VALUES OF THE BELGRADE REGIME

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Abstract: This article evaluates the legacy of Slobodan Milošević whose regime ruled Serbia for more than a decade from the end of the 1980s until 2000. The article briefly examines the main political and social aspects of the Milošević regime and analyzes a value equation by questioning the social values of Serbia in the 1990s. The main argument presented here is that years of Milošević’s rule produced catastrophic consequences for Serbian society that came to champion uncivic, non-democratic, anti-European values that still embody major roadblocks for successful democratic transition of the country.

Keywords: Yugoslavia, Serbia, Milošević regime, value equation, democratic transition, domestic politics

Introduction

The 1980s in Europe was characterised by communism in decline. The fall of the Berlin Wall, and ultimately the collapse of communist regimes through most of Europe – with the exception of Belarus, Moldova and Transneisteria – produced a wave of freedom and hope that reverberated across the recently divided continent. Such was not the case in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). Due to its internal, smouldering tensions, as well as the inability of political elites to accept new dynamics in international arena and to define common interests, the country became a stage for several conflicts, different in length, intensity and the sides involved.

The most prominent political figure of SFRY’s dissolution was Slobodan Milošević, who held the positions of the Serbian Communist Party leader and, afterwards, became the president of the (Socialist) Republic of Serbia. Milošević’s rule was the darkest period in the modern history of Serbia. The country was placed under severe economic sanctions by the international community, destroying the national economy and steeply decreasing living standard. Citizens were sent to wage wars that the country officially did not take part in, usually by forced mobilisation. Serbia lost its historical
allies, and the nation was labelled as an aggressor; an image still prevalent in public opinion and even among many political and academic circles around the world. Criminality bloomed. Overnight – and through criminal activities often whitewashed by patriotism – numerous individuals from the social “sludge” managed to become the elite. The system of cultural and intellectual values completely collapsed.

Thus, the first paradox of the Milošević regime was that instead of ‘protecting the nation and national interest,’ as Milošević’s political discourse often emphasised, Serbia was turned into a pariah state ruled by an authoritarian leader whose years in power continue to be a major stumbling block in the democratisation of Serbia. Everything the regime supported and fought for was eventually lost. Regardless, the Belgrade regime was always quick to proclaim victory out of every defeat in the decade of Milošević’s rule. That leads to another paradox: despite all such victories, the regime won a majority of votes (on the level of the Republic) in every election held during the 1990s. This could be identified as evidence that the values promoted by the regime had their roots within the Serbian public.

This work intends to add to the literature on Serbia, it regional and international role, by providing insights into the Milošević regime, how it came to power, what it sought and actually achieved once secure in its position and how Serbia has had to cope with the series of disasters brought about under Milošević. This work seeks to reveal the depth of responsibility Milošević bears for the current dysfunction of Serbia as it attempts to move beyond the immediate post-Cold War years to assume its proper place as a respected member of the European and international community of states. To achieve such aims, this work proceeds as follows. The first section traces some of the more important political and social aspects of the Milošević regime between 1989 and 2000, the year of his forced departure from office and, in fact, Serbia itself. This part of the work presents and examines the full gauntlet of issues ranging from the breakup of Yugoslavia – and the wars that followed – to domestic stability and economic hardships. The work then turns to evaluating the obstacles, and successes, faced by Serbia after the fall of
Milošević, including the wholesale political transformation of the state. Finally, this work concludes with a brief, but important, evaluation of the next (potential) steps in Serbia’s national rehabilitation.

**Political and Social Aspects of the Milošević Regime, 1989-2000**

At the end of the 1980s, Serbia witnessed a metamorphosis of its political elites. Hard-line communists became hard-line nationalists, atheists became passionate believers, and convinced Yugoslavs became first-class Serbs. As later developments showed, there were precious few real political ideas or sincere national feelings behind this transformation. Everything was possible, allowed and finally enacted on for Milošević to retain power. The most prominent example of this metamorphosis was Milošević himself, and the process started on territory he desperately wanted to protect Serbian interests in, but which was eventually removed from the sovereignty of Serbia by his very signature namely; Kosovo.

