high and credible for achieving good results in Europeanisation outcome.
Concluding Remarks

The debate on the impact of the EU in Eastern Europe focuses on the question of how much the EU enlargement process has, and can, transform the entire region. The literature is divided on the issue. As we argue in this article, the transformative power of EU is comparatively greater in CEE countries, thus producing no homogenous and convergent outcomes across Eastern Europe. Yet, the variation on Europeanisation performance between EU enlargement groups is more obvious in terms of time rather than on the level of progress. The countries of SEE are experiencing also a process of transformation and their progress has a tendency of improvement, although at a slower pace than in the case of CEE. In addition to domestic conditions, the credibility of EU accession has been a factor for better and speedy Europeanisation.

The dynamics of Europeanisation vary among, and within, EU enlargement rounds depending on the credibility of EU membership. The transformative power of Europe works better at certain external conditions. If the membership conditionality is credible, then Europeanisation follows. Otherwise, if membership is too distance or close to certain then Europeanisation outcomes decreases. In addition to the explanatory factors linked to domestic preferences and capacities, we have argued in this article that the credibility of membership is an important explanatory factor for explaining Eastern Europeanisation dynamics. By tracing the progress of countries in the same EU enlargement rounds and considering the temporal key political enlargement decisions made, we find Europeanisation progress to score better when membership credibility is high. That is, when the EU opens or closes association/accession negotiations with potential member-states, Europeanisation performance is better. The accession of CEE countries, and later of Bulgaria, Romania and more recently, Croatia, are important political events making enlargement process credible, and as consequence increasing also Europeanisation performance in the other countries of the Western Balkans waiting to join.

This finding has policy consequences. For the EU to repeat its CEE success story in the Western Balkans the membership credibility should be kept high on the policy agenda, despite all uncertainties and domestic difficulties. The speed as well as the progress of Europeanisation in the WB region will mostly depend on the credibility of membership.
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The research was undertaken while the author was NewDem Research Fellow at the Collegium Budapest, Hungary. A draft of this work was presented at the 2nd Euroacademia International Conference entitled: ‘Re-Inventing Eastern Europe,’ Vienna 17-19 May 2012.

Notes
5 Frank Schimmelfennig and Florian Trauner (eds.) ‘Post-accession compliance in the EU’s new member states’, European Integration online Papers 2:13.
7 Many scholars occupying with Eastern Europe refer to the process of transformations and changes that EU was causing to CEE countries but term it otherwise. For example in their edited book (Ronald Linden (ed.) (2002), Norms and Nannies: the Impact of International Organisations on the Central and East European States. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers) the authors refer and conceptualize the process of EU (and other international organizations) impact as “international socialization”. In the same way, Schimmelfennig and his colleagues (Frank Schimmelfennig, Stefan Engert and Heiko Knobel (2006), International Socialization in Europe: European Organizations, Political Conditionality, and Democratic Change, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan) refer to “international socialization” while analyzing the process in which CEE states are induced to adopt the constitutive rules of international community in light of the European experience. Other scholars speak of “domestication of Europe” to uncover
the impact of the EU in the domestic political transformations of CEE. “External governance” has been another term used to study the transformative power of EU external policies in Eastern Europe or even the impact of EU to CEE countries, more particularly in relation to implementing the acquis (see: Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier (2004), ‘Governance by conditionality: EU rule transfer to the candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe’, *Journal of European Public Policy* 11:4, pp. 661-679; Sandra Lavenex and Frank Schimmelfennig (2009), ‘EU Rules Beyond EU Borders: Theorizing External Governance in European Politics’, *Journal of European Public Policy* 16:6, pp. 791-812). The today attention, even from scholars previously not referring to Europeanization, has been directed to describe the process or at least link it to Europeanization.


13 Sedelmeier (2011), p. 6. In order to induce adjustment EU institutions cannot rely on the treaty-based sanctions or through financial penalties imposed by the European Court of Justice (ECJ), but rather on other in-
Instruments such as conditional incentives, normative pressure, persuasion or framing. Furthermore European Commission, different form the infringement procedures used in member state, publish Regular Reports as a way to monitor the process of compliance with EU conditions in candidate countries.

