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Dublin England

MITCHELL BELFER

Imagine the political volcano which would erupt if David Cameron were to announce that the City of Dublin was, in fact, not legitimately part of the Republic of Ireland; that it was historically part of England and England is where it should return to. The consequences of such a statement would be, quite literally, explosive. There would, of course, be unchained anger on the streets of Dublin and throughout the Republic of Ireland. Sectarian violence would probably flare in Northern Ireland and towns across the UK and, possibly even the US, would see major demonstrations. Scotland would protest, as would Wales, the EU and UN would condemn. Political chambers and the news media would be digesting this story until the likely resignation – and entry into some witness protection programme – of Cameron.

The reason for such an eventuality? Claiming foreign territories on the basis of some historical colonisation or elusive national mythology, without allowing for national self-determination, is wrong. People matter more than territories; Europe in the 21st century is not the same as Europe in the 17th where a leader could embody a state – *l'état, c'est moi* – without even the slightest input from the governed. Thankfully, those days are over. Or at least they should be.

Spain's PM Mariano Rajoy, thinks differently. He is comfortable bullying Gibraltar, delegitimising the nation and claiming it as Spanish. All of a sudden the now infamous 1713 Treaty of Utrecht is back under the spotlight and its clauses consuming peoples' time and patience, European territoriality is back on the table and intra-European suspicions are eroding the spirit of the European Communities which maintained continental harmony since the dark days of the Cold War. All this for some cheap political gains on his embattled home front where unemployment is rife and social stability in tatters. Gibraltar

cannot fix Spain, only Spain can do that and Rajoy would be better off addressing his nation's ailments rather than trying to divert attention to a trumped up crisis which he cannot control.

Rajoy is, of course, not alone. He is in good company with Khamenei who is unabashed in claiming Bahrain for Iran, de Kirchner and her Falkland fantasies and the Chinese Communist Party which lays claim to Taiwan.

*Mitchell
Belfer*

Such people and ideas exist. That cannot be helped. However, the international community has a responsibility to end the custom of large states bullying the small. Gibraltar has every right to exist as is. In 2002, its people voted in favour of continued British rule. The margin; 17900:187 or 98.48%:1.03%. The numbers speak for themselves. Gibraltar is British and its people wish to remain British, it is as much a part of Britain as Dublin is Irish. Any change to that status is both illegal and morally suspect. Rajoy – whose country includes the cities of Melilla and Ceuta on the African mainland – must respect the national self-determination of Gibaltans and get on with governing his own state.

* * *

The centennial of ww1 is only a year away, offering an opportunity to reflect and evaluate how far we have come in the quest to bring real, sustainable peace to Europe and beyond. For a long while it seemed Europe had managed. Now, with British warships having to be deployed to Gibraltar in order to deter Spanish intransigence and threats, it seems that the dream of Europe may have been just that.

**Beginning of
the Article**

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Uncovering Romania by Geography

A Study on How Geography in Romania Cultivated Lands and Romanians

COSMINA PAUL

This work contributes to the understanding of how the institutionalisation of geography as a science and discipline empowered the Romanian elites' nationalist discourse before World War Two. Far from being an objective, neutral and value-free science, geography invented new worlds and served to the expansion of imperialist powers. By the same token, with the same colonial instruments, it served to legitimise the Romanian nationalist elite in its state building endeavour. Older than time, geography overcame history and, closely following the German model, proved that borders are primarily ethnic. More permanent than historicity, geography proves that the Romanian state was authentic, natural and organic and justified the pursuit of the only Romanian colonial project, Dobrogea, as it deplored irredentist processes in Transylvania, Bukovina and Bessarabia. Dismissed as descriptive and non-intellectual since the 19th century, geography ended up playing a significant role in supporting the successful story of Romanian nation building.

Introduction

“To take the country out from the unknown,” were the words Carol I – the would-be king of Romania – used to address various Roma-

nian scientists of the time (1875) for the foundation of the National Geographic Society, following the model of royal societies at the time. Putting geography into the light was to take people, and land, out of the darkness, to discover them, to describe them, to represent them. Simply, it was about embodying a nation. The United Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia were recognised in 1859 by the Western powers, and in the years that followed, Romania incorporated Dobrogea (1878), Transylvania, Bukovina and Bessarabia (1918). Greater Romania materialised within its *natural borders and so nationalism had to be pursued to consolidate these borders*.

Cosmina
Paul

Greater Romania came to be seen as a natural body and, consequently, its hygiene and redemption were looked for. 'To take the country out from the unknown' was, first of all, a geographical endeavour and it came to have a twofold meaning: showing the Western powers that Romanians are a nation in the full sense of the term historically: people connected to their land since time immemorial, and simultaneously, showing Romanians that their immemorial being is sacred. The religious ritualisation of nationalism educated the interwar generation of the Legion of the Archangel Michael, the largest social mass movement from Central and Eastern Europe, supported by the father of Romanian geography, Simion Mehedinți-Soveja, a geographer and pedagogue. This is the first work inquiring into the relationship between geography, nationalism and extremism in Romania.¹

This work focuses on how the institutionalisation of geography, as an academic discipline, has been a strong impetus in the construction of the modern Romanian nation. Typically, when scholars look at the nation-building process through discourse theory, they tend to see the manifold ways through which history has been instrumentalised for creating a nationalist collective imagery but scant attention has been given to geography. Scholars continue to look at geography as the stepsister of history; a sub-discipline in nation building discourses. But it was geography and not history that was the science that formed the first and foremost cultural prerequisites in building the national imagery, and it is the discipline of history which comes secondary to these nationalistic endeavours.

This article opens discussion over the centrality played by geography in building the Romanian nation since the beginning of the 20th century until WWII. It first discusses how mapping land and people substantially helped in the legitimisation of colonial expansion and how,

by the same token, such techniques empowered nationalism: it was with these same colonial tools that Romania constructed its nation, envisioned a “homeland,” and further carried out its colonial and irredentist projects in the aftermaths of 1878 and 1918. The second part of this work discusses how geography entered academia at the end of the 19th century, how it was politically instrumentalised to result in evolutionary theories, and how it has since been contested as an object of study.² The paper then explores Romanian geographical textbooks as well as geographers’ works in order to understand how they both construct the imaginary homeland and establish the discourse on the Romanian ethnic ontology, going beyond history while proving the Romanian ancestral nature and uniqueness. The last part focuses on the biographies of the Romanian geographers in order to emphasise their intellectual genealogy into the German school of geography.

The emphasis on different layers of the institutionalisation of geography – as an academic discipline – has the wider relevance of showing that they actually mirror the imperial discourses and practices at the time. And so, this work advances Arendt’s proposal of looking at the domestic policies as being on a continuum with the imperial practices, but not of being two merely distinct ways of doing politics.³ So, if we can now look now at the German imperial politics of ordering, racialisation and purification as a way to inform and to also understand more about domestic German politics, we can take the thesis further and see that the well-educated Romanian petite bourgeoisie from the universities of imperial Germany, were coming back home to build a sacred Romanian race through the learned tools of or discriminating between nations and creating a class of others.

The most prominent scholars investigating the idea of the nation and national identity (e.g. Kedourie, Anderson, Gellner, Hobsbawm and Smith) bifurcate the debate along the question of whether the idea of the nation is a natural manifestation or a cultural construction. Whatever the case may be, instrumentalism overcame the debate by emphasising nationalism’s relation to modernisation such as the new national states of the 19th century which lacked the nation but not the elites to construct it. The Romanian university establishment, inspired by the Western model, is part of the process of building a national elite, and by the turn of the 20th century the marriage between politics and intellectuals in constructing the nation was cemented. Nationalism was also intimately connected to religion⁴ in Romania and here again,

the role of intellectuals, was to become more poignant. How geography contributed to the study of the relationship between nationalism, religion and modernity, received far less attention than its more prestigious bedfellow, history. If, one century ago, geography was seen as adjacent to the study of history and relegated to the status of a gymnasial discipline (indeed to never fully prove its academic status ever since), the study of nationalism did not pay close attention to geography. However blunt and contested the process of institutionalising geography was, it brought people and lands to the table of power and contributed to how modernity started.

*Uncovering
Romania by
Geography*

Theorising on Nations and Nationalism in Europe and Romania

Winichakul revitalised the studies on nationalism producing the idea that the geo-body was constructed closely to the advance of geography at the time and, progressively, replaced traditional ways of envisioning belonging and difference.⁵ A reflexive reading of colonialism in Western Europe had shown the importance of geography in the project of colonial expansion⁶ and Anderson, who coined the concept of nation as an “imagined community,” recognised the importance of mapping these processes in the nationalist imagination. Liulevicius’s recent work on the transition from geography as imagining ‘land and people’ to geography as imagining ‘space and race’ shows the permeability of geography to political projects and equally how geography may bring out political projects. Specifically, he referred to Germany’s eastern expansion, and argued that the process of evolution from German nationalism to eastern colonialism is what brought on WWI.⁷ Nonetheless, one should not forget that Germany in the last three decades of the 19th century became an imperial power and that it was also the time when most of European colonies’ land was appropriated. Therefore, mapping was used both for colonising and for nationalising projects; they are different sides to the same coin.

Yet, another insufficiency in studying Central, Eastern and Southern European nationalism is borne out of the projected cleavage between colonialism and nationalism although both processes centre on empowering an elite over a land. In the case of Romania, it was a nationalist elite educated in the West who carried out the nationalist project and gradually inflicted the national sentiment over Orthodox subjects

of the Ottoman millet—now the subjects of the Romanian state. I argue that the Romanian elite, at that time, was also using colonial instruments in order to construct the Romanian nation and to look to its people, while the map became one of the most powerful tools in defining the people and inspiring patriotic education. Mapping borders and people came to be seen as a first tool in empowering land expansion and legitimising power over the land. The only Romanian colonial land, Dobrogea, had been undertaken afterwards and Romania exited WWI with its land redrawn and almost doubled.⁸ There was nothing more to hope for than retaining its achievements. During such dramatic changes, geography remained constant in representing the homeland of the Romanians. The geography textbook at the turn of the century was entitled *Romania and the Land Inhabited by Romanians* therefore bearing from its very inception the irredentist dream.

Soon after the fulfilling of the irredentist dream, Simion Mehedinți published a work on the Romanian people and his relation to the alien elements (*Vechimea poporului român și legătura cu elementele alogene*, București 1924) revealing the unity of the Romanian nation and showing contempt towards the others, especially the Jews and the Gypsies as corrupting biological and social forces. From its inception, the work of Mehedinți, who chaired the Department of Geography at the University in Bucharest from 1900 until the end of the interwar period, bore the same conception over the racial unity of the Romanian people as an historical mission.

In the second half of the 19th century, geography was seen as a mistress of history in the process of university institutionalisation in Europe and its colonies. The same was the case of Romania, which closely followed Western models, and so, reluctance and distrust towards geography might be read even in the relegation of delegating textbook writing to a woman though later on, when geography entered the university, men took over. Its institutionalisation remains a contested process from its inception, to be further discredited when Ivy League members, faithfully following Harvard University's 1948 decision, closed their Departments of Geography in the immediate postwar period to reopen later (Harvard was never to reconsider its initial decision).⁹

Answering the question of how old geography is was thought to be the legitimisation of a discipline. There was a presumed continuity in studying geography since antiquity but, at that time, it was only

a device to help with the localisation of historical events. New land discoveries and travellers contributed to the advance of geographical knowledge but they were not the reason for academic geography's foundation; they wrote stories and descriptions without claiming to lay the foundation for a discipline. There were stories and descriptions to be told at Geographical Royal Societies meeting or carried out by the Societies' members themselves, in order to advance knowledge of cultures, flora and fauna, but not geography as a work of synthesis over land and people, as it was defined later.

*Cosmina
Paul*

Neither was it the tradition of cosmography since the 17th century, which was taught in universities and concerns the study of the earth placed in the universe but not of the earth in itself, the very reason for geography's foundation. Actually, geography constitutes an academic discipline following the advance of evolutionary theories in the second half of the 19th century, which brought along the comparative perspective and the work of synthesis. The linkages between land and people were following other universal laws, which were found in nature, geo-nature and in the universe. The first work seen as geographical was Humboldt's "Cosmos" that shows similar laws between universal and terrestrial worlds and Ritter's work on the connections between geography and human history. They switch the focus, revealing how land and its history might help understand human history. The Romanian National Geographic Society emulates the tradition of travelling and expeditors have been encouraged to travel for stories since its foundation in 1875.¹⁰ Nevertheless, it was only later, in 1892, when Mehedinti was sent westward to study geography, and he ended up in Leipzig, under Ratzel's supervision, the author of anthropogeographie and political geography.

The Advent of Political Geography

The short interlude between the process of naming and defining geography and its academic establishment showed that discovering new worlds and colonial expansion of Germany in the last three decades of the 19th century played an important role, but I argue that the final stroke was the theory of evolution developed at the time. In just one world, different worlds evolved and land, nature, and people seemed to follow the same rules. Starting from that, geography reclaimed the right to synthesis and universality, which enables any science to exist

and be recognised as such. Its object of study was still debated at the time, when Mehedinti returned to Romania (1900) and assumed chairmanship of geography; he played a fundamental role in defining the discipline's object. His work was not translated and he patronised the discipline until 1942 when he retired, and his work remains crucial for geography's institutionalisation.

Mehedinti pleaded for a universalist understandings of the science of geography with different branches but emphasised that a synthesis of geographic knowledge is possible. He was also an advocate of anthropogeography in Romania, a term and a discipline coined by Ratzel, and a vision born out of the presumed connection between land and people, with perilous similarities in the laws of biological and zoological species. Geography adopted the instruments of colonialism to nationalism, by the objectification of the land and people. In the case of Romania, anthropology and ethnography were much embedded in the geographical research. It was not Darwinism as much as Lamarckianism (explaining adaptation in nature) which became the chosen theory of Mehedinti in his arguments for the continuity and authenticity of the Romanian people, but not for their influences or incorporation by others.

Anthropogeography was so ambitious that it encompassed ethnography, Christian religion and history on the one hand, and also the mapping, naming and locating, on the other hand. Dobrogea, the only Romanian colony, became one of the first projects. Crucial importance was seen in bringing geographical knowledge to Transylvania, Bukovina, Dobrogea and Maramures, as another way of possessing land. Ethnogeography and ethnopedagogy were employed in order to discover people and represent them through means of colonial knowledge production. Therefore, how Romanian geography became a science with which to cultivate both lands and people until the end of WWII was a forgotten history.

It was not only that the education became national, multiplied at a scale as never before, but it was also that the new education radically changed the very traditional way of understanding 'who are we?' First of all, the sensitive words of seeing and hearing, i.e. seeing the horizon of the village and hearing the church bells of the community, were replaced by maps' representations: building an abstract mode of thinking of belonging and difference, taking the same world to a larger scale. If the traditional world used to be represented through *here* and

there, where *here* was the community and *there* was everything over the village margin, now the world became that of a *here* which means a country and a *there* which means everything over the national border. When the peasants' children started going to school, their whole old imagery was transformed. Now they could see, by the power of representation, the maps of the living Romanians, a language community, which proved for the case of Romania how singular this country, was. By representing the nation as being of Latin origin surrounded by Slavic languages, the singularity and the estrangement of the others was revealed.

The abstract representation of the map was maybe the most powerful instrument in creating the new home, the new national identity and strangers. Representing Romania through people and not by the country's borders, the irredentist dream became present for the first time in the imagery construct of the world of the children, the future soldiers. Nevertheless, the superstitious repertoire had also been transferred onto a larger scale as the religious mind-set had not been shaken, but rather empowered, as we may analyse further; there was indeed no need to give up religion in becoming national. All the same, if history gives the right to a nation over the land, there is geography that gives to that right an allure of a sacred nature. Therefore, the geography textbooks did not distance people from religion but enforced the mystical vocabulary of land, the world's beginnings, borders, strangers, here and there, and catastrophe. Mehedinti, also published geographical works and educational books to guide the new generation in the values of church and nationalism: *To the New Generation* (Pentru noua generatie, 1912), *Other Growth: the Work School* (1919); *The Romanian School and the biological capital of the Romanian people* (Scoala romana si capitalul biologic al poporului roman, 1927), *For our Church* (Pentru biserica noastra, 1911).

The Body, the Geo-Body and Romanian National Identity

The metaphor of the body expresses a collective identity, being it race, species, or ethnicity; 'the body was of one blood, one race and one will; it could allow no foreign contamination, no impurities or mixes.'¹¹ Therefore, I take on the metaphor of the body as it appears in the intellectual construction of the Romanian national identity in order to emphasise on the ethnic unity and to show the multiple ways in which

the metaphor was used. Here, the debate can be reconceptualised when we see the nation through the lens of the Christian idea of body. This concept illuminates mutability when we follow its occurrences through incarnation, Eucharist and resurrection. That was the way of becoming or re-becoming truly Romanian for all people who lived in the Romanian territories, except for the Jews and the Gypsies. The first are refused the belonging as not being Christian as Article 7 from the 1866 Constitution stated, and both are excluded for their blood. I also inquire about the unmovable assumptions of static ethnicity that the Romanians have always shared, closer to the German discourse of race given by the “rational” discourse of modernity. The Christian identity Romanian elites, in the discursive construction of collective identity, represent nation through Christianity and ethnicity—as an exclusive way of being Romanian, an exclusive way of belonging. Consequently, much of the state elite and popular discourses in Romania pivoted on corporeal assertions about being national. As everyone was suffering, Romania had a heart; as interests were the same, Romania had a mind; as everyone was Christian, Romania had to be redeemed. And, as everyone was part of a whole, Romania had a body (trup).

The body means unity and so does the geo-body. There is always a double reading of the intention and so is the case of drawing borderlines. When politicians set national borders they were meant to unite. The same thought the geographers. De Martonne completed the Wilsonian principle of ethnic borders, with the principle of territorial viability, geographical and infrastructural unity. De Martonne, a leading international geographer enamoured of Romania ever since the beginning of his career, who commenced his career with a doctoral thesis, *La Valachie* (1902), and continued working and defending the right of the Romanians over Transylvania as well as the Romanian intervention in WWI, helped in drawing-up the frontiers after the war.¹² Even though the national borders drawn were meant to unite, they were dividing as never before. Therefore, if the imperial borders were passable, the national ones were not. Geographical borders are as much natural as they are ethnic and as much ethnic as they are natural. The Romanian maps drawn in the textbooks represented Romania not by its state borders but by its ethnic borders.¹³ Here, Romanian irredentism might be read. The river Prut borders the Romanian state on the East but ethnic Romanians live up to the river Nistru, which marks its natural/ethnic border, and so are the margins of the imagined map. In

the West there are the Carpathians Mountains, seen by the Hungarians as naturally dividing Romania and Hungary but it was Romanian geographers who argued that they are not a natural border but the very spine of Romanian lands. It was the river Tisa that marked the natural westward border of the Old Kingdom as the national poem goes: 'From Tisa to the Nistru's tide / All Romania's people cried / That they could no longer stir / For the rabbled foreigner.'¹⁴ Therefore, the map became the most powerful tool in imagining the country and the nation, and so the authors of the geographical textbooks concluded that 'we travelled in our minds the land inhabited by Romanians.'¹⁵

But one should not overlook that a map representation is just one of many other possible representations and yet also a metaphor. The introduction of the textbook refers to the introduction to the belonging to Europe's superiority:

Europe is entirely situated in the temperate area, meaning exactly there where the climate influences at its best on people, making them diligent and smarter. Situated above in the middle of the continental hemisphere, near the all other continents, made more easier the communication with the other continents and led to their subjugation by Europeans.¹⁶

Political, ethnic, national, demographic and religious maps are ways of representing the body of the nation and therefore they institutionalise belonging and loyalty. To help pupils read the map, the authors of textbooks compared the country to a sun and the 'oppressed people living under the rule of foreigners are like the radiuses of the sun.'¹⁷ Comparing Romania to the sun became another everlasting image in the nationalist discourse; 'I vow to God that I shall make Romania in the likeness of the holy sun in the sky,' was the oath taken by extreme right legionnaires of the First World War generation. The natural borders also constructed natural enemies, the Russians and the Hungarians – those who cannot be trusted, cannot be befriended and who oppressed, at that time, the Romanian people and prevented national fraternity to be materialised.

The borders are ethnographic and anthropological units. Every branch of geography created regions, biological, geodesic, hydrographic units, and consequently, by using the same methodology, people became categorised. The categorisation and stereotypification of people encouraged racism, chauvinism and the colonial expansion in the second part of the 19th century; inasmuch as people are mapped,

discovered and taught, people are objectified and the discourses on the “other” versus “us” are constructed on the immutable differences of blood and land. In the work of Mehedinti, Eskimos, Australians, and Romanians are represented based on immutable differences born out of a land and of genetics, which also illuminates on the character of the people.¹⁸ Difference was meant to explain one’s unity as the nationalist discourse strongly relies on the image of the stranger inasmuch answer to the question “who are we?” They also bring the theme of the internal traitors, here the Gypsies and the Jews in the United Principalities and Greek-Catholics in Transylvania during the interwar period, which spoiled the authentic character of the Romanians and were feared of betrayal. Homeland is an imagery concept as powerful as the nation, since the country land may be grasped only in one’s mind. The land was to bear the ontology and the unity of the people and their rural roots should not be betrayed by Western emulation, seen as ‘forms without roots.’

As geography was born out of the nationalist discourse, it also draws heavily on religious vocabulary. The chosen people, the chosen book, the chosen land, and martyrdom are present in any nationalist endeavour. The national poet Mihai Eminescu was the mind that thinks for all Romanians and, and the heart that suffers for all Romanians. His poems ‘are the Scripture meant to heal the pains of his people.’¹⁹ From this perspective, three theses are found in the memoirs and anthropogeography work of Mehedinti: ‘We are Christians before Christianity,’ ‘None can be a full human being if he is not Christian,’ and ‘Who does not appreciate Eminescu is not a truly Romanian.’²⁰ Both advancing knowledge and myth-making builds the national imagery. And so geography progressed.

As geography was older than history, it could add pre-historical settings by and through itself. The Romanian pre-historicity is an everlasting theme in the Romanian nationalist discourse and continued during the early post-Communist years. Geography issued a birth certificate to Romanians showing the continuity of the Dacians, who survived the Roman Empire colonisation processes, but were not born out of colonisation, as the historians had believed. Therefore, even though lacking documents and just imagining the land, the geographer could assert permanence of the Romanians from pre-historical times within their territory. And it is that which gives the promise of eternity to the people. Since geography owns the ancestral, primordial and imme-

morial times with a force only granted to folklore, ethnographic work was pursued arduously. Mehedinti, George Valsan, Ion Concea, Constantin S. Nicolaescu Plopsor, were geographers and ethnographers as well. Moreover, anthropogeography goes further than history because it shows not only the past, but the living past. Permanence and unity, the authenticity of the Romanian people, are the same forever and will stay the same forever; 'We, the Romanians, want to be what we are: sons of our parents, followers of our forefathers.'²¹ Changes in time were overcome and it was only geography that could go beyond them.

Another key shift from history to geography was given by replacing the thesis of a nomadic people to the one of a trans-human people and so establishing the centrality of the relationship between man and nature helped transfer a mystical connection to the land. Equally, nationalistic portrayals of nomadic Hungarians, Tatars, Gypsies and Jews, became everlasting images of the stranger in the Romanian collective imagery, while Germans were merely guests. The state is seen as organic and the natural consequence of becoming Romanian. The Jews and the Gypsies were considered incapable of reaching the momentum to become neither a people nor a nation and therefore they were denied a state.

While the German discourse became radicalised so did Romanian nationalism and the pre-eminence of geographical discourse over people. It follows closely the eugenics project as the only way to redemption. The curve of ethnic values (infra-homines, sana mediocritas, super homines) is constructed by Mehedinti at the end of his work, 'Premises and Conclusions to Terra' where he states that

We all know well today that if we watch "the pure lines", the return to an inferior type, recessivity, is no longer possible. And the curve of the ethnic values shows us the way to select creatures [...] the deformed and infirm individuals are a kind of trash of the specie, rejected by the healthy crowd [...] here is the key to progress, to wipe out the trash, then to select out of the crowd the best developed sample in order to assure the inheritance of the traits worth to be praised.²²

Conclusion

Three filiations contributed to the formation of the geographers in Romania. They are all, in themselves, phenomena of estrangement

and return; the leaving of home and the coming back home, would have bear profound symbolical meanings. The first one is the journey of studying abroad, an intellectual endeavour having Paris, Berlin and Leipzig²³ as centres where geography was about to be institutionalised and professors were lecturing on geography. Lebensraum, organic state, geopolitics, anthropogeography and ethnography were invented and manipulated *avant la letter*. The latter conceptualisation of their work will always draw from this genealogy. From Paris, Mehedinti reached Leipzig where Ratzel was teaching. Valsan studied in Paris and Berlin, Bratescu also chose Leipzig, Popescu, was also a student of Ratzel and von Richthofen.²⁴ The first one chaired geography in Bucharest until the end of the wwII, Valsan came to Transylvania to chair the Department of Geography after wwI and Popescu taught, starting from 1908, at the University of Iasi, antropogeography and the geography of continents.²⁵ Another key moment is the returning home which awaken conscience. Mehedinti, before graduating from Leipzig, spent two years in Soveja, his birth village, and in his later memoires that will be seen as 'the return of the lost son.' Merutiu immigrated to Romania in 1905 just to return in Transylvania in 1918 to contribute to the establishment of the geography in university. The last one will be the symbolical return to a symbolical home: the homeland. In the 1990s, homage was given to Mehedinti-Soveja equally by new extreme right movement, by geographers and by pedagogues as a Romanian Christian scientist. As his prestige was restored along the lines of other nationalist historians, his work celebrated for its present relevance in teaching the new generation in Christian nationalist values. In 1992, he was reburied in a funeral ceremony in Soveja. His geographical works continue to be mentioned but much more attention has been giving to his works on religion and pedagogy, which were largely republished, and inasmuch attention was giving to his biography (Victor Tufescu, Luminita Draghicescu, Costica Neagu, Aurel Popescu).²⁶

Romanian geography, as a discipline and science, shares along its intellectual filiations an ambiguous genealogy: while serving to modernise culture, it simultaneously acted as an anti-moderniser in promoting formations of ethnicity and Christian spirituality; while serving to emancipate people it ended up in an eugenic ethno-pedagogical endeavour. So far, no critical study of Romanian geography – and its founders – as a nationalist project, *per se*, has been conducted and no

explicit links to Romanian colonialism (i.e. Dobrogea) and its irredentism have been revealed. It is hoped that this work inspires such research.