Milošević was sent to Kosovo in April 1987, as a high-ranking official of the Communist Party, to reduce tensions between the Albanian majority and the Serbian minority. His rhetoric was appropriate to the function he held at the time, emphasising the protection of ‘brotherhood and unity:’ cornerstones of the Yugoslav communist ideology. However, soon afterwards, Milošević realised that exploiting the Kosovo issue could increase his personal political power. Therefore, he changed rhetoric and presented himself as the protector of Serbia, the Serbian nation, Serbian interests and heritage in Kosovo. Milošević recalled the former glory of the Serbian medieval kingdom(s), themes which entred the political mainstream as a result.

Riding the wave of nationalism, using Kosovo Serbs as a tool and under the mask of the ‘anti-bureaucratic revolution,’ Milošević managed to sap the (rather extensive) powers from both Vojvodina and Kosovo and changed the political leadership in them (as well as in the Socialist Republic of Montenegro), rendering their autonomy symbolic. This was done to gain control over SFRY’s Presidency,
which despite violating the constitution, was supported by a majority of Serbs. This was also a period of intensive – as the Copenhagen School would suggest – securitisation.

According to Hadzic, there have been three waves of securitization in Serbia over the past two decades. The first, and critical, wave occurred in the second half of the 1980s and was ended with the eruption of the wars of Yugoslav succession. The core of this wave was the survival of both Serbs and Serbia. In this respect, Hadzic identified three specific lines of securitisation in Serbia. Firstly, Serbian securitising actors were (permanently) securitising the international community and its most important proponent (the US, NATO, etc). Secondly, partners in SFRY (republics and constitutive nations) were securitised and eventually presented as enemies. Finally, the “intra-Serbian,” line, based on identifying ‘true Serbian patriots’ and ‘traitors,’ was developed. The Serbian population was an appropriate public for this rhetoric; it was widely accepted and soon assumed bizarre proportions.

One prevailing characteristic of this period was the glorification of the past, i.e. Serbian history, stimulated by the anniversary (600 years) of the Battle of Kosovo Polje which was celebrated in 1989. The idea of a united Yugoslavia was presented by nationalists as a conspiracy against the Serbian nation, created specifically for the purpose of weakening Serbia (ironically neglecting that the most prominent initiator of the Yugoslav idea was Serbian King Aleksandar I Karadjordjevic and that a majority of Partisans during WWII were Serbs). Over a very short period of time, the communist legacy was abandoned, “comrades” became “gentlemen,” socialist sacraments and mottos were soon altered or forgotten. The lack of vision and ideas for the future was substituted by a specific return to the past.

Another paradox is therefore evidenced: in May 1989 Milošević became president of Serbia. Although he managed to present himself as defender of the Serbian nation, the fundamentals of his political orientation focused on keeping Yugoslavia intact. In 1992, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), which constituted Serbia and Montenegro, was established. This state existed until 2003, when it was renamed into State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, with more characteristics of a confederation than federation. The situation was indeed paradoxical; Serbs portrayed by the Milošević
regime as “victims” of Yugoslavia (a very common and extensively used interpretation by nationalists) were put in the position of being “protectors” of the very state that they felt “violated” in. During the parliamentary elections in 1992, after the proclamation of the FRY, Milošević’s party won 40.4% of the vote.

The beginning of the wars in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), in which soldiers from Serbia participated without official recognition of the state, brought economic sanctions and international isolation to Serbia/FRY. What followed, abreast impoverishment of the population, was the collapse of social and intellectual values. The state, politics and criminality became entangled and essentially merged into one, while many prominent criminals gained the status of celebrities and appropriate political influence, some even organised their own paramilitary units.6 It was a public secret that those units, supported and equipped by the state, were taking part in wars in Croatia and BiH. Nationalist politicians became prominent public figures, although some of their public speeches were almost beyond sense.