Grabbe (2003)

In the Enlargement process, the requirements to be fulfilled as set out in the Copenhagen European Council meeting (1993) are Political (i.e. stability of its institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities), Economic (the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union), as well as Legal (ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union).


Klaus H. Goetz (no date), 'Europeanisation in West and East: A Challenge to Institutional Theory'.


Claudio M. Radaelli (2004), 'Europeanisation: Solution or problem?', European Integration online Papers 8:16, p. 7.

Note here that following Radaelli’s suggestion, we leave out what Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005a, pp. 7-8) consider as a third form of change, the communicative or discursive aspect of Europeanization.


Although the reports are compiled by the Commission they are based on information gathered from many sources including information and contributions from the Commission delegations in each country’s capital, the national governments of the potential member-states and the EU member-states, European Parliament reports as well as assessments made by various international organization, in particular Council of Europe, osce, International Financial institutions, and other non-governmental organizations.

The indicator for measuring adoption and implementation, and as a result Europeanization, is the positive change in terms of both formal rule adoption and implementation compare to the previous status quo at a given point in time rather than assessing the actual degree of convergence.
achieved. This because the misfit with European norms and rules has been deep and full convergence requires time to be achieved.

24 ‘Progress’ is measured on the basis of decisions taken, legislation adopted and measures implemented. This approach ensures equal treatment across all reports and permits an objective assessment. See Methodology of the Progress Reports.


27 The first ceeCs countries that start accession negotiations in 1998 where Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia (Cyprus was also included). The rest of the countries Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia (Malta also included) started accession negotiations in 2000.


32 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005b), p. 215

33 Steunenberg and Dimitrova (2007).


Book Reviews

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174 The Fanaticism of the Apocalypse
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This edited volume considers why ‘various forces and claims are [...] fragmenting the possibility of one European identity even as the European economic integration has proceeded faster and further than anyone expected’ (p. 2). It evaluates the situational nature of identity and attempts to answer the question of whether a common European identity may be developed in light of strong challenges? In the introduction, Checkel and Katzenstein summarise the theoretical background for European identity studies and situate their work in the wider literature, considering neo-functionalism, the transactionalist theory of the flow of information, goods and services, and historical institutionalism, among other theories, for comparative purposes. While weighing the benefits of these approaches, the editors acknowledge that the literature diminishes the importance of politics and politicisation; it is this theoretical gap that the volume aims to fill.

Proposing a multidisciplinary approach, the work is divided into three parts. Part I, ‘Identity as a Project,’ analyses the role of EU institutions and elites. Political theorist Castiglione argues that ‘the construction of European political identity does not necessarily rest on a definite conception of what it is to be European’ (p. 29). He considers the transformation of the conception of political identification with one’s own community and the mixed nature of the EU as a multilevel structure. In ‘Experimental Identities (after Maastricht),’ anthropologist Holmes suggests that there is ‘a fundamental change in the underlying dynamics of identity formation’ in Europe (p. 52). He argues that post-Maastricht, EU citizens are burdened with the need to negotiate the political meanings of a pluralist Europe. Concluding this section,
Chapter 4, sociologist Medrano considers the emergence of the public sphere in the identity formation project and the breakdown of the permissive consensus which had previously prevailed among the European public.

Opening the second section, ‘Identity as a Process,’ historian Case considers events and ideas which have blurred the boundaries between the national and supranational conceptions of European identity and analyses the notion of ‘false oppositions,’ especially as they relate to the differences between the conception of European identity in the “East” and the “West” (p. 111). Fligstein suggests that a common European identity is likely to emerge among people who have the opportunity to regularly interact with others from European countries with whom they may have a basis for solidarity; he concludes, however, that even among those with increased opportunities for interaction, ‘there is little evidence for an outpouring of sentiment among the citizens of Europe supporting a European nation’ (p. 154). Chapter 7 analyses how migration in Europe is influencing identity formation in a territorial and a structural economic sense. Favell considers the importance of the migration of non-Europeans to Europe, the process of intra-European “elite” migration, and the ambiguous movement of East-West migrants.