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the Article

Notes

- 1 Works dealing with the concepts of 'national essence' and 'ethnic ontology' were drawn (until the end of WWII) from historical writings but not geographical works. See Liviu Neagoe (2010), 'De la "esență națională" la "ontologie etnică:" fundamente filosofice ale naționalismului românesc,' *Seris Historica*, pp. 357-366; Sorin Antohi (1999), *Civitas imaginis. Istorie și utopie în cultura română*, Iasi: Polirom.
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- 10 The first explorers sponsored by the SRS. were Iuliu Popper in Patagonia, Assan in northern Canada, Ghica in Somalia, Racovita in Antarctica. See Vintila Mihailescu (1967), *Simion Mehedinti: Opere alese*, Bucuresti: Stiintifica, p. 31.
 - 11 Erik Ringman (1998), 'Nationalism: The Idiocy of Intimacy,' in *The British Journal of Sociology*, 49:4, pp. 534-549.
 - 12 Gavin Bowd (2012), *Un géographe français et la Roumanie: Emmanuel de Martonne (1873-1955)*, Paris: L'Harmattan, pp. 85-167.
 - 13 Murgoci and Burca (1905), *Romania si tarile locuite de romani cu o introducere generala asupra Europei si notiuni de cosmografie. Manual pentru clasa a IV-a secundara*, Bucuresti: Institutul de Arte Grafice Carol Gobl.
 - 14 Mihai Eminescu, *Doina*, a well-known melancholic Romanian folk song.
 - 15 Murgoci si Burca, *Manual pentru clasa a IV-a secundara*, p. 260.
 - 16 Murgoci si Burca, *Romania si tarile locuite de romani cu o introducere generala asupra Europei si notiuni de cosmografie. Manual pentru clasa a IV-a secundara*, p. 1.
 - 17 Ibid, p. 22.
 - 18 Simion Mehedinti (2007 version), *Antropogeografia. Pentru clasa a VI-a secundara*, Focsani: Terra.
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 - 24 Victor Tufescu, *Simion Mehedinti: Viata si Opera*, Bucuresti: Enciclopedica, 1994.
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Misadventure or Mediation in Mali

The EU's Potential Role

PAUL PRYCE

With a humanitarian crisis mounting in the West African state of Mali, the Council of the European Union has called on the Economic Community of West African States to deploy a stabilisation force to the northern regions of the country. But such a military intervention would have to contend with a plethora of cultural and logistical challenges. A better approach might be for the Council to appoint an EU Special Representative for the Sahel Region, employing the Union's civilian power to facilitate mediation between the central government in Mali and the Tuareg rebel groups that recently proclaimed a de facto independent state in the north, the Islamic Republic of Azawad.

Keywords: European Union, Mali, ECOWAS, conflict prevention, Tuareg

Introduction

On 23 July 2012, the Council of the European Union convened in Brussels to discuss a number of issues relating to the EU's external affairs. In a statement released at the conclusion of those proceedings, the Council expressed its concern over the deteriorating situation in Mali and called on the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to deploy a stabilisation force to the country.¹ This expression of support for military intervention from the EU Member States comes shortly after calls were issued by some in the American press,

such as the Editorial Board of the *Washington Post*, for NATO to act militarily to stabilize Mali.²

However, the Council may have been too hasty in offering its support for the deployment of such an ECOWAS stabilisation force. Given the complex relationships between communities within Mali, as well as the history shared between Mali and some of its neighbouring states, such a military intervention could very likely further exacerbate the situation in Mali, deepening the crisis in one of the world's most impoverished societies. Misperceptions regarding the nature of the Malian conflict might well have contributed to the Council of the EU's less-than-constructive call for ECOWAS to intervene militarily. Indeed, rather than the intra-state warfare in Mali being a purely religious conflict, Malian society is ethnically diverse and tensions have long existed between the Mandé peoples of the south and the sparse Tuareg communities of the north.

This work first examines the challenges with which an ECOWAS intervention would face in Mali. Having then discussed the history of the Malian conflict and the role of ECOWAS in peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations, this work subsequently considers the means through which the EU could become more constructively engaged in resolving the dispute that has emerged between the Malian government in Bamako and the 'Islamic Republic of Azawad,' a de facto independent state that has been newly proclaimed by rebels in the northern regions of the country. Chief among these potential instruments for constructive EU engagement would be the appointment of an EU Special Representative for the Sahel.

The Tuareg and Bamako

Until recently, the extent of the EU's direct involvement in Mali has largely been limited to the Migration Information and Management Centre (CIGEM), jointly established with the Malian government to '[...] provide for skill testing, training, and pre-departure information with a view to facilitating the movement of workers within African countries and to the EU.'³ The European External Action Service (EEAS) possesses an EU Sahel Strategy, adopted by the Council of the EU on 23 March 2012, but its direct application in Mali and elsewhere in the Sahel region has thus far been limited. Interest among European leaders in the instability experienced in northern Mali seems to have grown

along with the increasing frequency of reports in the international press that al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) may be responsible for the latest outbreak of violence in the Sahel region.

Yet tensions between the central government in Bamako and the predominantly Tuareg communities of northern Mali pre-date the formation of al-Qaeda itself, and the conflict can be traced back at least as far as the Kaocen Revolt of 1916. The recent emergence of AQIM and other Islamic fundamentalist groups in the Sahel region has inadvertently led to Western observers perceiving the conflict as primarily between the secular Malian state and armed groups attempting to impose Islamic fundamentalist beliefs.

In fact, rather than being a principal motivating factor for conflict, Islamic fundamentalist rhetoric has been harnessed by Tuareg groups in northern Mali to achieve select political objectives in the past. For example, during the late 1990s, tribal leaders from the powerful Ifoghas clan used Islamist rhetoric as an instrument to advance their interests in a hotly contested election for the Mayor of Kidal, one of the larger municipalities in northern Mali. A woman from the minority Idnan clan had emerged as the leading candidate in the election. It was at this time that Tablighi missionaries predominantly from South Asia arrived in the region to proselytise their views on Islam to the locals. '[...] The Ifoghas elite of Kidal, seeing that they might lose political power, willingly adopted the patriarchal rhetoric of the Tablighi in order to disqualify their female opponent, and to argue that pious Muslims would never vote for a woman.'⁴

Similar incidents in Mali and neighbouring Niger in subsequent years led to increasing alarm in the international press that Mali's Muslim religious leaders had acquired too much political power, that the Sahel was undergoing a process of steady 'Islamisation.'⁵ But it is important to distinguish between the perceived role Islamic fundamentalism has had in Mali on the one hand, and the role that it actually played on the other. Mali has not undergone a process of so-called 'Islamisation from below,' in which grassroots support for Islamic fundamentalist values leads to the formation of belligerent groups like AQIM or Ansar Dine.⁶ Instead, frustration with the central government and the lack of public services in northern Mali has motivated Tuareg communities to rebel repeatedly against Bamako, issuing increasingly vehement demands that culminated in early 2012 with the declaration of an independent 'Islamic Republic of Azawad.'

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In this sense, the underlying sources of conflict can be found in the aforementioned Kaocen Revolt and a series of Tuareg rebellions that broke out in northern Mali during the 1960s, 1990s, and again more recently in 2007-2009. Whereas the rebellions of the late 20th and early 21st centuries were primarily between the central government in the south and the Tuareg communities of the north, the Kaocen Revolt saw the mostly nomadic Tuareg resisting French colonial rule and the perceived expansion of Hausa influence from Nigeria.⁷ After a period of fierce fighting, the French had suppressed the uprising by late 1917. Following this defeat, Tuareg communities in Niger and Mali retreated further into the Sahel, seeming to seek seclusion from the aforementioned expansion of French and Hausa influence in the region.⁸

This has instilled a certain degree of suspicion among the Tuareg toward the Mandé peoples of the south, who have been decidedly more influenced by French and Hausa culture than the communities of the north. Furthermore, ethnic or racial identity has also been an exacerbating factor for relations within the country. The Tuareg are viewed as racially different and tend to be referred to as “reds” or “whites” by communities in southern Mali.⁹ This further deepens the mutual “Othering” of the communities that share the Malian state, viewing one another in the context of differences rather than the commonalities necessary to form a coherent polity corresponding to the Malian state.

More importantly, and as previously mentioned, Tuareg rebels have repeatedly demanded public services and development assistance from authorities in Bamako for nearly a century. Indeed, ‘(r)ebel leaders have demanded a paved road, a second hospital, better supplies, and more access to communications, and have criticised the Malian army for ‘foot-dragging’ in withdrawing bases from northern areas.’¹⁰ This is not to say that Bamako has ignored these demands, remaining aloof from affairs in the north of the country. However, many of the agreements struck between the central government and Tuareg leaders ultimately have not been realised as military officers have seized power from the civilian authorities in a number of coups, neglecting to fulfill the commitments made by democratically elected leaders of Mali.

In 1968, Moussa Traoré seized power in Bamako as part of a military coup, remaining President of Mali until 1991. Tensions continued to mount with Tuareg communities during this time, until President Alpha Oumar Konaré came to power in the country’s first democratic elections since 1960 and managed to negotiate a settlement with

Tuareg rebels by 1996. But further efforts toward reconciliation were undermined by a coup on 22 March 2012, in which a group of junior Malian military officers seized power from President Amadou Toumani Touré. While this move was reversed on 01 April 2012, with the military relinquishing power to civilian authorities once again, the episode underscored for many Tuareg leaders how unreliable the central government can be as a negotiating partner.

It is therefore apparent that the principal threat to peace and stability in Mali is the poor state of civil-military relations in the country. According to Huntington, civil-military relations are shaped by three important variables: the perceived level of external threat, the constitutional structure of the state, and the ideological makeup of society.¹¹ A brief consideration of Huntington's criteria in the context of Mali's independent history reveals a grim prognosis. So long as the Tuareg are perceived as the "Other" by the Malian military, and so long as the constitutional structure of the state remains fragile, Mali will remain vulnerable to the destabilising effects of military coups and internecine warfare between the north and south. In order for any intervention to be successful here, it must address the antagonism between ethnic groups and set out a structure for normalised relations between the Malian military and the civilian authorities of this West African state. This is not to understate the threat presented to peace and stability by some of the armed groups attempting to impose their political and religious views through violent means – AQIM, Ansar Dine, the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA), and the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNL). But, as we have seen here in this brief overview of the conflict between Bamako and the Tuareg, there are many factors to the crisis in Mali that were apparently not considered by the Council of the EU in calling for an ECOWAS stabilisation force. Beyond the cursory mention of the need to restructure Mali's security and defence forces, the Council's 23 July statement does not address the deeper problem of civil-military relations and the historical tensions between communities along ethnic lines.

An ECOWAS Quagmire

The Government of National Unity, which assumed power in Bamako after the military relinquished power in early April 2012, has already made it clear that it will not accept any kind of intervention from

ECOWAS that would attempt to address the problem of civil-military relations in the country. According to these authorities, any ECOWAS deployment would have to be limited solely to the northern regions of Mali.¹² As such, the ECOWAS stabilisation force would not be able to operate beyond a strict mandate of enforcing the disarmament of the myriad armed groups that would attempt to defend their claims to an independent 'Islamic Republic of Azawad.'

Since its inception nearly 40 years ago, ECOWAS has developed extensive experience with military intervention. Deployments to Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Cote d'Ivoire have met with varying degrees of success, and ECOWAS has demonstrated a capacity to adapt its structures and practices based on lessons learned from its peacekeeping and peacebuilding ventures. As of June 2006, ECOWAS has successfully established a rapid response force (ECOBRI) consisting of up to 6500 soldiers that can be deployed within 90 days.¹³ Yet a number of variables could lead to a mission in Mali becoming a veritable quagmire for ECOWAS, expending considerable resources while only further destabilising Mali.

One of these variables is the role of Nigeria. In previous peace support missions, ECOWAS has relied heavily on Nigerian troop contributions. In the case of the ECOWAS Mission in Cote d'Ivoire (ECOMICI), that peace support mission faced significant difficulty in pursuing its mandate as Nigeria contributed only five troops, far less than was originally pledged and much less than the Nigerian military had provided for previous missions in Sierra Leone and Liberia.¹⁴

The likelihood that the mission's success will depend greatly on the willingness of Nigeria to contribute the backbone for the deployment becomes especially problematic in light of the suspicion with which Nigeria's motives are sometimes regarded by other ECOWAS members. In the case of ECOMICI, Nigeria's initial willingness to contribute most of the required troops was regarded by other ECOWAS members as an attempt by Nigeria to use the ECOWAS stabilisation force as a proxy to expand Nigeria's sphere of influence in West Africa.¹⁵ No longer having to contend with Gaddafi's Libya for influence in the Sahel, some ECOWAS members may perceive a large troop contribution from Nigeria as yet another attempt by that country to expand its sphere of influence to encompass Mali. With President Goodluck Jonathan of Nigeria eagerly offering just such a level of support,¹⁶ smaller ECOWAS members

may be concerned that the ECOWAS stabilisation force will be effectively hijacked by the Nigerian military.

This is compounded by the disdain among some Francophone West African states for what is consistently perceived to be a crusade by Nigeria for regional hegemonic leadership.¹⁷ This has frequently led to entreaties by these states for France to serve as a security guarantor in the region, rather than looking to much more local solutions for emerging conflicts, like ECOWAS and the African Union. As negotiations are held to determine precisely how ECOWAS might intervene militarily in the Malian conflict, Mali's Francophone neighbours could object to any Nigerian presence in the contested regions of northern Mali on these grounds. Nonetheless, without a significant Nigerian contingent, an ECOWAS stabilisation force in Mali will suffer from a lack of personnel.

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The strain on ECOWAS and its member states' resources is further compounded by other developments taking place in the region. An April 2012 coup that took place in Guinea-Bissau has also commanded the attention of this sub-regional organisation. As such, the divided attention of ECOWAS was most apparent in a meeting of the ECOWAS Council of Ministers, the organisation's principal decision-making body, on 17 September 2012, at which the member states expressed difficulty in determining whether, and how, to intervene in Mali, Guinea-Bissau, or both.¹⁸ If ECOWAS is to intervene militarily in one while keeping one eye warily cast on the other, there is a significant risk that any military intervention will fail due to flimsy political will, with some contributing states pulling their personnel out of a belief that their resources might be better utilised facilitating stability in Guinea-Bissau, in the case of a Malian intervention.

Aside from the difficulties ECOWAS might experience in mustering the personnel necessary to carry out a military intervention, the composition of the stabilisation force could contribute toward heightened hostilities in northern Mali. As previously discussed, Tuareg communities in the region have resisted the perceived spread of Hausa influence just as fiercely as they resisted French colonial rule. Approximately 29% of the Nigerian population is ethnically Hausa, and Hausa is one of the most widely spoken languages in Africa. In addition to the Hausa ethnolinguistic community in Nigeria, 'Hausaness' is a cultural identity that has embraced many different regional groups within Nigerian so-

ciety.¹⁹ To Tuareg militants, the deployment of a Nigerian-dominated ECOWAS stabilisation force could be seen as a pact between the Hausa and Mandé peoples to force the assimilation of the communities in northern Mali, imposing 'Hausanness' there and eradicating the cultural distinctiveness of the Tuareg clans. Instead of motivating these belligerent groups to disarm, the ECOWAS force could inspire renewed resistance due to its composition.

Even if the armed groups in northern Mali were not to regard the prevalence of Nigerian Hausa in the ECOWAS force as a threat, the peace support mission would find the disarmament of these same groups a difficult goal to achieve. This stems mostly from the fractionalisation of the armed groups in northern Mali, with infighting occurring as a power struggle is waged between Tuareg elites. Fractionalisation has interfered with similar disarmament efforts in the past, such as the ill-fated intervention in Somalia during the early 1990s that were conducted under the auspices of the United Nations. In that conflict, the principal belligerents were Ali Mahdi Muhammad and Mohamed Farrah Aidid, who both sought to succeed Siyad Barre as ruler of Somalia. Aidid obstructed the deployment of UN forces in the country from the outset on the basis that he suspected the Americans and UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali favoured Ali Mahdi's claim to the Somali presidency.²⁰ The disarmament of Aidid's militias only served to compound Aidid's paranoia, leading to outright acts of violence against interventionist forces.²¹

The power struggle in northern Mali is perhaps even more complex than the past rivalry between Aidid and Ali Mahdi in Somalia. Initially, most of the drive to claim the territories of northern Mali for an independent Tuareg state came from the aforementioned MNLA and Ansar Dine. The MNLA was led by Bilal ag Acherif, a young member of the Ifoghas clan. Meanwhile, the Ansar Dine was led by Iyad ag Ghali, a veteran of the Tuareg rebellions of the 1990s and also a member of the powerful Ifoghas. A rivalry between these two men emerged at the inception of ag Acherif's political career, when both ag Acherif and ag Ghali sought to be elected by their peers as leader of the MNLA. Bilal ag Acherif was ultimately successful, and so Iyad ag Ghali redirected his efforts toward building up Ansar Dine as a separate and slightly more Islamic-influenced force.²² Despite this shared history, ag Acherif and ag Ghali were apparently able to set aside their differences in the offensive against the Malian military.²³

But a new force was beginning to take shape in Mali that would upset the balance of power between the MNLA and Ansar Dine. AQIM had not enjoyed much influence in Mali or among the Tuareg, and this is widely suspected to be due to the predominance of Algerian militants in the leadership of AQIM and the focus in al-Qaeda on countries further to the north, such as Libya and Algeria. As such, there have been limited opportunities for advancement among the senior ranks of AQIM for militants from southern areas of the Sahel region, such as Mali and Niger. Perhaps seeking greater opportunities for self-promotion in the militant Islamist movement, a new group broke off from AQIM in mid-2011, the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA).²⁴ Under the leadership of Hamada Ould Mohamed Kheirou, also known by the alias Abu Qumqum, MOJWA soon waged a limited terrorist campaign to establish its credibility in the region. For example, it was discovered in December 2011 that MOJWA was responsible for the kidnapping of three European aid workers from a Saharawi refugee camp in Algeria in October 2011, and a number of other attacks followed in the Sahel region.²⁵

Although the MNLA and Ansar Dine initially cooperated for the proclamation of their *de facto* Islamic Republic of Azawad (May 2012), by late June violence had erupted between these former allies. Fighters aligned with MOJWA and Ansar Dine clashed with MNLA forces in Gao, the provisional capital of the Azawad state. In the process, Ansar Dine and MOJWA successfully seized control of the capital, 40 MNLA combatants were taken prisoner, and Bilal ag Acherif was reportedly evacuated to Burkina Faso to receive medical treatment for wounds sustained during the fighting.²⁶

The Battle of Gao clearly left the MNLA reeling from defeat as an organisation. But fulfilling a disarmament mandate in northern Mali would present an ECOWAS stabilisation force with some difficult questions. Who should be compelled to disarm first? Mounting pressure against MOJWA and Ansar Dine first might leave the leadership of these groups suspecting that ECOWAS and its member states intend to install Bilal ag Acherif as an intermediary between the Tuareg communities of the north and Bamako. Conversely, pursuing the disarmament of the MNLA first would only strengthen the bargaining position of MOJWA and Ansar Dine against Bamako. Avoiding the issue of disarmament altogether will not go over lightly with the broader international community either. It has been reported that considerable numbers of

man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS) were left unsecured in the aftermath of NATO's intervention into Libya, and it is further suspected that some of these MANPADS have already made their way south to Tuareg groups in Niger and Mali as well as Boko Haram, a militant Islamist organisation operating in northern areas of Nigeria.²⁷ In exchange for financial and logistical support for the mission, US and EU leaders will, no doubt, expect ECOWAS forces to obtain what information they can on the whereabouts of any MANPADS in Mali.

As a result of the combined factors mentioned here, a mission in Mali has considerable likelihood of becoming a quagmire for ECOWAS. Mustering sufficient numbers of troops to respond to the crisis will be a significant obstacle in itself, made even more so because of the deepening instability in Guinea-Bissau. Even if regional antagonisms can be overcome and ECOWAS member states are willing to entrust Nigeria with the responsibility of deploying the bulk of troops for the mission, the restriction of the mission in mandate and location, the tensions between Hausa and Tuareg, and the fractionalisation of the northern militants present some daunting prospects for such a deployment. Significant risk remains that the arrival of ECOWAS forces in northern Mali will only intensify the violence while also deepening distrust in Bamako among the Tuareg people.

The EU Alternative

Having briefly examined the numerous challenges an ECOWAS stabilisation force would experience in Mali, it is worthwhile considering what steps the EU could take instead of continuing to exhort this African sub-regional organisation to intervene. Many authors have indicated that the EU has emerged as a civilian power, possessing tremendous capacity to influence outcomes on the international stage through non-military means.²⁸ Certainly, one means by which this civilian power can be utilised in the Malian context would be to provide non-military support to an ECOWAS mission, including financial backing and strategic airlift. Both NATO and the European Union provided just this form of assistance in the deployment of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), which was intended to facilitate an end to hostilities in the volatile region of Darfur.²⁹ But the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy has one particularly promising diplomatic tool that could contribute much more

meaningfully toward the peaceful resolution of hostilities in Mali: the appointment of an EU Special Representative for the Sahel Region.

In fact, the appointment of the first EU Special Representative, then known as a Special Envoy, was brought about by an emerging African conflict. As territorial disputes between some countries in the African Great Lakes region threatened to result in open warfare, the EU established the office of Special Envoy for the African Great Lakes Region during the late 1990s. The mandate of this Special Envoy was 'to support conflict resolution efforts there and report on developments [...] The Special Envoy assists national, regional, and international initiatives to find a lasting solution to the economic, humanitarian, and political problems facing the region.'³⁰ At the time, this was an unprecedented step by the EU member states to pool their efforts and resources in order to better influence events in Central Africa. The Special Envoy was left with a particularly general mandate, as detailed above. But, 'given the inexperience of member states with such an instrument, the EUSR's working mandate was deliberately left broad, if not vague.'³¹ This offered considerable flexibility in pursuing a diplomatic solution.

Since the appointment of that first EUSR, the High Representative now has the support of ten EUSR's in total, whose areas of responsibility range from Afghanistan to the Middle East peace process to Kosovo. But there is not, as yet, a EUSR responsible for Mali, the Sahel region, or any other state within the Sahel region. This presents a missed opportunity as the resources and expertise of a EUSR could greatly benefit efforts to mediate between not only Bamako and the Tuareg groups of northern Mali but also between Tuareg communities themselves. Roundtable talks that bring together Malian civilian and military authorities with parties from the de facto Islamic Republic of Azawad would be an important step toward facilitating the disarmament of groups like the MNLA and the normalisation of relations within Mali. Assistance for Mali in the area of civil-military relations could also be broached through such EUSR-led talks.

This sort of breakthrough could only be achieved through the appointment of a EUSR for the Sahel Region. This is because a EUSR must maintain a permanent presence in the region, allowing for sustained interaction with relevant stakeholders.³² This sustained interaction itself is integral to confidence-building efforts, increasing trust among the myriad actors in both the EU and the broader peace process. The deployment of some other measure, such as a delegation from the Eu-

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ropean Parliament would be far too impermanent a measure, lacking the sustained interaction facilitated by a EUSR. At the same time, the provision of a small group of experts under the auspices of the EEAS, without the leadership of a EUSR, would lack the prestige necessary to demonstrate to the relevant actors in the region that the EU seeks a serious role as a mediator in the conflicts of the Sahel region.

Of course, the appointment of an effective and successful Special Representative would also require coordination between the Council of the EU and the European Commission. Relations between the EU and African actors have demonstrably improved when the executive bodies of the EU have shown a willingness to present a clear and united front in relations with such external parties. An example of this coordination in practice can be found in the 2007-2011 appointment of one EUSR to liaise between the EU and the African Union.