War marks the beginning of the second wave of securitisation in Serbia, a wave that lasts until 2000 with the overthrow of the Milošević regime. As determined by Hadžić, and seen via circumstances in Serbia during the 1990s, the mainstream political and securitising discourse was shaped and conditioned by the pace, scope and results of the wars.7

From the first salvos of combat until 1995, the collapse of the Republic of Serbian Krajina (RSK)8 and the Dayton Peace Agreement for BiH, the main referent object was the survival of Serbs west of the Drina river and their self-proclaimed states which could not have existed neither in economical nor in a military sense without the support of Serbia.9 A majority of Serbs west of the Drina, although many in Serbia as well, believed that Milošević was genuinely interested in protecting them. Thus, considerable trust was lent to Milošević by the Serbian population that lived outside of the Republic of Serbia. Yet, Milošević’s actions do not reflect those of a leader truly intent on defending his people, their prescribed territories and interests. To support this claim it is important to recall that:
1. Serb paramilitaries fought in Croatia and BiH and units of self-declared Serbian states were equipped by the army of the FRY, yet Milošević never publicly stated that the Republic of Serbia was actively engaged in these conflicts, quite the opposite.

2. Initiatives by the leaders of RSK and RS to merge with Serbia/FRY, were all rejected by Milošević.

3. RSK and RS were never officially recognized by FRY.

4. In August 1994 Milošević’s regime imposed sanctions on RS because of political misunderstandings.

5. The army of the FRY was not ordered to react during Operations “Flash” and “Storm” in which the Croatian Army regained control of Serb-dominated territories; these were followed by ethnic cleansing.

Indeed, when Operation Flash commenced, information was presented very late (nearly the 20th minute) in the broadcast of the Serbian Broadcasting Corporation (RTS), the media wing of the government, a point which highlights the level of importance the Belgrade regime attached to RSK. Also, the army of RS – led by Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic – were equally lethargic, despite the long border between RSK and RS, and a history (albeit short) of joint military actions. It is clear that the concepts of “brotherhood” between Serbs and “holiness” of Serbian lands were not honest patriotic beliefs, but largely rhetorical devices for the political gains of Milošević and Karadzic.

At the same time, FRY was suffering from the third most robust hyperinflation in global economic history, with inflation reaching some 5,578,000,000,000,000,000% annually,10 (re: 113% daily.11 During this period, the highest banknote denomination – this was a country where the majority of the population believed they belonged to a ‘heavenly nation’ – was 500,000,000,000 Dinars (five hundred billion dinars). And yet, when FRY went to the polls in parliamentary elections in December 1993 and had the ability of voting Milošević out of office, the results speak for themselves: Milošević’s party won 49.2% of the vote and gained 123 parliamentary mandates.

After 1995, and following the conflict in BiH, securitising discourses were withdrawn from the Serbian issue in Croatia and BiH; RSK had disappeared, except for a minute slice called Eastern Slavo-
nia, Baranja and Western Syrmia which was put under UN protection and eventually reintegrated into Croatia (1998) peacefully. In BiH, RS was confirmed as an entity within the unitary state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Both Croatia and BiH were recognised by Milošević’s regime in their existing borders. Thousands had lost their lives in combat; why, remains a mystery to many observers, though few would – in hindsight – consider it justified. Yet, Milošević was unfazed and in the parliamentary elections of 1997, the Serbian populace again reelected Milošević’s party with some 44% of the vote, or 110 parliamentary seats. “Victory” was still incomplete; an additional “old/new” issue came to dominate the nearly-settled political environment in Serbia namely: Kosovo.

1998 marks the start of asymmetrical violence between the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)\textsuperscript{12} and Serbian security forces. This was the first armed conflict on the territory of FRY in the 1990s, though not the first time the FRY army was fighting for the “Serbian cause.” As tensions rose, so did the international community’s interest in preemptive conflict resolution so as not to repeat the errors it made during the conflict in BiH. Once international interest was peaked however, Milošević – who seemed unable of devising logical solutions to both internal and international problems – roused Serbian nationalism by calling potential international arbitration interference and, in that same spirit, asked for public opinion via referendum, which was held on 23 April 1998. Predictably, the results – some 94.73% of voters – were against the international community finding a solution to the Kosovo crisis.