The final section of the volume, ‘Identity in Context,’ opens with Kaelble’s chapter on the politicisation of the EU since the 1980’s in which he states that ‘politicisation has had a strong impact on identification with the EU since the 1980’s. It explains why public debate about identification with Europe and the EU has become more vivid [...]’ (p. 211). Chapter 9 summarises the major arguments outlined in the volume and provides some final thoughts on the subject. In it, Checkel and Katzenstein argue that a ‘politically looser and more encompassing Europe’ is rising in place of a receding Western Europe centred on the EU (p. 213). Contemporary debates over the EU and its constitutionalisation increasingly intersect with other arenas of identity construction, such as professional networks, transnational religion, [and] everyday individual practices [...]’ (p. 214). The editors conclude by pointing out that there currently exists a multitude of European identities, which can no longer be studied simply thought the analysis of institutions and their effects on identity nor can they be fully understood by examining nationalist movements as separate from the institutions. Instead,
these dynamics must be connected through multidisciplinary research, for which this volume aims to create a foundation.

Overall, *European Identity* succeeds in achieving its stated goal of '[relying] on multiple disciplinary traditions to offer fresh perspectives, raise new questions, and develop unexpected insights on “who we are” in today’s Europe’ (p. 19). The volume successfully elaborates on the historical institutionalist theory; it also establishes clear and concise arguments. The multidisciplinary approach works well in allowing the contributors to emphasise separate yet connected ideas. By considering European identity from the lenses of history, sociology, and anthropology, the authors are able to point out various dimensions which influence both the project and the process of identity formation. As well, the division of the volume into three sections serves the purpose of elaborating on the subject more fully. Approaching it as a project, a process, and in context, the authors are able to identify multiple angles of analysis and points of contention present. Finally, the chapters are organised in a clear and cohesive manner, each emphasising a specific aspect of European identity formation while collaborating in a larger argumentative framework.

Nevertheless, the volume has several contextual and structural limitations. Firstly, the key terms of “identity,” “project,” and “process” are only briefly mentioned in the introduction, leaving their definition to the conclusion and forcing the reader to closely analyse each contributing chapter in order to define them. The term “identity” remains a vague catch-phrase throughout the volume, failing to be clearly defined in either civic and/or ethnic terms. Without a clear definition set out by the editors, it is difficult to know what contributors mean when using the term. The key concepts of a “project” and a “process,” around which the volume is structured, are also not clearly defined until the first paragraph of the conclusion. Throughout, these are brought up; however, it is often unclear what each author means when using the terms without an initial definition. As an introduction to the field of European identity studies and a basis for future research, the volume would be significantly enhanced by clearly defined terms.

Secondly, the structure of the volume sometimes impedes the reader’s understanding. Chapter 1 is unnecessarily dense. The editors introduce the larger theoretical field, highlight the processes of politicisation and Europeanisation, outline their own arguments, and situate
the volume within the broader literature in less than thirty pages. For those new to the field or unfamiliar with the theories, the brief discussion of each sub-section is insufficient to grasp the nature of the debate. The better organisation of the material into two chapters, with one introducing the main arguments and contributions of the volume and the second outlining the theoretical background, would have been more appropriate for a book which aims to develop a basis for further research.

Despite this, Checkel and Katzenstein, along with the other contributors, successfully present the key issues of identity formation in Europe and provide valuable insight as basis for further work.
There have never been so many people living outside of their country of origin as today. According to the latest estimates of the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs international migrants constitute 232 million people or 3.2% of the world’s population. At the same time immigration continues to be very controversial and a highly politicised topic in the West. Support for immigration quotas, in a recent Swiss referendum won by a slim margin of 50.4% and shows a clear division on immigration. In his very timely book, *The Politics of Immigration*, Hampshire attempts to explain – in 8 Chapters – the driving forces behind this division and the implications it has for policy outputs in liberal states. A unique theoretical framework for the analysis of similarities and differences between liberal states and real-world examples are presented in this contribution.