In December 2007, the EU appointed the experienced Belgian diplomat, Koen Vervaeke, as both the EU Special Representative (EUSR) to the African Union as well as the Head of Mission of the European Commission Delegation to the AU, thus combining the representation of the Council and Commission in one person.³³

No longer presented with mixed messages from the EU, the AU was able to engage with the EU on a deeper level through the diplomatic offices of Koen Vervaeke. This is not to say, however, that the Commission and Council should be solely concerned with the crisis in Mali and thus appoint an EUSR to contend only with the crisis in Mali. Most of the currently appointed EUSR's are actually responsible for geopolitical regions, such as Central Asia or the Horn of Africa. Afghanistan, Sudan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo are the only exceptions to the rule at the time of this writing. Appointing a EUSR concerned exclusively with Mali would set a worrying precedent, whereby the High Representative could be pressured into appointing a new EUSR for any and every state in the world undergoing some period of instability.

Rather, a more prudent course of action would be to appoint a EUSR for the Sahel Region. This would also acknowledge the realities of the Sahel, where porous borders allow for conflicts to spread to neighbouring states, much as previous Tuareg rebellions have come to affect both Niger and Mali. Such a EUSR would essentially come to serve as a hub for mediation efforts within the region, coordinating with actors in both Mali and Niger while also liaising with stakeholders in nearby

Algeria, Burkina Faso, and Mauritania as necessary. Like the first EU Special Envoy to the African Great Lakes Region years ago, the EUSR to the Sahel Region would require a broad and vague mandate from the Council and possibly the Commission in order to address the complex dynamics of the conflict and the potential for the violence to spill-over into those neighbouring states mentioned.

As indicated, the EUSR would not be operating alone and in a diplomatic vacuum; having to actively seek out partners for negotiations. Mahmoud Dicko, a popular Malian imam and head of Mali's High Islamic Council, has been actively attempting to position himself as a mediator between Bamako and the Tuareg/Islamist groups in the north.³⁴ This could be designed to position himself as a power broker within Malian society, increasing his popularity both within the southern and northern regions of the country and establishing himself as an alternative to the political forces behind the Government of National Unity. But Dicko is only one potential partner for an EUSR seeking to bring all the myriad factions of the Malian conflict to the negotiating table.

For example, the AU, ECOWAS, or both, could make a valuable contribution to diplomatic efforts in Mali by appointing a mediator of their own. Former President of the African Union Commission, Alpha Oumar Konaré, is well-positioned to serve such a role. Also being the former President of Mali who successfully negotiated with Tuareg rebel groups in the 1990s, the prestige of Konaré's most recently held offices in ECOWAS and the AU would allow him to carry further weight both at home and abroad as a mediator. In the context of African politics, Konaré occupies a position not unlike that of José Manuel Barroso or Romano Prodi in the EU. Appointing such a personage to mediate within Mali would be a powerful demonstration of the AU's commitment to the peaceful resolution to hostilities.

Whatever allies the EUSR might identify in Mali and the wider region, the practical aims of these diplomatic efforts ought to be two-fold. On the one hand, it is apparent that Mali requires EU technical assistance in the areas of civil-military relations and developing the constitutional structure of the Malian state. This assistance appears to go above and beyond what is set out in the EU's Sahel Strategy. The EEAS may lack the capacities and competencies to effect the kind of transition needed in Mali, though this affords some opportunity for it to develop ties with other actors that possess the relevant special-

isations, such as the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), an organ of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) concerned with such diverse issues as election observation and combating intolerance.

After all, one of the recurring complaints from Tuareg leaders has been that, whenever Bamako has agreed to afford greater autonomy to Tuareg communities, greater responsibility has been delegated to local authorities without an attendant delegation of budgetary power and, 'the current policy of decentralisation has become largely a matter of deconcentration of state power.'³⁵ The OSCE/ODIHR might well have developed a series of best practices regarding such core-periphery tensions from its institutional experiences in resolving emerging conflicts in the Balkans, the Caucasus, and Central Asia, which could be adapted for application in the Sahel region. Doubtless other potential partners could be found to assist the EEAS in Mali and elsewhere, allowing this conflict to serve as a test for the projection of the so-called "European security toolbox" to other regions of the world.

In addition to facilitating appropriate technical assistance, the EUSR will need to work closely with potential allies like Dicko and Konaré to convince Tuareg groups like the MNLA, Ansar Dine, and even MOJWA to voluntarily disarm. This may seem a staggeringly difficult task to achieve under the current conditions in Mali. Yet, as was referred to previously, Konaré was able to attain such a seemingly insurmountable goal in 1996. His mediation efforts alone were not the only element which precipitated a disarmament agreement with the Tuareg groups. A socioeconomic reintegration program facilitated by the UN Development Programme (UNDP) assisted in training and absorbing more than 10,000 ex-combatants into the civilian population. But Konaré's negotiations culminated in some powerful gestures that could be understood as constituting a subtle confidence and security-building mechanism. Chief among these was 'the dramatic "*La Flamme de la Paix*" (Flame of Peace) of 27 March 1996, at which 3000 weapons collected from the former rebels were burned in Timbuktu at a ceremony attended by President Konaré and other West African and international officials.'³⁶ With the appropriate application of the EU's civilian power through the work of a EUSR for the Sahel Region, the Malian people could soon gather around the hearth of a *Nouvelle Flamme de la Paix* (New Flame of Peace).

Such a course of action would require a commitment from the Council of the EU to a long-term peacebuilding process in Mali and its neighbouring states. But such a commitment would be ultimately more likely to render a positive outcome than a haphazard military intervention into northern Mali. ECOWAS remains an invaluable tool for conflict resolution in West Africa. ECOBRIG, ECOWAS' rapid reaction force, is currently the only operational brigade within the AU's envisioned African Standby Force.³⁷ ECOWAS has also established a number of other structures for early detection, conflict prevention, and conflict resolution, including the ECOWAS Council of the Wise.³⁸ But the unique circumstances surrounding the Malian conflict requires a more nuanced and considered reaction from the international community than a knee-jerk military response. Appointing Konaré or a similarly prestigious and influential figure as an ECOWAS Special Mediator would be far more appropriate and far more effective, much as the appointment of an EUSR for the Sahel Region to serve as both backup to the ECOWAS Special Mediator and as a regional networker would be the best use of the EU's capacities in resolving this conflict.

Conclusion

With al-Qaeda displaced from its previous headquarters in Afghanistan, and presented with the risk that this terrorist organisation could find a new home base in the Sahel from which to operate, the Council of the EU most clearly wished to adopt a strong position on the instability in Mali by inviting ECOWAS to intervene militarily. As demonstrated here, however, the deployment of an ECOWAS stabilisation force is not a viable means for addressing the factors that have contributed toward conflict in Mali. In addition to the logistical challenges that have undermined the effectiveness of some ECOWAS missions elsewhere in West Africa, the troops of the ECOWAS stabilisation force would become entangled in the complex web of ethnic, religious, and clan identities of northern Mali as they attempt to compel the disarmament of the MNLA, MOJWA, Ansar Dine, and other organisations. ECOWAS must also contend with emerging instability in Guinea-Bissau, creating potential competition for the organisation's already limited resources. Ultimately, preserving the territorial integrity of Mali requires more than a military intervention limited to the northern re-

gions of the country. Attaining this goal also requires more than the current terms of the EU's Sahel Strategy.

Should the Council of the EU have the opportunity to revisit the issue before ECOWAS forces are deployed to the region, the member states must adopt measures that will utilise the EU's considerable civilian power to guarantee a kind of "deep" conflict resolution in the region. It is only through the complementary diplomatic efforts of an EUSR for the Sahel Region and an ECOWAS Special Mediator, building on the lessons learned from the successful negotiations in 1996, that Tuareg groups can be convinced to disarm. Even more importantly, assisting the Malian state in cementing its constitutional structures and establishing a relationship between civilian and military authorities that meets the highest democratic standards will ensure a lasting peace, rather than a brief respite before yet another Tuareg rebellion in the north. The permanent presence and sustained interaction of the EUSR in the region will also allow for the EU's Sahel Strategy to be updated so as to better reflect the current conditions in Mali and Niger. Convincing Tuareg communities to abandon their now half-realised independent state, the de facto Islamic Republic of Azawad, will be a long and arduous process. But the first steps toward ensuring the integrity of the Malian state must not be made in jackboots, but through an inclusive diplomatic initiative. If the Council of the EU maintains its current position on the crisis, it will be a missed opportunity for a relatively peaceful resolution to the conflict in Mali and a blow to the EU's accumulated soft power in Africa and elsewhere.

**Beginning of
the Article**

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Alternative Futures for the European Union–Turkey Accession Negotiations

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This work proposes a simple two-period interaction model to study EU-Turkey accession negotiations. Turkey perceives the EU as composed of two distinct groups with respect to its accession: traditional supporters and objectors. Supporters opt for either cooperation or defection in period one while objectors consistently oppose Turkish accession. Turkey reacts to cooperation and defection in the second period under its perceptions of EU support. Future uncertainties concerning Turkey's accession do not prevent supporters' cooperation provided that Turkey becomes successful in economics, political reforms, and foreign policy. Turkey continues to negotiate not because it appreciates supporters' cooperation but because no supporter defects. Supporters become concerned about the future interacting with a failing Turkey. Unlike impatient supporters that are less concerned about the future, patient supporters oppose a failing Turkey's accession. Turkey then extremely appreciates supporters' cooperation but quits accession process that becomes highly costly.

Keywords: Supporters, objectors, cooperation, defection, threshold, future discount factor

Introduction

Turkey is the largest Muslim state to have applied for European Union (EU) membership. Geographically located at an intersection between the Middle East and Europe, it constitutes a unique case in the possible enlargement of the EU. However, after almost five decades of bargaining and negotiations, Turkey suspects that the EU members do not genuinely seek its accession.¹ It perceives the EU as divided over its membership by receiving support from some EU members and observing Franco-German proposals of privileged partnership (PP) instead of membership.²

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A better understanding of Turkish accession to the EU helps us think about how intermingling cultural-religious differences affect international interactions. A rejected Turkey could cease taking steps toward adjustment with European norms and democratisation; a move that could socially and politically destabilise the periphery of the EU. Rejection could even support the “clash of civilizations” thesis and demonstrate that political-economic blocs can emerge in terms of religious and cultural fault lines.³ In that respect, the fate of Turkish accession constitutes an outstanding example for world politics.

That said, two recent developments must be taken into account. First, Turkish foreign policy recently shifted and has become more independent in terms of diverting priorities away from Turkey’s traditional Western orientation and connections. Second, Turkey has economically propelled and is now situated among the largest economies in the world; a point made more prominent as financial difficulties continue to threaten Europe’s common currency and pose formidable problems for some members such as Greece. These developments certainly affect EU members’ incentives in supporting Turkey.

This work argues that, in an interactive context, Turkish success in three domains, namely: economics, democratic reforms, and foreign policy, play a major role in the level of support Turkey receives from the EU. I argue that Turkish successes prevent the impact of future concerns on cooperative policies of traditional supporters of Turkey. However, a successful Turkey becomes bolder in negotiations unlike a failed one. Turkish failures trigger EU concerns about the future of Turkey’s accession process and defections in turn. Turkish tendency to quit negotiations then increases. Thus, the blend of European and Turkish incentives to cooperate and defect paints complex interactions under Turkish successes and failures.

The next section describes European and Turkish perceptions. The second outlines assumptions on preferences and interactions. The third briefly discusses how Turkish successes and failures in economics, domestic reforms, and foreign policy affect EU members' preferences for cooperation and defection. The fourth offers three alternative interaction paths for the future. The last section concludes this work while the appendix contains two basic deductions with respect to EU and Turkish actions.

Mutual Perceptions

Turkey's culture, large, predominantly Muslim population, its history of interactions with European countries – going back centuries – and its geographic location generate EU perceptions of Turkey as a non-European country and produces hostile European beliefs and discourses with respect to Turkey's candidacy. The overwhelming majority of Europeans believe that Christian Europe must be protected from Muslim Turks and that Turkey represents an identity that largely differs from theirs.⁴ Therefore, there exist multiple cognitive and discursive factors working against Turkish accession.

The evidence of adverse European perceptions is abundant. The French rejected the draft EU constitution in a 2005 referendum because they feared the new constitution would make Turkish accession a likely prospect. French leaders like Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and Nicolas Sarkozy, German Prime Minister Angela Merkel, and Dutch Leader Geert Wilders argue that Turkey should never have a chance to become an EU member. In addition, EU governments cannot discard citizens' opinions easily.⁵ As a result, Turkish accession faces formidable public and political opposition.

Turkish leaders, in turn, believe that their country is segregated in terms of religious and cultural differences. Recent polls conducted in Turkey exposed Turks' beliefs of the European use of double standards with respect to their country's membership. Turkish citizens do not believe their country will become an EU member.⁶ The length of the accession process, the EU enlargement spanning the accessions of the Republic of Cyprus, Central and Eastern European applicants, and proposals of PP produce Turkish distrust and suspicion.⁷ Moreover, Turkish leaders and citizens suspect that the EU negotiates to create a neighbour sharing European norms but not to integrate it. The ration-

ale is that Turkey, having improved conditions in human rights, civil-military relations and minority rights, is preferable to Turkey having not accomplished reforms in these areas.⁸

Turkey began its interaction with the EU – the European Economic Community at that time – in 1959 with the aim to join the organisation. It became an associate member by the Ankara Treaty of 1963. Turkey, the only candidate country that signed a customs union agreement with the EU, still strives to become an EU member. The length of the process is staggering; it covers both Cold War and post-Cold War periods, and Turks' patience is wearing thin. The more the accession drags, the more Turks believe that the EU is politically hypocritical. Turkish enthusiasm for EU membership accordingly wanes.⁹

The recent EU enlargement strengthens Turkish perceptions of European double standards and non-existence of scales in measuring a candidate's performance to become a member. The acceptance of a new member is rooted not in the fulfilment of Copenhagen criteria but in EU members' power, that is, EU members' interests and ability to influence the accession process. Indeed, there exists no precise measure to quantify the ripeness of economic and political conditions prevailing in the candidate country. To illustrate, Greece became a member in 1981 while it was negatively evaluated in 1976. In contrast with Turkey, some former Communist Bloc countries became members less than two decades after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Hungary and Poland became EU members in 2004; Bulgaria and Romania waited just three more years for full accession. In short, the fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria is not a sufficient, but a necessary, condition for accession.¹⁰

Turkish misperceptions about the EU became deeper with the accession of the Republic of Cyprus in 2004.¹¹ The island has been divided since 1974 and constitutes one of the oldest unresolved international conflicts. When the UN formulated the Annan Plan to unify the island, unlike Turkish Cypriots, Greek Cypriots voted against it. Yet Greek Cypriots became EU citizens just a week later. There is a claim that the customs union agreement between Turkey and the EU was made possible by a promise from the EU to Greece about starting accession negotiations with Cyprus; otherwise Greece would have vetoed the agreement.¹² Hence, the admission of the Republic of Cyprus as an EU member exemplifies the Greek veto as an extortionate threat first formulated by Thomas C. Schelling.¹³

Presently, one of the most substantial obstacles to Turkish accession remains Turkey's non-recognition of the Republic of Cyprus, and, as a consequence, Turkey's denial of its ports to Cypriot trade.¹⁴ Cyprus is responsible for many frozen chapters in accession negotiations; only one out of 35 chapters is negotiated and closed.¹⁵ Greece and Cyprus both declared their support for Turkey in its EU membership quest. Yet they also stepped-up their own conditions for a successful process: Turkey's diplomatic recognition of the Cyprus Republic, Turkish acceptance of Greek Cypriot trade at its ports and the withdrawal of Turkish troops from Cyprus. Unfortunately, no Turkish government can fulfil these conditions unless significant Greek and Cypriot concessions and incentives are provided.

Franco-German proposals of PP exacerbate Turkish beliefs further. No other candidate – besides Turkey – faced the PP proposal formulated by German Christian democrats in 2002. The proposal was then supported not only by Austria, Germany, and France but also by the Czech Republic and Denmark.¹⁶ Interestingly, even the proponents of the proposal do not agree about its content.¹⁷ Turkey, as a “privileged partner” would have no rights to be part of EU decision-making processes; it would only have an observer status Turkey already occupies. Hence, the implications of the PP proposal are not clear enough.

Moreover, there is uncertainty about whether Turkey can join the EU in the foreseeable future. The Turkish accession process is open ended. Turkey might still not achieve its full membership goal even if it successfully conducts all reforms needed to fulfil the Copenhagen criteria.

Turkey did not abandon its desire to become an EU member. The Justice and Development Party (known under AKP, its Turkish acronym), in power since 2002, is of a moderately Islamic political tendency. One might expect that such a party would oppose Turkey's EU membership. However, the AKP continued to spend efforts for the accession, perhaps because an EU membership can strengthen religious actors through higher democratic norms and wider freedom.¹⁸ In fact, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan rejects PP status and affirms that Turkey continues to negotiate with the final goal of becoming an EU member. Turkey will not be encrusted in the Western world without an EU membership indeed.¹⁹ Thus, Turkish preference to finalise its European status has strong bases.

Interactions

Turkey perceives the EU as roughly composed of two groups with respect to its membership bid. Some EU members such as the UK, Sweden, Italy, and Spain encourage and cooperate with Turkey by issuing declarations of strong support while they recognise the existence of multiple obstacles. They indicate that Turkish membership is not a sure prospect; negotiations are open-ended and will take a long time. These countries are qualified as supporters and their behaviour as cooperation. Some EU members such as France and Germany firmly oppose Turkey's accession by openly declaring that Turkey has no place in Europe and that Turkey should instead accept a position of privileged partner. These countries are qualified as objectors and their behaviour as defection in turn.

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This work simplifies EU-Turkey accession negotiations as if it consists of two periods. In the first period, supporters and objectors move by choosing between defection and cooperation. Turkey moves in the second period under its perceptions of a divided EU. Turkey reacts to cooperation by continuing negotiations but withdraws given defection. How would supporters, objectors, and Turkey interact under these rules? An answer comes through the distinction between present and future payoffs.

Future payoffs represent lesser values compared to present ones, as an uncertain future weighs less than the present.²⁰ A discount factor represents future evaluations of payoffs. The factor ranges between zero and one and scales second-period payoffs down. If the factor is close to one, its multiplication produces a second-period payoff which is almost equal to the present one. As a consequence, the future becomes nearly as valuable as the present. If it is close to zero, second-period payoffs become smaller; future does not matter to a high extent. To summarise, lower discount factors that are close to zero mean that the future is relatively unimportant while higher factors that are close to one imply that the future is important and cast a shadow upon present interactions.

Germany and France do not act like supporters.²¹ They always defect in the first period. Turkey quits in the second period as a reaction to defection. Thus, objectors gain the present value of defection and the future value of Turkish exit from the process. If supporters cooperate in the first period, Turkey does not quit in the second period and continues to negotiate. Consequently, supporters obtain present and

future values of having Turkey in track for EU accession. If they defect, they gain the present value of defection and the future value of Turkish exit similar to objectors. Would supporters defect or cooperate? The answer depends on supporters' preferences and evaluations of the future.

Objectors' preferences are fixed: future evaluations do not transform them. As to supporters, they can be assessed as preferring cooperation the most. The assumption leads to the strategically trivial result of supporters' constant cooperation. Consequently, the EU consists of two groups such that one cooperates and the other defects. No strategic uncertainty can affect EU policy towards Turkey's accession: interactions remain the same all the time, as future evaluations do not transform cooperators' preferences similar to objectors. No room for change exists in EU-Turkey interactions.

As an alternative, supporters can be assessed as preferring cooperation over defection unlike objectors and, like objectors, seek Turkish exit. In fact, the previous section established that such Turkish perceptions are well grounded. Turkey perceives that the EU negotiates not to ease its accession but rather to prevent it and that no EU member genuinely prefers its accession as a full member. Accordingly, we assume that supporters and objectors all prefer a Turkish decision to quit from the negotiation process yet, unlike objectors, supporters prefer cooperation over defection.

Supporters cooperate provided that the sum of present and future values of having Turkey on track for EU membership exceeds the sum of present value of their defection and the future value of Turkish exit; they defect otherwise. The comparison of cooperation and defection payoffs reveals a critical threshold that explains supporters' choice. The threshold is a ratio of the difference between cooperation and defection values to the difference between the values of cooperation and the Turkish decision to quit the process. If the future discount value exceeds the threshold, supporters prefer to defect. They cooperate when the future discount parameter remains below it.²² Hence, supporters' preferences over actions toward Turkey are not immune from future evaluations like those of objectors. Supporters can cooperate or defect depending on how they evaluate future interactions. Additionally, they can evaluate the future differently, but all discount factors must remain below the threshold for them to encourage Turkey in its EU bid.

Supporters can also act like objectors. By assumption, the value of cooperation is higher than the value of defection for supporters. Thus, supporters suffer a net loss from defection in the first period when they defect. They recover from the costs and gain some benefit by obtaining the value of their most desired outcome provided that Turkey quits accession negotiations in the second period. If Turkey does not quit, defection in the first period becomes costly for supporters who would then have no incentive to behave like objectors. Therefore, supporters prefer to defect, if Turkey, as a reaction, certainly quits the process of accession.

Turkish decisions derive from a simple comparison similar to supporters' decision. If the sum of Turkish payoffs to EU cooperation and defection weighed by Turkish beliefs of receiving support or rejection constitutes a loss, Turkey stops negotiations. The comparison generates a threshold in the form of a ratio of Turkish payoff to EU rejection to the difference between Turkish payoff to EU rejection and EU support.²³ If the Turkish belief of receiving support remains below the threshold, Turkey quits from the accession process.

Empirical Assessments

The Copenhagen criteria emphasises economic and political successes – such as achieving a functioning market economy, the capacity to compete within the EU, increases in the standards of democracy, and human rights – for would-be members. Therefore, Turkey's successes and failures in meeting the criteria affect how supporters evaluate cooperation, defection, and the Turkish decision to abandon the process.²⁴ It can be safely assumed that objectors are indifferent to Turkish successes; Turkish failures can only strengthen their position towards Turkey. An analysis indeed claims that the accession of Muslim Turkey still remains controversial even if economic barriers are worked out.²⁵ Cultural differences, which are not included in the Copenhagen criteria, offset repercussions of Turkey's economic successes.

Turkey remains almost unaffected by the 2007 global crisis and its economic performance is impressive given the financial crises some EU members face. In fact, Turkey's economy is ranked 6th in the world in terms of the 2010 single-digit inflation rates compared to those EU countries.²⁶ Turkey is the 'rising power on the Bosphorus' and constitutes an economic power and a "trading state."²⁷ According to Turkish

Prime Minister Erdoğan, these facts rule out the possibility of a poor country aiming at an expected economic growth through EU membership.²⁸

A wealthier Turkey is certainly a more valuable candidate than an economically weak one. Supporters would then attribute higher values to cooperation. The Turkish elite also expects that the long-term Turkish assets form 'a hedge against EU rejection,' and make Turkey 'more attractive to Europe.'²⁹ Nevertheless, Turkey's economy is not immune from adverse developments. The Wall Street Journal indicates that Turkey's economic boom is not without structural weaknesses, as the value of Turkish lira continues to drop against the US dollar.³⁰ Therefore, Turkey's economic performance can vary affecting supporters' evaluations and their critical thresholds to cooperate.

Turkish successes and failures in domestic reforms that aim at improving minority group rights and eliminating military interference into domestic politics also affects supporters' preference for cooperation. Van Rompuy and Barroso, respectively presidents of the European Council and the European Commission, congratulated Erdoğan on the success of the AKP in the parliamentary elections of 12 June 2011. They declared that progress in political reforms 'should also give a new impetus to the accession negotiations with the EU.'³¹ The rationale is that there is a lesser value in raising objections against a country sharing EU political norms. Thus, more valuable become efforts for uninterrupted accession negotiations with a more democratic Turkey having improved human rights.

Constitutional amendments have been under way since 2001 and those following the 2010 Turkish referendum hint at Turkey's commitment for success along with the political criteria. Yet, there is no new Constitution. Moreover, Turkey's democratisation is difficult to achieve as long as the Kurdish question is not peacefully managed and civilian control over the military is not fully established.³² There are actually several court cases against alleged military-coup leaders including civilians, bureaucrats, and journalists. The cases are still open while the intensity of armed clashes between the Turkish Army and the PKK (acronym for Partiya Kerkarani Kurdistan) is currently on the rise. Elected parliament members of the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party boycotted the Turkish Grand Assembly for a long time by refusing to take their parliamentary oaths. Some of them are charged with having ties to the PKK and are detained for this reason. A

new constitution, prepared by the newly elected parliament, might be a solution to the Kurdish problem. It is unclear, however, how such a collective deal might be found. Political reforms to reach more refined norms constitute the greatest impediment to higher cooperation values and thresholds.

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A factor omitted in the Copenhagen criteria – which also impacts supporters’ cooperation value – is Turkey’s conduct of its new, more active, foreign policy that aims at ‘zero-conflict’ with its neighbours and the establishment of lucrative trade relations. According to Ahmet Davutoğlu, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs and the architect of the new TFP, Turkey constitutes a source of stability for many countries and enjoys ‘strategic depth.’³³ He believes that Turkey is differentiated from other Islamic states with its unique history and Turkish speaking minorities around the world. Turkey’s imperial history, geopolitical position, cultural affinities and ties can help foreign-policy makers in the Middle East and the Balkans to understand how interconnected are their countries with each other and with Turkey. Any Turkish foreign policy not tapping into the strategic depth constrains Turkey’s diplomatic power and leverage.