Milošević was effectively handed a reason – and mocked democratic traditions in the process – for continuing his abrasive approach to Kosovo. The discourse on the very existence of Serbia and the Serbian nation was reactivated, while proponents of the international community, above all NATO, were labelled as existential threats, points reflected in the pervasive anti-Western propaganda in Serbian media, notably state owned television and newspapers.

In March 1999, after the Rambouillet stalemate, the elapsing of the NATO imposed deadline for Serbian troop withdraw from Kosovo and, in fact, intensified violence – mostly directed at civilians – in Kosovo, NATO commenced an air campaign against FRY in a bid to enforce the evacuation of Kosovo.

Instead of offering a public explanation as to why Serbia was
now at war with NATO, with no tangible political or military allies, the regime opted for cheap patriotism: broadcasting patriotic songs, populist speeches and replaying heroic partisan movies. Blunders piled up as, in April 1999, FRY’s Parliament adopted a decision to join the Union of Russia and Belarus without mentioning such a Union was worthless as it was not discussed in Russian or Belarus’s parliaments; it was a thinly veiled propaganda stunt that aimed to show Serbs that they did, in fact have allies. And yet neither Russia nor Belarus supported FRY in any meaningful way during Belgrade’s conflict with NATO.

After 78 days of heavy bombing, Serbian security forces – police, military and paramilitary units – were fully and verifiably withdrawn from Kosovo and the territory placed under UN administration; the polar opposite the referendum was meant to deliver. Again, victory was proclaimed by Milošević. The reality was rather different.

Kosovo, the final chapter of this round of Balkan violence, also proved to be fatal for Milošević’s regime; it had gone too far, had made too many errors, miscalculations and empty-promises. FRY was in economic and social ruin; internationally isolated and domestically paralyzed. Dissatisfaction turned in outrage which was reflected in popular demonstrations the security forces were unwilling to suppress. Milošević’s regime was toppled in October 2000 under the weight of popular anger.

Following slow but steady democratic changes to Serbia, the political discourse was considerably altered. As argued in the next section, Serbian society is still not ready to face issues related to the Milošević era and, moreover, deep divisions in society persist; keeping the country imprisoned by values belonging to Slobodan Milošević’s authoritarian rule. Unfortunately, the consequences of Milošević’s rule are often explained through popular conspiracies against Serbs and observed through the lens of self-victimisation and self-amnesty. Until such attitudes change, Serbian society will not be ready to accept, let alone understand, its past and will remain in doubt over its future.

The Post-Milošević Transition: Considering a “Value Equation”

As suggested above, Milošević’s 13 year rule produced cata-
strophic consequences. Not only did Belgrade venture into wars in ex-Yugoslav republics and finally in its own province of Kosovo, but its international standing was downgraded to a pariah. In a state of economic disrepair and international isolation, Serbia entered a vicious circle in which its political, economic and social capital was gradually eroded in a decade that many Serbian citizens remember as the roaring 1990s. With Milošević’s regime, a type of a competitive authoritarian regime,¹³ that saw delegitimisation of its political opponents and preservation of political power as its ultimate goals, Serbian citizens lived in a society of distorted values. This very distortion of values actually allowed the regime to take Serbia down a road of authoritarian rule and struck a devastating blow against the development of true civic values. As Pantić points out, values play a double role simply for they not only mirror the present, but also reflect the past.¹⁴ In this respect, as Ramet succinctly concluded, ‘values are created, promoted, and reinforced or, alternatively, subverted, mocked and destroyed by any number of agents and mediums.’¹⁵

Values stand at the very foundation of any society and once a values system is reinforced, changed or distorted – and in the case of Serbia one may speak of the predominance of uncivic values – society reacts and may be thrust down a different historical path. This section presents a brief, but dense, line of argumentation on Serbian values in the 1990s. It explains the significance of these for both the period of Milošević’s regime and the post-Milošević transition of Serbia.