The point of departure for Hampshire is the outline of the framework and presentation of 4 features of liberal statehood: constitutionalism, capitalism, representative democracy, and nationhood. Whereas the first two are the drivers of dynamics of openness in immigration, citizenship and integration policies, the last ones, often associated with cultural protectionism, are the roots of closure (p. 3). This causes ‘liberal paradox of immigration;’ liberal countries are neither completely open, nor completely closed, to immigration.

Hampshire devotes the subsequent chapters of his book to the implications of the 4 facets of the liberal state on migration policies in North America, Oceania and Europe. The author shows complete proficiency in the questions of work, irregular and family migration as well as asylum in various liberal states. The analysis is supported with convincing arguments and statistical data of the OECD, Eurostat and
European Commission. The chapter on *Migration Governance beyond the State* is particularly noteworthy for it conclusively portrays the lack of coherent multilateral initiatives and no unified body of migration law. Hampshire begins the chapter with a classical explanation of public good by Olson and questions whether migration governance can be regarded as a public good. He then comes to the conclusion about a very bleak future of the international migration governance since, due to the worries over sovereignty, 'cooperation on migration is more likely to take place on a bilateral or regional, rather than a global, basis' and the interstate cooperation is more likely to be informal than formal (pp. 86-87). Hampshire presents the EU migration regime as the only exception, where states’ sovereignty is constrained by a supranational migration regime.

This book also delivers a contribution to the on-going debates about citizenship in the liberal state. Drawing on the latest research the author convinces the reader that even if it might seem that globalisation, transnational migration and the international human rights are eroding the concept of state citizenship and immigrants enjoy almost the same rights as the natives, the closer analysis shows that political and social rights, right to international mobility, as well as basic human rights, such as freedom of speech and assembly, continue to be conditioned by your citizenship (p. 114). Hampshire presents convincing arguments that the access to citizenship has been liberalised through introduction of *jus sanguinis*, increased toleration of dual nationality and introduction of citizenship reforms that enable easier naturalisation.

In sum, *The Politics of Immigration* is an important contribution to the field. The author succeeds in bringing the state back into the migration research by deconstructing actors and institutions that constitute the state. While many volumes have been previously dedicated to the questions of migration, Hampshire presents a successful attempt to examine all 4 factors influencing migration regimes instead of focusing on just one or two of them. However, the definition of the liberal state, as this is one of the main concepts in the book, would contribute to a better understanding and eliminate the need to search for the explanation throughout the book or elsewhere. The book could also be improved with a deeper comparative analysis of the immigration policies in the liberal states.

This publication will be of use to a wide range of readers but may especially appeal to students of political science, migration and global
studies as well as international relations. Those who have a previous background in migration studies will find the framework presented in this book to be of a significant contribution to the theoretical debates centring on issues around migration. Those who are new to the field will also find this book very educational. Brief historical overviews of the migration regimes, explanation of all of the main concepts and a clear writing style make this book a pleasant reading for everyone.
The Politics of Energy Dependency

Ukraine, Belarus, and Lithuania between Domestic Oligarchs and Russian Pressure

Reviewed by Marat Gizatullin (Metropolitan University Prague)

This book is focused on three countries that have experienced the rapid, and dramatic, change from being part of one energy rich country to political independence and energy dependence on supplies from a single source, Russia. Additionally, these states and serve as transit routes for the sale of energy resources from Russia to its main European consumers. Balmaceda, has spent much time in the case countries gathering and processing sources in local languages as well as conducting a series of interviews in order to provide a solid analysis of the factors that affect Russia’s use of energy as a geopolitical tool in the region. According to Balmaceda, those factors include the peculiar territorial position, local influence groups, external pressure from Russia, and special conditions on the energy prices. Those factors have made diversification and move towards the minimisation of the energy security threats impossible for the case countries during considered time period.