Some analysts qualify the new TFP as “soft Euro-Asianism” as accession to the EU no more occupies an utmost priority for Turkish decision makers who are busy in building commercial and political connections with China and Russia.³⁴ On the contrary, some analysts indicate that Turkish commitment to joining the EU is still strong. According to a political analyst, Turkey simply has alternative foreign options to increase its wealth and political influence at regional and global levels; the EU bid is just one of them. The new TFP remains in line with AKP political elite’s cultural background and exhibits a “trading state” behaviour evolving through commercial links.³⁵ We also claim that a powerful and prosperous Turkey would become an attractive EU candidate through management of energy routes from Central Asia to Europe, Russo-Turkish energy cooperation prospects, lucrative trade interactions at different scales, and resolution of old animosities and conflicts in the neighbourhood.

Nevertheless, there are some question marks about the new TFP that became more volatile and independent in terms of the country’s traditional-Western orientation. Some analysts believe that the drift in TFP constitutes a reaction to EU and American policies.³⁶ Consequently, there exists a tension between Turkish efforts for accession and the

new TFP orientation.³⁷ The accession of Turkey would lead to the EU entanglement in centuries-old rivalries ravaging the Middle East and the Caucasus.³⁸ The current deterioration of Turkey-Israel and Turkey-Syria relations can indeed revive such worries and demonstrate that the new TFP can spectacularly fail. However, provided that the new TFP succeeds, Turkey's accession would not necessarily entail the EU entrapment in such conflict epicentres. As a consequence, the new TFP can strengthen or undermine anti-Turkish geo-strategic assessments within the EU and affect supporters' incentives to cooperate.

Paths of Interactions

A complex system of incentives underlies EU-Turkey interactions. The value of cooperation increases for supporters as Turkey registers successes in economics, foreign policy, and domestic reforms. The consequence becomes higher cooperation thresholds for supporters. It then becomes more likely that supporters' future discounts remain below thresholds which are getting closer to the value of one. Therefore, supporters cooperate with a successful Turkey by becoming less concerned about the future.

Yet, Turkish successes have produced an inversed impact on the Turkish threshold to quit. A successful Turkey can be assumed to evaluate objectors' defections as representing lesser costs. The consequence becomes lower Turkish thresholds to quit negotiations. It then becomes more likely that the now reduced Turkish beliefs of receiving support remains below thresholds which are contracting even more. Therefore, the slightest Turkish belief of receiving considerably low support, and, therefore, Turkish suspicion that supporters' now act like objectors, can prompt Turkey to end its EU membership quest.

In contrast, Turkish failures generate lower values of cooperation for supporters. The threshold of supporters' cooperation then becomes smaller. If supporters' future discounts are high and close to the value of one, it is likely that they exceed smaller thresholds. As a consequence, supporters who are patient, so that the future matters for them, prefer defect and act like objectors. Otherwise, if supporters do not care much about the future and, therefore, their discount factors are small and close to zero, then they cooperate. Therefore, those supporters that are less concerned about the future cooperate with

those who care about the future and defect against a failing Turkey in accession negotiations.

For Turkey, the higher the rate of its failures, the higher are the costs of an EU rejection. A failing Turkey suffers more in the process and Turkey's threshold for ending negotiations rises. As a result, it becomes more likely that high Turkish belief of receiving support remains short of higher thresholds. Therefore, a failing Turkey can give up its EU membership bid even if its belief of receiving support is relatively strong. Three alternative paths below organise these dynamics and display the complexity of EU-Turkey interactions.

*EU-Turkey
Accession
Negotiations*

Full Success

As established, supporters continue to cooperate if their future discount rate remains below the critical threshold. In general, Turkish successes along the three dimensions lead to higher values of cooperation and lower values of Turkish unilateral exit and defection. The threshold then swiftly increases so that no discount rate can exceed it. Time preferences become obsolete for supporters.

Naturally, it is impossible to assess that each supporter has the same future preference as the others; some might be more patient, others less. If the threshold is high enough, it is more likely that each individual future discount rate remains below it, triggering cooperation. Consequently, supporters' time preferences would not matter for their cooperative conduct as long as the new TFP continues to augment Turkish power and reputation, domestic reforms are conducted at a steady rate, and Turkish economy continues to thrive. Supporters would always cooperate with a successful Turkey regardless its evaluations of future.

A fully successful Turkey remains in track not because it highly values supporters' cooperation but because it faces no objection. Turkey, registering successes in all three domains, does not have to perceive that the EU is the only way to harness wealth and power. It would end accession negotiations at the slightest perception of defection emanating from supporters. Yet no defection occurs in this case. Therefore, a fully successful Turkey does not need a high level of cooperation to continue accession negotiations. It can spend efforts to become an EU member under even smaller beliefs of receiving support.

Mixed Success

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If Turkey fails in some domain, supporters' payoff to cooperation decreases while Turkish unilateral exit and defection become more attractive for supporters. The weight of failures on the threshold can vary and affect each other. For example, failures in domestic reform can be evaluated as inconsiderable next to Turkish economic successes. An economic setback would hurt domestic reform efforts. Reversals in new TFP would drain economic performance and vice versa. As a result, the critical threshold would become lower at different rates affecting supporters' preference for cooperation. Supporters' time preferences start to matter given Turkish failures, because the discount rate must be lower than smaller thresholds for supporters to cooperate. Supporters' future payoffs then are weighted by discount factors close to zero. Thus, if supporters cooperate under some Turkish failures, say, in the domain of human rights reforms, this implies that the future concerns play a relatively lesser role in their preferences toward Turkey.

Supporters do not necessarily have the same evaluations of the future. Some can cooperate with a failing Turkey only if the present is more important than the future, that is, if they are impatient. Some patient supporters can in turn value the future and defect while Turkey registers mixed successes. One would intuitively expect that if the future matters, some EU countries would have a higher tendency to cooperate with Turkey. Unfortunately, this might not be the case. Turkish failures induce supporters to encourage Turkey only if supporters evaluate future gains of the accession process are not as valuable as the present ones. The future then casts a shadow over present EU-Turkey interactions.

An economic or a foreign policy success can induce Turkish leaders to become bolder during the accession process even if they fail in achieving higher standards of democracy and human rights. The reason is simple; leaders can assess EU defective moves as less costly compared to periods with no Turkish accomplishments in economics or foreign policy. A successful Turkey would evaluate EU cooperation as representing lesser values and become highly sensitive to a supporter's defection. Therefore, as EU cooperation loses value in the eyes of Turkish leaders, stopping negotiations can become a compelling option.

According to Turkish leaders, Turkey having a stronger economy or an increased influence and power through its new foreign policy might not need an EU membership. Political reforms, for example, are not

necessarily conducted to meet EU criteria; they are tools to improve Turkish standards of living. It is also possible that Turks simply will not desire their country to become an EU member in the future. National priorities can change. Perhaps EU membership is no more the principal Turkish national interest.³⁹ Recent speeches emanating from the highest-rank Turkish leaders indicate that a reversal in Turkish preference might actually occur in the long run. Hence, a defection by a traditional supporter could prompt a partially successful Turkey to stop negotiations as Turkish perceptions of receiving support falls below the threshold.

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To sum up, if Turkey is economically successful facing setbacks in foreign-policy or internal reforms, the accession process can become more conflictive than before. It is possible that some supporters defect and Turkey evaluates EU support as representing a lesser weight. The path of interactions can then reflect mixed actions and reactions both from the EU and Turkey demonstrating how cultural and religious differences divide states.

Full Failure

If Turkey fails in all three domains, the threshold for supporters' cooperation decreases further. All discount rates can exceed it triggering full EU opposition against Turkey. Turkish beliefs then determine Turkish decision to quit accession negotiations. To illustrate this, imagine that the EU decides to suspend accession negotiations as Turkey does not open its ports to Greek Cypriot vessels. Turkey must quit as a reaction because supporters suffer a net loss from defection in the first period when they defect. Supporters recover from the cost and make some benefit if Turkey quits accession negotiations in the second period obtaining the value of their most desired outcome.

Turkey quits if the expectation of continuing negotiations constitutes a loss given an overall EU defection. Turkey indeed suffers from an EU defection to a high extent because the EU becomes the sole anchor given no success in any domain. The higher the costs Turkey suffers from the EU defection, the higher the threshold for Turkish perceptions of interacting with supporters. Thus, while cooperation becomes highly valuable for a failed Turkey, it quits believing that even its traditional supporters tend to oppose its accession. In other words, a totally failed Turkey quits the accession process because negotiations

becomes highly costly while it extremely appreciates supporters' cooperation. Hence, the third scenario demonstrates how a Muslim country can be a member of NATO but not of the EU.

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Conclusions

This work obtained insights about EU-Turkey membership negotiations through a fairly simple analysis. The analysis developed does not aim at an empirical application, an overly complicated objective. The deductions made here do not explain what exactly happens or how the future will look like. They generate conceptual clarifications and insights by letting us think about different scenarios. Despite its simplicity, the analysis reveals how Turkish beliefs and EU time preferences change in function of Turkish successes and failures. In gist, Turkey would reciprocate cooperative moves as long as there is a division within the EU regarding Turkey's accession. As to future concerns of Turkey's traditional supporters, they outline possible paths depending on how Turkey fares.

The present analysis can be extended to cover additional periods, actions, and EU groups towards Turkish membership to allow for more complexity. Nevertheless, it sheds some light on the present and the future EU-Turkey negotiations. Any analysis of EU-Turkey interactions must be dynamic, as actors must look forward about successive periods and they can hurt each other in the future affecting their choices today. If Turkey is successful, the accession process will linger on for more years to come. This might be interpreted as a failure by some and as a success by others who oppose the adhesion of a Muslim country in the EU.

Appendix

Supporters' threshold for cooperation and defection

Let A_1 denote the value of Turkish unilateral end of negotiations, A_2 the value of cooperation with Turkey, and A_3 the value of defection, that is, the opposition against full Turkish membership, for supporters. Supporters' preference ordering is assumed to be $A_1 > A_2 > A_3 > 0$. Supporters' cooperation payoff becomes $A_2 + \delta A_2$ as it obtains A_2 in both periods, but the second-period payoff is discounted. If support-

ers defect, they obtain A_3 in the first period. Turkey then suffers B_2 in the first period, updates its beliefs, and presumes it is dealing with objectors. As a result, Turkey stops negotiations in the second period. Turkish exit move generates a payoff of A_1 for supporters. Thus, the supporters receive a payoff of $A_3 + \delta A_1$ from defection. They cooperate only if cooperation yields a higher payoff than defection, that is, if $A_3 + \delta A_1 < A_2 + \delta A_2$. Rearranging, we obtain $\delta A_1 - \delta A_2 < A_2 - A_3$. Hence, we have $\delta(A_1 - A_2) < A_2 - A_3$. Dividing both sides of the inequality by $A_1 - A_2$, the future discount factor condition for supporters to cooperate with Turkey becomes:

$$\delta < \frac{A_2 - A_3}{A_1 - A_2}$$

Turkish threshold for continuing negotiations

Turkey walks away only if ending negotiations generates a payoff greater than or equal to the uncertain prospect negotiating with supporters or objectors. Turkey must decide to stay in or to exit the negotiation process without knowing whether it interacts with supporters or objectors. Turkish expectation of continuing negotiations is $pB_1 + (1 - p)B_2$ where p and $1 - p$ are Turkish beliefs of interacting with supporters and objectors; B_1 and B_2 are Turkish payoffs to EU cooperation and defection, respectively. We assume that $B_1 > 0 > B_2$. If the expectation constitutes a loss, that is, $0 > pB_1 + (1 - p)B_2$, Turkey stops to avoid any more losses. The inequality implies that:

$$p < \frac{B_2}{B_2 - B_1}$$

The threshold $\frac{B_2}{B_2 - B_1}$ is positive, as both the nominator and the denominator of threshold are negative and smaller than one under the assumption of $B_1 > 0 > B_2$.

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The Significance of Cyberspace in Canadian Security Policy

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The phenomenon of cyber-terrorism, cyber-espionage, or even the first examples of using cyberspace to conduct military operations has convinced decision-makers that new solutions to security challenges need to be implemented. Cyber-attacks in Estonia and Georgia, multiple incidents in the United States and the Stuxnet worm attack proved that computer networks have become a theatre of rivalry, not only between states but also between non-state actors (such as terrorist groups or criminal organisations). Therefore, there is a rising need to investigate how different governments react to cyber threats. This article deploys the example of Canadian approaches to securing cyberspace in terms of its policy direction and the international solutions that may be discerned.

Keywords: Cyber-security, Stuxnet, security policy, Canada, cyber-terrorism

Introduction

Traditional definitions of national and international security in the post-Cold War era are increasingly becoming outdated. The mainstream definitions of security adopted by Renouvin, Duroselle, Wright and Osgood, and many others, were based on the concepts of national interest, survival and the absence of fear. Such traditional approaches to security problems after the Cold War are obsolete. Zięba claimed that after 1989, a definition of security should include not only the

military and political dimensions, but also economic, social, cultural, ideological or even ecological. However, none of the canonical definitions included the rising importance of computer networks. On the verge of the 21st century, even such a broad approach to security was insufficient. The rapid development of information and communications technology (ICT) surprised states and they lost control over this process. In 1995 there were only about 15 million internet users. Five years later, there were 361 million, and 10 years later about 2 billion.¹ This process was accompanied by rising malicious activity on the internet. It led to new kinds of challenges for the security of states; neither regulated by national nor international laws.² Cyber-threats were unrecognised by most states until the first decade of the 21st century. The phenomenon of cyber terrorism, cyber espionage, or even the first examples of using cyberspace to conduct military operations finally convinced decision-makers that new solutions needed to be implemented. Cyber-attacks in Estonia and Georgia, multiple incidents in the us or the *Stuxnet* worm attack proved that computer networks have become a theatre of rivalry, not only between states but also between non-state actors. Therefore, there is a rising need to investigate how different governments react to cyber threats.

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This article presents the significance of cyberspace in Canadian security policy. There are several reasons why Canada's case is interesting. First, Ottawa is strongly involved in global security efforts, especially through military operations like in Afghanistan. This increases threats to Canada via acts of terrorism, including cyber-terrorism. Canada is also a neighbour and a key strategic and economic partner of the us; a popular target of cyber-attacks. Multidimensional cooperation between Canada and the us may encourage governments and non-state actors to use cyberspace against Canada. Its high-tech industry, advanced military technologies and well-developed economy also make Canada a convenient target of cyber-terrorism or cyber-espionage. Furthermore, thanks to outdated juridical practices, it is one of the most popular places to undertake cyber-criminal activity.³ Finally, despite such challenges, Canada was relatively late to adopt its first official cyber-security strategy. This document was presented in October 2010 when most European and Asian countries had their long-term plans already well-established and implemented. These issues beg several questions:

1. What are the main challenges to Canadian cyber-security?
2. What measures are deployed by Ottawa to counter cyber-threats?
3. What shortcomings have retarded Canada's cyber-security strategy?
4. What is the overall significance of cyberspace in Canada's security policy?

Cyberspace as a Challenge to National Security

To answer such questions, it is necessary to understand which challenges to national security stem from cyberspace in more general terms and define its very meaning. The first recorded use of the term cyberspace was by science-fiction writer William Gibson who understood this concept as a 'consensual hallucination,' which was the matrix. In his book *Neuromancer*, he used the word cyberspace to depict the world of digital networks, being a theatre of war, not between states but between corporations.⁴ In the 1990s, other definitions were generated; for instance, Hildreth characterised cyberspace as 'the total interconnectedness of human beings through computers and telecommunication without regard to physical geography.'⁵ However, it should be noted that the "cyber" prefix is derived from the word cybernetics and has a general meaning of 'through the use of computers.'⁶

Even though the term had not yet entered the parlance of security, the first cyber-threats occurred in the 1960s and 1970s. However, these were no more than simple acts of cyber-crime such as basic data theft. The first time cyberspace was used for national security purposes, was likely undertaken by the US Central Intelligence Agency in 1982. The CIA installed a so called "logic bomb" in the Canadian industrial programme which was stolen by Soviet spies and used to control pipeline systems in Siberia. The "logic bomb" caused an overload resulting in a huge explosion.⁷ It was not the only example of cyberspace activity in the 1980s. A couple of years later, NATO used the programme *PROMIS* to hack servers located behind the Iron Curtain. These acts demonstrated the potential there was in computer networks.⁸

Initially cyber threats were connected mostly with the activity of home-grown hobbyists, so-called "script kiddies," creating the first world-wide malware attacks and committing rather simple hacking attempts. They were behind the rise of wide-spread viruses such as *Boza*, *Michelangelo*, *Melissa*, and *I love you*.⁹ Over time, this phenome-

non evolved as individual hackers organised into groups. Among others, they were responsible for the first serious acts of cyber-terrorism in South-East Asia, where groups of hackers threatened to attack the Indonesian banking systems as a reaction to the crisis in Eastern Timor.¹⁰

The breakthrough however came in the 1990s and Richard A. Clarke noted that 'as Internet usage grew, so did intelligence agencies' interest in it.¹¹ The American, Chinese, and Russian governments were the first to pioneer the true potential of cyberspace. In March 1998, Russian hackers initiated operation *Moonlight Blaze* against American military, business and scientific networks. For the next two years, they hacked multiple servers belonging to universities, research institutes, corporations, as well as the Pentagon, the Department of Energy, and NASA. As US officials admitted, the Russians managed to obtain information about American missile targeting systems. It was the first massive, well-planned attack against the US in cyberspace. This experience helped convince US decision-makers about the rising significance of the Internet regarding national security. In 2003 Chinese hackers, under the operation *Titan Rain*, conducted another well-coordinated attack against American military and scientific servers, obtaining information concerning the *Joint Strike Fighter* programme.¹² At the same time, Russian and Chinese programmers began targeting West European servers; they were seeking new technologies, business, military, political, and private information.¹³

In 2006-2007 another milestone was reached. First, in 2006 Israel conducted operation *Orchard* against an alleged Syrian nuclear facility. The mission successfully undermined Damascus' attempt to become a nuclear power as Israeli fighter jets operated over hostile airspace thanks to the computer virus *Suter*, which infected Syrian anti-aircraft defence systems and prevented Israeli aircraft from appearing on Syrian radars. This was the first time that cyberspace was used to conduct a tactical military operation and demonstrated that computer networks could open completely new possibilities for both defensive and offensive military efforts.¹⁴

Second, in April 2007, a political crisis erupted between Russia and Estonia, caused by Tallinn's plans to remove the *Bronze Soldier* statue, which commemorated the liberation of Estonia by the Soviet army. The Russians reacted with a diplomatic protest and a massive cyber-attack.¹⁵ Multiple websites and servers belonging to the government and private companies were blocked and overwhelmed. Hackers attacked

the websites of the President of Estonia, government, ministries, political parties, and media consortiums. Furthermore, Estonian e-banking services were attacked and produced a serious blow to the national financial system. Even telecommunication networks suffered multiple incidents and malfunctioned. The Russians used a relatively simple method of attack called Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS), thanks to the huge botnet they disposed. The incidents in Estonia were regarded as the first cyber war, since computer networks were used to paralyse the critical infrastructure of a nation-state. Similar methods were used by the Russians one year later during the conflict in Georgia, when cyberspace became the fifth domain of war. On 07 August 2008, when war broke out, Russia reacted with armed force and the Internet. Using the same methods as in Estonia, Russian programmers successfully paralysed key elements of the Georgian critical ICT infrastructure. The main Internet and telecommunication services were blocked, along with government and private companies' websites. Georgia was largely deprived of the ability to present its position to the international public.

Finally, the vast potential of cyberspace was demonstrated through Israel's alleged creation and deployment of the *Stuxnet* virus designed to paralyze Iran's nuclear weapons programme. As many IT scientists noted, *Stuxnet* was the most advanced malicious programme ever created and its complexity initially prevented experts from understanding even its basic functions. It targeted industrial systems in both the Bushehr and Natanz nuclear power plants, interrupted communications between systems, disrupted inputs and calculations and generally undermined both plants in terms of their technological framework. Gerwitz argued that *Stuxnet* opened a new era of cyber-warfare and suggested that this new type of cyber-weapon had a similar meaning for international security as the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.¹⁶

In some ways, *Stuxnet* has acted as a punctuation mark for a variety of tactics deployed in cyberspace which add to its international appeal. For instance, cyber-operations retain, low operating costs, transcend national political boundaries without having to expose operatives to risks and they increase the potential and scope of propaganda activities. At the same time, there is an absence of strategic intelligence and warning systems that may offset such attacks while difficulties with international cooperation to deal with such issues persist.¹⁷

At present, cyber-threats may be classified into three groups:

1. Cyber-terrorism: a politically motivated attack or threat of attack against computers, systems or networks to intimidate or force groups or governments to meet specific demands;
2. Cyber-espionage: to extract classified information from systems or networks;
3. Cyber-War-fighting: to use aspects of cyberspace to conduct military operations.¹⁸

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The conducting of any of these may be considered as an act of cyber-war. And others add to such an understanding: Clarke sees it as 'actions by a nation-state to penetrate another nation's computers or networks for the purposes of causing damage or disruption,¹⁹ while Yagil presented it as a military operation that causes damage or changes to information and communication systems of the enemy.²⁰ As early as 1995 Warden included cyberspace as the fifth domain of armed conflict (next to air, sea, land and outer space);²¹ a point confirmed by US Deputy Secretary of Defence General William J. Lynn, who said that 'as a doctrinal matter, the Pentagon has formally recognised cyberspace as a new domain in warfare.'²²

Of course, such a definition depends on how war is understood. This work accepts the logic of Gelven's approach which holds war to be 'an actual, widespread and deliberate armed conflict between political communities, motivated by a sharp disagreement over governance,'²³ though concludes that Gelven has little to offer in terms of understanding post-Cold war conflict. Cyber-warfare is extraterritorial, typically clandestine and often involves unidentifiable patterns and consequences. In short, understand cyber-war entails an entire rethink of war itself; its laws, conventions and implications.

Consider Ellis' depiction of the challenges to international law posed by such technological explosions. He suggested that the

prospects of new technological attacks may pose problems for international law because law is inherently conservative. Technological change may enable new activities that do not fit within existing legal categories, or may reveal contradictions among existing legal principles.²⁴

Indeed, cyberspace may pressure international law in three ways: Firstly, the damage caused by cyber-attacks is fundamentally different than the physical damage produced traditional warfare. The extraction or manipulation of computer data may result in intangible damage, such as disrupting government activities. Secondly, the features

of electronic signals, which may be projected around the world with impunity, crossing different geographical regions and allowing different entities to affect the network challenges the inherent laws of sovereignty; in cyberspace they are ill-defined and difficult to execute. Finally, it is difficult to distinguish between cyber-attacks against military and civilian targets and damage caused by cyber-attacks may also skirt human rights.²⁵

Cyber-warfare challenges the security policies of all industrial states and the lack of a clear international mechanism to coordinate responses has increased the need for independent actions to be undertaken in a spinoff of an arms race. In short, each state is forced to develop its own plan of action with or without its allies.

Canada's Security Environment

Canada has not been spared the trials associated to security in cyber-space. However, analysis of policy in this domain must be preceded by a short depiction of Canada's wider security environment. Canada's security is largely based on its NATO membership, geopolitical position and its terminally close relationship to the US. This latter additive predates NATO and is based on geographical proximity combined with integrated infrastructures (re: power grids), economic interdependence and similar perceptions of international problems.²⁶ Despite such advantages, Canada still feels acute security challenges; made all the more acute since the 11 September 2001 terrorist in the neighbouring US. In fact, Canada recognised five challenges produced by states or sub-state groups:

1. International terrorism is currently considered the most potent threat to Canada's national security. The 9/11 attacks, the bombings in Madrid, London, and Bali forced a major shift in Canadian security policy since al Qaeda recognises it as among its main enemies a point accentuated by Canada's role in the counter-terrorism coalition spearheaded by the US in the aftermath of 11 September.²⁷
2. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, to other states and terrorist organisations, is viewed by Canada as representing its second main challenge.
3. Failed or failing states, perceived as a factor for spreading insta-

bility and providing fertile recruitment grounds for terrorist and organised crime.

4. Foreign espionage serves the fourth area of concern.
5. Organised crime supporting the trafficking of people, narcotics and weapons.²⁸

To meet such challenges, Canada's National Security Policy (CNSP) listed three main goals: 1. protecting Canada and Canadians at home and abroad, 2. ensuring that Canada is not a source of threats for its allies and 3. contributing to international security. The third goal is especially interesting, as Canada is perceived as one of the most active nations when it comes to global security efforts. However, as Bland and Maloney note, the Canadian operational approach in the international environment is usually rather more reactive than adaptive.²⁹ To develop more complex and corresponding approaches to current challenges, the document listed multiple measures. Among others, it decided: to establish an Integrated Threat Assessment Centre, analysing all threat-related information,³⁰ to establish a National Security Advisory Council composed of security experts, to create a Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security,³¹ and to enhance Canada's security intelligence capacity and emergency planning programmes. It also promised increased Canadian participation in the activities enhancing the international security environment.³² For all these units, Canada remains vulnerable to breaches of its cyber-security.