To place this line of thinking into a historical perspective, Milošević’s regime was established at the end of the 1980s in an atmosphere of a greatly weakened federal Yugoslavia and his rise to power was associated with increasing problems in the (then) Serbian province of Kosovo where issues of Serbo-Albanian relations assumed markedly nationalist contours. Turning his back on liberal communist discourses, and politicians, including Milošević’s own patron and former President of Serbia, Ivan Stambolić,¹⁶ Milošević succeeded in introducing the masses into Serbian political life and swiftly rose to prominence. Considering that Serbian liberal political culture and its capital were not inconsiderable, but certainly insufficient, it does not wonder that substantial number of citizens actually supported Milošević in his rise to power.¹⁷

Embedded in paternalist traditions – with a tendency towards
a personality cult – with citizens preferring vested political power in the hands of a strong national leader, Serbian political culture remained associated to its authoritarian roots.\textsuperscript{18}

In this context, Milošević's anti-bureaucratic revolution, presented as a strategy to protect Serbian national interests amounted to nothing more than the dismissal of those figures endangering Milošević's position. In other words, it was a power-grab. This is the fundamental reason why Milošević surrounded himself with a clique of political extremists, warlords and shady businessmen, members of the SPS and his wife’s JUL. Indeed, some spectators of Serbian politics have noted that over a decade such clique isolated Serbia in an authoritarian nutshell; with Milošević atop a system that was only partly institutionalised.\textsuperscript{19} This situation has hardly been remedied.

Serbia’s current political situation technically fulfils the formal requirements of a functioning democracy – after Milošević’s ouster – yet the country lacks working liberal values and a functioning political culture; intolerance and disrespect are mainstream traits of political life. Yet these are hardly new and author Jovan Skerlić, wrote over a hundred years ago about similar ills: ‘populism, political bickering of every kind, constant and unexpected shifts in political beliefs and attitudes, and political sell-outs.’\textsuperscript{20} Within such a climate, national triggers are likely to immerse the nation in endless political bouts and such triggers lurk at every (metaphorical) corner. In Serbia, the trigger was Kosovo and innumerable politicians engaged in innumerable debates, all for the sake of the elusive “national interest.” The government and opposition refuse to accept Kosovo’s independence; largely because both sides have built their careers on rejecting Kosovo and it has become nearly impossible – with this generation of leaders – to shift policy. Those refusing to participate in such a hallow discourse, or are ready to criticise majority opinion, are ostracised and portrayed as national enemies. Serbian domestic political life remains immature, similar to what Skerlić described (1906) as a process of ‘channelling [...] institutionalisation of the domestic political arena.’\textsuperscript{21}

Milošević’s Serbia, when nearly all other former-communist states in Europe were experiencing socio-political and economic transformation,\textsuperscript{22} was wasting away in nationalist isolationism. Đurić suggests that Serbia remains trapped in the nationalist discourse
of the past; it has trouble managing its nationalist legacy. In this way, ‘Serbia is not yet a post-conflict society,’ the conflict is ever-present and involves external issues related to territory and internal issues that gravitate around national identity, consciousness and determination. Unresolved historical issues (Serb diasporas, the legacy of WWII, etc.), continues to plague the country, and these go far beyond the personality cult encouraged by Milošević. In other words, Milošević was an accomplished political tactician rather than a nationalist and the rhetoric he deployed found deep resonance in an expecting political community, Serbia. If such feelings of historical pride and violation were not acutely felt throughout Serbian society, Milošević and his clique would have been spitting into the wind instead of leading many millions of people – in Serbia and throughout the region – on the path of extreme narratives and subsequent political violence.

In respect to the values under scrutiny, it is clear that civic culture is underdeveloped which itself is an unfortunate trademark of Serbia today. Assigning blame for such underdevelopment on Milošević, Gordy described the 1990s as the decade of the ‘destruction of alternatives’ where the regime – through destroying alternatives – created a system which championed state-sponsored criminality and the formation of a corrupt elite that actually enjoyed privileges while most Serbian citizens faced grim economic realities. With the country internationally isolated, Milošević’s regime depended on maintaining a sense of claustrophobia in which a number of nationalist and religious values became central features.

As a result, the regime emphasised collective over individual rights, the opposite of modern, liberal democracies.