One of the key concepts used in the book is the ‘energy rents.’ However, unlike previous use of this term by others in describing energy exporting countries, Balmaceda applies this concept to the energy dependent states. She argues that those rents can be very profitable for certain domestic influence groups while influencing the very political
systems of these countries. Those rents can emerge from the transit fees, infrastructural and storage costs, as well as from price differences. They can serve to finance local influence groups, oligarchs, and various corruption schemes. The author attempts to follow those rents in order to understand the changes they provoke in the political systems of energy dependent states. Namely, how those rents are “reincorporated” and “recycled” in the political systems, what kind of political actors they produce, as well as to what degree future of those actors depends on the rents. The rents, according to Balmaceda, come in various sizes and types, and are used to support different actors. She concludes that the impact of the rents on the political systems of the Ukraine and Belarus was considerably larger than on the Lithuanian political system.

The time period covered by this book is referred to by the author as ‘the golden age of energy rents.’ It is the period when the energy prices for the case countries (Ukraine, for example), were significantly lower than those for the EU markets (Germany, Italy, etc.), providing huge possibilities for corruption and flourishing of certain actors. Since 2009, when the prices in the case countries started to increase to the European level, the corruption has transformed into different forms.

Balmaceda underlines that it is important to concentrate on the problematic of this book from what she calls a ‘non-Russian perspective.’ She insists on going deeper than simply considering Russia a unitary actor using energy as a political weapon. As evidence, a historical parallel is drawn in the book between changing sets of actors (such as Ukrainian oligarchs) and simultaneously changing actors within Gazprom. This approach seems very promising in understanding the complicated logic behind Russia’s energy politics.

One of the main conclusions of the book is that the energy is not only a weapon and used as one by Russia, but also it has many other uses by Russian actors. Energy plays crucial role in defining relations between Russian oligarchs and the state, enrichment of certain oligarchs, etc. Basically, Russia uses energy as a weapon; however this is done in a much broader context.

This book is very useful not only because it provides a valuable historical look at causes of the recent developments in Ukraine, but also because it addresses some of the most important problems facing the post-Soviet energy dependent countries: relations between local oligarchy and the state under constant external pressure. This prob-
lem, largely overlooked by researchers in the field of energy security for many reasons, but mainly because of concentration on Russia as a unified actor using energy as a weapon, constitutes a major challenge for the energy security of both the post-Soviet energy dependent countries and EU as a whole, since those countries are either member states or crucial transit routes for the energy resources.

This book is recommended to those who study the energy security of the EU as well as those who are interested in the politics of post-Soviet countries. It is well structured and easy to read. Some readers may argue about the fact that notes constitute roughly one third of the text, however it is understandable since the author has done colossal work in systemising local language based sources from four (!) countries that provide extremely valuable information on the topic.
Power in the 21st Century

International Security and International Political Economy

Reviewed by Emilian Kavalski (Institute for Social Justice, Australian Catholic University)

The question of power forms one of the cornerstones of both the theory and practice of international relations. In spite of (or probably because of) its centrality, however, the notion and practices of power animate some of the most contested and tense debates in the study of world affairs. Thus, every generation of international relations scholars undertakes a reconsideration and probing of the concept of power in an attempt to place its own definitive stamp on one of the oldest conversations in world affairs. The volume edited by Enrico Fels, Jan-Frederik Kremer, and Katharina Kronenberg aims to set the framework for the debate on the notion and practices of power for the students of international relations at the start of the 21st century. In this respect, it is difficult in a review of this length to do justice to the full complexity of themes and issues covered by such an encompassing and perceptive collection.

Undoubtedly, this volume provides one of the most comprehensive accounts of the analysis of power relations to date. The contributors simultaneously generalise and contextualise the current state of the art on this topic. At the same time, the volume engages in re-thinking and re-evaluating its debates in the context of the current consider-
ations of the concept of power. The editors managed to pull-off this remarkable feat not least by involving in the project a cohort of insightful interlocutors in the debates on power and encouraging them to think critically about the experience of its conceptualisation and contextualisation.

