The EU’s Eastern Challenge
By David Erkomaishvili
The EU flagship initiative of Eastern Partnership (EP) was officially launched during the program’s inauguration summit in Prague, 07 May 2009. EP is designed specifically for the post-Soviet space states of: Azerbaijan; Armenia; Belarus; Georgia; Moldova; and Ukraine.
Before this initiative, the EU lacked a comprehensive alliance policy towards the post-Soviet space. Although attempts to assist Ukraine to develop into an alternative to Russian power in the post-Soviet space were undertaken several times, they lacked enough substance and ultimately failed to deliver on their goals. For instance, the proposed alliance between Ukraine, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova (GUAM) was stillborn, limited to offering alternative developmental approaches rather than a functional and reliable alliance framework focused on common security-related projects such as: energy transportation techniques, vital resources, regional security integration, and economic security. GUAM was constrained by Russian influence in the energy transportation area (due to Gazprom’s near monopoly on regional pipe-line networks) and offered no significant or credible additives to regional security. This is partly due to its ambiguous purpose at the time of its launch as it was not seen as a collective security organisation, fashioned on NATO, and it did not develop into a functioning military bloc. GUAM’s credibility deficit was most visible in its failure to negotiate settlement for the so-called ‘frozen conflicts’ faced by three of its four members.
Despite previous alliance ‘failures’ the EU has turned a new page on conceptualising its immediate security environment, and recognised a heightened need to further engage the new, and largely fledging, democracies in the post-Soviet space. Hence, the EU has earnestly begun supporting the initiation of and participation in security related programs in the post-Soviet space, so long as these are reflective of the increasingly normative international relations value system the EU prides itself on.
At the same time, the EU is increasingly concerned with its acute dependence on energy supplies located in the post-Soviet space. Therefore, the EU’s approach to security in the post-Soviet space may be interpreted as fulfilling two faucets of its international priorities: to enhance systems of democratic governance and acquire access to new sources of energy (those that fall outside of Russia’s direct control).
This dual priority list is confirmed by leading experts who suggest that the EU’s demand for the hydrocarbon resources will rise until 2050. Hence, while the EU seeks to maintain its more normative political orientation, its dependency on exogenous sources of energy supplies will lure the EU into strategic competition for an energy foot-hold in the post-Soviet space.
Russia and China – the EU competitors – already extended alliances to the post-Soviet space, prioritising: regional security; economic development; and trade liberalization while deliberately neglecting imposing any normative standards on regional political behaviour. For instance, alliances such as: the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and the Eurasian Economic Community (EAEC) are already operationalised and function to achieve broad security and economic goals without requisite changes to domestic political structures.
Alternatively, many regard the EP as an extension of the EU’s legal framework into the post-Soviet space. Compared to others, in order to legitimately invest into the economic and political future of post-Soviet states, the EU requires – as a precursor – a stable legal framework and, at least, the budding of a democratic culture. Because of these self-imposed restraints, the EU is significantly disadvantaged when compared to Russia and China.
Russian Concerns
Disadvantages associated with the EU’s ability to comprehensively ‘penetrate’ the post-Soviet space have not allayed Russian fears however and some believe that the EU’s latest initiative aims to reduce Russian power in what has traditionally been regarded by Moscow as its sphere of influence. However, the official EU position dismisses any accusations regarding attempts to curtail Russia in the post-Soviet space, or develop pro-Western blocs as had been done to the Baltic states (Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia), which are fully integrated into Euro-Atlantic structures (NATO and the EU). Instead the geopolitical ‘target’ of the EU’s EP efforts are other, non-EU, post-Soviet states in Eastern Europe (Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova), as well as South Caucasus states (Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia).
Russia is concerned that the proposed EP framework duplicates Moscow-dominated alliances and initiatives and may result in fragmenting its sphere of influence since the EU has more to offer in long-term developmental projects. This concern is especially acute with regards to Belarus, which is currently in Union with Russia, is an active member of EAEC (which aims at set up of the customs union and zone of free movement of labour, people and capital), and a geostrategic linchpin of the CSTO as it is the only formal Russian (military) ally in Eastern Europe.
Although the EU’s commitments to fundamental values such as human rights, freedom and democracy were expressed in the final declaration adopted in Prague, the extended invitation for Belarus and Moldova to join the EP marks a significant shift in EU thinking regarding these states. Recently, the EU has significantly reduced its critique of many regional authoritarian regimes – to better pursue strategic interests – in the post-Soviet space to gain further advantages and enhance its attractiveness to potential allies.
Russian concerns over the implications of the EP were supported by the EU sponsored meeting of the leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia which produced a joint declaration pledging to resolve the simmering Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Moscow had been the forerunner in resolution efforts of this conflict as the declaration between Azerbaijan, Armenia and Russia (2008) attests. However Russia’s approach to Caucasian problems differs from the EU’s. For Russia, for instance, the issue of Georgia’s territorial problems is no longer on the agenda as it has recognized independence of the break-away republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia while officially the EU considers these territories disputed and seeks to rectify the situation more amicably.
Frozen Conflicts and Duplicating Activities
The main goal of the EP is to accelerate political association and economic integration between the EU and partner countries. Furthermore, the EP aims to forge closer ties between the partners themselves: developing a legislative and regulatory approximation to EU standards; promoting democratic commitments; and economic cooperation. With this purpose the EP does establish a multilateral framework with target-oriented sessions: democracy, good governance and stability, economic integration, energy security, and sufficient contact between peoples – civil society and political/economic elites.
These areas duplicate the activities of GUAM. However, when asked by the CEJISS whether such overlap implies the fazing out of GUAM – taking into account that all GUAM members are now members of the EP and that EU has been supportive of GUAM in the past – (former) Czech Prime Minister and President of the European Council, Mirek Topolanek said that he does not think so; basing his answer on the example of the Visegrad Four, which was not dismantled after its members entered the EU, but rather reformed to play a supportive rather than superfluous role.
I do not think that the Eastern Partnership will replace GUAM
Mirek Topolanek
However, considering that GUAM lacks real multilateral cooperation – only Georgia and Ukraine exhibit firm commitments – this may imply that the EP’s and GUAM’s shared aims of promoting democratic values; stable economic integration; regional and international stability; stepped-up European integration, may result in the disintegration of the latter or the merger of the two to increase their impact. Furthermore, Georgia and Ukraine’s manifestations towards integrating into Euro-Atlantic structures are more bilateral in character. Another indication of the EP’s competitiveness with the regional frameworks is Bulgaria and Romania’s insistence on including a paragraph regarding complementing regional initiatives between the EU and relevant partner countries, in particular the Black Sea Synergy, in the final declaration of. However, the declaration goes on to say that “interaction with other regional initiatives should be considered on a case-by-case basis.”
For better or worse, the EU has now taken a formal step towards consolidating a comprehensive policy approach to the resource rich and geopolitically vital post-Soviet space. Its aims gravitate around its ability to increase its influence in the region, gain access to energy supplies and advance its more normative political orientation. The success of this pilot project will depend on the ability of the EU to its internal disagreements so that it may face a more competitive world with a single-mindedness of purpose and power direction.
07 May 2009