However, the idea that collective rights trump individual rights may be found in Serbian culture that transcends Milošević. Consider, for instance, those acutely anti-Western circles within the Serbian Orthodox clergy which routinely invoked a particular ethnic exclusivity while identifying the entire Serbian nation as a “community of believers,” assuming that that anyone who places themselves first, and beyond the community, ceases to belong to the community. This may be seen in the many opposition political activists who were castigated for undermining the community simply because of their dissent only to be portrayed as traitors. This was especial prevalent during Milošević’s time in power. The situation
has, however, become more fluid.

Certainly, in the post-Milošević era, Belgrade faced major obstacles surrounding the imposition of modern civic values. Yet, Lazic keenly suggested that liberal civic values have still not been fully accepted and firmly grounded in Serbia.²⁹ It is not that Belgrade has been unable to re-evaluate its values (and national interests) in the thirteen years since Milošević was overthrown, it has been. However, these have been only superficially examined, the nation seems to suffer from a period of either ‘shell-shock’ or collective amnesia. Its failure is in the inability of the state and every actor within it to properly deconstruct “Milošević’s Serbia” without which the post-2000 democratic engines will stall. Unfortunately, the Serbian national question is haunting political transformation and the acceptance of a new value system. Indeed, Belgrade has continued to press on without formal and thus proper ideational foundations rooted in civic values at a time in European history when new opportunities, re: EU accession was made possible; replete with economic and political benefits that far outweigh the costs involved of overcoming Serbia’s turbulent recent and more distant past.

Conclusion

Unless Serbia embraces a more progressive approach – and reflective values for dealing with 20th century challenges it will remain captive to its past, a past with is not a permanent fixture but rather fluid, revised for political gains as they surface. This slow-as-molasses method instead of preventing internal – and international – conflicts – actually fuels them because the state is not able to give its people the one thing that all people demand; hope for the future. Above all, it was the catastrophic rule of Milošević that undermined Serbia. However, the former regime cannot, and should not, be blamed for all the problems Serbia faced over the past decades: anti-modern and anti-liberal nationalist traditions have their roots deep in Serbian history. The only way forward for Serbia requires nothing less than a complete re-evaluation and an attempt to a corpus of ideas and values of a modern, civic state. This certainly is much easier said than done, but must be attempted. Regardless of how cliché the notion of ‘coming to terms with your past’ may sound, for Serbia it is fitting. Only through the exercise of proper
leadership, that needs to start leading rather than misleading the country’s public on the compatibility of international norms and Serbian culture. By accentuating individual over collective rights and democratic rule in a society based on civic values and norms, an example may be set that will reverberate. Only by overcoming its identity crisis can Serbia be free of its past, earning a chance for the European future its citizens deserve.

Notes to Pages
1 See ‘Interview with Slobodan Milošević,’ in the documentary ‘The Death of Yugoslavia: Enter Nationalism,’ The BBC.
2 One member of the Presidency was delegated by each of the republics and provinces. By installation of “his people” in both provinces and Montenegro, Milošević controlled 4 votes in the Presidency. As later developments showed, in some situations it was an issue how to persuade Macedonian or Bosnian members of the Presidency to vote in favour of Milošević. The reduction of power from the provinces occurred in 1988 (Vojvodina) and in 1989 (Kosovo).
5 Ibid, p. 121.
6 The case of Zeljko Raznjatovic ARKAN is indicative; a convicted criminal and former-prisoner in several European countries, he was supported, by the state, to establish a paramilitary unit called the Serb Volunteer Guard. Also, Raznjatovic founded the Party of Serbian Unity and was a member of parliament between 1992 and 1993.
8 RSK was a self-proclaimed Serbian entity within the recognised borders of the Republic of Croatia.
9 These were the Republics of Serbian Krajina (RSK) and of Srpska (RS), within the recognised borders of BiH. RS was officially recognized as one of two entities in BiH by the Dayton Peace Agreement.
11 Ibid.
12 The Kosovo Liberation Army (Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës) was a military organisation of Kosovo Albanians aimed at separating Kosovo from
Serbia/Yugoslavia.


18 Ramet (2011).


21 Ibid.


23 Ibid, p. 404.


25 Ibid.


28 Ibid, p. 245.