The volume demonstrates that the dispute over the appropriate ramification of the notion and practices of power are themselves a contestation over the power of different framework for understanding and explanation. As the editors suggest in the Preface to the collection, they have purposefully adopted an eclectic approach to the study of power, in order to approach its subject matter ‘from a variety of angles and introducing new theoretical designs’ (p. vii). Bearing this suggestion in mind, the analyses included in the collection engage power as simultaneously a relacional and a located concept. On the one hand, the notion of power reflects the ability to influence others – that is, the ability to affect the decision-making behaviour of other actors through the capacity either to make some policy choices more attractive than others or by limiting available the policy-alternatives (regardless of whether this ability reflect a recourse to force or the threat of force). On the other hand, the practices of power are located within a framework of relations guided (and made possible) by history, resources, contextual understandings of social location, and the actors’ judgment of those with whom they are interacting.

Thus, because of its relational and located characteristics, the exercise of power is more often than not (as well as much more often than the literature on the topic would like to admit) prone to the random effects of contingency. This multidimensionality of power and its analysis is reflected in the breadth and scope of the contributions included in the edited collection. The fifteen chapters of the volume are divided into three separate parts. In the first part, the contributors discuss various theoretical aspects of the notion of power in international relations. The papers included in this section of the volume discuss (i) the dynamics of post-Cold War “power shift” and the issue of the allegiance of middle powers (p. 3); (ii) the framework of hegemonic power in the context of the “global war on terrorism” (p. 29); (iii) the understanding and explanation of the emergence and demise of “soft power” (p. 43); as well as (iv) the dynamics of “structural power” (p. 59) in the beginning of the twenty-first century.
The second part of the volume details the emerging patterns of power relations through the analysis of various international security issues. The chapters included in this section offer illuminating assessments of (i) the contribution and cost of “nuclear weapons” in the calculus of national power (p. 81); (ii) the access and availability of “natural resources” (p. 97); (iii) the “military balancing” propensities of states (p. 119); (iv) the growing significance and vulnerability of “the critical information infrastructure” of cyber space (p. 137); (v) the importance of “maritime power” (p. 151); and (vi) the emergence of drones and other sophisticated technological innovations as substantive “power assets” (p. 177) in the international struggle for influence.

Finally, the third part of the volume discusses the international political economic aspects of power relations in the context of globalisation. The contributions included in this part of the volume draw attention to (i) the “diffusion and ambiguity” of the international monetary system (p. 195); (ii) the agency of “emerging powers” in the twenty-first century structure of global governance (p. 211); (iii) the utility of trade as a tool in “democracy promotion” (p. 237); (iv) the emergence “economic diplomacy” as a “game-changer” of the practice and analysis of power; and (v) the growing influence of “knowledge power” (p. 287) on the world stage.

In this way, the contributors to Fels (et al) offers one of the most vivid panoramic snapshot of the dominant interpretation of power in the study of world politics at the start of the twenty-first century. In this respect, it would be interesting to see what the contents-page of a similar volume would be in another hundred years. Until that time, however, the edited collection of Fels (et al) is likely to remain a key repository for understanding the dynamics animating the consideration of power in world politics. The volume would be of interest to students and scholars of international relations, political science, comparative politics, and security studies.
Pascal Bruckner, translated by Steven Rendall

The Fanaticism of the Apocalypse

Reviewed by Lukáš Makovický (University of Ottawa [Graduate])

About two thirds of Pascal Bruckner’s book The Fanaticism of the Apocalypse are, unfortunately to the theme, disappointing. To start, Bruckner is a celebrated French intellectual, a philosophy graduate and has written best-selling books on human guilt and masochism, to which Fanaticism seems an heir. The line selling this book says about the content – since we live in times close to an environmental, economic and political collapse, there is nobody else to blame, except for us, humans ... and instead of doing something, we are told to pay – such is an impasse blocking real Enlightenment, engagement and progress! While this would probably not turn down a broader, less-informed audience, one can wonder whether, and if, the poorly chosen examples and techniques of argumentation would convince professionals and academics.