The Canadian Cyber Security Policy

Libicki once noted that 'the denser the electronics the more that cyberspace pervades real space, the more dependent real life becomes on the correct functioning of cyberspace.'³³ Canada is, at the moment, one of the most wired states in the world and nearly all governmental and business services are Internet-based. As stated above, cyber security challenges are strongly related to the level of ICT development. On one hand, the widespread use of the Internet is beneficial, for regular citizens, business and the public sector. Alternatively, the wide use of the Internet causes a higher risk of serious cyber incidents, as the Estonian example revealed. In 2007, 87% of Canadian business and 74% of households used the Internet and online sales were estimated at \$62.7 billion (CDN). A year later, almost 60% of personal tax filings were elec-

tronic and in 2009, 67% of Canadians banked online. And, the federal government offers about 130 online services including business, family support, cultural, health, financial benefits, taxes, environmental, and career opportunities, showing just how important computer networks have become for Canada.

Despite the rising dependence on ICT's and the Internet, Canadian officials underestimated the importance of cyberspace and related issue were only seriously addressed in the 2004 CNSP which noted:

The August 2003 electrical blackout that affected Ontario and eight US states demonstrated how dependent we are on critical infrastructure and how vulnerable we are to accidents or deliberate attacks on our cyber and physical security. Cyber-attacks are a growing concern that have the potential to impact on a wide range of critical infrastructure that is connected through computer networks [...] Cyber-security is at the forefront of the trans-border challenges to Canada's critical infrastructure. The threat of cyber-attacks is real, and the consequences of such attacks can be severe.³⁴

According to Gagnon, Canadian perceptions of cyber-threats were similar to the us.³⁵ However, Canadian counter-measures were insufficient compared to Russian and the us. Ottawa simply did not allocate sufficient resources to catch-up to most other developed countries. Despite multiple, mostly scientific, voices to create a proper cyber-security strategy, such did not materialise for another six years—even after the Estonian and Georgian cyber-wars.

In April 2010, Bradbury asked

where is Canada's cyber security strategy? [...] Cyber-crime is becoming an increasingly pervasive problem that affects people across the globe. For example, losses from online crime more than doubled in the us last year, according to the latest figures from the Internet Crime Complaint Centre (IC3), which is operated by the FBI south of the border [...] As cyber-criminals continue to exploit vulnerable victims online, governments should surely be stepping in to do something about it, and yet Canada seems to be trailing significantly. The Canadian Government has long promised a cyber-security strategy to protect its citizens.³⁶

It did not take long for Bradbury to be vindicated; in January 2011 Chinese hackers gained access to the Finance and Treasury Board, the

Finance Department and the Defence Research and Development Canada networks, which forced the government to curtail the use of the Internet.³⁷ Then, in June the same year, a group called LulzCraft hacked the website of the Conservative Party of Canada, where they placed information concerning the hospitalisation of PM Stephen Harper, causing acute confusion.³⁸ This runs against the backdrop that Canada has suffered from a major boom in cyber-crime, in particular phishing. About 1.7 million Canadian citizens were victims of identity thefts in 2008, which caused a loss of about \$2 billion (CDN); 86% of Canadian companies were harmed by cyber-attacks in 2009.³⁹ According to Glenny, Canada is also the sixth most popular country among hackers to host servers running malicious programmes.⁴⁰ These threats were summarised by the Minister of Public Safety, Peter Van Loan, who noted at the beginning of 2010 that ‘we don’t have a day go by when there isn’t some effort by someone somewhere in the world to breach government systems.’⁴¹

Canada’s answer was the adoption of its Cyber Security Strategy (ccss) on 03 October 2010.

The ccss presented several basic definitions and information concerning Canadian cyber security of value to this work. For instance, Cyberspace was defined as

the electronic world created by the interconnected networks of information technology and the information on those networks. It is a global commons where more than 1.7 billion people are linked together to exchange ideas, services and friendship.⁴²

The Strategy also defined cyber-attacks, as

unintentional or unauthorised access, use, manipulation, interruption, or destruction (via electronic means) of electronic information and/or the electronic and physical infrastructure used to process, communicate and/or store that information.⁴³

The ccss also made a firm declaration that

Our success in cyberspace is one of our greatest national assets. Protecting this success means protecting our cyber systems against malicious misuse and other destructive attacks [...] Cyber security affects us all, in part because even attackers with only basic skills have the potential to cause real harm.’

The ccss also underscored the main challenges for Canadian cyber security. Legislators admitted that there are multiple ways to under-

take harmful activity on the Internet, like exploiting vulnerabilities in security systems or using malicious software such as trojans, viruses and backdoors. The Canadian Strategy formulated similar assessments of cyber threats like Rand Corporation in the mid-1990s.⁴⁴ According to this act, cyber-attacks are considered as inexpensive, easy to use, effective and low risk.

On this basis, the Strategy distinguished three main types of cyber-threats:

1. State sponsored espionage and military activities;
2. Cyber-terrorism to recruit and conduct basic cyber-attacks;
3. Cyber-crime in the areas of: identity theft, extortion and or money laundering. Some criminal groups are engaged in trade with credit/debit card numbers, logins, and passwords or even malicious software.

Such a threat perception is standard among most developed states. But such a simple classification of challenges is not enough. By comparison, the us Computer Emergency Readiness Team recognises a wider group of cyber-threats, from national governments' cyberwarfare programmes, cyber-espionage, cyber-terrorism, industrial spies, and organised crime groups, to hacktivists, bot-networks operators, phishers, spammers, and malware authors.⁴⁵ A narrow perception of the risks by the ccsc may be problematic. Canada's strategy is focused on the manifestations of malicious activity but omits its roots notably, the existence of bot-networks.⁴⁶

The ccsc also identified several counter-measures such as: securing government systems' – understood as defence of Canadian "cyber-sovereignty" – security, and economic interests; partnering to secure vital cyber-systems outside the federal government and assisting Canadian citizens to be secure online. The main goal included strengthening cyber-systems and critical infrastructure sectors, supporting economic growth, and protecting Canadians from cyber threats.

The Strategy also invited the private sector, NGO's and the academic community to cooperate with the government. It underlined the importance of citizens in the efforts to secure Canadian cyberspace: "The government can introduce and support important cyber security initiatives, but it cannot protect each of us from every threat we encounter when we go online. Canadians must be aware of these threats, and of the tools available to recognise and avoid them." Finally, the ccsc

clearly identifies the country's preferred allies in the struggle to secure cyber-space: the US, UK and Australia were listed as the closest security partners of Canada. Finally, the document stated that Ottawa will participate in the international cyber-security discussions at key organisations such as NATO, Council of Europe and the United Nations. Canada is the only non-European state that signed the Convention on Cybercrime.⁴⁷

The ccss is the first official document to address information challenges and may be assessed from two perspectives. Despite being a late addition, it delivered the long awaited mechanisms to face contemporary cyber-security challenges. It implemented a new division of responsibilities between core institutions tasked to secure computer networks. The ccss also introduced an innovative understanding of cyber-space, absent in most strategies of NATO members. Such a definition proved accurate, especially considering how, recently, social networks helped influence political changes in the Middle East. Furthermore, the idea of partnerships between public and private, federal, and provincial institutions is also a move in the right direction. Finally, the ccss introduced interesting ideas regarding how to secure critical infrastructure.

But, the ccss is incomplete and omitted a number of important issues. Cyber-security can be understood in many different ways, and that is why it is crucial to make all necessary clarifications in official documents. This is not the case with ccss, which used multiple terms without providing a clear definition concerning what each term meant which may cause some interpretation problems. And the Strategy consists of a very broad definition of cyberspace while skirting many social and political questions; activities of hacktivists, spammers, social networks, or those using the Internet for propaganda purposes are completely omitted despite its rising importance for the security of states. Then, the international dimension of Canadian cyber-security policy, remains haphazard. As Mehan stated, 'information globalism equals increased exposure,⁴⁸ and there is a great need for international cooperation to secure cyber space. The ccss promised dedication for international efforts, however it does not elaborate. What, for instance, should such global cooperation look like? Finally, the document lacked precision when it came to regular citizens and educational efforts. As stated above, increased citizens' awareness and proper training pro-

grams could themselves prevent many cyber threats e.g. the existence of bot-networks.⁴⁹ Canada's Cyber Security Strategy lacked specific ideas and how they may be realised.

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Conclusion: The Significance of Cyberspace in Canadian Security Policy

Despite the CCSS, Canada continues to face real problems in securing its cyber-domain. The first concerns insufficient government spending, which reveals the level of importance attached to cyberspace for Canadian authorities. Ottawa allocated roughly \$100 million (CDN) for cyber-security for a period of 5 years. At the same time, other leaders were spending billions of dollars per year, which is still insufficient to face-down contemporary threats. The huge difference here between Canada and most of the other developed countries causes a growing gap in cyber-potential, and this may become a very serious threat for national security in future. As Deibert noted, the Canadian cyber security strategy was adopted too late and its solutions are insufficient compared to the cyber policies of Canada's allies like the US. According to Deibert:

It devotes far too few resources to the problem, does not fully address the division of appropriate institutional responsibilities, and only barely nods at the importance of a foreign policy for cyberspace. A recent investigation revealed our public sector infrastructure was so thoroughly infiltrated with malicious activity emanating from foreign jurisdictions that the entire Treasury Board was taken offline for weeks. Embarrassingly, a recent security study ranked Canada among the highest of countries for the hosting of malicious content.⁵⁰

Second, despite the provisions of the Strategy, Ottawa is almost absent in international discussions concerning cyber-security challenges. Even during the most important international summits like the G8 and G20, Canada's role is limited. There is a lack of political willingness to belong. Even within NATO, which is constantly developing cyber-security solutions, Canada's voice is virtually non-existent. Even more troubling is Canadian IT technology, including social media monitoring tools, are being used by Middle Eastern or African countries to 'limit free speech, quash potential rebellions and stifle online freedoms.'⁵¹

Furthermore, during the age of the cyber arms race, when such

countries like the us, Russia, China, Iran, Syria, and Israel have focused on developing cyber potential, Canadian solutions remain mostly outdated. For example, authorities still have not decided whether to create an equivalent of the American military cyber command, which could trigger a major shift for the defence industry. At the same time, law enforcement agencies in Canada are overwhelmed by the surge in cyber-crime. Domestic juridical solutions do not keep pace with the development of cyber-threats.⁵²

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To counter these problems Canada should create

a comprehensive strategy to protect the cyber commons [...] [it] should begin by linking the international consequences of domestic policies [...] We need to give law enforcement new resources, capabilities, proper training and equipment to sort through voluminous flows of existing data. But alongside those resources, Canada should be setting the highest standard of judicial oversight and public accountability. New resources, yes, but the same if not more rigorous checks and constraints on powers [...] Part of Canada's cyberspace strategy needs to focus outward. Our Foreign Affairs department should be at the forefront of the promotion of decentralized and distributed security mechanisms, while actively resisting proposals that seek to alter the constitution of cyberspace through top-down, heavy-handed government controls (...) Diplomatically, we should work to build a broad community of like-minded states who share this common vision, and have an interest in a secure and open cyber commons across the many different venues of cyberspace governance. Such rules should include the promotion of norms of mutual restraint in cyberspace, protections for privacy and civil liberties, joint vigilance against cyber-crime networks, and respect for the free flow of information.⁵³

Canadian authorities have, for many years, danced around adopting a proper strategy to address pressing cyber-security challenges. In 2010 the ccsc was adopted but was insufficient. Compared to us and some European documents, the ccsc – despite some interesting solutions – omitted many essential issues such as: hacktivism, bot-networks, social networks, education and training, and international cooperation. In the 21st century, such a simple strategy is not enough to face contemporary challenges. Canada has devoted too few resources to secure

its cyberspace and neglected several important issues, such as training and educational programmes and functioning international cooperation, especially with the US and other allies. There is a serious need for Canada to implement a new, updated strategy, which would address all the omitted problems and contain the ideas on how cyberspace challenges should be managed by the government internally and externally for the upcoming years. The way cyberspace will be perceived by Canadian authorities will not only affect Canadian national security. It will also surely be one of the key factors influencing the future status and position of Canada on the international stage and the manner in which its allies choose to behave towards it. In many ways, states are the product of their times and if Canada cannot keep apace of the changes to security brought about over the past three decades, it risks increased security dependence from those that may not be able to afford providing security for a country that can scarcely secure itself.

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Improving the ENP and Establishing the Eastern Partnership Initiative

A Czech Perspective

ÖZGÜR ÜNAL ERIŞ

The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is among the most important external policies of the EU. Unfortunately, it has not substantially influenced EU member countries in the manner it was intended. This led to other regional EU initiatives that had similar aims but took more differentiated and country-specific approaches. The Eastern Partnership Initiative, which is one of these initiatives, will be discussed in detail in this article. Using empirical research conducted in Prague in September 2010, the Czech Republic's role in this initiative will be thoroughly explored.

Keywords: security community, executives, ENP, EPI, membership

Introduction

Since its foundation, the strategic purpose of the EU has been to increase security and stability among its members by promoting economic and social relations beyond military and strategic interdependence. These characteristics made it a *security community*, as termed by Deutsch in 1957. Deutsch defined *security community* as a group:

carrying features of reciprocity, trust, the discovery of new interests, possibility to settle disputes peacefully and even ac-

quiring collective identities through transactions such as trade, migration, tourism and cultural and educational exchanges.¹

The theory of security communities introduced by Deutsch and his colleagues in 1957 spawned several empirical studies over the subsequent decades. Specifically, Waever, de Wilde, and Buzan's elaboration on this theory in 1998 introduced the concept of "resecuritisation," which concerned potential threats to security communities and ways to face them. Waever identified disintegration and fragmentation as the greatest threats to the security of the EU. The resecuritisation process in Europe highlights the fact that while mature security communities do not expect war, they still experience *non-military* security dilemmas, such as economic, environmental, or ethnic conflicts, and they may eventually be fragmented by these events if they do not take action in time. Weaver sees the long-term solution to this potential fragmentation as "further integration;" specifically with countries in proximity because political and military threats travel more easily over shorter distances.

This is crucially relevant for this article since after the Cold War, most of the sources of insecurity for the EU were seen in the EU's neighbourhood: first in Eastern Europe, and later, after the completion of the Eastern enlargement, in the Balkans. As the EU started to realise that continuing instability in its neighbourhood could spill into Europe and threaten its security community, it started to assume a leading role in the stabilisation of its neighbourhood. The EU stabilised its neighbourhood by enlarging its security community by successive rounds of new member selection. However, some of the countries that have joined the EU in recent years have had poor economic and political statuses, which proved rather problematic for the EU. Faced with an unpopular process of enlargement but a lengthening queue of applications from governments in its neighbourhood who resented being excluded, the EU developed a network of agreements with these countries. The whole strategy was called the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).²

The ENP's main aim was to establish a kind of privileged relationship that would include 'the closest possible association below the threshold of membership.'³ This partnership would enable interested countries to be gradually integrated into the EU's internal market and regulatory structures, offering partners the possibility of participating in various EU programmes. Several issues were identified as "threats

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to mutual security,” and a joint response to these common challenges was called for.⁴

Studies of the ENP overwhelmingly show that there is a clear discrepancy between rule *adoption* and rule *application*. While the EU has been fairly successful in inducing ENP countries to adopt legislation in line with democratic governance provisions, these provisions have generally not been implemented.

There are certain deficiencies in the ENP that have led to this inefficacy. First, and likely the main reason is the lack of membership perspective. Second, as a consequence, member countries avoid aligning legislation with the *acquis*. The only possible reward, the prospect of access to the market to an unspecified extent at a future time, is overshadowed by the growing anti-liberalism and neo-protectionism in the EU, as reflected by the French and Dutch rejections of the Constitutional Treaty in 2005. This is coupled with the EU's unwillingness to commit and distribute massive financial resources throughout its neighbourhood, largely because of the financial burden of EU enlargement and the problems in the Eurozone. Third, despite that the rhetoric of the Commission Communication establishing the ENP is couched in terms of interdependence and partnership, in reality EU rules are dominant. The EU does not give any meaningful say to neighbours in setting the normative agenda; objectives and means are non-negotiable. Fourth, the EU is faced with the problem of building a neighbourhood stretched over a very large geographical area and encompassing a wide diversity of countries with different problems and priorities. Finally, the Action Plans of the ENP are also problematic, as the *acquis communautaire* of the EU may not be an appropriate framework for countries struggling with basic economic reforms.

These shortcomings of the ENP have led to the slow implementation of its policy objectives in partner countries. As detailed below, the EU came up with other incentives to improve the main tools of the ENP conditionality.

Historical Background for the Eastern Partnership Initiative

Even as early as 2006, the Commission had prepared a Communication to identify areas where the ENP required reforms. However, as shown by the most recent Communication of the European Commission, *A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood*, published on 25 May 2011,

the most important tools for improving the ENP and the partners' reform processes were seen to be differentiation and more regional orientation. This regional concentration and differentiation process had already taken shape when, in May 2008, Poland and Sweden proposed the establishment of an Eastern Partnership Initiative (EPI). The main idea behind the EPI was to improve the ENP by promoting further integration with the Union's six immediate *Eastern* neighbours: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. The EPI was formally launched on 7 May 2009.

Structure of the EPI

There are several reasons as to why focus was paid to the Eastern European countries:

1. They are relatively functional and predictable so they appear unlikely to become a serious threat to the European Union's security;
2. The region has significant potential for grassroots democracy. Over the past decade, mass protests against election fixing took place in each of the countries on at least one occasion;
3. Most of these countries also take significant pride in the European identity, which is mostly supported by their citizenry as well.

The EPI builds on the strong parts of the ENP and attempts to make up for the issues that have drawn criticism from partners, such as the fact that the ENP was not designed to deal effectively with the substantial geographical, historical, cultural, economic and political differences between the Southern and Eastern neighbours of the EU, and that it was rather ambiguous regarding prospects of closer integration with the EU.⁵ The EPI has both bilateral and multilateral forms of cooperation. The bilateral track is built upon the already existing Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) and the framework of the ENP, but it establishes a deeper and wider engagement than these predecessors have. As part of its aim toward multilateral cooperation, the initiative seeks to develop strong cooperation among the six partner states and with the EU by addressing through flagship initiatives the common issues, interests and problems that affect all participants. This gives it a more ambitious, flexible and efficient appearance compared to other regional initiatives. The flagship initiatives were designed in the following ways:⁶

Mobility and Security: This approach offers partner countries tai-

lor-made pacts which cover issues such as assistance in fighting corruption, organised crime and illegal migration, upgrading asylum systems to EU standards, setting up border management structures, establishing a new visa policy that should lead to visa liberalisation when coupled with financial assistance to partners, establishing readmission agreements and developing a plan to improve member states' consular coverage in partner countries.

New Contractual Relations: There will be new individual and tailor-made Association Agreements (AAs) which will be negotiated with partners who wish to make a far-reaching commitment to the EU. These agreements will establish a closer link with EU standards such as democracy, rule of law, human rights and *acquis communautaire*, as well as advanced co-operation on the European Security and Defence Policy. There will also be a Comprehensive Institution Building Programme (CIBP) that will help partner countries meet conditions established by the EU by improving administrative capacities in all sectors of cooperation.

Gradual Integration into the EU Economy: The six EPI countries have a large potential for economic growth, and because of their geographic proximity to its member states, the EU has a direct interest in supporting their economic development and becoming their principal trading partner. The AAs already include a deep and comprehensive free trade agreement (DCFTA) that covers all trade issues. There are also plans to establish bilateral agreements among partners, possibly leading to a Neighbourhood Economic Community, an Agricultural Dialogue, and the strengthening of intellectual property protection.

Supporting Economic and Social Development: A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on regional policy will be established, launching pilot regional and transnational programmes with additional funding and supporting sector reforms in the regions.

Environment and Energy Security: Energy interdependence provisions will be included in the AAs⁷, and all partners will be encouraged to participate in the Intelligent Energy Europe Programme.

Civil Society Mobilisation: Recognising the importance of socialisation in the transformation process, an Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum (EPCSF) will be established. This forum will bring together NGOs, think-tanks, national and international civil society organisations from the EU or partner countries to work on the empowerment of societies and help increase the resources available to the region.

This article selects the Czech Republic as a representative member state for the EU's position towards the EPI and is mostly based on empirical research conducted in Prague in September 2010, which involved in-depth interviews mainly carried out with representatives of the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the Foreign Affairs Committees in the Czech Republic Parliament, and several non-governmental organisations (NGO)s. Accordingly, in the subsequent sections, the Czech Republic's role in the initiation, implementation and improvement of the EPI is explored in detail.

Evaluation of the Czech Incentive in formulating the EPI

After the collapse of communism, the foreign policy of the Czech Republic was initially characterised by a rather low profile in Eastern Europe, due to several reasons:

Firstly, unlike Poland, Czechs always felt “Central European” rather than “Eastern European.” As a result, they felt a need to distance themselves from the East to prove their European credentials, as instanced by the motto “return to Europe.” Consequently, the main priority of the Czech foreign policy from the late 1990s until its 2004 EU accession was to subordinate all other foreign policy efforts and focus on joining the EU and NATO.

Secondly, the Czech Republic has not been as afflicted by the problems experienced by most of Eastern Europe, such as political instability, frozen conflicts, environmental threats, or migration pressures. This is because it does not have a direct geographical border with any of the EU's current Eastern neighbours, there is no substantive Czech minority residing in any of the countries currently falling under the EPI, unlike Hungary or Poland, which have large expatriate populations living in Ukraine, and there is no substantial Eastern European ethnic minority living in the Czech Republic, such as the Lithuanians in Slovakia or the Ukrainians in Eastern Poland. Furthermore, due to the absence of borders with Eastern countries that would allow small cross-border trade to develop – as well as the largest Czech companies' lack of interest in trading with or investing in this region – there has also been no economic impulse to develop stronger political ties with Eastern European states.

However, a stronger profile and a certain comeback of Eastern policy can be witnessed in Czech foreign policy discourse since its accession

to the EU in 2004. Within the Czech Republic, emphasis was placed on developing relations with Eastern neighbours mainly due to historical and cultural links with the region and close acquaintance with the countries because of their intensive contact during the socialist era. In addition, Czechs felt solidarity with the countries aspiring to join the European club, as it is generally acknowledged that the prospect of EU membership motivated the Czech government to undertake many internal democratisation reforms far more quickly than would have been possible otherwise. There were also economic and security considerations. According to Kratochvil,

with the economic growth and increased competition from newly industrialising countries and increasing labour costs in the Czech Republic, Czech companies started to need new markets and investments in lower-cost countries. Eastern Europe was a natural choice for Czech businesses due to their knowledge of the local environment and the good reputation of Czech industry and products in the region.

Additionally, a significant influx of migrant workers, mainly from Ukraine, raised security concerns about the Czech Republic's Eastern policy, especially in terms of visa and residency laws concerning the citizens of Eastern European countries.

Given these issues, along with the pressure produced by the Russo-Georgian conflict (2008) and the gas crisis between Russia and Ukraine in January 2009, it was unsurprising that improvement of the ENP and the newly formulated EPI became the main external priority during the Czech EU Council presidency in the first half of 2009. However, due to problems such as the global economic crisis, the resurgence of Russia and the challenge it posed at the EU's Eastern border, strained relations with China, the absence of some major EU leaders, such as Sarkozy, Brown, Berlusconi, and Zapatero as well as representatives of some Eastern partners, such as Moldavia and Belarus, and the fragile condition of the Czech government, the Czech presidency did not successfully advance the EPI.

However, this does not mean that the Czech Republic lost its enthusiasm for the EPI. An analysis of the in-depth interviews conducted in Prague in September 2010 shows that, given its geopolitical situation and economic interests, the Czech Republic still aims to improve the EPI. Below follows a detailed analysis of how Czech national interests

have been formulated in the country's foreign policy and used to implement and improve the EPI at the EU level.

National Interest Formulation in the Czech Republic

Moravcsik (1998) argues that decision making in the EU is done in three stages. In the first stage, national interests are articulated at the domestic level within EU member states and transmitted to political executives through party and interest group position papers, party manifestos, citizen petitions, and similar means. In return, the executives aggregate these interests and formulate the states' foreign policies from them. In the second stage, they develop strategies and bargain with one another in order to reach substantive agreements that realise those national interests more efficiently than they would be realised through unilateral actions. In the third stage, they choose whether to delegate or pool sovereignty in international institutions to secure the substantive agreements they have made.⁸ Thus, the institutional decisions and external policies of the EU are actually outcomes of the bargains struck between executives of EU member states trying to represent their national interests.⁹

In that sense, the analysis of the Czech Republic executives¹⁰ will reveal their position at the EU level regarding the EPI and the main reasons behind it. For this purpose, a total of 20 interviews were undertaken in September 2010 including with representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, major political parties serving in parliament and several civil society organisations.

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Table 1:
The most significant advantages of the EPI (N=20)

Analysis of the Czech Position Regarding the EPI

The outcome of interviews conducted with Czech executives show the following results:

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
In this question because each person had more than one answer, the percentages relate to the responses not the respondents. The response to this question shows that the establishment of a multilateral track in the EPI is a very useful tool of confidence-building to overcome difficult relations and solve frozen conflicts among partner states in the region.

As an example of the other factors, Jan Kaminek from the Human Rights and Transition Policy Department in the MFA contributes to this argument by emphasising the importance of people-to-people contacts in this multilateral framework and the advancement of bottom-up pressure for change and support for democratic values among the population:

as the EU has learned that specifically leaders in Belarus and Ukraine are less eager to integrate with the EU as membership would constrain their style of leadership, people-to-people contacts become specifically important for convincing others.

