Overcoming Obama's ‘Munich Moment'
By Mitchell A. Belfer
History weighs heavy in Central Europe, and many inhabitants of the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Poland define, and compare, themselves according to the political conditions of the WWII and post-WWII periods. The burden of history was seemingly lost on Obama as he rang Fischer - at midnight local time - to announce the end of the US missile defence project (which was meant to be housed by the Czech Republic and Poland) and with it any illusions of how the Czech Republic was seen in Washington. That Obama's announcement came on the 70th anniversary of Nazi Germany's invasion of Poland, marking the beginning of WWII's military campaigns, amounted to piling insult upon injury, and even Biden's ‘damage control,' offering new security assurances for the Czech Republic, cannot turn back the clock on Obama's ‘Munich Moment.'
Obama was not intentionally ignorant; his ignorance stemmed from the ‘yes we can' attitude that led him to the US's highest office; an attitude that seems to dispel the US's sense of history and leads it to question why the rest of the world seems trapped by their own. And trapped the Czechs are, because history is uncannily poised to repeat itself with the great powers neglecting their allies for the sake of larger geopolitical ambitions. Obama's lack of international political sensitivities demonstrates a key, and enduring, problem with US diplomacy; that its historical blindness damages its political capabilities now by undermining the trust of its allies and emboldening its adversaries. In short, the US is facing an acute credibility deficit.
In this latest episode, Obama may chalk-up the US to the growing list of those that have abandoned the Czechs (and Slovaks) to bring ‘peace to our times.' However, Obama's actions, like Chamberlain's before him, have edged the international community closer to, not further away from, the brink.
Obama's ‘Munich Moment' does not, of course, preclude inevitable warfare in Europe in the immediate future (as Chamberlain's had); there are no Hitler(esq) personalities in any EU state (or Russia for that matter) who would attempt to seize on the US's abandonment of the Czech Republic and reach for regional hegemony. However, the US's abandonment of the Czech Republic (and Poland) will reverberate throughout the international community, revealing holes in US commitments and, by extension, prod its existing alliance partners to rethink their security provisions while encouraging the US's (and its allies') adversaries to increase revisionist behaviour.
Since it was (then) Czechoslovakia which bore the brunt of the 1938 Munich Agreement, it is up to the Czech Republic to ensure that its history does not repeat itself. Therefore, the Czech Republic needs to take the initiative, embark on a new foreign policy approach and turn Obama's ‘Munich Moment' into an opportunity for itself and the wider EU.
In light of US abandonment, three options may be available to the Czech Republic: 1) maintaining the status quo, whereby the Czechs continue to be victims of circumstances beyond their control; 2) reformulating their foreign policy and adopting a neutral posture, thereby abandoning its NATO and EU partners on issues related to security; or 3) launching an initiative to assist in constructing new EU mechanisms for dealing with the variety of challenges facing the Union.
Of these, the first option is the least favourable as the Czech Republic needs to realise that despite its relative size and limited international influence it has an inherent right to participate in any and all discussions and decisions related to its vital interests and long-term security. The Czech Republic cannot afford to be a victim of circumstances again, and since the US has clearly demonstrated how little it values Czech partnership, the Czechs must not be complacent and simply weather the brewing storm. Rather, the Czech Republic must attempt to alter how others approach it by changing its approach to international relations altogether.
Neutrality - along the lines of Ireland or Austria - is feasible since the Czech Republic does not physically border on any non-EU states and is therefore well placed to remain on the security ‘sidelines.' However, adopting a neutral posture would work against long-term Czech interests, moral bearings and sensibilities. Most Czechs are ‘outward' looking in that they are deeply interested and concerned about the unfolding events along the EU's borderlands and, owing to their sense of injustice carried out against them in WWII, are very active in promoting key normative additives to international relations such as keeping democratisation atop of its and the EU's international agenda. News of the Czech adoption of neutrality would also likely be received negatively by most other EU members, those attempting to reform the 2nd Pillar and earnestly mould the EU into a responsible international actor, and is therefore not really in the Czech Republic's interest.
This leaves only one truly viable option: for the Czech Republic to spearhead a new initiative for further, and deeper, EU security integration. While critics may suggest that the Czech Republic is an unlikely candidate to bear responsibility for launching and maintaining such an initiative, the Czech Republic has the political capital, a well informed and largely educated public, and the political tools to see such a programme to success. Also, the Czech Republic is not plagued with the same weight of history; having been a persistent victim, it never reached for European hegemony, was not a colonial power within or outside of Europe and has not adopted, on its own free will, any malicious ideologies. Additionally, the Czech Republic has a long history of tolerance and has, long ago, abandoned (any) religion as the basis of its social and political order.
This so-called ‘Czech Initiative' should involve a two-step programme: 1) embarking on ‘aggressive diplomacy' to clearly demonstrate the need for a clearly Czech option in EU foreign affairs; and 2) working to construct a Czech Centre for EU Security Planning, under the auspices of the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
If the Czech Republic were to pioneer such an initiative the dividends would be immediately visible. It would be able to help consolidate EU foreign policy thinking in a single, centralised institution; concentrate EU attention on challenges that are typically perceived as Central and East European by nature (which are actually faced by the entire Union) such as new geopolitical challenges, energy security, and human trafficking, while raising the importance of ‘smaller' EU states and, for the Czech Republic, undoing the political damage caused by Klaus.
This ‘Czech Initiative' could include NATO, or it could eclipse it. That decision would be shouldered by the US. However, it would force the US to consider its allies and if it does not, then at least there would be a reliable contingency plan to ensure that Obama's ‘Munich Moment' does not jeopardise Czech security, but rather, through the course of events, enhance it.
While the 2009 Nobel Committee may disagree, far from the potential ‘peace-maker,' Obama is to world peace what Chamberlain was; a good intentioned person whose good intentions are leading the international community on a road to hell. It is the Czech Republic's responsibility to ensure that this is the road less travelled so that the Czech Republic's and Europe's future need not be its past.
17 November 2009