Speaking with a generalisation, there are two kinds of authors. One could be exemplified by Marx or Plato, for example—focused discussions about topics, which seem important, but one does not necessary have to identify themselves with. On the other hand, exemplified in St. Augustine or Nietzsche, the reader finds much of what is said to be immediate, even intimate to one’s very own existence, in need of attention. Now, the problem is that Bruckner is struggling to become one of the latter. Yet the content often compels one to stop and say aloud “Not me, sorry ...” and probably to wonder, whether it wouldn’t be more successful, if Bruckner avoided attempts to include the reader in his narrative. That this does not work is for two reasons.
First, Bruckner really enjoys to pull out quotations in order to ridicule some of his sources. As the author of this review is quite familiar with the work of Paul Virilio and André Gorz, as two cited examples, the problem is that some of the quoted statements are not easily qualifiable. To give an example, Bruckner cites Virilio’s concept of ‘integral accident’ (p. 114), which suggest that technology brings about accidents, e.g. the invention of a train involves the risk of derailment, computer drives make possible data loss, and so on. While for Bruckner, this is silly technophobia, Virilio is much more subtle here and uses this concept to think about how dangers are socially and techno-politically organised across the political space and how we can design our societies without giving up technology, since, as Virilio tends to imply, life as such is inevitably accidental itself.

The second reason is that at the same time, Bruckner quickly jumps on controversial statements from mainstream literature, such as Jared Diamond’s provocation that indigenous peoples (such as Native Americans, Africans, etc.) actively participated in their own decimation and subjection (p. 62). This is echoed a few times through Fanaticism, but without sufficient specificity to confirm his position. Even less convincing is his dismissal of indigenous knowledge, which, no matter how unscientific, is still an indicator of environmental degradation going beyond those who caused it, demonstrated in Bruckner’s completely out-of-picture portrait of indigenous environmental struggles in Canada (p. 124). Here’s the main problem: Bruckner is excited to ridicule all radical, leftist and especially green political movements without an interest in the sometimes subtle and sometimes major differences between and among them. Notwithstanding that many might have at least partly, if not completely acceptable responses to his criticism, which, when unpacked, makes the stronger part of his work. In chapter 1, he begins with the assertion that ever since the end of the Cold War and the subsequent excitement, the West, in particular, became frustrated by an absence of enemies. Bruckner makes an intellectually interesting move: in the evil of enmity, he locates a source of creative force, which, similar to the Frankfurt school, takes form in either myth or reason. It is apt that nature may not be the nice, harmonious system celebrated by “newageism” and can be seen as a quite nasty, indeed evil, unpredictable serial killer. ‘Environmental concern is universal, but the dis-
ease of the end of the world is purely Western’ (p. 181), concludes the author and the reader gets a glimpse of what the story is about: the myth here is ‘preventing rather than proposing’ as Bruckner understands the asceticism of his own Jesuit education (p. 3) and a passivity that threatens what he considers democracy and public engagement:

The choice is not between an intact Nature that slowly recovers from human intrusions and a devastating productivism that forges, pierces and disfigures, but between a process of regression and development lucidly embraced with all its risks and benefits (p. 128).

The author prefers to unleash a storm of big words to make his case, thus, one constantly hears about “sickness,” “vanity,” “disease,” “malevolence,” “devastation” and other like words used to describe what Bruckner doesn’t like. Unfortunately, he fails to give a single detailed case to present why the motifs behind what he attacks are so corrupt. Although there might be a few clever observations scattered across the book, such as how the line ‘scientists tell us ...’ and putting numbers next to everything can indeed serve to promote quite silly opinions, or an ironic lexicon demystifying certain contemporary buzzwords, such as “ethical,” “ethnic” and, to give an example, “sustainable:” ‘If everything started being durable, life would quickly turn into a nightmare’ (p. 47). All this is fine, until the last chapter, where Bruckner himself in conclusion repeats some of the popular clichés about progress, innovation and technology without qualifying them, and one is to wonder if it is to be taken seriously at all.

The problem with this book is that compared to my other review (Evans’ Liberal Terror), the author starts with a big picture of things, ignoring all the small and important details, such as the possibility, that behind some of green thought, there might be genuine beliefs in the possibility of a better life and not diseased misguidedness. The book’s reader doesn’t get anything concrete about green politics, or a conceptual or logical order that would meet the criteria for theoretical strength. The question then might be, ironically, whether Bruckner has settled all the issues with his own morbid vanity.