Anita Grmelova from the Middle East and North Africa Department of the MFA states that the key strength of the EPI is its ability to enable countries with different political ambitions and at different stages of socio-economic development and democratic maturity to create differentiated associations with the EU. Jakub Kajzler, international secretary of the (then) ruling party, ODS (Civic Democrats), highlights the economic advantages of the EPI that were brought to the fore specifically by the DCFTAs. He argues that:

Table 2:
The Reasons
for the Czech
Republic in
Supporting
the EPI
(N=20)



the removal of economic barriers vis-à-vis third countries and regulatory approximation necessary for establishment of a single space with Eastern neighbours will make it easier to adapt to European norms and standards, both economically and politically, and will ultimately result in achieving economic development and prosperity in Eastern Europe. This will help in solving security threats and stabilisation as well, because in poor countries there is more crime, terrorism and fragile democracy.

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In this question again each person had more than one answer so the percentages relate to responses. The majority of the Czech decision makers emphasise “security” as the most important reason. Katerina Bocianova, chairwoman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the CSSD (Social Democrats), is one of the most ardent supporters of the EPI for security reasons and she argues that:

through the EPI, the EU can face security threats such as energy security, frozen conflicts and illegal migration more strongly. Specifically, after the Ukraine gas crisis, energy security became increasingly important, and in the EPI, issues such as regulatory harmonisation, early warning mechanism, joint response in terms of energy crises and the creation of a diversified and interconnected energy market became prominent.

Despite that Eastern Europe has become increasingly important for the EU mainly because of its proximity and that the establishing of the EPI has led to the development of a network of mutual contacts and mechanisms for policy implementation, the actual integration process




Table 3:
Main problems with the EPI (N=20)

through the EPI has also been very limited. Actions undertaken by the EU show that it does not see integration with its Eastern neighbours as important enough to warrant investing significant resources in the integration process. Most of the goals set out in the documents remain unfulfilled. Although work on AAS has commenced with all countries except Belarus, and negotiations regarding the DCFTA with Ukraine are on track, problems have appeared right from the beginning. These problems were mentioned throughout the interviews.

According to Pavel Bucek from the Department of Northern and Eastern Europe in MFA, the most important problem in the EPI is the lack of a specific political narrative about where it is heading. He explains the upshot of this behaviour:

This attitude of the EU gave rise to a policy of evasion, where the key strategic issues were either not mentioned or formulated in a very complicated and vague manner. Apart from making EU policy incomprehensible by imposing extensive technical conditions that have little to do with promoting democracy without the membership prospect, this could also prove ineffective and counterproductive.

Even the association status that is currently made available to EPI countries is unlikely to excite Moldova, Ukraine, and Georgia, or provoke them to commit to reforms. Because of their proximity to the EU, these countries aspire to EU membership, visa liberalisation and an increase of available finances.¹¹

Vladimir Nemeč, Deputy Director of the EU Policies Department in MFA, draws attention to the demotivation caused by the lack of support from EU member states who argue that the EPI is duplicating already existing mechanisms found in the ENP. This lack of support is exacerbated by the wide economic crisis in the Euro zone and the fact that some member states are only interested in regional initiatives in their immediate neighbourhoods. Magdalena Janesová, deputy director of the Common Foreign and Security Policy Department in the MFA, underlines the fragile foundations on which the authoritarian regimes in Eastern countries are based. This fragility is demonstrated by recent anti-government protests in Armenia and Azerbaijan that seem to have been directly inspired by the recent events in North Africa. This situation makes it difficult to commit these countries to democratising and liberalising reforms.

Jan Tomasek, deputy chief of mission in the MFA, complements this argument by pointing to the fact that the unresolved conflicts in the region — Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transnistria, and Nagorno-Karabakh — continue to constitute serious security challenges, as well as important obstacles to economic and political progress and regional integration. Unfortunately, the EU still lacks the instruments, political will, and strong unified foreign policy necessary to prevent conflicts in the region. Jan Marian, head of the Russian Federation and Belarus Unit in the MFA, adds that areas where the EU has limited influence are, in fact, immediately filled by Russia, which uses its historical, cultural, and linguistic similarities to consistently build up its soft power in the region through economic ties and media.¹² This is an additional factor threatening to undermine the influence of the EU in its Eastern European neighbourhood.

Eastern Partnership: A Czech Perspective

As mentioned earlier, it is in the interests of the Czech Republic to substantially contribute to political and economic reforms in the Eastern neighbourhood of the EU. Given the disadvantages of the EPI, the Czech Republic is among the EU members most interested in improving this incentive and developing active and fruitful co-operation with Eastern European countries. The interviews conducted with Czech executives have yielded the results described below, which highlight the contribution of the Czech Republic to improving the EPI.

Czech Contribution to Improving the EPI:

To answer criticism of the ambiguous direction in which the EPI is




Table 4: Possible improvement of the EPI (N=20)

heading and the way this hurts political support for it in the partner countries, Katerina Moravcova from the MFA states:

Given that the EU cannot offer the big carrot of membership, and as all six EPI countries are very eager to benefit from the financial envelope the initiative carries, the EU could give multiple small *carrots*. These *carrots* could include access to the EU's agricultural and services market, starting DCFTA negotiations, formulating an action plan for a visa-free regime, possibilities for privileged institutional cooperation, more financial aid, mobility, high level visits, help in attracting assistance from other external donors and the chance to take part in EU policies.

Jakub Kulhanek, from the Association for International Affairs adds to this argument the need for the EU to enhance its presence in the EPI countries, particularly in local media, foster official contacts at all levels of governance, underline the European identity it shares with its eastern neighbours and encourage visits by EU member state officials to EPI countries where objectives of the partnership should receive greater visibility and public awareness. This will help create a positive image among young generations of Ukrainians, Moldavians, and Georgians, and, in turn, can help create a pro-European generation capable of pushing for better alignment with the EU.

Although this is a long-term project, these incentives are important for partners to get onto the right track. For the countries that do not aspire to EU membership, such as Armenia, Belarus and Azerbaijan, even the prospect of intensive cooperation with the EU could be helpful on issues such as migration, organised crime, spill-over of good neighbour relations and trade interests.

Still, being cautious, Oldrich Cerny, executive director of Prague Security Studies, argues that the:

EPI should hold out the actual prospect of membership in unambiguous terms for Ukraine and Moldova if the EU wants to offer the strong and timely incentive essential to reforming these countries. This will not mean that these countries become candidates in the very near future, but the prospect of actual membership could render the EPI more productive.

The existence of frozen conflicts is another major obstacle to efficient cooperation. Jan Kaminek points out that the EPI can be an im-

portant instrument whereby the EU can implement its soft power and try to mediate between conflicting parties. Here, the Russian factor is also very important. Because the initiative is seen by Russia as an anti-Russian project, the EU will have to be careful not to damage its strategic ties with Russia while trying to use its soft power in the region.¹³

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As demonstrated below, not all executives retain positive attitudes toward the EPI; some interviewees have stayed indifferent, while others oppose it.

Czech Indifference and Opposition to the EPI:

Coalition government partner TOP 09 is one of the actors to remain indifferent toward the EPI. As their 29 May 2010 position paper *2010 Election Platform-2010 Parliamentary Election* shows, they believe that the Western Balkans and Eastern Europe are traditionally the spheres of operation of Czech diplomacy, where it identifies its interests. Stability of this space and support of freedom, rule of law and democracy are in the interest of the Czech Republic.

However, they do not propose concrete methods for the realisation of this plan. Another former coalition party partner, VV, also had an unclear position regarding the EPI. David Kral attributes this indifference to the fact that since the party's membership is based on polls; they only concentrate on domestic issues such as combating corruption and struggling with old political structures. Vladimír Sedláček, from the Department of International Relations of the Communist Party (KSCM), argues that his party is not only against EU enlargement and similar initiatives, but it is also totally against EU membership, as during the time of socialism Czechoslovakia was more developed and self-sufficient. Cyril Svoboda, chairman of KDU-ČSL, claims that his party prefers first a deeper integration and careful absorption of the countries which became members in the previous enlargement waves, in other words, they have a negative attitude toward the EPI, as they see this initiative as a stepping stone to a premature enlargement process.

Recent Developments

Events in the Arab world have cast the Eastern neighbourhood agenda as a background feature of the EU. However, the fact that the ENP was

not successful in Arab countries should be taken into consideration when reviewing policies by which the EU can have greater influence on countries in its Eastern neighbourhood.

Analysis concerning the success of the EPI was produced in the Second Eastern Partnership Summit in Warsaw on 29-30 September 2011. The summit was attended by heads of states and representatives of the EU, and by 32 delegations from EU member states and EPI partner countries. The summit's participants reviewed the current implementation of the EPI and adopted a joint declaration at the end of the summit. It was acknowledged that relations between the EU and its European partners had deepened significantly. All EPI partner countries are currently negotiating association agreements with the EU and taking steps towards trade and visa liberalisation. The multilateral co-operation platforms of the EPI are focused on democracy, good governance, and stability, economic integration, convergence with EU policies and energy security. In addition, contacts between people have become operational and continue to grow.

However, the problems mentioned throughout this paper still remain. Specifically, the Hungarian and Polish presidencies in 2011 were important in illuminating the deficiencies of the EPI and the areas in which improvement is needed. In terms of further improvements, the partner states welcomed the published review of the ENP in a Communication from the High Representative and the Commission, which suggested greater differentiation and mutual accountability, more successful efforts toward building a common area of democracy and prosperity and increased interactions and exchanges. They also agreed that the achievements and progress of the EPI must bring direct and clearly perceived benefits to the citizens of partner countries, and that these benefits should be more visible. The suggested improvements, successfully implemented areas and disadvantages of the EPI have already been pointed out by the Czech executives.

Conclusion

Although designed to be one of the most ambitious external policies of the EU and an instrument for maintaining the security community of the EU while postponing the acquisition of further member countries, the ENP's ability to influence partner countries' transition to democracy and liberalisation has remained limited. One of the ways to improve

its influential capacity is the “differentiation” method. Differentiation means taking into account several things, such as the different desires and functions of the relevant countries and regions, the varied benefits of joining the EU, which largely depend on the individual aspirations and achievements of each partner country, and the existence of additional rewards for progress made in the partner countries’ reform and EU-alignment processes. All these means were present in the EPI along with other new instruments, such as the multi-lateral co-operation dimension, DCFTA and people-to-people contacts. The overall design was to facilitate the steady transformation of the EU’s Eastern neighbours into well-functioning democracies with transparent and reliable market economies. This is not only useful and necessary for their own democratisation and well-being, but it is also important for preventing acute problems and security threats from spilling over into the EU, which has so far remained a well-functioning security community.

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As a representative for the EU’s external policy position, the Czech Republic’s stance on the advantages and disadvantages of the EPI as a tool for transforming its partners into liberal democracies has been analysed in this paper, using in-depth interviews conducted with Czech executives in September 2010. Several shortcomings of the initiative have been outlined herein which lead to the similar outcome as the ENP; far from making a huge impact on the partners’ democratisation efforts, the EPI also gives the impression of an instrument for guaranteeing the existence of the EU as a security community by focusing specifically on the issues which are of major importance to the EU. Throughout the interviews, the Czech Republic’s position on improving the EPI for transforming these neighbours was also analysed. In that sense, the EPI is not only about the EU’s ability to make a substantial impact on its partner countries; it is also an opportunity for the Czech Republic to become a leader in the region and have the chance to substantiate its foreign policy at the European level. This is not only an asset for the Czech Republic alone but it is an additional advantage for enhancing the potential for global power of the EU.

**Beginning of
the Article**

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Notes

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1. Karl Deutsch (1957), *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*, Princeton UP, p. 6. See also: Buzan, Barry, Joop de Wilde & Ole Weaver (1998). *Security: A new Framework for Analysis*. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
2. Boyka Stefanava (2005), 'The European Union as a Security Actor: Security Provision through Enlargement,' *World Affairs*, 168:2, p.6-7.
3. Mustafa Aydın (2005), 'Europe's New Region: The Black Sea in the Wider Europe Neighbourhood,' *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, 5:2, p.66.
4. The Commission detected the transborder dimensionality of environmental and nuclear hazards, communicable diseases, illegal immigration, trafficking, organised crime, border management and terrorist networks (Commission, 2003a: 6).
5. The EPI does not alter the generally discouraging EU approach towards membership, but it aims to clarify the EU's political and economic message to partner countries and to draw reform-oriented countries closer to the EU. It defines the degree of the EU's engagement and new benefits to be offered based on the partner countries' ability to meet agreed targets for political and economic reform.
6. For details of such initiatives see: <www.osi-brussels.eu> (accessed 12 June 2013).
7. These contain plans for completing negotiations on Ukraine's and Moldova's membership in the Energy Community, concluding a Memoranda of Understanding on energy issues with Moldova, Georgia and Armenia, supporting full integration of Ukraine's energy market with the EU's market, enhancing political engagement with Azerbaijan, which is the only gas producing country in the EPI, and finalising the EU-Belarus declaration on energy.
8. Andrew Moravcsik (1998), *The Choice for Europe*, University College London Press, p.18.
9. Moravcsik also compares the decisions that lead to the institutional choice(s) of the EU to the main goal of a liberal economy: finding the intersection of demand and supply. Supply is the institutional choice decided collectively by the EU as a result of the bargaining of member states' executives. Demand is national interest formulation at the domestic level by a coalition of voters, political parties and interest groups.
10. By executives, Moravcsik refers to the people who occupy the most significant position in an analysis of foreign policy, as they are the people who negotiate their country's foreign policy in the European arena. In the Czech Republic, the executives who are responsible for negotiating foreign policy are usually in the Foreign Minister's office or leaders of political parties. In the 2010 parliamentary elections the Social Democratic Party (CSSD) gained 56 seats in Parliament, the greatest gain by any party. However, the government was formed with a centre-right coalition of the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) (53 seats), the formerly local Prague party Public Affairs

(VV) (24 seats), and the newly formed Tradice Odpolednost Prosperita 09 (TOP 09) (41 seats). The other parties in the parliament are the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSCM), which holds 26 seats, and the Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party (KDU-CSL). Petr Necas from the ODS became the Prime Minister.

11. Poland, in particular, thought it necessary to distinguish between European neighbours who have the right to apply for membership if they fulfil certain requirements and European neighbours who do not.
12. Often it can provide stronger incentives than the EU, as illustrated by the recent deal with Ukraine over the extension of the Russian Black Sea fleet base in Sevastopol in return for cheap gas.
13. Jan Marian argues that after the Ukraine-Russia energy crisis and the location of the Russian fleet in the Ukrainian city of Sevastopol, it became very difficult to advocate Ukraine's membership in the EU, for fear of the likely Russian reaction.

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Appendix

List of Interviewees

Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

Pavel Bucek (Ukraine and Eastern Partnership, Department of Northern and Eastern Europe)

Jan Marian (Head of Unit for Russian Federation and Belarus)

Jan Tomasek (Deputy Chief of Mission)

Jan Latal (Human Rights and Transition Policy Department, Transition Promotion Program)

Helena Stohanzlova (Human Rights and Transition Policy Department, Transition Promotion Program)

Jan Kaminek (Human Rights and Transition Policy Department)

Magdalena Janesova (Deputy Director of Common Foreign and Security Policy Department)

Vladimir Nemeč (Deputy Director of EU Policies Department)

Anita Grmelova (Head of Gulf Policy Group, Middle East and North Africa Department)

Martin Vitek (Deputy Director of EU General Affairs Department)

Katerina Moravcova (South and Southeast European Countries Department)

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Political Party Representatives:

Vladimir Sedlacek (Department of International Relations of the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSCM))

Cyril Svoboda (Chairman of the Christian and Democratic Union – Czechoslovak People’s Party (KDU-CSL))

Jakub Kajzler (International Secretary of the Civic Democratic Party (ODS))

Katerina Bocianova (Chairwoman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Czech Social Democratic Party (CSSD))

Civil Society Representatives:

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In Every Zealot is Deep Doubt

Islamism and the Role of Psychology amongst British Muslim Students

NAEEM MEER

Drawing on Razzaque's seminal book, *From Human Being to Human Bomb* which identifies patterns of extremist thought processes amongst young British Muslims, this study is the very first attempt at empirically testing such a concept and establishes a precedent for the study of the links between psychology and Islamism that continue to be critically underdeveloped. By analysing responses from two small samples, a test group of British Muslim UCL students and a control group of British non-Muslim UCL students, this project attempts to pioneer the use of alternative methods in the fight against extremism and ambitions to serve as a small but noteworthy part of an improved holistic national and international policy in the United Kingdom.

Keywords: Extremism, Islamism, psychology, terrorism, UK

Introduction

The decade following the events of 11 September 2001 produced a number of fundamental shifts in government policies and societal mind-sets that will undoubtedly affect future generations. The scale of the terrorist threat posed by radical jihadists has redefined the way in which the 'West' (loosely defined as Western Europe, North America

and Australia) looks at religion, culture, immigration and integration.

The UK is among a few countries to be hit by jihadi terrorism through the 07 July 2005 bombings of three underground trains and one bus, leaving the country in a frantic search for culprits and answers. This work argues that one such malefactor (although not the only one) is Islamism; the ideology that categorises Islam as not only a faith but also a political movement. Its all-encompassing format fits easily into debates on multiculturalism and identity. It is also possible to affirm that although not every Islamist is a jihadist, every jihadist is an Islamist. Successive British governments have focused on legislation aimed at tightening security measures, updating durations of custody and engaging with Muslim groups in order to defuse social tensions and decrease the likelihood of radical elements thriving in disenfranchised Muslim communities. However, there is an area that has not been researched enough in the understanding of the origins of Islamism, and by extension its violent component.

This work uncovers the unique role of psychology in the formation of a young British Muslim male's mind and the possible implications that this can have in structuring a polarised view of the world, facilitating his interest for Islamist ideas. This topic is extremely timely and fascinating, given that we have arguably reached a point in which past explanations have not attenuated the movement and new pathways need to be explored in the understanding of the Islamist phenomenon if it is to be challenged effectively. Dr Russell Razzaque, a consultant psychiatrist based in East London, has pioneered the idea of using a scale that might highlight certain predispositions for radical beliefs.¹ An adapted version of this scale will be tested in this project for the first time in order to assess the likelihood of such a link between psychology and extremism.

Given that Islamism is often misunderstood and misinterpreted, a short segment will familiarise the reader with what are the basics of Islamism as well as a short historical perspective on the evolution of the ideology and its offshoots. A literature review will then establish an overview of the research that has been produced with regards to the psyche of Islamists along with a comment on where the main concepts are headed and what ideas dominate the debate. This section shows that a tremendous gap in the current literature makes this study both relevant and necessary. A methodology section will follow and outline the approach used in this study and the ways in which the

data was collected. Then, two separate analytical sections will chart the study's findings both through basic descriptions and advanced statistical methods. A short recommendation section will ensure that the research is grounded in public policy and will precede the conclusion; the latter will be coupled with a critical evaluation of the project so as to fully assess the limitations of the study and highlight the areas that need further development.

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Literature Review

Given that it is only very recently that studies and analyses have begun to emerge on the specific subject of the processes of radicalization amongst Muslim individuals, there is not a clear variety of opinions in the available literature. This review will try to highlight the current ideas and trends present in the thematic areas of radicalisation and psychology. It will gradually become clear to the reader that there is an evident gap in the literature and that too often do researchers and experts jump from individual personality and group influence to terrorism, without pausing at the intermediate level of Islamist radicalisation. Before becoming a terrorist, a person is a fundamentalist, focused and uncompromising in his beliefs. For this reason, it is crucial to start analysing relations between individuals and the rest of society and specific attitudes pertaining to a certain vision of the world before we can attempt to move on and dissect an individual's actions.

One recent publication by Brooke Rogers has efficiently summarised the three theoretical contributions of psychology to the realm of violent radicalization. These are the Psychoanalytic approach, the Cognitive approach and the Social approach. The main caveat of this differentiation-which limits us in using it as a tool to understand aspects of Islamism-is that it is a classification linked to terrorism, therefore adding the element of violence to the analysis. Nevertheless it is still a valid breakdown and cases like the one of Omar Sharif, a British national groomed by Hizb ut-Tahrir to become a suicide bomber in Israel, reminds us of the links between non-violent and violent forms of extremism. Nevertheless, these three approaches communicate the feeling that the relation between psychology and radicalisation needs to be explored further.

In the psychoanalytical approach explained by Brooke Rogers, the notion that is most relevant to us is the Absolutist/Apocalyptic The-

ory, where individuals are extremely polarised regarding moral issues, easily believe in conspiracies and await a messianic symbol. Theodor Adorno's works on the authoritarian personality are part of this category and it is not surprising Razzaque builds his Ideological Extremism Vulnerability Scale on these premises. The cognitive approach developed by Martha Crenshaw argues that actions can be rationally explained based on the environment a person finds himself or herself in. Through Rational Choice Theory, we might be able to address the sources of certain behaviours and explain them. The drawback with this analysis is that certain psychological elements are not rationally explainable given that the individual himself might not know where a certain belief of his comes from. Finally, the social approach can also be useful in showing that a person's ideas are a product of the group he associates with and empowers him, but here again the authors miss the point that there is something to be said about differences in people who are attracted to such extremist groups: by definition it means that they already lack such interactions and are looking for membership in a circle.

A highly fascinating analysis that deserves a much deeper focus looks at the foundations of personalities as the product of varying parental connections with the children at a very young age. Based on previous research, Razzaque explains that the more formal and hierarchical a relation will be between the parent and the infant, the more the child will develop an "insecure-avoidant" style of interaction that can unfortunately be more common in Asian and Muslim households.² Without immigrants being the only recipients of potentially distant upbringings, this is important because the child will in turn lack the ability to identify a positive role-model (usually his father) and will end up searching for an alternative that can never be as satisfying as the attention of a parent.³ This inquiry joins the idea put forward by Mitscherlich in which he explains that during crucial formative years, adolescents are in a phase in which they need to find themselves because they feel useless; thus we see the undeniable importance of the teenage years as vectors of a positive or negative image of oneself and the world around us that Islamist recruiters can abuse by entertaining ideological fallacies in the eyes of very impressionable people in need of guidance.⁴ At university in the UK, the "lash culture" involving large consumptions of alcohol and drugs can be a strong factor in tipping

the balance in favour of social retreat and isolation for some young British Muslims who are not used to it.⁵

Finally, it is worth mentioning the role of integrative complexity in the study of Islamism. It has been pointed out that, often, certain individuals, whether Islamists or not, have a certain way of recognising and integrating conflicting viewpoints and perspectives. According to Suedfeld, Integrative Complexity is a measure of how someone will make decision and process information; this is relevant to our study because one of the main characteristics of all radical ideologies is their inability to accept other opinions and to integrate different thought structures. An enquiry into the levels of integrative complexity of respondents in a research could be an avenue to explore in the future.

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As shown, the literature surrounding the study of psychology, non-violent extremism and Islamism is particularly weak and lacks specific examination. After eleven years of an increased fight against terrorism and radicalisation, it is exceptionally striking that no more material or research has been produced on the topic.

Data and Analysis

The underlying question structuring this project is whether or not there is a link between vulnerable personalities-understood as those predisposed to be subdued by extremist ideologies, and Islamism in particular.⁶ This study deploys a scale that borrows notions from psychology to gather data and see if a causal link is present among students.

The null hypothesis is therefore:

H_0 : *There is no causal link between vulnerable personalities and Islamist views.*

This project seeks to disprove the null hypothesis in order to establish the veracity of our alternative hypothesis:

H_1 : *There is a causal link between vulnerable personalities and Islamist views.*

Descriptive Statistics

Test Group

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From the data collected, the significant highlight regarding the test group (British Muslim students) is that there is a clear overrepresentation of scientific studies, in particular around the medical field. This indicates that Muslim students often choose to pursue “hard” subjects that are inherited from a

		Test Group %	Control Group %
Graduate Level			
	Undergraduate	38	5
	Postgraduate	62	95
Degree			
	Medical Studies	38	0
	Sciences	33	9
	Humanities	19.5	67
	Other	9.5	24
Age			
	18-25	57	57
	26-30	24	33
	31-35	9.5	5
	36-40	9.5	5

Table 1:
Basic Sta-
tistics from
Test Group
and Control
Group.

cultural tradition that favours the arts and humanities in a lesser way. With a combined total of 71%, Medicine and Science topple Humanities (almost 20%) and other topics. The age differences are fairly regular with a clear majority of postgraduates and more than half of the respondents being aged 25 or under.

Control Group

Composed of British non-Muslim students, the control group is heavily dominated by Postgraduates and there is a striking absence of any of the respondents studying Medicine and a mere 10% pursuing a science-based degree. Most of the students are completing their studies

in humanities but the age gaps are similarly divided between a strong majority of under 25-year olds (57%), approximately a third of respondents between the ages of 26 and 30 and smaller numbers of older students.

Following the analysis favoured by Razzaque, this work firstly examines the data collected according to ten different, but often interlinked, clusters in order to have an insight into the thought processes of the respondents in the test group and in the control group.

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Conventionalism

According to Razzaque, conventionalism is defined as ‘a rigid adherence to conventional values’⁷ assessed through high responses to the following four statements from the Ideological Extremism Vulnerability (IEV) Scale:

Statement 1: Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues that children should learn.

Statement 2: A person who has bad manners, habits, and breeding can hardly expect to get along with decent people.

Statement 3: If people would talk less and work more, everybody would be better off.

Statement 4: The businessman and the manufacturer are much more important to society than the artist.

These are used because together they indicate a propensity to not challenge common social assertions and can later on be associated with a closed mind-set. For both the Test Group (British Muslim students) and the Control Group (British non-Muslim students), responses were taken and scores added through Microsoft Excel. The minimum possible score was 4 and the maximum possible score was 16. All results have been rounded to the unit.

	Test Group	Control Group
Min Value	5	5
Mean	9	9
Max Value	13	13

Table 2:
Summary of Responses:
Convention-
alism.

The results for both groups are identical and that all values are fairly similar.

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Authoritarian Submission

The IEV Scale defines authoritarian submission as ‘a submissive, uncritical attitude towards idealised moral authorities’⁸ that respond to the following three statements:

Statement 1: Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues that children should learn.

Statement 5: Science has its place, but there are many important things that can never be understood by the human mind.

Statement 6: What the world needs most, more than laws and political programs, are courageous, tireless, devoted leaders in whom the people can put their faith.

These statements highlight a respect and deference for perceived leaders that can be either real or imagined. The minimum possible score was 4 and the maximum possible score was 12. All results have been rounded to the unit.

Table 3:
Summary of
Responses:
Authoritarian
Submission.

	Test Group	Control Group
Min Value	3	3
Mean	8	7
Max Value	12	11

The control group has on average lower values than the test group. With a mean of 8 compared to a mean of 7, the test group can be said to be slightly more responsive to submission to authoritative figures that they perceive to be a source of undisputed ruling. A higher maximum value for the Muslim students (12 rather than 11) also goes to show this higher receptiveness.

Authoritarian Aggression

Authoritarian aggression is ‘the tendency to be on the lookout for, and to condemn, reject, and punish people who violate certain conven-

tional values.⁹ Six statements from the IEV enable us to assess such vulnerability:

Statement 2: A person who has bad manners, habits, and breeding can hardly expect to get along with decent people.

Statement 3: If people would talk less and work more, everybody would be better off.

Statement 7: What young people need most is strict discipline, rugged determination, and the will to work and fight for justice in the world.

Statement 8: An insult to our honour should always be punished.

Statement 9: Sex crimes, such as rape and attacks on children, deserve more than mere imprisonment; such criminals ought to be publicly whipped, or worse.

Statement 10: Most of our social problems would be solved if we could somehow get rid of immoral, crooked, and feeble-minded people.

Islamism amongst British Muslim Students

These statements shed light into the students' responses to actions that they perceive as morally and socially wrong and to the individuals indulging in them. The minimum possible score was 6 and the maximum possible score was 24. All results have been rounded to the unit.

	Test Group	Control Group
Min Value	8	8
Mean	14	12
Max Value	21	19

Table 4: Summary of Responses: Authoritarian Aggression.

We can see that once again the test group's responses are higher than the ones of the control group. Given that British Muslim students are more submissive towards idealised figures than British non-Muslim students, it is logical that they also score higher as defendants of such conventions and values. Their mean and their maximum value are both two points higher.

Anti-Intracception

Anti-intracception, understood as being the 'opposition to the subjective, the imaginative and the tender-minded',¹⁰ is evaluated by the following four statements:

Statement 3: If people would talk less and work more, everybody would be better off.

CEJSS 2/2013 *Statement 4:* The businessman and the manufacturer are much more important to society than the artist.

Statement 11: Nowadays, more and more people are prying into matters that should remain personal and private.

Statement 13: Wars and social troubles may someday be ended by an earthquake or flood that will destroy the whole world.

These declarations are intended as indicators of a respondents' ability to think outside of a rational framework and appreciate the value found in variety and choice. The minimum possible score was 4 and the maximum possible score was 16. All results have been rounded to the unit.

Table 5:
Summary of
Responses:
Anti-
Intracception.

	Test Group	Control Group
Min Value	5	6
Mean	9	8
Max Value	14	13

From the above table, we can see that the test group scores higher on the anti-intracception scale, both on the mean and on the maximum value, reinforcing the observation that Muslim students are less likely to be outgoing, extraverted and appreciative of the differences that society has to offer.

Superstition and Stereotypy

Razzaque sees superstition and stereotypy as a result of 'a belief in the mystical nature of fate and a disposition to think in rigid categories'¹¹ and for this trait he outlines three statements that need to be looked at:

Statement 5: Science has its place, but there are many important things that can never be understood by the human mind.

Statement 12: People can be divided into two distinct classes: the weak

and the strong.

Statement 13: Wars and social troubles may someday be ended by an earthquake or flood that will destroy the whole world.

These statements seek to highlight the role that categorisation and judgmental behaviour play in a respondents thought process. The minimum possible score was 3 and the maximum possible score was 12. All results have been rounded to the unit.

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	Test Group	Control Group
Min Value	4	3
Mean	7	6
Max Value	11	10

Table 6:
Summary of Responses:
Superstition and Stereotypy.

We can see that not only all values are higher for the test group, but that the minimum value that is available is also higher, meaning that the cut-off point for this personality trait is higher amongst British Muslim students. This confirms that there is a more superstitious mind set amongst the Test group and that stereotyping is more common.

Power and “Toughness”

Additionally, Razzaque suggests that there is a ‘preoccupation with the dominance-submission, strong-weak, leader-follower dichotomy, plus identification with power figures and an exaggerated assertion of strength and toughness’¹² which is highlighted by no less than eight statements:

Statement 6: What the world needs most, more than laws and political programs, are courageous, tireless, devoted leaders in whom the people can put their faith.

Statement 7: What young people need most is strict discipline, rugged determination, and the will to work and fight for justice in the world.

Statement 8: An insult to our honour should always be punished.

Statement 12: People can be divided into two distinct classes: the weak and the strong.

Statement 14: No weakness or difficulty can hold us back if we have enough willpower.

Statement 15: It is best to use a dictatorship in hard times to keep order and prevent chaos.

Statement 16: Most people don't realise how much our lives are controlled by plots hatched in secret places.

CEJSS
2/2013 *Statement 20:* The true God-fearing way of life is disappearing so fast that force may be necessary to preserve it.

These statements uncover a predisposition to a heightened sense of being on the right side of society as well as feeling a connection to an idealised elite. The minimum possible score was 8 and the maximum possible score was 32. All results have been rounded to the unit.

Table 7:
Summary of
Responses:
Power and
'Toughness.'

	Test Group	Control Group
Min Value	11	11
Mean	19	16
Max Value	27	23

British Muslim students score considerably higher than their non-Muslim counterparts for this characteristic; their mean is 19, compared to 16 for the control group. However, they both have the same minimum value of 11. Finally, a 4-point difference in their maximum value places the test group significantly higher in terms of adherence to values of strength.

Destructiveness and Cynicism

Through five statements, Razzaque's 1EV Scale defines destructiveness and cynicism as 'a generalised hostility and vilification of all things human.'¹³

Statement 17: Human nature being what it is, there will always be war and conflict.

Statement 25: Man on his own is a helpless and miserable creature.

Statement 26: Unfortunately, a good many people with whom I have discussed important social and moral problems don't really understand what's going on.

Statement 27: Most people just don't know what's good for them.

Statement 31: There is good in everyone.

These statements show that the respondent generally does not have a high esteem of his fellow humans and thus is more likely to approve the imposition of behaviours and actions onto them (usually through the medium of an idealised moral figure as identified previously through the propensity to authoritarian submission). The minimum possible score was 5 and the maximum possible score was 20. All results have been rounded to the unit.

	Test Group	Control Group
Min Value	9	7
Mean	13	11
Max Value	17	16

Table 8:
Summary of
Responses:
Destructiveness and
Cynicism.

This table displays once again higher numerical values for the test group; two points separate the minimum value and the mean while as only one point separates the two maximum values. It is interesting to note that both minimum values are quite distant from the minimum possible score for this question.

Projectivity

Projectivity, or ‘the disposition to believe that wild and dangerous things go on in the world’¹⁴ has five statements to assess its impact:

Statement 11: Nowadays, more and more people are prying into matters that should remain personal and private.

Statement 13: Wars and social troubles may someday be ended by an earthquake or flood that will destroy the whole world.

Statement 16: Most people don’t realise how much our lives are controlled by plots hatched in secret places.

Statement 18: Nowadays, when so many different kinds of people move around and mix together so much, a person has to protect himself especially carefully against catching an infection or disease from them.

Statement 19: The wild sex life of the old Greeks and Romans was tame compared to some of the goings-on in this country, even in places where people might least expect it.

These statements not only embody the impact of unconscious thoughts on a respondent’s ability to comprehend the world around him, but they also show the void that flawed ideologies can fill with esoteric explanations. The minimum possible score was 5 and the maximum possible score was 20. All results have been rounded to the unit.

Table 9:
Summary of
Responses:
Projectivity

	Test Group	Control Group
Min Value	8	8
Mean	13	11
Max Value	19	15

Although both the test group and the control group have the same minimum value of 8 and their respective means follow the pattern seen in a majority of previous tables (usually a difference of two points for British Muslim students), this time the maximum value of the test group is significantly higher with a four-point increase and almost reaches the maximum possible score for this statement.

Sex

The IEV Scale’s sex cluster helps us identify the respondents that have an ‘exaggerated concern with sexual “goings-on”¹⁵ through only two statements, although these could be refined:

Statement 9: Sex crimes, such as rape and attacks on children, deserve more than mere imprisonment; such criminals ought to be publicly whipped, or worse.

Statement 19: The wild sex life of the old Greeks and Romans was tame compared to some of the goings-on in this country, even in places where people might least expect it.

These statements are very useful, especially if coupled with other clusters, in understanding a respondent’s approach to his own sexuality through the vision he makes of the social order around him. The minimum possible score was 2 and the maximum possible score was 8. All results have been rounded to the unit.

	Test Group	Control Group
Min Value	2	2
Mean	5	4
Max Value	8	7

Table 10:
Summary of
Responses:
Sex.

This cluster is particularly revealing because it is only the second time that a maximum value matches the maximum possible score and once again it emanates from the test group. The Appendix 4 can also tell us that more than one respondent scored an 8 for this statement.

Generalised Rigidity

As one of the all-encompassing clusters, generalised rigidity informs us on the 'dogmatic thinking'¹⁶ of the person and as such is comprised of fifteen statements from the 1EV Scale:

Statement 21: If people in one's own group are always disagreeing among themselves, that is probably a rather healthy sign.

Statement 22: No one has a "mission in life" that he must accomplish no matter what.

Statement 23: It is necessary to be on guard against certain ideas, depending on where they originate from.

Statement 24: Truth is so elusive that no one can say when he has it.

Statement 25: Man on his own is a helpless and miserable creature.

Statement 26: Unfortunately, a good many people with whom I have discussed important social and moral problems don't really understand what's going on.

Statement 27: Most people just don't know what's good for them.

Statement 28: To compromise with our political opponents is dangerous because it usually leads to the betrayal of our own side.

Statement 29: It is annoying to listen to a speaker or teacher who seems unable to make up his mind about what he really believes.

Statement 30: For most questions there is only one right answer once a person is able to get all the facts.

Statement 31: There is good in everyone.

Statement 32: There is something to be appreciated in all forms of art.

Statement 33: I usually try to keep a fairly open mind on most issues.

Statement 34: It is possible that there are many versions to the ‘truth’.

Statement 35: People cannot be expected to stick to the same opinions month after month.

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These statements epitomise some of the respondents’ major characteristics, especially with regards to their general way of accepting the society around them and their approach to the uneven shifts in one’s social interactions. The minimum possible score was 15 and the maximum possible score was 60. All results have been rounded to the unit.

Table 11:
Summary of
Responses:
Generalised
Rigidity.

	Test Group	Control Group
Min Value	24	22
Mean	34	29
Max Value	45	37

This is again a clear example of the higher levels of generalised rigidity that can be witnessed in the test group of British Muslim students. All three values are higher than the ones from the control group; the mean is 5 points higher, the maximum value is a staggering 8 points greater and even the minimum value starts at 24 compared to 22 for British non-Muslim students.

Total Score

Gained from the responses to all 35 questions, the total score enables us to start with the most significant of results, namely the overall ‘vulnerability to extremism’¹⁷ that the Ideological Extremism Vulnerability Scale is intended to highlight.

Together, these statements help us identify which respondents are the most at risk of succumbing to the lure of an extreme ideology given their already vulnerable mind set, and see where they situate themselves in a group. The minimum possible score was 35 and the maximum possible score was 140. All results have been rounded to the unit.

Table 12:
Summary of
Responses:
Extremism.

	Test Group	Control Group
Min Value	64	87
Mean	83	114
Max Value	113	140

The above table regarding total scores is particularly striking due to the fact that the control group scores much higher than the test group in all the values. British non-Muslim students seem to be far more vulnerable to extremism as attested by their mean of 114 compared to 83 for British Muslim students. These values are interesting because they go against the grain compared to the previous ten cluster results and they also seem to suggest a difference in mind-sets between the control group and the test group that is above average and where the gaps between scores are much higher than what has been previously witnessed in selected clusters.

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Islamism

A result of the eight additional questions included in the questionnaire that was given to both groups, the Islamism cluster focuses on the scores of the following eight embedded statements:

Statement 1: Islam should guide an individual's personal life but should also serve as a basis for political and social structures.

Statement 2: The most appropriate source of judicial ruling amongst Muslim communities is the Sharia.

Statement 3: The Islamic world has never been so unstructured and is in dire need of a political movement that will unite it and lead it to its resurgence.

Statement 4: Islamic governance is a better model than democracy and takes into consideration everyone's needs.

Statement 5: British foreign policy applies double standards and is harsher with Muslims than with non-Muslims.

Statement 6: Not all Muslims have the same ability to understand the larger issues facing the Islamic community and it is crucial for a small group of enlightened individuals to lead the way.

Statement 7: Females who wear the veil have a better understanding of the role of women in a community.

Statement 8: Men and women have different characteristics and it is normal to think of ways to address issues concerning them differently.

Together, these statements are intended as strong examples of an individual's sharing of the basic guidelines common to Islamist groups and can thus give us an idea of how far an individual is in his assimila-

tion of this ideology. For example, Statement 4 is intended as a measure of a respondent's trust in the virtues of the Caliphate and Statement 6 shows a person's belief in an elite group of people (or vanguard) as leaders of a new Muslim world. The minimum possible score was 8 and the maximum possible score was 32. All results have been rounded to the unit.

Table 13:
Summary of
Responses:
Islamism.

	Test Group	Control Group
Min Value	12	10
Mean	20	15
Max Value	28	22


As expected, the test group comprised of British Muslim students scored significantly higher than the British non-Muslim students of the control group (a mean of 20 compared to a mean of 15). This is normal given that their faith puts them more at risk of being convinced by those who believe in the political component of Islam. It is nevertheless very interesting to note that some participants have scored high on the Islamism scale even though they are not Muslims; this could mean that some of the core ideas of Islamism are shared by individuals of other faiths.

Regression and Analysis Results

With the available data, a number of statistical tests were possible. Correlation showed that the two variables of interest; someone's general extremism and their penchant for Islamism-may have a relationship. However, correlation does not mean causation and a linear regression was therefore needed for further analysis. Correlation is the degree to which two variables vary together. If an increase in one variable also matches an increase in another variable, then they are positively correlated and vice versa.

Correlation

* p. 117 From the above* scatter plots and correlation outputs of both the test group and the control group, we can see that the two variables analysed - a respondent's level of extremist mind set (coded 'extreme') and a respondent's sympathy with Islamist beliefs (coded 'islamism')



- are indeed correlated. This can be witnessed thanks to the fact that the scatter plots in Figure A and Figure B enable a regression line to pass at average distance of all the points. Furthermore, the correlation between someone's level of extremism and his level of Islamism is positive and, given that the results are both higher than 0.60, it is a strong correlation. This tells us that the more someone is extreme, the more likely he is to espouse radical Islamist views. The figures are logically higher for the test group made of British Muslim students but it is interesting to see that overall, the more non-Muslim students of the control group are extreme, the more they are also sympathetic to Islamist views. However, correlation does not imply causation, though it brings us closer to inferring it. Applying regression techniques will account for variation in the data.

Regression lets us look at the effect of one variable on another whilst controlling or holding for the effects of another. It does not only help us with variance but it also enables us to predict a relationship and its likelihood of being present in the wider population. Linear regression minimises the sums of squares between variables to fit a line which can predict the outcome of a dependent variable, based on a number of independent variables. Figures C and D are bivariate regressions that do not control for other variables while as Figures E, F and G includes dummy variables. Initially, separate basic regressions for the test group and for the control group were used to regress the "extreme" score onto the "Islamism" score in order to see how a respondent's personality affects their level of Islamist beliefs.

Regression

* p. 119 The two tables above* show us that a 1 unit increase in extremism leads to a corresponding 0.15 unit increase in Islamism (Figure C) and a 1 unit increase in extremism leads to a corresponding 0.14 unit increase in Islamism (Figure D). Comparing results in Figure C and Figure D, we can see that in both cases the higher the extreme score, the higher the Islamism score. Both are significant at the 0.1% level but the fit of these models is not suitable for inference because of the low R-squared values of 0.47 (Figure C) and 0.44 (Figure D). Once again, the results are somewhat unsurprising for the test group but it is interesting to see similarities with the control group, even though its respondents are not Muslims. This shows a causal link between vulnerable person-

Figure C:
Regression
Results for
British Muslim
Students

reg islamism extreme					Number of obs =	21
Source	SS	df	MS	F(1, 19)	=	16.96
Model	239.128332	1	239.128332	Prob > F	=	0.0006
Residual	267.824049	19	14.0960026	R-squared	=	0.4717
Total	506.952381	20	25.347619	Adj R-squared	=	0.4439
				Root MSE	=	3.7545

islamism	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
extreme	-.1534232	.0372498	4.12	0.001	-.0754586 - .2313879
_cons	-.4720865	4.94627	-0.10	0.925	-10.82475 9.880576

Figure D:
Regression
Results
for British
Non-Muslim
Students

reg islamism extreme					Number of obs =	21
Source	SS	df	MS	F(1, 19)	=	15.17
Model	112.193495	1	112.193495	Prob > F	=	0.0010
Residual	140.473172	19	7.39332482	R-squared	=	0.4440
Total	252.666667	20	12.6333333	Adj R-squared	=	0.4148
				Root MSE	=	2.7191

islamism	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
extreme	-.135554	.0347975	3.90	0.001	-.0627219 - .208386
_cons	-.8187597	4.019241	-0.20	0.841	-9.231127 7.593608

alities and consideration for extreme Islamist beliefs.

There may be other variables which could be included to improve the fit. Neither of the previous regressions holds for a respondent's faith. By using a dummy variable that codes a respondent 1 if they are Muslim and 0 if they are not, we will be able to refine our models.

p. 121 Figure E shows that for a 1 unit increase in extremism there is a corresponding 0.15 unit increase in Islamism, controlling for the Muslim variable. Additionally, there is a 2.5 unit increase on the Islamism score if a respondent is Muslim, which makes sense given that being an Islamist is a combination of being Muslim and holding extreme views. This time we can see that there is a significant causal link between the "extreme" score and "Islamist" score given the t-value of 5.77, the fact that $[p > |t|] < 0.000$ and an R-squared value of 0.59.

For this reason I do not accept H_0 , I can reject the null hypothesis and consider the alternative hypothesis H_1 to be true. There is strong evidence of a link between a person's extreme mind set and his Islamist affinities; more thoroughly, there is a causal link between vulnerable personalities and Islamist views.

As this research has now shown that causal links can be inferred between extremist personalities and Islamism through the use of regression, it can be useful to delve deeper into our possibilities by attempting to use different variables in the same model. For example, we can control for the respondents' subject of studies to find out whether those reading sciences are more at risk of being convinced by Islamists. It might be the case that a scientific mind-set has an incidence on various attitudes.

p. 121 Figure F tells us that there are no causal links between whether a respondent studies science and his level of belief in Islamism. With $t=1.23$, the "science" variable is not significant.

Even though it has been said that Islamism attracts those who attempt to interpret sacred scriptures in a similar way as scientific textbooks,¹⁸ the above table does not give us scientific proof for that claim.

Given our data, another possibility would be to look at specific personality clusters gathered from the Ideological Extremism Vulnerability Scale and see if useful inferences can be made. The cluster pertaining to power and "toughness," where the respondent is exceedingly preoccupied with the dominance-submission dichotomy can be an interesting place to start with its relation to Islamism.¹⁹

* Figure G,

p. 122 Here* we see a positive causal link which is strongly significant

Figure E:
Total Regression Results
Including
Dummy for
Religion

```
reg islamism extreme muslim
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs =
Model	607.62789	2	303.813945	42
Residual	409.514967	39	10.5003838	F(2, 39) = 28.93
Total	1017.14286	41	24.8083624	Prob > F = 0.0000
				R-squared = 0.5974
				Adj R-squared = 0.5767
				ROOT MSE = 3.2404

```
islamism
```

	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
extreme	.1467151	.0254085	5.77	0.000	-.0953216 .1981086
muslim	2.500143	1.086459	2.30	0.027	.3025722 4.697714
_cons	-2.093784	2.987508	-0.70	0.488	-8.136588 3.949021

Figure F:
Total Regression Results
Including
Dummy for
Science

```
. reg islamism extreme science
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs =
Model	569.284681	2	284.642341	42
Residual	447.858176	39	11.483543	F(2, 39) = 24.79
Total	1017.14286	41	24.8083624	Prob > F = 0.0000
				R-squared = 0.5597
				Adj R-squared = 0.5371
				ROOT MSE = 3.3887

```
islamism
```

	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
extreme	.1593753	.0258323	6.17	0.000	-.1071245 .211626
science	1.379489	1.125181	1.23	0.228	-.8964046 3.65382
_cons	-2.954156	3.095419	-0.95	0.346	-9.215233 3.306921

Figure G: Total Regression Results for Power and Islamism

```
. reg islamicism power.and.toughness muslim
```

Source	SS	df	MS
Model	614.282881	2	307.14144
Residual	402.859976	39	10.329743
Total	1017.14286	41	24.8083624

islamicism	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
power.and.toughness	.7324216	.1246288	5.88	0.000	-.4803361 .9845071
muslim	2.824871	1.05586	2.68	0.011	-.6891912 4.96055
_cons	2.808412	2.136213	1.31	0.196	-3.512487 7.129312

Number of obs =	42
F(2, 39) =	29.73
Prob > F =	0.0000
R-squared =	0.6039
Adj R-squared =	0.5836
ROOT MSE =	3.214

with $t=5.88$ and $p=0.000$. Therefore for a 1 unit increase in power and toughness there is a corresponding 0.73 unit increase in Islamism, controlling for the Muslim variable. Future studies might attempt to regress all the variables as well as look at other specific clusters.

Naeem Meer

Evaluation and Conclusion

In terms of validity, it is possible to say that this research is, more or less, valid although there are some important caveats. Not every expert in the field believes in the crucial importance of the role of psychology in tackling Islamism and this can be witnessed by the minor exposure that Razzaque's book has had in the five years that have followed its publication. Face validity is therefore not strong. The hypothesis is indeed based in theory, thus there is construct validity; a second test might nevertheless have different results. The measure is valid in content as it covers the full range of meanings that the concept can have because the way to look at personalities is to ask respondents their attitudes regarding a wide range of issues. With regards to reliability, external reliability is stronger than internal reliability because time is not as much a relevant factor in collecting responses while as slightly changing the questionnaire might lead to different responses. Given its scope and its unprecedented nature, this study naturally encounters difficulties and limitations that need to be addressed.

First, a deeper dwelling into the literature could help us unearth relevant research that could have not been thoroughly reviewed and thus strengthen our initial assessment. The scarcity of the writings was indeed a severe hindrance. Instead of twenty-one respondents, which is not an adequate enough size for such a project, an ideal sample would have comprised at least one hundred twenty individuals, both in the test group and in the control group. Even though the overwhelming majority of British Muslims are Sunnis, it would have been important to find out about their denomination in order to potentially uncover additional differences in their responses. The survey also lacked inclusiveness by restricting the demographic to men. Even though it would be useful to incorporate young women in future surveys, it is somewhat more interesting to focus on male respondents given their predominance and visibility in extremist outfits. Age could also have been an interesting factor to look at and an analysis of different age brackets might have shown variances in the levels of extremism. A dichot-

omous (yes or no) response to the question regarding family members living abroad could have similarly informed us about a possible impact on a student's personality traits.

Time constraints and the limited pool of respondents did not enable the questionnaire to be tested beforehand. With more than 50 questions, the survey was not very parsimonious but shortening it would have compromised the data and prevented us from looking at all ten personality clusters in the IEV Scale. By asking specific questions related to Islamism that might have brought a particular issue to a respondent's attention (in this case the true aim of the research project), the study was at risk of indulging in saliency bias. Whether or not this had an impact on the responses given was not examined enough; however, this concern was partially tackled by embedding the specific questions at random throughout the IEV Scale statements. Regarding consistency bias, it was not an issue for the thirty-five IEV Scale points given that these were intended as purposefully vague. The problem could indeed have arisen for the Islamism statements if the person responding believed it was best to appear as an ideologically average person and therefore less extreme. Finally, the fact that the Muslim respondents came in part from a non-probability sample as mentioned in the methodology section, gives rise to the importance for any future researcher to find respondents from a large pool and ideally from a variety of sources.

This study is particularly useful because it can be geared towards a variety of religions and ideologies. Future researchers who focus on Jewish extremism or Christian fanaticism might find this study to be a solid starting point. Yet the possibilities for expansion do not stop at academia: the corporate sphere and other institutions could equally be interested in applying the findings of this research to their own dynamics. A company director or a human resources manager might find it useful to know more about an employee's personality in order to assess his or her effectiveness in a team setting or the appropriateness of delegating specific tasks.

In conclusion, we have seen that the academic area dealing with alternative responses to Islamism is particularly weak and lacks a diversity of expertise. The role of psychology has yet to gain a substantive foothold and the gap in the literature needs to be filled urgently if policymakers wish to tackle the issue effectively. By collecting data from two groups of British students at University College London, a Muslim

test group and a non-Muslim control group, this study was able for the first time to scientifically highlight the causal link between vulnerable personalities and Islamist beliefs. Not only does this breakthrough validate the importance of the role of psychology in understanding extremism, but it also empowers the British government to adopt novel ways of structuring its policies in order to challenge the pervasiveness of Islamism amongst Muslim communities in the United Kingdom.

Naeem Meer

**Beginning of
the Article**

Notes

- 1 Russell Razzaque (2008), *Human Being to Human Bomb: Inside the Mind of a Terrorist*, Cambridge: Icon, p. 197.
- 2 See, for instance, M. S. Ainsworth (1979), 'Infant-Mother Attachment, *American Psychologist*, 34:10, pp. 932-937. See also: Razzaque, (2008), p. 79-80.
- 3 Razzaque, (2008), p. 81.
- 4 Alexander Mitscherlich, (1969), *Society without the Father*, London: Tavistock Publications, pp. 84-85.
- 5 See: U. Hasan (2012), *The Balance of Islam in Challenging Extremism*, London: Quilliam.
- 6 Razzaque, (2008), p. 199.
- 7 Razzaque, (2008), p. 202.
- 8 Ibid, p. 202.
- 9 Ibid, p. 203.
- 10 Ibid, p. 203.
- 11 Ibid, p. 203.
- 12 Ibid, p. 203.
- 13 Ibid, p. 203.
- 14 Ibid, p. 203.
- 15 Ibid, p. 203.
- 16 Ibid, p. 203.
- 17 Ibid, p. 202.
- 18 See : E. Husain (2007), *The Islamist: Why I joined Radical Islam in Britain, What I saw Inside and Why I Left*, London: Penguin.
- 19 Razzaque (2008), p. 203.

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Dissident Irish Republicanism

Metropolitan
University
Prague

REVIEW BY SERGEI KARTASHEV

For those that are neither involved in international relations nor living in the UK or Ireland, the phenomenon of Irish republicanism, manifested in political violence, is something that ended in peace agreements and is beyond the current sources of terrorist threats. Scant news concerning Irish republican movements tend to be connected with the on-going political process and infrequent marches-cum-demonstrations. Compared to the period of “Troubles,” the activities of this movement have significantly decreased. There are, however, people for whom peace agreements and ceasefire are unacceptable. These people have the same objective as their predecessors: to end “British rule” in Northern Ireland. As for the means of achieving this objective they reject everything except violence. Thus the question of the “end of history,” in terms of Irish republicanism, is still open.

The purpose of P. M. Currie and Max Taylor’s work – which consists of papers ‘that have their origins in a workshop held in the University of St Andrews in the Centre for the Study of terrorism and Political Violence (СТРПВ)’ – is ‘to explore what the rise of dissident activity is and what it might mean for both Ireland and UK.’ The book is divided into eight chapters; each written by a different author and describes specific aspects of Dissident Irish Republicanism such as: the nature of dissident Irish republicans, reasons for joining dissident movement, challenges that are connected with them, process of radicalisation of the movement and its propaganda, and Ulster Loyalist responses to this movement. This book represents several interviews with former and current participants of events and process related to these issues.

This provides an excellent opportunity for the reader to gain important insights about the personal understanding of the situation from the perspective of those directly involved in this complicated and controversial process.

The relationship between those who agreed with the St Andrews and Good Friday agreements and those who 'see themselves as the true inheritors of the republican tradition' is one of them most important aspects discussed in this book. The difference of their understanding of the process that occurs in Ireland at the moment, and the role of both categories, is sometimes overwhelming.

One of the main questions is 'who are dissident Irish republicans?' Horgan and Gill, in the second chapter, provide information about this question by the introduction of the Violent Dissident Republican Project (VDRP). In this chapter unique statistical information about organisational affiliations of dissident republicans, their current statuses, geographical distributions, age and other aspects are found. Speaking about the nature of dissidents, Currie concludes that they are: unstable, fractured and small in number.

The next question is 'why people become dissident Irish republicans?' There is no clear answer for this question. One of the main reasons is, of course, the rejection of the agreements between Republicans and British representatives. For this category the members of the movement that accepted these treaties are considered traitors 'who have forsworn the aspiration of a United Ireland.' Morrison, in his chapter, provides a solid analysis of aspects that have an influence on the decision to participate in the dissident republican movement through the prism of political organisational theory. From his vantage, timing, context, influential individuals, regionalism and age are major variables.

The research connected to violence in this work retains a singular, core purpose; to discern possible ways to stop it. Although forming some perspectives that will also lead to the creation of a new dissident movement, there are some circumstances that help activists move away from the violent resistance methods. At the same time the support of the dissident movement is growing. That means that the further escalation of violence is only a question of time. The collective group of authors provide several practical and theoretical approaches (accompanied with the of other countries' experience in counter-terrorism policies) that may be usefully applied to prevent this from unfolding.

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Regarding the audience for whom this book can be both useful and interesting, it should be noted that the historical backgrounds that are represented in the majority of articles give the opportunity to understand the situation for any reader even if they have little exposure to the question of Irish republicanism. The variety of perspectives that can be found in this book makes it one of the most complete works related to the theme of dissident Irish republicanism.

Review
Beginning

Killer Robots

Legality and Ethicality of Autonomous Weapons

REVIEW BY DANIEL PALÁT

The militaries of developed states are on the cusp of witnessing the second Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), with the wide-scale introduction of automated and autonomous systems and weapons. These will be based on a wide range of technologies, including IT, biotechnology, robotics, AI and nanotechnologies. The development of these kinds of weapons was pioneered by the Nazis and Japanese during WWII, although their autonomous systems were not effective; they remained part of the totalitarian dreamscape. During the following decades, this area of military research experienced gradual improvements, but it has still largely been limited by computer speeds. At present, with the ever-evolving computer technologies, the second RMA is about to commence. Autonomous weapons are militarily desirable and it is a matter of time before they become fully available. On the other hand, few can adequately anticipate the manner in which autonomous weapons will evolve. Enter Krishnan who assesses the upcoming revolution in *Killer Robots: Legality and Ethicality of Autonomous Weapons*. While the work provides a very detailed description of many future systems, the author does not focus on the technological aspect alone, instead, Krishnan analyses the entire problematic as a phenomena which affects the international community as a whole.

The book is divided into six chapters, excluding the introduction, in which Krishnan provides the reader with a general description of what

autonomous weapons (AWS) are, and what enables their development. The following part, called 'The Rise of Military Robotics,' provides a historical context for the rise AWS, including the aforementioned Nazi and Japanese experiments. The next chapter, 'Weapons Autonomy and AI,' focuses on the question of artificial intelligence and possible problems that armies deploying highly intelligent AWS could face. Further questions regarding the use of AWS, in combination with lowered levels of human command, are discussed in the third chapter, 'The Robotics Revolution of Warfare.' These concerns lead Krishnan to think about international regulations for AWS which are described in a chapter called 'The Legality of Autonomous Weapons.' The introduction of artificial intelligence represents several social dangers, which are further developed in the chapters 'Ethical Considerations' and 'Dangerous Futures and Arms Control.' The book provides a complete analysis of current and future situations regarding AWS, and poses serious questions which require urgent addressing.

The standpoint – from which Krishnan commences – is based on the perspective of postmodern societies' attitudes towards the sacrifice of lives during wars. As respect for human freedom and dignity rose, it seemed natural that the willingness to allow high soldier casualties declines. The armies are facing a situation, which pushes them to figure out how to perform desired operations and to wage war with a lower number of people involved. This led to the introduction of new weapons, such as nuclear weapons and new types of military strategies and tactics, which work with smaller and more efficient troops of soldiers. This need to make armies more efficient also sprung the development of AWS. Although Krishnan talks about nuclear weapons as the main subject of the first RMA, he makes a sharp distinction between them and AWS, because, as he claims, AWS can lower the level of human sacrifice in actual battle, contrary to the huge and fatal destruction abilities of nuclear weapons. AWS can be truly revolutionary weapons because, if used properly, they could save human lives. Also, there is a significant role of military expenses that Krishnan points out—autonomous weapon does not need salaries; they could fight with a precision unattainable for human soldiers, and they feel no pain and experience no fear. As a consequence, when AWS would be deployed on a large scale instead of human soldiers, the whole defense budgets of states could be substantially lowered. Therefore, AWS are militarily desirable and as mentioned above, it is only a matter of time, when they become

available.

The author then focuses on technological aspects of the topic; pointing out that the development of AI started a few decades before. In 1980, several companies in the US launched government-supported AI research, but those projects were not as successful as the involved scientists hoped. The main obstacle was insufficient computer speeds. However, throughout the three intervening decades, computers reached speeds that cannot be compared to the levels available in the 1980s. Krishnan argues that according to scientists' assumptions, robot on human on higher level of intelligence could be available no later than by 2030. Once armies buy (or will be offered) such technology, they will face serious dilemmas. In these terms, Krishnan focuses on the clash between traditionalists and revolutionaries in US Army headquarters. Accordingly, there is a significant ambivalence of army commanders to let a machine make decisions and act independently. However, Krishnan assumes that the voice of society is going to be stronger and will out-shift the resistance of traditionalists.

Krishnan then moves his thoughts towards a more philosophical field as he attempts to outline the possible need to regulate the use of AWS by international law and describes probable ethical impacts of AI proliferation across the whole society (this means also commercial and home-serving autonomous devices). This includes pressing social issues, such as robots taking jobs from people, or robot rights. When speaking in terms of law regulation of AWS, Krishnan justifies this need by serious threats that AWS represent. He expands these theories in the last chapter, where he poses scenarios of possible dangerous futures, including full-scale nano-wars and swarms of killer-machines that could turn against their creators. Krishnan warns that it is probable, that political leaders will not fully understand the impact and power of AWS, such as they did not in the fifties, when nuclear weapons were introduced.

The core argument of the book is represented by the uncertain attitude of the author himself. Krishnan talks about tremendous scientific progress, he describes the unbelievable effectiveness of future robots, but he warns of a future that will bring the world new dangers, dilemmas and questions, and that could possibly destroy life on Earth. According to Krishnan, the whole phenomena of AWS needs to be implemented into international law norms and the technology scene has to be supervised; otherwise machines could get out of control and per-

form in undesirable ways. Despite these facts, the author acknowledges that limited use of AWS could lead to more effective and less lethal warfare and in some constellations, it could bring worldwide peace.

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Killer Robots by Krishnan is one of the first publications dedicated to the topic of AWS and therefore, almost naturally, presents some critical arguments and theories. The author uses a very wide range of sources, which vary from scientific and academic studies to military reports. The book does not lack historical evidence, as Krishnan spends a substantial amount of time explaining the roots of AW technologies. One of the most significant characteristics of the work is that the author understands the topic of AWS and AI as a phenomena that is, in the future, likely to change the whole society as we know it.

**Review
Beginning**

Dignity in Adversity

Human Rights in Troubled Times

REVIEW BY SCOTT NICHOLAS ROMANIUK

University of
Aberdeen

The dystopic possibilities for the US motioned by the violent acts of 9/11 were painfully intensified by the immediate aftereffects of Hurricane Katrina less than five years later. In Europe, tensions from the sovereign debt crisis yielded deep fissures in the fabric of the European project and presented unique degradations of their own that have become manifest across the social spectrum. Brazil, China, and India face ruthless challenges in the course of their global integration, while elsewhere around the world the reality of societies worst fears are lived-out daily through the pageants of drought, flooding, criminalisation, prostitution, poverty, hunger, drug abuse, disease, illiteracy, and menacing rates of unemployment. The demands of such phenomena show just how far collective society is from a concrete utopia and that responding to human tragedy of such nature and scale requires a drastic reorientation of action, a deeper awareness of the consequences of lifestyles, and a new willingness to 'speak up and fight' (p. 193).

This book addresses the issues of human dignity amid a backdrop of socio-economic exploitation, the relationship between perceptions of needing economic emancipation before the establishment of human rights, and tending of new and rich vocabularies within the public sphere and processes of democratic iterations (p. 15). As such, the author presents the central argument that, 'much appreciation of developments in contemporary human rights law and cosmopolitan norms misunderstands their jurisgenerative effect' – the capacity of the law to help develop a 'normative universe of meaning' that oftentimes be-

comes detached or outstretches the meaning of the law itself (p. 15). Cosmopolitanism, moral claims and legal entitlements, and the legacy of classical and ideational traditions for the progression of human rights are the essential features of this work. Under the term cosmopolitanism, Benhabib further pursues the themes of unity and diversity of human rights conceptualisations, strife between democracy and communities based upon shared moralities, and competing visions and world divisions of peoples and sovereignty, the nation-state, and crisis and tragedy.

With a brief history of the tensions between perspectives within the realm of cosmopolitanism, connections between Theodore Adorno, Max Horkheimer, and Hannah Arendt are explored to reflect upon views regarding anti-Semitism, genocide, and citizenship within Europe. Although they are strong methodological and normative universalists, each exhibits unique theoretical applications—from political economy and psychoanalysis to ideographic historical narrative and sociology (p. 22). In chapter three, Benhabib encounters Raphael Lemkin's "legal universalism" whereby the Holocaust is used as 'an example rather than the unique problem of that chief crime against humanity – the crime of genocide' (p. 23). Referring to 'international law and human plurality in the shadow of totalitarianism,' parallels between the lives of these two thinkers are brilliantly illuminated. Noting respective experiences, contributions to on-going debates, and their unique formulations of work relating to crimes against humanity and atrocity, Benhabib questions whether there exists a distinction between cultures playing a contributory role to civilization and those that either do not or cannot.

From the tensions resounding among the transformation of the international norm of sovereignty, Benhabib moves to 'another universalism,' considering the 'crisis of Western reason' within the context of Husserlian phenomenology. Questions of universalism and the legacy of Western rationalism as a universal legacy lead to reflections upon the Western way of life as a means of bringing "other peoples and other cultures under the influence of an in-egalitarian global capitalism (p. 59). A reconnoitre of the many dimensions of universalism establishes the basis for rich discussion of moving beyond interventionism and the state of indifference. Sovereignty and the emergence of cosmopolitan "norms" (i.e., new modes of citizenship conceptualisation

in “volatile” times), rights transcending national borders and the idea of international human rights, and “cosmopolitan federalism” are the focus of subsequent chapters. They cover fields of conflicting demand regarding sovereign state equality and a reach for universal principles of human rights, and their relationship with global forces, in addition to legal landscapes across borders, and institutions of national citizenship.

The cases of France, Germany, and Turkey are focused on in the penultimate chapter with the aim of revealing a juxtaposition of modernity and religion, a heightening level of ‘antagonisms around religious and ethno-cultural differences,’ and the rising challenge of religious fundamentalisms toward the separation of politics and religion as a ‘crucial aspect of the modernisation process’ (p. 167). These cases provide ideal milieus for examining a discursive frame of legal reference as all three countries are party to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the European convention on Human Rights. Fighting against what one group in particular referred to as ‘repressive governmentality,’ the achievements illustrated here may be understood ‘in the broader context of civil rights for other groups’ (p. 181). Despite successes shown in these cases, Benhabib holds them to a higher expectation in line with a Habermasian view of achieving an acceptable level of ‘civility in social relations’ even amid the ‘growth of a plurality of cultures and religious world views’ (p. 183).

This book delivers a remarkable contribution to theoretical debates centring on issues of human rights and exposes a field of intriguing connection points between Islam and Western liberal constitutional democracies. With a wide range of principles, norms, and conceptualisations facing one another, this book may easily relate to multiple disciplines, including those of political studies, sociology, legal studies, and international relations. Benhabib has constructed a praiseworthy position from which to build her empirical analysis. She strikes an admirable balance between intellectualising the driving ideas behind the issues as they are practiced and the theoretical dialogue that constitutes an important feature in each chapter. The approach is straightforward and devoid of convolution or legalese. By combining prevalent issues of a complex and often misguided post-9/11 world with classical traditions of the Frankfurt School and a rich blend of influential phi-

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Beginning**

losophers and thinkers, Benhabib offers a fresh perspective on the political transformation of the contemporary period entrenched within a striking vision for a lucid cosmopolitanism.

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Politics in Deeply Divided Societies

REVIEW BY GUY LANCASTER

Arkansas
State
University

The end of the Cold War and the reorganisation of global politics along less dualistic lines did not create deeply divided societies, although it did facilitate the breakup of once stable states into smaller and smaller polities, often along ethnic and/or religious lines, as peoples began to vie anew for their own right of self-determination. This has opened new challenges for national and global governance; challenges necessitating the development of an authoritative introductory survey of the phenomenon for both students and policy makers. Guelke's *Politics in Deeply Divided Societies* is that text.

Guelke opens by delineating the characteristics of deeply divided societies. After all, all societies can be divided upon any number of lines, from class, religion, language, and race/ethnicity to immigrant versus indigenous or urban versus rural divisions, but in deeply divided societies, these cleavages cut across a wide range of issues and inform even ostensibly unrelated matters. Therefore, conflict exists 'along a well-entrenched fault line that is recurrent and endemic and that contains the potential for violence between the segments' (p. 30). The potential for widespread violence signifies a deficiency of legitimacy in the polity, not to mention a lack of consensus on how legitimacy might best be achieved, which leads difficulties in enforcing the law without resorting to the kind of force that further delegitimises the government in the eyes of non-dominant communities. Some governments have addressed persistent divisions by instituting forms of legal segregation or, in more extreme cases, carrying out a regime of ethnic cleansing or genocide, given that 'the attitude that the very existence

of the other community constitutes a threat to one's own is quite commonly to be found in deeply divided societies' (p. 50)—this is the phenomenon that anthropologist Arjun Appadurai has famously dubbed 'the fear of small numbers.'

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Guelke devotes the second half of his book to examining means of ameliorating the divisions within such societies, tackling first issues of integration, assimilation, and multiculturalism before moving on to partition and population transfer. Of course, one of the problems with partition is that it invariably results in yet new minority populations 'created in circumstances in which the boundaries may still be disputed,' thus providing 'potent conditions for the emergence or reinforcement of deeply divided societies' (p. 101). Contrary to the regular American insistence upon simple democracy as a palliative for all ills, Guelke observes that if 'the outcome of elections repeatedly resembles an ethnic census,' the danger of the government being seen an illegitimate remains high (p. 114), thus warranting some form of consociationalism or the establishment of a federation of relatively autonomous regions. Lastly, the author tackles the tricky issue of external intervention, exhibiting case studies in which such produced worthwhile outcomes even as he cautions that 'the possibility that major powers might be responsive to the argument that the world should not stand idly by in the face of a humanitarian emergency has provided encouragement to groups challenging the status quo through violence, including separatists seeking to change the boundaries of the state' (p. 143). In the end, however, simply stopping the violence or negotiating a settlement does not guarantee a genuine peace if the original fault line remains.

Politics in *Deeply Divided Societies* regularly grounds all analysis of the phenomenon with real-world examples from the Balkans, South Africa, Northern Ireland, Palestine/Israel, and post-invasion Iraq, though Guelke occasionally hearkens back to the breakup of empires with World War I or the Civil War-era United States to show that the emergence of such societies, despite a proliferation in the last few decades, is not unique to the last twenty years. The diversity of real-world examples, paired with the variety of solutions which have been practiced throughout history, emphasises an empirical approach to conflict management, one which takes into account the unique conditions faced by the societies in question rather than prescribing a single, rationalist approach for all. Guelke has produced an authoritative guide for recognising the problems face by deeply divided societies while

presenting an array of methods for overcoming these divisions, and *Politics in Deeply Divided Societies* will likely remain a touchstone text for those working in conflict management or peace studies for many years to come.

**Review
Beginning**

Book Reviews

Bernard Stiegler, transl. by Daniel Ross and Suzanne Arnold, *The Decadence of Industrial Democracies: Disbelief and Discredit*, Polity Press, 2011, ISBN: 9780745648101

The Decadence of Industrial Democracies

Disbelief and Discredit

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For many years now, technology enthusiasts have asserted that new technological tools – both analog and digital – have largely played a positive role in advancing progress. In his *Decadence of Industrial Democracies: Disbelief and Discredit*, Bernard Stiegler challenges this view by providing a detailed account of the way in which technical reproduction has historically changed and continues to change our lives in the broader framework of capitalism, by disentangling culture and strangling the process of collective individuation. Originally published in 2004 in French, *The Decadence of Industrial Democracies* has been translated into English in 2011 by Daniel Ross and Suzanne Arnold. It is part of a 3-volume series, with the other two books appearing - in French - in 2006. The first book of the series, *The Decadence of Industrial Democracies: Disbelief and Discredit*, is divided into four parts: (1) *Decadence*, (2) *Belief and Politics*, (3) *The Otium of the People*, and (4) *Wanting to Believe*, which follow the argument of the book and conclude by calling for ‘a new model of industrial development and new cultural practices’ (p. 15).

The volume opens with the critique of the American industrial model - built on consumerism, and based on the control of culture - at the start of the 20th century. According to Stiegler, this represents a turning point as culture became ‘a strategic function of industrial activity’

(p. 4), propagating from the us to Europe and beyond as transmission technologies continued to develop. The new technological tools furthering a digitalisation process helped in spreading the trend across the globe and in creating the contemporary 'information society'. This evolution culminated with the birth of the internet in America, fostering the us-led cooperation between the public and the private sector in promoting consumerism and transforming culture in the very agent of control exercised over the masses. Radio and television, together with newer digital technologies, evolved towards bringing uniformity and standardising consumer behaviour among viewers, thus making Stiegler pessimistically affirm that 'there is no longer any belief in nor possibility of a pursuit of individuation' (p. 96).

The new technological means have also strengthened performative acts, while supporting the idea that public power has become obsolete. In this context, the author warns against creating political decadence performatively by reducing the concept of trust to a mere political calculation in a control society model. Stiegler's main thesis revolves around the idea that the so-called 'grammatology' of new technologies lead to a degradation of culture, as capitalism 'expresses a totalitarian tendency to reduce everything to calculation' (p. 49). The process of 'grammatisation' – a term borrowed from Derrida – represents the system of techniques employed by societies in order to constitute their collective individuation. The latter is done through cultural memory, which can be further elaborated based on its characteristic modes of retention. Stiegler distinguishes between primary, secondary and tertiary modes of retention, linked to three different aspects: the passage of time, memory itself and the externalisation of memory through culture and technology. As consumerism expanded, the process of 'grammatisation' moved away from individuation towards rationalising leisure time activities, thus turning technological tools and culture into means of control.

In the second part of the book, the author calls for a global debate for 'the enormous problems of mental environments that are in disequilibrium and that create disequilibrium' (p. 22). The problems identified stem from a distinction he makes between existence, characterised by otium, and subsistence, deriving from negotium. Otium represents the 'cult of the absoluteness of the singularity of existence' (p.86), whereas negotium is a rationalisation of all layers of existence. In line with the inner logic of negotium, the proliferation of credits to consumers puts

a price on the lifetime existence of the individual. With the continuous push towards commercialising and branding everything, globalisation is not more than 'generalised mimetism' and the world had become 'un-world', as it is no longer capable of individuation.

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However, Stiegler's view is not entirely pessimistic, as he believes there is a solution to dismantle the web of intricacies creating the current situation. He envisions a reformation of capitalism, which could be based on a cultural 'jumpstart' ('sursaut') connected to a collective individuation process. For a future that does not match a negative scenario, Europe must conceive a new industrial model based on alternative modes of existence, as opposed to subsistence only. As Stiegler sees it, the way out of decadence is a jumpstart in the direction of politics that are no longer industrial only, but also cultural.

The book is dense and explores, to a large extent, the main concepts developed by Stiegler in his previous books. This can pose a certain difficulty to the first-time readers of Stiegler. Moreover, his perspective is derived from a Western-centered understanding of the world, with brief inferences that the other parts of the world were following extensively the predominant social model(s) of the US and Europe. The positioning of Western Europe at the core of the book – in a direct comparison with North America only – overlooks the distinct development of the Eastern part of the continent, where the trends of collective individuation went through a series of inner-looking transformations, that have by and large weakened the potential of a Europe-wide individuation.

Globally, the book offers a critical analysis of the way in which decadence has entered industrial societies and continues to erode them internally. While condemning the dominance of consumerism and the instrumental use of technologies for furthering control over societies, Stiegler singles out a possible alternative model based on a redirection of capitalism towards prioritising culture. While this requires a systemic change, it might also depend on the ability of the individual readers of the book to take on the challenge of rediscovering the meaning of otium and finally, of appraising the true value of culture.

Review
Beginning

